-3- H Renemb Livers 13/8

Precise 1 M

Nature

from (3/16/87) Why Phenomenology? Why Now? What is the Relationship either to Organization, or to Philosophy, not Party? (1984-7)

needed is both a more comprehensive in dialectic of

Phen. than the 1960 Notes, and yet very much "narrower"

that is more concrete and limited to the present concentration on that subject as a form of how to begin anew.

On the road to discovery of a whole new continent of thought and revolution, in 1843-44, Marx, without any concrete reach for any such Promethean vision, was posing in his Doctoral Thesis the question of where to begin. As a Hegelian, he found himself in disagreement with his master, not just on the analysis of the different views of Epicurus and Democritus on the philosophy of nature. Rather, he saw the system of Hegel failing to achieve a unity of reason and reality in the present (1840) periodof crisis. Instead, there seemed to be a total diremption of 2 separate totalities; reason and reality confronted each other with hostility. "This duality of philosophical self-conscioueness appears finally as a double trend, each side utterly opposed to the other." (p. 86 of "The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature." as published in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 1 (Intern. Publ 1975))

Thisou

Marx's answer was to turn to the dialectical method stressing that "the practice of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the critique that measure the individual existence by the essence, the particular reality by the Idea." (p. 85%) And that it meant that the answer could only be found through a new beginning. It a totally new element. Marx found it in revolution, the very specific revolution which had both inspired and mystified Hegel — the great French Revolution.

The most difficult of all tasks that has confronted every generation of Marxists, to work out Marxism for its age, has neverbeen more one than the one that confronts the decade of the 80s. We often like to quote that creatively great statement of Hegel about the birth-time of History. What we fail to see is that same para. that talks of birth-time of history and period of transition is the period of darkness before the dawn, and that's what we all have to suffer through. Here is how Hegel articulated it in his Prefaces where the day was all the period of the suffer through.

the Doctoral Dissertation Marx moved to break with capitalism as well as the Y ung Hegelians, and on to the Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic in 1844.

From Hegel's Preface to Phenomenology

"The spirit of the time, growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, disintegrates one fragment after another of the structure of its precious world. That it is tottering to fall is indicated only by symptoms here and there, Frivolity and again ennui, which are spreading in the established order of things, the undefined foreboding of something unknown-- all these betoken that there is something else approaching. This gradual crumbling to pieces, which did not alter the general look and aspect of the whole, is interrupted by the sunrise, which, in a flash and at a single stroke, brings to view the form and structure of the new world."

Baillie, p. 75

The very way Marx abbreviates the contents page of Hegel's Phen. shows a reorganization which, far from "subverting" Hegel, actually brings in greater order into the work than that magnificent, seemingly chaotic Riemental bursting forth of all the profundities on Spirit — in such spontaneity that Hegel didn't even have subheadings for it whereas Mark Rauk Hos Knewledge Which was just a class of Park until Table.

Secondly, Marx wasn't only critiquing Hegel, but the materialist Feuerbach, whom he had "followed" but who he now says was deficient, having not understood the greatest cretive contribution of Hegel of all, and that was "the magation of the negation" as the most creative, not mysterious, but actual movement of history which he tried to shroud

with abstractions by "dehumanizing", that is to say, turning man into an so the abstraction "self-consciousness."

(p. 309, M&F): "The greatness of Hegel's Phenomenology, and its final result; the dislectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle--lies in this: that Hegel comprehends the self-production of man as a process . . . grasps the essence of <u>labor</u> and conceives of objective man, true actual man, as the result of <u>his own labor</u>."

But since it was in alienated form, it had to, just when it reached its highest point, Absolute Knowledge, undergo the Golgotha of the Spirit and perish.

"The Phenomenology is, therefore, the hidden, still unclear even to itself, and mystifying critical philosophy. However, to the extent that it holds east the alienation of Man -- even if Man appears only in the form of Spirit -- to that extent all' elements of criticism lie hidden in it and are often already prepared and worked out in a manner extending far beyond the Hegelian standpoint. The sections on "Unhapphy Consciousness," the "Honorable Consciousness," the fight of the noble and dowtrodden consciousness, etc., etc., contain the critical elements-although still in an alienated form -- of whole spheres like Religion, the State, Civil Society, Life, etc."

Historic Transcendence.

with seeing it as what made him grasp objectivity and becuase he does that though Hegel lives in an alienated world, and as a philosopher is the most alienated of all individuals, as the yardstick, and as not take the last step -- boredom -- but "arrives at an essence which is its very opposite, i.e. Nature".

Stop. Do you realize how great that is? What a leap? It was not only for Marx clearing his road, his totally new continent of thought and of revolution, but ours? Well, just consider how far in advance it is even of Lenin. Nature is not Practice. And Nature is not Sartrean exteriority. Nature, says Marx, is true essence because you can't separate Nature from Human Nature. And that is why he uses, not as a naturalist, thoroughgoing lalone. Naturalism or Humanism' which would first grasp the act of world history and therefore have undergone the transcendence both of religion and thinghood, i.e., mediated by atheism and xe communism as the abolition of private property, and only then would there start "positive Humanism, beginning from itself".

The fact that we cannot give an answer, a blueprint, does not absolve us from the task. It only makes
it more difficult. What we are trying to do with this bookto-be is to make this task historically and philosophically
so deeply-rooted that both we and all whom we can reach on
the outside will be glad to journey these uncharted roads.
What I want to do at the present is to probe what we all
know, and see whether there are new facets we didn't fully
see as they happened the past four months.

I have now located the exact letter, or rather the 1st random thoughts, on the dialectic of organization -- 9/24/86, which must have been when I must have decided to call it not "Dialectic of Organization" but adding to it: "Dialectic of Philosophy," since the very 1st para. states:

"The one thing that is new and surprised me for being new this lst week of working on the book is that somehow the difference is not on the difference between Party and forms of organization born out of spontaneity, both of which are organization. Rather, it is the dialectics of philosophy and dialectrics of organization."

This is followed in Nov. 18, 1986 with some ideas for a new Introduction and these 4 pages call attention to the objective situation in 2 ways: 1) 1964-66 as the beginning of Sino-Soviet orbit becoming Sino-Soviet conflict, with its climax of the rev'n in China and the trip to Japan,

which made me decide I would not get a collaborator for <u>P&R</u>;

2) 1967-8 on the 100th anniversary of the publication of

<u>Capital</u>. It may not have meant what they had to acknowledge on the 100th anniversary of Marx's death, but we treated it that way, both by all the new we published, so that even the Stalinists had to ask us where did we get "it." ("It" was the original ending of Vol. I, the famous chapter 6, that we translated from the Archives and published in N&L.) We

published with the Japanese state-capitalist theorist,

Tsushima, except that we subheaded ours "Philosophy and Revolution." Finally, that's where I used the expression from the artificer "the darkness of thought mated to the clearness of expression" directed against Ronald Reagan.


"The artificer, therefore, combines both by blending the forms of nature and self-consciousness; and these ambiguous beings, a riddle to themselves -- the conscious struggling with what has no consciouness, the simple inner with the multiform outer, the darkness of thought mated with the clearness of expression -- these break out into the language of a wisdom that is darkly deep and difficult to understand". Phenom. of Mind (p. 707).

The 1/21/87 "Talking to Myself", which was sent to the locals for individual study, was once again on the 1953 Letters, calling attention to all the points we didn't sec, especially those directed against Lenin, not only on the elitist party plus its reference to a 1952 letter that evidently was on the Idea of Cognition centering on the question, "What Kind of Organization Now?" very much directed to the period 1950 to 53.

All that is now left is a few quotations I took out from others like, 1) Lowith, who, on when Mark shows that the dialogue with Hegel has continued much more profoundly when he left the 1st sphere of direct critique of Hegel and did his own Capital, because Mark begins with an antithesis

to Hegel's consummation. The question which now moves Marx in his dissertation concerns the possibilities of a new beginning after the conclusion." He then works out nodal points appearing as historical necessity because Marx sees that philosophy itself is at stake, so a completely new philosophy is needed, whether it is an evening twilight 1 dark?

2)George Armstrong Kellly, p. 299, where he speaks about Hegel by 1801 "saw clearly that the inherent movement of reason would have to be seen in the form of metaphysical logic in order for philosophy to come to grips with all actuality: this is the way his system began at Jena and this is the way it ended with para. 577. of the 3rd edition of the Encyclopedia, where logic of pure Ideas mediates and cements the dialectically opposed fields of Nature and Spirit; the Hegelian last word."



crucible of history"

-9-11

I have something dated Sept. 1986, called Letter # 2, but also a circled 3 to indicate the 3rd of Random Thoughts, that was evidently something of "Talking to Myself" on the 2 versions of Notes on Phenomenology: 12/12/60 Notes and 11/16/68 on Literature, tragedy. P. 3 of these notes is where I speak of how Hegel combines immanent rhythm and strenuous toil as a way to reject the philosophers because none had for 25 years done anything to express the new, objective situation created by the Fr. Rev'n and to whom Hegel refers as "those 'representatives' who/like the dead burying the dead" (p. 130) And then I refer to pp. 789, where I jumpto 1969, to one of the latest Canadian academic discussions in 1982 on the meaning of Absolute Spirit ("Le Sens de l'esprit absolu") on the 150th anniversary (of ?)

I received a letter from Louis Dupre in answer to my letter where he reminds me that academia does not accept my equating all Absolutes -- Knowledge, Idea and Spirit.

And I also refer to H.S. Harris as having written the most exciting community community. Dupre's was called "Hegel's Absolute Spirit: A Religious Justification of Secular Culture."

The magazine in which these appeared is Revue de l*Universite d'Ottowa.

The whole point of the timeliness of this discussion is not that it is a commemoration of 150 years. the contrary. It is precisely because, rather than a commemoration, it actually answers today's problems and in doing so actually **exikts** elicits questions that you wouldn't wink is anywhere near the interest of Hegel either in his time or in ours, is what makes it so contemporary. And this contemporaneity emerges not in order for someone to say, well he was young and this was origin which Hegel long/since abandoned, in fact totally demolished as he glorified the state, is now quoted not to show the youthfulness and contrast it to the abandonment but to the objectivity which first brought it about, that is to say, the French Revolution which had him say there MPXX utopian things like "we must also go beyond the state! For every state has to in treat man as mechanical clockwork; and this is shall not do. So it, shall zeizry. This abolition f of the state (quoted on p. 448) which certainly did not get repeated again, nevertheless remained in Hegel's concept of freedom and not merely in the poetry of Holderlin, the way of the myth of Hyperian. It is what H.S. Harris defines ix dialectically extra xxxxxxxxxx in the mature period. "that is to say, they are not directly consistent with one another".

Dupre's commentary and questions here, becomes even more important as he expresses it as a Universal Erother-Hood:

"Buttofrom the time that (Hegel) decides that there is a radical breach between spirit and nature, his philosophy assumes this tripartied character: logic, the basic conceptual structure—nature, meaning sub-human nature, spirit in otherness.—and spirit, which is the realm of the realization of human nature, in the old terminokegy. The inteoduction of this radical breach between spirit and nature is at the same time the abolition of what used to be an absolute knum divide between Absolute Spirit—and finite spirit whi which was part of Nature. Because now all of spirit is an separate from nature and it becomes continuous."

I'm not very sure this follows p. 12, since I interrupted myself before I finished the Notes on Phenomenology and intended, and still intend, to make the climax be that last page of Phenomenology, where Hegel uses organization twise, once on organization phenomenologically, or what he calls "free existence" and once on intellectual comprehension of that historic phenomenon, intellectually comprehended.

But since I just developed the idea in my head that it isn't true that the separation of Organization from philosophic principles, i.e. the whole theory of Organization, began with Lenin's theory of the vanguard party, I want to develop that historic background here.

First and foremost, that isn't a fact, and it isn't

1902 that all this occurred. The truth is that organization totally separated from philosophy, or any theory of
politics, unless you consider "vote for me" as a theory of
politics, began in Germany, began with Lassalle, was not
just a sect but a mass movement he got so much credit for,
while Marx was shunted asidene as just an intellectual,
was actually the idea, the practice, the persistence, the
popularization, the never-ending path for all so-called
iese
socialists, whether reformists or revolutionary
And it wasn't because he, Lassalle, wasn't an intellectual;
he most certainly was, and a very typical state—Hegelian
whom Marx called a "workers' dictator". So you have
both organization and dictatorship and authoritarianism
and wheeler-dealing and that equalled "organization".

So when this organization, the General Association of German Workers, decided to marge with what was supposed to THE INTERLUDE THAT NEVER ENDED ORGANIZATIONALLY

be a Marxist group, the Eisenachists, to form a Germany Workers Party. By the time they got to meet in 1875 Marx had finished the French edition of Capital, which further developed, at one and the same time, the fetishism of commodities and greatly extended the MEXMIX general law of capitalist accumulation, with its law of concentration and centralization of capital that would reach their ultimate in the hands of one single capitalist or capitalist economy. In a word, Marx was now ready to so eliminate any distinction, not only between economics and dialectics but between organization and principles, that is to say, theories of revolution, dialectics of philosophy, that he/wrote a Critique of the Gotha Programme but was going to cut off all lationship to this newly-formed organization. He didn't make it public but he most certainly cut off relations and contrasted the difference between a national party and the International which he headed and which resulted in starting a new form of organization, the Paris Commune. To make sure that that would not die along with any physical death, that is, historic disappearance because of defeat by the counter-revolution, he asked the Marxists to go deeper and lower into the proletariat, as well as to the oppressed in general, whether they be peasants or minorities like Jews, while he went searching for precapitalist social forces and passions that we now call the Third World. The result was his very last work, the EN

included
that stretched from Iroquois women and Indians in America
to the inelligent Black aborigine in Australia, as well
Chinese and
as including the Asians in general, especially the/East
Indians. Which actually brought us back to the 1841 Thesis
and the Greeks as well as Hegel on how to begin anew when
two totally different totalities -- reality and ideas -collide.

Now it's only after still another division in the GSD with the new Erfurt Program, that finally after much prodding from Engels, that Critique of the Gotha Frogram was made public as a mere "contribution to the discussion" of what constitutes an organization, its principles. And it's that Kautskyian concept of the intellectual bringing socialism to the masses through a party that would lead them, which is what Lenin "copied", a concretizing it to further for Tsarist conditions/became "What is to be Done?" Luxemburg in her critique was neither at the Congress which voted to accept that, having refused to even attend a Congress that stood for self-determination of nations, nor did she criticize the specific principle of the fact that the workers could not get to socialism unless of had political a/party to lead them.

What is true in all the debates on Organization, spontensity, philosopphy/politics, class struggle, class struggle, class struggle, is that all those who scream so much about class struggle are the very ones who think the

workers are backward, and are the ones who lost all these the workers revolutions because are not "mature" enough, so they wish to subject them to further stay under capitalism to learn about "democracy." The one who is supposed to have written the most important book ever on Political Parties is Robert Michels that Cyrus summarized for me. It was published back in 1912 in Germany, in 1915 in English, and why it is still held up I'll never know. I remember being furious when I first read it way back when and I judged it to be totally unaware of what is really at stake when I found he had exactly one reference to Luxemburg. Cyrus notes that the first 300 pages exposes the very deep opportunism of the Second International in the first decade of this century, claiming this is "conclusive proof of the existence of immanent oligarchical tendencies in every kind of human organization." The only thing I would say "in favor of it" is that, at least he says that democracy leads to oligarchy, so that really the principle is that the very nature of organization is conservative, and that social revolution accomplisehs nothing. So that Marx, too, is a "dictator". The most ridiculous of all is that, right after he refers to Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme, he claims Marx remained a Lassallean, and a theoretician aloof from practical matters.

Obviously, this loose review on Nov. 7, 1985, was criticised by me and sc on Nov. 29 I got another with page numbers to the references and the edition he uses

here is a 1962 edition of 371 pages, with a 25 page
Introduction by Seymour Lipset, which shows that it did
indeed remain the Bible for those kind of intellectuals
in the 40s and 50s, and MXXX that the reference to Bukharin's
reference on Michel, pp 309-11 of his <u>Historical Materialism</u>.
The references to Marx and to Luxemburg are on pp. 76 on
parliamentarism, p. 89, regarding a letter of Marx to
Schweitzer, Oct. 13, 1868, pp. 93-96 on "cult of veneration",
pp. 194-95 discusses the First International alongside of
Lassalle's party. And there are a lot more references
I'm not interested in.

He first (Oct. 23, 1986) wrote on the Marx Lassalle correspondence, 1864 72, that is, it's in a book on the German Social Democrats and the First International by Roger Morgan. The only interesting thing about that I can see is that he openly states that this is not a book about ideas but about how German labor leaders perceived them in the day to day problems of organization and tactics. The only thing that is interesting is the Marx-Lassalle correspondence 1857-59, which is surely full of dialectics, where Marx says that Lassalle has no "critical reflection on dialectics as such, and the very famous p. 261: "He will discover to his cost that it is one thing for a critique to take a science to a point at which it admits of a dialectical presentation, and quite another to apply an abstract, ready-made system of logic to vague presentiments of just such a system."

After which follows a lot of praise of Hegel as "the first to comprehend the entire history of philosophy". As for Lassalle's contemplations, Marx calls them (to Engels) "philistine ruminations" (Look up Marx's letter of May 31, 1858) and also how, in the one of Nov. 10, 1858, he is talking about responsibility for "the party": "I owe it to the party that it (CPE) shouldn't be disfigured by a heavy, wooden style." In April 19, 1859, Marx has extended his literary criticism of Lassalle to his inability to see the peasantry as a revolutionary.

The parallelism between the early 50s, when the statue Hungarian Revin of Stalin was knocked to the ground by the very let revolution from under against Communist totalitarianism, from in the face of their machine guns rushing to restore "law and order" and the 1980s, when the question posed to the West rushing to its deadline was such a momentous, type of existence and even the historic moment as to put a question mark over the/very survival of Hittiterianx humanity, And yet the burning question led not to Golgotha unless one also believed in Resurrection, and not to the perishing of thought, but and thought, philosophy and how to begin and when 2 totalities -- reality/HNA revolution -- are in MANNAMIZEINAX such drastic collision as a non-existent to search not for MAXEMBXXE/haven . but a totally new beginning. This new beginning is not really just a new beginning, KINKK When 2 such wholes collide KHI a totally new philosophy/that would Medical unite, the contingency. ET the past, ET history, with notional comprehension. For that you need new forces of revolution, new passions; a new vision of totally new human relations, be they Man/ the end of Woman, mCaster/slaves,/alienated labor and the end of the fatishism of commodities. a The long trek of history, striving to achieve this in different historic periods, fought under the name of freedom but always crippled by the MARKIFICATION narrowing of specific freedoms have not, however, sunk into oblivion but reappear in this recollection of forms now inwardized as the ground for the

The question that remains unanswered is why should suddenly the word Organization appear as the key, whether free or we talk about it as spontaneous/existence all fully worked out as an intellectual expression which yet becomes a new beginning that is first to be worked out during INA actuality as history is first being made ? That is the arduous task that seems to have no answer and yet is put forward as something that must be answered by the coming generation who has absorbed all that objectivity of the past and the present.