Essay Article from News and Letters October 1997

Africa After Mobutu

by Ba Karang

Though Kwame Nkrumah said some years after the death of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 that the coming revolution in the Congo will be fought in the spirit of Lumumba, the masses did it in 1997 not for the sake of Lumumba but for the present and future. There has been a revolution in the Congo, fought by revolutionary, dedicated people. Yet we are not sure if these are the same people running the affairs of the country. We fear that not giving the masses the chance to play their historical role in a revolutionary situation always leads to their isolation and the grounding of the revolution.

But our critique must go beyond these points. To critique the revolution because of, among other things, the recent demonstrations against Kabila in Kinshasa, might not give us a good picture of the forces that see the revolution as an open threat to their interests. These demonstrations occurred only when it was clear that the reactionary Etienne Tshisekedi would not be invited into the new government.

We must not forget that as the revolutionary forces were advancing against Mobutu, demonstrations in Kinshasa opposed them, accusing Kabila of being an agent of the Tutsi. The Western press was quick to declare the advancing revolution an ethnic war.

We must also keep in mind that when Thomas Sankara of Burkino Faso imposed certain rules in the 1980s, such as denying women the use of make-up and skin bleaching as long as they are government employees, he argued that cultural imperialism is the most dangerous of all, for it is only then that the human mind could be controlled without any use of force. What the Pan-Africanists have been referring to as cultural imperialism is the Western style of dress, among other things. This, they argue, is not only traumatising the minds of the Africans but also wiping away the African culture. Sankara argued that imperialism no longer needs a huge army or armaments to control a nation; their music and lifestyle can do it better.

Kabila's banning of certain women's dress is posing the same argument. My fear is that culture in this way could be misinterpreted; what we might call an "African culture" does not in the first place exist. Africa has diverse cultural experiences that could not be defined as a "whole" and static. We have cultures that are in constant change, and the dynamism of each of these cultures can only be found in the day to day struggles of the people for freedom and a better life.

Putting African culture in a nutshell is without a doubt the greatest achievement of racist Western intellectuals. At the same time, to argue that an African with a Western lifestyle is a sign of cultural imperialism, in my view, ignores the fact that classes also exist on the continent.

THE ECONOMIC CONTENT OF THE REVOLUTION

Kabila has called his revolution a "national democratic revolution"; this means it is not yet socialist and that all the forces that are interested in democratic change are welcome. A national democratic revolution speaks more of compromise within the different forces that are interested in democratic rule.

But this might not be the only reason why we find in his government, among others, a finance minister who has no relation to the revolution. We are told that the economy of Congo will continue to be market oriented, but we have never expected anything else as long as the revolution is national democratic.

The collapse of "Communism" in Eastern Europe has not only created a new political debate but a new political situation. In Uganda, the finance minister, Mayanja Nkanga, is the leader of the conservative party; this not only releases the revolutionary forces from any blame of what is going wrong with the economy, but is also a way of meeting some of the requirements of the international finance institutions. Kabila made a serious calculation before bringing in a finance minister from Wall Street.

If Kabila fails to understand that he is leading a multiethnic revolution and falls on one tribe against another to consolidate his power, we must only expect fire. No force could have challenged the power of Mobutu without the involvement of millions.

His effort to resist the international monetary organisations by refusing to pay any debt is not an idea of the finance minister but of other forces. These are the very forces that Kabila has to satisfy if he wishes any continuous mass support in the country. The betrayal of the revolution in Congo will not be an easy game; this is a victory that has been hijacked for more than 30 years and won back with bitter experience.

Far beyond the boundaries of Congo, the defeat of Mobutu has again brought about political enthusiasm. The gradual political and ideological change that has been happening on the continent unnoticed for the past year has redefined its political geography.

THE REVOLUTION'S IMPACT UPON AFRICA

Uganda, Rwanda and Angola have used the Congo situation to rid themselves of reactionary forces. It has also helped advance the struggle of the Sudanese liberation forces. This is a victory for Pan-Africanism.

We will have to see how much the Pan-Africanists are going to advance their victory. Their struggle to link up all Pan-African forces on the continent is of great concern. But the limitations here will be the many factions within the Pan-Africanist movement itself, and here is the great role that Kabila, and not Museveni, is going to play.

South Africa is incapable of playing any ideological leadership despite its rich revolutionary history. The basis for any genuine revolutionary leadership within the ANC has been lost since before its victory. Those who worked within the South African solidarity movement long ago discovered the petty-bourgeois character of the ANC and the many efforts by leading its members to distance themselves from grassroots solidarity movements. Such tactics were meant to advance the diplomatic struggle, which became more important to the ANC leaders than anything else. The challenge of supporting the ideological struggle now going on in the continent is an impossible assignment for South Africa.

Within West Africa, apart from Nigeria, the political changes which have taken place for the past year have all claimed to be radical. The recent election victory of Charles Taylor in Liberia and the military coup in Sierra Leone are another matter. Neither of these countries have ever been a bastion of radicalism. How radical or progressive the leadership claims to be is of no significance; there is no doubt that there is very little substance in what they say.

But what is interesting is that proclaiming a radical revolutionary change has again become a fashion on the African political scene, despite the self-proclaimed ideological victory of capitalism following the political collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

How is this possible? The local election victory of Maoists in southern Senegal and the election victory of the so-called young radical military officers in the Gambia were won in the spirit of anti-imperialism. The truth is that the African masses consistently opposed anything that did not represent their interests and offered heroic resistance to oppressive and exploitative systems that have betrayed them. But they have never moved an inch from their determination to search for a new society and a better life that represents their interests. The betrayal of these struggles has grounded these openings, and at the same time revealed the true nature of the backward African middle class. These openings create new theoretical grounds that are not always taken seriously. Herein lies one of the most serious obstacles in advancing the African revolution.

CONTRADICTIONS FROM WITHIN

The experience of the African masses in relation to what happens after the revolution is of many betrayals and sufferings. The question of how the popular slogan "power to the masses" could be put into practical life, as we all know, is not only an African problem. But the other side of the fact is that no other people have been trying to solve this problem from a practical point of view more than the African people and the revolutionary left. The revolutions from the 1960s to pro-democratic movements at this very moment have been totally preoccupied with this issue.

What we have learned is that l) it is not enough to speak of past African institutions as having the answer to the problem and 2) as long as the masses have been left aside there is very little that can be done. The Pan-African movement has been seriously occupied by this at both the theoretical and practical level; the efforts to develop Ujama, Nkrumahism, etc. were all efforts geared towards this problem. But they have all ended up in isolating the people.

The committee form of organisation that was born in the liberated areas during the offensive against the Mobutu regime are not new to the African scene. As in all the other revolutionary struggles these committees represented the masses, were part of them and charged with serious assignments, like the recruitment of militants, political education, planning of production, etc. But immediately after victory these committees do not only lose their influence, but are put totally out of function and replaced with one-party or multi-party dictatorships.

In Uganda, they were called "Resistance Committees" (RCs) during the armed struggle. They existed at the local and regional levels. The RCs later became known as the Local Councils and we are told that they still have the same function and influence as in the days of the liberation struggle. However, what we know from experience is that immediately after victory these grassroots organisations lose their power and influence and become more a symbol of democracy rather than an active actor.

The victory in Congo has been masterminded by the ordinary masses, who for years have been struggling against one of the most brutal dictators and criminals in our lifetime. Whatever becomes of the revolution will have a creative effect on the rest of the continent.

One thing is certain: Kabila will be playing a great role in the coming struggles in Africa. It has given us a great chance to turn over the last reactionary capital supporting Jonas Savimbi. It has strengthened the struggle in Sudan and against the many reactionary armed forces fighting in Uganda. It has become a source of inspiration for millions of Africans. This has not been achieved by the South African revolution, whose leadership has only become more anti-revolutionary. A revolution that is more interested in consolidating the power of the leadership than grounding the revolution in the masses is without a future.

The many issues that have arisen in the Congo, such as solving the refugee problem involving the Hutus, leaves us with many doubts. We know that leaving the Hutu refugee camps as they were would have been suicidal for the revolution; the backyard must be cleared. Yet we also know the situation could have been solved better than endangering the lives of the refugees.

Kabila can never become the last hope of the African revolution; even betrayal by great African revolutionary thinkers did not stop the masses from still demanding a revolutionary solution to the African problem. He might become another Sankara, which would then be a great victory for all humankind. If he chooses something else, he will without a doubt face the bitter experience of history.

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