

March 6, 1961

Dear R. D.

Thanks for your letter and enclosures, BUT
I must express my utter disagreement with your article on
the Moscow Manifesto. This disagreement turns into out-
right revulsion against your remarks on I. Deutscher.
They amount to a plain denunciation in the all too po-
pular MacCarthy style: Deutscher has "so organic a com-
munist mentality that he might as well carry a party card
instead of a scholastic one". That is to say: although he
is (probably) not a card-carrying member, he might well be
one. Phoe! Pfu! ~~That goes into Edgar Hoover's file.~~
I guess it is because I wrote the preface to your book
that I still feel concerned with such things on your part:
~~with the company you keep, from MacCarthy to the FBI~~
Here too, the Weltgeist asserts itself. He is always on
the right side and founds the right alliances. And since
I am none of the Weltgeist's boys, I wish to state that, in
my view, Deutscher is not only a great scholar but also a
great human being who dares to speak out of tune with the
chorus of the lackeys on the Right and on the Left...
As to the substance: it is perfectly legitimate to compare
the Leninist International and the present international
organization, since an internal development connects the
two. It is also legitimate, as you do, to contrast the
two. But by no stretch and squeeze of the truth can one,
as you do, contrast the two by presenting the former as
the organ of a "workers' state", a paragon of revolution-
ary socialist democracy (in 1928!!) etc. To use your own
language: "nothing can be further from the truth" (as you
damn well know, or should know).
Is there still some chance that, some day, you might get
over your emotional predilections and settle down to a
genuine analysis - an analysis worthy of the names which
you claim? It is the absence of such an analysis which, in
your NEWS AND LETTERS, renders possible, among other horrors,
the lumping together of the "dictatorships of Castro and Tru-
jillo" - Marx and Hegel would turn in their grave if they
would see this sample of "working class" in-sight. I wonder
whether, sometimes, you are not slightly worried about the
vicinity of such formulations with those of the State De-
partment and CIA - but perhaps I am unjust to these agencies:
I think they indeed see the difference (the essential one!).

Sorry! Shall I go to a psychiatrist to have my "organic com-
munist mentality" diagnosed, or shall I swear that I do not,
never have, never will be "just as well" carry a party card?

9951

March 10, 1961

Dear HM:

Your amazing letter of the 6th was forwarded to me as I am still in New England on my lecture tour. The amazing aspect of your letter does not concern your politics, but your venom toward me, which does not even stop at slander "the company you keep from McCarthy to the FBI", and rises to the crescendo of worrying about being "unjust" to the State Department and the CIA, but not caring a hoot about attributing to me worry "about the vicinity of such formulations with those of the State Department and the CIA." Just to give you some fraternal help to get off that FBI kick, let me state for the record that I have made both the Attorney General's and the GPU list, not to mention the fact that the people in Deutscher you are so anxious to defend have greater access to both bourgeois publishers and university foundations and campuses than I have, and it is not because they are scholars and I am trying to shove them into "Edgar Hoover's file"!

Don't you believe that we are both old enough and have gone through enough experiences of concentration camps from Hitler's Germany's, Stalin's Russia, (and the FBI leases on camps in Florida for all "subversives" should at least give you pause to think before spreading yourself out quite in that manner with unrestrained name-calling?) to be able to discuss even "organic a communist mentality" as a subject for discussion instead of assault? Surely I had said enough in my book on state capitalist communist mentality, from Lassalle through Stalin to the "human relations projects" in American universities to warrant, on the part of an intellectual, consideration for my conception of State Planners, one and all, no matter how violently you disagree with that? But how can violent disagreement possibly make you CREATE EXPRESSIONS YOU NEVER FOUND IN ANY OF MY WRITINGS OR SHOULD EVER BE ABLE TO IMAGINE AS "dictatorships of Castro and Trujillo", although you have put in quotation marks? ~~But~~ dear Marcuse, there is no need to go ~~to~~ a psychiatrist. But ~~perhaps~~ ^{perhaps} inventive in what you attribute to my character and thought. You do need to reread that analysis I gave and then state your contrary position on: 1) the new role of Russia in Africa; 2) the defense of the African Revolutions outside of either pole of nuclearly armed world capital; 3) the self-activity of the masses that changed the map of Africa in less than a decade as it faces the imperialist struggle and the African stooges and the African intelligentsia and its administrative mentality. And if you must come to the defense of Deutscher's explanation as the correct one, then at least consider the facts, if not the philosophy and political assumptions underlying them, that I could not really think Russia of 1928 "a ~~resemblance~~ ^{resemblance} of revolutionary socialist democracy" not only because I go out of the way, even where I analyze the isolation of Russia of 1928 to Russia crowding others in 1960, if only because, in far off Chicago slum one little Raya got treated to a sample of "revolutionary socialist democracy" when she was expelled from the YOL by being rolled down a dirty staircase. Duff!

Here (the memo the students at Yale sent out) are my next three lectures-- when it is over On Wed. th 15th I go to NY, thence back to Detroit on my way to LA. By May all the lectures will be finished and I will escape to work on the outline of my new book. May I still consider you sufficiently interested in a Marxist analysis of the Absolute Idea as the struggles for freedom in the underdeveloped countries illuminate it for me to send the outline to you for submission to Reason as you promised?

9952

August 6, 1964

Dear H.M.:

The years have piled up since I last wrote you, and yet my new book is nowhere near completion. There have been trips, especially the one to West Africa, which I consider part of the book, and perhaps I ought to begin there to bring you up to date.

Enclosed are two articles on West Africa, one a journalistic one on the Gambian elections, which appeared in Africa Today, July 1962; and the other, on the ideological front, which appeared in Presence Africaine, Vol. 20, No. 48, 1963. But since I do not have an extra copy of the latter I enclose it in its original English, as it appeared in News & Letters.

Your One Dimensional Man was given to me for a review to appear in the Fall, and because, I like your critique of existentialism I felt you might be interested in my piece on Sartre, which I enclose. Some friends of mine tried to have it translated into French and published in Paris.

It may be that neither the enclosures here nor the new paperback edition of Marxism and Freedom (sent you under separate cover) with its new introduction relating the Negro revolution to it, and its new chapter on Mao relating it to the Sino-Soviet conflict will disclose my underlying preoccupation with the Absolute Idea, the new relationship of theory to practice, the concept of a new Subject, but then I need to know whether you are still interested before writing to you in any greater detail.

How are you?

Yours,

P.S. My sister (Bessie Gogol) whose son is in Mississippi with COFO wrote me excitedly when she spotted Mrs. Herbert Marcuse's name in the letter she got from the Parents of Mississippi Freedom Summer volunteers. When I see my nephew (Eugene) back all in one piece, I will find out whether he met anyone from your family in that Magnolia Jungle.

9953

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 02154

October 7, 1964.

HISTORY OF IDEAS PROGRAM

Dear R.D.:

Thanks ever so much for your letter with its enclosures which I received after my return to the States: I was in Europe for almost half a year.

Again I read your papers partly with great joy and partly with great irritation. I have rarely come across a case where such a large area of complete agreement meets with such a large area of disagreement. I found particularly interesting your critique of Sartre, which is an urgently needed job, but here, too, I would take into consideration that Sartre today is one of the very few who knows and says what is going on.

All these things should be reserved for a future personal discussion. At your request I am returning the papers herewith.

With best wishes,

Yours cordially,

M/g



9954

October 10, 1964

Dear Eli:

Welcome home! Or is home considered to be elsewhere? Well, welcome back, then, and thanks for yours of the 7th. I was especially pleased that you found my critique of Sartre "particularly interesting." Since my friends abroad did not succeed in getting a French publication to print it, and I know none in the US that would be interested in so doing, your suggestion about taking into consideration Sartre's speaking out presently becomes abstract. I note he has taken time out to write his autobiography rather than completing his Critique de la Raison Dialectique; do you happen to know when he intends to return to the work?

I would like nothing better than to have a chance to talk with you at great length, but, since I have no paid lectures in Massachusetts this winter or spring, I'm afraid that too is out for the present. (You once spoke of seeing whether I could be brought to Brandeis, and if you should still feel you want to, I'm enclosing the brochure that both the publisher and literary agent use.)

The best thing that has happened to me recently is that a Japanese edition of MARXISM AND FREEDOM has appeared (under the unlikely "translation" of ALIENATION AND REVOLUTION) and I have been invited to lecture there late next spring. But, again, the publisher is willing only to pay for expenses there, not the passage to Japan, so I do not know whether I can swing that trip either as I happen at the present to be as poor as a church mouse. If this is beginning to sound melodramatic, a veritable chapter in the Trials and Tribulations of Till the Toller, it is because I'm rather on the disgusted side because I have tried and tried to get some foundation to give me a grant to be free to complete my book, but I have been unsuccessful.

Instead, on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation or Proclamation last year I "diverted" to the American scene and helped in putting out the enclosed AMERICAN CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL. At the same time, off and on, I write outlines of odd chapters. For example, this, enclosed, on "The Algebra of Revolution" or the Dialectic of Thought and Action. I naturally would like your comments, but please return it to me. I've been working very hard at Hegel's Absolute Idea, especially on the second negation, second subjectivity, and new relationship of theory to practice in our day. It is to this I will return the next time I write you.

Yours,

9955

Bygones

Oct 27 1964

Dear HM:

Since you once asked me why I "translate" Hegel when I know "the original" (Marx) well enough I assume you thought that since my writings and activity were political my veritable obsession with Hegel's Absolute Idea was ..an obsession. I am exaggerating, of course, but it is only because I hope you'll permit me to write in this informal way an outline of a chapter of my new work (which I now lean to calling "Philosophy and Revolution) that deals with "Why Hegel? Why Now?"

The chapter is to have three sub-sections: Marx's Debt to Hegel; Lenin's Ambivalence toward Hegel and Shock of Recognition; the philosophical problems of our age. The first sub-section will connect with M&F but greatly expand why Marx couldn't "shake off" Hegel as easily as he shook off classical political economy; once he transcended it, then his "economics" became, not a political economy, but Marxism, a philosophy of human activity. This was true in every single respect from the theory of value and surplus value, through rent as a "derivative" rather than making the landlord class as fundamental a one as the new capitalist class, to capital accumulation and its "law of motion" bringing about its "collapse." In all these labor was seen as the living subject bringing all contradictions to a head and making socialism "inevitable"; at no point were economic laws independent of human activity. Regarding the Hegelian dialectic, on the other hand, despite its recreation in Marxism, or what you laughingly refer to as "subversion", that is to say, transformation of dialectic from "a science of logic" to "a science" of revolution, his "attachment" to Hegel remained. This was not because Marx began as a "Left Hegelian", nor even because the Hegelian dialectic speeded him on his own voyage of discovery ("thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism"). Indeed, when his break first came from Hegel, he used classical political economy to counterpose reality to "idealism", especially of the Proudhonian variety. Yet the adieu to classical political economy was complete; the adieu to Hegelianism was not.

Take the very first, and most thorough and profound attack on Hegel's Philosophy of Right--the very critique which led to nothing short of his greatest discovery--the materialist conception of history--a lesser man, a lesser Hegelian than Marx, would at that point have finished with Hegel. Marx, on the contrary, proceeded to the critique of the PHENOMENOLOGY and the ENCYCLOPAEDIA, and when he broke off at the last section on "The Philosophy of Mind" to stick with what he called "that dismal science"--political economy--and engage in class struggle activities revolutions, First International, which took the rest of his life, he still hungered to return to a presentation of "the rational form of the dialectic." Indeed, at every turning point, he returned to "the dialectic." You recall how happy he sounded, in 1853, in his letter to Engels when he explained that he "accidentally" came upon his library of Hegel's works and there got some "new developments" which are helping him complete Critique of Political Economy (and of course you can see the results all through the Grundrisse). Again, in (1861-63) when he first reworked it as CAPITAL and makes the most crucial decision on the economics presentation--not merely to break with Ricardo on land rent but to take out from Volume I all that would become Volume III and thus eliminate all relations between landlords and workers, leaving them "pure" with capitalists alone. And yet again, in 1866,

Use in
T.K.

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when he restructured CAPITAL to include The Working Day and actually break with the very concept of theory, both the move to the profound analysis of reification at the point of production and the fetishism of commodities, again illumined by the real Paris Commune, were still in the tightest wrappings of Hegelianism.

This is exactly why Lenin wrote that it was impossible to understand CAPITAL, "especially its first chapter" without the whole of the SCIENCE OF LOGIC. And in that first chapter, when you need Hegel most is where Stalin, in 1943, decided to make his theoretical break by asking that that chapter be eliminated in the "teaching" of ~~Marx's~~ CAPITAL. And, again, the last writing we have from the pen of Marx (Notes on Wagner and the analysis of the critiques of his own economics) the constant repetition is to "the dialectic." In a word, Marx never forgot his indebtedness to Hegel because it was not a debt to the past, but a vital, living present expressing as well the pull of the future.

The new I wish to bring in here will bring in a justification for the abstractness of Hegel since there are points, critical points, turning points, when the abstract suddenly can become the concretely universal. CAPITAL is concrete, an empiric study, a phenomenological as well as logical-economic analysis which "exhausts itself" in the one topic it is concerned with: capitalism. But LOGIC is "without concretion of sense", "applies" to all sciences, factual studies, so that when a sudden new stage is reached, and the old categories won't do, there is always a new set of categories in LOGIC as you move from Being to Essence to Notion. That is why Lenin, who long before he knew the whole of the Logic, knew the whole of Capital, and wrote most profoundly of all the three volumes, nevertheless, suddenly, when the ground gave way before him as the Second collapsed, found new "only" in LOGIC. That is to say, that abstract category "unity, identity, transformation into opposite", and such others as "self-transcendence" meant something so new to him also in the understanding of CAPITAL and its latest stage, imperialism, that he was willing to say none, including himself, had understood Capital at all before that specific moment of grasping the Doctrine of the Notion in general, and the breakdown of opposition between objective and subjective that he got from the Syllogism in particular.

What I am trying to say is that the minute the actual cannot be expressed in old terms, even when these terms are Marxian ones, it is because a new stage of cognition has not kept up with the new challenge from practice which only philosophy seems capable of illuminating--old, abstruse, abstract Hegelianism made Lenin see what the concrete terms in CAPITAL did not--that monopoly capital was not only a "stage" of centralization of capital, but a "transformation into opposite" which demanded a total reorganization and undermining of old categories, including that of labor.

This section that should lead to the second sub-section on Lenin's ambivalence to Hegel, both before the shock of recognition in 1914 and, unfortunately, after that shock, at least publicly. The duality in Lenin's philosophic heritage can no longer be put into a footnote, as I did in MARXISM AND FREEDOM. This ambivalence has allowed the Chinese as well as Russian Communists to pervert Marx's Humanism by quoting both Lenins alongside of each other as if they were one unchangeable Lenin who never experienced a sharp break with his own philosophic past. Once, however, this is cleared it is precisely Lenin, the Lenin of 1915-24, who allows us to jump

off from the 20th rather than the 19th century precisely because his most startling and most meaningful aphorisms were expressed in "Subjective " Logic and he is so enthusiastic as he equates (with literal equation signs) subjectivity with freedom. You'll recall also that Lenin's Notebooks stress that philosophy (Logic, 1813) expressed "the universal movement of change" first, and only afterwards (1847) did Marx express it in politics (The Communist Manifesto) whereas natural science (Origin of Species, 1859) came still later. And while it remains for our age to concretize Lenin's restatement of Hegel's appreciation of the Practical Idea "precisely in the theory of knowledge" for "Cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it", it is Lenin who put out the marker: "The continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx consist in working out dialectically the history of human thought, science and technology."

It is obvious to you, I am sure, that I do not take your position on technology. I am so Hegelian that I still consider that subject absorbs object, and not object subject which then becomes its extension. My preference of "ontology" to "technology" in the age of automation may be said to be due to the awe I feel when confronted with the dialectic of human thought, but this would not be the whole truth since human thought is inseparable from human activity and both result from the overpowering urge to freedom. Allow me, please, to express this within the range of the types of cognition in the dialectic itself:

In inquiring ~~xxxxxx~~ cognition we face an objective world without the subjectivity of the Notbn. In synthetic cognition, the objective world and subjectivity co-exist (and like the fragility of "peaceful co-existence" ~~xxxxxx~~ which fears movement, so in this laying of the objective world and subjectivity side by side, there can be no transcendence.) But now watch, the idea of cognition and the practical idea no sooner unite, then we are ready for the plunge to freedom. Hegel begins at the bottom of page 475 (SCIENCE OF LOGIC, VOL. II) to review again, not dialectic "cognition" but the Absolute Method, the form of the Absolute Idea, the new stage of identity of theory and practice that we have reached as we leave behind the previous forms of cognition. (Don't forget, either that two short pages after we view "the objective world whose inner ground and actual persistence is Notion", we reach "the turning point" (p.477) and learn that the "Transcendence between Notion and Reality... rests upon this subjectivity alone.)

It appears to me also that Hegel is right when he feels it absolutely necessary that the Method begin with abstract universality, abstract self-relation, the in-itselfness of the Absolute. (pp.469-472), which leads, though "the concrete totality which...contains as such the beginning of the progress and of development", to differentiation within what I would call the achieved revolution. I might as well here continue politically for I see Hegel as he finishes with subjective idealism to be finishing with reformism for whom the goal is always in the future, and shifting all his attack on the intuitionists--Jacobi, Schelling, Fichte, especially Jacobi whom he calls a "reactionary" (Encyclopaedia, par.76)--or the type of abstract revolutionism for whom, once an "end", a revolution has been reached, there is no more negative development or mediation. All that, to them, that seems to be done is an organization of what has been achieved and they go at this organization in so total a way they choke the

spontaneous revolution, and with it all further development, to death.

Hegel, on the other hand, moves from the overcoming of the opposition between Notion and Reality, resting on subjectivity alone to paeans about "personal and free" and "self-liberation" in the Philosophy of Mind, which, to me, is the new society and not the return to metaphysics. I'm not saying that Hegel may not have consciously striven to return to metaphysics (he certainly did so personally in his apology for the Prussian state) but neither those who have tried to make him out a complete reactionary as a statist, nor those who have welcomed his glorification of "revealed religion" (Christianity in general, Lutheranism in particular, or, as Bochenski, the Angry Thomist, to "deism" if not veritable atheism), can explain away why his Absolute is always Idea and Mind and not just God. Very obviously, the ideal toward which humanity, the humanity of the French Revolution, was striving toward, and the ideal toward which the philosopher Hegel who wished thought to be ~~made~~ so great a determinant in the transformation of reality, were not so far apart as either the ordinary or scientific mind wish to make out. For Notion is revolutionary politics, not in the narrowly political sense as "the organizers"* would have us believe, but in the sense of 1917: free creative power.

(When Marx is in the market he laughs at, and links, "Liberty, Equality and Bentham"; when he is in proletarian politics, it is "thinking, bleeding Paris", so flushed with excitement at the "incubation of a new society", that it fails to see the counter-revolution, etc.etc.)

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The greatness of the "Absolute Method", the Hegelian dialectic, is its universals, and their distinction from the generalizations of abstract understanding, so that each universal-Being as such, Essence as such, Notion as such--is a new category, a leap into individuality "purified of all that interferes with its universalism." As Lenin put it in his Notebooks "The forming of abstract notions already include consciousness of law so that the simplest forming of notions (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) signifies ever deeper knowledge of objective world connections. Hence the significance of the Hegelian Logic." The important point, it seems to me, is that the new categories arise at certain turning points in history when men have such overwhelming experience that they are sure also they have found "the truth," so that, as Lenin put it, "the consciousness of the law of the objective world connections" become transmuted into "new categories of thoughts, or knots." In a word, the Doctrine of Notion is revolutionary politics, contains the categories of Freedom, overcomes the opposition between subject and object, theory and practice, notion and reality, reaches "the second negation", not only "in general" as revolution against existing society, but in particular as the new society which has ~~the~~ not merely the stigma of the old from which it came, but is too ready to transform the universal into a "fixed particular" (be that state property or plan or even soviet) instead of moving forward to the abolition of the division between mental and manual work, the new human dimension.

That is why the collegio in the Doctrine of the Notion is so contemporary, so relevant to our day. When Hegel strikes out against transforming the universal into a fixed particular, it doesn't really matter whether he has in mind, in one case, socialism, and in the other statified property, we gain an illumination when he speaks of the universal needing to

be posited as particular, but if the particular is posited as the universal, it becomes isolated or, to use Marx's expression, gains "the fixity of a popular prejudice."

Even the bourgeois philosopher, John Findlay (whose book, despite its barbs against Marxists, I found fascinating) sees the revolutionary in Hegel as he concludes his praise of him "as the philosopher of 'absolute negativity', the believer in nothing that does not spring from the free, uncommitted, self-committing human spirit." (Hegel; A Re-Examination, p.354.)

We certainly can no longer, as did Lenin, keep "our" philosophic notebooks private. We live in the age of absolutes, and freedom as the innermost dynamic of both life and thought demands the unity of philosophy and revolution.

Yours,

*The finest attack on organizational vanguardists I have read anywhere is in Hegel's "Philosophy of Religion", in his attacks on the Church--what a totalitarian, monolithic party medieval catholicism was! Whoever it was who said that he who turns his back on history is doomed to relive it must have our age in mind!

P.S. Please return that chapter 5, or whatever I called the dialectics of liberation. I seem to have misplaced my original copy--or had I sent it to you previously too? In any case I need it, though where that one concentrated on Africa, I am now all for the contradictions of Japan and the dream to get there.

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
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November 2, 1964

HISTORY OF IDEAS PROGRAM

Dear R D:

Good for you that your physical and mental energies seem to be so much greater than mine. I did not yet have the time to digest your fourth chapter, the return of which you now request. Here it is. And now comes your long letter on the Absolute Idea and your strange application of it. I read it once, I read it twice and am afraid that my old criticism still holds. I would, however, appreciate it if you would give me a little more time to answer it.

As to your question whether and when Sartre will return to his book on dialectics, I do not know but no matter what he does I find his statement on his rejection of the Nobel Prize most sympathetic.

Please have a little patience.

With best regards,



M/g

9961

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 02154

January 12, 1965.

HISTORY OF IDEAS PROGRAM

Home telephone: 969-7622
University " : 894-6000
Ext. 444 or
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Dear R.D.:

Thanks for your letter. In the meantime I have read your review of my book which is probably the most intelligent one so far-as I expected it would be.

As to your prospective visit, the 12th of February unfortunately is not a University holiday, but I shall certainly reserve time Thursday afternoon or evening. It will be good seeing you.

Best regards and au revoir,

M/g



9962

April 3, 1965

Dear HM:

"Our" new generation (and I don't even have children!) are surely involved in similar work. First, it was your son and my nephew in Mississippi. Now your niece, Susan Kress came up to hear me yesterday—I have just returned from an insanely scheduled tour where one day at Berkeley I began at noon one day and didn't finish till 2 a.m. the following morning. She is struggling with my book, and since I'm invited also to speak to her school, I'll see her again, and then hope to have her over the house. The new generation of American youth is becoming radical in the best sense of the word of being both activists and concerned with ideas.

While at Oberlin college—the debate on Existentialism turned into a "discussion" since the philosophy professor—(Paul Schmidt) preferred it so. The reason I'm writing you about it is that he is transferring to Albuquerque New Mexico and when he heard about you being in California, he thought it would be possible to make the trip to La Jolla. He and his young wife Gail (she was a student of his, has travelled in East Africa and is generally active) were "Carpenters for Christmas" in Mississippi during the holidays last year. He evidently heard you once in Brandeis on Science of Logic, but doesn't think you remember him, and I promised to let you know because you will need friends in California, even if they are in New Mexico.

Hurriedly, yours,

Your friend Hans Meyerhoff, on the other hand, I didn't see since he was most assistant to my nephew (Eugene Gogel) that he and no one else makes decisions about his class, etc.etc. I did speak on the UCLA campus under sponsorship of CORE and the Marxist-Humanist, so whatever it is that he and the Administration suddenly saw alike about me, the students and the activists in the Negro revolt thought differently.

I should finally—by the end of the month—be able to get away to work on my book since the Japanese trip has been delayed till fall.

9963

8831 Cliffridge Ave.
La Jolla, Cal. 92038
September 7, 1965

Dear R. D.

Certainly I shall write to the Guggenheim people as soon as I get their request, repressing my deviation from your line.

I was fascinated by your statement that Marx' "theory of rectification" was his most original contribution - I like that much better than "reification".

Furthermore: the 1844 manuscripts were not rediscovered in the mid-1940ies by "by theological and secular existentialists" but in the very early 1930ies by non-theological secular non-existentialists.

And why is "Not Two Into One But One Into Two" a dialectical slogan?

But otherwise your project is indeed something to look forward to - even by me...

I am still swamped with socially necessary but individually alienating work.

Greetings!

Jim

9964

Sept. 9. 1965

9965

Dear HM:

Thank you very much for yours of the 7th. What a fantastic typo—"rectification"(!) instead of "reification"; I don't know what I can do other than to expect them to understand the word; by now it has notdoubt been sent out to their board. I am not the least bit worried however that I will be able to have the thesis hold for Marx who felt that his whole view of the dehumanizing work under capitalism was summed up in "Dead labor dominates living labor."

My reference to the rediscovery of the 1844 manuscripts by the mid-1940s was meant to contrast it to the belatedness of the work on them in the USA. I am, of course, well aware not only of their prior discovery of them by Marxists in the 1930s but Ryazanov's first publication of them in 1927. Indeed, in a criticism of George Lichtheim usually ^{in the} European air, here is what I say in fn 10, p.75, (Fromm's symposium on Socialist Humanism)*, practically transforming you into an American!

"I do not mean to say that I accept the West European intellectual's attitude on either the question of the degree of belatedness, or the low level of discussion in the United States. Four or five years before Europe's first rediscovery of Marx's early essays, when Europe was under the heel of fascism, Herbert Marcuse dealt with them in his Reason and Revolution. It is true that this was based on the German text of the essays, that no English translation was available, and that the discussion of Professor Marcuse's seminal work was limited to small groups. It is also true that I had great difficulty in convincing either commercial or university presses that they ought to publish Marx's humanist essays or Lenin's Philosophic Notebooks. I succeeded in getting both these writings published only by including them as appendices to my Marxism and Freedom (1958). Even when they did not become available to a mass audience. It was not until 1961, when Erica Fromm included a translation of the 1844 Manuscripts in Marx's Concept of Man, that Marx's humanism reached a mass audience in the United States, and received widespread attention in American journals. Nevertheless, I see no substantive reason for the intellectual arrogance of the European Marxologists; in Europe as in the United States, it was only after the Hungarian Revolution that the discussion of humanism reached the level of either concreteness or urgency. When I refer to the belatedness of the discussion, I have in mind the long period between the time of the 1844 Manuscripts were first published by the Marx-Engels Institute in Russia, in 1927, under the editorship of Ryazanov, and the time they received general attention."

"Not Two Into One But One Into Two" is not my conception of dialectics; it is Mao's. It certainly does show how hard the Chinese Communists work at what they think is a dialectical presentation. For any one, when referring to the Hegelian concept of contradiction, to sum it up, as Mao does, by saying: "As we Chinese say, opposites complement each other" is neither a Hegelian nor a Marxist, but a good Confucian.

Judging by the sparkling humour of your letter

The California air must be good for you despite "individually alienating work". I don't really expect to get the Guggenheim fellowship—I have neither the proper degrees nor the popular viewpoint to succeed. This will not stop my work, though it would greatly delay it, as it has all these years when I must constantly put the manuscript away for other work.

In mid-November I expect to leave for Hong Kong as I wish to do some research at the Universities Research centre there, and thence to Japan where they have just not only published Marxism and Freedom, but also my original 1944 articles on the Russian economy where I first developed the theory of state-capitalism. I was surprised how well these 21 year old writings stood the test of time.

*Has Doubleday your Calif. address to send you this volume since you too are included and, as usual, with