| Hungary '56
by Andy Anderson,
1964
|
We shall drag
the blood-soaked Hungarian mud on to the carpets of your drawing
rooms. In vain do you take us into your homes - we still remain
homeless. In vain do you dress us in new clothes - we remain in rags. From
now on a hundred thousand question marks confront you. If you wish to
live in the illusion of a false peace, do not heed us. In our streets
there are still cobble-stones from which to build barricades. From our
woods we can still get stout sticks. We still have clear consciences with
which to face the guns. But if you will heed us, listen. And at long
last understand. We not only want to bear witness to the sufferings of the
Hungarian people in their fight for freedom. We want to draw the attention
of all people to the simple truth that freedom can only be achieved
through struggle. Peace is not simply an absence of war. No people have
longed more passionately for peace than we. But it must not be the peace
of quiescence. This involves complicity in oppression. We promise the
world that we shall remain the apostles of freedom. All workers,
socialists, even communists, must at last understand that a bureaucratic
state has nothing to do with socialism.
Nemsetör, 15 January, 1957. |
Contents
Introduction
|
"Socialism is man's positive self-consciousness." K. Marx.
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
(1844). |
At 3.00 a.m. on November 4, 1956, fifteen Russian armoured
divisions comprising 6,000 tanks massed at key points in Hungary to make final
preparations for their second assault on a relatively defenceless people. The
first assault, little more than a week earlier, had been a confused affair.
Moscow pretended not to have been consulted. Hungarians had not been expected to
fight the tanks almost with their bare hands. Russian soldiers had not been
expected to go over to the side of the Hungarian workers in such numbers. This
time, there were to be no mistakes. At 4.00 a.m. the tanks went in.
It took them nearly two weeks to crush the main centres of
armed resistance. One of the greatest proletarian revolutions in history was
drowned in blood. It is bitter irony indeed that those who ordered this massacre
claimed to be the standard bearers of the glorious revolution of October 1917.
Thirty nine years earlier, Russia had for a while been the headquarters of world
revolution. From there the clarion call had gone out to the toiling and
oppressed people of the world to overthrow their masters and to join hands with
the Russian workers in building a new society. Today, however, it is not the
midwives of the Revolution who occupy the Kremlin, it is its undertakers.
After World War II, the Russians succeeded in enforcing their
'socialism' along the banks of the Danube and up to the frontiers of Austria.
They ruled an area extending from the Baltic in the north to the Balkans in the
south. Over a hundred million people of various nationalities had fallen within
the embrace of the new Russian bear. For many years these people had been
bullied, oppressed, manipulated, managed, either by Czarist Russia or one of the
Western States. Under Stalinist rule they fared no better. Their chains were if
anything tightened. To them the word 'socialism' came to mean its very opposite.
In March 1953, Stalin died. In June the workers of East Berlin
rebelled. The revolt, remarkable for the political character of the demands put
forward, was soon quelled by Russian tanks. By 1956, these subject nations were
becoming more and more of a political liability to Russia's rulers. The Russian
bureaucracy recognised the danger: at the 20th Congress Krushchev himself
debunked the Stalin myth and promised to liberalise Stalin's methods. But
Krushchev and his supporters soon found themselves in a dilemma. It is difficult
to continue practising a religion after you have destroyed its god. Although
Russia's rulers attempted to break with some of the worst evils of their past,
they were (and remain) incapable of coping with the root causes of these evils.
The workers of Poznan, in Poland, were the first to demonstrate
what they thought of the 'changed' road to 'socialism'. The Hungarians were
surprised and later elated to see how leniently these rebellious workers - and
even their 'leaders' - were treated. In their turn they rose. They were
victorious. And then they were crushed by the very methods Krushchev had
denounced only a few months earlier. Many throughout the world were shocked at
this butchery. Most of all it shocked those honest workers and intellectuals who
sincerely looked to Russia as the defender of socialism. To them a treasured
ideal, an ideal for which they had fought and suffered for many years,
and for which many of their comrades had died, had proved to be worm-eaten.
The Hungarian Revolution was the most important event in
working class history since October 1917. It marked the end of an era and the
beginning of a new one. It irrevocably destroyed any moral advantage the Kremlin
and those who support it may ever have had. But it was much more than this. It
was a very positive event. From the Hungarian Revolution can be drawn lessons of
the utmost importance for all who wish to bring about the change to a classless
society in Britain or anywhere else in the world.
In 1956 the Hungarian working class inscribed on its banner the
demand for workers' management of production. It insisted that Workers' Councils
should play a dominant role in all realms of social life. It did so in a society
in which the private ownership of the means of production (and the old ruling
class based on it) had been largely eliminated. And it did so in a society in
which political power was held 'on behalf of the working class' by a self-styled
working class party. In putting forward these two demands under these particular
circumstances, the Hungarian workers blazed a trail. In the second half of the
twentieth century their ideas will become the common heritage of all workers, in
all lands.
The Hungarian Revolution was far more than a national uprising
or than an attempt to change one set of rulers for another. It was a social
revolution in the fullest sense of the term. Its object was a fundamental change
in the relations of production, in the relations between ruler and ruled in
factories, pits, and on the land. The elimination of private property in the
means of production had solved none of these problems. The concentration of
political power into the hands of a bureaucratic 'elite' had intensified them a
thousandfold.
By its key demands, by its heroic example, and despite its
temporary eclipse, the Hungarian Revolution upset all previous political
classifications and prognoses. It created new lines of demarcation not only in
the ranks of the working class movement, but in society in general. It exposed
the theoretical void in the traditional 'left'. A mass of old problems have now
become irrelevant. Old discussions are now seen to be meaningless. The time is
up for terminological subtleties, for intellectual tight-rope walking, for
equivocation and for skilful avoidance of facing up to reality. For years to
come all important questions for revolutionaries will boil down to simple
queries: Are you for or against the programme of the Hungarian Revolution? Are
you for or against workers' management of production? Are you for or against the
rule of the Workers' Councils?
Most people have only a very superficial knowledge of these
weeks of October and November 1956. They have less knowledge still of the events
which led up to them. We feel this book may contribute to a better knowledge and
understanding of what really took place.
East-West Agreement
|
"...From the first moment of victory, mistrust must be
directed no longer against the conquered reactionary parties, but against
the workers' previous allies, against the party that wishes to exploit the
common victory for itself alone... The workers must put themselves at the
command not of the State authority but of the revolutionary community
councils which the workers will have managed to get adopted... Arms and
ammunition must not be surrendered on any pretext." K. Marx &
F. Engels. Address to the Central Committee of the Communist League
(1850). |
Prior to 1939, all the powerful capitalist nations, including
Hitler's Germany, were agreed that the USSR was the real villain on the stage of
history. Then the nature of their economies led them into war with one another.
In 1941 Hitler invaded Russia and the western capitalist 'democracies'
contracted a union with the 'villain', with the USSR. But this was no
love-match. It was a marriage of expediency, coloured by the fond hope that
Russia and Germany would mutually annihilate one another. Strategy was planned
towards this end. But this strategy failed. The grandiose dreams of the rulers
of Britain and America of emerging from the war as undisputed masters of the
world did not materialise. They had reckoned without the heroic resistance of
the Russian people against German fascism.
Russia paid a staggering price. The Nazi invaders caused
incalculable damage to buildings and to machinery. In the early months of the
war, when the Red Army was in retreat, a 'scorched earth' policy was carried
out. Millions of Russians gave all they had - their very lives. Yet while the
battles of World War II were still being fought the causes of World War III were
already maturing.
Russia emerged from the war the second most powerful nation in
the world. In throwing back the German army to the borders of the Elbe, it had
acquired half a continent. These were spoils indeed and hardly the outcome
bargained for by the West. Their failure to contain 'the red menace' led to near
panic in their ranks.
Veiled threats were made. Two hundred thousand
people were murdered in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atom bombs. The real purpose
of this crime was to warn Russia's rulers to show them there would be no limit
to the ruthlessness1 of
the Western ruling classes should they feel their interests threatened. But the
Western powers were not strong enough to challenge the situation in Europe
itself. They were in no position to dispute the established fact. Eastern Europe
belonged to the USSR 'by virtue of conquest'.
Formal recognition of the new reality was given at the Yalta
Conference, in February 1945. Those parts of Europe 'liberated' by the Red Army
(the satellite states) would remain in the Russian sphere of influence. Western
Europe and Greece would be left to Stalin's Western 'allies'. Persia was also
recognised as being within the 'Western' sphere. During the war the Red Army had
'liberated' northern Persia. After hostilities ended, it withdrew.
With the defeat of Nazi Germany, the whole of Europe was
seething for revolutionary change. Nothing like it had been felt since 1917. We
shall later see how the Russian leaders maintained 'order' in their own sphere
of influene in the face of this proletarian threat to their Power. In the West,
the communist parties (and in some cases, the social-democratic parties) helped
the ruling classes maintain their kind of order.
In FRANCE, considerable power was in the hands of
Resistance groups. These were dominated by 'communists' and 'socialists'. All
that really stood between the French workers and effective power were a few
shaky bayonets in the hands of British and American soldiers, most of whom only
wanted to go home.
On the instructions of the Communist leaders,
the Resistance groups handed over their arms to the so-called National
Liberation Government headed by General de Gaulle. On January 21, 1945, Maurice
Thorez, General Secretary of the French Communist Party, announced that the
Patriotic Militia had served well against the Nazis. But now, he said, the
situation had changed. "Public security should be assured by a regular police
force. Local Committees of Liberation should not substitute themselves for the
local governments."2 His
statements and actions closely resembled those of General de Gaulle.
The Communist Party was instructed to continue the campaign of
wartime 'unity'. They abandoned the class struggle. They preached the virtues of
production. They denounced workers defending their wages and conditions. "The
strike", they said, "was the weapon of the trusts". On November 17, 1945, they
entered the coalition government formed by General de Gaulle. Thorez was one of
the five Communist leaders in a cabinet of twenty-two members. He was appointed
Minister of State.
The French Communist Party's programme in 1945 can be
summarised as follows: (a) control of the trusts; (b) liberty of conscience,
press and association; (c) the right to work and leisure; (d) social security
for workers to be provided by the state; (e) aid to the peasants through the
syndicates and co-ops. Hardly the programme of a revolutionary party! No
liberal-minded Tory would have had qualms about supporting it.
In ITALY, the Communist leaders propped up the old
ruling class in much the same way. The Communist Party, of which Togliatti was
the General Secretary, had representatives in the governments of Bonomi and of
Marshal Badoglio. They enthusiastically protected the capitalist state against
revolution. The New York Times in a report during September 1944, stated:
"A good many Italian fascists seek refuge in the Communist Party. Communists
take over the party headquarters and institutions of the former regime like the
Balila. etc.. thereby soothing the transition from the old to the new."
Nor were the 'communists' deterred when unable to enter
bourgeois coalition governments. Indeed, they helped them as much as possible by
calling on the masses to support these wartime alliances. Prior to the General
Election of 1945, the British Communist Party declared itself in favour of a
coalition government with 'progressive' Tories, like Eden and Churchill!
In EASTERN EUROPE, as we shall see, the
Communists were able to gain complete control. This they did by appointing
Communist ministers to take charge of the state security forces via the
Ministries of the Interior. But in the West (France, Italy and Belgium) although
the Communists participated in national governments3 the
Ministry of the Interior was never within their grasp. In France, Duclos reached
out for this post. But the bid failed. It did not have the backing of the Red
Army.
Why did these Communist Parties act in this way?
What social interests did they represent? Had they ceased to be true parties of
the working class? The Hungarian events of 1956 were to give clear-cut answers
to these questions. But already the answers were being hinted at. The Communist
leaders knew that if the state machines in Western Europe were to collapse,
social revolution would certainly follow. And without the backing of the Red
Army, the Communists would have been powerless to control the workers.4
While Communists have from time to time proclaimed 'all power to the workers!'
they always added - if only under their breath ' ... under the leadership of the
Communist Party'. 'Under' is the operative word. How far under was demonstrated
in Eastern Europe, from 1944 on. There they did have the Red Army.
Liberation?
"Under Socialism all will govern in turn and will soon become
accustomed to no one governing". V. I. Lenin. The State and
Revolution (1917). |
Some people still believe that the Red Army carried the tide of
social revolution with it as it entered Eastern Europe in 1944. This is quite
untrue. Not only was the real essence of the regimes (social exploitation) left
unchanged, but for a long while even the existing political set-up was kept in
being with only a few superficial changes. Even the same policemen were often
kept on. As far as the masses were concerned all was the same as before. Only
the language spoken by the occupying army had changed.
The reason for the Russian Government's collaboration with the
"class enemy" was, according to Molotov, "to maintain law and order and prevent
the rise of anarchy". Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary provide clear examples of
whose 'law ' and what 'order' was maintained.
(a) RUMANIA
The first Eastern European state to be occupied by the Red Army
was Rumania. The Russian Government immediately announced its intention of
maintaining the status quo.
"The Soviet Government declares that it does not
pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the
existing social order in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry of Soviet
troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation
of resistance by enemy forces."5
The "enemy forces" were not Nazi desperadoes as might be
expected from the statement, but guerilla armies who had been fighting the
Nazis. These guerillas had originally been organized by the Peasant Party of
which the leader was Iuliu Maniu. Maniu became a member of the new government.
When he ordered his guerillas to disband and turn in their arms Moscow Radio
commented: " Maniu's declaration is belated. Even before this order the Red Army
Command had liquidated all bandit groups..."
Under the Nazis these guerillas had been 'brave resistance
fighters'. Under the Kremlin they were 'bandits'. Could their continued
resistance have been spurred on by the composition of the new government?
Molotov's guarantee not to interfere with the
existing social order encouraged King Michael to appoint a reactionary
government. General Sanatescu was made Prime Minister,6 an
office he was to hold for seven months. During this time the workers showed what
they felt. There were many uprisings and revolts against the government. The
Kremlin, with an army of a million men now in the country, then decided that if
Sanatescu could not control the people, he should go.
Vyshinski travelled to Bucharest. Soviet
artillery was posted in front of the royal palace. This was hardly necessary.
His Majesty promptly complied with Russian demands. Sanatescu's ministry was
dissolved and replaced with one headed by Petru Groza.7
Gheorghe Tatarescu became Vice-Premier.
Both Groza and Tatarescu had been members of
pre-war right-wing governments. In 1911 Tatarescu had led the suppression of a
peasant uprising in which 11,000 peasants had been murdered. He was Minister of
State at the time of the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1927. He was world famous as an
exponent of extreme right-wing doctrines. The British Communist Party itself had
called him "the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal
Party",8 the
party which helped King Carol establish his fascist regime under Marshal
Antonescu.
Prime Minister Groza's government was assisted
by two leading members of the Communist Party, comrades Gheorge Gheorghiu Dej
and Lucretiu Patrascanu. They were allotted the respective posts of Minister of
Public Works and Communications and of Minister of Justice. Patrascanu soon made
his 'socialist' position clear: "Industrialists, businessmen, and bankers will
escape punishment as war criminals under a law being drawn up by Lucretiu
Patrascanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist members of the Government.
Rumania could not afford to loose the services of merchants and industrialists.
M. Patrascanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a
more liberal policy towards this class than the French have".9
"Premier Groza said his
government did not intend to apply either collectivisation of the land or
nationalisation of the banks or industries and that the mere question showed
ignorance of its programme".10
Stalin himself advised Groza "to keep the system of private enterprise and
private profit".11
So, factories and enterprises owned by foreign capital were
also allowed to remain intact. Capitalists who had worked hand-in-glove with the
Nazis were permitted to keep their wealth and continue their activities. That
this happened with Groza as Prime Minister is hardly surprising. He was a banker
and owned many factories and a large estate. Before the war he had been a
minister in two right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).
Politically-conscious Rumanian workers did not
expect such a government to represent interests other than those of the big
landowners and financiers. Nor did they wonder why Groza was openly opposed to
measures of social reform and why he staunchly upheld the sanctity of private
property. But that a government carrying out a policy of suppressing workers and
peasants, that had been virtually appointed by Soviet Russia, forced many
Rumanian revolutionaries to think. It forced them to change opinions and ideals
they had held for years. Eventually, even Maniu and his supporters withdrew from
Parliament. But such were the rumblings among the people that even this trivial
demonstration of independence could not be tolerated by the government and its
Communist supporters. Maniu was promptly charged with being 'anti-monarchist
',12 a
'fascist' and an 'enemy of the people'.
Maniu was tried and sentenced to solitary
confinement for life.13
The President of the tribunal was the wartime Director General of prisons and
concentration camps. He owed his appointment to the tribunal to a leading member
of the Communist Party, Patrascanu.
(b) BULGARIA
When the Red Army occupied Bulgaria the
Russian-backed 'Fatherland Front' Government took over. It was headed by Colonel
Khimon Georgiev, Colonel Demain Velchev was Minister of War. Both had been
former leaders of the Military League, a fascist organisation sponsored by
Mussolini.14
Colonel Georgiev had also been the instigator of the fascist
coup of 1934 which had dismissed Parliament, dissolved the unions and declared
them illegal. He had then become Prime Minister and had begun a reign of terror
which, in its ruthless ferocity, surpassed even that of 1923. The Minister of
the Interior of the new 'Fatherland Front' Government was Anton Yugow; a
Communist leader. He controlled the state security forces and was responsible
for maintaining 'order'.
When the Nazi military machine eventually collapsed, the great
majority of the Bulgarian people were naturally overjoyed. Although tired of war
and oppression, their relief did not lead them to inactivity. Revolution - the
opportunity at last to become the masters of their own destiny - now appeared
possible. During the autumn months of 1944, in Sofia and other towns, workers'
militias arrested the fascists and clamped them in gaol. They held mass
demonstrations. They elected full democratic people's tribunals. The police were
disarmed and in many cases disbanded.
The soldiers' feelings were in harmony with
those of the people: "Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western
Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian Army in 1917.
Soldiers' councils have been set up. Officers have been degraded, red flags
hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished."15
This similarity to 1917 was anathema to the Russian and Bugarian 'Communist'
leaders. Backed by the Russian High Command, the Minister of War, Colonel
Velchev, issued a strict order to his troops. "Return immediately to normal
(sic) discipline. Abolish Soldiers' Councils. Hoist no more red flags."
Sincere Bulgarian Communists denounced the
hypocrisy of the Russians. Molotov attempted to quell the ensuing furore: "If
certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason.
Bulgaria will remain with her democratic government and her present order ...
You must retain all valuable army officers from before the coup d'état. You
should reinstate in the service all officers who have been dismissed for various
reasons."16
The sinister ring of these words echoed through
Bulgaria. In 1934, the fascist Colonel Georgiev had attacked the workers. He had
suppressed strikes with loss of life and declared them illegal. In 1945, the
same Colonel Georgiev, now a Communist stooge, attacked striking workers as
'fascists.' "In March 1945 a number of coal miners struck for higher wages. They
were immediately branded as 'anarchists' and 'fascists', and rushed into jail by
the Communist-controlled state militia."17
(c) HUNGARY
In 1918, the feeling in Hungary had been strong for
revolutionary change. These feelings had for a time been peacefully channelled
through the Government of Count Karolyi, who had a reputation for being some
kind of a Socialist. The Karolyi Government made some concessions to the people.
In March 1919, the Allies brought about the fall of the Karolyi Government. They
issued Hungary with an ultimatum concerning the frontier with Czechoslovakia
which Hungarians felt would be 'crippling the cripple'.
Patriotic and revolutionary feelings combined and
Bela Kun's18
Government rode in on the crest of a new revolutionary wave. Communists
dominated the new administration, although it contained a number of Social
Democrats.
In March 1919, the new government proclaimed the Hungarian
Soviet Republic. This was not imposed on the country by a Russian army. There
was no direct contact between Hungary and Russia. Russia had quite enough
to contend with at this time.
Prisoners of war returning from Russia gave accounts, excitedly
and with undisguised admiration, of the Great Revolution, news of which inspired
the people with hope for a new way of life. How badly the Hungarians needed to
cling to such a hope!
Hungary was a predominantly peasant country in - which the
distribution of land was more unjust than in any other part of Europe.
Almost all the land was owned by aristocrats and by the Church. The majority of
the people were landless, unemployed, and close to starvation. To end the feudal
land structure at this time would have been a truly revolutionary act.
Bela Kun's Government lasted a little over four
months. Some argue there was no time for such measures. But not even the promise
was made. Had such steps been taken, Bela Kun's regime might have lasted longer.
It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for successive governments to
take the land away from the peasants again, without facing the prospect of
prolonged civil war. As it was, the Kun regime was overthrown as soon as the
Rumanian Army had occupied Budapest. Bela Kun fled to Russia on August 1,
1919.19
The demise of the Kun Government had been planned at Szeyed by
Admiral Nicholas Horthy and his supporters. Representatives of the Rumanian Army
had been present. A White Terror was let loose on Hungary by Horthy's foreign
assisted counter-revolution. The first fascist regime in Europe was set up. For
the Hungarians, all former horrors were now surpassed. Thousands of Communists
and Socialists were rounded up by fascist gangs, beaten, tortured, killed. The
Trade Unions were violently suppressed. Those merely suspected of socialist
sympathies were tortured and finally murdered. Thousands of people, quite
unconnected with such ideas, suffered persecution and death. So frightful were
the reports of atrocities that even the British (who knew all about atrocities
in India) were moved to send a Parliamentary Commission to Budapest. The
Commission reported that "the worst stories of mutilation, rape, torture and
murder" were proved.
The activities of the Hungarian Communist Party at this time are
referred to by Peter Fryer in his book Hungarian Tragedy: "The tiny
Communist Party carried out its work in deep illegality. It made the kind of
sectarian mistakes that are so easy to make under such conditions, with leaders
in jail and murdered" (p.29). The movement was 'decapitated' and floundered.
This is inevitable under conditions of civil war, whenever revolutionary
movements are obsessed with the cult of leadership. It is a pre-requisite of
success under such conditions, that the leading activities of a movement be
spread as far and wide as possible throughout its membership. No one should be
indispensable. Arrested 'leaders' should always be replaceable by others.
For the Hungarian people the following years under Horthy's
fascist tyranny were full of dread and suffering. Some people have claimed that
Horthy's regime was not truly fascist. But we must remember that fascism in
power may take a variety of forms. Although basically similar, the regimes of
Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar also differed in several particulars.
Perhaps Horthy's regime could best be called 'rule by aristocratic fascists'.
Whatever its name, its sickening bestiality, as far as the ordinary people were
concerned, remains as a scar on the body of humanity.
The Horthy regime took part in World War II on Hitler's side.
However, towards the end of this war a movement developed which sought to detach
Hungary from its alliance with Nazi Germany. Nazi troops then occupied the
country and the terror ruled again. Left-wing militants were ruthlessly hunted
out and exterminated. Some 400,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to agony and
death in Nazi concentration camps.
Despite this long history of misery, the Hungarian people had
not given up their hope of a better life. When in 1944 the Red Army began to
occupy the country the people were well disposed towards it. They sincerely held
Russia to be a friend. They trusted the promise of liberation. Many Russians had
given their lives in bitter battles to drive out the German Nazis. The glorious
ideals of 1917 were not forgotten. So trusting were the few Hungarian Communists
that they helped to organise the dividing up of large estates among the
peasants.
In December 1944, a Hungarian government was
formed at Debrecen in the Russian-occupied area. A shudder went through the
people. The First Minister was the Hungarian Commander-in-Chief General Bela
Miklos de Dolnok. Bela Miklos had been the first Hungarian personally to receive
from Hitler the greatest Nazi honour: Knight Grand Cross of the Iron Cross. Only
a few months earlier, in July 1944, General Bela Miklos had held the highly
trusted job of messenger between the principal organiser of the White Terror,
Admiral Horthy, and the vilest Nazi of them all, Adolf Hitler.20
There were two other generals in the Government: Vörös and
Faragho. General Janos Vörös, Bela Miklos's ex-Chief-of-Staff, became Minister
for Defence. Imre Nagy became the Minster for Agriculture. The rest of the
Government was formed of members of the Communist, Social Democratic, and
Smallholders parties. The Economist described it at the time as "a queer
collection of the local denizens and the parties of the left".
The new government still considered Admiral
Horthy the legitimate ruler of Hungary. The Minister for Defence, General Vörös,
ended his first speech over the Russian radio with the contradictory slogan:
"Long live a free and democratic Hungary, under the leadership of Admiral
Horthy!". The first declaration of the Russian-sponsored government as broadcast
by Moscow radio on December 24, 1944, proclaimed: "The Regent of our country,
Nicholas Horthy, has been seized by the Germans. The mercenaries now in
Budapest2l
are usurpers. The country has been left without leadership at a moment when the
reins of government must be taken in strong hands ... Vital interests of the
nation demand that the armed forces of the Hungarian peoples, together with the
Soviet Union and democratic peoples, should help in the destruction of
Hitlerism. The Provisional Government declares that it regards private property
as the basis of economic life and the social order of the country and will
guarantee its continuity".
General Miklos, Knight Grand Cross of the Iron Cross, had read
the proclamation. It sounds incredible. How could such a man call for "the
destruction of Hitlerism"? To people like Bela Miklos, the privileges, prestige
and power that go with leadership, were the paramount considerations. The nature
of the leadership, its policy, methods and aims, were of secondary consequence.
But how could Soviet Russia put such men into leading positions? The main reason
was given by Miklos himself in the declaration quoted above: "... The country
has been left without leadership ...". In other words a political vacuum
existed. There was a real danger of it being filled by the organisations thrown
up by the industrial and agricultural workers. The workers had taken Communist
propaganda at its face value. They had already begun to act upon it. This was
extremely dangerous for the Soviet leadership and for all those who accepted it.
The only people the Russians could rely on were the remnants of the previous
ruling groups.
Russian beliefs that nobody other than erstwhile managers and
administrators could run the country were not new. The seeds had been sown in
Russia itself, shortly after the October Revolution and long before the Stalin
era. Prior to the Revolution the Bolsheviks had repeatedly advocated workers'
control of production. But as early as the spring of 1918 - and long before the
difficulties imposed by the Civil War - leading Party members were stressing the
advantages of 'one-man management' of industry. They were soon actively
denouncing those within their own Party - and those outside it - who still held
to the view that only collective management could be a genuine basis for
socialist construction.
We cannot here deal with this
extremely important and complex period of working class history, nor with the
extremely tense controversies which this question of management gave rise to.22
There can be little doubt, however, that it is in the events, difficulties, and
conflicts of this period that one should seek the real roots of the degeneration
of the Russian Revolution. Many years later, even the bourgeoisie was to
perceive the significance of what then took place. When The Guardian23
refers to Lenin's writings of March 1918 as "dealing in part with emulating
capitalist organisation of industry within a socialist framework", it is merely
expressing this awareness with its customary mixture of naivete and
sophistication.
The dangers that would flow from such ideas had been clearly
perceived in Russia by a grouping known as the Workers Opposition. As early as
1921, one of its prominent members, Alexandra Kollontai, had written: "Distrust
towards the working class (not in the sphere of politics, but in the sphere of
economic creative abilities) is the whole essence of the theses signed by our
Party leaders. They do not believe that the rough hands of workers, untrained
technically, can mould these economic forms which in the passage of time shall
develop into a harmonious system of Communist production.
"To all of them - Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and
Bukharin - it seems that production is such a 'delicate thing' that it is
impossible to get along without the assistance of 'managers'. First of all, we
shall 'bring up' the workers, 'teach them'. Only when they grow up shall we
remove from them all the teachers of the Supreme Council of National Economy and
let the industrial unions take control over production. It is significant that
all the theses written by the Party leaders coincide on this essential point:
for the present we shall not give the trade unions control over production. For
the present, 'we shall wait'. They all agree that at present the management of
production must be carried on over the workers' heads by means of a bureaucratic
apparatus inherited from the past."24
In the capitalist West, of course, there had
never been any 'nonsense' about the workers controlling and managing production.
When the Western powers 'liberated' parts of Europe in 1945, the Military
Governments set up by the occupying armies ensured that only people with a
particular social background or a particular kind of previous experience were
put or retained in commanding managerial or administrative positions.25 To
the victors it mattered little to what ends - or to whose ends - this experience
had been put in the past. Like spoke to like - and they got on fine! The
mystique of management cut across national boundaries.
As it became obvious that the future rulers of Hungary would be
the Communist Party and its rapidly forming bureaucracy, the place-seeking
elements came flocking in. The Party became the recruiting centre for the future
'leaders ' and managers. (A similar process had occurred in Germany, with the
rise of Hitler's party.) Economic administration and political rule were
concentrated into fewer and fewer hands.
Salami and Reparations
"An intelligent victor will, whenever possible, present his demands
to the vanquished in instalments." A. Hitler, Mein Kampf
(1925). |
In the East European states, the systematic destruction of the
Socialist and Peasant parties began gently. It continued with increased tempo
until, by 1948, they had been virtually liquidated. It was essential that no
means of opposition be open to the people if the tools of the Russian
bureaucracy, the national Communist parties, were to carry out their
programmes.
The people were already beginning to feel that their trust in
Soviet Russia was being betrayed. There is no more bitter and painful
disappointment than that caused when a friend betrays your trust. The Hungarian
Communists knew this. They knew what passions it would arouse. They were only a
minority. Their ruthless determination to hold on to power had to be made
apparent to all.
Their instrument of repression was of course
the police. Complete control of this force was essential. By gaining the key
post of the Ministry of Interior, this was assured them. Through this Ministry
they also controlled the Civil Service. All the key positions were held by their
members. The party of the proletariat, far from destroying the existing state
machine, utilised it and strengthened it to establish its dictatorship over the
proletariat. In later describing their methods. Rakosi said that in those days
the very idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was discussed only in
limited Party circles. "We did not bring (it) before the Party publicly because
even the theoretical discussion of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as an
objective, would have caused alarm among our companions in the coalition. It
would have made more difficult our endeavour to win over ... the majority of the
mass of the workers."26
The winning over of the workers to a revolutionary programme
would have been only too easy. But the Party would have lost control of the
workers in the process. In their fear of this, the Party united with their
bourgeois 'companions in the coalition'.
Rakosi explained how the 'Revolution' had been
made from above and how it had brought the Hungarian Communist Party to power.
He described how, through the Ministry of the Interior, the Party had been able
to 'unmask' the leaders of the Smallholders Party, 'reveal' their crimes and
'remove' them. Rakosi described how the opposition was cut into slices (like a
salami sausage) and discarded. "In those days this was called 'salami tactics'
... We sliced off, bit by bit, reaction in the Smallholders Party ... We
whittled away the strength of the enemy."26
Rakosi also described the fusion of the
Communist Party with the Social Democratic Party as a complete victory for the
Communists and utter defeat for the Social Democrats. (How easy this must have
been, with the Minister of the Interior to reveal the 'crimes' of the Social
Democrats!) He then related how the Communist Party 'captured' the army, police,
and state security forces (i.e. the secret police). This was achieved in "bitter
battle ... the more so because our Party already had a strong foothold in those
organisations ... When in the autumn of 1948, our Party took over the Ministry
of Defence, the vigorous development of the defence forces could start."26
That the absolute control of the secret police
is indispensable to those who wish to suppress the people, was also made quite
clear by Rakosi himself. "There was one position, control of which was claimed
by our Party from the first minute. One position where the Party was not
inclined to consider any distribution of the posts according to the strength of
the parties in the coalition. This was the State Security Authority ... We kept
this organisation in our hands from the first day of its establishment."26
The leaders of the Communist Party knew exactly what they were doing when they
took control of the A.V.O. (Secret Security Police).
The Hungarian secret police used all the latest techniques of
torture and murder known to the Gestapo and N.K.V.D. Soviet occupation troops
had been immediately followed into Hungary by the 'political experts' of the
N.K.V.D., who immediately proceeded to 'reorganise' the security forces. These
were now staffed by a curious mixture of the old vermin of the Horthy regime and
the new scum of the Communist Party. This human garbage occupied a privileged
position in Hungarian society. The national average wage in 1956 was about 1,000
forints a month. The pay of A.V.O. 'rankers ' was 3,000 forints a month.
Officers were paid between 9,000 and 12,000 forints a month. All were
passionately hated by the Hungarian people.
The 'salami tactics' of taking over the State apparatus evoked
criticism from a number of Communist Party members. The 'leadership' dealt with
their critics ... through the police. The Party was directly responsible for the
terror, the murder, the torture and the beatings which were a feature of
Hungarian life under the Rakosi regime.
* *
*
Along with violent political suppression, the workers also
suffered the slower agony of deteriorating economic standards, amounting at
times to starvation. The reparation payments extracted by Russia accounted for
this to no small degree.
The reparations plot was hatched at the Yalta Conference, where
the West had agreed with Stalin to carve up Europe into spheres of influence.
After World War I the Soviet Union had vigorously condemned the reparations
exacted from Germany by the victorious Allies through the Treaty of Versailles.
It continually and correctly emphasised that these extortions placed an
intolerable burden upon the German working class who were not responsible for
the war and for the damage it had caused. At the time, the same opinions had
been clearly and firmly voiced by the various national Communist Parties. During
World War II, as the hopes of a Russian victory grew brighter, this line was
dropped. It looked as if the Russians might be on the receiving end of
reparations. The chameleon ideology of their 'socialism' showed itself. What was
deemed 'robbery' by the capitalist states became 'justice' when the Russians
practised it.
Exact figures as to the quantity of machinery, etc., dismantled
and sent to the U.S.S.R. are not available. One estimate for Hungary puts it at
124 million dollars. Like Hitler's army, the Red Army lived off the country it
occupied. Here again exact figures for these occupation costs are lacking.
However, an addition to the country's population of over a million men must have
used up a great deal of the nation's food produce alone. A rather hypocritical
American note to the Russian Government, dated July 23, 1946, stated that "the
Soviet Forces had, up to June 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of
heat, rye, barley, maize and oats. (The total ore-war annul production of these
grains was a little over 7 million tons.) Of the foodstuffs available for the
urban population in the second half of 1945, the Soviet Army had appropriated
nearly all the meat, one sixth of the wheat and rye, one quarter of the legumes,
nearly three quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of
the milk and dairy products. Extensive requisitioning of food was going on as
late as April 1946." The food shortage during this period was so serious that
each person was getting at the most only 850 calories a day - less than in
Germany or Austria. As one might expect, the increase in the death rate was
alarming.
Another unknown quantity is the amount of material (personal
goods, etc.) which found its way to Russia through looting.
The known list of reparations extracted from Eastern Europe is
staggering enough. We cannot here go into the details for each country. Some
details about Hungary should give a picture of the whole.
The total-reparations demands from Hungary amounted to 300
million dollars. Two-thirds of this went to Russia and the rest was divided
equally between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Industrial goods constituted 83%
of the total. The remaining 17% was agricultural products. Before the war,
industrial products made up only about a quarter of all Hungarian exports. The
British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946,
stated that the combined costs of reparations and of the occupation amounted to
30% of the national income (reparations 18%, occupation 12,°%). A U.S.
representative at the October 1946 session of the Paris Peace Conference had put
these costs at 35 % of the national income.
The scale of these reparations placed an enormous burden on the
Hungarian economy and hence on the producers: the working class. By 1948,
despite the A.V.O. and the Red Army, their resentment might have erupted into
the streets. The danger was reported to the Kremlin. In July 1948 Russia decided
to waive half the reparations still due. On December 15, 1948, the Finance
Minister, Erno Gerö, was able to tell the Hungarian Parliament that, although in
1948, 25.4% of the national expenditure went to pay Russian reparations, only
9.8% of the budget for 1949 would be allocated to this purpose.
Methods of Exploitation and Subjugation
|
"Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are
organized like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army, they are
placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and
sergeants." K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto
(1848). |
(a) TRADE
There were still other ways of exploiting the people. Trade,
for example. The Communist governments of Eastern Europe soon saw that Russian
heavy industry was incapable of providing them with capital goods. They knew
that machinery and raw materials were essential. They were prepared to try and
get these from the West. The Marshall Plan seemed to be an answer to the
problem. At least two of these countries, Czechoslovakia and Poland, made clear
their desire to take part in the Marshall Plan. Even after pressure from Moscow
had compelled them to drop the idea, attempts were still made to get trade with
the West.
Moscow's plans in this period were helped by
Washington. The U.S.A. established an 'iron curtain' to trade between the West
and the countries of Eastern Europe, when she instructed other Western nations
not to exhort 'strategic goods'. The State Department's 'secret list' of
strategic goods covered practically every kind of capital equipment. It included
such items as gramophone recording discs and needles for the textile industry.27 Trade with
the Soviet Union (on Russia's terms) was assured.
To some people, the term 'trade' means 'a mutually agreed
exchange of commodities between countries'. Those in the Kremlin did not accent
this definition. Their idea of trade was based on the old imperialist principle
of buying cheap and selling dear - very, very dear!
The satellite states were regarded as a source
of raw materials and of cheap manufactured goods. Exploitation worked in two
directions. Russia secured the satellites' exports at below world prices. And it
exported to them at above world prices. The Polish-Soviet agreement of August
16, 1945, for the annual export of Polish coal to the U.S.S.R. is a startling
examole. "The robbery of Poland through this transaction alone amounted to over
one hundred million dollars a year. British capitalists never got such a large
annual profit out of their investments in India."28
Shoes manufactured in Czechoslovakia at a cost of 300 crowns a pair were sold to
Russia at 170 crowns a pair. Yet when the Czech government, owing to the severe
drought of 1947, was forced to import large quantities of grain from the
U.S.S.R., it had to pay more than 4 dollars a bushel for it. At the time, the
U.S.A. was selling grain at 2.5 dollars per bushel on the world market.
Bulgaria found no difficulty in selling her tobacco for badly
needed dollars. Yet in 1948, she had to sell nearly all her tobacco crop to the
U.S.S.R. at a very low price. Russia was then able to re-sell the tobacco to
Italy, making a handsome profit - in dollars.
That Russian 'trade' with Hungary was considerable is shown by
the 1948 long-term agreement. This stated that 'trade' was to be trebled in
1949. No details were given. Although Russia supplied cotton, and Hungary
manfactured goods, the quantities involved and their prices were as jealously
guarded as military secrets. One of the main reasons for the secrecy was that
workers in the factories were, to some extent, aware of this exploitation and
strongly resented it.
(b) MIXED COMPANIES
The amount of German capital invested in
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, was considerable. In Rumania, for example, it
equalled over a third of all investments in oil, banking, and industry. In
Hungary, German-owned property was estimated at being worth 1,200 million
dollars. Russia exercised her 'rights' under the Potsdam agreement. All German
investments were confiscated. (The Russians only took over the assets of the
various enterprises. Their liabilities were charged to the state.) This was done
partly by dismantling machinery, partly by taking control of those industries
still operating in Hungary. Jointly controlled companies were set up. These
were, at first, operated in partnership with private capitalists but when these
were later expropriated, the U.S.S.R. held joint control of the companies with
the Hungarian Government.29 No
industry was completely owned by the U.S.S.R.. Russia invested in as many
undertakings as possible, thus gaining a greater grip over the whole economy.
These 'mixed companies' were organized and conducted on capitalist lines. The
only notable difference was that one side of the 'equal' partnership (U.S.S.R.)
was making far greater profits than the other (the satellite State). In some
cases the latter even had to underwrite the losses!
It was not, however, until 1948 that integration of the
Hungarian economy into that of the Soviet Union was seriously begun. This was
achieved through nationalization.
The term 'nationalization', when used by the
leaders of either East or West, has only one meaning: to ensure and consolidate
their own control over the means of distribution, production and exchange.30
In Hungary, some industries had already been nationalized. But
until the nationalization law of March 25, 1948, 25% of heavy industry and 80%
of all other industry was still in private hands. This law laid down that all
firms employing more than 100 people were to be taken over by the State.
It was not until the end of
1949 that nationalization was completed. The Hungarian Communist leaders did not
differ from those of the British Labour Party on the question of whether
nationalization should involve control by the workers themselves. This is shown
by the report that "Easter Monday, 1948, was declared a holiday. While the
workers were not in the factories, State officials came down and took them over.
The next day the workers arrived to find a new master "31
Nationalization by the Labour Government was carried out with rather more
political sophistication. As far as the workers were concerned, the net result
was much the same.32
(d) COLLECTIVIZATION
Another method of exploiting the population was the Russian
type of collectivization. While in other states of Eastern Europe this was begun
at an early stage, in Hungary, the Government remained, for a long time, shy at
making the attempt. After some manoeuvring, it eventually began slowly to
'collectivize' agriculture.
By November 1949, some 7% of the arable land was in the hands
of cooperative or state farms. The diffidence of the Hungarian rulers was due
mainly to their fear of open opposition from the agricultural workers. The
reason, in the jargon of the government, was that faster collectivization might
strengthen 'Titoist tendencies'.
In the process of completing nationalization, what few rights
the workers had enjoyed under private ownership were whittled away. Strikes, as
before, were of course illegal. Complete control of the factory was placed in
the hands of a single manager. Minister Erno Gerö, in his June 1950 report to
the Central Committee of the Party, put it like this: "a factory ... can have
only one manager who in his own person is responsible for everything that
happens in the factory". The screw subjecting the workers to the will of
management had been given the final turn. Hungary was a fully qualified
satellite of the U.S.S.R.
The destruction of the gains
which the Russian workers had for a short while secured in 1917 had taken rather
longer. True, the Party campaign for 'one man management' of production - and
against workers' management - had begun as early as the spring of 1918. It met
with considerable resistance. For the first few years industries were run by the
so-called Troika, i.e. the workers' committee, the Party cell and the manager.
By 1924 even this had become a farce. By 1929 the Party's Central Committee felt
ready to pass a resolution that workers' factory committees "may not intervene
directly in the running of the plant or endeavour in any way to replace plant
management. They shall, by all means possible, help to secure one-man control,
increased production, and plant development, and thereby improve the material
conditions of the working class."33
The ghost of the erstwhile Troika was not officially buried until 1937. The
official presiding at this particular ceremony was Stalin's right-hand man,
Zhdanov. Speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee he said: "...the Troika
is something quite impermissible ... the Troika is a sort of administrative
board, but our economic administration is conducted along totally different
lines."34
In the 'workers' states' of Eastern Europe, the people were not
even allowed to go through these limited and distorted forms of economic
self-administration. The Troika system was never introduced.
Given the complete political and economic integration with the
Soviet Union, nothing seemed now to stand in the way of total exploitation.
Nothing?
Resistance Grows
|
"Piece-wage is the form of wages most in harmony with
the capitalist mode of production ... it served as a lever for lengthening
the working day and the lowering of wages." K. Marx, Capital
(1867). "It has been the iron principle of the National Socialist
leadership not to permit any rise in the hourly wage rates but to raise
income solely by an increase in performance." A. Hitler, speaking
at the Party Congress of Honour. "Piece-work is a revolutionary
system that eliminates inertia and makes the labourer hustle. Under the
capitalist system loafing and laziness are fostered. But now, everyone has
a chance to work harder and earn more." Scanteia [Rumanian
Communist daily]. January 13, 1949. |
The 'chance to work harder' - through piece-work - was
introduced into Hungary on an unprecedented scale. Piece-work appeals to the
baser instincts of man. This is apparent in our own society. Piece-work is much
praised by those who rule us. For the managers of the people, here or abroad, it
is an important means of controlling, manipulating, and dominating the workers.
Piece-work helps break up their natural tendency to unite and cooperate. It is a
valuable weapon in the hands of those who wish to demoralize and atomize the
working class.
The whole piece-work system depends upon basic wages being kept
at a low level. In Poland, for example, because of the extent of piece-work,
basic wages almost disappeared. The system was bolstered by the Russian-style
Stakhanovites. These were the piece-workers, par excellence. The type exists in
British factories and they are usually disliked. The workers in Eastern Europe
were quite hostile to them. The Stakhanovites themselves continually complained
of this hostility. The official party organs deplored it as an "attack on
Stakhanovites by politically immature workers". In fact, the 9th congress of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party called for measures against these workers "who run
down the work of the Stakhanovites and who even try to put a spoke in their
wheel."
In Hungary, not only the workers, but even some Party members,
were trying to put a spoke in the wheel of the whole piece-work system. In a
speech on November 27, 1948, Rakosi referred to this and to various 'go-slow'
movements among the workers when he said: "... the factory directors are
capitulating to the lazy workers. The production quotas are too low". But
although the 'lazy workers' were being continually threatened, they did not mend
their ways. In June, 1950, Erno Gerö, in his report to the Party's Central
Committee, declared: "wage and norm swindling have spread among the masses. They
can be attributed, to a great degree, to the underground work of
right-wing social-democratic elements and their allies, the clerical
reactionaries. That such an unsavoury situation in the field of norms could
arise is partly because, in many cases, the economic leaders of the factories,
Party functionaries and trade union members, are among those who slacken the
norms ... In more than one case they go so far as to protect and support the
wage swindlers". Having virtually stated that Party members were in league with
'right-wing Social Democrats', Gerö arranged for a big increase in the basic
norm.
Conditions in the factories worsened. On
January 9, 1950, the Hungarian Government issued a decree prohibiting workers
from leaving their place of work without permission. Penalties for disobeying
were severe.35
Increasing alienation and exploitation in any
country in the world are invariably met by increasing resistance. Sabotage
becomes widespread. This is one of the economic facts of life. It is well known
to all industrial sociologists and is openly discussed by those of them who are
not directly in the pay of the giant corporations.36
That Hungarian workers were resisting
became even clearer through the utterances of their 'leaders'. Speaking at
Debrecen on December 6, 1948, the Hungarian Minister of Industry, Istvan
Kossa,37
said: "The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude towards the directors of
the nationalized industries". He added that if they didn't change their
attitude, a spell of forced labour might help. Workers who didn't seem to be in
love with their work were often denounced by the leaders as 'capitalist
agents'.
Despite police terror, workers found several
ways of resisting. The two most important were absenteeism and turning out work
of poor quality. On August 31, 1949, Rakosi stated that production had fallen
"by 10-15% in the last few months". He also claimed that the number of days lost
due to workers going sick was 2 to 3 times higher than before the war.38
The Times (September 5, 1949) carried a report from its Budapest
correspondent on the Conference of the Communist Party of Greater Budapest (an
area comprising over 60% of Hungary's industry): "The Conference report says
that productivity is stagnant in most industries and declining in some. Between
February and July, it fell throughout the manufacturing industry by 17% ... Far
too many workers were applying for sick relief - in a recent week, in one
factory: 11%. In another : 12%. Instances are given of self-inflicted
wounds."
Referring to the decline in the quality of the goods produced,
Rakosi also stated (August 31, 1949) that "waste in the Manfred Weiss iron
foundry (Hungary's second largest factory) had risen from 10.4% to 23.5%."
On paper many workers still remained in the Party. Well, what
would you do? To leave would have meant the risk of being dubbed a 'fascist
spy'. There was plenty of evidence of this. It made the incentive to stay in
particularly attractive. Some proof of the crisis of conscience Party members
were going through was shown by Jozsef Revai - the Party theoretician. In
October 1948, he complained that Szabad Nep, the Party daily of
which he was editor, was read by only 12% of Party members.
* * *
Meanwhile a few leading members of the Communist parties of
Eastern Europe had become audacious. They had begun to think for themselves.
Their thoughts were subversive of the established order. Party purges became
popular.
Between 1948 and 1950, the Communist parties expelled: in
Czechoslovakia over 250,000 members; in Bulgaria 92,500 - about a fifth of the
membership; in Rumania 192,000 - over a fifth of the membership. In Hungary,
483,000 Party members were expelled.
This was the period of the big Tito-Stalin explosion. The
'fallout' contaminated Communist parties throughout the world. The sickness was,
of course, most prevalent in Eastern Europe, where hunting Titoists became a
fashionable sport for the various leaderships. Large numbers of people were
arrested and thrown into prison. Show trials were held. Thousands of erstwhile
'good Stalinists' were found guilty on clearly trumped-up charges. Many hundreds
were executed. Among the leaders themselves, Slansky and Clementis in
Czechoslovakia. Koci Xoxi in Albania, Kostov in Bulgaria, and Rajk in Hungary,
all paid the supreme penalty. One of Kostov's most 'serious' crimes was revealed
by the Prosecution in dead-pan-comedian style. Kostov was charged with having
been a friend of Bela Kun who, it had been 'proved', was a 'Trotskyist
fascist.'
The most truly frightening thing was Rajk's 'confession'. He
was arrested in May, 1949, and his trial began on September 16, Rajk pleaded
guilty to all the Prosecution's charges and to a number of others besides. That
he could not possibly have been guilty of these charges, must have been quite
obvious to those who knew him. Rajk and the others were sacrificed to bolster up
the tottering authority of the Party leadership. These 'victorious' Stalinists
intended the trials to be shocking and frightening examples of their
ruthlessness. They were. Through these judicial murders, Stalin, as chief
spokesman for the bureaucracy, was saying to all: "Think twice before you
question our infallibility." In Eastern Europe at this time, people might well
have thought that Orwell's prophesy had been brought forward by several decades.
But here again resistance was growing.
|
"... a stratum of the old state that had not cropped
out but been upheaved to the surface of the new state by an earthquake;
without faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those
above, trembling before those below, egoistic towards both sides and
conscious of its egoism, revolutionary in relation to the conservatives
and conservative in relation to the revolutionists ..." K. Marx,
The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-Revolution (1850).
|
On March 6, 1953, the Kremlin bluntly announced that Stalin had
died after a short illness. Workers in Eastern Europe felt the time had now come
to end the oppression his regime had imposed on them. They did not wait long.
Early in June, workers in Plzen began a mass demonstration.
Plzen is one of Czechoslovakia's largest industrial centres.
The great 'Skoda' arms factory is situated there. The demonstration, which was
quite spontaneous, began as a protest against currency changes. But as it
spread, political demands were made: greater participation in factory
management, an end to piece-work, the resignation of the Government and free
elections. By the time the demonstration had developed to the verge of a revolt
(uniformed soldiers had joined in and large crowds had occupied the Town Hall),
troops arrived from Prague and the rising was swiftly quelled. Further
spontaneous risings in other parts of Czechoslovakia and in other satellite
countries, were quickly crushed without reaching the world's headlines. Two
weeks later, on June 17, 1953, the workers of East Berlin rebelled.
The revolt started with "a
demonstration of building workers on the Stalin Allee.39
Downing tools, they marched to the city centre to present their demands. ...
Transport workers left their trams and lorries to join the demonstration.
Factory workers rushed from their benches, students from the colleges,
housewives from their homes and shopping, even schoolboys from their lessons ...
Soon, the revolt spread throughout Eastern Germany."40
The workers of East Berlin were not subdued until after they
had waged bloody battles with Russian tanks. For several days, this revolt drew
world wide attention, not only because it involved workers whose demands were
political as well as economic, but also because of Russia's direct and violent
intervention. This intervention exposed the weakness of the Ulbricht regime.
After the Berlin uprising, the Kremlin adopted a 'new
course'. Many reasons dictated this change of policy. The men in Moscow
were certainly frightened by the Berlin events. Their lackeys in the capitals of
Eastern Europe were shuddering as they felt the angry breath of the masses down
their backs. They were all for 'changing course', but they knew that the Russian
bureaucracy could grant them no major degree of autonomy, for it feared they
might attempt to go the Tito way. The last thing Moscow wanted at this stage was
to be seen using the tanks and bayonets of the Red Army to crush revolution
throughout Eastern Europe.
* * *
A slight relaxation occurred in the U.S.S.R. itself. It was
immediately reflected in the satellite countries.
In Hungary, early in July 1953, Malenkov himself 'advised'
Rakosi to move into the background for a while. Imre Nagy, who had been Minister
for Agriculture in the 1944 Government, Minister of the Interior in 1946, and
had somehow survived the various purges, became Prime Minister. His first speech
outlined the new programme.
In this first speech, Nagy criticised the revised plan of 1951
as too heavy a burden on the country. Greater consideration was to be given to
light industry and to consumer goods. More material aid was to be given to
collective and state farms, and also to individual peasant owners. A collective
farm could be dissolved on a majority vote of its members. The special police
tribunals were to be abolished. These were only concessions. But it is
noteworthy that they were the most radical of all those made by the satellite
leaderships during this period.
During the four months that followed Nagy's speech, a number of
collective farms were dissolved - 10% according to a speech that Rakosi (who
remained Party Secretary) made to a plenary session of the Party's Central
Committee on October 31, 1953. Rakosi also reported that some local officials
were obstructing peasants who wished to leave the collectives. In a few cases,
force had had to be used. Rakosi, who showed no real enthusiasm for the
concessions, stressed that it was a Party decision that must be carried out by
members. The Party, whether torturing and killing people or just throwing them a
few crumbs, is always right.
The 'new course' was applied throughout 1954. The 'relaxation'
was even noticeable to foreign visitors. In conversation, people were more ready
openly to criticise the Government. Many political prisoners were released.
There can be no doubt that Hungarians were breathing a little more freely.
When a smothered people begin to see daylight, when they get
the first whiff of fresh air, they tend to press strongly forwards. Their first
ideas are to enlarge the holes, their second to tear down the whole throttling
structure. This creates insoluble dilemmas for all ruling minorities - dilemmas
felt the more acutely the more totalitarian their regimes.
* * *
All major decisions about Hungary were taken in Moscow. After
Malenkov had 'resigned' and Krushchev had taken over, the Hungarians again
sensed change in the air.
In real terms, Nagy's concessions had been small enough. But he
was moving too quickly for the Kremlin. On April 18, 1955, the National Assembly
decided, by a 'unanimous' vote, to relieve Nagy of his post. The Hungarians
tensed when Rakosi was brought back to the centre of things. The feeble lights
dimmed. The tragedy again reverted to macabre farce.
The long
statement issued by the Central Committee showed some signs of the Party's
discomfort. It accused Nagy of hindering the development of heavy industry and
of collective farms, and of "using the Government machine as an instrument of
repression against the Party." That Nagy was not immediately 'liquidated'
reveals the uneasiness and indecision felt in the Kremlin about Hungary.
'Reconciliation' negotiations were proceeding between Tito and Krushchev.41
Nagy was not called a 'Titoist' or a 'Fascist' when he was later expelled from
the Party. He was simply labelled - "an incorrigible, right-wing,
deviationist".42 To
be called a 'deviationist' by Rakosi would stand a worse 'Stalinist'43
than Nagy in good stead with the Hungarian people.
Most of the concessions granted over the twenty
months of Nagy's rule were now subjected to 'salami tactics': they were slowly
whittled away. The Secret Police, who for a while had remained discreetly in the
background, now felt they could safely justify their high pay once again.
Measures for the rapid development of collectivization were introduced. Pressure
on workers for increased output was stepped up... to help fulfil Moscow's Five
Year Plan44 -
a plan in which the Hungarian workers, incidentally, had never been consulted in
any way.
In the Kremlin. the new leadership felt fairly secure. They had
coped with the immediate repercussions of Stalin's death. The Plan seemed to be
working. Leaders in the satellite countries boasted of increased outputs for
1955. In Hungary, industrial production was claimed to have increased by 8.2%
over the figures for 1954. The methods used to extract this from reluctant
workers hardly bear thinking of. The people had endured misery up till 1953 -
yet had shown they could resist. The relative clemency of the Nagy regime
followed by the abrupt putting back of the clock to 1953 provoked a working
class resistance greater than ever. Even harsher measures were needed to
'discipline' the masses.
But as far as the Kremlin was concerned, things seemed
definitely on the mend. Khrushchev and his colleagues felt they had everything
under control. This was an important consideration in their momentous decision
to reveal that after all Stalin had not been God.
|
"The working class could not be the leading and most
progressive section of the nation if reactionary forces were able to find
support in its ranks. 'Agents provocateurs' or reactionaries have never
been the inspiration of the working class; they are not and they never
will be." Gomulka, Polish Facts and Figures (November, 1,
1956). |
At the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, held in
February 1956, Krushchev's 'revelations' about Stalin caused a political
earthquake. The foundations of every Communist party in the world were shaken.
It will be decades before they are repaired - if ever they are. Were the
'revelations' a 'tactical mistake'? Had the Russian bureaucrats not realized
that, by de-godding God, the faithful might begin to question the whole theology
proclaimed by his disciples?
Did Krushchev know of the ferment growing in Poland and Hungary
even before the 20th Congress? Did he know that this was affecting the Polish
Communist party itself? Did he understand its potential danger both to his own
regime and to those of his satellites?
In Poland on the morning of June 28, 1956, the workers at the
Zispo locomotive factory in Poznan struck. They walked out onto the streets.
This was not done on impulse. Many weeks earlier a committee had been elected.
It had presented the management with a list of demands. Some were predictable.
They wanted pay increases, lower prices and lower piece-work norms. The
management was startled, however, when these 'common workers' criticised the way
the factory was being run and demanded a different organization of work in the
various shops. To question managerial infallibility in deciding what the workers
were to do, and then to demand reorganization of shop floor production, struck
at the very roots of the system. The managers did not go up through the roof.
They did what their Western counterparts would have done: they adopted delaying
tactics and called them 'negotiations'. These dragged on, without result. The
workers eventually saw through them. In their thousands they took to the
streets.
As the news spread, workers assembled in other plants. They
voted to join the movement. The political character of the demonstrations then
became apparent. Posters carried in the processions demanded such things as
"Freedom and Bread!", "Out with the Russians!" and "End Piecework!"
Other people, taking their lead from the workers, joined in. As
far as Poznan was concerned, the demonstrations soon showed the features of a
full-scale uprising. Russian tanks and troops surrounded the city, but did not
move in. The Government brought in Polish tanks whose crews did as they were
told. Workers' blood flowed in the streets. After two days, the revolt was
crushed. The Zispo factory management had their 'right' to manage inscribed in
blood. There were 'sympathetic' strikes in several other towns, but they were
quickly isolated by the police and did not reach similar proportions.
Shocked and confused, the Polish bureaucracy blamed the
uprising on 'provocateurs ', on 'secret agents employed by the United States and
Western Germany'. But on July 18, at a meeting of the Party's Central Committee,
Edward Ochab, the First Secretary, said: "... it is necessary to look first of
all for the social roots of these incidents (in Poznan) which have become, for
the whole of our Party, a warning signal testifying to the existence of serious
disturbance in the relations between the Party and various sections of the
working class."
Ochab went on to explain that about 75% of the Poznan workers
had suffered from a fall in wages, while the piecework norms had increased. By
giving only economic reasons for the uprising, Ochab was seeking to play down
its important political aspects. His statement, nevertheless, appeared to
reflect a more positive attitude to the workers' demands. It no doubt prevented
further immediate uprisings in a nation still seething with discontent.
After Poznan, the demand for change increased. The badly shaken
leadership tried to evolve a new policy - a 'Polish road to socialism'. Some
anti-Stalinists were given posts in the Party. Gomulka, excommunicated and
imprisoned in 1951, and under house arrest since 1954, was brought back into
communion with the Party. He was issued a brand new membership card.
The attitude of the Polish leaders differed
from that of the Communist hierarchy in the rest of Eastern Europe.45
This worried the men in the Kremlin. So, while the Polish Communist Party's
Central Committee was still in session, reviewing the Poznan events, the
Russians sent their Premier, Marshal Bulganin, to Warsaw. He came to enforce
the Russian line that Poznan was the work of "Western agents and
provocateurs". The Central Committee showed him they would not stand for outside
interference. As soon as Bulganin arrived, the Central Committee meeting was
suspended. After the formalities, it was politely suggested to Bulganin that he
make a tour of the provinces. He agreed. The Central Committee then resumed its
session. As soon as Bulganin returned to Warsaw, the Central Committee meeting
was again suspended. The session was not resumed until he had finally left for
Moscow. Bulganin's visit only succeeded in increasing anti-Russian feeling among
the Polish people.
At the end of September, the first trials began. People were
charged with 'anti-Socialist' activity during the Poznan riots. The trials were
less of a farce than those of pre-Poznan days. The defence was allowed some
freedom. The sentences were relatively mild. In October 1956, the Government
announced the postponement of further trials.
On October 19, another meeting of the Central Committee was
convened, primarily to elect Gomulka Party leader. As the Committee met, it was
reported that the Red Army in Poland had begun large-scale manoeuvres. Armoured
units were moving towards Warsaw. While the Polish leaders were asking
themselves whether this was some kind of threat, the answer walked in on them -
Krushchev himself accompanied by a formidable detachment of the Kremlin 'Old
Guard': Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and a smattering of generals. The news
spread quickly. The workers formed groups and armed themselves. Their groups
kept in close contact with the Polish Army.
Crisis point had been reached. The air was electric with the
tension. Precise details of the clash between the Central Committee and the
Krushchev circus are not yet known. But the main reason for the visit is known.
Above all else, the Russians insisted that, in the elections that were about to
take place, Marshal Rokossovski should retain his posts of Minister of Defence
and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army. Gomulka refused and despite threats
did not give way. He knew that in standing up to the Kremlin, he not only had a
big majority of the people on his side: the workers, peasants and students. He
also had a considerable proportion of the bureaucracy and of the Army behind
him.
A war between Russia and Poland was the last thing the Kremlin
wanted. The Russians did not insist. The Red Army was not called in. Krushchev
knew that whatever Gomulka's attitude might now be, he would later be compelled
to call on Russian help, both to maintain the Oder-Neisse frontier and to assist
the Polish economy, which was in a chaotic condition. Within 24 hours, the
Russians returned to Moscow. The following day, October 21, the Polish Politburo
was elected. As expected, Gomulka became First Secretary of the Party. Changes
in the Government, the Army and the Party were immediately initiated.
Rokossovski resigned and returned to Moscow (where he was at once given the post
of Russian Minister of Defence).
Gomulka had triumphed only in so far as he represented the
national aspirations of the Polish people. The base of his rule was still
extremely narrow. He represented the interests of the Polish bureaucracy.
Following the independent action taken by the Polish workers, and their
insistent demands for a greater share in the management of their own affairs,
the basis of the bureaucracy - even purged of its pro-Russian elements - remains
both weak and unstable. An attempt to broaden the basis of the regime led
Gomulka into an alliance with the ex-propertied class, through the Catholic
Church. In exchange for a partial restoration of its former property and
privileges, the Church threw its influence behind Gomulka. God and Gomulka were
brought together through a joint fear of the working class. It is a temporary
alliance - a mutual expedient. When the Polish workers take to managing their
own affairs, they will put all these parasites right out of business.
Nearing
Flashpoint
|
"The time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried
through by small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses,
is past. Where it is a question of a complete transformation of the social
organization, the masses themselves must also be in it, must themselves
already have grasped what is at stake, what they are going in for, body
and soul." F. Engels, Introduction to Marx's ' The Class
Struggle in France' (1895). |
From the spring of 1956 on, the quick build-up of tension in
Poland was paralleled by similar development in Hungary. The exposure of Stalin
at the 20th Congress, in February 1956, gave further impetus to revolutionary
tendencies in Hungary. These, already discernible in October 1955, now came more
into the open.
In April, 1956, the 'Petöfi Circle'46
was formed by the Young Communists - mainly students. Assisted by the Writers'
Union, it soon became an important and effective centre for the dissemination of
opinion, criticism, and protest about the deplorable state of Hungarian society.
Several other discussion groups were formed, but the Petöfi Circle remained the
largest. (Similar discussions took place in Russia, prior to 1917.)
Many pamphlets were produced and distributed at this time,
mainly in Budapest. A duplicating machine at Party Headquarters in Budapest is
said to have been used. This could not have been done without the connivance of
some members of the government. Due to shortages, there were production
difficulties. It is reported that one pamphlet had been produced on toilet
paper. In the early days, the main themes of this literature were purely demands
for more literary freedom. But the political implications were clear. Later, the
writers, all Communists, demanded that Hungary should follow her own road to
Communism. They thereby clearly implied that the present road was wrong and that
a greater independence from the U.S.S.R. was necessary.
Similar themes were now being discussed at the longer and
longer meetings of the Petöfi Circle. The Rakosi government then banned these
meetings. This made things worse.
The ban was soon lifted. The Communist writer,
Gyula Hay47
took the discussion a stage further. In an article in Irodalmi Ujság
(Literary Gazette), he sharply attacked the bureaucratic interference with
writers' freedom. Soon, the meetings of the Petöfi Circle were attracting
thousands of people. These gatherings, already unanimous in their demands for
intellectual liberty and truth, began to hear voices openly calling for
political freedom.
One of these meetings was noteworthy for a passionate speech
made by Mrs. Julia Rajk, widow of Laszlo Rajk, who had been executed as a
"Titoist Fascist" in October, 1949. Several thousand people attended this
meeting. It overflowed into the streets, where the speeches were relayed by
loudspeakers. Mrs. Rajk called for justice to her husband's memory; an
honourable place in the Party's history. She severely criticised the offhand way
in which a few months earlier her husband had been "rehabilitated". In a speech
at Eger on March 27, 1956, Rakosi had casually announced that the Party had
passed a resolution to rehabilitate Laszlo Rajk and others. This had been done
officially through the Supreme Court. In a cold voice, Rakosi had added
that the entire Rajk trial had been based on a provocation. "It was a
miscarriage of justice," he said. Julia Rajk then demanded that those guilty of
his murder should be punished. This electrified the audience. Although there was
no mention of Rakosi, everybody present knew exactly whom Julia Rajk meant.
By June, 1956. the intellectual agitation was in full swing.
The articles in Irodalmi Ujság were becoming more and more bluntly
critical of the regime. Although, earlier in the year, an issue of the paper had
been confiscated, people were now quite surprised that the 'leadership' did not
suppress it. As the title suggests, the paper was primarily intended for people
with literary interests. But many others were now reading it. Odd copies could
be seen in the hands of factory workers, on the shop floor. In fact, demand for
some issues so outstripped supply that a 'black market' developed. Copies were
selling at 60 forints - about 30s. each.
The articles by Gyula Hay suggested he was the
centre of a campaign for freedom of the written word. During June this was
sometimes referred to as the 'writers' revolt'. Officialdom reluctantly
countenanced the situation. In fact, the June 28 issue of Szabad Nep48
surprised many of its readers by welcoming this hitherto frowned-upon use of the
human intellect. Pravda immediately countered the move.
It vehemently denounced the Hungarian writers. On June 30 the
Central Committee brought Szabad Nep back to the Party line, with a
resolution condemning the "demagogic behaviour" and "anti-party views" of
"vacillating elements." It accused the writers of "attempting to spread
confusion" with "the provocative content" of their articles. For once, part of
the stereotyped party jargon was quite correct. This was indeed the precise
intention of the revolutionary writers: to provoke thought, ideas, and
discussion about the existing conditions in Hungary. The Central Committee
resolution was carried and hastily propagated at exactly the time when news of
the workers' revolt in Poznan was reaching intellectual circles in Hungary and
inspiring them to intensify their campaign.
The feeling of guilt among honest Communist intellectuals -
members of long standing - became apparent. Their consciences no longer allowed
the gulf between myth and reality to be bridged. At a large meeting of the
Petöfi Circle on June 27, the novelist Tibor Dery had asked why they found
themselves in such a crisis. "There is no freedom," he said. "I hope there will
be no more Police terror. I am optimistic. I hope we shall be able to get rid of
our present leaders. Let us bear in mind that we are allowed to discuss these
things only with permission from above. They think it's a good idea to let some
steam off an overheated boiler. We want deeds and we want the opportunity to
speak freely."
In the first days of July, articles in Irodalmi Ujság
began demanding Rakosi's resignation. The same demand was clearly voiced at the
meetings of the Petöfi Circle. It was even suggested by some speakers that Imre
Nagy should be brought back into the Party, although Nagy's name was only
mentioned casually, even guardedly. Rakosi, who was in Moscow, returned suddenly
to Budapest. He sought to suppress the heretical movement He knew of only one
way to do this: a purge. A list of prominent names among the politicians and
writers was drawn up. But before the first stage (the arrests) could be carried
out, Suslov, Russian Minister for the affairs of the People's Democracies,
unexpectedly arrived in Budapest. He was immediately followed by Mikoyan. They
told Rakosi that his plan would ignite an already explosive situation. The
Kremlin had decided that Rakosi should go.
The smouldering crisis in Hungary was not the only reason for
the Kremlin's decision. Tito hated Rakosi. He had for some time been agitating
for his removal. Tito refused to meet Rakosi, or even to travel through the
country where he held power. The Russo-Yugoslav rapprochement influenced the
decision to get rid of Rakosi.
All this was clearly a Kremlin-inspired compromise. For
Rakosi's close friend and collaborator, Erno Gerö, was to succeed him as First
Secretary. And, with the exception of General Farkas, who was expelled from the
Party, most of Rakosi's followers retained their positions.
Hungarians heard of Rakosi's resignation on
July 18. They also heard that the recently rehabilitated Janos Kadar and Gyorgy
Marosan,49
the Social Democrat, had been made members of the Political Bureau. These were
the first of a few minor concessions made during the month of August. In the
tumultuous situation, these concessions were to prove insignificant and wholly
inadequate. The suffering of the working people had been too long and too great
for them to harbour illusions about changes in the Leadership or to be bought
off by a few extra coppers in their pay packets.
Through the long summer days the debate smouldered on. While
the fireflies danced animatedly among the trees of the countryside, fascinating
ideas about freedom flew about the meetings in the towns. Tension mixed
strangely with a holiday mood. The whole month was like a heavy summer evening:
the sun still glowing eerily through the dark purple clouds of a threatening
storm. Familiar objects seemed out of perspective and took on a different shape
and colour. In private rooms and public meeting places an ominous feeling of
destiny pervaded the air. The intellectuals seemed to sense the 'dangers'
inherent in their ideas. Yet they felt compelled to carry on, on to whatever
ends free expression might lead them to.
We have found no evidence throughout the whole
of this restive period of any conscious attempt made by the intellectuals50 to
co-operate with the industrial workers on a mass scale, to share with them the
experiences of this cultural and political awakening, and thus to demonstrate
that the workers' struggles were bound up with the articulate demands for
freedom, for truth, etc. Nevertheless, the Petöfi Circle had become, albeit not
in a completely conscious manner, the articulate voice of the working people of
Hungary. It may well be that, had such co-operation occurred, the Party leaders
would have acted to suppress the movement sooner than they did. But they would
have had to do so in the face of even greater solidarity than was to develop at
the height of the revolution. In the event, the degree of co-operation, liaison,
and solidarity between workers and intellectuals was remarkably great. But
closer co-operation with the workers earlier on would most certainly have
broadened the base of the movement. The more practical and radical approach of
the workers would have cleared the air of at least some of the cramping
illusions held by many of the intellectuals - for example their great enthusiasm
for a Nagy Government, appeals to Western leaders, to U.N.O., etc.
It was the veteran Communist writer, Gyula Hay, who again
brought the cauldron to the boil with an article in the September 8 issue of
Irodalmi Ujság. It poetically demanded "absolute and unfettered freedom"
for writers.
The article stated that "it should be the
writer's prerogative to tell the truth; to criticise anybody and anything; to be
sad; to be in love; to think of death; not to ponder whether light and shadow
are in balance in his work; to believe in the omnipotence of God; to deny the
existence of God; to doubt the correctness of certain figures in the Five Year
Plan; to think in a non-Marxist manner even if the thought thus born is not yet
amongst the truths proclaimed to be of binding force; to find the standard of
life low even of people whose wages do not yet figure amongst those to be
raised; to believe unjust something that is still officially maintained to be
just; to dislike certain leaders; to describe problems without concluding how
they may be solved; to consider ugly the New York Palais,51
declared a historic building, despite the fact that millions have recently been
spent on it; to notice that the city is falling into ruins since there is no
money to repair the buildings; to criticise the way of life, the way of
speaking, and way of working of certain leaders; ... to like Sztalinvaros; to
dislike Sztalinvaros; to write in an unusual style; to oppose the Aristotelian
dramaturgy; ... etc., etc. Who would deny that a short while ago many of those
things were strictly forbidden and would have entailed punishment ... but today,
too, they are just tolerated and not really allowed."
About a week after Hay's article was published, the congress of
the Writers' Union opened in Budapest. The depth of the revolt revealed itself
in the elections for the new Presidium. All those who had supported the Rakosi
regime, if only passively, were ousted. Communist 'rebels' and some
non-Communist writers were elected. All the speeches sharply criticised the
"regime of tyranny." The rehabilitation of Nagy was demanded. Gyula Hay admitted
that Communist writers, "having submitted to the spiritual leadership of the
Party Secretariat, let themselves be led astray on to the path of mendacity." He
added that the most honest writers had found themselves in a frightful dilemma
and "suffered horribly in this atmosphere of lying ... and paid dearly for the
lie ... with the lowering of the standard of our work ..." Konya, the poet, took
up the theme in an impassioned speech about writing only the truth. He ended
with the rhetorical questions: "In the name of what morality do the Communists
consider themselves justified in committing arbitrary acts against their former
allies, in staging witch-trials, in persecuting innocent people, in treating
genuine revolutionaries as if they were traitors, in gaoling and killing them?
In the name of what morality?"
Thus, the intellectuals exposed their crisis of conscience. Yet
this resolute search for truth, amounting at times almost to mysticism, helped
to give the events that followed an essential theme of socialist morality.
The First
Demands
|
"Men make their own history, whatever its outcome may
be, in that each person follows his own consciously desired end, and it is
precisely the resultant of these many wills operating in different
directions and of their manifold effects upon the outer world that
constitutes history. Thus it is also a question of what the many
individuals desire". F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of
Classical German Philosophy (1888). |
Towards the end of September the first of the Poznan trials
began in Poland. Public sympathy with the accused was apparent. Every possible
opportunity was taken, both by those on trial and the public, to condemn the
violence and injustice of the regime. The Government squirmed. Almost all the
accused were ordinary workers. The sentences were comparatively mild.
When this news reached the Hungarians they were elated. The
tension and the pressure on the Government increased.
The ruling group, feeling
themselves more out of touch than usual, tried to win sympathy with a
stage-managed funeral for Laszlo Rajk. Many of those who had stage-managed his
trial and execution as a "Titoist Fascist" now indignantly deplored the
"slander" of Comrade Rajk who had been "innocently condemned and executed."
Their belief that they could deceive the people with such a macabre exhibition
proved their complete to degeneracy. Over 200,000 people turned out for the
funeral.52
Even then the 'leaders' did not see the light. They did not see that the demand
for Rajk's complete rehabilitation was purely symbolic. The people had not
forgotten the brutality of Rajk's secret police. "One of the jokes current in
Budapest at the time was: 'What is the difference between a Christian and a
Marxist? The Christian believes in a hereafter; the Marxist believes in a
rehabilitation hereafter'."53
Rajk's exhumed corpse was re-buried on Martyrs' Day - October
6. This was the anniversary of the execution by the Austrians, on October 6,
1849, of the first constitutional Prime Minister of Hungary, Count Batthány, and
of thirteen others. About three hundred young men discovered some connection
between this and the day's event. They began the first unofficial demonstration.
They marched to the Batthány monument carrying posters and shouting slogans
about independence and freedom. Several onlookers joined them believing that
such a demonstration, however incredible, must have official sanction.
During September and early
October the workers had become active. They were demanding 'genuine workers'
self-government'54 in
the factories. The Trade Union Council, still controlled by the Party, gave
these demands the universal 'leadership' twist. It 'moderated' them. The demands
were revolutionary in the circumstances: broadening of trade union democracy;
establishment of workers' control;55 a
prominent role for the unions in solving problems of production and management;
the manager to keep his "full right" to make decisions, but to consult the union
committee on questions of wages and welfare. Here was the most important
development in the whole of the campaign so far.
This remarkable political consciousness of the
workers had its core in the concentrated industrial area of Czepel Island,56 in
the Danube between Buda and Pest. It immediately transformed the whole
situation. Until now the campaign had been one of agitational ferment and
protest. The workers' demand for 'self-government ' in the factories gave it a
revolutionary edge in the strictest sense of the word. The workers were
preparing for the psychological moment when their radical action would change
the whole political and economic system. No wonder that, later on, the spokesmen
of the West were to prove so uninformative!
The Petöfi Circle took up the workers' demands. But they were
still unaware of their revolutionary implications. In a series of new demands,
the Government was requested to hand over the administration of the factories to
the workers. This must surely have appeared naive to anyone aware of the nature
of government. It tended to perpetuate the illusion that any government can act
in the interests and on behalf of working people.
The Petöfi Circle also called for the expulsion of Rakosi from
the Party; for a public trial of General Farkas; for a revision of the second
Five Year Plan; for equality in all relations between Hungary and the Soviet
Union; for full publication of all trade agreements (the trade pact with Moscow
for the exploitation of the rich uranium deposits found a few months earlier at
Pécs was stressed); and for the re-admittance of Nagy to the Party. A concession
to the pressure came a few days later. Nagy was given a new Party card!
In mid-October, Gerö left to meet Tito in Belgrade. At
precisely this time, momentous events were taking place in Poland. The Hungarian
intellectuals were further inspired when they learned that the Kremlin and the
old Polish leadership had been defeated, that Gomulka had been elected as First
Secretary, that Rokossovski had resigned.
The Petöfi Circle called for a mass demonstration on October
23, "to express the deep sympathy and solidarity with our Polish brothers" in
their struggle for freedom. They applied to the Ministry of the Interior for
permission to hold the demonstration. It was granted! All hell would have broken
loose had it been refused.
By October 22, groups in the Hungarian universities and the
various discussion circles were meeting. They considered the form of the
demonstration. There was broad agreement that there should be a march to the
statue of General Josef Bern, on the bank of the Danube. This seemed
appropriate. Bem was a Pole who won fame when he fought with the Hungarians
against the Hapsburg (Austrian) oppression in the so-called 'umbrella
revolution' of 1848-49. But there was some disagreement between two of the
largest Budapest universities. The Central University wanted slogans and banners
to make the purpose of the demonstration clear beyond doubt. The Polytechnic
wanted a more 'aesthetic' demonstration - no shouting, no banners, just a quiet
march to the statue and back. A surprising development occurred at Szeged
University, in Hungary's second largest city. A separate students' organisation,
called MEFESZ, was formed. Many members of DISZ, the official Communist
organisation, joined. The Party decided it was no use trying to oppose the
regrouping. To retain some influence, DISZ was instructed to welcome the new
formation. Then DISZ went further. It decided to participate in the next day's
demonstration.
By the end of October 1956, many years of misery, of being
bullied and oppressed, manipulated and managed, had brought the Hungarian people
to the brink of revolution. Yet the people were not fully aware of it. No plans
had been laid, no conscious steps taken towards fundamental change. No
leadership, in the generally accepted sense, had emerged. Nevertheless, the
classical conditions for revolution were there. The build-up had occurred over a
period of years. The culminating events were to be compressed into days - even
hours.
The
October 23 Demonstrations
"Do not be afraid of the initiative and independence of the masses;
entrust yourselves to the revolutionary organisations of the
masses." V. I. Lenin, One of the Fundamental
Questions of the Revolution
(1917). |
In the absence of Gerö, now returning from Belgrade, the Party
was undecided about what should be done. Some, believing they were expressing
Gerö's wishes, wanted the march banned. Others preferred the old tactic of
infiltration and take-over. Both views sprang from a degenerate and bureaucratic
attitude to events. Laszlo Piros, the Minister of the Interior and a close
associate of Gerö, had the final word. On the morning of Tuesday, October 23,
permission to hold the march was withdrawn
Delegations from the various groupings and universities began
to arrive at Party Headquarters in Academy Square. A few were allowed in. They
asked officials to use their influence to get the ban withdrawn. Gyula Hay, and
a small delegation from the Petöfi Circle, argued for the lifting of the ban.
They explained that many students and writers intended to march, permission or
no permission. The bureaucrats Prevaricated.
By the afternoon, marchers were forming up in different parts
of the City. As is so often the case, rank-and-file action caused a sudden
change of mind at the Ministry of the Interior. Deputy Minister Mihaly Fekete
suddenly announced on the radio that the ban had been lifted. The 'infiltration'
faction had apparently won. Fekete patronisingly added: "The employees and all
the Communist Party members of the Ministry of the Interior have rallied to the
side of honest Hungarians in the interests of change."
The demonstration was soon under way. Marchers
were converging on the Bem statue from numerous points in Budapest. A crowd of
several thousands had assembled at the Petöfi statue and now joined the march.
The Hungarian national colours of red, white and green were much in evidence.
Improvised banners and posters appeared. Some were simply inscribed "Freedom."
Others added "Independence - Truth." Others still called for "Polish-Hungarian
Friendship." Among the many and diverse slogans, which showed the individuality
of the demonstrators, none was directly anti-Russian. Only one came anywhere
near to it: "Let each nation keep its army to its own soil!"57
The various columns of marchers arrived at the Bem statue one
after the other. They there fused into one great crowd. The large majority were
young people. On the way their ranks had grown as people in the streets, women,
and children, had joined. A small number of workers left their jobs and tagged
on, a little self-consciously. Even before all the marchers had arrived,
spontaneous speeches were being made. The general theme was solidarity.
Solidarity at home. International solidarity. Solidarity with the people of
Poland was much stressed.
Considerable pathos was added when a student reminded the crowd
of the 1849 revolution by reciting the words of Petöfi:
Our battalions have combined two nations And what nations! Polish
and Magyar! Is there any destiny that is stronger Than those two
when they are united? |
When nearly 50,000 people a had assembled, Peter Veres moved up
to the foot of the statue to read a resolution from the Writers' Union. Its
seven points can be summarised as follows
1. An independent national policy based on the principles of
socialism.
2. Equality in relations with the U.S.S.R. and the People's
Democracies.
3. A revision of economic agreements in the spirit of the
equality of national rights.
4. The running of the factories by workers and specialists.
5. The right of peasants freely to decide their own fate.
6. The removal of the Rakosi clique, a post in the Government
for Imre Nagy, and a resolute stand against all counter-revolutionary attempts
and aspirations.
7. Complete political representation of the working class -
free and secret ballot in elections to Parliament and to all autonomous organs
of administration."58
As Peter Veres stepped down, the crowd applauded. They had
listened in almost total silence. Indeed, why should they have become
particularly excited? In some respects, the resolution was remarkably vague.
There was really very little in it that Krushchev himself had not advocated at
some time or other. The demands could, it is true, have been developed into a
revolutionary programme. No mention was made of how all this might be achieved,
even as it stood.
The demonstration was over. The crowds began to move away, but
not to disperse. For some unknown reason they marched towards Parliament Square.
Another crowd of several thousands joined them on the way. When they reached the
Square they just stood there, in silence. People were now converging on
Parliament Square in their hundreds. Many of the later arrivals had heard Gerö
make his expected speech on the radio. Snatches from the speech were passed on,
in low, angry voices. Faces at the windows of the Parliament building stared out
at the crowd, which must now have numbered about a hundred thousand. Perhaps
those at the windows became afraid. Suddenly all the lights in the building and
in the square went out. The crowd remained where it was. Someone struck a match
and lit a newspaper. Newspapers flared up all over the square. The people
watched the building take on a gaunt, menacing look in the flickering yellow
light. Perhaps they were thinking of what Gerö had just said: the students'
demonstration had been an attempt to destroy democracy ... to undermine the
power of the working class ... to loosen the friendly ties between Hungary and
the Soviet Union ... whoever attacks our achievements will be repelled
... the intellectuals had heaped slanders on the Soviet Union; they had asserted
that Hungary was trading with the Soviet Union on an unequal footing, that
independence must allegedly be defended, not against the imperialists, but
against the Soviet Union. All this was an impudent lie - hostile propaganda
which did not contain a train of truth. After more such accusations. Gerö had
said that the Central Committee would not meet for eight days.
Was this why the people now stood silently in Parliament
Square? Or were they just dumbfounded and exasperated by Gerö's intransigent
stupidity? Was it really possible that hypocrisy could be taken so far? The
sheer mendacity left one speechless. Why deny so vehemently what everybody knew
to be fact?
A discussion began in one corner of the Square. After a while,
voices from the darkness suggested that a delegation should go to the Radio
station, in Sánder Street, with the request that their demands be broadcast.
There were cries of agreement from the crowd. Then more discussion. Eventually a
deputation moved off in the direction of Sándor Street ... followed by 100,000
people! They now wanted to see some action, if only a broadcast, result from
their silent vigil in Parliament Square. As this mass of people moved through
the streets, they were joined by several thousand more, many of them industrial
workers on their way home.
Further along the road, a group in the crowd decided to visit
the City Park where stood a 26 foot, bronze statue of Stalin, the 'Man of
Steel'. Two or three thousand people peeled off from the body of marchers and
joined them. They were in great spirits, singing and laughing. When they reached
the statue, a ladder and a tough rope were passed up onto the massive plinth.
The ladder was put against the pedestal. Up climbed two men. A rope was placed
around 'Stalin's' neck. It was grabbed by hundreds of eager hands. It tautened.
The statue grated and creaked as it bowed, slowly, to the crowd. With a final
screech, it fell from its pedestal. There was an ear-splitting clang as it hit
the plinth. A great cheer was followed by a roar of hilarious laughter. The
whole thing was ludicrous. It was absurd. The plinth now looked even more
grotesque. Still firmly planted on the pedestal were 'Stalin's' 6-foot-high
jack-boots. The rest of the statue was taken away by lorry and dumped in front
of the National Theatre, where a laughing crowd soon smashed it to pieces.
Stalin's boots, however, still stood there. What an omen for
those who believed in such things! It is not much use getting rid of one man.
Another will always fill his boots. You must get rid of the need for rulers.
Perhaps somebody thought about this, for later a Hungarian flag appeared in one
of the boots. This red, white, and green tricolour, with the Communist hammer
and wheatsheaf emblem raggedly cut from its centre, was the only symbol of
revolution the people knew.
The main crowd marching from Parliament Square had in the
meantime arrived at the entrance to Sándor Street. It had been joined by many
thousands more, mostly workers. Many had rushed there from all over Budapest.
They had heard Gerö's speech (which had been broadcast at 6 p.m. and again at
7). The spontaneous decision of the demonstrators to go to the Radio Station
particularly appealed to the workers. Traffic in the centre of the city had come
to a standstill. The municipal police, though somewhat perplexed, made no
attempt to interfere with the 'unofficial' marchers. But the entrance to Sándor
Street was barred by a shoulder-to-shoulder line of the dreaded A.V.O. men. They
had also occupied the Radio Building. A machine-gun-carrying detachment stood on
guard outside. The marchers stopped. There had obviously been members of the
A.V.O. among the crowd in Parliament Square. On hearing the intention of the
crowd to march to the Radio Station, they had informed their leaders.
The demonstrators craned their necks to see why the march had
halted. They saw the glint of arms held by the grim-faced Security Police.
Although unarmed, they no longer felt fear. In their solidarity, they recognised
their strength. They glimpsed the possibility of freedom. Their destiny was in
their hands alone. Yet none advocated violence against their oppressors.
"Let us pass!" - "The Hungarian people must hear our
proposals!" - "Send in a delegation!". These demands were shouted from various
points in the crowd. Each demand was greeted with great applause. There was some
discussion among the front ranks. A delegation was formed. After a further
discussion with the A.V.O., this small group of people was let through the
cordon and then into the Radio Building.
The crowd waited. The air rumbled with conversations.
Occasional laughter was heard, even the snatch of a song. They were still in
good mood. An hour passed. No sign of the delegation. The crowd's gaiety gave
way to more serious determination. Some people were growing restless. The front
ranks were now touching the A.V.O. cordon. Another half-hour. Still no word from
their comrades in the building. The mood changed rapidly. Angry shouts flew up
from all parts of the crowd. The armed cordon began to bulge a little. The
A.V.O. men were clearly worried. After all, according to official rules and
regulations, the people shouldn't really be there at all. And there were so many
of them! People across the whole width of the road. People as far as the eye
could see!
"Where's our delegation ?" - "Let them out!" - "Free our
delegates!" - roared the crowd impatiently. A spontaneous surge forward swept
the A.V.O. cordon aside. The people halted in front of another line of A.V.O.
men guarding the Radio Building. Policemen throughout the world are not noted
for either intelligence or understanding. The Hungarian Security Police were no
exception. What should they do? The demonstrators were unarmed - but there were
thousands of them and they were angry. In any case, demonstrations of this sort
were illegal. For their protection, ruling minorities always staff their police
forces with men whose minds only work one way. The A.V.O. men knew only one
answer. Machine-guns fired.
Agonized shrieks arose as the front ranks of the peaceful
demonstrators crumpled to the ground. The crowd became infuriated. The police
were quickly overwhelmed, their arms used to fire at the windows of the
Radio Building from which lead now streaked into the throngs below.
The Hungarian Revolution had begun.
Nagy Calls in Russian Tanks
|
"The Party fights for a more democratic Workers and
Peasants Republic, wherein the police and the standing army would be
completely eliminated and replaced by a general arming of the people, by a
universal militia; all the offices would be not only elective but also
subject to instant recall by a majority of electors; all offices without
exception would be paid at the rate of the average wage of a skilled
worker; all representative parliamentary institutions would gradually give
place to Soviets ... functioning both as legislative and executive
bodies." V. I. Lenin. Materials relating to the Revision of the
Party Programme (May 1917). |
The news spread fast. Within half an hour of the first shots in
Sánder Street (and while Radio Budapest was continually broadcasting messages to
the effect that "armed fascist and counter-revolutionary bands were attacking
public buildings in the city") the truth about the events at the Radio Building
was known by almost everyone in town. The rest of the country knew soon
after.
During the months of intellectual ferment,
little had been heard of workers' opinions. On October 21, a worker from a
factory in Czepel had said: "Rest assured, we too shall speak."59
Now the workers spoke with deeds. Those who had earlier left the arms factories
returned there. Their comrades of the night shift helped load lorries with
commandeered arms: revolvers, rifles, light machine guns, and ammunition. Many
on the night-shift then left the factories and went to Sánder Street to help
distribute the weapons and join the ever-increasing crowds. The police made no
attempt to disperse the demonstrators. Many handed over their weapons to the
workers and students, then stood aside; some policemen joined the demonstration.
This also applied to the soldiers. Large numbers of soldiers handed over their
arms. Although the majority did not fight alongside the revolutionaries,
practically none fought against them. This is easily explained. The majority of
soldiers were young peasants. The peasants had been less affected by the general
ferment.
While fighting continued in Sánder Street and efforts were
being made to occupy the Radio Station, thousands of workers and students began
to form groups in the surrounding streets. These groups spread out into the
city. They set up road controls and occupied some of the main squares. All cars
were stopped. If members of the A.V.O. were found inside, the car was
commandeered and the occupants sent off on foot. There was no general attack on
the A.V.O. at this stage.
By 1 a.m., all the main streets and squares (including
Parliament Square) had been 'occupied' by vast crowds. Large groups carrying an
assortment of small arms stationed themselves at vantage points.
Getö's lies were still coming from the radio; over the
incongruous signature of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian Peoples
Republic. "Fascists and reactionary elements have launched an armed attack on
our public buildings and on our security units. To restore order, and until
further measures are taken, all meetings, gatherings and marches are banned. The
armed security organs have been ordered to apply the full vigour of the law
against anyone who breaks this order." Later in the night, the term 'Fascists'
was altered to 'counter-revolutionaries.' Of course, no mention was made of the
machine-gunning by the A.V.O., nor of the killing of many of the unarmed people
taking part in a peaceful demonstration.
It must be emphasized that although the situation had now
reached the proportions of an armed uprising, it had not in any way been
planned or organised. Many commentators throughout the world either
claimed the whole thing had been previously organised or simply failed to
mention its spontaneity. Whether their allegiance was to East or West, they were
unable to understand that ordinary people could take effective action against
the State without hierarchical and top-heavy organisation.
As we have previously shown, both the Russian rulers and the
Western Powers had kept many Nazi administrators in position after the war. A
hierarchical organisation, based on privilege, and reinforced by a rigid chain
of command from above down, was for them the, very essence of 'efficiency'.
Their minds had been conditioned to see this structure as the only one possible.
Understandably, but wrongly, they believed that the efficiency of the Hungarian
revolutionaries must depend on some form of organisation similar to their own.
How else, they argued, could ordinary workers, students, and others have had
such an excellent system of communication? How else could they have armed
themselves with such speed and smoothness? The events in Hungary during the last
week of October 1956 show clearly that the workers relied on quite different
methods of organisation. If revolutionaries organise like those whose rule they
seek to overthrow, they are defeated before the battle is engaged.
* * *
During the early hours of Wednesday October 24, workers and
students were dying in the streets for the ultimate freedom to decide how to run
their society. The Party leaders meanwhile were engaged in various manoeuvres.
Getö arranged for the Premier to be relieved of his post. Andras Hegedüs, an
obedient stooge of Rakosi, had been little heard of even before he had been made
Prime Minister. Now he was out. Getö invited Nagy to take over. There is no
evidence that Nagy needed any persuasion or that he made any conditions. No
official announcement was made of this re-shuffle. The first the people knew of
it was when, at 7.30 that morning, the radio referred to Nagy as the "Chairman
of the Council of Ministers" - the official term for Prime Minister.
At 7.45 a.m. the radio
announced that the Minister of the Interior had proclaimed martial law "as
mopping-up operations against counter-revolutionary groups engaged in looting60
are still in progress". At 8 a.m. came the shocking announcement that, under the
terms of the Warsaw Treaty, the Government had asked for help from Russian
military units stationed in Hungary - "The Soviet formations, in compliance with
the Government's request, are taking part in the restoration of order."61
There is no doubt that Imre Nagy was Prime Minister of the
Government which called in Russian troops. There is some doubt about whether he
was tricked into doing so. A large number of students and intellectuals felt
Nagy had 'betrayed' them. Their esteem for him dropped. At a crucial stage in
the struggle, their morale took a severe jolt. But why should so many
intellectuals have had illusions about Nagy? Nagy was concerned with 'order'. He
had never shown that his idea of 'order' was any more than a liberalised form of
the 'order' that had prevailed in satellite Hungary. And in the situation
prevailing on October 24, 1956, any demand for this kind of order had long ago
been eclipsed by the people's desire and all-out struggle for far more
fundamental change. A man of Nagy's background was bound to believe, like Getö
that the massive force of Russian tanks would soon restore 'order'. He had been
in the first Russian puppet government. He had, in turn, been Minister of
Agriculture, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Food, Minister of
Agricultural Deliveries, and Deputy Prime Minister. He knew the ropes and where
power lay. One of the main reasons for the naivety of the intellectuals was
their lack of contact with industrial workers. There was, to some extent, a
mutual embarrassment and suspicion. But action, the revolt itself, had brought
them together as nothing else could have done. It was the workers who, on the
morning of Wednesday, October 24, saved the struggle from complete collapse.
They saw the Nagy issue as largely irrelevant. In the society they were
glimpsing through the dust and smoke of the battle in the streets, there would
be no Prime Minister, no government of professional politicians, and no
officials or bosses ordering them about. The decision to call in Russian troops
only strengthened the morale and resolve of the workers. They were now more
determined than ever to fight to the end, whatever that end might be.
* * *
Thousands had spent the early hours of Wednesday in the streets
or at meetings. A revolutionary council of workers and students was formed in
Budapest and remained in permanent session. Radio Budapest continued to pour out
lies: "The revolt is about to collapse; thousands have surrendered to the
authorities; those who don't surrender will be severely punished; no action will
be taken against those who surrender." "Fascists, misguided patriots,
counter-revolutionaries, bourgeois, bandits". Persuasion, threats, cajoling,
ranting. The purpose of propaganda is not to convince, but to confuse. It failed
as far as the Hungarians were concerned. They knew it was all lies.
In Sánder Street, the Radio Building was repeatedly and
furiously attacked. Later, the 'boys' (one of the names Hungarians
affectionately gave to the fighters) succeeded in occupying it. But the
transmitters remained in the hands of the A.V.O. who concentrated all their
effort in holding them. Heading the small group of announcers who kept the
station operating was one György Szepesi, a sports commentator. During the first
days of November, a group of workers searched the whole of Budapest for Szepesi,
but he had disappeared.
The Battle is Joined
|
"A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian
thing there is. It is the act whereby one part of the population imposes
its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannons -
authoritarian means, if such there were..." F. Engels, On
Authority (1872). |
By 8.30 a.m., reports were circulating in Budapest that workers
had already been involved in battles with Russian tanks on the outskirts of the
city. Another report, less widely circulated, was that Suslov and Mikoyan had
arrived in Budapest at dawn. They had apparently flown direct from Moscow, where
the Kremlin was getting worried at the mess their men in Budapest were making of
things. Mikoyan, it was alleged, had become very angry with Getö. Whether this
was true or not, it soon became known that Getö had been 'relieved of his post'
as First Secretary of the Communist Party. Janos Kadar was given the job. Many
among the Communist hierarchy thought this a master move. Kadar was of
working-class origin. He had spent a long time in prison as a Titoist. He had
suffered considerably. He had been tortured - missing fingernails and scars on
various parts of his body were proof of this. It is said he was a frightened man
- frightened of pain. Understandably so. He was to prove soft clay in the hands
of a ruthless 'leadership'!
Just after 9 a.m., Nagy broadcast a personal appeal as Prime
Minister. He called for an end to the fighting. He asked that order be restored.
"People of Budapest! I announce that all those who, in the
interest of avoiding further bloodshed, stop fighting before 1300 hours today
and lay down their arms, will be exempted from summary jurisdiction. We shall
realise as soon as possible, by all means at our disposal and on the basis of
the June 1953 Government Programme, as I expounded it at that time in
Parliament, the systematic democratisation of the country in every sphere of
Party, State, political, and economic life. Every possibility exists for the
Government to realise my political programme by relying on the Hungarian people,
under the leadership of the Communists. Heed our appeal. Cease fighting and
secure the restoration of calm and order in the interest of the future of our
people and country. Return to peaceful and creative work."
Does this sound like the speech of a man incapable of calling
in Russian troops? First, the implied threat, clothed as a concession: "If you
stop fighting by 1 p.m., you'll only be subject to normal (?) legal proceedings.
If you don't then summary jurisdiction." All knew what summary jurisdiction
meant. And what about "laying down arms"? This meant surrendering their newly
acquired weapons to the authorities.
Why should Nagy have hoped that workers fighting Russian tanks,
the A.V.O., and the whole rotten bureaucratic set-up, should suddenly hand in
their arms that Wednesday morning? At that very time, the workers and students
had every reason, on the contrary, to intensify their struggle. And what of "the
June 1953 Government Programme"? Such a programme had been made redundant by the
events of the last few days. It might have worked in April. On October 24, it
appeared ridiculous. It may be true that Nagy was the most humane and liberal in
the Hungarian Communist hierarchy. But he was a prisoner of certain ideas which
clashed with the people's desire for fundamental political and economic change.
It was beyond Nagy's comprehension to grasp what the people really wanted - what
they were now striving towards.
Even if we accept that Nagy was honest and sincere, he must
have shown an incredible naivety to talk, at this stage, of "the
Hungarian people under the leadership of the Communists". Leadership? This was
precisely what the people were against. This seemingly negative approach implied
a very positive one: to make and carry out their own decisions. The only
effect of Premier Nagy's first speech was to strengthen the resolve of most
revolutionaries to fight on. As we shall see later, the people had already begun
to build their own revolutionary organisations. As early as the first morning of
the armed struggle, leaflets were being distributed in Budapest calling for a
general strike. The imprint on these leaflets was: "The Revolutionary Council of
Workers and Students."
* * *
Russian tanks had begun to enter the city at various points
during the morning of October 24. Some units were immediately attacked by
workers and students. Others were attacked after they had taken up strategic
positions and opened fire. In some places, neither side opened fire. Here,
students who had learnt Russian at school, were in conversation with the
soldiers. It was explained that they were ordinary Hungarians - workers. A
number of the young Russian soldiers seemed quite embarrassed. Perhaps they
remembered some of the things they had been taught at school. Perhaps parts of
'Marxism-Leninism' did not quite accord with what was now required of them.
Increasingly bitter battles were now raging throughout
Budapest: at Baross Square outside the Eastern Railway Station, by the
Ferencvaros railway freight station, around the Party Buildings of the 13th
District, and in the streets around the statue of General Bem, scene of the
peaceful demonstrations of the previous afternoon. Tanks of the 'Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics', 'workers' tanks', were firing 'workers' shells'. The
bodies of Hungarian workers were being torn to pieces.
Two of the biggest battles were at Széna Square and at the
Killian Barracks. At Széna Square, in Buda, many thousands of people waited not
knowing exactly what to expect or what to do. The majority were industrial
workers; but there were also many students, some of them young women. This was
the general social composition of the revolutionaries. There were also
schoolboys and even some schoolgirls. Most of them were armed.
The main idea was to stop all cars and see who was in them.
They had found that by using hundreds of barrels to barricade the middle of the
roads leading into the square, they could do this with ease. There were several
gunfights with the occupants of cars who opened fire as soon as they saw the
barrel barricade and its armed defenders. Several people were killed and
wounded. Later the barricades were strengthened when workers brought onto the
streets railway coaches and wagons from a nearby goods yard. Although some
wagons were loaded with goods, nothing was taken at any time - a further
indication of the people's awareness of the nature of their revolution.
Soon, all entrances to the Square were barricaded. The throb of
powerful engines was heard and the first Russian tank rumbled into sight. It
picked a weak spot in the barricade and went right through the centre of the
Square. It was only attacked with a few odd rifle shots. Workers rushed to
repair the breach. Then came two more tanks and two armoured cars. The was a
heavy burst of machine gun and rifle fire from the revolutionaries. The first
tank swung round and retreated down the road. The second rammed the barricade
and, pushing a wagon along in front of it, moved slowly across the Square.
Although attacked with Molotov cocktails, it rumbled on. The armoured cars were
put out of action. All eight occupants were killed.
It had now become clear that the barricades had not been built
to the best advantage. They were again strengthened. This time, the toughest
obstacles were concentrated in the centre of the road, thus forcing the tanks to
pass near to or on the pavements. Molotov cocktails could then be dropped on to
them with far greater success from the windows of buildings lining the road.
A 'Molotov cocktail' is a home-made petrol bomb. It can be a
very effective weapon, even against heavy armour. The Hungarians found them easy
to make and fairly easy to use. Screw-top beer or lemonade bottles were used.
The bottles were filled with petrol and the top very tightly screwed on. If
non-screw-top bottles were used, it was imperative for them to be very securely
sealed. A piece of dry rag (which was sometimes soaked in methylated spirit) was
then firmly attached to the bottle by, a wire around a ridge in its neck, or by
strong elastic bands. Before throwing, the rag was lit. As the bottles hit the
Russian tanks the glass would break and the petrol would ignite, often with
devastating effect.
* * *
As the battle progressed, the workers and students in Szena
Square improved their fighting methods. They were quite undisciplined in the
military sense. There was no saluting, no bawling of orders. In their motley
dress, their, small arms looking like toys against the thick armour and big
cannons of the tanks, they no doubt appeared pathetic to the 'orderly' military
mind. But before Saturday, these few thousands of undisciplined workers and
students had put some thirty Russian tanks out of action. They were a true
vanguard of the working class. They fought with great courage, ardour,
initiative, and even humour. When a Russian tank caught fire, their cheers
echoed from the buildings around the square. When a tank retreated, the Square
was filled with cheers and laughter.
It was the same in the streets around the
Killian Barracks. A group of workers had got hold of a small field gun which
they operated from the front of the Corvin Cinema, on the Boulevard. The cinema,
Budapest's largest, stood back from the other buildings in the street to form a
'bay'. When under extra-heavy fire, the gun was run back into the shelter of
this bay. A tram conductor was put in charge of the aiming and firing of the
gun. He and the others sometimes pulled their artillery up the street, to the
Barracks at the junction of Ulloi Road and the Boulevard. From there they could
shell targets in Ulloi Road until forced back to the Corvin Cinema. During lulls
in the fighting, the gun crew would sit smoking and talking shop - revolution
was their business. "At one time the discussion became so absorbing that a
couple of Russian tanks had got into the Boulevard and were getting perilously
close to the Cinema. There was a concerted rush to man the gun. Some way behind
them came an odd figure in a furious shuffle to get to the gun. Under his arm
was a crumpled newspaper, his hands sought frantically to pull his trousers up
from around his ankles. 'Caught with your trousers down, eh?' came the
inevitable jibe. The laughter continued as they made the gun ready. They fired
the first round almost at point-blank range. It hit the first tank which
exploded. The second tank immediately turned and retreated, but was caught in a
crescendo of cross fire at the road junction. It stopped dead. Firing ceased.
Thousands of eyes watched the tank. Suddenly, the Russian crew clambered out
with their hands held high. A group of workers escorted them to the Killian
Barracks."62
The Barracks had been taken over by a Hungarian army unit led
by Colonel Pál Maéter, which had sided with the people. Maléter's men were
supported by a large number of workers and students. Once inside the Barracks,
the civilians armed themselves. Throughout the Thursday they were under heavy
fire from Russian guns. Towards evening three Hungarian tanks appeared on the
scene and took up strategic positions near the Barracks. They went into action
the next morning. Each day and all day, the battle raged around the Killian
Barracks and in the adjoining side streets. At night, things were relatively
quiet, for the Russian tanks always withdrew.
For nearly three days the struggle in Budapest had continued
relentlessly. On Friday the Russians brought in four big field guns to pound the
Killian Barracks into submission. Pál Maléter and the soldiers and civilians
occupying the barracks had no heavy weapons other than their faith in themselves
and in what they were doing. They fought. The workers in the streets fought. The
tram conductor and his 'boys' at the Corvin Cinema fought ... with their one
small gun. Through determination, courage, and a flair for doing the unexpected,
they not only kept the Russian gun crews on their toes, but caused them first
drastically to restrict their fire and within two hours all four guns had been
rendered useless.
Throughout the fighting, Radio Budapest alternated between
calls to the freedom fighters (involved in this, that, or the other big battle)
to surrender, and reports that one or other group of freedom fighters had or was
about to capitulate. This incredible radio station was now listened to strictly
for laughs.
The Massacres
"Working men's Paris, with its Commune, will be forever celebrated
as the glorious harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs are enshrined in
the great heart of the working class. Its exterminators, history has
already nailed to that eternal pillory from which all the prayers of their
priests will not avail to redeem them." K. Marx, The Civil War
in France (1871). |
At a meeting of students and workers in
Magyaróvár on Wednesday, October 24, it was decided to send a delegation the
following morning to A.V.O. headquarters to ask them to remove the Soviet star
from the front of the building. Soon after 10 a.m. on the 25th a large crowd of
students and workers, including many women and children, met in the park. About
two thousand people then began to march to the A.V.O. buildings. They were
unarmed. The demonstration had been openly planned, and the A.V.O. had been busy
during the night digging two trenches in front of their headquarters. Each
trench now held two machine guns, manned by A.V.O. officers. The crowd stopped.
Four workers walked the hundred yards or so and spoke to these officers. "We
request you not to shoot. We are peaceful demonstrators." "All right," said one
of the officers, "come nearer!" The crowd moved forward. All the machine guns
then opened fire. Many people crumpled to the ground. At first, people at the
back didn't believe they were being fired at. Then, starting from the front
rows, from where - the bloody corpses could be seen,63
people began throwing themselves to the ground. From the roofs of the buildings,
A.V.O. men began throwing grenades into the crowd. 101 people were killed and
over 150 seriously wounded, including women and children.
When this dreadful news reached Györ, a little later, a large
number of 'freedom fighters' set out in lorries for Magyaróvár. They arrived in
the afternoon and joined the now-armed battalions of workers and students of
Magyaróvár and of the neighbouring town of Moson. The A.V.O. barracks were
surrounded. The people wanted the gun crews. They got them. Some were just
beaten to death. Others were hanged upside down, beaten to death and their
bodies slashed. This was done by a grim, silent crowd.
In Budapest on the 25th, an unarmed crowd had
begun to march slowly to the Parliament Square from Rákócziút. They carried
national flags with the 'communist' emblem torn from the centre. They also bore
black flags in honour of those killed. According to Charles Coutts64,
they met a Russian tank on the way: "The tank stopped. A soldier put his head
out and the people in the front of the crowd began to explain they were unarmed
and were engaged in a peaceful demonstration. The soldier told them to jump on
the tank: a number of them did so, and the tank set off in the demonstration. I
have a photograph of this."
"Entering Parliament Square they met another
Soviet tank which had been sent to fire on them. This tank, too, turned and
joined the demonstration. In the Square were three more Soviet tanks and two
armoured cars. The crowd went right up to them and began to talk to the
soldiers. The Soviet commandant was saying : 'I have a wife and children waiting
for me in the Soviet Union. I don't want to stay in Hungary at all', when
suddenly from the roof tops there were three salvoes of gun-fire. Some of the
people ran to the sides of the Square for shelter. Others were told by the
Russians to shelter behind their tanks. Some thirty people, including a Soviet
officer, were left lying on the Square either dead or wounded."65
Who fired from the roofs? Coutts thought it was the A.V.O. Who
else could it have been? Their reason was obvious - to provoke the fraternising
Russians into action, to harden their seeming softness. The friendship of the
insurgents towards the Russian soldiers who refused to shoot them was later
shown in a resolution of the Budapest Revolutionary Council which demanded "that
they be accorded right of asylum in Hungary."
The Workers' Councils
|
"Those miners were not concerned with the question as
to whether or not they should have a President. They seized the mine, and
the important question to them was how to keep the cables intact so that
production might not be interrupted. Then came the question of bread, of
which there was a scarcity. All the miners again agreed on the method of
obtaining it. Now this is a real programme of the revolution, not derived
from books. This is a real seizure of power, locally." V. I. Lenin,
The All-Russian April Conference of the Russian Social Democratic
Labour Party (May 1917). |
In the thick of the fighting on Thursday 25, Nagy came again to
the microphone of Budapest Radio.
"As Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I hereby announce
that the Hungarian Government is initiating negotiations on relations between
the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union, concerning among other
things, the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary. ... I am convinced
that Hungarian-Soviet relations built on that basis will provide a firm
foundation for a sincere and true friendship between our peoples." Meanwhile,
the struggle in the streets of Budapest went on more fiercely than ever. As it
developed, so did the strike.
The strike began on the morning
of Wednesday 24. It spread quickly through the industrial suburbs of Budapest -
Czepel, Rada Utca, Ganz, Lunz, Red Star - then out into the industrial centres
of the country - Miskolc, Györ, Szolnok, Pécs, Debrecen. In Budapest, almost the
whole population had risen. In the industrial areas, the revolution was carried
out exclusively by workers. Everywhere the workers formed 'councils': in the
factories, in the steel mills, in the power stations, in the coal mines, in the
railway depots. Everywhere they thrashed out their programmes and demands.
Everywhere they armed themselves. In a number of places they fought. Hubert
Ripka66
comments that, in the middle of the fighting, workers proclaimed "a programme of
radical and political social change. This was a spontaneous development. There
were no governmental directives or any central leadership ... Workers' Councils
took over the management of the factories... In Hungary they were born of a
spontaneous popular movement, and they soon became the living organs of a rising
democracy and the effective instruments of a fighting revolution."67
Radio Budapest's news broadcasts referred to the strike and to
the formation of workers' councils as "industrial disturbances". "Public
demonstrations" in the towns and cities of the various industrial regions, were
constantly referred to. There were also repeated announcements that, in
such-and-such a city, "calm" had returned and that workers should therefore
return to "normal work" the following morning. But in the provinces the workers
had taken over a number of radio stations, and news of a very different kind was
being beamed from them.
There were now hundreds of Workers' Councils throughout the
country. The number of people in the Councils varied considerably. So did their
programmes. But all included demands for the abolition of the A.V.O., for the
complete withdrawal of Russian troops, for political and civil liberty, for
workers' management of factories and industries, for independent trade unions
and freedom for all political parties, and for a general amnesty for all the
insurrectionists.
The various programmes also called for improvements in wages
and pensions, but nowhere were these the first items on the list. Many included
demands for 'parliamentary democracy'. A number expressed their confidence in
Nagy.
Before 'revolutionary socialists' raise their hands in puritan
horror, let them remember that in relation to the social, political, and
economic conditions prevailing in Hungary prior to October 1956, even a Liberal
programme would appear revolutionary. In such conditions, democratic slogans
have an explosive effect. They were a great step forward. They resulted in the
smashing of the totalitarian state machine. These demands had never been
realised under the Horthy regime. The Hungarians turned their backs on both the
feudal-capitalist dictatorship and on the Stalinists. The workers were not
blinded by bourgeois ideology: while they supported broad democratic claims,
they also fought for claims of their own. The workers wanted no more
elections in which the Communist Party imposed a single list of candidates and
where the result had been decided in advance. They wanted to choose their
representatives themselves. They wanted the one-party system abolished. They had
seen it result in the suppression of all opinions and all groupings which did
not conform to the views disseminated by those who controlled the State. They
wanted freedom to organise themselves. It cannot be doubted that such freedom
would have led them to make conscious choices between a number of revolutionary
parties or groups, and to reject both bourgeois and bureaucratic parties which
could have threatened their freedom. Their reactions were fundamentally sound.
Even their demand for freedom of the press was aimed at the destruction of
organs owing allegiance to the State.
A revolution is never 'pure'. Different tendencies show
themselves. The great revolution of 1917 was not pure - side by side with the
workers and poor peasants there fought sections of the petty bourgeoisie ... and
even some elements who felt indignant at the Czar's inability to effectively
wage the war against Germany. When revolution breaks out in the so-called
Peoples' Democracies or in the U.S.S.R., the forces at work will be particularly
complex. Totalitarianism gives rise to universal feelings of revolt. The
majority of the population will some day line up against it, bound at lust by a
common objective: freedom. After this first stage, some will doubtless want to
revive the religion of their ancestors, archaic national customs, the little
private profits they had once made. Others will want radical social change and
will seek to bring about the society to which their rulers had paid lip service
(while they went about destroying any attempt to achieve it). Shopkeepers will
thank God for lower taxes. They may even seek to raise their prices. The workers
meanwhile will be forming their Councils and will take over the factories.
* * *
The level of political consciousness achieved by the Hungarian
workers was quite astonishing. For twelve years every means of propaganda had
been used to stud their minds with the myths and dogmas of the Party's
infallibility, of its right to rule 'on behalf of the working class'. But the
workers knew they had remained a subject class. They had remained those
who merely carried out the self-interested decisions taken by a managerial and
bureaucratic hierarchy. The most 'revolutionary' words were no substitute for
the reality of their everyday experience both in production and in society at
large. Reality, however fogged by incessant propaganda, kept their class
instinct unblunted.
On Thursday, the Councils had begun to
link up. In the cities, the main Councils (usually simply called 'Revolutionary
Councils') consisted of delegates from all the councils in the area. Some of
these Revolutionary Councils included representatives from white-collar workers,
from the local peasants and from the army. Peasants willingly supplied the
rebels with food. In some agricultural areas, despite their allegedly intrinsic
conservatism, the peasants formed their own councils - for example, that of the
big state farm at Babolna.68
On Thursday afternoon, while Nagy and Kadar
were promising they would negotiate for the withdrawal of the Russians, it had
become clear that nothing could stop the growth of the Councils and of the
General Strike. By the evening the Councils constituted the only real power in
the country apart from the Red Army.69
Radio Budapest meanwhile paternalistically proclaimed: "The Government knows
that the rebels are quite sincere."
Thursday, October 25, marked a sort of turning point. It seemed
the Government was giving way. Premier Nagy now appeared to realise the strength
of the movement throughout the country. The previous morning he had only
appealed to the "People of Budapest". At that time Revolutionary Councils had
already been formed in all the main cities. The Miskolc Revolutionary Council
had, for example, been elected early on Wednesday by all the workers of the
factories in the area. It immediately organised a strike in all sectors except
the public services (transport, electrical power supply, and hospitals). A
delegation was sent to the capital to coordinate activities with the Budapest
Councils, and there to put forward the proposals of the Miskolc Council's
programme. These proposals were similar to those mentioned above. They had been
made known to the whole of Hungary on Thursday 25 when the revolutionaries had
gained control of Miskolc Radio.
The Miskolc Council was not opposed to Nagy. It
even proposed him as First Minister of a new government. But that did not
prevent it from doing the opposite of what Nagy wanted. When he begged the
insurrectionaries to lay down their arms and go back to work, the Miskolc
Council formed workers' militias, maintained and extended the strike and
organised itself as a local government independent of the central power... It
was only ready to support Nagy if he applied a revolutionary programme. Thus
when Nagy brought representatives of the Smallholders Party (Zoltan Tildy and
Bela Kovacs) into the Government the council reacted vigorously. In a special
communiqué broadcast on Saturday 27, at 9.30 p.m., the Council declared that it
had "taken power in all the Borsod region.70 It
severely condemns all those who term our battle a battle against the will and
power of the people. We have confidence in Imre Nagy. but we do not agree with
the composition of his Government. All those politicians who have sold
themselves to the Soviet Union must not have a place in the Government."
"This last declaration also puts the activity
of the Council into proper perspective. It acted like an autonomous government.
On the day it took power in the Borsod region, it dissolved the organisations
which were the hallmark of the preceding regime, that is, all the organisations
of the Communist Party. This measure was announced by the radio on the morning
of Sunday, October 28. It also announced that the peasants in the region had
driven out those responsible for the kolkhozes and begun a redistribution of the
land. In Györ, in Pécs, in the greater part of other large towns, the situation
was similar to that in Miskolc. It was the Workers' Councils which directed
everything: they armed the fighters, organised the provisioning, presented the
political and economic demands."71
* * *
Some idea as to what the Revolutionary Councils were like can
be got by looking at the Council at Györ. Its headquarters were the Town Hall.
At almost any time of the day, the square outside was packed with groups of
people deeply, and often loudly, engrossed in discussion. In a revolution 'from
below', there will always be a great deal of talking, arguing, row, jostling,
polemic, excitement, and agitation.
Delegations leaving the Town Hall for other Councils crossed
deputations coming in from the various local groups and committees. The noise
and bustle inside the Town Hall reminded one of the seeming chaos of a disturbed
ants' nest. Shouldered rifles got caught up with shouldered flags. Arm-banded
people holding documents jostled their way through thronged corridors. People
filled the rooms. As one walked along the corridors one knew from the various
sounds coming from the rooms that this was a real people's movement - a calm
male voice, the shrill ring of a telephone, the excited tones of a girl, uproar,
laughter, booing, swearing, applause. Many deputations demanded lorries for a
great attack on Budapest to relieve Red Army pressure on the 'freedom fighters'.
Council members argued that this would prejudice the success of the revolution.
All lorries that could be spared should be used to carry food to the people of
Budapest. The huge numbers of people who turned out to help with this operation
showed that a majority agreed with the Council's decision. Meanwhile a man was
addressing a crowd in the square demanding the removal of the 'compromisers'
from the Council. The spokesman of a deputation wanting a 'march on Budapest'
was denouncing those on the Council who wanted 'to pacify us instead of
mobilising us'. But from this seeming chaos had nevertheless evolved a programme
of demands which had the support of the great majority.
From the first day of the revolution, a truly proletarian
movement had expressed itself in the spontaneous formation of Councils all over
Hungary. These Councils, partially isolated by the Red Army, immediately sought
to federate. By the end of the first week, they had virtually established a
Republic of Councils. Only their authority meant anything. The Government,
regardless of the fact that Nagy was at its head, had no authority whatsoever.
Does anyone still wonder why
the Kremlin and its stooges used the foullest methods to smear and discredit
this Revolution? They called it a 'counter-revolution', a 'fascist uprising'.72
Does anyone still wonder why the press and the 'leaders' of the West used lies
in their efforts to misrepresent this Revolution as merely a 'national'
uprising? Nationalist aspects there certainly were, but these were taken out of
context and given a prominence and an importance they certainly did not
warrant.73
* * *
Apart from the industrial workers the real social force in the
provinces was the agricultural proletariat - the peasantry. Peasant claims
during this period may have been confused, but their struggle for the division
of the land had a revolutionary character. To get rid of the Kolkhoze
(collective farm) bosses, had for them the same meaning as getting rid of the
great landowners. Under the Horthy regime, agricultural workers represented over
40% of the population. They had tasted the benefits of agrarian reform after the
war, but saw themselves almost immediately deprived of their new rights and
forced into collective farms. Hatred for the bureaucrats who managed the
co-operatives and got rich at their expense came to replace, almost without
transition, the hatred they had previously felt for their ancestral exploiters -
the landed aristocrats.
After October 23, a redistribution of land took place in some
districts. In others the co-operatives continued to function although taken over
by the peasants. This suggests that certain peasant groups were aware of the
advantages of collective work despite the exploitation they had suffered under
the Rakosi regime. Although many peasants were prepared to put their trust in
representatives of parties such as the Smallholders (who reflected and expressed
their religious and family traditions) they nevertheless remained members of an
exploited class. They showed they were ready to reunite with the working class
in its struggle for socialist aims.
In this context, the programme of the Magyarovar Municipal
Executive Committee, (a body obviously directed by peasant elements) should be
mentioned. It demanded free elections under the control of the United Nations,
the immediate re-establishment of the professional organisation of the
peasantry, and the free exercise of their profession by small craftsman and
tradesmen. The programme goes on to make a whole series of bourgeois-democratic
claims. But at the same time it demands "the suppression of all class
distinctions" (point 13). This surely shows that within the peasantry
conservative and revolutionary elements always co-exist. This had been shown by
the Russian Revolution itself, some 40 years earlier.
While the idea of collective farms could be profoundly
socialist, collective ownership only has a socialist content provided the
association of peasants is freely arrived at. If. as was the case prior to
October 23, agricultural workers are forced into collectives, if they do not
themselves determine their work in common but have to carry our orders of
officials who don't work, if their standard of living does not increase, if the
differentials between their incomes and those of the bureaucracy are great and
grow greater, then such collectives have nothing whatever to do with socialism.
They can in fact prove to be instruments for a 'rationalised' and intensified
form of exploitation.
The Revolutionary Programme
|
"Proletarian revolutions ... again and again stop
short in their progress; retrace their steps in order to make a fresh
start; are pitilessly scornful of the half-measures, the weaknesses, the
futility of their preliminary essays. It seems as if they had overthrown
their adversaries only in order that these may draw renewed strength from
contact with the earth and return to the battle like giants refreshed.
Again and again they shrink back appalled before the vague immensity of
their own ends." K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte (1852). |
On Friday October 26, the newly formed National Council of Free
Trade Unions published its famous resolution. This Council was a federation of
the recently dissolved and reformed trade unions.
The resolution comprised a list of far-ranging demands. It
gathered together and clarified the demands put forward by various Workers
Councils throughout the country. It was signed by the President of the Council.
The demands were as follows:
"Political
(1) That the fighting cease, an amnesty be declared, and
negotiations begun with the Youth delegates.
(2) That a broad government, comprising representatives of the
Trade Unions and of youth, be constituted with Imre Nagy as its president.
(3) That the country's economic situation be put to the people
in all honesty.
(4) That help be given to people wounded in the tragic battles
which had just taken place and to the families of the victims.
(5) That, to maintain order, the police and the army be
reinforced by a national guard composed of workers and young people.
(6) That, with the support of the trade unions, an organisation
of young workers be formed.
(7) That the new government start immediate negotiations for
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungarian territory.
Economic
(1) Constitution of Workers' Councils in all the factories, to
establish (a) workers' management and (b) a radical transformation of the system
of central planning and direction of the economy by the state.
(2) Readjustment of wages: immediate rise of 15% in monthly
wages less than 800 forints and of 10% in wages less than 1,500 forints. Maximum
monthly wages to be fixed at 3,500 forints.
(3) Abolition of production norms except in factories where the
workers' council elect to keep them.
(4) Abolition of the 4% tax paid by unmarried people and
childless families.
(5) The lowest pensions to be increased.
(6) Family allowances to be increased.
(7) Speed-up of house building by the State.
(8) That the promise made by Imre Nagy be kept
regarding the start of negotiations with the Government of the U.S.S.R. and
other countries with a view to establishing economic relations ensuring mutual
advantages by adhering to the principle of equality."74
The resolution concluded by demanding that the Hungarian trade
unions should function as before 1948, and should henceforth be called: The Free
Hungarian Trade Unions.
The Daily Worker of
Saturday, October 27, 1956, significantly ignored the political demands, but
published an approximately correct version of all eight economic ones. The
economic points of the programme alone must have startled Daily Worker
readers who simultaneously were being told that the revolution 'owed its
inspiration to fascism'. The newspaper of the British Communist Party presumably
took its line from Pravda.75
The Kremlin mouthpiece, echoed the words of Shepilov, the Russian Foreign
Minister, when it reported: "Events in Hungary have amply demonstrated that a
reactionary, counter-revolutionary underground, well-armed and thoroughly
trained for vigorous action against the people's system, had been set up there
with help from outside ... (but) it is clear that People's Hungary had, and has
now, a number of difficulties and unsolved problems. There have been serious
mistakes in the economic field ..."76
But why did the Daily Worker keep so silent about the
political demands of the National Council of Free Trade Unions? Undoubtedly,
because the programme as a whole was further indisputable proof of what the real
forces were behind the Revolution.
Although the Hungarian workers still saw the problem in terms
of 'men of good will' in whom they could have confidence, they were sufficiently
alive to the inadequacies of this view to demand that direct representatives of
workers and youth be included in the Government, and that the Government be
supported by the permanent arming of the youth and of the workers. Youth was
undoubtedly the vanguard of the Revolution.
The Hungarian unions moreover were not prepared to leave to the
Government the job of deciding everything in their name. Through their demand
for the recognition of their own autonomous organisations (free,
democratically-elected and truly representative of the class), they wanted to
consolidate and extend the power they already held. Hence their demand for the
"constitution of Workers' Councils in all factories". They may not have been
aware of the implications of their demands and of their potential power to
enforce them. Yet the trend was clear. In their everyday lives, in their work,
they were not prepared to remain mere executants. They wanted to act on their
own behalf.
For proof, let us look again at the first 'economic' point,
which demanded the establishment of workers' management and a radical
transformation of the system of central planning and direction of the economy by
the State. The demand may be imprecisely formulated, but we can understand its
basic logic. Workers were rejecting the idea that production should be planned
independently of them. They were rejecting the State bureaucracy's 'right' to
send down the instructions. They were intensely interested in what was to
be decided nationally - and by whom; in what industries or what sections
of industry the biggest efforts would have to be made - and why; what was
to be the volume of production in each section and how production was to
be organised. They wanted to know how all this would affect their standard of
living, the length of their working week, and the rhythm of work it would all
entail.
The basic logic of the first demand is reinforced by the second
and third. We can have no doubt about what was really in the minds of the
workers. The demand that production norms be abolished (except in the factories
where the Councils elected to keep them) is quite precise. It emphasises an
elementary point: since the workers are the producers, they must be free to
organise their work as they understand it. They wished to be rid of the whole
hierarchical set-up of the bureaucracy: from those at its summit, who took the
key decisions about the level of production down through the 'office
scientists', with their charts and graphs, seeking to interpret these decisions
- down further still to the foremen and time-and-motion snoopers, on the shop
floor, with their stop-watches, hustling the workers to make products out of
blueprints. In all of these the workers saw attempts to dominate the labour
process from the outside, attempts to subordinate human work to that of the
machine - often to a point where the effort required was too great even for the
machine itself.
It is characteristic of the managerial bureaucrats, both East
and West, that they seek to maintain and widen a hierarchy among the workers.
This, indeed, is essential to management. Only in this way can they hope to
exercise a more complete control over 'their' labour force. The demand for a
readjustment of wages was made to counteract this tendency. The Hungarian
workers were quite aware that a wide range of pay scales (sometimes very
complicated) enabled their rulers, on the one hand, to foster the growth of a
'labour aristocracy' which would support the established regime, and on the
other hand, to divide the workers, to isolate them from one another.
This struggle against hierarchy and wage differentials is
fundamental for any movement seeking to achieve workers' power and a classless
society. It can be seen to emerge, in the United States, Britain, France, or
Germany, whenever 'unofficial' strikes occur independently of the union
leadership. To maintain its control, management seeks to sectionalise the
managed. But in so doing it creates enormous problems for itself. As all this
becomes clearer to the workers, as inevitably it must, the struggle becomes
sharper. Due to the speed of modern technological development and to the
ever-increasing division of labour, workers whose jobs once appeared to be
different are now beginning to see that they are not as different as all that.
Wage differentials (or, for the moment at least, their more extreme instances)
begin to appear absurd.
The trade unions' resolution clearly revealed (and this is its
great importance) that the Hungarian workers had discovered that under the rule
of the bureaucracy, they had as little say in the running of their own affairs
as they had had under private capitalism. They saw the real division in their
industries, in their society, and in their lives, as the one between those who
decided everything and those who had only to obey. A mere three days after the
rising and still in the fire of battle, their programme was an affirmation of
all they were fighting for. It was a fundamentally revolutionary programme,
although they had little idea of how it was to be carried out.
This new federation of trade unions, shorn of the bureaucratic
leadership, democratically elected and basing itself on the Workers' Councils
and their demands, was typical of the Hungarian political scene in those last
days of October 1956. Freedom became an elixir, gulped down greedily by those
who had been dying of thirst. The people seemed to sense that this freedom was
to be short-lived, so ardently did they go about re-arranging everything around
them.
Dual Power
|
"What constitutes dual power? The fact that by the
side of the Provisional Government, the government of the bourgeoisie,
there has developed another, as yet weak, embryonic, but undoubtedly real
and growing government - the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies ...
a power based not on laws made by a centralised state power, but on
outright revolutionary seizure, on the direct initiative of the masses
from below." V. I. Lenin, On Dual Power (April
1917). |
Several parties suddenly re-appeared, including the
Social-Democratic Party, the National Peasant Party, and the Smallholders Party.
Kadar disclosed that the Communist Party had been 're-organised'. It was to have
a new name: the Socialist Workers' Party. The new Executive Committee would only
be composed of those who had fought against Rakosi (himself, Nagy and five
others!).
Twenty-five new dailies replaced the five dreary and obedient
mouthpieces of the defunct 'people's bureaucracy'. Not only did people get news,
real news at last, but also clashes of opinion, full-blooded polemics,
hard-hitting commentaries, satire and wit.
But there was little to be gay about in Budapest. Day and
night, gunfire could be heard. There was no public transport. Knocked-out
Russian tanks stood raggedly about the streets, while others rumbled continually
up and down. Shattered buildings with gaping holes cast grotesque shadows across
hundreds of bodies lying in the streets amid the broken glass, empty cartridges
and other debris. Occasionally, a van with a Red Cross flag or a lorry-load of
'freedom fighters' would go crunching by. Some food shops were open. The
cinemas, theatres, and restaurants were closed. In the ferment of activity,
there was no time or thought for entertainment.
From Friday night on, the struggle had become increasingly
bitter. By this time, 5,500 political prisoners had been released by the
revolutionaries. During the night of Saturday to Sunday, the 'boys' broke into
Budapest prison and released all the political prisoners. Their poor physical
condition and the nauseating stories they told of torture by the A.V.O.,
heightened the people's hatred for the secret police. This, coupled with the
fact that only the A.V.O. fought with the Red Army, brought the people's anger
to a climax. Almost every captured A.V.O. man was beaten to death and hanged by
the feet, to be spat upon by the angry crowds.
Budapest Radio was still calling for a cease-fire. Again and
again it repeated Kadar's and Nagy's promises. They promised immediate wage
increases. They promised the formation of Workers' Councils in all factories.
(Since every factory already had its Workers' Council, this was a sinister offer
indeed). They also promised an immediate start of negotiations to put
Russo-Hungarian relations on a basis of equality. But they added that none of
these things would be done until 'law and order' was restored. Throughout, 'law
and order' remained Nagy's refrain.
Whom did Nagy want to impress with his demands for 'order'? The
workers? He was quite aware of what was happening up and down the country. He
knew that delegates from the main committees throughout Hungary had met in Györ
to co-ordinate and put forward the people's demands. These now included
"withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact". The presence in Györ of delegates
from Budapest probably gave credence to the report that a provisional government
was being formed there. Nagy had to get some 'influential' support quickly.
Nagy went to Budapest Radio again. (All other radio stations in
the country - Miskolc, Györ Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen and Magyaróvár - were now
controlled by the Revolutionary Councils). He announced some concessions. The
A.V.O. would be dissolved. The Government would be 're-organised'.
A cease-fire was promised while the Government
're-organisation' was in progress. By this time, a number of fighting groups had
surrendered, because their ammunition had run out. Others, weakened by
casualties, had been rounded up. But at several points, notably Szena Square and
the Killian Barracks, groups were still holding out. By the weekend many people
began to think the Revolution had gained some kind of victory. Russian tanks
were no longer attacking. There were rumours that they were about to withdraw
from Budapest.
Yet the workers were suspicious of Nagy. His various
pronouncements about 'order' and so on, seemed to them deliberate delaying
tactics, aimed at getting a tighter grip on the country. On Monday, October 29,
delegates from Councils throughout the country, meeting at Györ sent Nagy a
strongly worded resolution, re-affirming their demands. This message almost
amounted to an ultimatum.
Early on Tuesday morning, Budapest Radio confirmed that the Red
Army was to withdraw. Later in the afternoon a statement that "the withdrawal of
the troops of the Soviet Union has begun", was broadcast in the name of the
Prime Minister. At the same time, Nagy said that "to ensure complete orderliness
of the troops' departure, every citizen must refrain from any provocative,
disturbing or hostile action". He also appealed for a resumption of work.
Similar appeals were broadcast the same day by Tildy and Kadar.
Red Army units began withdrawing from Budapest
at 4 p.m. The workers remained suspicious. The Councils' delegates at Györ
immediately put out a call for the General Strike to be maintained and
strengthened77
until the last Russian soldier had left the country. A resumption of work would
only be considered when negotiations were started on the basis of their other
claims.
* * *
The country was still locked in strike when an official
statement was issued that it was not Imre Nagy but András Hegedüs and Ernö Gerö
who bore full responsibility for calling in Russian troops on the previous
Wednesday morning. At a time when Nagy's authority and that of his 'Government'
were at their lowest, they decided to disclaim all responsibilty for one of the
most important events of the whole period: the invoking of the Warsaw Pact! But
Nagy gave no reason for his seven-day silence on this matter. The fact did not
escape the notice of the Hungarian workers. A few days earlier they might have
been impressed. Now, the strike continued.
As far as the Hungarian people were concerned, with each day
that passed the statement assumed a diminishing significance. It was now
irrelevant. But it was relevant to the 'leadership'. It showed their dilemma.
They were desperate to regain their authority, to re-establish their 'order' and
control. Who knows exactly how far they were successful? Many intellectuals
welcomed Nagy's statement, like drowning men clutch at a straw. They took Nagy
back into their hearts. The Government regained some of its authority. A large
proportion of the Army and ordinary police began once again to obey its orders.
As instructed, they took over, unopposed, from the Russian units withdrawing
from Budapest.
On the other hand, the workers in parts of Budapest and in the
rest of the country remained armed and solidly behind their own organisations. A
classical situation of 'dual power' existed.
The Hungarian people were weakened at an extremely critical
time by the Government's frantic desire to regain control. The Red Army had only
withdrawn to positions outside Budapest! The city was ringed with Russian tanks.
At the same time, fresh Russian troops were pouring into the country from the
north-east. By Thursday, November 1, (when British aircraft were busy bombing
Egyptians at Suez) these new Red Army units had already reached Szolnok, in
central Hungary. They were about eighty miles from Budapest.
As soon as the Revolutionary Councils, Workers' Councils, and
other autonomous organisations in North-east Hungary (e.g. Miskolc) learned
about these Russian troop movements, they informed all other Councils throughout
the country. Ultimatums were sent to Nagy that unless Red Army soldiers
immediately stopped entering Hungary and withdrew, the Councils would take
drastic action. This clearly implied that the people themselves would try to
stop them.
The Councils received no official answer.
Several ministers of Nagy's reorganised Government again appealed for 'order'
and for a resumption of work. The strike was now gripping the few hitherto
functioning sections of industry. "The workers reiterated: first the Russians
must leave, then they would end the strike."78
By the evening of November 1, Nagy was under very great
pressure indeed. The Hungarian Government delegation which included Pál Maléter,
the well-liked Communist of Killian Barracks fame, who was now Minister of
Defence, and General Istvan Kovacs his Chief of Staff - were still negotiating
with Kremlin representatives about Red Army withdrawal and other military
arrangements. The Russians issued a statement that the troops entering Hungary
were there simply to cover their withdrawal. But Nagy was now well aware of the
Kremlin's purpose. He knew what the fresh Russian divisions were for. He was
desperate.
Just before 7 p.m., Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who earlier in
the day had taken over the Foreign Ministry, broadcast a short speech in which
he declared the neutrality of the 'Hungarian People's Republic'. Nagy had moved
a long way towards meeting the demands of the revolutionaries. On October 24, he
had invoked the Warsaw Pact. On November 1, he revoked it. But it was too late.
The next day, Friday November 2, the Russian
delegate at the United Nations declared that all reports about Russian troops
moving back into Hungary were "utterly unfounded". Most of the Western delegates
had a rough idea of the real situation in Hungary. Reports from various radio
stations controlled by the revolutionaries had been picked up by Western
monitoring services on the Continent, in the United Kingdom and in the U.S.A..
Yet neither then nor later did Western delegates 'embarrass' the U.S.S.R. by
questioning the truth of its delegate's statement. How could they? The American
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had summed up their attitude eleven days
earlier (October 22). In a speech in Washington, he defended the legality of
Russian troops being in Poland under the Warsaw Pact: "From the standpoint of
international law and violation of treaties, I do not think you could claim that
it would be a violation of a treaty."79
At 2.18 p.m. on Saturday, November 3, Radio Budapest announced
"the Soviet delegation has promised that no further trains carrying troops will
cross the Hungarian frontier". This promise may well have been kept. Red Army
units had by now occupied air fields, main road functions and railway stations
in almost the whole of the country apart from the big cities.
Later in the afternoon, four of Nagy's ministers - Kadar, Apro,
Marosán and Münnich - disappeared. They were in fact at the Russian Embassy to
which they had been invited for a meeting with Mikoyan, recently flown in from
Moscow. Many members of Nagy's latest Government were confident the Russians
were not going to attack. Even Pál Maléter, leader of the Hungarian delegation
still negotiating at Red Army headquarters, is said to have "trusted their words
and sincerity". On the same day two ministers, Dr. Zolton Tildy, Minister of
State, and Geza Losconczi held a press conference in the Gobelin room at
Parliament House, Questioned about the imminence of a new Russian attack. Tildy
said, "Such a tragedy is humanly impossible ... it will never take place."
The workers did not share this optimism. The General Strike was
now complete. The workers were really in control. If Nagy was really any
different from the rest, now was the chance to show it. An appeal from Nagy for
the workers to stand fast would have galvanised the revolutionaries. Instead
Nagy appealed to ... U.N.O.!
Just before midnight, Colonel Pál Maléter and General Kovacs
were arrested by Red Army officers while officially still taking part in
'negotiations'. They were imprisoned in a villa on Gorky Allée. The scene was
set.
The
Second Russian Intervention
"Will Hungary move further forward toward Socialism, or will she
allow the forces of reaction to gain the upper hand and restore a scheme
of things that would throw the nation back a
generation?" Pravda, November 4,
1956. |
At 4 o'clock on Sunday morning, November 4, Budapest was roused
by the thunder of shells bursting in the city centre. Hundreds of guns in the
hills of Buda opened fire, their flashes flood-lighting the MIG fighters, as
they screamed over the city. The armed forces of the Russian State had begun
their attack to crush the Hungarian workers.
The attack was country-wide and simultaneous. All the major
cities were pounded by artillery. But the people were not terrorised. They knew
that the uneasy truce of the last few days wouldn't last. They knew that,
militarily, the situation was hopeless. Yet at the first sound of gunfire they
were galvanised into action. Young and old, workers, students, soldiers, and
children, all took up their positions in the streets before the armoured
divisions had reached the outskirts of Budapest. The barricades were rebuilt, at
times with the same materials used on October 24. In some places children loaded
handcarts with suitable objects and dragged them to the barricade builders.
The Russian tanks entered Budapest, their guns blazing. They
were firing phosphorus as well as ordinary shells. Several buildings were soon
in flames. The tanks were immediately attacked by the people. Pitched battles
were fought with the inevitable outcome. The tanks advanced towards the town
centre. The struggle was repeated in the other large towns of Hungary. Györ for
example; was completely surrounded by a steel wall of tanks, squeezing in
relentlessly. Everywhere, the people fought even mare courageously and against
far greater odds than ten days earlier. There were now fifteen Russian armoured
divisions in the country, with six thousand tanks. Who could still deny this was
a popular revolution?
At 6 a.m. Nagy, with fifteen others and their families, sought
refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, where it had earlier been agreed they would be
given protection. Just after 7 a.m., the first Russian tanks reached Parliament
Square. Obviously acting on orders, a number of officers rushed into the
Parliament Building. They found no one to arrest.
In the streets, between the tall buildings, the din of battle
was becoming deafening. Smoke from burning buildings, exploding shells and
Molotov cocktails, mixed with the dust from crashing masonry to create a choking
fog. The sight of the mounting dead and the agonising cries of the wounded
created a fog to choke the mind. Was this nightmare a 'defence of socialism'?
As the tanks continued their advance, strong points of
resistance emerged: Szena Square and the Killian Barracks as in the earlier
battles. The single field gun by the Corvin Cinema was still in action. At
several points near the old Royal Palace in Buda, along the Boulevard and at the
Polytechnic, the revolutionaries could not be dislodged.
Despite very heavy bombardment,
all the big working class districts - particularly 'red' Czepel, Dunapentele,
Ujpest, Köbanya - were still in the hands of the workers.80 In
the first Russian attack, these working class areas had been subjected to
lighter treatment. Now, they bore the full weight of the onslaught. The new
Russian troops had no sentimental feelings about Hungarians. They had been well
indoctrinated: the freedom fighters were 'fascists' and 'bourgeois capitalists'.
Peter Fryer, in his last dispatch to the Daily Worker (which the editor
would not even allow his staff to see) says: "Some of the rank-and-file Soviet
troops have been telling people that they had no idea they had come to Hungary.
They thought at first they were in Berlin, fighting German fascists."81
These new troops were disgruntled at having to come to Hungary. Some were
frightened, not only by the sight of so many of their tanks standing burnt-out
and silent, but by the ferocity and courage of the Hungarians. Hand-to-tank
fighting was going on in many streets. People ran up close to the tanks and made
sure their Molotov cocktails did not miss - it is difficult for a tank to train
its guns on a close target. Some got so close to the tanks that they were able
to throw in hand-grenades, then close the driver's hatch.
The fight of the Hungarian workers should be remembered by
those who say the British working class has been completely demoralised by their
rulers' well-propagated ideology of 'self'. In Hungary, years of violent
suppression and concentrated propaganda had failed to destroy the workers'
vision of a new society. They were fighting what they knew to be a military
force a thousand times more powerful than themselves. But they were fighting for
something more than bread and circuses. They were fighting for a totally new way
of life. In a mere eleven days they had become giants.
At this stage Janos Kadar came
forward to help the Kremlin put the clock back. At Szolnok, sixty miles
southeast of Budapest, Kadar formed what he called a new Workers' and Peasants'
Government.82
This Government immediately issued a proclamation. It had asked the Russian
Government "for help in liquidating the counter-revolutionary forces and
restoring order". The Daily Worker of November 5 had put it slightly
differently: "It called for Soviet aid to close the Austro-Hungarian border
across which fascist elements had been streaming for several days."83
This all appeared an underestimation of the 'wisdom' of the Russian Government,
which had started to 'help in liquidating' the Revolution several hours before
the Kadar Government had even been formed! Kadar's part was that of an
'accessory after the fact' pretending he was speaking before the fact.
Either way, Kadar and the others were guilty of complicity.
They carry a full share of responsibilty for the savage and brutal massacre of
thousands of workers and young people in Hungary.
The Kremlin remained consistent in its lies and
hypocrisy. Later in the day, while mass murder continued, the Russian delegate,
Sobelev, calmly addressed a meeting of the United Nations Security Council.
"Events in Hungary", he said, "have clearly shown that the workers there, who
had been able to make great achievements under a democratic regime, had rightly
raised a number of questions appertaining to the eradication of certain
shortcomings in their economic life. But they were exploited by reactionary,
counter-revolutionary elements who wanted to undermine the popular regime and
restore the former landlord and capitalist regime in Hungary.84
Goebbels claimed that "the bigger the lie, the more it's
believed". He never bettered this one. The workers were leading a Revolution
against a 'democratic regime' which had given them 'great achievements'? They
had raised 'questions' about 'shortcomings in their economic life'?
Demands become 'questions'. Total exploitation becomes
'shortcomings'! Note again the fear of admitting, no matter how guardedly, the
existence of political dissatisfaction! And does the workers' programme look
like that of a people bent on restoring capitalism and led by 'reactionary and
counter-revolutionary elements'?
'Counter-revolution' was the propaganda bogey
of the day. Just after midday on Sunday, November 4, Moscow Radio announced that
the "counter-revolution in Hungary has been crushed". Later in the afternoon,
the Kremlin broadcast that the "complete defeat of the counter-revolution is
under way". At 8 p.m. Kadar announced that the "counter-revolution" had been
completely defeated. Following Kadar, Moscow Radio reverted to its midday
statement declaring that "order has been restored in Hungary and the resistance
of a negligible handful overcome with the assistance of the Budapest
population."85 In
fact, heavy fighting was to continue for about ten days.
What did the Kremlin mean by "counter-revolution"? Through
careful propaganda over the years they had sustained the myth that despite their
tactical zig-zags, theirs were still the original revolutionary aims of
October 1917. Members and supporters of the various communist parties have been
led to revere the Soviet Union as the vanguard and guardian of this revolution.
Any movement that opposed Russian 'socialism' was branded as
'counter-revolutionary'. This was just one of the many smears used by the
Russian bureaucracy to discredit those who fundamentally challenged its rule.
The Hungarian revolutionaries believed they were fighting for a society in which
the basic conflict in production and social life had been removed - for a
classless society in which the people themselves managed their factories, their
industries and thus their lives. They had had their illusions in Russia savagely
dispelled during the previous twelve years. No one has done more than the
Hungarians to expose the myth of Russia as the vanguard of such a revolution and
of such a society. They exposed it with their political and economic
organisation. They exposed with their revolutionary demands. They exposed it in
a grim battle with the Red Army. Above all, they exposed it with their humour.
Out of their misery came an incredible and
heart-rending humour. It emphasised rather than disguised the people's
bitterness. As all major resistance drew to its close, a week after the second
Russian attack, hundreds of posters, roughly produced and simply worded, began
mysteriously to appear on the ruins of Budapest - like smiles through tears.
Their irony was crushing. One neatly showed the Hungarians' contempt for Russian
smear tactics: "Ten million counter-revolutionaries at large in the country!"
Another said "Former aristocrats, land and factory owners, Cardinals, Generals,
and other supporters of the old capitalist regime, disguised as factory workers
and peasants are making propaganda against the patriotic government and against
our Russian friends." Another recalled a phrase from pre-revolution travel
propaganda: "Come and see our beautiful capital in Soviet-Hungarian friendship
month." A skit on the Government and its spate of propaganda about what 'honest'
Hungarians were doings86
appeared in a little poster which said: "Luckily, seven honest men were found in
the country. They are all in the Government."
During the week, this puppet Government took up the old
Stalinist tactic of blowing hot and cold in its psychological war for the minds
of the Hungarian people. Kadar kept up a continuous barrage of promises and
threats. But it had no effect. The people had been immunised through years of
bitter experience. He announced 'changes'. Many members of the A.V.O. - Rakosi's
and Getö's secret police - were still alive. As the Red Army began to take
control, they crawled out of their hiding places, like rats from sewers. Kadar,
who had already changed the name of the Communist Party to the Hungarian
Socialist Workers' Party, now changed the name of the A.V.O.. New names, new
uniforms. But they still behaved like the secret police of a totalitarian state.
Not only were they eager to act on Kadar's orders. They were burning for
revenge. During the last week of October, the workers, enraged by A.V.O.
atrocities, had chased them underground. With the Red Army to protect them, they
now reverted to their terror methods. Torture and beatings began again. While
fierce battles were still raging, freedom fighters were being hanged from the
bridges on the Danube and in the streets. Almost all were workers. The bodies,
sometimes hanging in groups, had notices pinned to them: "This is how we deal
with counter-revolutionaries".
The Proletariat Fights On
"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of
class struggles." K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the
Communist Party (1848). |
But the workers were not cowed. Despite Government appeals,
threats, and terror, the importance of the Workers' Councils, formed in October,
increased daily.
The Councils maintained and strengthened the solidarity of the
General Strike. Intellectuals, peasants, and other non-industrial workers who
had not hitherto fully appreciated their importance now turned even more towards
them. They recognised that here was the heart of real power in the
country. Kadar knew it too. The Councils had already shown how efficiently they
could run the country. And in the process, Kadar, the Government, the A.V.O.,
indeed the whole bureaucratic set-up, had been exposed as not only superfluous
to the needs of the people, but as an encumbrance holding back their advance to
real freedom.
The ruling minorities of the whole world had been given
redundancy notices by the workers of Hungary. A new form of society was here
being juxtaposed to the old. The rottenness of the 'old' was being forced into
relief. The shock was not only felt in Moscow. It reverberated through the
managing and bureaucratic 'elites' the whole world over. The Hungarian workers
had made it quite clear they did not want the 'Communism' of the Kremlin. In so
doing, they had made it equally clear that capitalism, even in its 'enlightened
' form, was just as irrelevant to their needs. Most important of all, they had
proved once again that the achievement of 'workers' power' and the emancipation
of the working class can only come from below, from the workers' own action, and
never from a 'leadership' acting on their behalf.
In the conditions of pre-revolution Hungary a movement
advocating ideas such as our own would almost certainly have been liquidated. It
was just these ideas nevertheless that came to the fore during the last week of
October. Several people had no doubt held them for some time. For others, they
were born out of the impact and intellectual ferment of the struggle itself, as
part of their class instinct and elemental sense of solidarity. A group with
views such as ours [Solidarity] might have helped, during the revolution,
explicitly to formulate these ideas and to warn of the dangers of the
bureaucratic counter-revolution. As it was, the ideas emerged clearly enough to
gain the allegiance of hundreds and later of thousands and tens of thousands of
people. This was a grave threat to the Kadar Government. It was, above all, a
threat to the Russian bosses who had 'elected ' it ... with their six thousand
tanks. The threat had to be smashed.
* * *
Large-scale military resistance ceased by Saturday, November
10. Scores of disabled Russian tanks lay scattered around Budapest. It had
obviously been contrary to accepted military strategy to send so much armour
into the built-up areas of a city to suppress a revolution. One reason for the
Kremlin's decision may well have been their shocked realisation of how much
fraternisation had taken place between Russian troops and the Hungarian people
during the first attack.
On November 4, to be sure of success, the
Russians felt it necessary to use a large number of troops. They put them in
tanks (called 'Kadar taxis' by the Hungarians) to reduce to a minimum physical
contact with the civilian people. Russian soldiers would thus see less of
Hungarian living conditions, see less that it was ordinary working people they
were fighting. Yet they could see the devastation their bombardment was causing
in the cities. In his last unpublished dispatch to the Daily Worker,
Peter Fryer wrote: "I have just come out of Budapest, where for six days I have
watched Hungary's new born freedom tragically destroyed by Soviet troops. Vast
areas of the city - the working class areas above all - are virtually in ruins.
For four days and nights Budapest was under continuous bombardment. I saw a once
lovely city battered, bludgeoned, smashed and bled into submission."87 By
the end of that terrible week, a trickle back to work began. But the workers had
not submitted. Most sections of industry were still strike-bound.
In the towns, organised resistance by groups of fighting
workers and youth ended on November 14. Although sporadic fighting continued
well into 1957, in the country districts, the military defeat of the Hungarians
was complete. But what everyone had thought would only take a few hours. had
taken over a week. And the Hungarian people were still not defeated. The
Workers' Councils were gaining strength. They proclaimed that their demands
remained unchanged. These were similar to those put forward by the Council of
Hungarian Trade Unions - although in some cases there was now more stress on the
demand for the 'release' of Nagy and for the withdrawal of Russian troops. The
General Strike continued.
* * *
While the fighting was still raging Kadar began to act against
the Workers' Councils. He proceeded cautiously. In terms of active support the
Councils had far greater power in the country than had the Government. Kadar
made a few selective arrests of members of the Councils' Action Committees. This
had little or no effect. Others immediately took their place.
On November 12, 1956, Kadar made more promises.
He promised that the secret police would be abolished. He was ready to negotiate
with Kremlin representatives about the complete withdrawal of Russian troops.
Some of the most-hated Stalinists would be removed from the Party. The people
did not believe him. Kadar then announced that twelve leading Stalinists had
been expelled from the Party, including Ernö Gerö.88
This move caused a few workers to return to work. But there was still a partial
strike. Industrial activity was not even half-hearted. Public transport was
chaotic. The train service was haphazard. When some trams ran in Budapest,
crowds stopped them and the blackleg crews were chased home. People employed in
hospitals remained at work. So did those concerned with food packaging and
distribution, but they threatened to strike if there was any large resumption of
work.
Unsuccessfully, the Kadar Government appealed, threatened,
begged, making bigger and bigger verbal concessions. The Kremlin sent in more
divisions of infantry. It made no difference. The strike, though not total,
continued. The Workers' Councils continued to increase their power, which daily
showed itself greater than that of the Kadar Government.
Kadar then appealed directly to the workers to end the strike.
He used the bogey argument of rulers everywhere: inflation. They threw his
appeal back in his face with a list of further demands: recognition of the
Central Council as the negotiating body representing the workers, the release of
prisoners, the withdrawal of Russian troops, and the restoration of Nagy as
Prime Minister. Although the workers managed most of the factories, these
demands showed they knew that their power might eventually be broken by more
ruthless methods. They were determined to 'interfere' for as long as they were
able to, and in such a way as to leave them with some concrete achievements. The
'release of Nagy' now featured in all their demands. He had by now become a
symbol, rather like Rajk had, earlier in the year, when his rehabilitation had
been repeatedly demanded.
A tacit admittance of where real power lay came on Friday,
November 16, when Kadar was obliged to start negotiations with the Councils. The
delegates from some Councils agreed to ask workers to resume work on condition
that a number of their demands were immediately satisfied and the rest later.
At the meeting on November 17, Kadar was told that his appeal
had gone out: Workers' delegates then demanded that a National Workers' Council
be set up by decree. Kadar said this was unnecessary since there was already a
'Workers' Government' in Hungary. But he agreed to the recognition of individual
Councils and to the establishment of some form of factory militia. He added that
if workers' delegates would use their influence to ensure a resumption of work,
he would use his to obtain a withdrawal of Russian troops and negotiations
between Warsaw Treaty countries about Hungarian neutrality. Workers did not
trust this somewhat ambiguous promise. They asked for it to be put in writing.
Kadar refused, saying his word should be enough.
The situation was confuse Very few workers resumed work. The
negotiations wen on fitfully. Precariously, dual power survived.
Towards the end of November. Kadar tried another method to
reduce the workers' resistance. As the industrial area of Budapest was the base
of this resistance, the peasants were forbidden from bringing food into the area
except by permission of the Government. The Red Army saw to it that the order
was complied with. At the same time ration cards were issued, but only to
workers who reported at the factories. This was clearly an attempt, not merely
to starve the workers into submission, but also to drive a wedge between them
and the peasants who wanted to sell their produce.
But still the strike continued. The Russians and their puppet
Government were becoming increasingly apprehensive about the situation. So much
so that, when word got around that the Central Workers' Council of Budapest was
to hold a meeting in the National Stadium on November 21, the 'official'
authorities believed the mass meeting would set up another Government, in
opposition to Kadar's. This was not only untrue, but quite unnecessary. On
November 21, Russian tanks barred the roads leading to the Stadium. The few
people already there were dispersed by the A.V.O.. In answer to this, the
Central Workers' Council called for the strike to be strengthened.
Kadar again appealed for a return to work. Again the workers
renewed their demands. And again they increased the pressure by adding new ones:
the formation of a Workers' Militia; freedom to publish their own uncensored
newspaper; a meeting with Nagy. Kadar reverted to threats. The movement he had
earlier referred to as 'a great popular movement', he now called
'counter-revolutionary' - the Workers' Councils were 'fascist-led'! This charge
left workers in no doubts as to what was now to happen. In both East and West, a
prelude to a successful purge is the raising of a bogey and its denunciation.
The following day, Kadar made his intentions crystal clear. He
declared: "... a tiger cannot be tamed by baits, it can be tamed and forced to
peace only by beating it to death ... Every worker, instead of drawing up and
scribbling demands (my italics, A.A.) must immediately and unconditionally
begin to work to the best of his ability."
Kadar's attitude merely reflected the Kremlin's, where patience
was getting short. The huge army they had in the country was causing them grave
problems. Apart from the loss of world prestige entailed in their inability
completely to suppress a small country, the oppressed people of Eastern Europe
were watching closely. The Kremlin's troops were inadequately fed. Discipline
was poor. The longer Russian soldiers stayed in Hungary, the more clearly they
perceived the truth. Some had already joined the guerillas in the mountains.
Many others had to be disarmed and sent back to Russia, in sealed wagons,
because they refused to carry out orders. The Kremlin decided it was now time
both to smash the Workers' Councils and to get rid of Nagy.
The Nagy Abduction
Imre Nagy, together with some ex-ministers, high-ranking
military personnel, and others (including Julia Rajk), had taken refuge in the
Yugoslav Embassy. Correspondence between Kadar and the Yugoslav Ambassador,
Soldatich, resulted in Kadar guaranteeing the personal safety of Nagy, and both
his own safe conduct and that of his group. Then, suddenly, Kadar put forward
four conditions:
(1) Nagy's formal resignation as Premier.
(2) A statement from Nagy supporting the Government in its
'fight against counter-revolutionaries'.
(3) Nagy to make a public self-criticism.
(4) Nagy and the rest of the Group to agree to go to one of the
'Peoples' Democracies' until normality was restored in Hungary.
These conditions were all refused.
Kadar clearly had orders to get Nagy out of the Embassy. He
then gave, in writing, an unconditional promise of safe conduct for the group
whenever they should decide to leave the Embassy. Some sent messages home,
telling relations they were returning. None mentioned the possibility of going
to Rumania or any other 'Peoples' Democracy'. A bus was laid on to take them
home. At 6.30 on November 23, they all left the Embassy. Soldatich had insisted
that two of his Embassy official should accompany the party. A few hundred yards
from the Embassy, the bus was stopped and surrounded by patrol cars. Russian
security officers poured out of the cars and into the bus. The Yugoslav
officials were ordered to leave, but they refused and were thrown out. The bus
was then driven to the Russian Kommandatura.
The Yugoslavs sent strongly-worded notes of protest to Kadar.
At first Kadar denied all knowledge of the abduction. He later admitted he knew
about it by saying that if Nagy had been allowed to return home,
counter-revolutionary elements might have murdered him. He also claimed that
Nagy and the others had gone to Rumania at their own request. A likely story. In
Rumania the press and radio had for some time shown a more violent hostility to
Nagy than in any of the other 'Peoples' Democracies'. An attitude more hostile
even than that of the Russians! How free Nagy's choice had been became evident
later, with the news that he and others, including Pál Maléter, had been
executed in Rumania.
The Proletariat Crushed
|
"The civilisation and justice of bourgeois older comes
out in its lurid light whenever the slaves and drudges of that order rise
against their masters. Then this civilisation and justice stand forth as
undisguised savagery and lawless revenge ... a glorious civilisation,
indeed, the great problem of which is how to get rid of the heaps of
corpses it made after the battle was over!" K. Marx, The Civil
War in France (1871). |
On December 2, 1956, The Observer reported: "... the
(Hungarian) Government's plan to divert Workers' Councils into innocuous
channels by 'legalising' them as organs of economic self-government, somewhat on
the Yugoslav model, but denying them the right to put forward political demands
or issue a newspaper, has merely led to continued deadlock in Budapest."
The erratic negotiations between Kadar
government officials and representatives of the Workers' Councils then came to
an abrupt end. Two prominent members of the Central Workers' Council were
invited to a meeting with Kadar and his henchmen at the Government Building.
They were the 24-year-old Chairman, Sandor Racs - a pre-October 23 member of the
Communist Party and a toolmaker of the Belajanis Electrical Works in South Buda
- and the secretary, Sandor Bali, a worker from the same factory. On arrival at
the Government Building, they were arrested. All the workers at the Belajanis
factory immediately went on a sit-in strike. They refused to resume work until
their comrades were released. It was, of course, an 'unofficial' strike.89
The factory was seized by hundreds of armed police and Government militia. In
spite of this, the sit-in lasted for three days, during which time no work was
done. Under the pressure of threats and victimisation the workers were
eventually forced to resume work. Police arid militia were posted all over the
factory. Whenever workers gathered to talk, they were instantly dispersed. Still
the workers were not defeated - they began a 'go-slow'. This, combined with an
unplanned campaign of poor-quality individual workmanship, reduced production to
8% of normal. Kadar's comment on these workers was the same as that of managers,
politicians, and trade union leaders throughout the world - the workers were
'sheep' led by 'subversive elements', 'agitators', 'irresponsible, self-seekine
demagogues', 'spies and agents of Capitalism'. (In the West, for 'Capitalism'
read 'Communism').
The scene was now set for a full-scale purge of the Workers'
Councils. Many prominent committee members were arrested and jailed. This tactic
of selective arrests was also applied to many militant student groups. But a
reserve of supporters was standing by, ready to step into the breach. When the
authorities realised this, widespread arrests of rank-and-file Workers' Council
members followed.
A form of passive resistance by the masses then developed.
similar to that previously described. It continued for months. I feel this
period, beginning in December, 1956, can most graphically be portrayed in diary
form:
December 2, 1956 -
Copies of Népszabadság (Communist Party newspaper)
burned in the streets by crowds, who were later dispersed by Russian troops.
December 4, 1956 -
A demonstration by 30,000 women in Budapest, many wearing the
national colours of red, white, and green (the only way they knew to symbolise
their fight for freedom) gathered at the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Hero's
Square. Russian troops fired over their heads. One woman was hit by a bullet.
December 5, 1956 -
Demonstrations numbering many thousands in all parts of the
country, including several in Budapest. Another large demonstration of women in
Budapest, marched towards the Petöfi statue shouting "Russians go home!" "We
want Nagy!" "Russian tanks out!" Some were carrying wreaths and flowers in
memory of relations who had been killed. They did not reach the statue, but were
intercepted by Russian tanks and infantry. Nepakarat (Trade Union
newspaper) refers to the revolution as "a great mass movement".
December 6, 1956 -
Nepakarat states: "It is no wonder the masses, who were
denied every possibility of expressing their will, finally took to arms to show
what they thought." Several factories surrounded by Russian troops and A.V.O..
Hundreds of factory workers in the famous 'Red' Czepel, fight Russian troops and
A.V.O., as latter try to enter a factory to arrest three members of a Workers'
Council. Russian tanks open fire on unarmed demonstrators in Budapest: two
killed and several wounded.
The Chairmen of the Workers' Councils at the Ganz and MAVAG
factories arrested.
The Central Workers' Council (Budapest) proclaims: "The
Government does not build its power on the Workers' Councils in spite of Comrade
Kadar's promises ... Members of Workers' Councils are being arrested ... dragged
from their homes during the night without investigation or hearing ... peaceful
meetings of Workers' Councils are interrupted or prevented by armed force". The
Council demands a reply to this proclamation by 8 p.m. on December 7.
December 7, 1956 -
Demonstrators (workers, students, and many women) fired on in
the industrial towns Pécs, Bekeskaba, and Tatabanya. Widespread arrests of
rank-and-file members of Workers' Councils.
No reply to the Central Workers' Council proclamation.
December 8, 1956 -
10,000 people demonstrate against the arrest of two members of
the Workers' Council in the mining town of Salgatarjan: 80 casualties, dead and
wounded. (Coal and uranium miners were outstanding passive resisters. Output
fell to less than half of what it had been before the Revolution. Many mines
were flooded.)
More clashes between workers and A.V.O. in the so-called
'Communist Party stronghold' of Czepel, due to further arrests of workers.
Strikes (unofficial) reported from all parts of the country.
The first resolution passed by Kadar's 'Socialist Workers' Party' states that
Workers' Councils are "to be taken over and cleansed of unsuitable
demagogues".
Still no reply to the proclamation of the Central Workers'
Council of Budapest.
December 9, 1956 -
Demonstrations by worker and students in Budapest increase. The
Central Workers' Council declares a 48-hour general strike to begin on December
11 "...in protest against the repression of workers and their freely chosen
delegates".
Martial law declared.
The Kadar government dissolves all Regional and Central
Workers' Councils - but adds that it will not dissolve those in the
factories and mines.
December 11, 1956 -
In the town of Eger, demonstrators force the release of jailed
members of the Workers' Council.
The Chairman of the Central Workers' Council (Budapest), Sandor
Racs, and its secretary, Sandor Bali, are arrested. To show Kadar and the
Russians what support the Workers' Councils still enjoy among workers
throughout the country, the great, historic, 48-hour General Strike
begins. The response is practically unanimous.
December 12, 1956 -
At Eger a large crowd of demonstrators is fired on by the
police - two workers killed, some wounded. Hand grenades then thrown by the
demonstrators who occupied, for a short time, a small building which housed a
printing press. Revolutionary leaflets and posters are produced and distributed.
Népszabadság commenting on the 48-hour strike, says: "A strike, the like
of which has never before been seen in the history of the Hungarian workers'
movement ..." but claims it is the result of intimidation by
'counter-revolutionaries'. In Budapest, the whole electricity supply is cut off.
This hadn't happened even during the thick of the recent battles. Rail and other
forms of transport paralysed throughout the country. Factories at a standstill.
Large numbers of Russian tanks sent into the streets of the capital. The Kadar
Government empowers Summary Courts automatically to pass the death sentence on
people declared 'guilty'. At Kutfei, a 23-year-old worker is sentenced to 10
years imprisonment for having a revolver and ammunition at his home. Big
house-to-house searches for arms continue - often carried out by Russian
troops.
December 13, 1956 -
"People in Budapest are laughing today." - Sam Russell,
Daily Worker.
December 14. 1956 -
The two-day strike, having shown its strength, ends. The
Government reminds the people that all demonstrations and assemblies are
'officially' banned. Pravda states that the attempted revolution in
Hungary was "a fascist putsch ... (in which) ... the international imperialist
forces, directed by certain United States circles, played the main and decisive
roles".
December 15, 1956 -
Death penalty re-introduced for striking. János Soltész brought
before a Court Martial in Miskolc, charged with hiding arms, and executed
immediately after the trial. This is the first known execution for this offence.
Jozsef Dudas, popular chairman of the Budapest Revolutionary Committee,
executed. Gyula Hay and many other writers and intellectuals arrested.
Trade Unions again 're-organised' and a 'reliable' leadership
installed. The name 'National Council of Free Trade Unions' is, hypocritically,
retained. (See Appendix III, February 26, 1957).
December 17, 1956 -
Miners give Kadar conditions for resumption of normal work.
These include: formation of their own independent committees to represent them
in negotiations with the management; withdrawal of all Russian troops; Nagy to
be Prime Minister. A spokesman added: "If the government does not accept these
conditions, no work will be done in the mines even if we miners have to go
begging or emigrate from our Motherland." (The Times, December 17,
1956).
Reported a third of the labour force at the uranium mines in
Pécs had left. Another third had been declared redundant because of electrical
power shortage.
December 20, 1956 -
Police empowered to imprison people for six months, without
trial, whom they suspect of 'threatening public safety and production'.
December 25, 1956 -
Reports of many executions. Strikers being singled out and
victimised to intimidate the others. Strikes do not last long in such conditions
of terror.
December 26, 1956 -
Gyorgy Marosán, the Social Democrat and a
Minister in the Kadar Government,90
declares that, if necessary, the Government will execute 10,000 people to prove
that they are the real Government, and not the Workers' Councils.
December 29, 1956 -
Declaration of the Hungarian Writers' Union:
"We have to state with a depressed heart that the Soviet Government made a
historical mistake when it stained the revolution with blood. We predict that
the time will come when the great power that erred will repent. We warn everyone
away from the erroneous judgment that revolution in Hungary would have
annihilated the achievements of Socialism but for the interference of Soviet
arms. We know that that is not true."91
(The Observer, December 30, 1956).
* * *
The events chronicled for December 1956 are only some of those
we have been able to check. There were reports throughout the month of armed
resistance by guerillas, particularly in the Borsod region (Hungary's largest
industrial area), Veszprom, Miskolc, Szambathely, Vac, Kunszentmarton, even in
the hills of Buda itself. There were moreover almost daily reports of
large-scale arrests, trials, sentences and executions of workers students and
intellectuals. These would often be announced by Radio Budapest as a means of
intimidation.
The diary for 1957 (see Appendix III) shows that open
resistance gradually lessened. Nevertheless, strikes and demonstrations
continued throughout 1958 and 1959.
Between December 1956 and December 1957 bureaucratic control
was progressively tightened. Of particular significance during this period was
the systematic destruction of the Workers Councils by the Party leaders. First
there was the selective arrests of Council committee members. Next, many
rank-and-file members were arrested. Then the Kadar Government stated on
December 9th 1956 that all regional and central Workers' Councils were
dissolved, although those in individual factories and mines were tolerated for a
while longer.
The intimidation worked. By early January 1957, members of
Councils not yet arrested began to resign. By the middle of the year, the
purpose of the Councils had been completely destroyed. The workers' own
delegates had been removed and replaced by government stooges. In September
1957, Antal Apró, Deputy Premier, announced that the remaining Workers' Councils
were to be replaced by Works Councils, "under the leadership of the trade
unions" (any shop steward will know what this means!).
By the beginning of November, the Workers' Councils were being
attacked by Ferenc Münnich, Minister of the Interior, as "led by class-alien
elements". It was "necessary to replace this whole set-up as soon as possible by
new organisations".
On November 17, 1957, it was officially announced that all
remaining Workers' Councils were to be abolished forth-with. The very name
'Workers' Council' now both embarrassed and infuriated the regime. The
bureaucracy attempted the impossible: to expunge from the memory of the
Hungarian people and from History itself the great, positive experience of
working class self-administration.
Fascist Counter-Revolution?
|
"In all its bloody triumphs over the self-sacrificing
champions of a new and better society, that nefarious civilisation, based
upon the enslavement of labour, drowns the moans of its victims in a hue
and cry of calumny, reverberated by a world-wide echo." K. Marx,
The Civil War in France (1871). |
Despite all this, there are, even today, members of the
Communist Party who still believe their leaders' propaganda that Russian troops
stopped a fascist counter-revolution in Hungary. Let us nail this lie once and
for all.
In the Daily Worker of November 10, 1956, the British
Communist Party's 'theoretician', Palme Dutt, wrote: "The issue in Hungary is
between the Socialist achievements of twelve years and the return to capitalism,
landlordism, and Horthy fascism, as made clear to all by Cardinal Mindszenty's
broadcast." What a terrible indictment this sounds of Russian-type Communism!
Does Palme Dutt really mean that large sections of the Hungarian working class
actually preferred capitalism? Of course this is not true.
In our account of the Hungarian Revolution we have not
mentioned the release of Cardinal Mindszenty (on October 30) nor his broadcast
(on November 3) which Palme Dutt refers to. This was no mistake. We did not
'forget it'. The Mindszenty broadcast was not an important feature of the
Revolution. It only appears important when one looks at the 'excuses' given by
the Kremlin's apologists for the massacre of November 4.
It is unnecessary to quote the whole of Mindszenty's speech.
Palme Dutt and other Stalinist propagandists based their claim of a 'return to
fascism' on the fiction that Mindszenty called for the restoration of the
confiscated property of the Catholic Church. While ambiguity abounded in the
Cardinal's phrases, none could have been interpreted as meaning this - not even
when he said he wanted "a classless society based on the rule of law and
democracy and also on private ownership, correctly restricted by the interests
of society and justice". This sentence might have tarred Mindszenty as God's own
social-democratic confusion-monger, but never as a 'fascist'.
Reactionaries of conservative or even of fascist persuasion
undoubtedly took part in the Revolution. They would no doubt have taken the
fullest advantage of a new, free society to air their views. But such views
would have gained insignificant support. These people certainly did not start
the revolution nor did they have any influence on its development. Communist
propagandists throughout the world scraped the barrel and ransacked the
dispatches of press correspondents, particularly those of the Right, for
any scrap of information which might be used to prove their contention.
Mindszenty's broadcast, coming as it did the day before the second Russian
attack, was the best they could unearth.
And even here, they were forced to misrepresent what Mindszenty
had said. They were also forced to maintain an eloquent silence when, on
November 5, Mindszenty had to seek refuge in the American Embassy. What? Were
there no Hungarian 'counter-revolutionaries' who might have sheltered the worthy
priest? So much for his influence on the Hungarian masses in revolt. On the
whole, Mindszenty supported Nagy. But Nagy was not in control - the people were.
The workers would not listen to Nagy. Why should they listen to Mindszenty?
If the Hungarian Revolution of October-December 1956 was the
work of 'reactionary, fascist, counter-revolutionary forces', where was the
bureaucracy's much-vaunted 'efficiency'? What were the Hungarian state-security
forces (A.V.O.) doing during the preparations for the uprising? How is it no
inkling of the plans for revolt ever reached the big flapping ears of the secret
police? In a state where a dossier was kept of every person above the age of
six, the sort of organisation essential to a fascist, or just a plain
capitalist-inspired, revolt was impossible. It may seem paradoxical, but the
strength of the Hungarians in revolution lay in their lack of a centralised and
bureaucratic 'revolutionary' organisation - an organisation, that is, similar to
that of their rulers.
What professional revolutionaries would have wasted valuable
time in pulling down the massive statue of Stalin, in burning books and papers
in the 'Horizont' Russian bookshops, in the interminable discussions that went
on in the Councils, committees, and even in the streets?
But on the other hand, what professional revolutionaries would
have been able to extract from the Hungarian working class the depths of
initiative, resistance, and self-sacrifice they were to show in a cause they
felt to be their very own?
The Stalinists still insist that the revolutionaries did not
get their arms from the factories or from soldiers in the Hungarian army. All
their propaganda at the time stressed that arms were being smuggled to the
people across the Austrian border. How could the frontier guards (a section of
the bureaucracy's most faithful servants, the A.V.O.) be so feckless in their
'duties' as to allow hundreds of thousands of rifles, machine-guns, grenades -
not to mention hundreds of tons of ammunition - to pass unnoticed through the
electrified barbed wire and from there to proceed, unmolested, to various
pre-arranged distribution points? Little more need be said about the charge of
'fascist counter-revolution'!
But there were other, minor features which, the Stalinists
claim, were 'reactionary': the demand for parliamentary elections, the illusions
in U.N.O., the dropping of the term of address 'comrade', the adoption of the
word 'friend', and the elimination of the Communist Party emblem from the
Hungarian flag.
We have already commented on some of these points. The first
two demands arose as the result of ten years of Stalinist rule. Not only were
parties of the Right suppressed, but also all political tendencies and ideas
among the working class itself. Compared with the conditions that prevailed in
Russian-dominated Hungary, many of the political institutions in the West
appeared as paragons of democratic virtue. Even within the ranks of the Party,
all opposition was strangled. Defectors from the party line were dealt with by
the security police.
It is not relevant here to make a detailed
analysis of fascism. It is enough to point out that fascism had no chance among
workers as politically conscious as the Hungarians showed themselves to be in
October-November 1956. Moreover, the social and economic conditions essential
for the growth of fascist tendencies simply do not develop under conditions of
total bureaucratic capitalism. Despite this, the Party propagandists formulated
a new dogma following Kadar's return from Moscow, in March 1957. They declared
that "the dictatorship of the proletariat, if overthrown, cannot be succeeded by
any form of government other than fascist counter-revolution". Like in the
Catholic Church, things are proclaimed as dogma which the leaders want the
masses to accept but can't logically convince them of. Anyway, even before the
Revolution, the proletariat did not dictate. It was dictated to.
And it was against this that the proletariat rose. Kadar himself was to admit
all this quite explicitly when he proclaimed: "the regime is aware that the
people do not always know what is good for them. It is therefore the duty of the
leadership to act, not according to the will of the people, but according to
what the leadership knows to be in the best interests of the people".92
At the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, in 1921,
while the workers and sailors of Kronstadt were being ruthlessly suppressed,
Trotsky had first clearly formulated the same idea. Denouncing the workers'
opposition inside his own Party he explained: "They have come out with dangerous
slogans! They have made a fetish of democratic principles! They have placed the
workers' right to elect representatives above the Party. As if the Party were
not entitled to assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship temporarily
clashed with the passing moods of the workers' democracy". Trotsky spoke of the
"revolutionary historical birthright of the Party." "The Party is obliged to
maintain its dictatorship ... regardless of temporary vacillations, even in the
working class ... The dictatorship does not base itself at every given moment on
the formal principle of a workers' democracy ..."
Over seventy years earlier Marx had spoken of the emancipation
of the working class being the task of the working class itself. In 1921 and in
1956 Bolshevism and Stalinism respectively set out to prove him wrong. The Party
leaders, not the masses, were now the embodiment of social progress. If
necessary the 'temporary vacillations of the working class' were to be corrected
with Party bullets!
Why?
|
"All political struggles are class struggles, and all
class struggles for emancipation ... turn ultimately on the question of
economic emancipation." F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End
of Classical German Philosophy (1888). "Terror implies mostly
useless cruelty perpetrated by frightened people in order to reassure
themselves." F. Engels, Letter to Marx (September 4,
1870). |
It is still not known for certain how many people lost their
lives during the Hungarian Revolution. Estimates range from 20,000 to 50,000
Hungarians and from 3,500 to 7,000 Russians. The number wounded was very much
higher. Since November 1956, many thousands have been executed. The number
imprisoned runs into tens of thousands - most of the political prisoners
released during the Revolution were later rounded up.
Some people have been aware, for a long time,
of the true character of the Russian regime and of the counter-revolutionary
role played by its agents (the Stalinist parties) in the working class struggles
of the previous thirty years. Some remember the pitiless way the Party repressed
all working class opposition within the U.S.S.R., and the sufferings it
inflicted on whole populations, deported at the time of collectivisation.93 It
nevertheless seemed incredible that, before the shocked gaze of workers and
Communists in every country, the Russian bureaucracy should have assumed
responsibility for crushing with thousands of tanks an insurrection which had
mobilised every section of the Hungarian people, and particularly the youth and
the working class.
The Krushchevs, the Mikoyans, the Bulganins, had accused Stalin
of every evil of the past. They had claimed to be impotent spectators of a
terror they abhored. For the preceding few months they had been cavorting around
the capitals of the world exhibiting themselves as 'decent chaps'. But they were
guilty of a crime which matched any of Stalin's previous atrocities.
Why did the Kremlin decide to crush Hungary ?
We have examined the 'official' excuse: Nagy
was powerless to stop a fascist counter-revolution. Nagy was certainly
powerless. But powerless to check the workers! For the Russians to admit this
would be to admit the failure of their Communism. That is why Mao Tse-Tung,
Tito, Gomulka, indeed the whole Communist hierarchy throughout the world,
whatever their other differences,94
all supported the Kremlin line. The Russian bureaucracy could find compromises
with the Tildys, the Kovacs, even the Mindszentys. It could still govern by
making concessions. Indeed, this had already been done, not only in Hungary, but
in all the so-called 'Peoples' Democracies'. BUT THERE WAS NO BASIS WHATEVER FOR
COMPROMISE WITH THE AUTONOMOUS ORGANISATIONS OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ARMS (THE
COUNCILS). THEIR VICTORY WOULD HAVE SPELLED TOTAL DEFEAT FOR THE BUREAUCRACY!
Some have said Russia had no alternative but to keep Hungary
well within its grip, for to withdraw would have left her vulnerable from the
West. Militarily, this argument is false. Whereas Poland and East Germany were
vital, Hungary and Rumania were not. It is reported that Krushchev himself had
been considering the evacuation of Hungary. He believed this would have meant an
immense gain in prestige. But this was before the Revolution.
Others have said that Eden's barbarous attack on Egypt (on
November 1, 1956) greatly influenced the Kremlin's decision to launch the second
attack against the Hungarians (on November 4). Because of the Suez venture, the
United States propagandists were unable to exploit the Hungarian tragedy to the
full. But although this was a coincidence of great convenience to the Kremlin,
it is simply not true that it basically influenced their decision. The build-up
of Russian armour in north-east Hungary had been going on for several days
before Eden announced his ultimatum to Egypt.
Between October 23 and November 4, the working people of
Hungary had spontaneously organised their own power through their Councils. To
these Councils they immediately gave the greatest possible extension. These
autonomous groups had formed, with extraordinary speed, a military force capable
of momentarily neutralising the Russian army and the A.V.O., if not of actually
compelling them to retreat. Their demands had resulted in a radical change of
the workers' position within the framework of industry. They had attacked
exploitation at its very roots. Public order, their order, had been
maintained. The distribution of food, fuel and medical supplies, had been
carried out magnificently. Even a reporter of The Observer recognised
this: "A fantastic aspect of the situation is that although the general strike
is in being and there is no centrally-organised industry, the workers are
nevertheless taking upon themselves to keep essential services going, for
purposes which they themselves determine and support. Workers' Councils in
industrial districts have undertaken the distribution of essential goods and
food to the population, in order to keep them alive. The coal miners are making
daily allocations of just sufficient coal to keep the power stations going and
supply the hospitals in Budapest and other large towns. Railwaymen organise
trains to go to approved destinations for approved purposes..." (November 25,
1956).
The network of Workers' and Peasants' Councils which sprang up
spontaneously was the biggest single gain of the Hungarian Revolution. This was
the great historical significance of Hungary '56. This has immortalised the
Hungarian people. By the end of October, government by Workers' Councils was
virtually a fact. This is the simple yet powerful truth that evaded so many at
the time - and since.
In their decision to crush this little country, the Kremlin's
logic was cold, consistent, and ruthless. They could not tolerate, on their very
doorstep, a country in which ordinary people were, for the first time in
history,. running their own affairs and were more-over advancing, in giant
steps, towards genuine equality. It could not be tolerated because of the
example it would have given to the other oppressed 'satellite' peoples already
seething with discontent. To allow the Revolution to triumph meant to allow its
influence to be felt and acted upon by the working class of Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The workers in these countries were suffering
exploitation similar to that from which the Hungarians had freed themselves. To
allow the Revolution to develop would have meant giving an immense impetus to
the movement in Poland which for a month had extracted concession after
concession from the Polish bureaucracy as well as from the Kremlin.
Finally, Revolution in Hungary could not be tolerated because
of the example it might set to the great subject people on its north-eastern
borders - in the Soviet Union itself. That Russian soldiers were handing over
weapons to Hungarian revolutionaries (and, in some cases, actually joining their
ranks) must have chilled the spines of Krushchev and his henchmen. If sections
of the Red Army proved unreliable in putting down a 'foreign' uprising, how
would the army react to a similar uprising in Russia itself. Of such stuff were
nightmares made!
The Meaning of The Hungarian Revolution
|
"The emancipation of the workers contains universal
human emancipation - and it contains this because the whole of human
servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production. Every
relation of servitude is but a modification and consequence of this
relation." K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
(1844). |
When the Hungarians were finally crushed, the Western crocodile
began to weep. But it leered as it wept.
We have already seen how, in the West, 'political' comment was
centred upon the nationalistic aspects of the Revolution, no matter how trivial.
Why were Western politicians so selective in their support and so parsimonious
in their praise for Hungary's October? Basically because they were opposed both
to its methods and to its aims.
"The view prevailing among United States
officials was that 'evolution' towards freedom in Eastern Europe would be better
for all concerned than 'revolution', though nobody was saying this publicly",
wrote the New York Times (October 27, 1955). And as to ends, can anyone
imagine the President of the United States, the House of Representatives, the
British Prime Minister, Her Majesty's Government, Her Majesty's Loyal
Opposition, the T.U.C.'s General Secretary or Her Majesty's trade union
leadership supporting the fundamental social, economic, and political aims of
the Hungarian Revolution? What capitalist government could genuinely support a
people demanding 'workers' management of industry' and already beginning to
implement this on an increasing scale? Such governments might go to war to
protect their own class interests. One cannot conceive of them going to war to
protect the interests of a Revolution which showed every sign of making both
them and their bureaucratic counterparts in the East redundant. For, as Peter
Fryer wrote, the Hungarian Revolution showed "the ability of ordinary working
men and women to take their affairs into their own hands and manage them without
a special caste of officials".95
Naive observers could not understand why the West, having
'failed' to take a military initiative over Hungary, did not at least make some
political gesture. Shocked noises they made, in U.N.O. and elsewhere. But an
effective political initiative involved supporting, clarifying, and propagating
the most important demands of the Hungarian workers, those that were the
mainspring of the Revolution, in particular the demand without which it would
not have been a people's revolution at all: Workers' Power - a complete
change in the relations of production.
"The relations of production (boss-worker;
manager-managed; order-giver - order-taker) remain the basis of the class
structure of any society. In all countries of the world these relations are
capitalist relations because they are based on wage labour."96
The Hungarian working class attempted to transcend class society by striking at
the very roots of the social system.
Certain Western observers thought their methods 'chaotic'. They
deplored their 'absence of organisation'. But the Hungarian workers had
instinctively grasped, although perhaps not explicitly proclaimed, that they
must break completely with those traditional organisational forms which had for
years entrapped both them and the working class of the West. This was their
strength. They saw that it meant breaking with those very institutions which
they themselves had originally created for their emancipation, and which had
later become fetters upon them. New organs of struggle were created: the
Workers' Councils which embodied, in embryo, the new society they were seeking
to achieve. Western 'observers' could hardly be expected to recognise all this,
or to elaborate on this theme!
The working class of Western Europe, although
stirred by the struggle of their Hungarian comrades, remained passive. Yet, they
alone had the power to save the Revolution. They stood and watched because they
were (and still are) under the ideological influence of the 'leaderships' of
'their own' organisations. The degeneration of these organisations is not due to
'bad leaders' who 'betray'. "The problem has much deeper roots ... The political
and trade union organisations of the working class have increasingly adopted the
objectives, methods, philosophy, and patterns of organisation of the very
society they were trying to supersede. There has developed within their ranks an
increasing division between leaders and led, order-givers and order-takers. This
has culminated in the development of a working class bureaucracy which can
neither be removed nor controlled. This bureaucracy pursues objectives of its
own."97
Once this is perceived and acted upon the days of the bureaucracy will be
numbered.
In the organisation of their Workers' Councils
and in the reorganisation of their trade unions, the Hungarians had shown an
awareness of the fact that "the revolutionary organisation will not be able to
fight the tendency towards bureaucracy unless it functions itself according to
the principles of proletarian democracy and in a consciously anti-bureaucratic
manner."98
The various Councils that sprang up all over the country had the greatest
possible autonomy. As far as we have been able to discover, no one ever
questioned the principle that delegates elected to the Central Councils should
be revocable, at all times. The principle became an immediate reality,
automatically accepted and acted upon.
The massacre of the Hungarian people, the destruction of the
organisations they had built during their brief spell of freedom and the
re-imposition of total bureaucratic control over all aspects of their lives
brought an end to an era: the era during which the Russian bureaucracy had
partly succeeded - despite Stalin - in passing themselves off as defenders of
Socialism and as champions of the working class. Now it would never be the same
again!
The Hungarian Revolution of October 1956, wrote its message in
the blood of thousands of ordinary working people, particularly the youth. The
message is that, today, the class struggle throughout the world is not one
between East and West, between Labour and Tory, or between employers and trade
union leaders. It is the struggle of the working class for its own emancipation.
It is the struggle of the working class against all the bureaucratic regimes,
institutions and ideologies, which, in both East and West, obstruct its road to
freedom.
Whatever we choose to call the new society we aspire to - the
classless society in which men are truly free to develop to the full, and to
manage all aspects of their lives - its establishment will depend on several
essentials. It will depend on a different and entirely new attitude to
'leadership' from that prevailing in the traditional organisations of the 'left'
today. It will depend on an understanding that the objective of the Revolution
is not just a change in the formal ownership of property but the abolition of
all special strata in society, managing the activities of others from the
outside. It will depend finally on the realisation, by working people, of their
ability to manage society and of the urgent need for them to do so. Without this
no progress can be made towards solving the gigantic problems that confront
humanity, not least of which is whether tomorrow will ever dawn or whether at
any moment we shall all be destroyed in a nuclear holocaust.
Famous intellectuals have written learned books about the
world's problems in an age when life on earth could be wiped out by the
decisions and actions of infinitesimal minorities. Because of their particular
position within society few of these intellectuals have dared to speak out and
to proclaim that the solution to these problems implies a profound social
revolution in which the working people, the vast majority of mankind, will take
power into their own hands and proceed to build a society where they are masters
of their fate. They must do this themselves and cannot delegate the task to
anybody. Real freedom depends on the extent to which this revolutionary task is
both understood and acted upon.
Appendix I
Resolution of the Writers' Union (read to the crowd at the
Bem statue, October 23, 1956)
"We have arrived at an historic turning point. We shall not be
able to acquit ourselves well in this revolutionary situation unless the entire
Hungarian working people rallies round us in discipline. The leaders of the
Party and the State have so far failed to present a workable programme. The
people responsible for this are those who, instead of expanding Socialist
democracy, are obstinately organising themselves with the aim of restoring the
Stalin and Rakosi regime of terror in Hungary. We, Hungarian writers, have
formulated these demands of the Hungarian nation in the following seven points:
(1) We want an independent national policy based on the
principle of Socialism. Our relations with all countries, and with the U.S.S.R.
and the People's Democracies in the first place, should be regulated on the
basis of the principle of equality. We want a review of inter-State treaties and
economic agreements in the spirit of the equality of national rights. (This was
a clear reference to the uranium mines at Pecs - discovered eighteen months
earlier. The Russians called them 'bauxite mines'. A.A.)
(2) An end must be put to national minority policies which
disturb friendship between the people. We want true and sincere friendship with
our allies - the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples' Democracies. This can be realised
only on the basis of Leninist principles.
(3) The country's economic position must be clearly stated. We
shall not be able to emerge from this crisis unless all workers, peasants, and
intellectuals can play their proper part in the political, social, and economic
administration of the country.
(4) Factories must be run by workers and specialists. The
present humiliating system of wages, norms, social security conditions, etc.,
must be reformed. The trade unions must be the true representatives of the
interests of the Hungarian working class.
(5) Our peasant policy must be put on a new basis. Peasants
must be given the right to decide their own fate, freely. The political and
economic conditions for free membership in the co-operatives must be created.
The present system of deliveries to the State and of tax payment must be
gradually replaced by a system ensuring free Socialist production and exchange
of goods.
(6) If these points are to materialise, there must be changes
of structure and of personnel in the leadership of the Party and the State. The
Rakosi clique, which is seeking restoration, must be removed from our political
life. Imre Nagy, a pure and brave Communist, who enjoys the confidence of the
Hungarian people, and all those who have systematically fought for Socialist
democracy in recent years, must be given the posts they deserve. At the same
time, a resolute stand must be made against all counter-revolutionary attempts
and aspirations.
(7) The evolution of the situation demands that the Peoples'
Patriotic Front should assume the political representation of the working strata
of Hungarian society. Our electoral system must correspond to the demands of
Socialist democracy. The people must elect their representatives in Parliament,
in the Council, and in all autonomous organs of administration, freely and by
secret ballot."
Appendix II
Brief History of Personalities
Ernö Getö, imprisoned in 1919, after the
fall of the Kun regime. Fought in Spain from 1936 until the Republican collapse.
Went to Moscow and became a Russian citizen. After World War II he returned to
Hungary and led the Party until his friend, Rakosi, arrived.
Janos Kadar was born in 1910. His parents were
farm workers. He had little education and became a locksmith. At nineteen, he
joined the youth movement of the illegal Communist party. Served several short
terms of imprisonment. Under the Communist regime after the war, he was made a
police officer. His rise in the hierarchy was then rapid. After the merger of
the communist and socialist parties, he was made a member of the Politbureau.
Two months later he became Minister of the Interior. But in mid 1950 he was
dismissed. Nine months later he was re-elected to the Central Committee and the
Politbureau. Shortly after this he 'disappeared'.
Bela Kun was a prisoner of war in Russia during
World War I. He was released by the Bolsheviks and took part in the Revolution.
Author of The Second International in Dissolution, Marxism versus
Social Democracy, Lenin on the I.L.P.: published in English by Modern
Books Ltd.
Pál Maléter was an officer of the regular army
during the inter-war years. In World War II, he was one of Horthy's
highly-trusted personal guards until 1943, when he was sent to the Russian
Front. He was taken prisoner and soon after joined a Russian-organised brigade
of partisans. After a six-months' course he was made commander of a partisan
group. In 1944, he parachuted into northern Hungary and fought the Nazis until
Russian troops arrived. He rejoined the Hungarian Army in 1945 with the rank of
major and then joined the Communist Party. When the Republic was proclaimed in
1946, Maléter was made a lifeguard of its President, Zoltan Tildy. Tildy was
arrested in 1948, and Maléter rejoined the regular army. In 1951 he was promoted
colonel and put in command of an armoured division. He also was given the task
of training all armoured divisions including the training of officer-cadets at
the school in Tata. In 1952, he was moved to the Ministry of Defence and at the
end of the year he was given the post of Commander, of the Works Brigades.
Imre Nagy was born in 1896, of Calvinist
Peasants. He had an elementary education, but became a professor in both Rostov
and Budapest and a member of the Hungarian Academy. In 1915 he was conscripted
into the Army. Later taken prisoner by the Russians.
He saw the Revolution and joined the Russian Communist Party in
1918. Returned to Hungary in 1921 and worked underground against the Horthy
regime. In 1927 he was arrested, but escaped to Austria a year later. He went
back to Russia in 1930 and became a Russian citizen. On his return to Hungary in
1944, he became a founder-member of the 'new' regime.
Laszlo Raik was born in 1909, in Transylvania.
His father was a cobbler. He joined the Communist Party when a student at
Budapest University. At the age of 23, he was imprisoned for his part in a
'Communist conspiracy' at the University. Released and worked for some time as a
manual labourer. Fought in the International Brigade in Spain, and was severely
wounded in 1937. At the end of the Spanish Civil War he tried to get back to
Hungary, via France, but was interned. He escaped from France in 1941, tried to
enter Hungary but was arrested and imprisoned. When released he became secretary
of the underground Communist Party section in Budapest. Captured by the Germans
in 1944 and sentenced to death. The sentence was not carried out, but he was
sent to the notorious jail of Sopronköhida and later to a concentration camp in
Germany.
After his return to Hungary, at the end of the war, he became
Minister of the Interior and was soon dreaded and hated for his ruthless
violence. He was arrested on the orders of his 'comrades' in May 1949. His trial
began on September 16, 1949. The main charge was that he had been spying
for Tito's secret police. But he was also charged with spying for the American
F.B.I. and for the Gestapo, with "attempting to overthrow the democratic order
of Hungary", with war crimes, sedition, conspiracy, and a host of other charges.
He pleaded guilty and was hanged.
Matyas Rakosi was born in 1892. His father was a
poultry merchant. When young he decided on a career in the Austro-Hungarian
Consular Service. Went to London to perfect his English and worked as a bank
clerk. Returned to Hungary just before the outbreak of World War I, joined the
Army, got a commission, was sent to the Russian front and was taken prisoner. As
a P.O.W. he became an ardent supporter of the Bolsheviks. It is said that he met
Lenin in 1918 and that they became friendly. Returned to Hungary in 1918 and
worked with Bela Kun. When the Kun Government collapsed, he fled to Austria
where he worked for the Comintern.
In 1924 he returned to Hungary to reorganise the Communist
Party. For this he was soon arrested by Horthy's police and was sentenced to
death. This caused uproar from certain circles in the West and as a result the
sentence was commuted to eight years' imprisonment. He was released in 1935, but
was later re-arrested and tried for his part in the 1919 revolution. At his
trial he gained a reputation throughout the world for being fearless and
outspoken.
He and his lawyer - Rustem Vémbéry - used the dock with great
skill to accuse the Horthy regime. In doing so, they showed a courage rarely
seen in Fascist countries. This was particularly remarkable in Rakosi, who had
already spent more than ten years in some of Hungary's worst prisons. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
Following the Hitler-Stalin pact, the Horthy regime agreed to
send Rakosi (and Zoltan Vas) to Russia in exchange for some flags captured by
the Russians in 1849. Rakosi became a close 'friend' of Stalin which added
greatly to his 'standing' in the Communist hierarchy.
During World War II, Rakosi organised the indoctrination of
Hungarian P.O.W.s and was in charge of Russian radio propaganda to Hungary. He
was a naturalised Russian when he returned to Hungary with his Mongolian wife
after the war. In Hungary he became one of the most ruthless tyrants of history.
Copied Stalin's personality myth-building methods, and was always referred to as
"our father and great master. Stalin's greatest Hungarian pupil". On August 11,
1963, Communist Party headquarters in Budapest reported that Rakosi had recently
died in Russia.
Appendix III
January 1, 1957 -
In a New Year message, Miklos Samogyi, President of the
recently 're-organised' National Council of Free Trade Unions, appeals to the
miners: "Miners, we beg of you to give us more coal!" The miners gave 'them'
more coal - more coal left in the pits!
January 3, 1957 -
The miners of Tatabanya (production since the second Russian
attack cut to 3% of normal) again out on strike, this time in protest against
the arrest of 12 brother miners. Népszabadság reports 'large quantities'
of arms and ammunition found hidden in a pitshaft entrance, in the mining town
of Várpolata.
January 4, 1957 -
A military court sentences a 25-year-old transport worker to
death for being in illegal possession of arms on October 30, 1956 - i.e., before
the Kadar Government even existed!
January 5, 1957 -
After a visit to Budapest, N.S. Krushchev states: "In Hungary,
everything is now in order."
January 6, 1957 -
Kadar issues statement on the 'major tasks' of the Government:
"Russian troops will remain in Hungary for the time being, in order to repel the
whole imperialist attack ... The question of their withdrawal will be a matter
of negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary." The statement hailed the
establishment of the Workers' Councils as "one of the great achievements of the
regime", but in future, their function was to be changed slightly. They were to
ensure that "the workers adhere strictly to Government decisions". Due to severe
intimidation, with many of their comrades arrested and some believed to have
been already executed, members of Workers' Councils now begin to resign.
January 8, 1957 -
The Central Workers' Council of Czepel resigns and issues the
following statement:
"It was the hallowed events of the October 23 Revolution of the
Hungarian people that brought us into being so that we could build an
independent, free, and democratic Hungary, and establish the basis for a way of
life free from fear.
"The events that have taken place in the meantime, however,
have prevented us from fulfilling our mandate. We are to have no other role than
to carry out the orders of the Government. We cannot carry out orders that
oppose our mandate. We cannot sit passively when members of Workers' Councils
are being arrested and harassed, and when the entire work of the Workers'
Councils is branded as 'counter-revolutionary'. For these reasons, and
regardless of our personal fate, we have unanimously decided to resign our
mandate.
"Our decision does not mean that we are trying to evade
responsibility. It is our opinion that our continued existence would help to
deceive our comrades. We therefore return our mandate to the workers."
January 9, 1957 -
Industrial troubles, strikes and demonstrations, flare up more
violently in all parts of the country.
January 10, 1957 -
Workers demonstrate in Czepel against the installation of a
Government Commissioner and a director in the engineering works. The militia,
reinforced by Russian troops, is called in. Workers dispersed after three hours
of fighting. Situation in Czepel so grave that Government issues order
forbidding newspaper reporters to visit island.
January 11, 1957 -
Official statement issued that one killed and six injured in
'disturbances' at the Czepel engineering works.
January 13, 1957 -
Official announcement over radio that, due to continuing
'counter-revolutionary' activity in industry, Summary Courts to be given
additional power to impose the death sentence for almost any act against the
Kadar Government. In addition to the death sentence for anyone calling a strike,
the new decree declares it illegal for workers even to discuss possible strike
action.
January 15, 1957 -
"The Central Council of the Hungarian Workers has issued a
manifesto addressed to the workers. It says that against the terror of the
Russian rulers, assisted by their Hungarian henchmen, there is only one thing to
be done - to fight to the bitter end. It is a question of 'to be or not to be'
the statement adds. Because of the terror, however, and the death penalty even
for distributing leaflets, the Council exhorts the workers to spread all news
concerning the underground by word of mouth. Sabotage and passive resistance are
the order of the day. Strikes and go-slow tactics are recommended." (The
Times).
January 17, 1957 -
The Writers' Union dissolved by decree.
January 19, 1957 -
The Union of Journalists dissolved by decree.
Janos Szabo, the elderly worker who played a prominent part in
the Szena Square battles, executed.
January 21, 1957 -
"The waves of arbitrary arrests continue. Hundreds of members
of Revolutionary Councils are in prison. During the last week there have been a
number of judges who have resigned in protest against what they called the farce
of this jurisdiction." (The Times).
January 25, 1957 -
Statement by the Ministry of Interior (over Budapest Radio)
that the writers Gyula Hay, Domokos Varga, Tibor Tardos, Zoltan Roth, and Balazs
Lengyel, and the journalists Sandor Novobaczky and Pal Letay, have been arrested
and charged with participating in 'counter-revolutionary' activities.
January 27, 1957 -
Police announce that another 35 people have been arrested today
in Budapest. Minister of State, Marosán, declares that "the insurrection was
organised by international imperialism".
January 29, 1957 -
In a speech to the 'trade unions', Kadar says he has "never
relied on his Government being popular with the Hungarian people".
Radio Budapest announces that the Government has 'suspended'
the activity of the Workers' Council of Railwaymen.
February 3, 1957 -
Marosán, repeats the threats he made at the end of December:
the Government "will create a climate of terror for the enemies of the people".
February 5, 1957 -
Discussions between the public prosecutors, the Minister of
State Marosán, and the Minister of the Interior (Münnich). Decision to introduce
new measures aimed at "the restoration of discipline and public order". The
amnesty promised by Kadar on November 4 for all 'counter-revolutionaries' who
laid down their arms is withdrawn. (Only very few people had been taken in. They
had paid for their gullibility with their lives.)
February 13, 1957 -
Newspapers celebrate the 12th anniversary of Russian troops'
entry into Budapest.
February 18, 1957 -
One of Kadar's promises, given at the meeting with workers'
delegates on November 17, is to be fulfilled. A "workers' militia" is to be
established ... for the purpose of "maintaining discipline among the workers".
February 21, 1957 -
Bela Barta, accused of "organising demonstrations on December
10, as a result of which people were killed and injured" (by Kadar's police!) is
sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment by a tribunal at Miskolc.
February 21-23, 1957 -
Violent clashes between workers and police, sparked off by
re-erection of red stars over industrial plants in Budapest.
February 26, 1957 -
Beginning of two-day conference of the 'Provisional Central
Committee' of the Socialist Workers' Party. In a long resolution, part of the
section dealing with how the unions are to 'serve' the workers, states: "We
reject as reactionary the demand that trade unions should be independent of both
the Party and the Workers' and Peasants' Government, and the demand for the
right to strike in defiance of the Workers' State".
March 5, 1957 -
Gyula Kallai, Minister of Culture, declares that a "systematic
ideological propaganda is necessary to liberate the intellectuals from
counter-revolutionary influences".
March 6, 1957 -
A new literary weekly Magyarosag is published in
Budapest to replace Irodalmi Ujsag (literary gazette of the dissolved
Writers' Union). It announces the formation of new literary club, Tancsis, to
replace the Petöfi Circle.
March 17, 1957 -
Announcement that a Communist Youth organisation is to be
formed.
March 20, 1957 -
Ministry of Interior issues order that persons " dangerous to
the State or to public security " are liable to " forced residence " at places
specified by the authorities.
March 23, 1957 -
Minister of State, Marosán, states at a meeting in Czepel that
Russian troops will remain in Hungary "as long as the interests of the workers
require their presence".
March 27, 1957 -
At a press conference, Marosán, declares that "although the
counter-revolutionaries have suffered defeat ... some disturbing elements still
remain to be eliminated".
April 8, 1957 -
At a trial in Budapest, three of the accused are sentenced.
Playwright, Joseph Gali, and journalist, Gyula Obersovsky, charged with
publishing an illegal journal and 'agitation', are sentenced to 1 and 3 three
years respectively. (But see below: June 20, 25 and July 4).
April 17, 1957 -
Radio Budapest announces that "counter-revolutionary" Miklos
Olach, aged 21, has been executed at Borsod for "killing an officer of the
Hungarian Army".
April 20, 1957 -
Ministry of Interior issues a communiqué that the writer, Tibor
Dery, has been arrested and charged with "behaviour prejudicial to the security
of the State".
April 29, 1957 -
Announcement that Minister of State, Marosán, has been
appointed First Secretary of the Budapest section of the 'Socialist Workers'
Party'.
May 1, 1957 -
In a May Day speech, Marosán pays tribute to Kadar for
"creating the conditions that have made possible the existence of the Party and
of socialist Hungary".
May 3, 1957 -
The trade union paper Nepakarat reports the arrest of a
"counter-revolutionary band" of nine workers in the Nograd area. They are
accused of obstructing Russian tanks from entering the industrial town of
Solgotorjan.
May 10-11, 1957 -
Meeting of National Assembly. Kadar says: "The task of the
leaders is not to put into effect the wishes of the masses ... the leaders' task
is to realise the interests of the masses ... In the recent past, we have
encountered the phenomenon of certain categories of workers acting against their
own interests ... If the wishes of the masses do not coincide with progress,
then they must be led in another direction."
June 20, 1957 -
Announcement that Joseph Gali and Gyula Obersovsky have now
been sentenced to death. Other prison sentences of accused in the same trial are
raised.
June 25, 1957 -
Official communique announces the re-trial of the writers Gali
and Obersovsky. In the meantime, death sentences suspended.
June 27, 1957 -
National Conference of the 'Socialist Workers' Party' opens in
Budapest. Kadar gives a report on the general situation - couples Nagy with
Rakosi as "guilty of treason".
June 29, 1957 -
National Conference ends. A resolution condemning the
"counter-revolution attempt of October-November 1956" admits that it is not yet
defeated: "Those who have committed crimes and continue to undermine the
people's regime, will be severely punished". Tribute is paid to "the brotherly
help of the Soviet Union".
July 4, 1957 -
Death sentences on Gali and Obersovsky quashed by the Budapest
Supreme Court. They are sentenced instead to life and fifteen years'
imprisonment respectively.
July 9, 1957 -
Népszabadság reports that police had to be called in to
put an end to strike of building workers which started on June 5, at
Sajoszent-Peter, for a wages increase.
July 25, 1957 -
In a speech, Minister of State, Marosán, says hundreds of
arrests made during recent weeks ... also that the Soviet Union has agreed to
the Hungarian Government's request that Rakosi should remain in exile in the
U.S.S.R..
August 7, 1957 -
Announcement that there is to be a trial of seven workers who
have been charged with "counter-revolutionary" activities in the Tatabanya
coalfields, where strikes and "industrial unrest" continue.
August 20, 1957 -
Purge of schoolteachers in Miskolc.
Nepakarat reports speech by Sandor Gaspar, Secretary of
the 'Council of Free Trade Unions', during which he said: "Absenteeism,
unpunctuality, and unjustified early departure from work, have increased in
factories during the last months".
September 1, 1957 -
Third volume of the official White Book published in
Budapest. This gives the total number of 'comrades' killed during the revolution
as 201 (166 members of the A.V.O., 26 Party officials - including people working
for the A.V.O. - and 9 civilians).
Celebrating 'Miners' Day' at Tatabanya, Kadar admits that the
"October mood" still prevails among the miners.
September 17, 1957 -
Népszabadság scolds factory managers who throw on to the
Government the responsibility for "tightening norms and reducing wages", instead
of "explaining that such unpopular decisions are made in the interests of the
workers".
September 21-23, 1957 -
Marosán makes speeches in several parts of Budapest, including
the Technical University. "If there are any demonstrations on October 23, those
taking part will be severely punished." As if to add emphasis to this, he adds
that 1,200 people were arrested in July.
September 29, 1957 -
At Kecskemet, Deputy Premier Antal Apro announces that the
remaining Workers Councils are to be replaced by "works councils, under the
leadership of the trade unions".
October 15, 1957 -
Népszabadság repeats threats of heavy penalties for any
person who "disturbs the peace" on October 23, and emphasises the need for
"increased vigilance".
October 16, 1957 -
Marosán again warns students against any demonstrations on
October 23.
October 23, 1957 -
Budapest and other cities had a calm day. A.V.O. out on the
streets in great numbers. Russian troops standing by.
November 2, 1957 -
Budapest City Council decides to erect a statue of Lenin - on
the pedestal at the plinth in City Park where had stood the 26 ft. bronze statue
of Stalin, pulled down by demonstrators on October 23, 1956.
The Hungarian Writers' Association Abroad receives reports of a
secret trial of Gyula Hay, Tibor Dery, Zoltan Zelk and Tibor Tardos.
November 3, 1957 -
Writing in Népszabadság, the Minister of the Interior,
Ferenc Münnich, reports on the first year's achievements of the Kadar
Government. He attacks the Workers' Councils which "were led by class-alien
elements ... It is necessary to replace this whole set-up by new organisations
as soon as possible".
November 13, 1957 -
Radio Budapest announces that the trial of the writers (held in
camera since the beginning of the month) has ended. The verdict of the Supreme
Court is: Tibor Dery (aged 63) sentenced to nine years' imprisonment; Gyula Hay
(57) six years; Zoltan Zelk (51) three years; and Tibor Tardos 18 months. Report
that during the proceedings, Dery and Hay declared that if a similar situation
were to arise today, they would act exactly as they did in October 1956.
November 17, 1957 -
Official announcement that all remaining Workers' Councils are
to be abolished forthwith.
Appendix IV
Sources of Information and Quotations
Books & Pamphlets
L. B. BAIN, The Reluctant Satellites, Macmillan, New
York, 1960.
NOEL BARBER, A Handful of Ashes, Wingate,
1957.
HUGO DEWAR & DANIEL NORMAN, Revolution and
Counter-Revolution in Eastern Europe, Socialist Union of Central Eastern
Europe, 1957.
PETER FRYER, Hungarian Tragedy, Dobson Books Ltd., 1956.
YGAEL GLUCKSTEIN, Stalin's Satellites in Europe, Allen
& Unwin, 1952.
ADMIRAL NICHOLAS HORTHY, Memoirs, Hutchinson, 1956.
The Hungarian Workers' Revolution, Syndicalist Workers
Federation, 1956.
ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI, The Workers' Opposition, Solidarity
Pamphlet No. 7.
GEORGE MIKES, The Hungarian Revolution, Andre Deutsch,
1957.
ANAND MISHRA, East European Crisis of
Stalinism, Calcutta, 1957.
HUBERT RIPKA, Eastern Europe in the Post-war World,
Methuen, 1961.
The Road of Our People's Democracy, Hungarian News and
Information Services, June 1952.
HUGH SETON-WATSON, Eastern Europe, 1918-1941, Cambridge,
1945.
HUGH SETON-WATSON, The East European Revolution,
Methuen, 1950.
G. N. SHUSTER, In Silence I Speak, Gollancz, 1956.
Socialism or Barbarism, Solidarity Pamphlet No. 11.
Newspapers & Periodicals
Continental News Services
Daily Worker
The Economist
The Guardian
Irodalmi Ujsag (Literary Gazette)
The Nation
Nemzetör (Monthly of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters)
Nepakarat ('Official' Hungarian T.U. newspaper)
Neue Zürcher Zeitung
New York Times
The Observer
Polish Facts and Figures
Pravda
Scanteia (Rumanian CP daily)
Socialisme ou Barbarie
Solidarity
Szabad Nep (Hungarian CP daily)
The Times
Tribune
World News and Views
Matyas Bajor and five other young Freedom Fighters were
interviewed in London by the author, in January, 1957.
FOOTNOTES
1. In July 1945, the Japanese had offered to
negotiate on 'unconditional surrender' terms. They were ignored. The A-bombs
were dropped on August 6 and 9. Paradoxically, the Russians were not opposed to
this. They were curious to see the result: they were already working diligently
to produce their own nuclear weapons. [return to
text]
2. Politics, New York Times, March 1945.
[return to
text]
3. With the advent of Marshall Aid two years
later, they were kicked out of these governments, without a word of thanks for
the services they had rendered to the capitalist class. [return to
text]
4. That genuine revolution by the people must be
avoided at all costs, was a point on which both 'communist' parties and
capitalist ones were completely united. [return to
text]
5. Molotov speech of April 2, 1944. [return to
text]
6. August 23, 1944. [return to
text]
7. The Kremlin's explanation to the British
Government was that the Sanatescu Government was unable to maintain control over
'fascists' and ' pro-Hitlerite elements' in the country. [return to
text]
8. World News and Views, November 19,
1938. [return to
text]
9. New York Times, March 17, 1945. [return to
text]
10. New York Times, September 26, 1945.
[return to
text]
11. Radio Bucharest reported that Groza had made
this statement when describing his talks with Stalin in autumn 1945. [return
to text]
12. At an election meeting in Bucharest on
November 17, 1946, Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party) ended his
speech with the slogans: "Vote for the King's government! Long live the King!
Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the
people's!" [Ygael Gluckstein, Stalin's Satellites in Europe, Allen &
Unwin, p.141.] [return to
text]
13. Maniu died in 1955. [return to
text]
14. In 1923, the Military League organised a
coup d'état and overthrew the progressive regime of Stambulinski.
Stambulinski was assassinated. Tens of thousands of his supporters, together
with many Communists and socialists, were murdered. [return to
text]
15. The Economist, October 7, 1944. [return
to text]
16. New York Times, January 16, 1945.
[return to
text]
17. The Nation, June 23, 1945. [return
to text]
18. Kun was Foreign Minister, but he dominated
the Government. [return to
text]
19. Kun opposed Stalin during the great purges
of the middle thirties and was executed. In February 1962 a national delegate
conference of Kadar's Hungarian Journalists' Union 'cleared' Kun's name. The
Union's President, Dr. Arpad Szakasits, paid high tributes to Kun, his "great
central committee,: and his Voros Utsag - the first Hungarian Communist
newspaper. It was also reported (Feb. '62) that Bela Kun's widow and son, who
live on a farm in the Soviet Union, had been invited by Kadar to return and
settle in Hungary. (Szakasits was an ex-Social Democratic leader and editor of
Nepszava in 1944. He succeeded Tildy as President of Hungary in 1948.
Became a victim of Rakosi's 'Salami tactics' (see Chapter 41 and was imprisoned
for four years) [return to
text]
20. See Admiral Nicholas Horthy -
Memoirs, p.222. [return to
text]
21. At this time the Germans still occupied the
capital. They fought in every street, leaving a devastated city behind them.
[return to
text]
22. For further information on this subject see
Solidarity Pamphlet No. 7, The Workers Opposition, by Alexandra
Kollontai. [return to
text]
23. The Guardian, September 29,
1962. [return to
text]
24. Solidarity Pamphlet No. 7, The
Workers Opposition, by Alexandra Kollontai, p.20. [return to
text]
25. The author, who was a P.O.W. in Austria and
remained there for six months after the war had ended, has personal experience
of all this.
While working with American Intelligence in Styria, he was
arrested on the order of the American Military Governor of the area. He was
again put behind barbed wire in ex-P.O.W. camp in the town of Stainach. An
American guard was placed over the camp. Two American members of the
Intelligence Unit were also arrested, but were not seen again by Anderson, who
escaped from the camp the very same night and went into hiding.
Anderson and the others had been actively objecting to leading
local Nazis being retained in or given positions of authority by the American
Military Government. When the British took over this particular zone from the
Americans, Anderson came out of hiding and joined a British Intelligence Unit
operating from the town of Liezen. Things were no better. The British Military
Government also regarded the strutting Nazi administrators and managers of only
a few weeks earlier as the only people they could rely on. A similar situation
developed as with the American Military Government. Anderson was again arrested.
[return to
text]
26. From Rakosi's speech of February 29, 1952,
to the Party Academy (see The Road of our People's Democracy, published
in June 1952 by the Hungarian News and Information Service). [return to text a b c d]
27. See speech by the Polish Foreign Minister
Modzelewski, to a Committee of the U.N. General Assembly (November 2, 1948).
[return to
text]
28. Ygael Gluckstein - Stalin's Satellites in
Europe (p.66) - an excellent source of information for the period up to
1950. [return to
text]
29. Similar developments occurred in Bulgaria,
Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. [return to
text]
30. Lord Chandos, chairman of Associated
Electrical Industries, and head of the Institute of Directors, said at a
luncheon of the Coal Industry Society at the Hyde Park Hotel, in London, on
January 8. 1962: "Nationalization of a fairly substantial sector of industry has
come to stay... It is quite clear that every loyal citizen must try to make our
nationalized industries work efficiently. I congratulate Lord Robens (ex-front
bench Labour M.P.) Chairman of the National Coal Board, on having many ideas. I
congratulate the coal trade upon the lively revival in marketing. As an
industrialist I want cheap fuel and reliable supplies and I believe that is what
you will secure for us.' (The Guardian. January 1, 1962). [return
to text]
31. Continental News Service,
April 16, 1948. [return to
text]
32. Another similarity between the Hungarian (or
any other) Communist Party and the British (or any other) Labour Party is that
both profess to be parties of the working class. Both no doubt started with the
objective of 'emancipating labour'. Both have become obstacles to this end. Both
are now the mouthpieces of non-proletarian strata. In their internal
organization - and in their conceptions of their relations to the masses - both
now reflect the fundamental division of exploiting society into order-givers and
order-takers. Objectively, the function of both types of party is to force the
working class to accept a rationalised form of exploitation. [return to
text]
33. Pravda, September 7, 1929. [return
to text]
34. Pravda, March 11, 1937. [return
to text]
35. Although there is an almost monastic silence
about them, forced labour camps certainly existed in Hungary. An indication of
their existence was given on August 21, 1950, when Radio Budapest reported that
I. Olagos, a worker in the wagon factory at Györ, had been found guilty of a
'wages swindle' and sentenced to six years compulsory labour. [return to
text]
36. See Solidarity, vol. II, No. 1, p.15
"Who Sabots?" [return to
text]
37. Kossa was a former Budapest tramworkers'
leader who had been sent with a penal labour battalion to the Russian front,
captured by the Red Army and 'politically educated' at a Russian training
centre. He became boss of the Communist-reorganized trade unions, in 1945. [return
to text]
38. Neue Zurcher Zeitung, September 6,
1949. [return to
text]
39. Re-named "Karl Marx Allee." [November 14,
1961.] [return to
text]
40. Syndicalist Workers Federation pamphlet -
The Hungarian Workers' Revolution, p.15. [return to
text]
41. George Mikes says that Tito expressed
dissatisfaction at the restoration of Rakosi. Krushchev replied: "I have to keep
Rakosi in Hungary because, in Hungary, the whole structure will collapse if he
goes." George Mikes, Hungarian Revolution, p.61. [return to
text]
42. Peter Fryer - Hungarian Tragedy.
[return to
text]
43. Nagy was a member of a Government and of the
Party which had, for years, faithfully carried out all Stalin's wishes. [return
to text]
44. The first Hungarian Five Year Plan, which
ended in 1954, was to be followed in 1955 by a second, "in close co-ordination
with the Soviet Union." Other countries involved were Czechoslovakia, Rumania,
Poland, and East Germany. [return to
text]
45. We do not have space here to describe the
Russian treachery during the magnificent campaign of the Polish workers of
Warsaw against the Nazis in 1944. This was a betrayal of such sickening
magnitude that few Poles will ever forget it. The memory of these events played
a large part in the post-war attitude of the Poles to the U.S.S.R. [return
to text]
46. Sandor Petöfi was a poet who played an
important part in the Hungarian revolution against the Hapsburg oppression, in
1848. Czar Nicholas I sent troops to suppress the Hungarians. [return to
text]
47. Gyula Hay was well known at the time of Bela
Kun's regime of 1919, when one of his plays was performed at the Hungarian
National Theatre. He fled Hungary from Horthy's White Terror and wandered
through Europe with a suitcase full of unperformed plays. He returned to
Budapest at the end of World War II when another of his plays became a great
success. [return to
text]
48. Communist Party daily. [return to
text]
49. Rakosi had kept them both in jail for years
as "Titoist Fascists", etc. Kadar still bore the marks on his face and body of
the tortures he suffered on orders of the 'Leadership.' [return to
text]
50. We use the term loosely to describe the type
taking part in this movement. There were, of course, a few industrial workers at
the meetings, but the large majority were writers and students plus a number of
schoolteachers, doctors, etc. [return to
text]
51. A famous coffee house damaged during the war
and rebuilt by the Government. [return to
text]
52. The Daily Worker carried no report of
this very important event. [return to
text]
53. Peter Fryer - Hungarian Tragedy,
p.39. [return to
text]
54. We call this 'workers' management' - see
Solidarity pamphlet No. 6: The Meaning of Socialism. [return
to text]
55. Not necessarily a revolutionary demand. See
Solidarity pamphlet No. 7: The Workers' Opposition p.66. [return
to text]
56. The great industrial area of Budapest
renowned as 'Red Czepel' because of the large number of its workers who were
Party members. [return to
text]
57. Perhaps this was carried by the student who, at
the Polytechnic the previous evening, had caused an apprehensive hush to fall on
the meeting when he suddenly shouted: "Out with the Russians!" There was some
laughter when the silence was broken by the quiet voice of a lecturer: "Our
friend means, of course, to suggest that it would be desirable for each nation
to keep its army on its own soil." [return to
text]
58. For the full text of the resolution, see
Appendix I. [return to
text]
59. Quoted from Socialisme ou Barbarie -
vol. IV, No. 20, p.87. [return to
text]
60. It is remarkable that, during the whole
course of the revolution, no cases of looting were reported by any observers
other than die-hard Stalinists. [return to
text]
61. Hubert Ripka, Eastern Europe in the Post War World,
p.163. [return to
text]
62. Related by Matyas Bajor-see Appendix IV. [return to
text]
63. All observers interviewed say dum-dum bullets were used.
[return to
text]
64. A British Communist who had lived in
Budapest for three years. Editor of World Youth. [return to
text]
65. Related by Peter Fryer in Hungarian
Tragedy, p.46. [return to
text]
66. Hubert Ripka was a minister in the post-war
government of Czechoslovakia, during the presidency of Benes. After the
Communist coup of 1948, he went into exile. He died in 1958. Ripka was certainly
not a revolutionary socialist. Just as certainly, he was no fascist. He was one
of the more liberal-minded Czech social democrats. [return to
text]
67. Hubert Ripka, Eastern Europe in the Post
War World, p.166. [return to
text]
68. For an account of the Babolna Peasants'
Council, see Peter Fryer - Hungarian Tragedy, pp.60-62. [return to
text]
69. Even the bureaucrats of U.N.O. recognised
this. A U.N. special committee report on Hungary stated: "The Workers' Councils
emerged from the Revolution as the only organisations commanding the support of
the overwhelming majority of the people and in a position to require the
government to negotiate with them, because they constituted a force able to
bring about the resumption of work." [return to
text]
70. North-East Hungary, on the borders of
Czechoslovakia. Coal mines and steel works amongst the most important in the
country. Large power station, iron-smelting, and centre of the Hungarian
chemical industry. [return to
text]
71. Quoted from Socialisme ou Barbarie -
Vol. IV, No. 20. pp. 90-91. [return to
text]
72. "Counter-revolution in Hungary staged an
uprising in the hours of darkness on Tuesday night." (Daily Worker,
October 25, 1956.) The same edition ran an article entitled "The Hell that was
Horthy's", thus implying that the current revolt was of fascist nature. [return
to text]
73. In his book A Handful of Ashes, Noel
Barber of the Daily Mail quotes what he calls "the demands of the
Writers' Union" (pp. 89-90). His words bear little relation to the original
text. For example, he makes absolutely no mention of workers' management or
workers' control. [return to
text]
74. Quoted from Socialisme ou Barbaric - vol. IV, No.
20, p.92. [return to
text]
75. The Daily Worker's special
correspondent in Budapest, Peter Fryer, had his dispatches mutilated beyond
recognition by the Editor and finally suppressed altogether. [return to
text]
76. Daily Worker, October 29, 1956. [return to
text]
77. There had already been a resumption of work in some
factories. Public transport had started running again on Saturday, October 27.
[return to
text]
78. George Mikes, The Hungarian Revolution, p.145.
[return to
text]
79. New York Times, October 23, 1956. [return to
text]
80. The Daily Worker of November 5,
reported that Kadar had "called for the arming of the workers in the factories."
[return to
text]
81. Peter Fryer, Hungarian Tragedy, p.85.
[return to
text]
82. The four principal Ministers were: Foreign
Minister, Imre Horvath; Deputy Prime Minister, Ferenc Münnich; Minister of
Defence and Interior, Antal Apro; Minister of Agriculture, Imre Degoe. Two
Social Democrats were also given Ministries: Minister of State, Gyorgy Morosan
and Minister of Trade, Sandor Ronal. [return to
text]
83. In the same issue, the front page headlines
ran: "New Hungarian Anti-fascist Government in Action - Soviet Troops called in
to stop White Terror." Further down the page the Daily Worker reported
"Budapest Radio, under control of the Kadar Government, said that Ernö Gerö,
former First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party had been murdered in a
'barbarous fashion' by the rebels." In fact Gerö had been taken to Moscow by the
Russians on October 24. [return to
text]
84. Daily Worker, November 5, 1956. [return
to text]
85. Daily Worker, November 5, 1956. [return
to text]
86. This was started by Moscow radio on the
afternoon of November 4, which, according to the Daily Worker of November 5,
announced "All honest Hungarian patriots are taking an active part ... in
disarming the mutineers and in overcoming individual nests of resistance of
fascist groups." [return to
text]
87. Peter Fryer. Hungarian Tragedy, p.83.
[return to
text]
88. This appears to contradict the Daily
Worker report that Gerö had been killed by the rebels on November 4. Perhaps
the Daily Worker's News Editor, knowing in what kind of esteem Gerö was
held by the workers, had made an 'intelligent guess' about his fate. If so, the
Daily Worker had been thwarted by the Russians who had 'arrested' Gerö on
October 24, and taken him to Moscow. Gerö was not expelled at this time. On
August 19, 1962, the Soviet news agency Tass reported that a meeting of
the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist (Communist) Party had just
expelled Gerö - and Rakosi (see The Guardian, August 20, 1962, pp.1 and
7). [return to
text]
89. Before, during, and since the period of the
Hungarian revolution, all strikes were 'unofficial' except, perhaps, during the
short life of the National Council of Free Trade Unions, formed in October.
[return to
text]
90. Marosán, together with Kadar, Apró and
Münnich, disappeared the day before the second Russian attack, presumably to
form a 'Government.' [return to
text]
91. Early in 1957, the Writers' Union was
banned. So was the Union of journalists [see entries for January 17 and 19, 1957
in Appendix III]. [return to
text]
92. See also other extracts from Kadar's speech
to the National Assembly in Appendix III [May 10-11, 1957]. [return to
text]
93. Confirmed by Krushchev at the 20th Congress.
[return to
text]
94. The Chinese Communists now reproach the
Russians with not having acted vigorously enough in suppressing the Hungarian
Revolution! [return to
text]
95. Peter Fryer, Hungarian Tragedy. [return
to text]
96. Quoted from Socialism ou Barbarism
[Solidarity pamphlet No. 11, p.3]. [return to
text]
97. Ibid. pp.13-14. [return to
text]
98. Ibid, p.20. [return to
text]
(CX5382)
Subject Headings
Communist Movement & Parties Communist Regimes/Europe Eastern Europe European History Hungary Revolution Revolution/Study of Socialism Soviet Union Workers' Control Working Class
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