Communists and the British Labour Party

Part Three: Applying the New Policy, 1922-1924

Between 1920 and 1924, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) applied for affiliation to the Labour Party at least five times. Every application was rejected.

Historians unsympathetic to Communism have generally interpreted this as a sign that Lenin’s policies towards the Labour Party were a failure. In drawing such conclusions, they reveal that they themselves have little understanding of the objectives and complexities of the policies the Communist International adopted for Britain. In this article I will examine the Communist Party’s policies towards the Labour Party, from the formation of the CPGB in August, 1920 to the fall of the first Labour Government in October, 1924.

(From 1924 on, the policies of the Communist International veered sharply away from Leninism. A full discussion of the impact of this change is beyond the scope and purpose of this series.)

Sectarian heritage

At its founding convention in August 1920, the Communist Party of Great Britain voted by a narrow margin to apply for affiliation to the Labour Party. But the party still had a long heritage of sectarianism to overcome. Not only was a large section of the party opposed to affiliation, but the majority had only the most superficial understanding of the policy they were adopting. A more thorough debate on the Labour Party was taking place at the Congress of the International held in Moscow at the same time as the CPGB convention; the results of that debate did not reach England until mid-September.

The CPGB applied for affiliation to the Labour Party on August 10, 1920. The application stressed the sharp divisions between the policies of the Labour Party and the Communist Party: it virtually invited rejection.

The Labour Party leaders lost no time in answering the letter, refusing affiliation on the grounds that the objectives of the Communist Party "did not appear" to be in accord with those of the Labour Party.

The deep-rooted sectarianism of the British Communist movement is evident in the CP’s response to this rejection, published in the September 16 issue of The Communist. Instead of calling for reversal of the decision, it all but expressed relief at being turned down. Now, said the CPGB:

"We can fight where we like and whom we like. We can oppose Labour candidates as freely as we oppose ordinary capitalist candidates, and since the Labour Party Executive admits that our objects are not in accord with their own they cannot have the slightest cause for complaint. So be it. It is their funeral, not ours" (quoted in S. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution, p. 145).

This was not the policy Lenin had recommended. If continued, it would have completely divorced the CPGB from the mainstream of British working-class politics.

Fortunately, during the week following the publication of the statement quoted above, the British delegates to the International Congress returned, bringing with them the resolutions adopted, and more importantly, their reports of days and weeks spent in intense discussions with the leaders of the Russian revolution.

The returning delegates were able to reverse the party’s suicidal course without much difficulty. The September 23 Communist included a full report on the discussions in the International’s Commission on Britain, and the CPGB’s conclusion from those discussions:

"The view of the Third International, made quite clear in the various theses, is, that it is the duty of the Communists to work where the masses are. That may mean going into reactionary organizations, but that is better and easier than creating brand new organizations in the hope that the masses will leave the old ones and come to the new." (quoted in Graubard, p. 145)

At the same time the CPGB renewed its application for affiliation, this time in more diplomatic terms. It pointed out that other groups that differed with official policy were affiliated with full right to criticize party policy, and that the Labour Party constitution allowed the affiliation of all groups that supported the principle of independent working-class political action. In a subsequent letter the CP denied charges that they intended to disrupt the Labour Party:

"The agenda for any Labour Party Conference contains resolutions seeking to broaden, modify, or in other ways change the policy and methods of the Labour Party. Are the affiliated bodies responsible for such resolutions charged with ‘disrupting the Labour Party’?" (quoted in Klugmann, History of the CPGB, p. 169)

The CP emphasized that it was prepared to abide by the provisions of the Labour Party constitution.

This was an approach that was far better calculated to win a hearing from the Labour Party rank and file. By mid-October, fifteen local Labour Party branches had announced that they would refuse to accept the executive’s ruling, and would allow the local CPGB branches to affiliate. The London Labour Party Conference in November 1920 defeated a bid for CP affiliation by only 380 to 283 votes—and only with the aid of a heavy block of votes from conservative trade-union delegates.

Wherever possible, CP members joined the Labour Party as individuals. Some CPGB branches were able to affiliate to their local Labour Parties, and to participate in city and regional conferences. The affiliation issue gave them an opportunity to discuss the Communist Party with Labour Party militants, to sell Communist newspapers and pamphlets, and to win broader support.

A similar policy was followed in the trade unions. Communists in the unions pressed their locals to protest the exclusion of the CPGB from the Labour Party, and stood for election as delegates to local and national Labour Party Conferences.

By the time of the June 1923 national Labour Party Conference, it was reported that more than 100 local trade union branches and Trades and Labour Councils supported CP affiliation. Thirteen resolutions supporting affiliation appeared in the resolutions book. And, despite an official ban, thirty-eight members of the CPGB were elected as delegates from local Labour Parties and trade unions.

‘A fighting issue’

The 1919-1920 debate on affiliation had approached the question in a static way—were Communists for or against it? The possibility that the party’s bid for affiliation might be rejected does not seem to have been raised at all. Following Lenin’s intervention, the CPGB approached affiliation from an entirely different angle. It was made a fighting issue, a focus for Communist work with Labour Party activists. Even though the party never won affiliation, it did gain a hearing and win support from hundreds of thousands of workers—and that was the object of the policy.

But affiliation was only one aspect of Communist policy toward the Labour Party. In "Left-Wing" Communism Lenin recommended that the Communists approach parliamentary elections with a view to reaching Labour Party supporters The main thrust of his proposal was that the CP should avoid the appearance of running against the Labour Party. Either the CP should run only where Labour was not running, or it should run only in places where the CP vote would not bring about the defeat of a Labour candidate. In all constituencies where no Communist was running, the CP should call for a vote for Labour.

The first election after the formation of the CPGB was a by-election in East Woolwich in March 1921. This was an excellent opportunity for the CPGB to show itself as a supporter of independent labour political action, by campaigning for Labour candidate Ramsay MacDonald while explaining its disagreements with him.

Instead, the CP issued a manifesto calling on the workers to boycott the election:

"Against the capitalist, the nominee of the Black International of finance and militarism; against the ‘Labour’ leaders, the candidate of the Yellow International of treachery; we Communists of Great Britain offer you the fraternal support of the Red International, whose program is our watchword: ‘All power to the working class!'" (quoted in Graubard, p. 142)

MacDonald was defeated by only 683 votes; the CPGB promptly boasted that its campaign had swung the balance against Labour.

This all sounded very revolutionary—but it was no way to win a hearing from workers who voted Labour out of a healthy desire to defeat the capitalist candidate! The rooted sectarianism of the British revolutionary left was still exercising a powerful influence in the CP.

It was not until after the Third Congress of the Communist International that the CPGB began to formulate a genuinely Leninist approach to the Labour Party. That Congress, which Trotsky called "The School of Revolutionary Strategy," took the fight against ultraleft sectarianism as its central theme, and concentrated on the need for Communists to involve the reformist parties in united actions of all kinds.

On January 12, 1922, Lenin introduced a motion in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, proposing that the ECCI adopt:

"a well-argued resolution demanding of the Communist Of Party of Great Britain that all Communists campaign and vote for members of the Labour Party with the exception of those very few instances when it can safely be said that voting for a Communist would definitely not entail victory for the bourgeois candidate." (quoted in Sobolev, Outline History of the Communist International, p, 146)

The ECCI accepted Lenin’s proposal, On March 4 it adopted a Resolution on the English Question which posed the question of tactics towards the Labour Party as a particular expression of the united front tactic:

"The Labour Party is the political organization of the trade unions. It includes various political tendencies within the workers’ movement, such as those represented by the Independent Labour Party, the Fabians, the Guild Socialists, etc. But the defensive struggle of the working class against the increasing oppression of the bourgeoisie requires that the Labour Party should include within its ranks all the political aspirations of the workers’ movement. The Labour Party cannot claim that it unites the working class in the political field if it does not also include the communist party which has long become an undeniable factor in the workers’ movement.

"The enlarged Executive of the CI suggests that the CPGB seek admission to the Labour Party in order that the unity of the working class in the political sphere can be established with particular reference to the forthcoming general election, the goal of which will be to replace the bourgeois coalition by a workers’ government. In seeking admission to the Labour Party the communist party will retain for itself complete freedom of propaganda. On the same basis and with the same object the communist party is asked to support the Labour Party in the general election," (Degras, The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents, Vol I, p. 329)

Following adoption of this resolution, whose logic and language were in complete contradiction to the sectarian positions the CPGB had been advancing, the British Communists issued a pamphlet entitled Who Is Splitting the Workers’ Movement? In it they renewed their appeal for affiliation, but stated that they would not allow the refusal of the Labour leaders to stand in the way of united working class action against the capitalist class. The Communist Party "as an expression of the sincerity of its wish to maintain solidarity with the organized movement," announced that it would not run any candidates against the Labour Party in the 1922 General Election.

Communist campaigns

Six Communists ran in the election. Two were so prominent in the Labour Party that they received endorsement as official Labour candidates. Two others received the endorsation of the local Labour Parties but not from the national executive, and two ran as Communists in constituencies where no Labour candidate was running.

The party’s election manifesto, A United Front Against the Capitalist Enemy, declared party policy to the voters: "The large body of the working-class forces in the Labour Party stands for the fight against capitalism, even though they do not clearly understand the implications of the struggle.... But, inasmuch as they stand for the fight against capitalism, we are with them in action, even while we point out their mistakes.

"Because we are convinced that, by the struggle against capitalism, they will be compelled to adopt the policy of the Communist Party sooner or later, or perish, we decline to put opposition candidates against the Labour candidates, where they are already fighting: ... We call on the revolutionary workers to give the most active support to every Labour candidate whatever our criticisms among ourselves; in all action against the capitalists, we present a common front.

"But support the Labour Party candidates with your eyes open." (quoted in Klugmann, p. 188)

When the votes were counted, two Communists had won seats—Shapurji Saklatvala, who had run as an official Labour candidate, and Walton Newbold, who ran as a Communist. The party promptly announced that its MPs, "will co-operate with the Labour Party in every struggle against the capitalist Parties and will not hesitate when the Labour Party fails to carry through the struggle, to stand and fight alone for the interests of the working class." (quoted in Klugmann, p. 192).

Saklatvala took his place as a member of the Labour Party caucus; Newbold applied to join it, but was refused. The CPGB’s 1922 election strategy paid off in more important portant ways than the election of MPs. The campaign was decisive in winning new support in the Labour Party for affiliation, and in gaining a wider audience for Communist ideas. By the end of 1923 the party newspaper, Workers’ Weekly, had a circulation of more than 50,000, more than any other socialist or Labour weekly, though party membership was somewhat less than 4,000.

1924: A Labour government

The 1922 General Election had confronted the CPGB with the need to develop a correct policy toward the Labour Party; the Communists passed the test with flying colors. One year later, in the aftermath of the December 1923 general election, the CP faced a new problem: what policy to adopt towards a Labour government. In January 1924 a minority Labour government, dependent upon Liberal Party votes, took office under Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald.

There was a brief period of confusion in the CPGB leadership after Labour took office. R. Palme Dutt, for example, wrote that "the first duty of all is to support it, no matter whether they agree with its programme or not." He called for "patient understanding ... on the part of the workers" of the difficulties a minority government would face. (MacFarlen, The British Communist Party, p. 104)

This policy, which amounted to apologizing to the working class for the cowardice of the Labour leaders, was quickly rejected by the CPGB. As J.T. Murphy wrote in an article reprinted in the Canadian Communist press:

"…. if the voice of working class criticism is silenced because Labour is in office while in a minority in Parliament, and pursuing a Liberal policy, how are we to develop the class consciousness of the workers and free them from the snares of capitalist liberalism? It seems to me that this would be a surrender of the revolutionary movement on a par with MacDonald’s surrender of the Labour Party to nationalism....

"No one expects it to do more than it has the power to do, but a Labour government which fails to rouse the whole working class movement into action for the defeat of capitalism, and turns instead to be an instrument for the suppression of mass activity, not only asks for defeat at the polls in any subsequent election but betrays the workers in their struggles to defeat the capitalists. Mass activity must be the driving force, pushing the Labour Government into conflict with the Liberals and Tories and strengthening its hands in every conflict with them." (The Worker, March 15, 1924)

The Communists could not support the Labour government—it was a capitalist government. But they could and did support specific positive measures enacted by Labour, while attempting to build mass pressure to force the government to respond to the pressing needs of the working class. This policy was codified in a joint statement issued by the Executive of the CPGB and the Executive of the Communist International on February 6, 1924. (see Appendix)

During its year in office, the MacDonald government enacted a few progressive pieces of legislation, most notably extending diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. But in general it acted as a loyal defender of capitalism and the Empire, stopping strikes and defending scabs, supporting the prosecution of rebels against British rule in India, and finally arresting the editor of a Communist newspaper for sedition.

In this context, the Communist Party’s policy of organizing mass opposition to Labour treachery won considerable support. In August 1924 a conference of the National Minority Movement, a left-wing current in the unions led by the CPGB, drew representatives of over 200,000 workers. During the October 1924 General Election, in which Labour gained votes but lost office, the circulation of the Workers Weekly reached 100,000.

On the basis of its work in 1924, the Communist Party was able to organize a National Left-Wing Movement in the Labour Party in 1925, with broad support among non-Communist left-wingers. (For a discussion of the National Left-Wing, and how the CPGB’s abandonment of Leninism led it to disaster, see Woodhouse and Pearce, Essays on the History of Communism in Britain, London 1975, pp. 179-203.)

At its birth, the Communist movement in Britain held to sectarian and ultraleft policies toward the Labour Party—policies which, if pursued for any length of time, would have reduced the party to an isolated sect. Even those Communists who rejected the sectarianism of the majority had little idea of what policies to follow. With the assistance of Lenin and the leadership of the Third International, the CPGB was able to overcome this sectarianism, to avoid the opposite danger of adapting to Labour’s backwardness, and to formulate a clear revolutionary policy. For Canadians attempting to elaborate a policy toward our labour party, the NDP, a careful study of the British experience of 1920-1924 will pay large dividends.

[Part One]  [Part Two]  [Part Three]  [Appendix]