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NEWS & LETTERS, December 2002
The political, religious and ethnic conflict in Ivory Coast
Ivory Coast--What seems to have been a military mutiny has
now become an organized attempt to overthrow the government of President Laurent
Gbagbo. About 750 military men who were recruited into the army by former
military dictator General Guei are said to be resisting demobilization and are
at the core of the rebel forces demanding Gbagbo's resignation . BACKGROUND TO CRISIS To understand the crisis in Ivory Coast one has to start
from the beginning. Ivory Coast, until recently a relatively peaceful country
under the one-party neocolonial and brutal regime of President Houphouet- Boigny
(who ruled from independence in the 1960s until his death in 1993), witnessed
serious economic problems in the 1980s. The 1980s saw the birth of a
pro-democracy movement, which saw the masses challenge the neocolonial forces in
the Ivorian cities. The corruption and misadministration deepened to such an
extent by the 1990s that political reform became inevitable. Yet political
reform by itself proved unable to resolve the crisis. Alassane Ouattara, who was an official of the World Bank
and the IMF, was brought into the government and later made prime minister to
put the economy into shape. He then became involved in a battle with Kone Bedie,
who took over after the death of President Boigny in 1993. The economy, however,
never regained its strength and poverty deepened as a result of a military coup
in 1999, led by General Guei. Since Guei was confronted with mass resistance in
the streets, he had no other choice but to call another general election. At this time the preferred candidate of western
imperialism, Ouattara, was disqualified from the elections on the grounds of his
alleged Burkinabi citizenship. Ouattara then took political power into his hands
and tolerated very little opposition to his IMF-dictated economic reforms. This
brought him into conflict with Laurent Gbagbo, who came from the Ivorian radical
left. Ouattara began his IMF-dictated privatization program with
French companies as his primary clients. But these reforms quickly cost him his
political power. Guei, who had called an election which he then lost to Gbagbo,
was forced out of power by the Ivorian masses after he insisted that his party
had won the election. Gbagbo won the election with the firm promise that he would
throw out all IMF programs and refuse to pay the foreign debt, which he insisted
has never served the interests of the Ivorian people. Both France and the
international financial institutions saw that their interests were at stake.
Within two days of the start of the recent crisis on Sept. 19 of this year, when
an uprising against President Gbagbo occurred, General Guei was murdered by
government forces and Ouattara sought refuge at the French embassy. Burkinabi
citizens in the country were brutally attacked and their homes and property put
on fire and destroyed. The crisis became framed as one between the Muslim North
and the Christian South. The French, who sent military forces, claim to be there to
save their citizens and other foreign nationals. They say this is an internal
crisis in which they have no mandate to intervene, but French forces have
intervened in many internal conflicts in the continent, including in Ivory
Coast. The most open and brutal example was when they helped overthrow the
elected government in Congo-Brazzaville of Pascal Lissouba, after he insisted on
revising and/or annulling agreements that the former government had made with
French companies as part of an IMF-dictated privatization program, which would
have handed over government-controlled companies to French interests at
give-away prices. It is no accident France is being accused of having a hand in
this rebellion. Burkina Faso, under the reactionary leadership of President
Blaise Campaore (who in the 1980s murdered one of the most able leaders in the
postcolonial history of the continent, Thomas Sankara) also has an interest in
fomenting this crisis, in part because of Campaore's close ties with Quattara. ETHNICITY AND POLITICS We know that Laurent Gbagbo, who came to power not only by
winning a general election but also through popular mass resistance against
military dictatorship on an anti-imperialist program, never grounded this
victory with the masses. He could have done better than further escalating the
Ivorian internal crisis along ethnic and regional lines. The ethnicity card has divided the country into two parts,
with the religious division as the contributing factor. This has changed the
nature of the state, which from the start had tried to bring together the
different forces in the country. The northern part of the country is mainly
inhabited by Muslims, who are accused by the government of harboring the rebels.
This is why the mainly Muslim Burkinabis have been accused of playing a role in
the fighting. This has left many Muslims vulnerable to brutal attacks from not
only ordinary Ivorians but also from the military. Statist fascism has so far
been the only response from the government to the crisis. Contrary to the
disinformation that part of the international press is consciously spreading,
this rebellion has been well organized and is not only due to some military men
angry about being demobilized. The fact that the rebels are unwilling to reveal
their leadership also indicates that foreign interests may be at play. ECONOMIC REALITIES The economic crisis since the end of the 1980s is at the
core of the political crisis. The price of the main cash crop, cacao, has since
been falling and is responsible for much distress in the national economy (the
majority of the population are farmers). The UN is saying that food shortages
will become severe within six months. This will produce more atrocities in the
struggle for survival. Knowing that this could become a protracted conflict, rebel
forces have been demanding the resignation of Gbagbo as a precondition for
ending the conflict. This is unlikely, since government forces are consolidating
their ranks with more arms and external military support. Some Africans
countries are also contemplating a military intervention in support of Gbagbo. Now that we are getting a clearer picture of the rebel
forces, we are of the opinion that their program is no better than that of
Gbagbo's. It is believed that there are now three different rebel forces, who
have also been fighting with each other. This has caused the rebels to lose
ground. The peace process is in total disarray and the fighting remains serious.
The war seems to be destined to last for some time. The question that should now be asked is how Gbagbo and his
government will handle the internal crisis after the end of the conflict. If he
chooses to confront the crisis on ethnic and regional lines, instead of
confronting the forces that are against the interests of the Ivorian people, he
is bound to fail sooner than later. --Ba Karang |
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