| Hungary '56
by Andy Anderson,
1964
|
We shall drag
the blood-soaked Hungarian mud on to the carpets of your drawing
rooms. In vain do you take us into your homes - we still remain
homeless. In vain do you dress us in new clothes - we remain in rags. From
now on a hundred thousand question marks confront you. If you wish to
live in the illusion of a false peace, do not heed us. In our streets
there are still cobble-stones from which to build barricades. From our
woods we can still get stout sticks. We still have clear consciences with
which to face the guns. But if you will heed us, listen. And at long
last understand. We not only want to bear witness to the sufferings of the
Hungarian people in their fight for freedom. We want to draw the attention
of all people to the simple truth that freedom can only be achieved
through struggle. Peace is not simply an absence of war. No people have
longed more passionately for peace than we. But it must not be the peace
of quiescence. This involves complicity in oppression. We promise the
world that we shall remain the apostles of freedom. All workers,
socialists, even communists, must at last understand that a bureaucratic
state has nothing to do with socialism.
Nemsetör, 15 January, 1957. |
Contents
Introduction
|
"Socialism is man's positive self-consciousness." K. Marx.
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
(1844). |
At 3.00 a.m. on November 4, 1956, fifteen Russian armoured
divisions comprising 6,000 tanks massed at key points in Hungary to make final
preparations for their second assault on a relatively defenceless people. The
first assault, little more than a week earlier, had been a confused affair.
Moscow pretended not to have been consulted. Hungarians had not been expected to
fight the tanks almost with their bare hands. Russian soldiers had not been
expected to go over to the side of the Hungarian workers in such numbers. This
time, there were to be no mistakes. At 4.00 a.m. the tanks went in.
It took them nearly two weeks to crush the main centres of
armed resistance. One of the greatest proletarian revolutions in history was
drowned in blood. It is bitter irony indeed that those who ordered this massacre
claimed to be the standard bearers of the glorious revolution of October 1917.
Thirty nine years earlier, Russia had for a while been the headquarters of world
revolution. From there the clarion call had gone out to the toiling and
oppressed people of the world to overthrow their masters and to join hands with
the Russian workers in building a new society. Today, however, it is not the
midwives of the Revolution who occupy the Kremlin, it is its undertakers.
After World War II, the Russians succeeded in enforcing their
'socialism' along the banks of the Danube and up to the frontiers of Austria.
They ruled an area extending from the Baltic in the north to the Balkans in the
south. Over a hundred million people of various nationalities had fallen within
the embrace of the new Russian bear. For many years these people had been
bullied, oppressed, manipulated, managed, either by Czarist Russia or one of the
Western States. Under Stalinist rule they fared no better. Their chains were if
anything tightened. To them the word 'socialism' came to mean its very opposite.
In March 1953, Stalin died. In June the workers of East Berlin
rebelled. The revolt, remarkable for the political character of the demands put
forward, was soon quelled by Russian tanks. By 1956, these subject nations were
becoming more and more of a political liability to Russia's rulers. The Russian
bureaucracy recognised the danger: at the 20th Congress Krushchev himself
debunked the Stalin myth and promised to liberalise Stalin's methods. But
Krushchev and his supporters soon found themselves in a dilemma. It is difficult
to continue practising a religion after you have destroyed its god. Although
Russia's rulers attempted to break with some of the worst evils of their past,
they were (and remain) incapable of coping with the root causes of these evils.
The workers of Poznan, in Poland, were the first to demonstrate
what they thought of the 'changed' road to 'socialism'. The Hungarians were
surprised and later elated to see how leniently these rebellious workers - and
even their 'leaders' - were treated. In their turn they rose. They were
victorious. And then they were crushed by the very methods Krushchev had
denounced only a few months earlier. Many throughout the world were shocked at
this butchery. Most of all it shocked those honest workers and intellectuals who
sincerely looked to Russia as the defender of socialism. To them a treasured
ideal, an ideal for which they had fought and suffered for many years,
and for which many of their comrades had died, had proved to be worm-eaten.
The Hungarian Revolution was the most important event in
working class history since October 1917. It marked the end of an era and the
beginning of a new one. It irrevocably destroyed any moral advantage the Kremlin
and those who support it may ever have had. But it was much more than this. It
was a very positive event. From the Hungarian Revolution can be drawn lessons of
the utmost importance for all who wish to bring about the change to a classless
society in Britain or anywhere else in the world.
In 1956 the Hungarian working class inscribed on its banner the
demand for workers' management of production. It insisted that Workers' Councils
should play a dominant role in all realms of social life. It did so in a society
in which the private ownership of the means of production (and the old ruling
class based on it) had been largely eliminated. And it did so in a society in
which political power was held 'on behalf of the working class' by a self-styled
working class party. In putting forward these two demands under these particular
circumstances, the Hungarian workers blazed a trail. In the second half of the
twentieth century their ideas will become the common heritage of all workers, in
all lands.
The Hungarian Revolution was far more than a national uprising
or than an attempt to change one set of rulers for another. It was a social
revolution in the fullest sense of the term. Its object was a fundamental change
in the relations of production, in the relations between ruler and ruled in
factories, pits, and on the land. The elimination of private property in the
means of production had solved none of these problems. The concentration of
political power into the hands of a bureaucratic 'elite' had intensified them a
thousandfold.
By its key demands, by its heroic example, and despite its
temporary eclipse, the Hungarian Revolution upset all previous political
classifications and prognoses. It created new lines of demarcation not only in
the ranks of the working class movement, but in society in general. It exposed
the theoretical void in the traditional 'left'. A mass of old problems have now
become irrelevant. Old discussions are now seen to be meaningless. The time is
up for terminological subtleties, for intellectual tight-rope walking, for
equivocation and for skilful avoidance of facing up to reality. For years to
come all important questions for revolutionaries will boil down to simple
queries: Are you for or against the programme of the Hungarian Revolution? Are
you for or against workers' management of production? Are you for or against the
rule of the Workers' Councils?
Most people have only a very superficial knowledge of these
weeks of October and November 1956. They have less knowledge still of the events
which led up to them. We feel this book may contribute to a better knowledge and
understanding of what really took place.
East-West Agreement
|
"...From the first moment of victory, mistrust must be
directed no longer against the conquered reactionary parties, but against
the workers' previous allies, against the party that wishes to exploit the
common victory for itself alone... The workers must put themselves at the
command not of the State authority but of the revolutionary community
councils which the workers will have managed to get adopted... Arms and
ammunition must not be surrendered on any pretext." K. Marx &
F. Engels. Address to the Central Committee of the Communist League
(1850). |
Prior to 1939, all the powerful capitalist nations, including
Hitler's Germany, were agreed that the USSR was the real villain on the stage of
history. Then the nature of their economies led them into war with one another.
In 1941 Hitler invaded Russia and the western capitalist 'democracies'
contracted a union with the 'villain', with the USSR. But this was no
love-match. It was a marriage of expediency, coloured by the fond hope that
Russia and Germany would mutually annihilate one another. Strategy was planned
towards this end. But this strategy failed. The grandiose dreams of the rulers
of Britain and America of emerging from the war as undisputed masters of the
world did not materialise. They had reckoned without the heroic resistance of
the Russian people against German fascism.
Russia paid a staggering price. The Nazi invaders caused
incalculable damage to buildings and to machinery. In the early months of the
war, when the Red Army was in retreat, a 'scorched earth' policy was carried
out. Millions of Russians gave all they had - their very lives. Yet while the
battles of World War II were still being fought the causes of World War III were
already maturing.
Russia emerged from the war the second most powerful nation in
the world. In throwing back the German army to the borders of the Elbe, it had
acquired half a continent. These were spoils indeed and hardly the outcome
bargained for by the West. Their failure to contain 'the red menace' led to near
panic in their ranks.
Veiled threats were made. Two hundred thousand
people were murdered in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atom bombs. The real purpose
of this crime was to warn Russia's rulers to show them there would be no limit
to the ruthlessness1 of
the Western ruling classes should they feel their interests threatened. But the
Western powers were not strong enough to challenge the situation in Europe
itself. They were in no position to dispute the established fact. Eastern Europe
belonged to the USSR 'by virtue of conquest'.
Formal recognition of the new reality was given at the Yalta
Conference, in February 1945. Those parts of Europe 'liberated' by the Red Army
(the satellite states) would remain in the Russian sphere of influence. Western
Europe and Greece would be left to Stalin's Western 'allies'. Persia was also
recognised as being within the 'Western' sphere. During the war the Red Army had
'liberated' northern Persia. After hostilities ended, it withdrew.
With the defeat of Nazi Germany, the whole of Europe was
seething for revolutionary change. Nothing like it had been felt since 1917. We
shall later see how the Russian leaders maintained 'order' in their own sphere
of influene in the face of this proletarian threat to their Power. In the West,
the communist parties (and in some cases, the social-democratic parties) helped
the ruling classes maintain their kind of order.
In FRANCE, considerable power was in the hands of
Resistance groups. These were dominated by 'communists' and 'socialists'. All
that really stood between the French workers and effective power were a few
shaky bayonets in the hands of British and American soldiers, most of whom only
wanted to go home.
On the instructions of the Communist leaders,
the Resistance groups handed over their arms to the so-called National
Liberation Government headed by General de Gaulle. On January 21, 1945, Maurice
Thorez, General Secretary of the French Communist Party, announced that the
Patriotic Militia had served well against the Nazis. But now, he said, the
situation had changed. "Public security should be assured by a regular police
force. Local Committees of Liberation should not substitute themselves for the
local governments."2 His
statements and actions closely resembled those of General de Gaulle.
The Communist Party was instructed to continue the campaign of
wartime 'unity'. They abandoned the class struggle. They preached the virtues of
production. They denounced workers defending their wages and conditions. "The
strike", they said, "was the weapon of the trusts". On November 17, 1945, they
entered the coalition government formed by General de Gaulle. Thorez was one of
the five Communist leaders in a cabinet of twenty-two members. He was appointed
Minister of State.
The French Communist Party's programme in 1945 can be
summarised as follows: (a) control of the trusts; (b) liberty of conscience,
press and association; (c) the right to work and leisure; (d) social security
for workers to be provided by the state; (e) aid to the peasants through the
syndicates and co-ops. Hardly the programme of a revolutionary party! No
liberal-minded Tory would have had qualms about supporting it.
In ITALY, the Communist leaders propped up the old
ruling class in much the same way. The Communist Party, of which Togliatti was
the General Secretary, had representatives in the governments of Bonomi and of
Marshal Badoglio. They enthusiastically protected the capitalist state against
revolution. The New York Times in a report during September 1944, stated:
"A good many Italian fascists seek refuge in the Communist Party. Communists
take over the party headquarters and institutions of the former regime like the
Balila. etc.. thereby soothing the transition from the old to the new."
Nor were the 'communists' deterred when unable to enter
bourgeois coalition governments. Indeed, they helped them as much as possible by
calling on the masses to support these wartime alliances. Prior to the General
Election of 1945, the British Communist Party declared itself in favour of a
coalition government with 'progressive' Tories, like Eden and Churchill!
In EASTERN EUROPE, as we shall see, the
Communists were able to gain complete control. This they did by appointing
Communist ministers to take charge of the state security forces via the
Ministries of the Interior. But in the West (France, Italy and Belgium) although
the Communists participated in national governments3 the
Ministry of the Interior was never within their grasp. In France, Duclos reached
out for this post. But the bid failed. It did not have the backing of the Red
Army.
Why did these Communist Parties act in this way?
What social interests did they represent? Had they ceased to be true parties of
the working class? The Hungarian events of 1956 were to give clear-cut answers
to these questions. But already the answers were being hinted at. The Communist
leaders knew that if the state machines in Western Europe were to collapse,
social revolution would certainly follow. And without the backing of the Red
Army, the Communists would have been powerless to control the workers.4
While Communists have from time to time proclaimed 'all power to the workers!'
they always added - if only under their breath ' ... under the leadership of the
Communist Party'. 'Under' is the operative word. How far under was demonstrated
in Eastern Europe, from 1944 on. There they did have the Red Army.
Liberation?
"Under Socialism all will govern in turn and will soon become
accustomed to no one governing". V. I. Lenin. The State and
Revolution (1917). |
Some people still believe that the Red Army carried the tide of
social revolution with it as it entered Eastern Europe in 1944. This is quite
untrue. Not only was the real essence of the regimes (social exploitation) left
unchanged, but for a long while even the existing political set-up was kept in
being with only a few superficial changes. Even the same policemen were often
kept on. As far as the masses were concerned all was the same as before. Only
the language spoken by the occupying army had changed.
The reason for the Russian Government's collaboration with the
"class enemy" was, according to Molotov, "to maintain law and order and prevent
the rise of anarchy". Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary provide clear examples of
whose 'law ' and what 'order' was maintained.
(a) RUMANIA
The first Eastern European state to be occupied by the Red Army
was Rumania. The Russian Government immediately announced its intention of
maintaining the status quo.
"The Soviet Government declares that it does not
pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the
existing social order in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry of Soviet
troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation
of resistance by enemy forces."5
The "enemy forces" were not Nazi desperadoes as might be
expected from the statement, but guerilla armies who had been fighting the
Nazis. These guerillas had originally been organized by the Peasant Party of
which the leader was Iuliu Maniu. Maniu became a member of the new government.
When he ordered his guerillas to disband and turn in their arms Moscow Radio
commented: " Maniu's declaration is belated. Even before this order the Red Army
Command had liquidated all bandit groups..."
Under the Nazis these guerillas had been 'brave resistance
fighters'. Under the Kremlin they were 'bandits'. Could their continued
resistance have been spurred on by the composition of the new government?
Molotov's guarantee not to interfere with the
existing social order encouraged King Michael to appoint a reactionary
government. General Sanatescu was made Prime Minister,6 an
office he was to hold for seven months. During this time the workers showed what
they felt. There were many uprisings and revolts against the government. The
Kremlin, with an army of a million men now in the country, then decided that if
Sanatescu could not control the people, he should go.
Vyshinski travelled to Bucharest. Soviet
artillery was posted in front of the royal palace. This was hardly necessary.
His Majesty promptly complied with Russian demands. Sanatescu's ministry was
dissolved and replaced with one headed by Petru Groza.7
Gheorghe Tatarescu became Vice-Premier.
Both Groza and Tatarescu had been members of
pre-war right-wing governments. In 1911 Tatarescu had led the suppression of a
peasant uprising in which 11,000 peasants had been murdered. He was Minister of
State at the time of the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1927. He was world famous as an
exponent of extreme right-wing doctrines. The British Communist Party itself had
called him "the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal
Party",8 the
party which helped King Carol establish his fascist regime under Marshal
Antonescu.
Prime Minister Groza's government was assisted
by two leading members of the Communist Party, comrades Gheorge Gheorghiu Dej
and Lucretiu Patrascanu. They were allotted the respective posts of Minister of
Public Works and Communications and of Minister of Justice. Patrascanu soon made
his 'socialist' position clear: "Industrialists, businessmen, and bankers will
escape punishment as war criminals under a law being drawn up by Lucretiu
Patrascanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist members of the Government.
Rumania could not afford to loose the services of merchants and industrialists.
M. Patrascanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a
more liberal policy towards this class than the French have".9
"Premier Groza said his
government did not intend to apply either collectivisation of the land or
nationalisation of the banks or industries and that the mere question showed
ignorance of its programme".10
Stalin himself advised Groza "to keep the system of private enterprise and
private profit".11
So, factories and enterprises owned by foreign capital were
also allowed to remain intact. Capitalists who had worked hand-in-glove with the
Nazis were permitted to keep their wealth and continue their activities. That
this happened with Groza as Prime Minister is hardly surprising. He was a banker
and owned many factories and a large estate. Before the war he had been a
minister in two right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).
Politically-conscious Rumanian workers did not
expect such a government to represent interests other than those of the big
landowners and financiers. Nor did they wonder why Groza was openly opposed to
measures of social reform and why he staunchly upheld the sanctity of private
property. But that a government carrying out a policy of suppressing workers and
peasants, that had been virtually appointed by Soviet Russia, forced many
Rumanian revolutionaries to think. It forced them to change opinions and ideals
they had held for years. Eventually, even Maniu and his supporters withdrew from
Parliament. But such were the rumblings among the people that even this trivial
demonstration of independence could not be tolerated by the government and its
Communist supporters. Maniu was promptly charged with being 'anti-monarchist
',12 a
'fascist' and an 'enemy of the people'.
Maniu was tried and sentenced to solitary
confinement for life.13
The President of the tribunal was the wartime Director General of prisons and
concentration camps. He owed his appointment to the tribunal to a leading member
of the Communist Party, Patrascanu.
(b) BULGARIA
When the Red Army occupied Bulgaria the
Russian-backed 'Fatherland Front' Government took over. It was headed by Colonel
Khimon Georgiev, Colonel Demain Velchev was Minister of War. Both had been
former leaders of the Military League, a fascist organisation sponsored by
Mussolini.14
Colonel Georgiev had also been the instigator of the fascist
coup of 1934 which had dismissed Parliament, dissolved the unions and declared
them illegal. He had then become Prime Minister and had begun a reign of terror
which, in its ruthless ferocity, surpassed even that of 1923. The Minister of
the Interior of the new 'Fatherland Front' Government was Anton Yugow; a
Communist leader. He controlled the state security forces and was responsible
for maintaining 'order'.
When the Nazi military machine eventually collapsed, the great
majority of the Bulgarian people were naturally overjoyed. Although tired of war
and oppression, their relief did not lead them to inactivity. Revolution - the
opportunity at last to become the masters of their own destiny - now appeared
possible. During the autumn months of 1944, in Sofia and other towns, workers'
militias arrested the fascists and clamped them in gaol. They held mass
demonstrations. They elected full democratic people's tribunals. The police were
disarmed and in many cases disbanded.
The soldiers' feelings were in harmony with
those of the people: "Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western
Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian Army in 1917.
Soldiers' councils have been set up. Officers have been degraded, red flags
hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished."15
This similarity to 1917 was anathema to the Russian and Bugarian 'Communist'
leaders. Backed by the Russian High Command, the Minister of War, Colonel
Velchev, issued a strict order to his troops. "Return immediately to normal
(sic) discipline. Abolish Soldiers' Councils. Hoist no more red flags."
Sincere Bulgarian Communists denounced the
hypocrisy of the Russians. Molotov attempted to quell the ensuing furore: "If
certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason.
Bulgaria will remain with her democratic government and her present order ...
You must retain all valuable army officers from before the coup d'état. You
should reinstate in the service all officers who have been dismissed for various
reasons."16
The sinister ring of these words echoed through
Bulgaria. In 1934, the fascist Colonel Georgiev had attacked the workers. He had
suppressed strikes with loss of life and declared them illegal. In 1945, the
same Colonel Georgiev, now a Communist stooge, attacked striking workers as
'fascists.' "In March 1945 a number of coal miners struck for higher wages. They
were immediately branded as 'anarchists' and 'fascists', and rushed into jail by
the Communist-controlled state militia."17
(c) HUNGARY
In 1918, the feeling in Hungary had been strong for
revolutionary change. These feelings had for a time been peacefully channelled
through the Government of Count Karolyi, who had a reputation for being some
kind of a Socialist. The Karolyi Government made some concessions to the people.
In March 1919, the Allies brought about the fall of the Karolyi Government. They
issued Hungary with an ultimatum concerning the frontier with Czechoslovakia
which Hungarians felt would be 'crippling the cripple'.
Patriotic and revolutionary feelings combined and
Bela Kun's18
Government rode in on the crest of a new revolutionary wave. Communists
dominated the new administration, although it contained a number of Social
Democrats.
In March 1919, the new government proclaimed the Hungarian
Soviet Republic. This was not imposed on the country by a Russian army. There
was no direct contact between Hungary and Russia. Russia had quite enough
to contend with at this time.
Prisoners of war returning from Russia gave accounts, excitedly
and with undisguised admiration, of the Great Revolution, news of which inspired
the people with hope for a new way of life. How badly the Hungarians needed to
cling to such a hope!
Hungary was a predominantly peasant country in - which the
distribution of land was more unjust than in any other part of Europe.
Almost all the land was owned by aristocrats and by the Church. The majority of
the people were landless, unemployed, and close to starvation. To end the feudal
land structure at this time would have been a truly revolutionary act.
Bela Kun's Government lasted a little over four
months. Some argue there was no time for such measures. But not even the promise
was made. Had such steps been taken, Bela Kun's regime might have lasted longer.
It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for successive governments to
take the land away from the peasants again, without facing the prospect of
prolonged civil war. As it was, the Kun regime was overthrown as soon as the
Rumanian Army had occupied Budapest. Bela Kun fled to Russia on August 1,
1919.19
The demise of the Kun Government had been planned at Szeyed by
Admiral Nicholas Horthy and his supporters. Representatives of the Rumanian Army
had been present. A White Terror was let loose on Hungary by Horthy's foreign
assisted counter-revolution. The first fascist regime in Europe was set up. For
the Hungarians, all former horrors were now surpassed. Thousands of Communists
and Socialists were rounded up by fascist gangs, beaten, tortured, killed. The
Trade Unions were violently suppressed. Those merely suspected of socialist
sympathies were tortured and finally murdered. Thousands of people, quite
unconnected with such ideas, suffered persecution and death. So frightful were
the reports of atrocities that even the British (who knew all about atrocities
in India) were moved to send a Parliamentary Commission to Budapest. The
Commission reported that "the worst stories of mutilation, rape, torture and
murder" were proved.
The activities of the Hungarian Communist Party at this time are
referred to by Peter Fryer in his book Hungarian Tragedy: "The tiny
Communist Party carried out its work in deep illegality. It made the kind of
sectarian mistakes that are so easy to make under such conditions, with leaders
in jail and murdered" (p.29). The movement was 'decapitated' and floundered.
This is inevitable under conditions of civil war, whenever revolutionary
movements are obsessed with the cult of leadership. It is a pre-requisite of
success under such conditions, that the leading activities of a movement be
spread as far and wide as possible throughout its membership. No one should be
indispensable. Arrested 'leaders' should always be replaceable by others.
For the Hungarian people the following years under Horthy's
fascist tyranny were full of dread and suffering. Some people have claimed that
Horthy's regime was not truly fascist. But we must remember that fascism in
power may take a variety of forms. Although basically similar, the regimes of
Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar also differed in several particulars.
Perhaps Horthy's regime could best be called 'rule by aristocratic fascists'.
Whatever its name, its sickening bestiality, as far as the ordinary people were
concerned, remains as a scar on the body of humanity.
The Horthy regime took part in World War II on Hitler's side.
However, towards the end of this war a movement developed which sought to detach
Hungary from its alliance with Nazi Germany. Nazi troops then occupied the
country and the terror ruled again. Left-wing militants were ruthlessly hunted
out and exterminated. Some 400,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to agony and
death in Nazi concentration camps.
Despite this long history of misery, the Hungarian people had
not given up their hope of a better life. When in 1944 the Red Army began to
occupy the country the people were well disposed towards it. They sincerely held
Russia to be a friend. They trusted the promise of liberation. Many Russians had
given their lives in bitter battles to drive out the German Nazis. The glorious
ideals of 1917 were not forgotten. So trusting were the few Hungarian Communists
that they helped to organise the dividing up of large estates among the
peasants.
In December 1944, a Hungarian government was
formed at Debrecen in the Russian-occupied area. A shudder went through the
people. The First Minister was the Hungarian Commander-in-Chief General Bela
Miklos de Dolnok. Bela Miklos had been the first Hungarian personally to receive
from Hitler the greatest Nazi honour: Knight Grand Cross of the Iron Cross. Only
a few months earlier, in July 1944, General Bela Miklos had held the highly
trusted job of messenger between the principal organiser of the White Terror,
Admiral Horthy, and the vilest Nazi of them all, Adolf Hitler.20
There were two other generals in the Government: Vörös and
Faragho. General Janos Vörös, Bela Miklos's ex-Chief-of-Staff, became Minister
for Defence. Imre Nagy became the Minster for Agriculture. The rest of the
Government was formed of members of the Communist, Social Democratic, and
Smallholders parties. The Economist described it at the time as "a queer
collection of the local denizens and the parties of the left".
The new government still considered Admiral
Horthy the legitimate ruler of Hungary. The Minister for Defence, General Vörös,
ended his first speech over the Russian radio with the contradictory slogan:
"Long live a free and democratic Hungary, under the leadership of Admiral
Horthy!". The first declaration of the Russian-sponsored government as broadcast
by Moscow radio on December 24, 1944, proclaimed: "The Regent of our country,
Nicholas Horthy, has been seized by the Germans. The mercenaries now in
Budapest2l
are usurpers. The country has been left without leadership at a moment when the
reins of government must be taken in strong hands ... Vital interests of the
nation demand that the armed forces of the Hungarian peoples, together with the
Soviet Union and democratic peoples, should help in the destruction of
Hitlerism. The Provisional Government declares that it regards private property
as the basis of economic life and the social order of the country and will
guarantee its continuity".
General Miklos, Knight Grand Cross of the Iron Cross, had read
the proclamation. It sounds incredible. How could such a man call for "the
destruction of Hitlerism"? To people like Bela Miklos, the privileges, prestige
and power that go with leadership, were the paramount considerations. The nature
of the leadership, its policy, methods and aims, were of secondary consequence.
But how could Soviet Russia put such men into leading positions? The main reason
was given by Miklos himself in the declaration quoted above: "... The country
has been left without leadership ...". In other words a political vacuum
existed. There was a real danger of it being filled by the organisations thrown
up by the industrial and agricultural workers. The workers had taken Communist
propaganda at its face value. They had already begun to act upon it. This was
extremely dangerous for the Soviet leadership and for all those who accepted it.
The only people the Russians could rely on were the remnants of the previous
ruling groups.
Russian beliefs that nobody other than erstwhile managers and
administrators could run the country were not new. The seeds had been sown in
Russia itself, shortly after the October Revolution and long before the Stalin
era. Prior to the Revolution the Bolsheviks had repeatedly advocated workers'
control of production. But as early as the spring of 1918 - and long before the
difficulties imposed by the Civil War - leading Party members were stressing the
advantages of 'one-man management' of industry. They were soon actively
denouncing those within their own Party - and those outside it - who still held
to the view that only collective management could be a genuine basis for
socialist construction.
We cannot here deal with this
extremely important and complex period of working class history, nor with the
extremely tense controversies which this question of management gave rise to.22
There can be little doubt, however, that it is in the events, difficulties, and
conflicts of this period that one should seek the real roots of the degeneration
of the Russian Revolution. Many years later, even the bourgeoisie was to
perceive the significance of what then took place. When The Guardian23
refers to Lenin's writings of March 1918 as "dealing in part with emulating
capitalist organisation of industry within a socialist framework", it is merely
expressing this awareness with its customary mixture of naivete and
sophistication.
The dangers that would flow from such ideas had been clearly
perceived in Russia by a grouping known as the Workers Opposition. As early as
1921, one of its prominent members, Alexandra Kollontai, had written: "Distrust
towards the working class (not in the sphere of politics, but in the sphere of
economic creative abilities) is the whole essence of the theses signed by our
Party leaders. They do not believe that the rough hands of workers, untrained
technically, can mould these economic forms which in the passage of time shall
develop into a harmonious system of Communist production.
"To all of them - Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and
Bukharin - it seems that production is such a 'delicate thing' that it is
impossible to get along without the assistance of 'managers'. First of all, we
shall 'bring up' the workers, 'teach them'. Only when they grow up shall we
remove from them all the teachers of the Supreme Council of National Economy and
let the industrial unions take control over production. It is significant that
all the theses written by the Party leaders coincide on this essential point:
for the present we shall not give the trade unions control over production. For
the present, 'we shall wait'. They all agree that at present the management of
production must be carried on over the workers' heads by means of a bureaucratic
apparatus inherited from the past."24
In the capitalist West, of course, there had
never been any 'nonsense' about the workers controlling and managing production.
When the Western powers 'liberated' parts of Europe in 1945, the Military
Governments set up by the occupying armies ensured that only people with a
particular social background or a particular kind of previous experience were
put or retained in commanding managerial or administrative positions.25 To
the victors it mattered little to what ends - or to whose ends - this experience
had been put in the past. Like spoke to like - and they got on fine! The
mystique of management cut across national boundaries.
As it became obvious that the future rulers of Hungary would be
the Communist Party and its rapidly forming bureaucracy, the place-seeking
elements came flocking in. The Party became the recruiting centre for the future
'leaders ' and managers. (A similar process had occurred in Germany, with the
rise of Hitler's party.) Economic administration and political rule were
concentrated into fewer and fewer hands.
Salami and Reparations
"An intelligent victor will, whenever possible, present his demands
to the vanquished in instalments." A. Hitler, Mein Kampf
(1925). |
In the East European states, the systematic destruction of the
Socialist and Peasant parties began gently. It continued with increased tempo
until, by 1948, they had been virtually liquidated. It was essential that no
means of opposition be open to the people if the tools of the Russian
bureaucracy, the national Communist parties, were to carry out their
programmes.
The people were already beginning to feel that their trust in
Soviet Russia was being betrayed. There is no more bitter and painful
disappointment than that caused when a friend betrays your trust. The Hungarian
Communists knew this. They knew what passions it would arouse. They were only a
minority. Their ruthless determination to hold on to power had to be made
apparent to all.
Their instrument of repression was of course
the police. Complete control of this force was essential. By gaining the key
post of the Ministry of Interior, this was assured them. Through this Ministry
they also controlled the Civil Service. All the key positions were held by their
members. The party of the proletariat, far from destroying the existing state
machine, utilised it and strengthened it to establish its dictatorship over the
proletariat. In later describing their methods. Rakosi said that in those days
the very idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was discussed only in
limited Party circles. "We did not bring (it) before the Party publicly because
even the theoretical discussion of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as an
objective, would have caused alarm among our companions in the coalition. It
would have made more difficult our endeavour to win over ... the majority of the
mass of the workers."26
The winning over of the workers to a revolutionary programme
would have been only too easy. But the Party would have lost control of the
workers in the process. In their fear of this, the Party united with their
bourgeois 'companions in the coalition'.
Rakosi explained how the 'Revolution' had been
made from above and how it had brought the Hungarian Communist Party to power.
He described how, through the Ministry of the Interior, the Party had been able
to 'unmask' the leaders of the Smallholders Party, 'reveal' their crimes and
'remove' them. Rakosi described how the opposition was cut into slices (like a
salami sausage) and discarded. "In those days this was called 'salami tactics'
... We sliced off, bit by bit, reaction in the Smallholders Party ... We
whittled away the strength of the enemy."26
Rakosi also described the fusion of the
Communist Party with the Social Democratic Party as a complete victory for the
Communists and utter defeat for the Social Democrats. (How easy this must have
been, with the Minister of the Interior to reveal the 'crimes' of the Social
Democrats!) He then related how the Communist Party 'captured' the army, police,
and state security forces (i.e. the secret police). This was achieved in "bitter
battle ... the more so because our Party already had a strong foothold in those
organisations ... When in the autumn of 1948, our Party took over the Ministry
of Defence, the vigorous development of the defence forces could start."26
That the absolute control of the secret police
is indispensable to those who wish to suppress the people, was also made quite
clear by Rakosi himself. "There was one position, control of which was claimed
by our Party from the first minute. One position where the Party was not
inclined to consider any distribution of the posts according to the strength of
the parties in the coalition. This was the State Security Authority ... We kept
this organisation in our hands from the first day of its establishment."26
The leaders of the Communist Party knew exactly what they were doing when they
took control of the A.V.O. (Secret Security Police).
The Hungarian secret police used all the latest techniques of
torture and murder known to the Gestapo and N.K.V.D. Soviet occupation troops
had been immediately followed into Hungary by the 'political experts' of the
N.K.V.D., who immediately proceeded to 'reorganise' the security forces. These
were now staffed by a curious mixture of the old vermin of the Horthy regime and
the new scum of the Communist Party. This human garbage occupied a privileged
position in Hungarian society. The national average wage in 1956 was about 1,000
forints a month. The pay of A.V.O. 'rankers ' was 3,000 forints a month.
Officers were paid between 9,000 and 12,000 forints a month. All were
passionately hated by the Hungarian people.
The 'salami tactics' of taking over the State apparatus evoked
criticism from a number of Communist Party members. The 'leadership' dealt with
their critics ... through the police. The Party was directly responsible for the
terror, the murder, the torture and the beatings which were a feature of
Hungarian life under the Rakosi regime.
* *
*
Along with violent political suppression, the workers also
suffered the slower agony of deteriorating economic standards, amounting at
times to starvation. The reparation payments extracted by Russia accounted for
this to no small degree.
The reparations plot was hatched at the Yalta Conference, where
the West had agreed with Stalin to carve up Europe into spheres of influence.
After World War I the Soviet Union had vigorously condemned the reparations
exacted from Germany by the victorious Allies through the Treaty of Versailles.
It continually and correctly emphasised that these extortions placed an
intolerable burden upon the German working class who were not responsible for
the war and for the damage it had caused. At the time, the same opinions had
been clearly and firmly voiced by the various national Communist Parties. During
World War II, as the hopes of a Russian victory grew brighter, this line was
dropped. It looked as if the Russians might be on the receiving end of
reparations. The chameleon ideology of their 'socialism' showed itself. What was
deemed 'robbery' by the capitalist states became 'justice' when the Russians
practised it.
Exact figures as to the quantity of machinery, etc., dismantled
and sent to the U.S.S.R. are not available. One estimate for Hungary puts it at
124 million dollars. Like Hitler's army, the Red Army lived off the country it
occupied. Here again exact figures for these occupation costs are lacking.
However, an addition to the country's population of over a million men must have
used up a great deal of the nation's food produce alone. A rather hypocritical
American note to the Russian Government, dated July 23, 1946, stated that "the
Soviet Forces had, up to June 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of
heat, rye, barley, maize and oats. (The total ore-war annul production of these
grains was a little over 7 million tons.) Of the foodstuffs available for the
urban population in the second half of 1945, the Soviet Army had appropriated
nearly all the meat, one sixth of the wheat and rye, one quarter of the legumes,
nearly three quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of
the milk and dairy products. Extensive requisitioning of food was going on as
late as April 1946." The food shortage during this period was so serious that
each person was getting at the most only 850 calories a day - less than in
Germany or Austria. As one might expect, the increase in the death rate was
alarming.
Another unknown quantity is the amount of material (personal
goods, etc.) which found its way to Russia through looting.
The known list of reparations extracted from Eastern Europe is
staggering enough. We cannot here go into the details for each country. Some
details about Hungary should give a picture of the whole.
The total-reparations demands from Hungary amounted to 300
million dollars. Two-thirds of this went to Russia and the rest was divided
equally between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Industrial goods constituted 83%
of the total. The remaining 17% was agricultural products. Before the war,
industrial products made up only about a quarter of all Hungarian exports. The
British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946,
stated that the combined costs of reparations and of the occupation amounted to
30% of the national income (reparations 18%, occupation 12,°%). A U.S.
representative at the October 1946 session of the Paris Peace Conference had put
these costs at 35 % of the national income.
The scale of these reparations placed an enormous burden on the
Hungarian economy and hence on the producers: the working class. By 1948,
despite the A.V.O. and the Red Army, their resentment might have erupted into
the streets. The danger was reported to the Kremlin. In July 1948 Russia decided
to waive half the reparations still due. On December 15, 1948, the Finance
Minister, Erno Gerö, was able to tell the Hungarian Parliament that, although in
1948, 25.4% of the national expenditure went to pay Russian reparations, only
9.8% of the budget for 1949 would be allocated to this purpose.
Methods of Exploitation and Subjugation
|
"Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are
organized like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army, they are
placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and
sergeants." K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto
(1848). |
(a) TRADE
There were still other ways of exploiting the people. Trade,
for example. The Communist governments of Eastern Europe soon saw that Russian
heavy industry was incapable of providing them with capital goods. They knew
that machinery and raw materials were essential. They were prepared to try and
get these from the West. The Marshall Plan seemed to be an answer to the
problem. At least two of these countries, Czechoslovakia and Poland, made clear
their desire to take part in the Marshall Plan. Even after pressure from Moscow
had compelled them to drop the idea, attempts were still made to get trade with
the West.
Moscow's plans in this period were helped by
Washington. The U.S.A. established an 'iron curtain' to trade between the West
and the countries of Eastern Europe, when she instructed other Western nations
not to exhort 'strategic goods'. The State Department's 'secret list' of
strategic goods covered practically every kind of capital equipment. It included
such items as gramophone recording discs and needles for the textile industry.27 Trade with
the Soviet Union (on Russia's terms) was assured.
To some people, the term 'trade' means 'a mutually agreed
exchange of commodities between countries'. Those in the Kremlin did not accent
this definition. Their idea of trade was based on the old imperialist principle
of buying cheap and selling dear - very, very dear!
The satellite states were regarded as a source
of raw materials and of cheap manufactured goods. Exploitation worked in two
directions. Russia secured the satellites' exports at below world prices. And it
exported to them at above world prices. The Polish-Soviet agreement of August
16, 1945, for the annual export of Polish coal to the U.S.S.R. is a startling
examole. "The robbery of Poland through this transaction alone amounted to over
one hundred million dollars a year. British capitalists never got such a large
annual profit out of their investments in India."28
Shoes manufactured in Czechoslovakia at a cost of 300 crowns a pair were sold to
Russia at 170 crowns a pair. Yet when the Czech government, owing to the severe
drought of 1947, was forced to import large quantities of grain from the
U.S.S.R., it had to pay more than 4 dollars a bushel for it. At the time, the
U.S.A. was selling grain at 2.5 dollars per bushel on the world market.
Bulgaria found no difficulty in selling her tobacco for badly
needed dollars. Yet in 1948, she had to sell nearly all her tobacco crop to the
U.S.S.R. at a very low price. Russia was then able to re-sell the tobacco to
Italy, making a handsome profit - in dollars.
That Russian 'trade' with Hungary was considerable is shown by
the 1948 long-term agreement. This stated that 'trade' was to be trebled in
1949. No details were given. Although Russia supplied cotton, and Hungary
manfactured goods, the quantities involved and their prices were as jealously
guarded as military secrets. One of the main reasons for the secrecy was that
workers in the factories were, to some extent, aware of this exploitation and
strongly resented it.
(b) MIXED COMPANIES
The amount of German capital invested in
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, was considerable. In Rumania, for example, it
equalled over a third of all investments in oil, banking, and industry. In
Hungary, German-owned property was estimated at being worth 1,200 million
dollars. Russia exercised her 'rights' under the Potsdam agreement. All German
investments were confiscated. (The Russians only took over the assets of the
various enterprises. Their liabilities were charged to the state.) This was done
partly by dismantling machinery, partly by taking control of those industries
still operating in Hungary. Jointly controlled companies were set up. These
were, at first, operated in partnership with private capitalists but when these
were later expropriated, the U.S.S.R. held joint control of the companies with
the Hungarian Government.29 No
industry was completely owned by the U.S.S.R.. Russia invested in as many
undertakings as possible, thus gaining a greater grip over the whole economy.
These 'mixed companies' were organized and conducted on capitalist lines. The
only notable difference was that one side of the 'equal' partnership (U.S.S.R.)
was making far greater profits than the other (the satellite State). In some
cases the latter even had to underwrite the losses!
It was not, however, until 1948 that integration of the
Hungarian economy into that of the Soviet Union was seriously begun. This was
achieved through nationalization.
The term 'nationalization', when used by the
leaders of either East or West, has only one meaning: to ensure and consolidate
their own control over the means of distribution, production and exchange.30
In Hungary, some industries had already been nationalized. But
until the nationalization law of March 25, 1948, 25% of heavy industry and 80%
of all other industry was still in private hands. This law laid down that all
firms employing more than 100 people were to be taken over by the State.
It was not until the end of
1949 that nationalization was completed. The Hungarian Communist leaders did not
differ from those of the British Labour Party on the question of whether
nationalization should involve control by the workers themselves. This is shown
by the report that "Easter Monday, 1948, was declared a holiday. While the
workers were not in the factories, State officials came down and took them over.
The next day the workers arrived to find a new master "31
Nationalization by the Labour Government was carried out with rather more
political sophistication. As far as the workers were concerned, the net result
was much the same.32
(d) COLLECTIVIZATION
Another method of exploiting the population was the Russian
type of collectivization. While in other states of Eastern Europe this was begun
at an early stage, in Hungary, the Government remained, for a long time, shy at
making the attempt. After some manoeuvring, it eventually began slowly to
'collectivize' agriculture.
By November 1949, some 7% of the arable land was in the hands
of cooperative or state farms. The diffidence of the Hungarian rulers was due
mainly to their fear of open opposition from the agricultural workers. The
reason, in the jargon of the government, was that faster collectivization might
strengthen 'Titoist tendencies'.
In the process of completing nationalization, what few rights
the workers had enjoyed under private ownership were whittled away. Strikes, as
before, were of course illegal. Complete control of the factory was placed in
the hands of a single manager. Minister Erno Gerö, in his June 1950 report to
the Central Committee of the Party, put it like this: "a factory ... can have
only one manager who in his own person is responsible for everything that
happens in the factory". The screw subjecting the workers to the will of
management had been given the final turn. Hungary was a fully qualified
satellite of the U.S.S.R.
The destruction of the gains
which the Russian workers had for a short while secured in 1917 had taken rather
longer. True, the Party campaign for 'one man management' of production - and
against workers' management - had begun as early as the spring of 1918. It met
with considerable resistance. For the first few years industries were run by the
so-called Troika, i.e. the workers' committee, the Party cell and the manager.
By 1924 even this had become a farce. By 1929 the Party's Central Committee felt
ready to pass a resolution that workers' factory committees "may not intervene
directly in the running of the plant or endeavour in any way to replace plant
management. They shall, by all means possible, help to secure one-man control,
increased production, and plant development, and thereby improve the material
conditions of the working class."33
The ghost of the erstwhile Troika was not officially buried until 1937. The
official presiding at this particular ceremony was Stalin's right-hand man,
Zhdanov. Speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee he said: "...the Troika
is something quite impermissible ... the Troika is a sort of administrative
board, but our economic administration is conducted along totally different
lines."34
In the 'workers' states' of Eastern Europe, the people were not
even allowed to go through these limited and distorted forms of economic
self-administration. The Troika system was never introduced.
Given the complete political and economic integration with the
Soviet Union, nothing seemed now to stand in the way of total exploitation.
Nothing?
Resistance Grows
|
"Piece-wage is the form of wages most in harmony with
the capitalist mode of production ... it served as a lever for lengthening
the working day and the lowering of wages." K. Marx, Capital
(1867). "It has been the iron principle of the National Socialist
leadership not to permit any rise in the hourly wage rates but to raise
income solely by an increase in performance." A. Hitler, speaking
at the Party Congress of Honour. "Piece-work is a revolutionary
system that eliminates inertia and makes the labourer hustle. Under the
capitalist system loafing and laziness are fostered. But now, everyone has
a chance to work harder and earn more." Scanteia [Rumanian
Communist daily]. January 13, 1949. |
The 'chance to work harder' - through piece-work - was
introduced into Hungary on an unprecedented scale. Piece-work appeals to the
baser instincts of man. This is apparent in our own society. Piece-work is much
praised by those who rule us. For the managers of the people, here or abroad, it
is an important means of controlling, manipulating, and dominating the workers.
Piece-work helps break up their natural tendency to unite and cooperate. It is a
valuable weapon in the hands of those who wish to demoralize and atomize the
working class.
The whole piece-work system depends upon basic wages being kept
at a low level. In Poland, for example, because of the extent of piece-work,
basic wages almost disappeared. The system was bolstered by the Russian-style
Stakhanovites. These were the piece-workers, par excellence. The type exists in
British factories and they are usually disliked. The workers in Eastern Europe
were quite hostile to them. The Stakhanovites themselves continually complained
of this hostility. The official party organs deplored it as an "attack on
Stakhanovites by politically immature workers". In fact, the 9th congress of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party called for measures against these workers "who run
down the work of the Stakhanovites and who even try to put a spoke in their
wheel."
In Hungary, not only the workers, but even some Party members,
were trying to put a spoke in the wheel of the whole piece-work system. In a
speech on November 27, 1948, Rakosi referred to this and to various 'go-slow'
movements among the workers when he said: "... the factory directors are
capitulating to the lazy workers. The production quotas are too low". But
although the 'lazy workers' were being continually threatened, they did not mend
their ways. In June, 1950, Erno Gerö, in his report to the Party's Central
Committee, declared: "wage and norm swindling have spread among the masses. They
can be attributed, to a great degree, to the underground work of
right-wing social-democratic elements and their allies, the clerical
reactionaries. That such an unsavoury situation in the field of norms could
arise is partly because, in many cases, the economic leaders of the factories,
Party functionaries and trade union members, are among those who slacken the
norms ... In more than one case they go so far as to protect and support the
wage swindlers". Having virtually stated that Party members were in league with
'right-wing Social Democrats', Gerö arranged for a big increase in the basic
norm.
Conditions in the factories worsened. On
January 9, 1950, the Hungarian Government issued a decree prohibiting workers
from leaving their place of work without permission. Penalties for disobeying
were severe.35
Increasing alienation and exploitation in any
country in the world are invariably met by increasing resistance. Sabotage
becomes widespread. This is one of the economic facts of life. It is well known
to all industrial sociologists and is openly discussed by those of them who are
not directly in the pay of the giant corporations.36
That Hungarian workers were resisting
became even clearer through the utterances of their 'leaders'. Speaking at
Debrecen on December 6, 1948, the Hungarian Minister of Industry, Istvan
Kossa,37
said: "The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude towards the directors of
the nationalized industries". He added that if they didn't change their
attitude, a spell of forced labour might help. Workers who didn't seem to be in
love with their work were often denounced by the leaders as 'capitalist
agents'.
Despite police terror, workers found several
ways of resisting. The two most important were absenteeism and turning out work
of poor quality. On August 31, 1949, Rakosi stated that production had fallen
"by 10-15% in the last few months". He also claimed that the number of days lost
due to workers going sick was 2 to 3 times higher than before the war.38
The Times (September 5, 1949) carried a report from its Budapest
correspondent on the Conference of the Communist Party of Greater Budapest (an
area comprising over 60% of Hungary's industry): "The Conference report says
that productivity is stagnant in most industries and declining in some. Between
February and July, it fell throughout the manufacturing industry by 17% ... Far
too many workers were applying for sick relief - in a recent week, in one
factory: 11%. In another : 12%. Instances are given of self-inflicted
wounds."
Referring to the decline in the quality of the goods produced,
Rakosi also stated (August 31, 1949) that "waste in the Manfred Weiss iron
foundry (Hungary's second largest factory) had risen from 10.4% to 23.5%."
On paper many workers still remained in the Party. Well, what
would you do? To leave would have meant the risk of being dubbed a 'fascist
spy'. There was plenty of evidence of this. It made the incentive to stay in
particularly attractive. Some proof of the crisis of conscience Party members
were going through was shown by Jozsef Revai - the Party theoretician. In
October 1948, he complained that Szabad Nep, the Party daily of
which he was editor, was read by only 12% of Party members.
* * *
Meanwhile a few leading members of the Communist parties of
Eastern Europe had become audacious. They had begun to think for themselves.
Their thoughts were subversive of the established order. Party purges became
popular.
Between 1948 and 1950, the Communist parties expelled: in
Czechoslovakia over 250,000 members; in Bulgaria 92,500 - about a fifth of the
membership; in Rumania 192,000 - over a fifth of the membership. In Hungary,
483,000 Party members were expelled.
This was the period of the big Tito-Stalin explosion. The
'fallout' contaminated Communist parties throughout the world. The sickness was,
of course, most prevalent in Eastern Europe, where hunting Titoists became a
fashionable sport for the various leaderships. Large numbers of people were
arrested and thrown into prison. Show trials were held. Thousands of erstwhile
'good Stalinists' were found guilty on clearly trumped-up charges. Many hundreds
were executed. Among the leaders themselves, Slansky and Clementis in
Czechoslovakia. Koci Xoxi in Albania, Kostov in Bulgaria, and Rajk in Hungary,
all paid the supreme penalty. One of Kostov's most 'serious' crimes was revealed
by the Prosecution in dead-pan-comedian style. Kostov was charged with having
been a friend of Bela Kun who, it had been 'proved', was a 'Trotskyist
fascist.'
The most truly frightening thing was Rajk's 'confession'. He
was arrested in May, 1949, and his trial began on September 16, Rajk pleaded
guilty to all the Prosecution's charges and to a number of others besides. That
he could not possibly have been guilty of these charges, must have been quite
obvious to those who knew him. Rajk and the others were sacrificed to bolster up
the tottering authority of the Party leadership. These 'victorious' Stalinists
intended the trials to be shocking and frightening examples of their
ruthlessness. They were. Through these judicial murders, Stalin, as chief
spokesman for the bureaucracy, was saying to all: "Think twice before you
question our infallibility." In Eastern Europe at this time, people might well
have thought that Orwell's prophesy had been brought forward by several decades.
But here again resistance was growing.
|
"... a stratum of the old state that had not cropped
out but been upheaved to the surface of the new state by an earthquake;
without faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those
above, trembling before those below, egoistic towards both sides and
conscious of its egoism, revolutionary in relation to the conservatives
and conservative in relation to the revolutionists ..." K. Marx,
The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-Revolution (1850).
|
On March 6, 1953, the Kremlin bluntly announced that Stalin had
died after a short illness. Workers in Eastern Europe felt the time had now come
to end the oppression his regime had imposed on them. They did not wait long.
Early in June, workers in Plzen began a mass demonstration.
Plzen is one of Czechoslovakia's largest industrial centres.
The great 'Skoda' arms factory is situated there. The demonstration, which was
quite spontaneous, began as a protest against currency changes. But as it
spread, political demands were made: greater participation in factory
management, an end to piece-work, the resignation of the Government and free
elections. By the time the demonstration had developed to the verge of a revolt
(uniformed soldiers had joined in and large crowds had occupied the Town Hall),
troops arrived from Prague and the rising was swiftly quelled. Further
spontaneous risings in other parts of Czechoslovakia and in other satellite
countries, were quickly crushed without reaching the world's headlines. Two
weeks later, on June 17, 1953, the workers of East Berlin rebelled.
The revolt started with "a
demonstration of building workers on the Stalin Allee.39
Downing tools, they marched to the city centre to present their demands. ...
Transport workers left their trams and lorries to join the demonstration.
Factory workers rushed from their benches, students from the colleges,
housewives from their homes and shopping, even schoolboys from their lessons ...
Soon, the revolt spread throughout Eastern Germany."40
The workers of East Berlin were not subdued until after they
had waged bloody battles with Russian tanks. For several days, this revolt drew
world wide attention, not only because it involved workers whose demands were
political as well as economic, but also because of Russia's direct and violent
intervention. This intervention exposed the weakness of the Ulbricht regime.
After the Berlin uprising, the Kremlin adopted a 'new
course'. Many reasons dictated this change of policy. The men in Moscow
were certainly frightened by the Berlin events. Their lackeys in the capitals of
Eastern Europe were shuddering as they felt the angry breath of the masses down
their backs. They were all for 'changing course', but they knew that the Russian
bureaucracy could grant them no major degree of autonomy, for it feared they
might attempt to go the Tito way. The last thing Moscow wanted at this stage was
to be seen using the tanks and bayonets of the Red Army to crush revolution
throughout Eastern Europe.
* * *
A slight relaxation occurred in the U.S.S.R. itself. It was
immediately reflected in the satellite countries.
In Hungary, early in July 1953, Malenkov himself 'advised'
Rakosi to move into the background for a while. Imre Nagy, who had been Minister
for Agriculture in the 1944 Government, Minister of the Interior in 1946, and
had somehow survived the various purges, became Prime Minister. His first speech
outlined the new programme.
In this first speech, Nagy criticised the revised plan of 1951
as too heavy a burden on the country. Greater consideration was to be given to
light industry and to consumer goods. More material aid was to be given to
collective and state farms, and also to individual peasant owners. A collective
farm could be dissolved on a majority vote of its members. The special police
tribunals were to be abolished. These were only concessions. But it is
noteworthy that they were the most radical of all those made by the satellite
leaderships during this period.
During the four months that followed Nagy's speech, a number of
collective farms were dissolved - 10% according to a speech that Rakosi (who
remained Party Secretary) made to a plenary session of the Party's Central
Committee on October 31, 1953. Rakosi also reported that some local officials
were obstructing peasants who wished to leave the collectives. In a few cases,
force had had to be used. Rakosi, who showed no real enthusiasm for the
concessions, stressed that it was a Party decision that must be carried out by
members. The Party, whether torturing and killing people or just throwing them a
few crumbs, is always right.
The 'new course' was applied throughout 1954. The 'relaxation'
was even noticeable to foreign visitors. In conversation, people were more ready
openly to criticise the Government. Many political prisoners were released.
There can be no doubt that Hungarians were breathing a little more freely.
When a smothered people begin to see daylight, when they get
the first whiff of fresh air, they tend to press strongly forwards. Their first
ideas are to enlarge the holes, their second to tear down the whole throttling
structure. This creates insoluble dilemmas for all ruling minorities - dilemmas
felt the more acutely the more totalitarian their regimes.
* * *
All major decisions about Hungary were taken in Moscow. After
Malenkov had 'resigned' and Krushchev had taken over, the Hungarians again
sensed change in the air.
In real terms, Nagy's concessions had been small enough. But he
was moving too quickly for the Kremlin. On April 18, 1955, the National Assembly
decided, by a 'unanimous' vote, to relieve Nagy of his post. The Hungarians
tensed when Rakosi was brought back to the centre of things. The feeble lights
dimmed. The tragedy again reverted to macabre farce.
The long
statement issued by the Central Committee showed some signs of the Party's
discomfort. It accused Nagy of hindering the development of heavy industry and
of collective farms, and of "using the Government machine as an instrument of
repression against the Party." That Nagy was not immediately 'liquidated'
reveals the uneasiness and indecision felt in the Kremlin about Hungary.
'Reconciliation' negotiations were proceeding between Tito and Krushchev.41
Nagy was not called a 'Titoist' or a 'Fascist' when he was later expelled from
the Party. He was simply labelled - "an incorrigible, right-wing,
deviationist".42 To
be called a 'deviationist' by Rakosi would stand a worse 'Stalinist'43
than Nagy in good stead with the Hungarian people.
Most of the concessions granted over the twenty
months of Nagy's rule were now subjected to 'salami tactics': they were slowly
whittled away. The Secret Police, who for a while had remained discreetly in the
background, now felt they could safely justify their high pay once again.
Measures for the rapid development of collectivization were introduced. Pressure
on workers for increased output was stepped up... to help fulfil Moscow's Five
Year Plan44 -
a plan in which the Hungarian workers, incidentally, had never been consulted in
any way.
In the Kremlin. the new leadership felt fairly secure. They had
coped with the immediate repercussions of Stalin's death. The Plan seemed to be
working. Leaders in the satellite countries boasted of increased outputs for
1955. In Hungary, industrial production was claimed to have increased by 8.2%
over the figures for 1954. The methods used to extract this from reluctant
workers hardly bear thinking of. The people had endured misery up till 1953 -
yet had shown they could resist. The relative clemency of the Nagy regime
followed by the abrupt putting back of the clock to 1953 provoked a working
class resistance greater than ever. Even harsher measures were needed to
'discipline' the masses.
But as far as the Kremlin was concerned, things seemed
definitely on the mend. Khrushchev and his colleagues felt they had everything
under control. This was an important consideration in their momentous decision
to reveal that after all Stalin had not been God.
|
"The working class could not be the leading and most
progressive section of the nation if reactionary forces were able to find
support in its ranks. 'Agents provocateurs' or reactionaries have never
been the inspiration of the working class; they are not and they never
will be." Gomulka, Polish Facts and Figures (November, 1,
1956). |
At the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, held in
February 1956, Krushchev's 'revelations' about Stalin caused a political
earthquake. The foundations of every Communist party in the world were shaken.
It will be decades before they are repaired - if ever they are. Were the
'revelations' a 'tactical mistake'? Had the Russian bureaucrats not realized
that, by de-godding God, the faithful might begin to question the whole theology
proclaimed by his disciples?
Did Krushchev know of the ferment growing in Poland and Hungary
even before the 20th Congress? Did he know that this was affecting the Polish
Communist party itself? Did he understand its potential danger both to his own
regime and to those of his satellites?
In Poland on the morning of June 28, 1956, the workers at the
Zispo locomotive factory in Poznan struck. They walked out onto the streets.
This was not done on impulse. Many weeks earlier a committee had been elected.
It had presented the management with a list of demands. Some were predictable.
They wanted pay increases, lower prices and lower piece-work norms. The
management was startled, however, when these 'common workers' criticised the way
the factory was being run and demanded a different organization of work in the
various shops. To question managerial infallibility in deciding what the workers
were to do, and then to demand reorganization of shop floor production, struck
at the very roots of the system. The managers did not go up through the roof.
They did what their Western counterparts would have done: they adopted delaying
tactics and called them 'negotiations'. These dragged on, without result. The
workers eventually saw through them. In their thousands they took to the
streets.
As the news spread, workers assembled in other plants. They
voted to join the movement. The political character of the demonstrations then
became apparent. Posters carried in the processions demanded such things as
"Freedom and Bread!", "Out with the Russians!" and "End Piecework!"
Other people, taking their lead from the workers, joined in. As
far as Poznan was concerned, the demonstrations soon showed the features of a
full-scale uprising. Russian tanks and troops surrounded the city, but did not
move in. The Government brought in Polish tanks whose crews did as they were
told. Workers' blood flowed in the streets. After two days, the revolt was
crushed. The Zispo factory management had their 'right' to manage inscribed in
blood. There were 'sympathetic' strikes in several other towns, but they were
quickly isolated by the police and did not reach similar proportions.
Shocked and confused, the Polish bureaucracy blamed the
uprising on 'provocateurs ', on 'secret agents employed by the United States and
Western Germany'. But on July 18, at a meeting of the Party's Central Committee,
Edward Ochab, the First Secretary, said: "... it is necessary to look first of
all for the social roots of these incidents (in Poznan) which have become, for
the whole of our Party, a warning signal testifying to the existence of serious
disturbance in the relations between the Party and various sections of the
working class."
Ochab went on to explain that about 75% of the Poznan workers
had suffered from a fall in wages, while the piecework norms had increased. By
giving only economic reasons for the uprising, Ochab was seeking to play down
its important political aspects. His statement, nevertheless, appeared to
reflect a more positive attitude to the workers' demands. It no doubt prevented
further immediate uprisings in a nation still seething with discontent.
After Poznan, the demand for change increased. The badly shaken
leadership tried to evolve a new policy - a 'Polish road to socialism'. Some
anti-Stalinists were given posts in the Party. Gomulka, excommunicated and
imprisoned in 1951, and under house arrest since 1954, was brought back into
communion with the Party. He was issued a brand new membership card.
The attitude of the Polish leaders differed
from that of the Communist hierarchy in the rest of Eastern Europe.45
This worried the men in the Kremlin. So, while the Polish Communist Party's
Central Committee was still in session, reviewing the Poznan events, the
Russians sent their Premier, Marshal Bulganin, to Warsaw. He came to enforce
the Russian line that Poznan was the work of "Western agents and
provocateurs". The Central Committee showed him they would not stand for outside
interference. As soon as Bulganin arrived, the Central Committee meeting was
suspended. After the formalities, it was politely suggested to Bulganin that he
make a tour of the provinces. He agreed. The Central Committee then resumed its
session. As soon as Bulganin returned to Warsaw, the Central Committee meeting
was again suspended. The session was not resumed until he had finally left for
Moscow. Bulganin's visit only succeeded in increasing anti-Russian feeling among
the Polish people.
At the end of September, the first trials began. People were
charged with 'anti-Socialist' activity during the Poznan riots. The trials were
less of a farce than those of pre-Poznan days. The defence was allowed some
freedom. The sentences were relatively mild. In October 1956, the Government
announced the postponement of further trials.
On October 19, another meeting of the Central Committee was
convened, primarily to elect Gomulka Party leader. As the Committee met, it was
reported that the Red Army in Poland had begun large-scale manoeuvres. Armoured
units were moving towards Warsaw. While the Polish leaders were asking
themselves whether this was some kind of threat, the answer walked in on them -
Krushchev himself accompanied by a formidable detachment of the Kremlin 'Old
Guard': Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and a smattering of generals. The news
spread quickly. The workers formed groups and armed themselves. Their groups
kept in close contact with the Polish Army.
Crisis point had been reached. The air was electric with the
tension. Precise details of the clash between the Central Committee and the
Krushchev circus are not yet known. But the main reason for the visit is known.
Above all else, the Russians insisted that, in the elections that were about to
take place, Marshal Rokossovski should retain his posts of Minister of Defence
and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army. Gomulka refused and despite threats
did not give way. He knew that in standing up to the Kremlin, he not only had a
big majority of the people on his side: the workers, peasants and students. He
also had a considerable proportion of the bureaucracy and of the Army behind
him.
A war between Russia and Poland was the last thing the Kremlin
wanted. The Russians did not insist. The Red Army was not called in. Krushchev
knew that whatever Gomulka's attitude might now be, he would later be compelled
to call on Russian help, both to maintain the Oder-Neisse frontier and to assist
the Polish economy, which was in a chaotic condition. Within 24 hours, the
Russians returned to Moscow. The following day, October 21, the Polish Politburo
was elected. As expected, Gomulka became First Secretary of the Party. Changes
in the Government, the Army and the Party were immediately initiated.
Rokossovski resigned and returned to Moscow (where he was at once given the post
of Russian Minister of Defence).
Gomulka had triumphed only in so far as he represented the
national aspirations of the Polish people. The base of his rule was still
extremely narrow. He represented the interests of the Polish bureaucracy.
Following the independent action taken by the Polish workers, and their
insistent demands for a greater share in the management of their own affairs,
the basis of the bureaucracy - even purged of its pro-Russian elements - remains
both weak and unstable. An attempt to broaden the basis of the regime led
Gomulka into an alliance with the ex-propertied class, through the Catholic
Church. In exchange for a partial restoration of its former property and
privileges, the Church threw its influence behind Gomulka. God and Gomulka were
brought together through a joint fear of the working class. It is a temporary
alliance - a mutual expedient. When the Polish workers take to managing their
own affairs, they will put all these parasites right out of business.
Nearing
Flashpoint
|
"The time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried
through by small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses,
is past. Where it is a question of a complete transformation of the social
organization, the masses themselves must also be in it, must themselves
already have grasped what is at stake, what they are going in for, body
and soul." F. Engels, Introduction to Marx's ' The Class
Struggle in France' (1895). |
From the spring of 1956 on, the quick build-up of tension in
Poland was paralleled by similar development in Hungary. The exposure of Stalin
at the 20th Congress, in February 1956, gave further impetus to revolutionary
tendencies in Hungary. These, already discernible in October 1955, now came more
into the open.
In April, 1956, the 'Petöfi Circle'46
was formed by the Young Communists - mainly students. Assisted by the Writers'
Union, it soon became an important and effective centre for the dissemination of
opinion, criticism, and protest about the deplorable state of Hungarian society.
Several other discussion groups were formed, but the Petöfi Circle remained the
largest. (Similar discussions took place in Russia, prior to 1917.)
Many pamphlets were produced and distributed at this time,
mainly in Budapest. A duplicating machine at Party Headquarters in Budapest is
said to have been used. This could not have been done without the connivance of
some members of the government. Due to shortages, there were production
difficulties. It is reported that one pamphlet had been produced on toilet
paper. In the early days, the main themes of this literature were purely demands
for more literary freedom. But the political implications were clear. Later, the
writers, all Communists, demanded that Hungary should follow her own road to
Communism. They thereby clearly implied that the present road was wrong and that
a greater independence from the U.S.S.R. was necessary.
Similar themes were now being discussed at the longer and
longer meetings of the Petöfi Circle. The Rakosi government then banned these
meetings. This made things worse.
The ban was soon lifted. The Communist writer,
Gyula Hay47
took the discussion a stage further. In an article in Irodalmi Ujság
(Literary Gazette), he sharply attacked the bureaucratic interference with
writers' freedom. Soon, the meetings of the Petöfi Circle were attracting
thousands of people. These gatherings, already unanimous in their demands for
intellectual liberty and truth, began to hear voices openly calling for
political freedom.
One of these meetings was noteworthy for a passionate speech
made by Mrs. Julia Rajk, widow of Laszlo Rajk, who had been executed as a
"Titoist Fascist" in October, 1949. Several thousand people attended this
meeting. It overflowed into the streets, where the speeches were relayed by
loudspeakers. Mrs. Rajk called for justice to her husband's memory; an
honourable place in the Party's history. She severely criticised the offhand way
in which a few months earlier her husband had been "rehabilitated". In a speech
at Eger on March 27, 1956, Rakosi had casually announced that the Party had
passed a resolution to rehabilitate Laszlo Rajk and others. This had been done
officially through the Supreme Court. In a cold voice, Rakosi had added
that the entire Rajk trial had been based on a provocation. "It was a
miscarriage of justice," he said. Julia Rajk then demanded that those guilty of
his murder should be punished. This electrified the audience. Although there was
no mention of Rakosi, everybody present knew exactly whom Julia Rajk meant.
By June, 1956. the intellectual agitation was in full swing.
The articles in Irodalmi Ujság were becoming more and more bluntly
critical of the regime. Although, earlier in the year, an issue of the paper had
been confiscated, people were now quite surprised that the 'leadership' did not
suppress it. As the title suggests, the paper was primarily intended for people
with literary interests. But many others were now reading it. Odd copies could
be seen in the hands of factory workers, on the shop floor. In fact, demand for
some issues so outstripped supply that a 'black market' developed. Copies were
selling at 60 forints - about 30s. each.
The articles by Gyula Hay suggested he was the
centre of a campaign for freedom of the written word. During June this was
sometimes referred to as the 'writers' revolt'. Officialdom reluctantly
countenanced the situation. In fact, the June 28 issue of Szabad Nep48
surprised many of its readers by welcoming this hitherto frowned-upon use of the
human intellect. Pravda immediately countered the move.
It vehemently denounced the Hungarian writers. On June 30 the
Central Committee brought Szabad Nep back to the Party line, with a
resolution condemning the "demagogic behaviour" and "anti-party views" of
"vacillating elements." It accused the writers of "attempting to spread
confusion" with "the provocative content" of their articles. For once, part of
the stereotyped party jargon was quite correct. This was indeed the precise
intention of the revolutionary writers: to provoke thought, ideas, and
discussion about the existing conditions in Hungary. The Central Committee
resolution was carried and hastily propagated at exactly the time when news of
the workers' revolt in Poznan was reaching intellectual circles in Hungary and
inspiring them to intensify their campaign.
The feeling of guilt among honest Communist intellectuals -
members of long standing - became apparent. Their consciences no longer allowed
the gulf between myth and reality to be bridged. At a large meeting of the
Petöfi Circle on June 27, the novelist Tibor Dery had asked why they found
themselves in such a crisis. "There is no freedom," he said. "I hope there will
be no more Police terror. I am optimistic. I hope we shall be able to get rid of
our present leaders. Let us bear in mind that we are allowed to discuss these
things only with permission from above. They think it's a good idea to let some
steam off an overheated boiler. We want deeds and we want the opportunity to
speak freely."
In the first days of July, articles in Irodalmi Ujság
began demanding Rakosi's resignation. The same demand was clearly voiced at the
meetings of the Petöfi Circle. It was even suggested by some speakers that Imre
Nagy should be brought back into the Party, although Nagy's name was only
mentioned casually, even guardedly. Rakosi, who was in Moscow, returned suddenly
to Budapest. He sought to suppress the heretical movement He knew of only one
way to do this: a purge. A list of prominent names among the politicians and
writers was drawn up. But before the first stage (the arrests) could be carried
out, Suslov, Russian Minister for the affairs of the People's Democracies,
unexpectedly arrived in Budapest. He was immediately followed by Mikoyan. They
told Rakosi that his plan would ignite an already explosive situation. The
Kremlin had decided that Rakosi should go.
The smouldering crisis in Hungary was not the only reason for
the Kremlin's decision. Tito hated Rakosi. He had for some time been agitating
for his removal. Tito refused to meet Rakosi, or even to travel through the
country where he held power. The Russo-Yugoslav rapprochement influenced the
decision to get rid of Rakosi.
All this was clearly a Kremlin-inspired compromise. For
Rakosi's close friend and collaborator, Erno Gerö, was to succeed him as First
Secretary. And, with the exception of General Farkas, who was expelled from the
Party, most of Rakosi's followers retained their positions.
Hungarians heard of Rakosi's resignation on
July 18. They also heard that the recently rehabilitated Janos Kadar and Gyorgy
Marosan,49
the Social Democrat, had been made members of the Political Bureau. These were
the first of a few minor concessions made during the month of August. In the
tumultuous situation, these concessions were to prove insignificant and wholly
inadequate. The suffering of the working people had been too long and too great
for them to harbour illusions about changes in the Leadership or to be bought
off by a few extra coppers in their pay packets.
Through the long summer days the debate smouldered on. While
the fireflies danced animatedly among the trees of the countryside, fascinating
ideas about freedom flew about the meetings in the towns. Tension mixed
strangely with a holiday mood. The whole month was like a heavy summer evening:
the sun still glowing eerily through the dark purple clouds of a threatening
storm. Familiar objects seemed out of perspective and took on a different shape
and colour. In private rooms and public meeting places an ominous feeling of
destiny pervaded the air. The intellectuals seemed to sense the 'dangers'
inherent in their ideas. Yet they felt compelled to carry on, on to whatever
ends free expression might lead them to.
We have found no evidence throughout the whole
of this restive period of any conscious attempt made by the intellectuals50 to
co-operate with the industrial workers on a mass scale, to share with them the
experiences of this cultural and political awakening, and thus to demonstrate
that the workers' struggles were bound up with the articulate demands for
freedom, for truth, etc. Nevertheless, the Petöfi Circle had become, albeit not
in a completely conscious manner, the articulate voice of the working people of
Hungary. It may well be that, had such co-operation occurred, the Party leaders
would have acted to suppress the movement sooner than they did. But they would
have had to do so in the face of even greater solidarity than was to develop at
the height of the revolution. In the event, the degree of co-operation, liaison,
and solidarity between workers and intellectuals was remarkably great. But
closer co-operation with the workers earlier on would most certainly have
broadened the base of the movement. The more practical and radical approach of
the workers would have cleared the air of at least some of the cramping
illusions held by many of the intellectuals - for example their great enthusiasm
for a Nagy Government, appeals to Western leaders, to U.N.O., etc.
It was the veteran Communist writer, Gyula Hay, who again
brought the cauldron to the boil with an article in the September 8 issue of
Irodalmi Ujság. It poetically demanded "absolute and unfettered freedom"
for writers.
The article stated that "it should be the
writer's prerogative to tell the truth; to criticise anybody and anything; to be
sad; to be in love; to think of death; not to ponder whether light and shadow
are in balance in his work; to believe in the omnipotence of God; to deny the
existence of God; to doubt the correctness of certain figures in the Five Year
Plan; to think in a non-Marxist manner even if the thought thus born is not yet
amongst the truths proclaimed to be of binding force; to find the standard of
life low even of people whose wages do not yet figure amongst those to be
raised; to believe unjust something that is still officially maintained to be
just; to dislike certain leaders; to describe problems without concluding how
they may be solved; to consider ugly the New York Palais,51
declared a historic building, despite the fact that millions have recently been
spent on it; to notice that the city is falling into ruins since there is no
money to repair the buildings; to criticise the way of life, the way of
speaking, and way of working of certain leaders; ... to like Sztalinvaros; to
dislike Sztalinvaros; to write in an unusual style; to oppose the Aristotelian
dramaturgy; ... etc., etc. Who would deny that a short while ago many of those
things were strictly forbidden and would have entailed punishment ... but today,
too, they are just tolerated and not really allowed."
About a week after Hay's article was published, the congress of
the Writers' Union opened in Budapest. The depth of the revolt revealed itself
in the elections for the new Presidium. All those who had supported the Rakosi
regime, if only passively, were ousted. Communist 'rebels' and some
non-Communist writers were elected. All the speeches sharply criticised the
"regime of tyranny." The rehabilitation of Nagy was demanded. Gyula Hay admitted
that Communist writers, "having submitted to the spiritual leadership of the
Party Secretariat, let themselves be led astray on to the path of mendacity." He
added that the most honest writers had found themselves in a frightful dilemma
and "suffered horribly in this atmosphere of lying ... and paid dearly for the
lie ... with the lowering of the standard of our work ..." Konya, the poet, took
up the theme in an impassioned speech about writing only the truth. He ended
with the rhetorical questions: "In the name of what morality do the Communists
consider themselves justified in committing arbitrary acts against their former
allies, in staging witch-trials, in persecuting innocent people, in treating
genuine revolutionaries as if they were traitors, in gaoling and killing them?
In the name of what morality?"
Thus, the intellectuals exposed their crisis of conscience. Yet
this resolute search for truth, amounting at times almost to mysticism, helped
to give the events that followed an essential theme of socialist morality.
The First
Demands
|
"Men make their own history, whatever its outcome may
be, in that each person follows his own consciously desired end, and it is
precisely the resultant of these many wills operating in different
directions and of their manifold effects upon the outer world that
constitutes history. Thus it is also a question of what the many
individuals desire". F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of
Classical German Philosophy (1888). |
Towards the end of September the first of the Poznan trials
began in Poland. Public sympathy with the accused was apparent. Every possible
opportunity was taken, both by those on trial and the public, to condemn the
violence and injustice of the regime. The Government squirmed. Almost all the
accused were ordinary workers. The sentences were comparatively mild.
When this news reached the Hungarians they were elated. The
tension and the pressure on the Government increased.
The ruling group, feeling
themselves more out of touch than usual, tried to win sympathy with a
stage-managed funeral for Laszlo Rajk. Many of those who had stage-managed his
trial and execution as a "Titoist Fascist" now indignantly deplored the
"slander" of Comrade Rajk who had been "innocently condemned and executed."
Their belief that they could deceive the people with such a macabre exhibition
proved their complete to degeneracy. Over 200,000 people turned out for the
funeral.52
Even then the 'leaders' did not see the light. They did not see that the demand
for Rajk's complete rehabilitation was purely symbolic. The people had not
forgotten the brutality of Rajk's secret police. "One of the jokes current in
Budapest at the time was: 'What is the difference between a Christian and a
Marxist? The Christian believes in a hereafter; the Marxist believes in a
rehabilitation hereafter'."53
Rajk's exhumed corpse was re-buried on Martyrs' Day - October
6. This was the anniversary of the execution by the Austrians, on October 6,
1849, of the first constitutional Prime Minister of Hungary, Count Batthány, and
of thirteen others. About three hundred young men discovered some connection
between this and the day's event. They began the first unofficial demonstration.
They marched to the Batthány monument carrying posters and shouting slogans
about independence and freedom. Several onlookers joined them believing that
such a demonstration, however incredible, must have official sanction.
During September and early
October the workers had become active. They were demanding 'genuine workers'
self-government'54 in
the factories. The Trade Union Council, still controlled by the Party, gave
these demands the universal 'leadership' twist. It 'moderated' them. The demands
were revolutionary in the circumstances: broadening of trade union democracy;
establishment of workers' control;55 a
prominent role for the unions in solving problems of production and management;
the manager to keep his "full right" to make decisions, but to consult the union
committee on questions of wages and welfare. Here was the most important
development in the whole of the campaign so far.
This remarkable political consciousness of the
workers had its core in the concentrated industrial area of Czepel Island,56 in
the Danube between Buda and Pest. It immediately transformed the whole
situation. Until now the campaign had been one of agitational ferment and
protest. The workers' demand for 'self-government ' in the factories gave it a
revolutionary edge in the strictest sense of the word. The workers were
preparing for the psychological moment when their radical action would change
the whole political and economic system. No wonder that, later on, the spokesmen
of the West were to prove so uninformative!
The Petöfi Circle took up the workers' demands. But they were
still unaware of their revolutionary implications. In a series of new demands,
the Government was requested to hand over the administration of the factories to
the workers. This must surely have appeared naive to anyone aware of the nature
of government. It tended to perpetuate the illusion that any government can act
in the interests and on behalf of working people.
The Petöfi Circle also called for the expulsion of Rakosi from
the Party; for a public trial of General Farkas; for a revision of the second
Five Year Plan; for equality in all relations between Hungary and the Soviet
Union; for full publication of all trade agreements (the trade pact with Moscow
for the exploitation of the rich uranium deposits found a few months earlier at
Pécs was stressed); and for the re-admittance of Nagy to the Party. A concession
to the pressure came a few days later. Nagy was given a new Party card!
In mid-October, Gerö left to meet Tito in Belgrade. At
precisely this time, momentous events were taking place in Poland. The Hungarian
intellectuals were further inspired when they learned that the Kremlin and the
old Polish leadership had been defeated, that Gomulka had been elected as First
Secretary, that Rokossovski had resigned.
The Petöfi Circle called for a mass demonstration on October
23, "to express the deep sympathy and solidarity with our Polish brothers" in
their struggle for freedom. They applied to the Ministry of the Interior for
permission to hold the demonstration. It was granted! All hell would have broken
loose had it been refused.
By October 22, groups in the Hungarian universities and the
various discussion circles were meeting. They considered the form of the
demonstration. There was broad agreement that there should be a march to the
statue of General Josef Bern, on the bank of the Danube. This seemed
appropriate. Bem was a Pole who won fame when he fought with the Hungarians
against the Hapsburg (Austrian) oppression in the so-called 'umbrella
revolution' of 1848-49. But there was some disagreement between two of the
largest Budapest universities. The Central University wanted slogans and banners
to make the purpose of the demonstration clear beyond doubt. The Polytechnic
wanted a more 'aesthetic' demonstration - no shouting, no banners, just a quiet
march to the statue and back. A surprising development occurred at Szeged
University, in Hungary's second largest city. A separate students' organisation,
called MEFESZ, was formed. Many members of DISZ, the official Communist
organisation, joined. The Party decided it was no use trying to oppose the
regrouping. To retain some influence, DISZ was instructed to welcome the new
formation. Then DISZ went further. It decided to participate in the next day's
demonstration.
By the end of October 1956, many years of misery, of being
bullied and oppressed, manipulated and managed, had brought the Hungarian people
to the brink of revolution. Yet the people were not fully aware of it. No plans
had been laid, no conscious steps taken towards fundamental change. No
leadership, in the generally accepted sense, had emerged. Nevertheless, the
classical conditions for revolution were there. The build-up had occurred over a
period of years. The culminating events were to be compressed into days - even
hours.
The
October 23 Demonstrations
"Do not be afraid of the initiative and independence of the masses;
entrust yourselves to the revolutionary organisations of the
masses." V. I. Lenin, One of the Fundamental
Questions of the Revolution
(1917). |
In the absence of Gerö, now returning from Belgrade, the Party
was undecided about what should be done. Some, believing they were expressing
Gerö's wishes, wanted the march banned. Others preferred the old tactic of
infiltration and take-over. Both views sprang from a degenerate and bureaucratic
attitude to events. Laszlo Piros, the Minister of the Interior and a close
associate of Gerö, had the final word. On the morning of Tuesday, October 23,
permission to hold the march was withdrawn
Delegations from the various groupings and universities began
to arrive at Party Headquarters in Academy Square. A few were allowed in. They
asked officials to use their influence to get the ban withdrawn. Gyula Hay, and
a small delegation from the Petöfi Circle, argued for the lifting of the ban.
They explained that many students and writers intended to march, permission or
no permission. The bureaucrats Prevaricated.
By the afternoon, marchers were forming up in different parts
of the City. As is so often the case, rank-and-file action caused a sudden
change of mind at the Ministry of the Interior. Deputy Minister Mihaly Fekete
suddenly announced on the radio that the ban had been lifted. The 'infiltration'
faction had apparently won. Fekete patronisingly added: "The employees and all
the Communist Party members of the Ministry of the Interior have rallied to the
side of honest Hungarians in the interests of change."
The demonstration was soon under way. Marchers
were converging on the Bem statue from numerous points in Budapest. A crowd of
several thousands had assembled at the Petöfi statue and now joined the march.
The Hungarian national colours of red, white and green were much in evidence.
Improvised banners and posters appeared. Some were simply inscribed "Freedom."
Others added "Independence - Truth." Others still called for "Polish-Hungarian
Friendship." Among the many and diverse slogans, which showed the individuality
of the demonstrators, none was directly anti-Russian. Only one came anywhere
near to it: "Let each nation keep its army to its own soil!"57
The various columns of marchers arrived at the Bem statue one
after the other. They there fused into one great crowd. The large majority were
young people. On the way their ranks had grown as people in the streets, women,
and children, had joined. A small number of workers left their jobs and tagged
on, a little self-consciously. Even before all the marchers had arrived,
spontaneous speeches were being made. The general theme was solidarity.
Solidarity at home. International solidarity. Solidarity with the people of
Poland was much stressed.
Considerable pathos was added when a student reminded the crowd
of the 1849 revolution by reciting the words of Petöfi:
Our battalions have combined two nations And what nations! Polish
and Magyar! Is there any destiny that is stronger Than those two
when they are united? |
When nearly 50,000 people a had assembled, Peter Veres moved up
to the foot of the statue to read a resolution from the Writers' Union. Its
seven points can be summarised as follows
1. An independent national policy based on the principles of
socialism.
2. Equality in relations with the U.S.S.R. and the People's
Democracies.
3. A revision of economic agreements in the spirit of the
equality of national rights.
4. The running of the factories by workers and specialists.
5. The right of peasants freely to decide their own fate.
6. The removal of the Rakosi clique, a post in the Government
for Imre Nagy, and a resolute stand against all counter-revolutionary attempts
and aspirations.
7. Complete political representation of the working class -
free and secret ballot in elections to Parliament and to all autonomous organs
of administration."58
As Peter Veres stepped down, the crowd applauded. They had
listened in almost total silence. Indeed, why should they have become
particularly excited? In some respects, the resolution was remarkably vague.
There was really very little in it that Krushchev himself had not advocated at
some time or other. The demands could, it is true, have been developed into a
revolutionary programme. No mention was made of how all this might be achieved,
even as it stood.
The demonstration was over. The crowds began to move away, but
not to disperse. For some unknown reason they marched towards Parliament Square.
Another crowd of several thousands joined them on the way. When they reached the
Square they just stood there, in silence. People were now converging on
Parliament Square in their hundreds. Many of the later arrivals had heard Gerö
make his expected speech on the radio. Snatches from the speech were passed on,
in low, angry voices. Faces at the windows of the Parliament building stared out
at the crowd, which must now have numbered about a hundred thousand. Perhaps
those at the windows became afraid. Suddenly all the lights in the building and
in the square went out. The crowd remained where it was. Someone struck a match
and lit a newspaper. Newspapers flared up all over the square. The people
watched the building take on a gaunt, menacing look in the flickering yellow
light. Perhaps they were thinking of what Gerö had just said: the students'
demonstration had been an attempt to destroy democracy ... to undermine the
power of the working class ... to loosen the friendly ties between Hungary and
the Soviet Union ... whoever attacks our achievements will be repelled
... the intellectuals had heaped slanders on the Soviet Union; they had asserted
that Hungary was trading with the Soviet Union on an unequal footing, that
independence must allegedly be defended, not against the imperialists, but
against the Soviet Union. All this was an impudent lie - hostile propaganda
which did not contain a train of truth. After more such accusations. Gerö had
said that the Central Committee would not meet for eight days.
Was this why the people now stood silently in Parliament
Square? Or were they just dumbfounded and exasperated by Gerö's intransigent
stupidity? Was it really possible that hypocrisy could be taken so far? The
sheer mendacity left one speechless. Why deny so vehemently what everybody knew
to be fact?
A discussion began in one corner of the Square. After a while,
voices from the darkness suggested that a delegation should go to the Radio
station, in Sánder Street, with the request that their demands be broadcast.
There were cries of agreement from the crowd. Then more discussion. Eventually a
deputation moved off in the direction of Sándor Street ... followed by 100,000
people! They now wanted to see some action, if only a broadcast, result from
their silent vigil in Parliament Square. As this mass of people moved through
the streets, they were joined by several thousand more, many of them industrial
workers on their way home.
Further along the road, a group in the crowd decided to visit
the City Park where stood a 26 foot, bronze statue of Stalin, the 'Man of
Steel'. Two or three thousand people peeled off from the body of marchers and
joined them. They were in great spirits, singing and laughing. When they reached
the statue, a ladder and a tough rope were passed up onto the massive plinth.
The ladder was put against the pedestal. Up climbed two men. A rope was placed
around 'Stalin's' neck. It was grabbed by hundreds of eager hands. It tautened.
The statue grated and creaked as it bowed, slowly, to the crowd. With a final
screech, it fell from its pedestal. There was an ear-splitting clang as it hit
the plinth. A great cheer was followed by a roar of hilarious laughter. The
whole thing was ludicrous. It was absurd. The plinth now looked even more
grotesque. Still firmly planted on the pedestal were 'Stalin's' 6-foot-high
jack-boots. The rest of the statue was taken away by lorry and dumped in front
of the National Theatre, where a laughing crowd soon smashed it to pieces.
Stalin's boots, however, still stood there. What an omen for
those who believed in such things! It is not much use getting rid of one man.
Another will always fill his boots. You must get rid of the need for rulers.
Perhaps somebody thought about this, for later a Hungarian flag appeared in one
of the boots. This red, white, and green tricolour, with the Communist hammer
and wheatsheaf emblem raggedly cut from its centre, was the only symbol of
revolution the people knew.
The main crowd marching from Parliament Square had in the
meantime arrived at the entrance to Sándor Street. It had been joined by many
thousands more, mostly workers. Many had rushed there from all over Budapest.
They had heard Gerö's speech (which had been broadcast at 6 p.m. and again at
7). The spontaneous decision of the demonstrators to go to the Radio Station
particularly appealed to the workers. Traffic in the centre of the city had come
to a standstill. The municipal police, though somewhat perplexed, made no
attempt to interfere with the 'unofficial' marchers. But the entrance to Sándor
Street was barred by a shoulder-to-shoulder line of the dreaded A.V.O. men. They
had also occupied the Radio Building. A machine-gun-carrying detachment stood on
guard outside. The marchers stopped. There had obviously been members of the
A.V.O. among the crowd in Parliament Square. On hearing the intention of the
crowd to march to the Radio Station, they had informed their leaders.
The demonstrators craned their necks to see why the march had
halted. They saw the glint of arms held by the grim-faced Security Police.
Although unarmed, they no longer felt fear. In their solidarity, they recognised
their strength. They glimpsed the possibility of freedom. Their destiny was in
their hands alone. Yet none advocated violence against their oppressors.
"Let us pass!" - "The Hungarian people must hear our
proposals!" - "Send in a delegation!". These demands were shouted from various
points in the crowd. Each demand was greeted with great applause. There was some
discussion among the front ranks. A delegation was formed. After a further
discussion with the A.V.O., this small group of people was let through the
cordon and then into the Radio Building.
The crowd waited. The air rumbled with conversations.
Occasional laughter was heard, even the snatch of a song. They were still in
good mood. An hour passed. No sign of the delegation. The crowd's gaiety gave
way to more serious determination. Some people were growing restless. The front
ranks were now touching the A.V.O. cordon. Another half-hour. Still no word from
their comrades in the building. The mood changed rapidly. Angry shouts flew up
from all parts of the crowd. The armed cordon began to bulge a little. The
A.V.O. men were clearly worried. After all, according to official rules and
regulations, the people shouldn't really be there at all. And there were so many
of them! People across the whole width of the road. People as far as the eye
could see!
"Where's our delegation ?" - "Let them out!" - "Free our
delegates!" - roared the crowd impatiently. A spontaneous surge forward swept
the A.V.O. cordon aside. The people halted in front of another line of A.V.O.
men guarding the Radio Building. Policemen throughout the world are not noted
for either intelligence or understanding. The Hungarian Security Police were no
exception. What should they do? The demonstrators were unarmed - but there were
thousands of them and they were angry. In any case, demonstrations of this sort
were illegal. For their protection, ruling minorities always staff their police
forces with men whose minds only work one way. The A.V.O. men knew only one
answer. Machine-guns fired.
Agonized shrieks arose as the front ranks of the peaceful
demonstrators crumpled to the ground. The crowd became infuriated. The police
were quic |