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Table of Contents

Articles:

- PAUL BREINIS: *Introduction to Lukács*
 GEORGE LUKÁCS: *Old Culture and New Culture*
 MICHAEL KOSOK: *The Dynamics of Paradox*
 RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA: *Lenin's Philosophical Ambivalence*
 ENZO PACE: *Towards a New Phenomenology*
 WILLIAM LEISS: *Husserl and The Mystery of Nature*
 CARL RATNER: *Laing's Psychology*
 MICHAEL KOSOK: *The Dialectical Matrix*
 PIER ALDO ROVATTI: *A Phenomenological Analysis of Marxism*

Notes:

- ALEXANDER DELFINI: *On The Woman Question*
 PAUL PICCONE: *The Problem of Consciousness*
 RUSSELL JACOBY: *Marcuse and the New Aesthetics: A Note on Style*
 KENNETH MEGILL: *In Defense of Revolution*
 HOWARD PARSONS: *Marx and the Student Movement*
 JAMES HANSEN: *On Misunderstanding Hegel*

Reviews:

- DAVID GROSS: George Boas, *The History of Ideas*
 PAUL BREINIS: Giuseppe Vacca, *Lukács or Korsch?*

4516

THE SHOCK OF RECOGNITION AND THE PHILOSOPHIC AMBIVALENCE OF LENIN

by
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The simultaneous outbreak of World War I and the voting of war credits to the Kaiser's government by the German Social Democracy, took from under Lenin the philosophical grounding which up until then he had considered impregnable. By August 4, 1914, all of the concepts previously held in common by the various tendencies within the marxist movement were altogether destroyed. Before that time, all marxists were agreed that the material conditions provided the basis for the creation of a new social order, that the more advanced these conditions were, the better prepared the proletariat would be for stripping the bourgeoisie of their power, and, finally, that the larger the mass party and the more mature its marxist leadership, the more certain the road to revolution. The material foundation provided the real basis for the explanation of the ideal, or consciousness. To believe otherwise was considered philosophical idealism, bourgeois apologetics, and clerical obscurantism.

Now marxist revolutionaries were faced with a shocking new development: the marxist leaders were the ones responsible for the workers being set against each other rather than against their real enemy, world capitalism. Making the situation even worse was the fact that these leaders were recognized as such by the entire International, Bolsheviks included, and were the head of what was then the largest mass party. Moreover, this took place in the most technologically advanced country at that time, the German Social Democracy. Confronted with the inadequacy of all previous conceptions regarding the relationship between the material base and the level of consciousness, the subjective and the objective, the universal and the particular, Lenin was forced to search for a new philosophy. Had Hegel never existed, Lenin would have had to invent him, since the hegelian dialectic was to provide Lenin with the basis for the reconstruction of his philosophical perspective. It was not that Lenin had any doubts concerning his opposition to the imperialist war. Rather, he was adamant in his opposition to any "indiscriminate unity"¹ and would not abandon the most extreme and

1. The phrase appears in Lenin's letter to Kollontai: "you emphasize that 'we must put forward a slogan that would unite all!' I will tell you frankly that the thing I fear most at the present time is indiscriminate unity which, I am convinced, is most dangerous and harmful to the proletariat." Quoted in *Memories of Lenin*, Vol. II, p. 160, by N.K. Krupskaya.

unequivocal of slogans: the defeat of one's own country is the lesser evil; turn the imperialist war into a civil one. (This position was in conflict with that of other revolutionaries of the time, however, who, being so overwhelmed by the collapse of the Second International, they considered it necessary to limit the "struggle for peace" to one which would unite all the tendencies that had not betrayed revolutionary internationalism.) In a word, for Lenin, what was needed was not to pick up the pieces of what once was, but rather, to separate entirely from the Second International, with the creation of a Third. The events of 1914 did not cast doubt on his Bolshevik politics and organization; what was put into question was the old materialism, lacking the principle of the "transformation into its opposite": the dialectic itself. This was what Lenin was to emphasize in the hegelian dialectic.

While other revolutionaries ran around without reorganizing their thinking, Lenin was eagerly looking for a new philosophical perspective. Thus, as soon as he reached Bern in September 1914, even with the war in full force, Lenin headed for the library to grapple with the works of Hegel, especially his *Science of Logic*. For an uncompromising revolutionary such as Lenin to spend his days in the Bern Library while the whole world was going to pieces — including the marxist movement — must have indeed presented a strange and incomprehensible sight. Nevertheless, for an entire year Lenin studied Hegel's logic.² And just as his slogan "turn the imperialist war into a civil war" became the political Great Divide in marxism, so his *Abstract of Hegel's Logic* became the philosophic foundation for all serious writing that Lenin was to do during the rest of his life: from *Imperialism and State and Revolution* on the eve of November 1917, through the works written during the Revolution, to his *Will*.

Cautiously Lenin turned to Hegel, forever reminding himself that he was reading him "materialistically", and, as such, was "consigning God and the philosophic rabble that defends God to the rubbish heap." At the same time, however, he was hit with the shock of recognition that the hegelian dialectic was revolutionary, and that Hegel's dialectic, in fact, preceded Marx's own "application" of it in the *Communist Manifesto*. "Who would believe," Lenin exclaimed, "that this [movement and self-movement] is the core of Hegelianism, of abstract and abstruse (difficult, absurd?) Hegelianism?? ... The idea of universal movement and change (1813 *Logic*) was disclosed before its application to life and society. It was proclaimed in reference to society (1847)* earlier than in relation to man (1859)**."³

2. Actually, Lenin spent two years — 1914-1916 — in the Library. He completed the Hegel Studies in 1915, and began gathering material for his book on *Imperialism*.

* The reference is to the *Communist Manifesto*.

** The reference is to the *Origin of Species*.

3. The first translation of Lenin's *Abstract* appeared as "Appendix A" to the first edition of my work *Marxism and Freedom*, (New York, 1958), hereafter referred to as *M & F*. This translation will be used throughout but, for the reader's convenience, I will also cite the pagination in the Moscow translation (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38). See *M & F*, p. 331, and Vol. 38, p. 141.

To grasp the full impact that this reading of Hegel had upon Lenin, we should keep in mind the fact that Lenin did not know Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844. As he read the *Science of Logic*, Lenin was thinking about Marx's *Capital* as well as his struggle with "vulgar materialism." Thus, even as he argued with Hegel, designating the section of "Being-for Self" in the *Doctrine of Being* as "dark waters", he continued to say: "The idea of the transformation of the ideal into the real is profound. Very important for history. But also in the personal life of man it is evident that there is much truth in this. Against vulgar materialism. NB. The difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional, not *überschwenglich*."⁴

It is this discovery of the relationship between the ideal and the material in Hegel, that led Lenin to see that the revolutionary spirit of the dialectic was not superimposed by Marx on Hegel, but was already present in Hegel's own work. While dealing with the *Doctrine of Being*, he had already stressed both the identity of, and transformation into, opposites: "Dialectic is the doctrine of the identity of opposites — how they can be and how they become — under which conditions they become identical, transforming one into the other..."⁵ While dealing with the *Doctrine of Essence*, the stress was first and foremost on self-movement. As he indicated with his comments concerning The Law of Contradiction, his stress was not so much on the identity of opposites as it was on the transition from one to the other and the sharpening of the contradiction. Yet, he had such a comprehensive knowledge of the totality that even causality became but a "moment" of the whole: "Cause and effect, ergo, only moments of every kind of interdependence, connection (of the universal), concatenation of events are only links in the chain of the development of matter." "NB. All-sidedness and all-embracing character of world connection are only one-sidedly, desultorily and incompletely expressed by causality."⁶

In the final section on Essence, Lenin broke with the materialism and empiricism that had overemphasized science and the category of causality in explaining the relationship of mind and matter. "Iron economic laws" and "essence" had constantly been contrasted to "appearance", as if, thereby, the totality of a problem had been exhausted. What now became crucial for Lenin was the Hegelian concept of "moments": "The essence is that both the world of appearance and the world which is in-itself are essentially moments of the knowledge of nature by man, steps, changes in (or deepening of) knowledge."⁷

Lenin also kept arguing with himself. At the same time that he mercilessly criticized Hegel's "mysticism and empty pedantry", he also stressed the profundity of the dialectic, the "idea of genius". By the time Lenin reached *The Doctrine of the Notion* — and it is here that he broke with his own philosophic past — he underscored the materialist elements present in Hegel: "When Hegel tries — sometimes even strains himself and worries to death — to subsume the

4. *M & F*, p. 338; *Vol. 38*, p. 176.

5. *M & F*, p. 332; *Vol. 38*, p. 143.

6. *M & F*, p. 335; *Vol. 38*, p. 159.

7. *M & F*, p. 333; *Vol. 38*, p. 153.

purposeful activity of men under the categories of logic, saying that this activity is the 'syllogism', that the subject plays the role of some sort of 'member' in the logical 'figure' of the syllogism, etc., then this is not only a strain, not only a game. There is here a very deep content, purely materialistic. It is necessary to turn this around: The practical activity of man, repeated billions of times, must lead the consciousness of man to the repetition of the various logical figures in order that these can achieve the significance of an axiom. *This nota bene*."⁸

Lenin's *Abstract* of Hegel's *Science of Logic* reveals a mind in action, arguing with himself as well as with Hegel, advising himself "to return to" Hegel, "to work out" ideas, history, science, Marx's *Capital*, and current theories, jamming up opposites, and leaping into the Notion which he translated as "NB. Freedom=subjectivity ('or') goal, consciousness, striving NB."⁹ Precisely because of this, the *Abstract* is an exciting experience for his readers as well. No sooner had Lenin designated the first section of the Notion by saying that "these parts of the work should be called: a best means of getting a headache", than he also emphasized the following: "NB. Hegel's analysis of the Syllogism (I-P-U, 'individual, particular, universal', P-I-U, etc.) is reminiscent of Marx's imitation of Hegel in Chapter I."¹⁰ Later Lenin pointed out the close relationship between Marx's *Capital* and Hegel's *Logic*: "If Marx did not leave a *Logic* (with a capital letter), he left the *logic* of capital, and this should be especially utilized on the given question. In *Capital*, the logic, dialectic and theory of knowledge of materialism (3 words are not necessary: they are one and the same) are applied to one science, taking all that is valuable in Hegel and moving it forward."¹¹ But while dealing with section one of *The Doctrine of the Notion*, Lenin found it necessary to break not only with Plekhanov, but also with his own views. Three aphorisms quickly follow one after the other: "(1) Plekhanov criticizes Kantianism (and agnosticism in general) more from the vulgar materialistic than the dialectic materialist point of view... (2) At the beginning of the 20th century) Marxists criticized the Kantians and Humeans more in a Feuerbachian (and Buchnerian), than in a Hegelian manner. (3) It is impossible to fully grasp Marx's *Capital*, and especially its first chapter, if you have not studied through and understood the whole of Hegel's *Logic*. Consequently, none of the Marxists for the past half century have understood Marx!!!"¹²

8. *M & F*, p. 343; *Vol. 38*, p. 190.

9. *M & F*, p. 336; *Vol. 38*, p. 164.

* This sentence is in English in Lenin's text.

10. *M & F*, p. 339; *Vol. 38*, p. 178. "Chapter I" refers, of course, to *Capital*. It is the same chapter that Stalin, in 1943, ordered Soviet theoreticians not to follow when he decided to break with Marx's Analysis of the Law of Value as typical of Capitalism and only capitalism. See the translation from *Pod Znamenem: Marxizma* and my commentary on it with debate in the *American Economic Review*, Sept. 1944 to Sept. 1945. Ever since, it has remained a subject of controversy whenever the question of alienation and the fetishism of commodities is discussed.

11. *M & F*, p. 353; *Vol. 38*, p. 349.

12. *M & F*, p. 340; *Vol. 38*, p. 180.

The epigones who deny that Lenin was also thinking of himself, must explain what Lenin meant by the additional remark alongside the first two aphorisms, i.e., "Concerning the question of the criticism of modern Kantianism, Machism, etc.?" Was it not his own *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* which dealt so extensively with "Machism"? The point is not, of course, to simply mention names for their own sake, much less, to investigate whether or not the aphorisms contain exaggerations. No one had written more profoundly than Lenin on Marx's *Capital*, especially on Volume II, and Lenin certainly did not mean that all students of *Capital* must first labor through the two volumes of the *Science of Logic*. What was crucial and what he saw looming before him, was a great philosophic debate directed not so much against Hegel, as against Plekhanov. Here, he sensed a conflict with his philosophic past. In fact, he even began to feel uneasy with his essay, "Karl Marx", which he had just completed for the *Encyclopedia Granat*.

Calling attention to the fact that Lenin's essay began with a discussion of philosophic materialism and dialectics, Krupskaya commented that "this was not the usual way of presenting Marx's techniques."¹³ That was certainly true. What Krupskaya did not mention was that this departure from previous analyses had not been sufficiently concrete to satisfy Lenin's new understanding of the dialectic, especially since he had just finished the entire *Logic*. The essay was written during July-November, 1914. Lenin had begun studying the *Logic* in September and completed it on December 17, 1914. This, along with the date on a new letter to Granat, January 14, 1915 helps us to determine the point at which Lenin's thought went through a significant change. In any case, with typical precision, Lenin wrote Granat: "By the way, will there not still be time for certain corrections in the section on dialectics? ... I have been studying this question of dialectics for the last month and a half and I think I could add something to it if there was time ..."

Lenin's break with old concepts is nowhere clearer than in his remarks concerning the relationship between theory and practice. Thus, even when Lenin spoke of practice, he stressed that Hegel dealt with practice "in the theory of cognition". And even Lenin himself tended to soar: "Alas: Man's cognition not only reflects the objective world, but also creates it."¹⁴

How far we have travelled from the "photocopy" theory of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism!* And yet it is not because Lenin had forgotten his materialist roots, or his revolutionary views on class consciousness. Rather, Lenin had gained from Hegel a totally new understanding of the unity of materialism and idealism. It was this new understanding that subsequently permeated Lenin's post-1915 writings in philosophy, politics, economics and organization. Always stressing the concrete, Lenin interpreted Hegel's remark about the "non-actuality of the world" to mean: "The world does not satisfy man, and man decides to change it by his activity."

13. *Memories of Lenin*, op. cit., p. 155.
14. *M & F*, p. 347; Vol. 38, p. 212.

Lenin had not soared into abstraction in gaining a new appreciation of idealism. It is simply that in this new understanding of Hegel, the notion of the Absolute Idea lost its sinister connotations. This is not due either to Lenin's conversion from a revolutionary materialist to a "bourgeois idealist", nor to any acceptance of an hegelian concept of God or some self-unfolding "World Spirit". Rather, Lenin saw that, although Hegel dealt only with thought-entities, the movement of "pure thought" does not just "reflect" reality. The dialectic of both is a process, and the Absolute is "absolute negativity."¹⁵ Lenin's grasp of the second negation, which Hegel called "the turning point",¹⁶ led Lenin to question Hegel's diversion to the numbers' game, i.e., whether the dialectic is a "triplicity" or "quadruplicity", with the resulting contrasting of "simple" and "absolute". Lenin commented: "The difference is not clear to me; is not the absolute equivalent to the more concrete?"¹⁷ thus interpreting both absolute and relative as developmental "moments".

When Lenin finished reading the *Science of Logic*, he was no longer disturbed by the notion of the Absolute Idea "going to nature". Instead, he claimed that, in so doing, Hegel "stretches a hand to materialism". He writes: "It is noteworthy that the whole chapter on the 'Absolute Idea' scarcely says a word about God (hardly ever had a 'divine' 'Notion' slipped out accidentally) and apart from that — this NB. — it contains almost nothing that is specifically idealism, but has for its main subject the dialectical method ... And one thing more: in this most idealistic of Hegel's works there is the least idealism and the most materialism. 'Contradictory', but a fact!"¹⁸

Lenin did not feel the kind of excitement that he had experienced in reading the *Logic* when he turned to Hegel's *History of Philosophy*. But it is in this stage that he completed the final break with Plekhanov: "NB. Work out: Plekhanov probably wrote nearly 1,000 pages (Belov + against Bogdanov + against Kantians + basic questions, etc., etc. on philosophy [dialectic]). There is in them nil about the Larger Logic, its thoughts (i.e., dialectic proper, as a philosophic science) nil!"¹⁹

Furthermore, when he proceeded to summarize in a somewhat orderly fashion the meaning of the dialectic after he had gone through Hegel's major works,* he even criticized Engels: "The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts ... is the essence ... of dialectics ... This aspect of dialectics (e.g., in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of examples 'for example, a seed',

15. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
16. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, Vol. II, p. 477.
17. *Vol. 38*, p. 231.
18. *Vol. 38*, p. 234.
19. *M & F*, p. 354; *Vol. 38*, p. 277.

* We do not have Lenin's notes on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, but the *Notebooks on Imperialism* show that he had read it while he was preparing the pamphlet on *Imperialism*. (The *Notebooks* are a massive 739 pages as against the short pamphlet that was actually published.)

'for example, primitive communism'. The same is true of Engels. But it is 'in the interests of popularization. . .'²⁰ So great is Lenin's appreciation of dialectics that even in his references to "clerical obscurantism", a "sterile flower" is expanded to mean "a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge."

The last quotation was from Lenin's only article specifically dealing with the dialectic, as against Lenin's comments on the margin of other work — mainly Hegel's. Though not prepared for publication, this, at least, has never been treated as mere "jottings". It is the last word we have from Lenin's strictly philosophic commentary of the crucial 1914-1915 period. Lenin had not prepared his *Philosophic Notebooks* for publication. Thus, they remained "private". Since it seemed that Lenin simply continued with his economic studies, political theses, and organizational work, and since factional polemics continued unabatedly, Lenin's heirs were not prepared to face a most confusing, totally contradictory double vision: On the one hand, there was the well-known vulgar materialist *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, and on the other, endless references to dialectics — the dialectic of history, the dialectic of revolution, the dialectic of self-determination covering both the national question and world revolution, the dialectic relationship of theory, to the self-activity of the masses as well as to itself.

Both Lenin's followers and opponents knew nothing and cared less about any great philosophic divide set up by Hegel's Absolute Method. The dialectic of the development of the "pure movement of thought" and of reality battling its way through contradictions provided so total a unity of subject and object that Lenin, the revolutionary materialist, could copy the philosophical concept of "subjective" from Hegel, the idealist, and lay special stress on the last sentence: "Each new stage of exteriorization (that is, of further determination) is also an interiorization, and greater extension is also higher intensity. The richest consequently is also the most concrete and subjective. . ."²¹

How could anyone imagine that the "philosophic neutralist" who, for a long period, had even accepted "Machists" into the Bolshevik ranks just so long as they accepted "Bolshevik discipline", could come under the spell of what he called "the dialectic proper", and that this dialectic proper was to become Lenin's underlying philosophy? For his part, Lenin was faced with the fact that he had to fight not only against betrayers and Mensheviks as well as non-Bolshevik internationalists, such as Rosa Luxemburg and "the Dutch"²², but also his own small Bolshevik group abroad. And he had to do so over a subject upon which the Bolsheviks had previously agreed in principle — the self-determination of nations.

Suddenly, Lenin found himself completely alone, and the word "dialectics" kept springing up everywhere. It was no longer limited to "the transformation into opposites", such as the transformation of competition into monopoly, or of a section of labor into a "labor aristocracy". It could also explain "opportunism"

20. *Vol. 38*, p. 359, 363.

21. *Science of Logic*, Vol. II, p. 483; *Vol. 38*, p. 231.

* Pannekoek, Gorter, Roland-Host.

and the collapse of the Second International. Dialectics was extended to revolution itself and the theoretical "enemy" was none other than the Bolshevik theoretician, Bukharin. The stark new truth was that Lenin called the Bolshevik opposition to the self-determination of nations nothing short of "imperialist economism". For our purposes, the importance of this debate is not so much in Bukharin's thesis as in his methodology, to which Lenin referred again and again, all the way to his deathbed. Lenin's ire was aroused by Bukharin's statement that "The imperialist epoch is an epoch of the absorption of small states, [that] therefore [it was] impossible to struggle against the enslavement of nations, [except] of course, [in a struggle for socialism, and that] therefore, any deviation from that road, any advancement of 'partial' tasks of the 'liberation of nations' within the realm of capitalist civilization was *utopian* and reactionary."²²

It was the "therefore's" that Lenin most intensely opposed. He insisted that the horrors of the imperialist war had led to "the suppression of human reasoning". How could we otherwise explain the Bolsheviks' "curious errors in logic"? According to Lenin, the very transformation into its opposite of free competitive capitalist economy into monopoly imperialism and the suppression of national democracy would produce resistance. It became clear to him that the impulse to self-movement came precisely out of these contradictions, and became the dialectics of revolution. To think otherwise, Lenin insisted, was to treat the masses as the object instead of the subject of history. If the "therefore's" do not emerge out of living contradictions instead of dead substance, then socialism is nothing but an "ought". The truth is that both the proletariat and the new revolutionary forces — the national minorities — were arising and struggling for the self-determination of nations. As the Irish Easter Rebellion proved, the self-determination of nations was not just a "principle" but a reality. There had never been a "pure" revolution, and national revolts were valid both in themselves and as "baccilli" for proletarian revolutions.

Dialectics, the "algebra of revolution",²³ has been on many great adventures since Hegel formulated it on the basis of the activity of the French masses,²⁴ and it has revolutionized metaphysics. What in Hegel had been a

22. I will be quoting, Gankin and Fisher, eds., *The Bolsheviks and the World War* because it quotes Bukharin's theses (see esp. pp. 219-223). But the latest and one of the finest books on the battle against national chauvinism during the period after the Bolsheviks gained power is to be found in Moshe Lewin's *Lenin's Last Struggle*; the most comprehensive on the National Question both before and after Bolshevism triumphed is *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism*, by Richard Pipes. See also my chapter on Stalin in *Marxism and Freedom*.

23. Alexander Herzen, *Selected Philosophical Works*, p. 521.

24. Jarring as this may sound to the professional philosopher accustomed to tracing the dialectic from the Greeks through Kant to Hegel in the realm of thought alone, the truth of the above statement has, in recent times, been carefully traced in the works of Jean Hyppolite (*Genève et Structure de la Phénoménologie de Hegel* and *Studies on Marx and Hegel*), as well as the actual documents of Hegel's early development, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*.

revolution in philosophy, became, with Marx, a philosophy of revolution, a totally new theory of liberation — the proletarian revolutions of 1848 culminating in the Paris Commune of 1871. Lenin's rediscovery of dialectics, of self-activity, of Subject versus Substance at the very moment of the collapse of the Second International, disclosed at one and the same time, the appearance of counter-revolution from within the marxist movements, and the new forces of revolution in the national movements. Moreover, these new forces were present not only in Europe, but throughout the world as well. What Lenin's economic study of imperialism revealed was that capitalism had gorged itself on more than one half billion people in Africa and Asia. This was to become a totally new theoretic departure after the Bolshevik conquest of power, expressed as the Thesis on the National and Colonial Question presented to the Third International in 1920.²⁵ Even while the holocaust was most intense and Lenin stood alone, he refused to retreat an inch to abstract internationalism; The outbreak of the Easter Rebellion in 1916, while proletarians were still slaughtering each other, showed the correctness of his position on the self-determination of nations.

In 1914-1915, Lenin turned to the study of Hegel, the 'bourgeois idealist philosopher'. Whatever the reason, it certainly was not in order to discover the driving forces of revolution. Yet, Hegelian dialectics was more useful in making sense out of the action of the masses taking fate into their own hands in Ireland in 1916 than the debates on the National Question with his Bolshevik colleague.²⁶

In 1917, the opposition to national self-determination should have ended. In fact, it only took on a new form. This time Bukharin contended that it was no longer possible to admit the right of self-determination since Russia was now a workers' state, whereas nationalism meant bourgeois and proletariat together, and 'therefore', a step backward. In his admission that in some cases he would be for it, he listed the "Hottentots, the Bushmen, and the Indians". To which Lenin replied: "Hearing this enumeration I thought, how is it that Comrade Bukharin had forgotten a small trifle, the Bashkirs? There are no Bushmen in Russia, nor have I heard that the Hottentots have laid claim to an autonomous republic, but we have Bashkirs, Kirghiz... We cannot deny it to a single one of the peoples living within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire."²⁷

Bukharin, for whom all the questions, from the "self-determination of nations" to state-capitalism, were "theoretical questions", may not have suffered

from Russian chauvinism. But he created the theoretical premises for Stalin, who did turn the wheels of history straight back to capitalism. At the last moment — too late as it turned out — Lenin broke completely with Stalin, and in his debates with Bukharin he refused to do away with that single word, "dialectics": dialectics of the relationship of theory to practice, dialectics as the relationship of subject and object, dialectic as the movement from abstract to concrete. In place of the mechanistic bifurcation of subject and object, Lenin joined the two in a new concrete universal: *man, "for man."*

Abstract revolutionism was the methodological enemy. Bukharin's theory of state-capitalism, the obverse side of his theory of economic development under a workers' state, is one of continuous development, a straight line leading from "unorganized" competitive capitalism to "organized" state-capitalism. On a world scale, it remains "anarchic" and subject to the "blind laws of the world market". Anarchy is "supplemented" by antagonistic classes". Only the proletariat, by seizing political power, can extend "organized production" to the whole world. The fact that Bukharin believed in social revolution did not seem to stop him from dealing with labor, *not as subject, but as object.*

Despite the fact that Bukharin played no small role in the 1917 Revolution, his concept of revolution is so abstract that all human activity is subsumed under it. Thus, he was inescapably driven to preclude self-movement, which was precisely the reason why labor remained an object. As an object, the highest attribute Bukharin could think of assigning to labor was its becoming an "aggregate". People were referred to as "human machines."²⁸

That a revolutionary intellectual had become so entrapped in the fundamental alienation of philosophers in a class society, identifying men with things, was a phenomenon that laid heavy on Lenin's mind as he wrote his *Will*. So completely did Lenin disagree with Bukharin's *method* of presentation that even when he agreed with the specific points, he felt it necessary to criticize them. Thus, there was certainly no disagreement about the major achievement of the Russian Revolution — the destruction of bourgeois productive relations. But when Bukharin tried to make an abstraction of it by trying to subsume productive relations under "technical relations", it became obvious to Lenin that Bukharin simply failed to understand the dialectic. Thus, when he quoted Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*, to the effect that "once the destruction of capitalist production relations is really given; and once the theoretical impossibility of their restoration is proven..." Lenin replied with: "Impossibility" is demonstrable only practically. The author does not pose *dialectically* the relationship of theory to practice."

25. See part III, "Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Liberation", where I develop this thesis for the African revolutions in our age, in *Marxism and Freedom/Philosophy and Revolution*.

26. "I do not attribute significance to the desire to hold on to the word, 'Bolshevism'," Lenin wrote in his reply to Bukharin, "for I know some 'old Bolsheviks' from whom may God preserve me." *The Bolsheviks and the World War*, Gankin and Fisher, eds, p. 235.

27. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 342. The whole of Part IV, "The Party Program (1918-1919)", is very valuable for the theoretical points in dispute, and have the advantage of being cast more in a theoretical frame than the factional bite of the Trade Union Dispute which can be found in Vol. IX.

28. *Draft CI Program*, included in *Ataka*, p. 121, Collection of Theoretical Articles by N. Bukharin (May, 1924, Moscow). Unfortunately, neither Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*, nor Lenin's *Commentary* on it is available in English. I have used the Russian text. However, other works by N. Bukharin are available in English. These are: *The World Economy and Imperialism, Historical Materialism*, and individual essays which are included in other works. Cf. *The Bolsheviks and the World War*.

The most difficult relationship to work out once state power has been gained is precisely this relationship of theory to practice, for it was not only on the National Question but especially in relation to the working masses that a gulf opened between the Bolsheviks in power and the working people. And the party was surely to degenerate: "to think that we shall not be thrown back is utopian." What Lenin feared most was the sudden "passion for bossing" to take command. Unless they practice the new concrete universal, "to a man", they would be doomed: "Every citizen to a man must act as a judge and participate in the government of the country. And what is important to us is to enlist all the toilers to a man in the government of the state. That is a tremendously difficult task. But socialism cannot be introduced by a minority, a party."²⁹

This is not the place to analyze the actual objective transformation of the workers' state into its opposite, a state-capitalist society,³⁰ or to Stalin's usurpation of power. Of all of Stalin's "theoretical" revisions, what is relevant to our subject is his perverse concept of *partiinost* (partyness) in philosophy, which he and his heirs attributed to Lenin. Fortunately, there exists a most comprehensive and scholarly work on the relationship of Soviet philosophy to science which explodes the Communist and the Western ideologist myth of "partyness in philosophy" in Lenin: "In order to achieve this interpretation one must also disregard the fact that the original sources, including *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* itself, never suggest what (Bertram) Wolfe and the Soviet scholars attribute to Lenin. The sources show that he had a political aim in writing the book, but it was not to join the philosophical and political issues that Russian Marxists were arguing about; it was to separate them."³¹

There is not a trace of partyness in the *Philosophic Notebooks*, not even the old concept of "the party of idealism" or the "party of materialism." What we are concerned with is not the monstrous myth of partyness in philosophy, but rather, the duality of the philosophical heritage. Far from publicly proclaiming his philosophic repudiation of Plekhanov, or his break with his own philosophic past, Lenin advised Soviet youth to study "everything Plekhanov wrote on Philosophy . . ." and he reprinted his own *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. We need not bother here with simplistic explanation of these actions such as the one offered by an ex-Old Bolshevik when he wrote: "And yet Lenin did not have the courage to say openly that he had thrown out, as useless, some very substantial parts of his philosophy of 1908."³² The reason for the "privacy" of his *Philosophical Notebooks* is at once more simple and more complex, and has

29. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 324.

30. I devoted a good part of *Marxism and Freedom* to the study of Russian state-capitalism.

31. *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, 1917-1932*, by David Joravsky, p. 34. The two sections most relevant to our study are "Lenin and the Partyness of Philosophy", pp. 24-44, and "The Cultural Revolution and Marxist Philosophers", pp. 76-89.

32. *Encounters with Lenin*, by Nikolay Valentinov, p. 256.

nothing to do with an alleged lack of courage. The tragedy lies elsewhere, deep in the recesses of time, revolution, and counter-revolution. Too short were the years between 1914 and 1917, and between 1917 and 1923. Too great was the November Revolution in Russia, and too many the beheaded and missed revolutions elsewhere; too overwhelming the concrete problems of this great historic event, objective and subjective, including what Lenin called cultural backwardness. The pull, therefore, was for "stage-ifying". When to study what? First one read Plekhanov, then *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, then . . . Lenin himself continued his hegelian reading even at the height of the famine.³³ Lenin was so moved by Ilyin's book on Hegel that, though the author was both religious and an enemy of the Soviet state, Lenin intervened to get him out of jail.

The duality in Lenin's philosophical heritage is unmistakable. But how can that excuse the failure to grapple with the *Philosophic Notebooks* on the ground that they are mere 'jottings', 'had never been intended for publication', and, therefore, it would be no more than 'idle speculation' to conclude that Lenin wished to follow one road rather than another? In any case, no one can explain away the clear public tasks he set for the editors of the newly-established philosophic organ, *Pod Znamenem Marxizma* (*Under the Banner of Marxism*), to work out a "solid philosophical ground" which he spelled out as: (1) "The systematic study of Hegelian dialectic from a materialist standpoint, i.e., the dialectic which Marx applied practically in his *Capital* and in his historical and political works."³⁴ (2) "Taking as our basis Marx's method of applying the

33. The Lenin Institute has records for the year 1920, when Lenin asked for the Russian translations of Hegel's *Science of Logic* and *Phenomenology of Mind*, as well as works by Labriola, and Ilyin's *The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and of Man*. Deborin, in his "Introduction" to the *Notebooks* when they were finally published in 1929 (*Leninski Sbornik*, IX) and Adoratsky in his preface to the 1933 edition (*Leninski Sbornik*, XII) both refer to the Lenin Institute records, and then, without telling anything about the intrigues in the delay in publication, proceed with platitudinous praise leading to nothing concrete; they are of "great significance", "interesting", contain "leading indications regarding the direction in which further materialist dialectic should be worked out".

In this respect, Ilyin's works are more revealing because one sees why Hegel's analysis of the concrete influenced Lenin so much: "The first and fundamental thing that one who wishes to adequately understand and master philosophic teaching of Hegel must do is to explain to oneself his relation to the concrete empirical world . . . the term, 'concrete' comes from the Latin 'concretere'. 'Crescere' means 'to grow'; 'concretere', to coalesce, to arise through growth. Accordingly, Hegel's concrete means first of all the growing together . . . The concrete empiric is something in the order of being (*Sein*), something real (*Realität*), actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), something existing (*Existenz*), something *Dasein*. In its totality, this reality forms a world, a whole world of things (*Dinge, Sachen*), existences (*Existenzen*), realities - the 'objective' world a realm of 'objectivity'. This real, objective world is also the concrete world, but only the empiric-concrete."

34. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, p.77.

Hegelian dialectic materialistically conceived, we can and should treat his dialectic from all sides, print excerpts from Hegel's principal works . . .³⁵ (3) "The group of editors and contributors of the magazine *Under the Banner of Marxism* should, in my opinion, be a kind of 'Society of Materialist Friends of Hegelian Dialectics'."³⁶

This was the year 1922, the year of his most intense intellectual activity, which stretched into the first months of 1923 and the last of his great battles against the top leadership. Most of all, it was against Stalin's brutal, rude, and disloyal acts, mainly against the Georgians, that is to say, once again out the National Question - "scratch a Communist and you will find a Great Russian chauvinist." Not accidentally, Bukharin held the same position on the National Question.

As Lenin lay writhing in agony - not just physical agony, but agony over the early bureaucratization of the workers' state and its tendency to "move backwards to capitalism" - he took the measure of his co-leaders in his *Will*. What is relevant here is what he says of Bukharin: "Bukharin is not only the most valuable and biggest theoretician of the party, but also may legitimately be considered the favorite of the whole party; but his theoretical views can only with the very greatest doubt be regarded as fully Marxian, for there is something scholastic in him. (He has never learned, and I think never fully understood, the dialectic.)"³⁷

Clearly, "understanding the dialectic" had become the *pons sini* for Lenin. It was not an abstraction when it was used to describe the chief theoretician of the party. Clearly, "not understanding the dialectic" had become crucial. As the head of the first workers' state in history, witnessing the emergence of bureaucratization and national chauvinism, of both Bolshevism and non-Bolshevism being so permeated with an administrative mentality as to call for the statification of the trade unions, and the chief theoretician's views being non-dialectic and therefore not "fully Marxian", Lenin saw all these traits developing and creating problems because, in their totality, they tended to stifle rather than release the creative powers of the masses. Nothing short of sensing this danger would have prompted Lenin to take such sharp measure of those who led the greatest proletarian revolution in history.

35. Consider the greatly-overrated young French Communist philosopher, Louis Althusser, in our epoch proclaiming that "one phantom is more especially crucial than any other today; the shade of Hegel. To drive this phantom back into the night . . ." And read especially how studiously he writes of Lenin as if he never had written anything beyond *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. (*Lenin and Philosophy*.) In Part II of *Marxism and Freedom*, (in "Alternatives") I develop the consequences of not building on the foundations left by Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*.

36. *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, p. 78.

37. Since Khrushchev's De-Stalinization speech in 1956, Lenin's *Will* has finally been published in Russia and appears also in the latest edition (the fifth) of his *Collected Works*. However, I have the text which was first published by Trotsky, and I am therefore quoting from *The Suppressed Testament of Lenin*.

It is the nature of truth, said Hegel, to force its way up when its "time has come". He should have added, "even if only in a murky form". But then he could not have known how much a state-capitalist age can excrete to make it impossible to see the truth even when it surfaces. No conspiracy was needed between "East" and "West" to keep Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* out of the reach of the masses - and then work to make it "beyond" their understanding. It is in the nature of the administrative mentality of our state-capitalist automated age to consider Hegelian philosophy, at one and the same time, the private preserve of those "in the know" and to let it remain "gibberish" to the uninitiated. And although in the "East" they bow before the founder of their state, and in the "West" sneer at Lenin's non-professional status as a philosopher, both poles find it convenient to keep apart what history has joined together - Hegel and Marx, Hegel and Lenin. In this 200th anniversary year of Hegel and the 100th anniversary year of Lenin, it is time to begin listening to the voices from below who are finding out the truth for themselves by attempting to practice the dialectic both of thought and of revolution.

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CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

Philosophy as a Drama: An approach to Plato's Symposium, by Henry G. Wolz

Towards a Theory of Intentionality, by Aron Gurwitsch

Originative Thinking in the Later Philosophy of Heidegger, by S.L. Bartky

The Community in Marx's Philosophy, by Kenneth A. Mogil

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Positivism, Realism, and Existentialism in Mach's Influence on

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FASCICOLO SPECIALE

1. IL RUOLO DEGLI INTELLETTUALI E LA TEORIA.

FORTINI - Per le origini di « Quaderni Rossi » e
« Quaderni Piacentini »

TOMASSINI - Intellettuali, tra ideologia e scienza
operaia

MERIGGI - Fine dell'intellettuale organico. Note su
Gramsci

2. FILOSOFIA E POLITICA

ROVATTI - Il caso Althusser

VIGORELLI - Della Volpe e l'autocritica dello sto-
ricismo

ASCENSO - Le tesi filosofiche di Mao

MATERIALI

DUNAYEVSKAYA - L'ambivalenza filosofica di Lenin

SCHLEIFSTEIN, NEGT, SCHMIDT - Dibattito sul
la filosofia stalinista

4524

PRAXIS

FILOZOFSKI DVOMJESEČNIK

πραξις

KORČULANSKA LJETNA ŠKOLA

HEGEL I NASE VRIJEME — pišu R. Suppek, E. Bloch, M. Kangrga, E. Fink, D. Grlić, D. Jähnig, V. Simeunović, K. H. Volkman-Schluck, E. Paci, M. Đurić, E. Grassi, K. H. Wolff, B. Despot, M. Darnjanović, J. P. Arnason, F. Muhić, J. Schumacher, N. Mišćević, E. Barroni, T. Hribar, P. Apostol, Z. Vidojević, G. Zajčaranović, ▲ LENJINIZAM — NOVA LJEVICA — pišu E. Mandel, M. Marković, M. Rubel, R. Dunayevskaya, V. Cvjetičanin, J. R. Nunez Tenorio, B. Jakšić, D. Stošić, H. Hona, Z. D. Denić, J. Gojković, Z. Falout ▲ DODATAK — Sadržaj VII godišta

HEGEL I NAŠE VRIJEME
LENJINIZAM - NOVA LJEVICA

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HEGEL I NAŠE VRIJEME
REFERATI

Rudi Supek / Aktualnost Hegelove i Lenjinove misli	699
Ernst Bloch / Povijesno posredovanje i Novum u Hegela	709
Milan Kangiga / Hegel — metafizika ili revolucija?	721
Eugen Fink / Hegelova problemska formula »Iskušavanje realnosti spoznavanja« (u »Fenomenologiji duha«)	733
Danko Grlić / Revolucija i teror	741
Dieter Jähnig / Odstranjenje povijesti pomoću »obrazova- nja« i »prisjećanja«	753
Vojin Simcunović / Aktualnost Hegelove »Fenomenologije duha«	763
Karl Heinz Volkman-Schluck / Hegelov pojam apsolutne negacije i njeno značenje za nas	773
Enzo Paci / Fenomenologija i povijest u Hegelovu mišljenju	779
Mihailo Đurić / Praksa, rad i delanje	789
Ernesto Grassi / Hegelovo nerazumijevanje latinske i hu- manističke tradicije	795

SAOPĆENJA

Kurt H. Wolff / O lukavstvu uma u naše vrijeme	813
Branko Despot / Hegel u ozbiljenju filozofije	823
Milan Đamjanović / Rad i jezik u Hegelovom sistemu i kod Marxa	833
Johan P. Arnason / Opća povijest i emancipacija	839
Fuad Muhić / Hegel i staljinizam	847
Joachim Schumacher / Prinjedbe uz pretpovijest pojma Ništa u Hegela i njegovo ukidanje u Marxa i Ernsta Blocha	853
Nenad Mišević / Povijest i svrha	863

4526

Ernesto Barroni / Vrijeme, ne-vrijeme i Ništa	867
Tine Hribar / Povijest i prisjećanje	871
Pavel Apostol / 96 stavova o snirti i slobodi u Hegelovoj filozofiji i u našem vremenu	875
Zoran Vidojević / Savremeni odnos radničke klase i komu- nističke organizacije u svjetlu Hegelove ideje iden- tитета	885
Gligorije Zajčaranović / Dijalektika rada i otuđenja u He- gela	897

LENJINIZAM — NOVA LJEVICA
REFERATI

Ernst Mandel / Aktualnost lenjinističke teorije organizacije u svjetlu historijskog iskustva	909
Mihailo Marković / Nova leвица i kulturna revolucija	927
Maximilien Rubel / Historijska funkcija nove buržoazije	945

SAOPCENJA

Raya Dunayevskaya / Lenjin i Hegel	957
Veljko Cvjetičanin / Nekoliko teza o Lenjinu u suvremenim uvjetima socijalizma	973
J. R. Nunez Tenorio / Postoji li lenjinistička filozofija?	983
Božidar Jakšić / Građansko društvo i građanska nauka	991
Dušan Stošić / Hegel i otuđena ljudska zajednica	999
Hairedin Hoxha / Lenjin o nacionalnom pitanju	1005
Zivojin D. Denić / Lenjinovo definisanje pojma društvene klase	1015
Jasminka Gojković / Raskršću američkog SDS-a	1023
Zeljko Falaut / Lenjin i pitanje književnosti	1037

DODATAK

Sadržaj VII godišta (1970)	1043
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SAOPCENJA

LENJIN I HEGEL

Raya Dumayevskaya

Detroit

Istovremenost izbijanja prvog svjetskog rata i izglasavanja ratnih kredita kajzerovoj vladi od strane njemačkih socijaldemokrata lišila je Lenjina filozofskog temelja na kome je stajao i za koji je mislio da je nepokolebljiv. Četvrti avgust 1914. razbio je na paramparčad koncepte koji su bili zajednički svim tendencijama u marksističkom pokretu. Do 4. avgusta svi su se slagali da materijalni uslovi predstavljaju temelj za stvaranje novog društvenog poretka, da će što su napredniji materijalni uslovi, proletarijat biti to bolje pripremljen za preuzimanje vlasti od buržoazije, i da će što je veća masovna partija i što je zrelije njeno marksističko vodstvo, to sigurniji biti put do revolucije. Materijalno je bilo ono realno i objašnjenje za ono idealno. Vjerovati u bilo šta drugo bio je filozofski idealizam, buržoaska apologetika, klerikalni opskurantizam.

Poslije 4. avgusta, međutim, marksistički revolucionari morali su se suočiti s jednom zaprepašujućom novom realnošću — marksistički vođe (priznati kao takvi od čitave internacionale, uključujući i boljševike) na čelu najveće masovne partije, »Velike njemačke socijalne demokracije«, u tehnički najnaprednijoj zemlji, naredili su radnicima ne da razore svjetski kapitalizam, već da ubijaju jedan drugog preko nacionalnih granica radi »obrane domovine«. Suočen s tim slomom svih svojih ranijih konceptija o odnosu između materijalnog i idealnog, subjektivnog i objektivnog, općeg i posebnog, Lenjin je bio prisiljen da potraži jednu novu filozofiju. Da Hegel nije nikad postojao, Lenjin bi morao da izmisli hegelovsku dijalektiku da bi ponovno uspostavio svoj vlastiti um.

Lenjin se nije ni jednog trenutka pokolebao u svom revolucionarnom suprotstavljanju imperijalističkom ratu. Naprotiv. Dok su drugi revolucionarni protivnici rata bili tako zaprepašćeni slomom Druge internacionale da su smatrali za potrebno da

ograniče »borbu za mir« na ono što bi ujedinilo sve tendencije koje nisu izdale, Lenjin je bio nepokolebljiv u svom suprotstavljanju »nediferenciranom jedinstvu« i nije htio odustati od najekstremnije i najnedvosmislenije parole — poraz vlastite zemlje je manje zlo. Pretvorimo imperijalistički rat u građanski rat. Jednom riječi, po Lenjinovom mišljenju bilo je potrebno nešto drugo, a ne krpanje komadića onog što je nekad bilo. Neizbježno je bilo potpuno odvajanje od Druge i stvaranje Treće internacionale. Razorno iskustvo nije dovelo u pitanje njegovu boljševičku politiku i organizaciju. U pitanje je došao stari materijalizam kojem je nedostajao princip »pretvaranja u suprotnost«, »dijalektika sama«. To je ono što će Lenjin naglasiti u Hegelovoj dijalektici.

Dok se klanje širilo svijetom i dok su drugi protivnici rata lutali ne sređujući svoje vlastito mišljenje, Lenjin, odmah čim je stigao u Bern septembra 1914, uputio se u knjižnicu da se uhvati u koštac s Hegelovim djelima, napose s njegovom *Naukom logike*. Da jedan beskompromisni revolucionar kao Lenjin provodi svoje dane u bernskoj knjižnici, dok je čitav svijet, uključujući marksistički pokret, bio u raspadanju mora da je predstavljalo doista čudnu i nerazumljivu sliku. Ali, iz dana u dan, čitave godine¹ Lenjin se nije micao od Hegela. Upravo kao što je njegova politička parola, »Pretvaranje imperijalističkog rata u građanski rat« postala politički velika razdjelnica u marksizmu, tako je njegov *Izvod iz Hegelove Logike* postao filozofski temelj za sve ozbiljne spise koje je Lenjin napisao od tada pa do kraja života, od *Imperijalizma i Države i revolucije* uoči novembra 1917, kroz djelo stvarne revolucije, do njegovog *Testamenta*.

Lenjin je prišao Hegelu dosta oprezno, uvijek se podsjećajući da ga čita »materijalistički«, i kao materijalist je »upućivao boga i filozofski ološ koji brani boga na dubrište«. U isto vrijeme, međutim, on je uzbuđen spoznajom da je *hegelovska* dijalektika revolucionarna, da je Hegelova dijalektika, u stvari, prethodila Marxovoj »primjeni« u Komunističkom manifestu, »Tko će povjerovati«, rekao je Lenjin sam sebi, »da je to kretanje i »samokretanje«... suština 'hegelovštine', apstraktnog i apstruznog (teškog, besmislenog?) hegelijanstva??... Ideja univerzalnog kretanja i univerzalne promjene (1813, *Logika*) bila je dokučena prije njene primjene na život i društvo. Za društvo je proglašena

1) Fruza se pojavljuje u Lenjinovom pismu Aleksandri Kolontaj: »vi naglašavate 'da mi moramo istaći jednu parolu koja bi ujedinila sre'. Ja ću vam reći otvoreno da je stvar koje se u sadašnje vrijeme bojim najviše nediferencirano jedinstvo koje je, uvjeren sam, najopasnije i najštetnije za proletarijat. (Citirano u N. K. Krupskaja *Uspomene na Lenjina*, sv. II, p. 160.)

2) Stvarno je Lenjin proven dvije godine — 1914—1916. — u knjižnici. Ali on je Hegelove studije završio 1915. te je počeo s prikupljanjem materijala za pisanje *Imperijalizma*.

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jem mate-

ranije (1847)* nego što je dokazana u primjeni na čovjeka (1859).^{**}

Da bismo shvatili puno značenje koje je to čitanje Hegela imalo za Lenjina moramo držati na umu da Lenjin nije poznavao Marxove sada slavne *Ekonomsko-filozofske rukopise* iz 1844. O čemu Lenjin konkretno razmišlja dok čita Hegelovu *Nauku logike* jest Marxov *Kapital*, na jednoj strani, i njegova borba s «vulgarnim materijalizmom» na drugoj strani. Tako, čak kad polemizira s Hegelom i označava odjeljak Biće-za-sebe u učenju o biću kao «mutne vode», on nastavlja: «Misao o preobraćanju idealnog u realno je duboka. Veoma je važna za historiju. Ali i u lažnom životu čovjeka se vidi da tu ima mnogo istine. Protiv vulgarnog materijalizma, NB. Razlika između idealnog i materijalnog također nije apsolutna, nije neizmjerena».⁴

To otkriće povezanosti idealnog i materijalnog kod Hegela dovelo je Lenjina da uvidi da revolucionarni duh u dijalektici nije Marx dodao Hegelu, već da je on bio već u Hegelu. Proučavajući učenje o biću, Lenjin već naglašava i identičnost suprotnosti i pretvaranje u suprotnost: «Dijalektika je učenje o tome kako mogu biti i kako bivaju, kako postaju, *identičnim suprotnosti* — pod kojim uslovima one bivaju identične preobraćajući se jedna u drugu.»⁵ Kad je stigao do učenja o suštini, naglasak je prešao na samokretanje; prije i više svega. Raspravljajući o zakonu protivrječnosti, on ne insistira toliko na identičnosti suprotnosti koliko na *prijelazu* od jednog u drugo i na zaoštavanju protivrječnosti. S druge strane on pokazuje takvo duboko poznavanje *čjelokupnosti* da čak i kauzalitet postaje samo jedan «moment» cjeline: «Uzrok i posljedica, ergo, samo su momenti međusobne svjetske zavisnosti, veze (univerzalne), uzajamne *zalančenosti* događaja, samo su karike u lancu razvoja materije.» «NB. Svestranost i sveobuhvatni karakter svjetske veze, koju uzročnost izražava samo jednostrano, fragmentarno i nepotpuno.»⁶

U završnom odjeljku o suštini Lenjin je prekinuo s onim materijalizmom i empirizmom koji je suviše naglašavao nauku i kategoriju uzročnosti objašnjavajući odnos duha i materije, pri

*Misli se na *Komunistički manifest*.

**Misli se na *Porijeklo vrsta*.

3) Ja sam prva prevela na engleski Lenjinov *Izvod (Konspekt)*. Ovdje ću se služiti, uglavnom tim prijevodom. Dodatak D. knjizi: Rayn Dunajevskaya, *Marxism and Freedom*, New York, 1958. Ovdje će se citirati kao M&F.) Ipak, navoditi ću i stranice u moskovskom prijevodu (V. I. Lenin: *Collected Works*, Vol. 38). [Prevedilac ovog članka navodi citate iz te knjige prema izdanju V. I. Lenjin, *Izabrana djela*, Kultura, Beograd, tom 15 i svudu navodi stranice tog toma.] M&F, p. 331; Vol. 38, p. 141; Kult. pp. 120—130.

4) M & F, p. 338; Vol. 38, p. 176; Kult. p. 102.

5) M & F, p. 332; Vol. 38, p. 143; Kult. p. 97.

6) M & F, p. 335; Vol. 38, p. 150; Kult. pp. 148—149.

čemu su «čelični ekonomski zakoni» i «suština» bili stalno suprotstavljani «pojavi» kao da se u tome iscrpljuje cjelokupnost problema. Sad je Lenjinu upao u oči hegelovski pojam «momenta»: «Ovdje je bitno to da su i svijet pojava i svijet po sebi momenti čovjekove spoznaje prirode, stupnjevi, promjene ili produbljanja (spoznaje).»⁷

Lenjin je isto tako stalno vodio debatu sam sa sobom. Svaki put kad je bio nemilosrdan prema Hegelovom «misticizmu i praznoj pedanteriji», Lenjin je u isti čas naglašavao dubinu dijalektike, «genijalnu ideju». Kad je Lenjin stigao do Učenja o pojmu — a tu je on prekinuo sa svojom vlastitom filozofskom prošlošću — on je naglašavao da su elementi materijalizma prisutni kod Hegela: «Kad se Hegel trudi — ponekad čak napreže i upinje da svrhovitu djelatnost čovjeka podvede pod kategorije logike govoreći da je ta djelatnost 'zaključak', da subjekt (čovjek) igra ulogu tog i tog 'člana' u logičkoj 'figuri' 'zaključka' itd., onda to nije samo natezanje, nije samo igra. Tu je veoma duboka sadržina, čisto materijalistička.»

Treba obrnuti: praktična djelatnost čovjeka morala je milijardu puta dovoditi ljudsku svijest do ponavljanja raznih logičkih figura tako da bi te figure mogle dobiti značenje aksioma. Ovo nota bene.⁸

Lenjinov Izvod iz Hegelove *Nauke logike* otkriva jedan duh u akciji, koji polemizira sam sa sobom kao i s Hegelom, savjetujući sebi da «se vrati» Hegelu, «da razradi» ideje, historiju, nauku, Marxov *Kapital*, aktualne teorije, istražujući suprotnosti i prelazeći na Pojam koji on prevodi kao «NB. Sloboda = subjektivnost ('ili') cilj, svijest, težnja». Upravo zato Lenjinov Izvod postaje uzbudljiv doživljaj i za njegove čitaoce. Tako, Lenjin tek što je označio prvi odjeljak Pojma kao «Ove dijelove knjige trebalo bi nazvati: najbolje sredstvo za dobivanje glavo-bolje»⁹ a već naglašava slijedeće: «NB. analiza zaključka kod Hegela (E—B—A, Eins; Besonderes; Allgemeines B—E—A itd.) podsjeća na Marxovo ugledanje na Hegela u I glavi.»¹⁰ Iza toga, on ističe usku povezanost između Marxova *Kapitala* i Hegelove *Logike*: «Ako Marx nije ostavio *Logiku* (s velikim početnim slovom), on je ostavio *logiku* 'Kapitala', a to bi trebalo naročito is-

7) M & F, p. 333; Vol. 38, p. 153; Kult., p. 142.

8) M & F, p. 313; Vol. 38, p. 190; Kult., p. 180.

9) M & F, p. 336; Vol. 38, p. 164; Kult., p. 153.

* Ova rečenica je u Lenjinovom tekstu na engleskom.

10) M & F, p. 339; Vol. 38, p. 178; Kult., p. 167. Glava I odnosi se naravno na *Kapital*. To je ta ista glava za koju je Staljin, 1943, kad je odlučio da prekine s Marxovom analizom zakona vrijednosti kao karakterističnom za kapitalizam i samo kapitalizam, naredio sovjetskim teoretičarima da je napuste (Vidi prijevod iz *Pod zastavom marksizma* i moj komentar uz to, te debate oko toga u *The American Economic Review*, sept. 1944 do sept. 1945.) Od tada je to ostalo trajnim predmetom spora kad god se raspravljalo o otuđenju i o fetišizmu roba.

koristiti nauku i treba tr Hegela u prvom odvoji, aforizm kantovs tičkog »(Počet hjumov (3) »N prva gli lova. Lo stoljeća

Epi odgovo dva aft ma itd' empiri naravn aforizm njin o nije mi raditi c sudno, ska de protiv filozof: sve zac dovršit

Upi matrai te kor Marxo nje da dovrši njegov do no tembr pisao nam c dila v svako: Grana

11),
12)
13)

koristiti u datom pitanju. U 'Kapitalu' je primijenjena na jednu nauku logika, dijalektika i teorija spoznaje materijalizma (ne treba tri riječi, to je jedno te isto), koji je uzeo sve vrijedno kod Hegela i ovo vrijedno pomjerio naprijed.¹¹ Ali dok je još uvijek u prvom odjeljku učenja o pojmu, Lenjin osjeća potrebu da se odvoji, najprije od Plehanova a zatim čak i od sama sebe. Tri aforizma slijede brzo jedan iza drugog: (1) »Plehanov kritizira kantovstvo (i agnosticizam uopće) više s vulgarno-materijalističkog gledišta nego s dijalektičko-materijalističkog...«. (2) »(Početkom 20. vijeka) marksisti su kritizirali kantovce i hjumovce više fojrbahovski (i bihnerovski) nego hegelovski.« (3) »Ne može se potpuno shvatiti Marxov 'Kapital' i posebno prva glava u njemu ako se ne prostudira i ne shvati cijela Hegelova Logika. Dakle, nitko od marksista nije shvatio Marxa pola stoljeća kasnije!«¹²

Epigoni koji niječu da je tu Lenjin mislio na sebe moraju odgovoriti što je Lenjin mislio s dodatnom napomenom uz prva dva aforizma, »o pitanju kritike modernog kantovstva, mahizma itd?« Cije je djelo više nego njegov vlastiti *Materijalizam i empiriokriticizam*, upereno tako na »mahizam? Bitno pitanje, naravno, nije navođenje imena, a pogotovo ne sadržavaju li aforizmi pretjerivanja. Tako, nitko nije pisao dublje nego Lenjin o Marxovom *Kapitalu*, napose o svesku II. i Lenjin sigurno nije mislio da svi koji žele izučavati *Kapital* moraju najprije pročitati oba sveska *Nauke logike*. Ono što je sad bilo za njega presudno, ono što je on nazirao pred sobom, bila je velika filozofska debata, iznenada upravljena ne toliko protiv Hegela koliko protiv Plehanova i čak osjećanje protivurječnosti u sebi, u svojoj filozofskoj prošlosti. Dokaz je u činjenici da on sad nije bio posve zadovoljan čak ni sa svojim esejom *Karl Marx*, koji je upravo dovršio za *Enciklopediju Granat*.

Upozoravajući na činjenicu da je Lenjinov esej počeo s razmatranjem filozofskog materijalizma i dijalektike, Krupska je to komentirala ovako: »to nije bio običan način da se prikažu Marxova učenja.«¹³ To je sigurno istina. Ali Krupska ne spominje da to odstupanje od ranije analize, u vrijeme kad je Lenjin dovršio cijelu *Logiku*, nije bilo dosta konkretno da zadovolji njegova nova shvaćanja dijalektike. Esaj je bio pisan od jula do novembra 1914. Lenjin je počeo da izučava *Logiku* u septembru i dovršio je 17. decembra 1914. Ovo i datum kad je on pisao jedno novo pismo Granatu — 14. januara 1915. — pomaže nam da odredimo tačno kada je Lenjin povjerovao da se dogodila velika revolucija u njegovim filozofskim koncepcijama. U svakom slučaju, s karakterističnom preciznošću Lenjin je pisao Granatu: »Usput, ne bi li još bilo vremena za neke ispravke u

11) M & F, p. 353; Vol. 38, p. 349; Kult., p. 311.

12) M & F, p. 349; Vol. 38, p. 180; Kult. p. 169-170.

13) *Memories of Lenin*, p. 155.

odjeljku o dijalektici? ... Upravo s tim pitanjem dijalektike bavio sam se posljednjih mjesec i po dana pa mislim da bih mogao ponešto dodati ako bi bilo vremena ...»

Proces raskida sa starim koncepcijama nije nigdje jasniji nego u njegovu komentaru o odnosu između teorije i prakse. Tako, čak kada Lenjin govori o praksi, on naglašava da Hegel ovdje raspravlja o praksi »u teoriji spoznaje«. Na što i sam Lenjin počinje da tvrdi: »Alias: čovjekova svijest ne samo odražava objektivni svijet već ga i stvara.«¹⁴

Koliko smo se udaljili od »fotokopijske« teorije koja prožima *Materijalizam i empiriokriticizam!* A ipak to nije zbog toga što bi Lenjin zaboravio svoje materijalističke korijene ili svoje revolucionarne poglede na *klasiu* svijest. Prije je stvar u tome da je Lenjin dobio od Hegela jedno posve novo shvaćanje *jedinstva* materijalizma i idealizma. *To će shvaćanje prožimati Lenjinove radove poslije 1915. o filozofiji, politici, ekonomiji i organizaciji.* I kako je bio uvijek usmjeren na konkretno, Lenjin ovako interpretira Hegelovu primjedbenu o »nestvarnosti svijeta«: »Svijet ne zadovoljava čovjeka i čovjek odlučuje da ga svojom djelatnošću promijeni.«

Lenjin nije odlebdio u apstrakcije kada je na novi način ocijenio idealizam. Samo je apsolutna ideja izgubila zlokobni prizvuk. Naravno to se ne objašnjava nekim preobražajem Lenjina od revolucionarnog materijalista u »buržoaskog idealista«, niti njegovim prihvaćanjem Hegelovog pojma boga ili nekog »svjetskog duha«. Naprotiv, Lenjin sad vidi da, iako se Hegel bavi samo s misaonim entitetima, kretanje »čiste misli« ne samo »odražava« realnost, već je i dijalektika jednog i drugog procesa a postulat je »apsolutna negativnost.«¹⁵ Lenjinovo duboko shvaćanje druge negacije koju Hegel zove »prekretnicom«¹⁶ vodi Lenjina da stavi u pitanje Hegelovo skretanje u brojčanu igru — da li je dijalektika »triplicitet« ili »kvadruplicitet« s rezultatom da Hegel razlikuje »jednostavno« i »apsolutno«. Lenjin komentira: »Razlika mi nije jasna, nije li apsolutna (negacija) jednaka konkretnijoj?«¹⁷ Lenjin sad prevodi i apsolutno i relativno kao 'momente' razvitka.

Kad je Lenjin završio s čitanjem *Nauke logike* njega više nije smetao ni prijelaz apsolutne ideje »u prirodu«. Naprotiv, on tvrdi da Hegel time »pruža ruku materijalizmu«. On piše oduševljeno: »Značajno je da cijela glava o »apsolutnoj ideji« ne govori gotovo ni riječi o bogu (jedva jedanput slučajno se promakao »božanski pojam«) i osim toga — ovo NB — gotovo ne sadrži

specifični *idea* metod... I je lu ima najm: no', ali činjen

Lenjin nij čitajući *Logi* Ali tu je došl diti. Plehanov 1.000 strana + osnovna p nje, njene n nil!«¹⁸

Ne samo liku šta znač djela*, on ča njegovih pro ovu stranu d dovoljno pa: mjera, na p Isto kod En

Lenjin to skog idealizr jet koji rast: moćne, obje

Za razlik ma, uglavne novog člank nije bio pr: smatran za koju nam je nije pripre ostale »priv stavio sa s organizacio tavljalne nes pripravni z: protivurječi vulgarno-m: drugoj stra: revolucije,

18) Vol. 3:

19) M & F

Mi nema

Sveske o imj

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kratkoj broš

20) Vol. 3

14) M & F, p. 347; Vol. 36, p. 212; Kult., p. 202.

15) Ibid., p. 200.

16) Hegel, *Science of Logic*, sv. II, p. 477.

17) Kult. p. 219.

specifični idealizam, već ima za glavni svoj predmet *dijalektički metod*... I još jedno: u tom *najidealističijem* Hegelovom djelu ima najmanje idealizma, najviše materijalizma. 'Protivrječno', ali činjenica!''

Lenjin nije osjetio oduševljenje slično onom koje je doživio čitajući *Logiku* kad je prešao na Hegelovu *Historiju filozofije*. Ali tu je došlo do konačnog prekida s Plehanovom. «NB. Razraditi. Plehanov je napisao o filozofiji (dijalektici) vjerojatno oko 1.000 strana (Beljtov + protiv Bogdanova + protiv kantovca + osnovna pitanja itd., itd.) Od njih o velikoj Logici, povodom nje, njene misli (tj. 'upravo dijalektika kao filozofska nauka') nil!!»''

Ne samo to. Poduzimajući da sumira u organiziranijem obliku šta znači dijalektika, sada kad je prešao glavna Hegelova djela'', on čak kritizira Engelsa: «Razdvajanje jednog i spoznaja njegovih protivrječnih dijelova... jest bit... dijalektike... Na ovu stranu dijalektike obično se (npr. kod Plehanova) ne obraća dovoljno pažnje: identitet suprotnosti uzima se kao zbroj *primjera*, 'na primjer — zrno', 'na primjer, pivobitni komunizam!' Isto kod Engelsa. Ali to je 'radi popularnosti'...»''

Lenjin toliko cijeni dijalektiku da je njegova ocjena filozofskog idealizma kao «sterilnog cvijeta», proširena u «sterilan cvijet koji raste na živom drvetu žive, plodne, istinite, moćne, svemoćne, objektivne, apsolutne ljudske spoznaje».

Za razliku od komentara koje je Lenjin pisao o tuđim djelima, uglavnom Hegelovim posljednji citat je iz jedinog Lenjinovog članka specifično «O dijalektici». Premda ni ovaj članak nije bio pripremljen za objavljivanje, on bar nije nikad bio smatran za puke «bilješke». To je posljednja filozofska riječ koju nam je ostavio iz odličnog perioda 1914—1915. Kako Lenjin nije pripremao svoje *Filozofske sveske* za objavljivanje one su ostale «privatne»; kako se činilo da je Lenjin jednostavno nastavio sa svojim ekonomskim studijama, političkim tezama organizacionim radom; a kako su se frakcijske polemike nastavljale nesmanjenom žestinom, Lenjinovi nasljednici nisu bili pripravnici za zahtjev da se suoče s krajnje zbrkanom, potpuno protivrječnom dvostrukom vizijom: na jednoj strani poznati vulgarno-materijalistički *Materijalizam i empiriokritičizam* a na drugoj strani, beskrajna pozivanja na dijalektiku — dijalektiku revolucije, dijalektiku samoopredjeljenja u odnosu na nacional-

18) Vol. 35, p. 234; Kult., p. 224.

19) M & F, p. 354; Vol. 38, p. 277; Kult., p. 266.

Mi nemamo Lenjinove sveske o Hegelovoj Fenomenologiji duha, ali *Sveske o Imperijalizmu* pokazuju da ju je on čitao dok je pripremao brošuru o *Imperijalizmu*. (*Sveske* su opsežno djelo na 738 strana, nasuprot kratkoj brošuri koja je bila stvarno objavljena).

20) Vol. 38, p. 359, p. 363; Kult., p. 351.

no pitanje i na svjetsku revoluciju, dijalektički odnos teorije prema samodjelatnosti masa kao i prema samoj sebi.

Ni Lenjinovi pristalice ni njegovi politički protivnici nisu znali ništa, o velikom filozofskom sporu izazvanom Hegelovom apsolutnom metodom. Dijalektika razvitka «čistog kretanja misli» i realnosti koja sebi krči put kroz protivurječnosti, pružala je takvo potpuno jedinstvo objekta i subjekta, da je revolucionarni materijalist Lenjin mogao da ispiše filozofski pojam »subjektivnog« od idealiste Hegela posebno naglašavajući posljednju rečenicu: »Ali proširenje zahtijeva i produbljenje ('ulaženje u sebe'), a veće proširenje je isto tako viši intenzitet. Najbogatije je stoga najkonkretnije i najsubjektivnije, a ono...« Ovo NB. Najbogatije je najkonkretnije i najsubjektivnije...»

Tko bi mogao i pomisliti da će »filozofski neutralac« koji je, dugo vremena, prihvaćao u boljševike čak i »mahiste«, sve dok su prihvaćali »boljševičku disciplinu«, sad dospjeti pod čarobnu moć ovog što je on nazvao »pravom dijalektikom«, da će to, *upravo to*, postati Lenjinova osnovna filozofija? Sa svoje strane Lenjin je bio suočen s činjenicom da se on morao boriti ne samo protiv izdajnika i menjševika kao i neboljševičkih internacionalista kao što su Rosa Luxemburg i »Nizozemci«, već i protiv svoje vlastite malene boljševičke grupe izvan zemlje. Tako se morao boriti i za jednu stvar s kojom su se boljševici ranije slagali »u principu« — samoopredjeljenje nacija.

Iznemada se Lenjin našao posve sam i riječ »dijalektika« nicala je posvuda. Ona više nije bila ograničena na »promjene u suprotno« kao npr. pretvaranje konkurencije u monopol ili jedne sekcije rada u »aristokraciju rada«. Ova je mogla objasniti i »oportunizam« i slom druge internacionale. Sada je dijalektika primijenjena i na samu revoluciju. A »neprijatelj« — *teoretski neprijatelj* nije bio nitko drugi nego *boljševički* teoretičar, Buharin. Boljševičku opoziciju prema samoopredjeljenju naroda Lenjin je nazvao ništa manje nego »imperijalističkim ekonomizmom«. Za naše svrhe važnost te debate počiva ne toliko na Buharinovoj tezi koliko na njegovoj metodologiji, koju je Lenjin spominjao sve do svoje smrti. Lenjinov gnjev bio je izazvan Buharinovom tvrdnjom da je »imperijalistička epoha — epoha asimilacije malih država«, pa je »zato nemoguća borba protiv porobljavanja naroda«, izuzev »naravno« u borbi za socijalizam tako da je »zato svako skretanje s tog puta, svako postavljanje 'parcijalnih' zadataka za 'oslobođenje naroda' unutar vladavine kapitalističke civilizacije *utopijsko* i reakcionarno.«²¹

21) *Science of Logic*, sv. II, p. 483; Vol. 38, p. 231; Kult., p. 221.

* Panekock, Gorter, Roland-Host.

22) Ju citiram knjigu Gankin and Fisher, *The Bolsheviks and the World War*, jer ona sadrži Buharinove leze (vidi napose pp. 219—223). Ali posljednja i jedna od najboljih knjiga o borbi protiv nacionalnog šovinizma u periodu poslije preuzimanja vlasti od strane boljševika nalazi se u djelu Moshe Lewin: *Lenin's Last Struggle*; a najopsežnija rasprava o nacional-

Lenjin se i da su strahot skog mišljenj zablude u log suprotnost sl imperijalizam otpor; da imj slovlja, postarao je Lenjin subjektom his nosti nego iz da«. Istina je snage — naci ljenje naroda je to pokazal sta« revolucij »bacili« za pr

Dijalektik: like avanture talim i djela la bilo revoh revolucije, p revolucije iz Lenjinovo p jekta nasupr cionale otkril mom marksi nalnim pokr samo u Evro o imperijaliz lijarde ljudi boljševičkog nom i koloni nali.« Čak i on je ipak o ternacionaliz

nom pitanju i Pipesa *The Fo* Vidi i moju gl

23) Alexanc

24) Ma kol!

da izvodi dija području misli obrazložena u *néologie de l*

mentima o He 25) Vidi di u mem djelu ričke revolucij

Lenjin se najviše protivio onem »zato«. On je uporno tvrdio da su strahote imperijalističkog rata dovele do »gušenja ljudskog mišljenja«; kako drugačije objasniti boljševičke »čudne zablude u logici«? Lenjin je tvrdio da će upravo pretvaranje u suprotnost slobodnog kapitalizma konkurencije u monopolski imperijalizam i njegovo gušenje narodne demokracije izazvati otpor; da impuls za samopokret proizlazi upravo iz tih protuslovlja, postaje dijalektika revolucije. Misli drugačije, insistirao je Lenjin, znači postupati s masama kao s objektom a ne subjektom historije. Ako »zato« ne proizlazi iz živih protivrječnosti nego iz mrtve stvari, tada je socijalizam samo jedno »treba da«. Istina je da ne samo proletarijat već i nove revolucionarne snage — nacionalne manjine — ustaju i bore se za samoopredjeljenje naroda koje je ne samo »princip« već i stvarnost, kao što je to pokazala uskršnja pobuna Iraca. Nikad nije postojala »čista« revolucija i nacionalni revolti vrijeđe i sami po sebi i kao »bacili« za proleterke revolucije.

Dijalektika, ta »algebra revolucije«²³ proživjela je mnoge velike avanture otkako ju je Hegel formulirao inspiriran među ostalim i djelatnošću francuskih masa.²⁴ Ono što je kod Hegela bilo revolucija u filozofiji postalo je, kod Marxa, filozofija revolucije, potpuno nova teorija oslobođenja — proleterke revolucije iz 1848. kulminirale su u Pariskoj komuni iz 1871. Lenjinovo ponovno otkriće dijalektike, samodjelatnosti, subjekta nasuprot supstanciji baš u trenutku sloma Druge internacionale otkrilo je, u isto vrijeme, pojavu kontrarevolucije u samom marksističkom pokretu i nove snage revolucije u nacionalnim pokretima. Staviše, te nove snage bile su prisutne ne samo u Evropi već širom svijeta. Lenjinova ekonomska studija o imperijalizmu otkrila je da kapitalizam živi na znoju 1/2 milijarde ljudi u Africi i Aziji. Ovaj novi teorijski pristup *poslije* boljševičkog osvajanja vlasti izražen je u Tezama o nacionalnom i kolonijalnom pitanju predloženim 1920. Trećoj internacionali.²⁵ Čak i kad je opasnost bila najveća, i Lenjin stajao sam, on je ipak odbijao da i najmanje odstupi pred apstraktnim internacionalizmom. Izbijanje uskršnje pobune 1916, dok su se

nom pitanju i prije i poslije pobjede boljševizma jest knjiga Richarda Pipesa *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism*. Vidi i moju glavu o Staljinu u *Marxism and Freedom*.

23) Alexander Herzog, *Selected Philosophical Works*, p. 521.

24) Ma koliko to vrijedalo uho profesionalnom filozofu koji je navikao da izvodi dijalektiku od Grka preko Kanta do Hegela ostajući samo u području misli, istinitost gornje tvrdnje je, u novije vrijeme, brižljivo obrazložena u djellima Jeana Hyppolitea (*Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de Hegel* i *Studies sur Marx et Hegel*) kao i u najnovijim dokumentima o Hegelovu ranom razvitku *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*.

25) Vidi dio III, »Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Liberation« u mom djelu *Philosophy and Revolution* (gdje ja razvijam te teze za afričke revolucije u naše doba).

proleteri još međusobno ubijali, pokazalo je ispravnost njegova stava o samoopredjeljenju naroda.

Ma s kog se razloga Lenjin, 1914—1915, obratio Hegelu, »buržoaskom idealističkom filozofu«, to sigurno nije bilo zato da nade pokretačke snage revolucije. A ipak hegelovska dijalektika osvijetlila je više akcije masa koje uzimaju sudbinu u svoje ruke u Irskoj 1916. nego što su to uradile debate o nacionalnom pitanju s njegovim boljševičkim kolegama.²⁶ 1917. god. je trebala da donese kraj opoziciji prema nacionalnom samoopredjeljenju, ali, u stvari, ova je samo primila nov oblik. Ovaj put je Buharin tvrdio da se više ne može priznavati pravo na samoopredjeljenje jer je sad Rusija radnička država, dok nacionalizam znači buržoaziju i proletarijat zajedno i »zato« korak natrag. Dopusćajući da bi ga u »nekim slučajevima« podržao, on je naveo »Hotentote, Bušmane i Indijce«. Na to je Lenjin odgovorio: »Kad sam čuo to nabranje pomislio sam kako je to drug Buharin zaboravio jednu sitnicu, Baškire? U Rusiji nema Bušmana, niti sam čuo da su Hotentoti postavili zahtjev za autonomnu republiku, ali mi imamo Baškire, Kirgize... Mi ne možemo uskratiti to nijednom od naroda koji žive u granicama ranijeg Ruskog carstva.«²⁷

Buharin, za koga su sva pitanja od »samoopredjeljenja nacija« do državnog kapitalizma, bila »teoretska pitanja«, nije patio od ruskog sovinizma. Ali on je stvorio teoretske premise za Staljina, koji je okrenuo kotače historije ravno natrag u kapitalizam. U svjetskim razmjerima on ostaje »anarhičan«, podpostavilo — Lenjin je posve prekinuo sa Staljinom, a u svojim debatama s Buharinom insistirao je na dijalektici — dijalektici odnosa teorije prema praksi, dijalektici odnosa subjekta prema objektu, dijalektici kao kretanju od apstraktnog prema konkretnom. Umjesto mehaničke bifurkacije na subjekt i objekt, Lenjin ih je spojio u novo konkretno opće — u **COVJEKA**.

Apstraktna revolucionarnost bila je metodološki neprijatelj. Buharinova teorija o državnom kapitalizmu, obrnuta strana njegove teorije ekonomskog razvoja u radničkoj državi, govori o kontinuiranom razvoju, ravnoj liniji koja vodi od »neorganiziranog« kapitalizma konkurencije do »organiziranog« državnog kapitalizma. U svjetskim razmjerima on ostaje »anarhičan«, podložan »slijepim zakonima svjetskog tržišta«. Anarhiju »dopunjuju antagonističke klase«. Samo proletarijat, preuzimanje političke vlasti, može proširiti »organiziranu proizvodnju« na cijeli

26) »Ja ne pridajem značenje želji da se sačuva riječ 'boljševizam', pisao je Lenjin u svom odgovoru Buharinu. »Jer poznajem neke 'stare boljševike' od kojih neko me sačuva bog.« O. Gankin i H. Fisher eds. *The Bolsheviks and the World War*, p. 235.

27) Lenin, *Selected Works*, sv. VIII, p. 342. Citeli IV dio. »Program partije (1918—19)« vrlo je vrijedan za teoretska sporna pitanja i ima prednost da je formuliran više u teoretskom stilu nego frakcionaške zajedljivosti u diskusiji o s'ndikatima koje se mogu naći u sv. IX.

svijet. Cinje se da ga ne kao objekti

Upravo je Buharin cepti revolucija pada pod r ključni samjekt. Kao c da pripíše i minju kao

Da jedan tati žrtva o ficirajući lj vao Lenjina s Buharino tada, kada treba kritiz dostignuću odnosa. Ali ciju, da pre njinu je po dijalektiku. perioda: »K nosa ostvar tavljanja d dokazati sa teorije pren

Odnos k nu vlast jes mo u nacio kim masan radnih ljud nećemo biti plašio bila tvare novo osuđeni na lovati kao s no da uklju

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svijet. Činjenica što Buharin vjeruje u društvenu revoluciju čini se da ga ne sprečava da radništvu prilazi, ne kao subjektu već kao objektu.

Upravo obratno, bez obzira na 1917 — i usprkos činjenici da je Buharin igrao ne malu ulogu u toj revoluciji — njegov koncept revolucije je tako apstraktan da sva ljudska aktivnost potpada pod njega. Tako je on neizbježno doveden do toga da isključi samodjelatnost. Upravo zato radništvo ostaje njemu objekt. Kao objektu, najviši atribut koji Buharin može zamisliti da pripíše radništvu jest da ono postaje »agregat«. Ljudi se spominju kao »ljudske mašine«.

Da jedan revolucionarni intelektualac može u toj mjeri postati žrtva osnovnog otuđenja filozofa u klasnom društvu, identificirajući ljude sa stvarima, jest fenomen koji je jako zabrinjavao Lenjina kad je pisao svoj Testament. Lenjinovo neslaganje s Buharinovom metodom prikazivanja bilo je toliko da je čak i tada, kada se slagao s njim u pojedinim tačkama smatrao da ga treba kritizirati. Tako, sigurno nije bilo neslaganja o najvećem dostignuću ruske revolucije — rušenju buržoaskih proizvodnih odnosa. Ali kad je Buharin pokušao da od toga napravi apstrakciju, da proizvodne odnose podvede pod »tehničke odnose«, Lenjinu je postalo očividno da Buharin jednostavno nije razumio dijalektiku. Tako, kad citira Buharinovu *Ekonomiju prijelaznog perioda*: »Kad je jednom rušenje kapitalističkih proizvodnih odnosa ostvareno, i kad je teoretska nemogućnost njihovog uspostavljanja dokazana« Lenjin odvrća sa: »Nemogućnost se da dokazati samo praktički. Autor ne postavlja dijalektički odnos teorije prema praksi«.

Odnos koji je najteže razraditi kada čovjek posjeduje državnu vlast jest upravo taj odnos teorije prema praksi, jer se ne samo u nacionalnom pitanju već napose u odnosu prema radničkim masama otvorila provalija između boljševika na vlasti i radnih ljudi. I partiji prijeti sigurno degeneriranje: »Misao da nećemo biti bačeni natrag utopijska je«. Čega se Lenjin najviše plašio bila je nagla »strast za komandiranjem«. Ako oni ne ostvare novo konkretno opće »do posljednjeg čovjeka«, oni će biti osuđeni na propast: »Svaki građanin do posljednjeg mora djelovati kao sudac i sudjelovati u vladanju zemljom. Nama je važno da uključimo sve trudbenike do posljednjeg čovjeka u vladu«.

28) *Draft CI Program*, uključen u *Ataka*, p. 121. zbirka teoretskih članaka N. Buharina (maj 1924, Moskva, na ruskom). Na žalost ni Buharinova *Ekonomika prijelaznog perioda* ni Lenjinov *Komentar* te knjige nisu dostupni na engleskom. (Ja upotrebljavam ruske tekstove). Međutim, druga djela N. Buharina su pristupačna na engleskom. To su: *The World Economy and Imperialism. Historical materialism*, kao i pojedini eseji koji su uključeni u druga djela. Up. *The Bolsheviks and the World War* (izdali Gankin i Fisher, Stanford U. Press, 1940).

nje državom. To je užasno težak zadatak. Ali socijalizam ne može uvesti manjina, jedna partija.²⁹

Ova studija o Lenjinovom filozofskom naslijeđu nije mjesto za analizu današnjeg objektivnog pretvaranja radničke države u njenu suprotnost, državno-kapitalističko društvo,³⁰ a još manje za analizu Staljinove uzurpacije vlasti. Od svih Staljinovih »teoretskih« revizija, za naš predmet je relevantna Staljinova perverzna koncepcija o partijnosti u filozofiji, koju on i njegovi nasljednici pripisuju Lenjinu. Na sreću, postoji jedno opsežno i učeno djelo o odnosu sovjetske filozofije prema nauci koje odbacuje mit komunističkih i zapadnih ideologa o »partijnosti u filozofiji« kod Lenjina: »Da bi se došlo do tog tumačenja morala bi se zanemariti i činjenica da originalni izvori, uključujući sam *Materijalizam i empiriokriticizam* ne potvrđuju ono što Bertram Wolfe i sovjetski učenjaci pripisuju Lenjinu. Izvori pokazuju da je on imao jedan politički cilj kod pisanja knjige, ali taj nije bio da se povežu filozofska i politička pitanja o kojima su diskutirali ruski marksisti; cilj je bio da se ona odvoje.«³¹

Nema ni traga »partijnosti« u *Filozofskim sveskama* — čak se nigdje ne javlja ni stara misao o »partiji idealizma« ili »partiji materijalizma«. Ono što nas zanima nije monstruozi mit o »partijnosti« u filozofiji. Nas zanima *dualnost* filozofskog naslijeđa. Daleko od toga da bi javno proklamirao svoje filozofsko odbacivanje Plehanova, ili svoj prekid s vlastitom filozofskom prošalošću, Lenjin je savjetovao sovjetskoj omladini da izučava »sve što je Plehanov napisao o filozofiji...«, i on je iznova štampao svoj *Materijalizam i empiriokriticizam*. Mi ne trebamo da ulazimo u simplicističko tumačenje tog postupka koje je dao jedan bivši stari boljševik pišući: »A ipak Lenjin nije imao hrabrosti da kaže otvoreno da je izbacio, kao neupotrebljive, neke vrlo bitne dijelove svoje filozofije iz 1908.«³² Razlog za neobjavlivanje njegovih *Filozofskih sveski* je i jednostavniji i kompliciraniji i nema nikakve veze s navodnim nedostatkom hrabrosti. Tragedija leži drugdje, duboko u teškim okolnostima vremena, revoluciji i kontrarevoluciji. Suvviše kratke su bile godine između 1914. i 1917. te između 1917. i 1923. Prevelika je bila Oktobarska revolucija u Rusiji, a previše je bilo i propalih revolucija drugdje; preteški su bili konkretni problemi tog velikog historijskog događaja, objektivni i subjektivni, uključujući i ono što je Lenjin zvao kulturnom zaostalošću. Korisno je zato bilo da se uvede red kojim će se šta studirati. Citajmo najprije Ple-

29) Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 329.

30) Ja sam posvetila dobar dio djela *Marxism and Freedom* izučavanju ruskog državnog kapitalizma.

31) David Joravsky, *Sovjetski marksizam i prirodne znanosti, 1917—1932* p. 34. Dva odjeljka koja su najrelevantnija za našu studiju jesu »Lenjin i partijnost filozofije« (pp. 21—41) i »Kulturna revolucija i marksistički filozofi« (pp. 76—89).

32) Nikolaj Valentinov, *Susreti s Lenjinom*, p. 256.

hanova, za Lenjin nas je bio toliko autor bio rao da ga

Dvojst Ali to ne pod izgov bile nam: kulacija« drugi. U ne zadatak lozofskog filozofski poučavan tj. one di pitatu i t njajući s čenu Heg jalektiku nih Heg

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hanova, zatim *Materijalizam i empiriokriticizam*, zatim. . . sam Lenjin nastavio je da čita *Hegela* čak na vrhuncu gladi.³³ Lenjin je bio toliko uzbuđen Ijtinovom knjigom o Hegelu da je, iako je autor bio i religiozan i neprijatelj Sovjetske države, intervenirao da ga puste iz zatvora.

Dvojestvo u Lenjinovom filozofskom nasljeđu je nesumnjivo. Ali to ne može opravdati nezainteresiranost za Filozofske sveske pod izgovorom da su one puke »pribilješke«, koje »nisu nikad bile namijenjene objavljivanju« pa bi »zato« bila samo »puka spekulacija« zaključiti da je Lenjin želio da slijedi put a ne neki drugi. U svakom slučaju nitko ne može ignorirati jasne javne zadatke koje je on postavio pred urednike novoosnovanog filozofskog časopisa, *Pod zastavom marksizma* da razrade »solidan filozofski temelj«, koji je on stilizirao ovako: (1) »sistematsko peučavanje hegelovske dijalektike s materijalističkog stanovišta, tj. one dijalektike koju je Marx praktički primijenio u svom *Kapitalu* i u svojim historijskim i političkim djelima.«³⁴ (2) »Oslabljujući se na to, kako je Marx primjenjivao materijalistički skraćenu Hegelovu dijalektiku, mi možemo i moramo razrađivati tu dijalektiku sa svih strana, objavljivati u časopisu odlomke iz glavnih Hegelovih dijela. . . «³⁵ (3) »Grupa urednika i suradnika ča-

33) Institut Lenjina ima zabilješke iz 1920. god. kad je Lenjin tražio ruske prijevode Hegelove *Nauke logike* i *Fenomenologije duha* kao i Labriolina djela i Ijtinovu knjigu *Hegelova filozofija kao učenje o konkretnosti* boga i čovjeka. Deborin, u svom uvodu u *Sveske* kad su one najzad bile objavljene 1929. (*Lenjinski Sbornik IX*) i Adoratsky u svom predgovoru izdanju iz 1933. (*Lenjinski Sbornik XII*) obojica se pozivaju na zabilješke Lenjinovog instituta i zatim, ne govoreći ništa o intrigama oko odlaganja objavljivanja, nastavljaju s plitkim pohvalama koje ne vode ničemu konkretnom; one su od »velikog značenja«, »interesantne«, sadrže »uputstva o smjeru u kojem treba da se dalje razrađuje materijalistička dijalektika«.

U tom pogledu Ijtinovo djelo puno otkriva jer pomaže da se vidi zašto je Hegelova analiza konkretnog tako djelovala na Lenjina: »Prva i osnovna stvar koju oni žele da adekvatno shvate i ovladaju osnovnim učenjem Hegela moraju da urade jest da objasne sami sebi svoj odnos prema konkretnom empirijskom svijetu . . . izraz »konkretni« do'azi od latinskog »concretere«: »Crescere« znači »rasti«; »concretere« — srastati, nastajati kroz rast. Prema tome, Hegelovo »konkretno« znači prije svega zajednički rast . . . Konkretno iskustveno je nešto u redu bića (Sein), nešto realno (Realität), stvarnost (Wirklichkeit), postojanje (Existenz), Dasein. U svojoj cjelokupnosti, ta realnost sačinjava svijet, čitav svijet stvari (Dinge, Sachen), egzistencija (Existenzen), realnosti — »objektivan« svijet, carstvo »objektivnosti«. Taj realni, objektivni svijet je i »konkretni« svijet, ali samo empirijsko-konkretni.«

34) Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, p. 77.

35) Razmotri što u našoj epohi izjavljuje jako precljenjeni mladi francuski komunistički filozof, Louis Althusser: »Jedna avet je danas važnija nego jedna druga, Hegelova sjenka. Tu avet treba otjerati natrag u noć . . . « I vidi napose kako on piše o Lenjinu kao da ovaj nije nikad napisao ništa osim *Materijalizma i empiriokriticizma*. (Lenjin i filozofija). Vidi II dio moje knjige *Marxism and Freedom*, («Alternative»), gdje izlažem posljedice toga što se ne gradi na temeljima postavljenim u Lenjinovim *Filozofskim sveskama*.

sopisa *Pod zastavom marksizma* treba, po mom mišljenju da bude neke vrste 'Društvo materijalističkih prijatelja Hegelove dijalektike'.³⁶

To je bilo 1922. godine, godine njegove najintenzivnije intelektualne aktivnosti, koja se protegnula u prve mjesece 1923. i koja je bila posljednja od njegovih velikih bitaka protiv najužeg rukovodstva. To je bila prije svega bitka protiv Staljina za koga će, suviše kasno, tražiti da se makne, zbog njegovih brutalnih grubih i nelojalnih postupaka, napose protiv Gruzina, dakle, još jednom u nacionalnom pitanju.

Grčeći se u agoniji — ne samo u fizičkoj agoniji, već i u agoniji zbog rane birokratizacije radničke države i njene tendencije »da ide natrag u kapitalizam« — Lenjin je uzeo mjeru svojim suradnicima na vlasti u svom Testamentu.³⁷ Za naše svrhe je najvažnije ono što on kaže za Buharina: »Buharin je ne samo najdragocijeniji i najveći teoretičar partije, već se također s pravom smatra i ljubimcem čitave partije; ali njegovi teoretski pogledi mogu se samo uz najveću neodumicu smatrati posve marksističkim, jer u njemu ima nešto skolastičkog (on nikad nije studirao, i mislim da nije nikad potpuno shvatio dijalektiku).«

Očito je »shvaćanje dijalektike« postalo odlučan kriterij za Lenjina. To nije bila apstrakcija, kad je upotrebjeno za karakteriziranje glavnog teoretičara partije. Jasno je da je »nesхваćanje dijalektike« postalo presudno. Vođa prve radničke države u historiji upozorio je na pojave birokratizacije i nacionalnog šovinizma; na prožimanje boljševizma (i neboljševizma) administrativnim mentalitetom koji poziva na podržavanje sindikata, i na ne-dijalektičke i zato ne »posve marksističke« poglede glavnog teoretičara — a sve te crte nejednake težine sabrane su zajedno, jer, u svojoj cjelovitosti, sve one teže da ukoče a ne da oslobode kreativne snage masa. Upravo osjećanje te opasnosti potaklo je Lenjina da uzme tako strogu mjeru onima koji su vodili najveću proletersku revoluciju u historiji.

U prirodi je istine, kaže Hegel, da ona nalazi svoj put kad za to »dode vrijeme«. On bi bio morao dodati, »makar samo i u jednom maglovitom obliku«. Ali tada on nije mogao da zna koliko mnogo jedno državno-kapitalističko doba može da zagadi da bi učinilo nemogućim da se vidi istina čak kad je ona na površini. Nije bila potrebna urota između Istoka i Zapada, da bi se Lenjinove *Filozofske sveske* zadržale izvan domašaja masa — i da bi se zatim poradilo na tom da one ostanu 'iznad' njihovog shvaćanja. U prirodi je administrativnog mentaliteta našeg dr-

36) *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, p. 78.

37) Poslije Hruščevljevog govora o destaljinizaciji 1956. g., Lenjinov Testament najzad je objavljen u Rusiji i pojavljuje se i u posljednjem (5.) izdanju njegovih *Sabranih djela*. Međutim, ja imam tekst koji je prvi objavio Trockij i zato citiram iz *The Suppressed Testament of Lenin* (1935).

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Zavno-kapitalističkog automatiziranog vijeka da smatra Hegelovu filozofiju, istovremeno, privatnom rezervom za one »koji znaju« i »nerazumljivim brbljanjem« za neposvećene. I, premda se na Istoku klanjaju pred utemeljiteljem njihove države, a na Zapadu podsmjehuju Lenjinovom neprofesionalnom statusu kao filozofa, oba pola smatraju da je zgodno da drže odvojenim što je historija spojila -- Hegela i Marxa, Hegela i Lenjina. Prilikom 200-godišnjice Hegelova i 100-godišnjice Lenjinova rođenja krajnje je vrijeme da se počnu slušati glasovi odozdo koji pronalaze istinu za sebe pokušavajući da ostvare dijalektiku misli i revolucije.

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