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Moscow Gangsters
Rick Solomon
Boris Kagarlitsky talks to Rick Simon about the drive towards privatisation
in the Soviet Union. This interview was conducted before the failed
coup and its aftermath, but most of its analysis of the dynamics
of privatisation and economic change are if anything more pertinent
now that these processes have been speeded up.
Rick Simon: In the past year there seems to have
been a fundamental change of course in the Soviet leadership from
the notion of a perestroika of Soviet economy to one of the reintroduction
of capitalism. Do you think this is the case?
Boris Kagarlitsky: I don't think there has been
any really dramatic change. The Soviet leadership don't see it this
way but as a radicalisation of their course and of drawing logical
conclusions from the choices they make earlier. This it how they
present it to the public and I really think that it is the case.
In reality, the leadership wanted the Soviet economy, from the very
beginning, to be more integrated into the world economy and the
Soviet ruling elite to become a more respectable and legitimate
part of the world's ruling elite.
By adopting this approach they have had to think of the consequences
and the price they have to pay is to drop socialism not only objectively,
so to speak, but also at an ideological level. This is not so difficult
for them because, in reality, the Soviet economy never was socialist
and it was always controlled by the ruling elite. So now it is only
logical that the ruling elite is trying to formally privatise the
state economy, which it earlier controlled informally. It is just
an attempt to legistimise and stabilise the existing system of privilege
and social differentiation.
Rick Simon: We know that the ruling elite has
more than one programme. Could you outline the differences between
them?
Boris Kagarlitsky: The differences are minimal.
The differences are always stressed by the different groups, or
should I say gangs, competing for power in Moscow. They use the
existing differences within their programmatic texts as an explanation
of their differences. In reality, that doesn't explain anything
they are trying to get more personal power and it's just a power
struggle between different groups within the elite. Of course, the
Shatalin is more extreme and the Ryzhkov programme is more moderate.
In that sense the Shatalin programme looks more logical and more
self-sufficient. But, in both cases it is absolutely clear that
such a programme cannot be realised without mass repression and
probably starvation.
Rick Simon: Do Ryzhkov's and Shatalin's programmes
represent the interests of different sections of different sections
of the bureaucracy?
Boris Kagarlitsky: Yes. The Ryzhkov group has
some support within the state bureaucracy and among industrial managers,
who do not want privatisation to go ahead so fast. In some ways
it represents sections of the elite that are engaged in some sort
of constructive work, at least doing something for the country of
course, from their own perspective. The Shatalin group is getting
support from the new power elite which has come into the Soviets
and mostly from ex-Party and Komsomol functionaries who are just
privatising Party and Komsomol property and are preparing to buy
state property. So, in reality, the Shatalin group is supported
by more parasitic layers of the elite but differences is really
minimal.
RS: How does Yeltsin's programme compare with
Shatalin's?
BK: Yeltsin's programme is Shatalin's programme.
RS: They are identical?
BK: Yes. Yeltsin doesn't have a programme of his
own.
RS: Could you briefly outline what Shatalin's
programme involves?
BK: Shatalin's programme is mostly about cutting
subsidies, trying to control wages while not controlling prices
from next January, closing down inefficient enterprises and selling
what remains to private owners, private shareholders, who are mainly
going to be the bureaucrats themselves. This is quite openly discussed.
Abolishing subsidies and dropping support to loss-making enterprises
actually means destroying the best enterprises in the Soviet economy.
One of the interesting paradoxes of the Soviet economy is that advanced
technology enterprises are mostly loss-making, while the enterprises
with very low technology, working with shovels so to speak, which
have very low wages and do not need much investment are more profitable.
So this about dropping the most technologically advanced sectors
of the Soviet economy.
Technologically advanced sectors of the economy need additional
investment to continue their modernisation and they are just caught
in the trap of having begun modernisation but not being able to
finish it. And that will be the position of most of the best enterprises
in the Soviet Union because we have just begun the process of modernisation.
So it means just stopping the modernisation of the Soviet economy
and destroying the most important sectors for the future.
RS: So all future investment will have to come
from private shareholders?
BK: Exactly, and private shareholders are not
interested in investing. So it's just robbery and a manifestation
of the complete irresponsibility and social egoism of the ruling
elite a sort of "apres moi, le deluge."
RS: What is the response of workers and trade
unions to these programmes?
BK: It is interesting that both the official trade
unions and the most of the newly-formed independent trade unions
are equally supportive of the austerity programme and are going
to co-operate in breaking strikes and so on. The new union never
became really strong and even Sotsprof (a left-wing union) has been
gradually hijacked by the liberals including even technically buying
the union executives paying them and giving them subsidies for accepting
certain political lines.
On the other hand Sotsprof is moving to the right while the oldest
of the independent unions, SMOT (The Inter-Professional Association
of Workers), is suddenly taking a very radical, left-wing stance.
Their last bulletin said that they have to fight against the new
capital and to resist the capitalist transformation of the bureaucratic
economy, but SMOT is still very weak.
RS: Wasn't SMOT originally associated more with
NTS (a right-wing emigre organisation)?
BK: That's right, some of their people did co-operate
with NTS, but things are changing so fast that people from Sotsprof
are talking about supporting the government austerity plan while
SMOT people are suddenly beginning to speak in a class-conscious
way talking about class struggle and the resistance of the workers
to the coming of corrupt capitalists and so on. It shows how unstable
the situation is.
Of course, in Sotsprof there are left-wing people and there are
Socialist Party members. The new leadership is now trying to purge
them but if they do that they will purge almost all of the workers
out of the union but that is still a possibility.
RS: So the more bureaucratic elements of the unions
are supporting austerity programme while the working class base
is opposed.
BK: Absolutely. The same thing is happening with
the official trade unions which are supporting the austerity programme
just because they are the official trade unions. In both cases the
unions are incapable of resisting the programme. There is a discussion
taking place that probably we either have to launch new unions,
incorporating some elements of Sotsprof and SMOT and also some people
from the official trade unions who really want to be in a union
so creating a new confederation of unions.
The other possibility is to launch the workers councils at the enterprise
level, uniting people from different unions who really want to defend
workers' rights. Both things will probably be worked simultaneously.
RS: Presumably the situation of workers' opposition
at the base to the austerity programme cannot hold for very long.
BK: Well, then the alternative is repression to
break the strikes. That is what is planned. There is a lot of discussion
in the Moscow Soviet about having some form of emergency rule.
RS: But how keen would the military be to implement
some form of market reform?
BK: That's just not clear.
RS: They would seem to have more interest in the
maintenance of a nationalised economy.
BK: Unfortunately, there are some layers in the
armies especially among the officers, who are in favour of some
sort of immediate solution. Paradoxically, it is not among the generals
where this argument is appreciated but among the officers, who expect
promotion with a new role for the army.
RS: How do the economic reforms relate to the
Republic's struggle for greater autonomy?
BK: Nobody knows. Each republic is going to have
its own programme of marketisation so they will probably differ.
The Russian programme is taken as the basic norm for everybody.
RS: Will this lead to the further disintegration
of the Soviet Union?
BK: Disintegration is already taking place. On
the other hand, the funniest thing is that, while politically disintegrating,
the Union still remains as a single economic unit. After their first
attempts to break their economic links with Russia, even the Baltic
republics realised that the only possible market for their goods
is Russia and there is no chance for them to get into the Western
markets. Even the attempts to establish local currencies are not
developing very fast. They haven't dropped the idea but, on the
other hand, they are being very cautious.
RS: What alternatives are Soviet socialists arguing
for?
BK: We are arguing first of all for the direct
control of enterprises by the labour collectives. Then we say that
we must encourage private enterprise but without privatising the
state enterprises. So if people want to start private enterprises
they must start new enterprises, creating new jobs and new products.
That must be encouraged but not at the expense of the public sector.
In reality, the position of the Shatalin group is the exact opposite.
They are discouraging entrepreneurs just cannot get any credit it
is quite clear that all the money will go into the privatisation
schemes.
Thirdly, we need, not the abolition of state investment, but its
concentration in a few key priority branches like modernising the
technology of advanced enterprises, building roads, developing modern
communication systems and generally developing the infrastructure,
so having something like Roosevelt's 'New Deal' but a left-wing
version.
This article appeared in The Connexion
Digest #54, February 1992.
The article originally appeared in Catalyst: Magazine of the
Independent Left. Boris Kagarlitsky is a member of the Moscow Soviet
and leading member of the newly formed Socialist Party. Rick Simon
translated Kagarlitsky's most recent book, Farewell to Perestroika.
Subscriptions are œ from Catalyst, 25 Horsell Road, London
N5 1X1, United Kingdom.
(CX4351)
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