

Very first attempt at outlining PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION (then
called SUBJECTIVITY OF SELF-LIBERATION) plus commentary by
Herbert Marcuse, Dec. 22, 1960, and reply by Raya Dunayevskaya,
Jan. 12, 1961.

(Part IV of New Book — Subjectivity of Self-Liberation.)

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"The Algebra of Revolution" (or) the Dialectic of Thought and Action."

Q. by Herzon

*The C.C. Rev. in 1953 at Cleveland
Hegelian Revolution, on the other hand,
on the other hand,*

The African Revolutions have opened a new page in the dialectic of thought as well as in world history. A reformulation of the relationship between theory and practice, ^{is imperative} if the ^{limited freedom} won ^{is to be} developed into the forward movement of humanity. Far from this being a need for intellectuals only, it ^{is} a need the masses themselves feel most deeply. It is they who demonstrated that there is a movement from practice to theory as well as from theory to practice. At the crossroads they found that without the unity of these movements a process of suction emanating from the two nuclear world powers would pull them away from their very reason for being, as they have shown in the Congo. To use an expression of Hegel's, who had the much easier job of unifying theory and practice in the restricted realm of thought, "each of these by itself is one-sided and contains the Idea itself only as the sought Beyond and unattained goal" (Science of Logic Vol. II, p. 466).

The decade of the 1950's ^{has} been marked by three kinds of revolutions:

(1) The African Revolution seeking freedom from Western imperialism and symbolic of the revolutions in all underdeveloped economies, stretching from Africa to Latin America, and confronted with the alternative of "the China Road" in Asia, or "the Russian Road" in the Middle East and Cuba. ^{Because all of these are inseparable from the color question, the Negro and the United States become the}

"Hick Rhodes, Hick salt". ^{where the black revolution is a result of the most present level of the white man's machine becomes a more subtle thing the more "scientifically" or "economically" it is}

- 2 - *... a decade of defeats, a long...*
... more of a...
... still from...
... Zech...

The East German and
The Hungarian Revolutions Seeking Freedom from Russian totalitarianism
and symbolic of not only East Europe, but of the revolution within Russia
itself, as witness the revolt in the forced labor camps at Vorkuta. Their slogan of
and Freedom epitomized the inseparability of economics,
politics and philosophy with its direct link to the humanism of Marxism, even
as the Russian counter-revolution traveled with both tanks and the ~~idea~~
ideology which claimed it was fighting an alleged "revisionism". That this
ground was accepted by the intellectuals of the West who should have known
was the true origin
that the humanism of Marxism, which the Communists were choosing to pervert
to suit their possession of power, ~~was~~ discloses a greater theoretic void
than did the brain-washing at Korea.

... the Second Industrial Revolution in the technologically advanced world
of America, Russia and Western Europe, ~~symbolic~~ *but, in the* of the "one-
worldedness" of the epoch following World War II, *was a change* It is true that automation
is "only" the logical conclusion of the first Industrial Revolution that gave
birth to our machine age at the end of the 18th Century. But once we stop
for a moment to consider and contrast all the revolutions produced in life
and in thought in the nearly two centuries since that revolution, we will
see at once that there is something so totally different in the present
technological revolution that ~~it~~ *they* can by no means be subsumed as "only
the logical conclusion" of the first Industrial Revolution. Thus, ~~that~~
that industrial revolution which produced both the American and French
revolutions of the 18th century revolutionized also English political economy and
German idealistic philosophy. On the foundation of class ical political economy and
classical German philosophy, but with an entirely new "subject" -- the pro-
letariat -- Marxism arose simultaneously with the 1848 Revolutions.

From that point on, we have no firm division between a demand of the workers' movement and Marxian thought. Thus the struggle for the shorter working day is recognized by Marx as a philosophy greater, because —"the first necessity of freedom" — more concrete than either the Declaration of Independence or the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

~~With the development of capitalism~~ *It is 15 years that the world has been in a state of transition from competition to monopoly*

to state-control, we had no less than two World Wars, the first resulting in the Russian Revolution, and the second in the colonial revolutions of today. *technologically*

By 1950, when automation was born, the most backward countries in Africa, not only take the center of the stage away from the Asian and Eastern ~~revolutions~~ *revolts*, but match in profundity the attitudes, both of the American workers to automation and the Hungarian workers to labor

under Communist totalitarianism. That is to say, they raised the question of the alienation of labor under capitalistic conditions of production in the manner in which Marx first raised it in purely philosophic terms. Those

who did not hear the voice of the American worker asking "What kind of labor should man perform?"; those who were willing to agree with the Russian ideologists that the Hungarian revolutionaries unfolding of the banner of

Marxist-Humanism ~~was~~ *are* "revisionists" are the very ones who ~~are dismissing~~ *are dismissing* the slogans emanating from the African revolutions as "backward". It may

be true that when you take the official slogans issued by the leadership, whether it be Nkrumah's "seek ye first the political kingdom" or Kaunda's *brief* "one man, one vote" or the ~~strong~~ but decisive "no" of Little Guénea to the ~~mighty~~ *mighty* remaining part of the mighty (but not almighty) French Empire, none

measure up to the challenge of the mass movements they lead, but neither are they vacuous as are the heads of the Western intellectuals. *Quite* the contrary. Not only have they shaken empires and re-shaped the map of the

and destroyed other empires

neo-colonialism

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world in a single decade, but they are the result of the previous decades of thinking about African freedom, which ~~xxxxxxxx~~ were of a more advanced nature than the national freedoms. For example, ^{African} in the quiet/1930's Azikiwe was writing of continent-wise, or at least West-African, freedom, rather than freedom of single countries. In the not-so-quiet 1940's, the methods of class struggle, whether large Nigeria or little Guinea, were like that of the ^{advanced} West European proletariat, that of general strikes and mass political demonstrations. By the 1950's as freedom was being won, we had the theoretical unfoldment of Marxian-Humanism, though heurized in by apologetics, of Leopold Senghor, and the concept of Universalism for both technological and ideological know-how of Sekou Toure. These are abstract whate compared to the subjectivity of self-liberation of the masses, they are nevertheless so great a leap forward that we can gain perspective only by both moving forward ^{listen to} to the voice of the rank and file and backward to the dialectic method which Hegel had elicited from the French Revolution as the "Absolute Method" of

Best

Thought and that Alexander Herzen rightly called "The algebra of revolution." *They have since then also strengthened, refined and cleared up the limits ourselves. To the new established between early 1950's up to mid 1960's*

Lack of confidence in those masses is the common root of all the objections to "abstruse, idealistic, mystical Hegelianism" from the Communists to the academic Marxists. ^{for Marxists} I have shown elsewhere (M&F) that the Communist attack on Hegelianism is in fact an attack on the Humanism of Marxism, ^{the} whole struggle with "revisionism" ever since near-~~Polish~~ revolution and the actual Hungarian Revolution is proof of this theoretically even as the actual capitalistic production relations within Russia is proof of it factually. ^{is it} ^{Make ch} ^{is it}

On the other hand, the academic Marxist would rather argue with other intellectuals

is it
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on "technicity" vs. "ontology" and thus appear to be against both
positivism and idealism while retaining the theoretic void resulting from
the combination of not listening to the now in the workers and consigning
Hegel's Absolute Idea to the "pre-technological" stage of capitalism which
allegedly compelled Hegel back to the ^{both Hegel and} old Aristotelian ontological tradition. ^{Staff}
Hegel's Absolutes have as ^{little} much to do with Platonian philosopher-kings as the
slavery which characterized Greek society has to do with the freedom established
in the French Revolution. ~~Which is the actual ground of revolution, Hegel's~~ Precisely because Hegel's
point of departure had this actual ground of revolution, his Absolutes enable
a serious Marxist to build on the inherent logic of the present-day revolutions,
their subjectivity and the "philosophers" subsumption so that the whole of
humanity can realize philosophy, that is to say the recognition that they have
a future to build.

The one element of truth that all these, (including what Marx called
"abstract materialism") detractors of Hegel express is the need to break with
bourgeois idealism, including that of Hegel. For, without Marx's discovery of
the materialist foundations of history, Hegelian dialectics remained imprisoned
in an idealism that was abstract enough to ^{serve as} ~~serve as~~ ^{for} ~~for~~ apology ~~in~~ the Prussian
state... Had Marx not broken with the Hegelian absolute's historic ^{of "prerogative"}
in the Prussian state, we wouldn't have discovered the algebraic formula of
revolution inherent in it. But Prussian ~~materialism~~ prison house for Hegelian
dialectics was no worse than S.D.'s and vulgar communism's ^{state's} perversions of the
Marxian dialectic, (with or without its fellow-travelers)

Where the mature Marx returned to Hegel, declaring in CAPITAL that Hegelian dialectics was "the source of all dialectic" (Vol. III, Capital, p.....), The present-day Marxists throw out Hegel and, with it Marxian dialectics. Because Marx recreated the dialectic on the ground of the class struggles of his day, he was enabled to split the absolute into two, thereby gaining a new dimension in his analysis of capitalism: (1) The absolute general law of capitalistic development and collapse -- the unemployed army -- and (2) "The new passions and forces" -- the elements of the new society embedded in the old -- that would achieve ^{the} new "negation of the negation", not through mere abolition of the old, nor through mere establishment of "true" private property of the artisan, but rather to the construction of a new society, whose reason for being was the "all-round^d individual", whose freedom was the "basis for the freedom for all".

But that ~~Marxist~~ only element of truth that all these detractors of Hegel (including those who expounded what Marx called "abstract materialism" *) ^{expressed} ~~expressed~~ the need to break/bourgeois idealism, ^{with} ~~was~~ transformed into the whole truth that quite shut out the voice of those new "forces and new passions", as Lenin found out when the ~~second~~ collapse and he had to return to the Hegelian dialectics. People who have ~~now~~ admitted the objective base for the collapse of the Second International failed to follow Lenin in his freeing the subjective idealism of Marxism from its narrow confines of "higher wages" and towards a self-movement in the dialectic of thought that would meet the objective of the dialectic of action.

* To be distinguished from "vulgar materialism" which Marx had used to separate himself from the communists of his day. The "abstract materialism" he attacks in CAPITAL (Vol. I, p. 11) is the bourgeois materialism that leaves out the "historic process" which resolves contradictions, that is to say, the actual class struggle.

Henceforward, Lenin's re-embrace of the dialectic did not stop short of the Absolute Idea itself. Thus, of the last chapter of Hegel's Science of Logic, Lenin wrote the following: "It is remarkable: in the whole chapter on the "Absolute Idea" there is almost not a single word on God (scarcely a "godly" "notion" slips out even accidentally) and, moreover — this EB — this chapter almost does not contain idealism specifically, but its main object is the dialectical method. The sum and summation, the last word and gist of the Logic of Hegel is the dialectic method — that is extremely remarkable. And another thing: in this most idealistic work of Hegel, there is most materialism. "Contradictory" but a fact!"

It's true, nevertheless, and there would be something amiss if it were otherwise, that Marx and Lenin solved the problem of their age, not ours. Lenin did, ~~however~~, indicate politically ~~explicitly~~ what should be the point of departure for our age as well, since it dealt with under-developed countries. I am referring to the three new elements in the thesis of the Second Congress of the ³⁹CP: These are: (1) the world role and relationship: a victorious proletarian revolution to the technologically undeveloped countries*; (2) the role of national liberation movements in the context of the imperialist world; and (3) the revolutionary role of the peasantry within the country fighting for liberation.

* In the advanced role that a "backward" group plays as impulse to world revolution, LT's theory of permanent revolution could also illuminate what I will call "the historical law of compensation". Unfortunately, LT failed to develop that aspect of his theory and proceeded to develop features that were proven wrong over and over again — the backwardness of the peasantry.

With that and the deeper revolutions of our own era, we must now turn to that most materialistic, idealistic chapter in Hegel's Science of Logic, "The Absolute Idea". ~~Up until we reach the~~ Up until we reach the ~~second~~ second negation, the Absolute Idea sounds almost familiar, or at least does not create insurmountable differences to academic Marxists. Although the "translation" from thought to act may sound a bit more brash than they would care to indulge in, nevertheless, "Self-determination of the Idea" and self-determination of nations are ~~definitely not~~ ^{as in} ~~separate~~ ^{in common} and the corollary to "Self-Determination" in which alone the Idea is ^{to} hear itself speak would ~~therefore naturally be that the people as well as the Idea must also be heard~~ ^{should be heard} and out of ~~it~~ ^{it} a new dialectic would ~~be created~~ ^{emerge}. Just as Marx saw that only with the transcendence of first negation — abolition of capitalism — would there arise "positive Humanism, so it is with "transcendence of the opposite between Notion and Reality". Yet, if they based themselves on the negative force, the proletariat, that is precisely where they should begin to "translate" easily Hegel's AI, and that ~~marks~~ ^{is} self-liberation. Thus "the word negative... (p.478) personal and free." That precisely is the proof, the only proof, that there has been a true transcendence of class society. Only where "the individual is the social entity", to borrow from Marx again, is society not counterposed to the individual as opposite. What, therefore, was only potential ("in itself") or implicit became actual ("for itself") or explicit. All division between inner and outer has come to an end and "Each new stage of exteriorization" (that is, of further determination) is also an interiorization, and greater extension is also higher intensity." (p.483) - A.I.)

absolute idealism

Since all proof is in the subject (man), absorbing all objectivity (a world outside of him, science) the move towards a new society cannot be a mere transition as if it were only "a perfected becoming". The key is instead "absolute liberation ... " (P.485) The greatest force for the future is this total release. Total release is not only release from exploitation, but the release of all his thoughts, freeing it from fetishism, and making man for the first time fully free. Man, having ^{absorbed} ~~incorporated~~ all of science in his own knowledge, the latter can no longer exist "as mere objectivity", but "arises to perfect its self-liberation" in the "new sphere", that is to say the new society. All the exaltation about freedom, ^{self-}liberation, release, absolute liberty is due to the leap from necessity ^{ty} into the realm of freedom or, as Marx put it, "positive humanism starting from itself."

What is the basis? The Human Self-Def. 4/11/11

Any other basis, any other basis, whether that be the state, as "collective property", or leaders as sort of "mental repositories", that would "represent" ~~the~~ humanity instead of be it, would once again signify outside tyranny.

"If that's all you mean, why can't you say it without leaning on the mystical, abstract, idealistic, ontological, confining language of Hegel?" Even if no superciliousness would be involved in the phrase "if that's all"... the question is a trap that would soon unfold its many and varied hues and open up endless ^{doors} ~~doors~~ leading nowhere. For to rob thought of its historic link is worse than not finding "the missing link" in man, since man at least is obviously here alive and kicking, and needs no other proof of his existence; whereas ~~thought~~ the continuity in thought needs inter-communication between the ages for its proof. And inter-communication between the ages is not quite as tangible as

when tapping out a Morse Code, and ~~you~~ you drop that historic link, then truly as Hegel long ago saw, we would be in for nothing but "error,^{and} gloom, opinion, striving, caprice and transitoriness" (p. 466). Or as Marx put it ...

Where there is continuity, the Logic of Thought and the Logic of Objective and Subjective Development are not as far apart as would appear on the surface. At the moment of the opening of the Machine Age and the self-activity of the French masses, as well as in the Hegelian dialectic, we confront the self-development, or negativity (~~whatsoever~~ both of alienated consciousness and oppressed man) that has as proof ^{hundred} two/years of mass struggle on the one hand and one thousand closely-worked out pages of categories on the other. Whether you consider the details of 197 ~~and~~ categories and sub-categories, or take them only in their ^{quintessential} ~~thorough~~ movements-of Being, Essence and Notion,

Handwritten scribbles

December 22, 1960

Dear RD:

I do not want the year let go without thanking you for your letters. I read them several times, but I am unable to discuss them in writing - there is just too much to say.

To me, the most important passages are those in which you stress the need for a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice, and the notion of the new Subject. This is indeed the key, and I fully agree with your statement that the solution lies in the link between the first and second negation. Perhaps I would say: in the self-transcendence of materialism, or in the technological Aufhebung of the reified technical apparatus.

But again, although I am trying hard, I cannot see why you need the Absolute Idea in order to say what you want to say. Surely you do not need it in order to demonstrate the Marxian content of self-determination, of the Subject, etc. The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the pre-technological stage. Certainly you can "translate" also this part of Hegel - but why translate if you can speak the original language??

Please don't mind my all too brief and inadequate reaction. I am still too much absorbed by these and other problems. But one day soon I hope there will be more.

With the very best wishes for the new year,

*Yours,
HM*

January 12, 1961

Dear H. M.:

I was glad to get your note of December 22nd and sorry you had no chance to develop your ideas at greater length. I am looking forward to seeing you and have you expand on this in person. The January lecture in Boston fell through, but I do have a series of three in Springfield the last week in February and the first week in March. Please let me know where I can reach you by phone and when I get there I'll make it my business to come up to Boston for at least a day, and while that won't be just the Absolute Idea, will make a little dent in it.

I should like to divide what I have to say into two parts, the first dealing with your question as to why I "need the Absolute Idea....why translate if you can speak the original language?" I disagree with you when you say that "The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the pre-technological stage." It was not the pre-technological stage that impelled Hegel to the Absolute Idea. Although he certainly lived in a pre-technological era, it was the fact that the French Revolution had not brought about the millennium--Reason, Freedom, Self-Liberation--which impelled him towards the Absolute Idea. As we know from his First System, he couldn't accept the fledgling proletariat as that absolute negativity which would reconstruct society, but he didn't just "give up" when he stopped short with that work. Insofar as he compromised with the Prussian State, he seemed to have accepted the State as the Absolute and the opportunist in him, no doubt, did. ~~Marx~~ Marx, in fact, was transformed from the petty bourgeois intellectual into the Marx we know by so profound a critique of the Philosophy of Right that the materialist conception of history was born. But, in all fairness to Hegel the philosopher, he just couldn't stop either at the State or even Religion or its Art (Form) of the Spirit, but proceeded on to the A. I. Why? Why when you consider that he had broken with all preceding philosophy and had no use whatsoever for the empty Absolute of Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi?

Let's approach this from another way--Marx' constant return to Hegel and constantly breaking from him. After Marx' Critique of the Philosophy of Right came the Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic. There where he breaks with the Absolute Idea--and he had to break from it or the discovery of the Materialist Conception of History would have been just Empirical, rather than dialectical, comprehensive, total and human--it is no longer just material foundation vs. super-structure; it is against the de-humanization of the Idea, and while he is at it, he rightly rejects the philosopher as the yardstick without forgetting, however, also to break with Feuerbach's anthropological materialism and vulgar communism. By that time he has barely mentioned Absolute Mind ~~when~~ the whole essay breaks off. With the 1848 Revolutions, Marx certainly has no further "use" for Hegel, and yet in 1859 he is back again. If you contrast the "copying" of Hegel in the form chosen for Critique of Political Economy and in the language of the Grundrisse with his recreation of the Dialectic from the life of the historic period, 1861-67, you see at once that this break from Hegel, the final transcendence of the Absolute reappears but is this time split into two--for capitalism

the general absolute law of capitalist accumulation, and for "the negation of the negation" the new passions and new forces. And, when he returns to Capital after the French Revolution (P.C.) and inserts changes of independent "scientific value" both in Chapter One on the Form of value and in the part on Accumulation its ultimate development in the concentration of Capital in the hands of a single corporation, he at the same time makes the "purely technical" change of eliminating Part Eight as a separate part, subordinating it to a chapter following capitalist accumulation. That is to say, the historical tendency, the whole movement from primitive accumulation through capitalistic to the expropriators being expropriated, now is not just a negation of the negation "in general" but the specifically self-developing subject. In its logical, philosophical, historical and individual development. You will remember that he makes some cracks at the "pre-technological" proletarian--the artisan--to the fully-developed individual who will have absorbed the technological achievements and we will get to this Subjectivity when we return to Hegel again.

Again, why the Absolute Idea, only this time tracing it through with Lenin's need. It would, of course, be nonsense to consider that without "a transformation into opposite" that he found in Hegel, Lenin wouldn't have known what to do about the betrayal of the Second International. That man never wavered for one second on what to do with or without Hegel. But the need to break with his own philosophy, that vulgar materialism to which his "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" gave the green light, the need for self-liberation in thought must have been overpowering for him to have felt so very much at home with that idealist Hegel, and indeed he learned that the freedom, the leap to freedom one gets from a generalization is a release from the empirical, the factual, the deed to where one truly reaches a new human dimension. Think of his writing, and all to himself at that, "man's cognition not only reflects the world, but creates it".

I will take only one single sentence from Hegel from the Absolute Idea chapter which so preoccupies my every waking moment, and "translate" it and you will see at once that though all translations are "correct" and surely historical, they are by far from exhausting what Hegel meant, and therefore, the constant compulsion to return to him. The sentence is, "The self-determination in which alone the idea is to hear itself speak". If any man understood self-determination in the Marxian sense of self-determination of nations, it certainly is Lenin. At least there you would have thought he would have no need for Hegel. Yet, if you contrast what self-determination of nations meant to Lenin pre-1914, when it was merely a principle, to what it meant post-1914 when life and theory and philosophy combined, it will be clear that two different worlds, not contradictory perhaps, but different, are at issue there. For, by 1916 when the Irish Revolution had occurred, self-determination wasn't something that was being given by principled Marxists, but something that the masses were getting and giving to Marxists, a new beginning for their revolution which had been betrayed, the bacillus that would bring onto the stage the proletariat in action once again; and after 1917, when it is the Bolsheviks who had to be doing the giving, and when a Bukharin was willing to take liberties with it, because now we were at a "higher" stage, how that revolutionary dialectic, Lenin, hit out, and in the Will he was to remind the world that Bukharin never truly understood the Dialectic. Isn't that something?

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for a reigning statesman to bother himself with on his dying bed? (Did you know that 1922 Lenin once again, ^{and} Hegel's Logic and with it that religious philosopher Ilyin, who, in his Commentary on the Logic was so illuminating on the question of concrete, that he insisted that Ilyin, the reactionary, be freed from jail?)

Now all that meant self-determination in 1914-24 and if I took only the political translation, how was I to have seen the humanism in the self-determination of the African Decade, 1950-60? "The self-determination in which alone the Idea is in to hear itself speak", and it speaks with a different voice now, and to be able to hear it there is a necessity not only for the practice of hearing today's masses, but the theory of Hegel's philosophy.

If I must further justify myself, I would say that, frankly during the 1940's, when I first became enamored with the Absolute Idea, it was just out of loyalty to Marx and Lenin; Hegel was still hardly more than gibberish, although by now the music of his language got to me even if I couldn't read the notes. But once the new technological period of Automation got to the miners and they started asking questions about what kind of labor, the return to the early Marx meant also the late Hegel. As I said, I do not agree with you that the Absolute Idea relates to a pre-technological stage. [So long as classes still exist, the dialectic will, and A.I. will forever show new facets.] What I do agree with is that once on the world scale, we have reached the ultimate in technological development, then the responses of the masses in the pre-technological under-developed economies are the spur to seeing the something new in the Absolute Idea. Be it backward Ireland in 1916, or backward Russia in 1917, or backward Africa in 1960, somehow that absolute negativity of Hegel comes into play.

One final word on why "translation" is no substitute for Hegel. It has to do with the limits of the age one lives with, which creates the concrete, but also exhausts it, and there is need for return to the abstract, the pre-universal which will become the new concrete. For example, for Lenin's age "transformation into opposite" was the category, while cognition, not only reflecting but creating, was left alone. To get to a new relationship of theory and practice, on a new foundation, there was a new concrete in life to create a new stage of philosophic cognition, a return to Hegel was necessary. Or at least I needed it.

Now to the second reason for this letter. I am glad you agree that a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice and the notion of a new Subject is the key. Without a new formulation, the second negation could be diverted, as it is by the Stalinists, to mean a new object--a technique, a sputnik, even an ICBM--instead of the self-developing subject. Of course, technology means the conditions for universality, but without a new subject one would automatically relapse to the state or "Balance" doing it. I do not know whether you happen to have read the latest issue of "Technology and Culture" (Winter 1961) where A. Zverovskine, the Editor-in-Chief of the Russian Review of the History of World Civilization is attempting to do the same thing with technology that Leontiev and Ostrovityanov did with value, that is to

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say, denuded of its class content. I am writing the Journal a letter, which I will enclose for you. The point I want to make here is that vulgar materialism, which rests upon a contemplative attitude toward reality, has, when it is in power, a very vindictive attitude to the self-developing subject. This it tries to hide, either by disregarding the subject or transforming the object Science into "Subject".

A new beginning must be made, needless to say not from the Object but the Subject. That, I hope, is what you mean by "the self-transcendence of materialism". Let me return once again to Hegel and that key-passage on the Second Negation and Subjectivity: (Page 477) "The negativity which has just been considered is the turning-point of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality, and that unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone."

To overcome the *Empiricism* of taking the given concrete to be the real one had to do more than just to contrast essence with appearance. Lenin, in his notebooks, is happy when he gets over the final section on Essence (Causality) because it permits him to break with inconsistent *Empiricism*, which includes the limitations of the scientific method, that is to say, the category of causality ~~cannot~~ explain the relationship between mind and matter. The categories by which we will gain knowledge of the objectively real, Lenin sees, are Freedom, Subjectivity, Notion. These, then, are the transition, or better yet transcendence, of objective idealism into materialism, as well as of vulgar materialism into true subjectivity, which has absorbed the object. And yet, it is precisely from the passage of Hegel which I just quoted that Lenin writes that this play over whether there is a triplicity or quadruplicity in the dialectic, is unclear to him.

(Incidentally, quadruplicity, instead of triplicity, had also a special, though a secondary interest for me because I used to be quite at a loss to understand why Hegel, in the Encyclopedia, lists three Attitudes to Objectivity, which excludes the Hegelian dialectic, since from Kant you go, not to Hegel, but backward to Jacobi. It would then mean that there is a retrogression in history and the famous triplicity of the dialectic must really become a quadruplicity before we finally reach the Freedom of the Absolute. But here, in the Science of Logic, we are dealing not so much with attitudes to objectivity as to self-development of self-activity. In any case, the real point to us here is the "immanent determination"--the "self-mediating" movement and activity" (Page 479).

The following and last pages are all on self-relation, "personal and free", free release, self-liberation, and it is all done via the three movements of Universal, Particular, and Individual, which has characterized the Science of Logic as a whole, as well as in each of its sections. Let me retrace my step once again to Page 479: "The beginning was the universal; the result is the individual, the concrete, and the subject"

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And yet, the dialectic method, "the method of truth", has here extended itself into a system. Unless one fully holds on to the fact that it is only because the result has been "deduced and demonstrated" (Page 480), he is like to give up at this point and say that's where Hegel must really be stood on his head because he is nothing more than an idealist, after all, who has yet one other system to present as the "Absolute", and his own at that. But, neither the "system" nor the foundation is any longer a mere assumption, and we have not stopped going to the objective for proof. It does not come out of the philosopher's head at all, although "each new stage of exteriorization (that is, of further determination) is also an interiorization, and greater extension is also higher intensity" (Page 487). No doubt, Lenin here again took heart and near the very next sentence, "the richest consequently is also the most concrete", referred us back to Capital. Indeed, it is at this point most likely when he wrote so frantically to the Great Encyclopedia, asking whether he couldn't after all still add something on the dialectic, even as he had concluded to himself what no Marxist in the past half-century had understood - Capital, which it is impossible to understand without the whole of the Logic. History, however, putting barriers even before a genius like Lenin, he remained happiest when he could pretend that the Logic ended with Hegel's extending a "hand to materialism," because as a totality the unity of Notion and Reality, after all assumed ~~something~~ the form of Natura, which Lenin "translated" as "practice".

I am certainly all for the practice of the 1917 Revolution. But even as Lenin had to live also with what "happens after", 1917-20, so we who have lived with what "happens after" for nearly four decades must find the self-developing subject, the new subject, and now, not only in a country and regarding a specific layer in the proletariat (as against our "aristocrats of labor" and for Marx' deeper and lower "strata" that have contigued the revolutionary impulse), but new that embraces the whole world. That is why it is impossible to look only at the advanced economy; that is why it is necessary to look also at the most backward, and that is why the world must be our country, i.e., the country of the self-developing subject. Back then to that final paragraph of the A. I., the insistence that we have not just reached a new transition, that this determination is "an absolute liberation", having no further immediate determination which is not equally posited and equally Notion. Consequently there is no transition in this freedom. The transition here, therefore, must rather be taken to mean that the Idea freely releases itself in absolute self-security and self-repose. By reason of this freedom the form of its determinateness also is utterly free--the externality of space and time which is absolutely for itself and without subjectivity."

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You see I am not afraid either of the "system" of Hegelian Philosophy, nor of the idealism of the Absolute Idea. The A. I. is the method of cognition for the epoch of the struggle for freedom, and philosophic cognition is not a system of philosophy, but the cognition of any object, and our "object" being labor. The unity of object and subject, theory and practice, and the transcendence of the first negation

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will not realize itself in our time.

One minor word on the question as to why Hegel continued after he "ended" with Nature, which is the way he ended the smaller Logic and which is the logical transition if you ~~transform~~ transform his Science of Logic into a system as he did in the Encyclopedia and move from Logic to Nature to Spirit or Mind. Marx, too, had three volumes to his Capital and likewise was going to end the first volume "logically", i. e. without entering this sphere of Accumulation. When he decided, however, to extend ~~the~~ the book to include the Notion, not as mere "summit" of all that preceded, but, to use a Hegelian phrase once again, "the pure Notion which forms a Notion of itself", he also included an anticipation of what Volumes II and III would contain. Volume II, as we know, is far from being Nature; on the contrary, it is that fantastic, pure, isolated "single society" ("socialism in one country," if you please, only Marx thought it was state capitalism). It was so pure and so logical and so unreal that it completely disorganized poor Rosa when she contrasted that phantasmagoria to the rapacious imperialism living off all those under-developed countries it conquered. And, finally, he tells us also that he will indeed come down from those heights to face the whole concrete mess of capitalism and rates of profit and speculation and cheating, but we would only lose ~~the~~ all knowledge of what society really is if we reversed the method. And even though Volume III stopped before he had a chance to develop the chapter on Classes, we know that it was not really the class but the full and free development of the individual that would signify a negation of a negation that was not merely destructive of the old, but constructive of the new. In this sense, and in this sense only, Hegel's last sentence about the Notion perfecting "its self-liberation in the philosophy of Spirit" must be translated, stood right-side up. And Hegel will certainly help us a lot in that book as he goes on to describe freedom, not as a "have", but as an "is".

I hope we will get a chance to discuss all these ideas and more when I see you either the last week of February or first week of March. Let me know which is more convenient for you.

Yours,

Raja