

Nov. 3, 1967

Dear Friends:

The attached chapter, Leon Trotsky as a Theoretician, is from Part III, entitled Alternatives, which will deal with Trotskyism on the one hand and, on the other hand, Existentialism. In a word, it gives various analyses by Marxists and non-Marxists who try to fill the void left by Lenin's death. If you will remember, Part II dealt with Hegel, Marx, and should have ended with Lenin. I left it out because, in essence you already have this in the Chapter in Marxism and Freedom, and again in the pamphlet State Capitalism and Marx's Humanism. What I am trying to say is that I am trying to do the new chapters first and leaving those that are done in one form or another for a different stage.

What I will next attempt to do will be Part I, the objective world situation. Meanwhile, each local will have to make copies of the chapter on Trotskyism and set a discussion date for it. Give yourselves approximately a month. Please type the discussion and send it to me. This does not mean that you have to wait for the discussion before you write to me your individual comments. If there is one thing I am not "absent" from, it is the book, and it is the one subject upon which I am always ready to communicate.

Yours,

RAYA

I should have also included a task -- a truly original piece of philosophic work -- which each of you can try to grapple with and thus "outguess" me. The chapter on Trotsky was to have ended with a section which compared what, politically, Lenin called Trotsky's administrative mentality, and what, it appears to me, Hegel would have called "intuitional idealism", or the third attitude to objectivity. You will find in THE LOGIC OF HEGEL (Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, or that which is "popularly" referred to as the "Smaller Logic" to distinguish it from the SCIENCE OF LOGIC or the "Larger Logic") that, besides the Introduction, it has 3 other chapters that do not appear in the larger work. These 3 (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) are devoted to various attitudes to objectivity, of which the 3rd "Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge" is the most difficult to comprehend and most relevant for us since intuition here is not just faith; it comes after we have already gone through both empiricism and the critical or Kantian philosophy which accept science and philosophy and yet, instead of the movement of thought having then go toward dialectics or Hegelianism, it has retrogressed to intuition, faith, separation of thought from object. The point is both: how could it have gone backwards? and how could he -- Kant and Jacobi, especially the latter -- accept both the one and the other? If Hegel himself concludes that he is "astonished" where Kant stopped after he had gone so far, you can guess it is no easy matter to work out. But it is a challenge. This book on the Logic is a great deal easier to read than the Science and so go ahead and test yourselves. You will get no "solution" from me, because, as I mentioned above, I go next to Part I of PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION.

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RAYA TO MIKE ON THE MARXIAN CATEGORIES

December 21, 1967

Dear Mike:

Hegel remains correct even where it is such a "personal" matter as getting you to write theoretically--the stimulation of opposition works every time. It is a shame, too; considering you display such great talent in posing the theoretical questions, you should definitely have written before. By talent I mean the fact that you could find your way out of the fog of Marc's absolute sectarianism (or, to put it philosophically, the "fixed particular"* which paralyzes you absolutely from concretizing the universal of socialism, which is exactly what happened not only to Trotsky but to Luxemburg, though for different reasons), and succinctly rephrase it into three questions. Since all three as well as the preliminary restatement of Marc's position revolve around what "Subject" means not only philosophically but politically and even action-wise, I will begin with that and relate it to your first question about "exactly why the contradiction in capitalism results from 'the preponderance of constant capital over variable.' What is the internal cause of capitalist crisis?"

You must realize that the very categories of constant and variable capital--Marx's originals--is related to Subject. By creating these terms as against those used by bourgeois economics--fixed and circulating capital--Marx was saying two things simultaneously: (1) It is not a technical (or what you, Mike, call "internal" because, I suppose, that is what Marc called them) problem; it is not a question as to whether capital is "fixed" like means of production, is the immovable property, or circulates like money. The real question is does it, can it cede value, surplus value, unpaid hours of congealed labor? (2) Well, neither means of production nor raw materials nor money for that matter creates value; whatever went into the production of either the means of production, raw materials, etc., etc., is transferred, transferred but not increased in value as, bit by bit, parts of its value is put into the new commodity. In a word, if a machine lasts 10 years, its wear and tear has to be accounted for in the products, commodities produced by it, but its own value has already been "fixed" by the process of production which produced it. So, in fact, all these are constant in value; they are constant, or, to speak "vulgarly" cost whatever labor was put into it. On the other hand, living labor (which appears in capitalist eyes as variable capital because it, too, belongs to the capitalist) that is the one and only commodity of all the millions that exchange daily that does undergo a CHANGE IN MAGNITUDE because you, the capitalist, extract many unpaid hours of labor, but it is not a thing; "it" is a living person, it produces all your values, including your surplus values.

Not only that. Since that little commodity, labor power, that you buy is buried under that great fetishism of commodities which "reifies" people, that is to say, transforms people into things, becomes both a "chemical" that dissolves all the many particular, specific kinds of concrete labor into but one mass of abstract labor, and yet cannot be killed off, remains alive, is Subject, contains within itself all the contradictions of your system, and is the one and only that can resolve the contradictions by overturning the very mode of your

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production, here is what happens to YOU, Mr. Moneybags: (a) you think you re smart by having to depend less and less on that rebellious person, those "refractory hands", the variable capital, and (b) putting more into dead labor, constant capital those lovely machines that you think is the golden goose that lays all the golden eggs, but in fact this preponderance of constant over variable capital results in (c) you have less and less of your precious profits, to speak your language instead of the scientific one of values and surplus values. Ah yes, I can hear you laugh since the mass of profits are so much with mass production and greater machines "the automaton" you worship so. But the truth is that the rate of profit has gone down all the time and it is the expectation of ever greater rates that makes you invest, expand, etc. And, my dear stupid fellow, you cannot expand that rate of profit if you keep using less and less of living labor relative to greater and greater investments in machines for you cannot suck surplus out of your constant capital but only out of variable capital, you can suck blood (what you call profits and gold) out of living people, not dead.

Now I will admit, it is only a tendency to a decline in the rate of profit, and there are many counteracting tendencies, games you play on the market, home and abroad, but the greatness about economic laws, those little objective factors in behavior, is their persistence of appearance. So, if you'll stop dismissing these appearances as mere show, accidents, next time you'll know better, you will note this about your own history:

(i) Crises were born with capitalist production established as factory production. Before 1825, your first general crises, no one had ever heard of suffering from too much production: it was always scarcity that got you into trouble, but here you are suffering from what you call "overproduction".

(ii) These crises, though, don't come from the market, even though you think they do because that's where they appear; they come from production, from producing ever more c/v C/V , $CCCCCC/vvv$. I'll predict that the technological revolutions which make a machine obsolete in ten years are the actual cause of your crises and you'll have an ever ever bigger one every ten years or so.

Now, do you know, that in these years, Mike, no one paid any attention to technological revolutions as having anything to do with crises, or the "internal" causes of crises; it would be all the way till 1929 when suddenly bourgeois economics saw something in Marx's analysis of crises and began to build their business cycles on them? But Marx wrote all that in 1867 (in fact it was 1857, 10 years before actual publication of Capital) and while the bourgeoisie paid no attention to him, the "Marxists" did and the first one who said Marx was all wrong on the crises was Bernstein because no crises appeared on "the" day it was supposed to. Rosa Luxemburg rose to the defense of Marx — but in fact she saw only "Subject", or rather saw Subject only as force that would overthrow capitalism, but not that something we can learn from them "exactly how" they mean to resolve these crises. In any case, in the first fight with Bernstein, Rosa won not only because she posed revolution vs. reform, but, simply, because the debate was still going strong when the crises came, and bigger than ever. Where Rosa went thoroughly wrong was not in that easy debate, but the next time around, so to speak, when the question posed was not the easy one for revolutionaries — revolution vs. reform — but the event of World War I — actually 2 years in advance, 1912, when capitalism reached a still newer stage of monopoly and finance.

O.K. She was still a revolutionary but two "scientific" matters she did not understand: (1) did those little categories, c/v, really mean everything; weren't they in fact just "technical" for any means of production and means of consumption that would characterize all systems of production; were they really necessary to Marx; didn't Engels after all edit Volumes II and III, making a mess of the mass of manuscripts Marx left; shouldn't we the Marxists of today look at "reality" (o, that word, Reality, what a trap for how many Marxists!) and see that it is the underdeveloped countries, the non-capitalistic ones that make it possible for capitalism to continue to live. If we depended only on c/v, we'd have to wait till Doomsday, so it is really the relationship of capitalism to non-capitalism. But being a revolutionary, and fearing that that too might involve waiting for the mood to turn green, she ran outside of "economics" and said "But long before that happens, the revolutionary proletariat", etc., etc.

(2) The question is if she thought that it was a question of capitalism vs. non-capitalism, then the Subject has moved -- it is the underdeveloped countries where the peasants are, and the peasant mass should be the revolutionary. Ah, no, she wouldn't have that either. Indeed, when she first began the fight against Lenin and self-determination of nations -- long before the Accumulation debate -- she was trying to prove to Lenin that Poland was really more advanced than Russia, though Russia was the oppressor and Poland the oppressed, and "therefore" one shouldn't fight for national self-determination which was "chauvinistic" as against such great internationalists as "Marxists." In all cases, whether it was a question of markets or some stupidity of absorption of markets "into" the system, the result is the same. In Rosa's case, all it ended in was that she was so utterly removed from her Polish masses that the reactionary "Socialists" (that's what Pilsudski originally was) were for Poland fighting against Soviet Russia.

(Do please read again the chapters both on Capital and on appearance and Reality re Rosa Luxemburg in Marxism and Freedom.) It will never happen that you absorb "all" for the simple reason that there are not only workers vs. capitalists but intra-capitalist and intra-imperialist rivalries and the "theory" (Kautsky's) of super-imperialism absorbing all, etc., etc., has long since been answered by Lenin. All we are interested in is the reality which leads to revolutions, not in the abstract, but in the concrete and for that you need people, Subject, so let's return to that, this time, not in the relationship to economic categories, but people -- proletarians, peasants, oppressed peoples.

Marx "chose" the proletariat as the force of revolution, and he remains the central, but not the only force. He "chose" him because he was both source of all the capitalist's surplus value and the "subject" who would transform society since he was strategically placed in that process of production, and organized by it, united, cohesive, etc., etc.

Then came some Narodniki from Russia -- they had translated Capital and tried to make him say it is really the "mir" which would produce "Socialism". Marx wouldn't say so but he said send me lots of material, let me see the data, the facts and really I should learn Russian--which he did quite late in life -- and find out about these voices. The Narodniki gave the Marxists a lot of

trouble in Russia, then a Marxist (Zasulich) wrote and asked Marx: What did you really mean? We know the Narodniki are wrong because Russia isn't escaping capitalism; it's here too; but what did you really mean? Well, poor Marx, he never had so much trouble writing a letter. He wrote 3 different versions, sent the briefest and least telling, but pregnant enough with meaning. It said: well, what I described in Capital was capitalism in GB, the most advanced country, etc., etc., now in Russia -- no one in any case "must" follow a tendency -- well IF the mir can tie up with the proletariat; IF Russia can tie in with advanced Europe; IF the Russian Revolution can be the signal, then it indeed could be the vanguard.

How Marx knew how to listen to voices and how that became but the beginning for him to return to theory and work for the unity of theory and practice. You think he said that only about Russia? Read the absolutely magnificent articles in the Tribune way back in the 1850s (just published as The American Journalism of Marx and Engels, New American Library, \$6.50) and see what he says on the Chinese REVOLUTION (yes, he called it a revolution), not the monstrosity of our day but the monstrosity of 1853. Moreover, despite all he had written of the idiocy of rural life, he thought those peasants could start a new page of world revolution: "It would be a curious spectacle that of China sending disorder into the Western world while the Western powers, by English, French and American war steamers, are conveying 'order' to Shanghai, Nanking, and the mouths of the Great Canal. Do these order-mongering powers, which would attempt to support the wavering Manchu dynasty, forget that the hatred against foreigners and their exclusion from the Empire.....?" Sound today-ish, what?

Now that doesn't mean that he was either an anarchist, or just a utopian, or like the guerrilla warfare types chose any old "Subject", any one that "dared and dared and dared some more"? Nonsense. The Subject has to be objective as well as subjective, it has to be elemental as well as historical, and above all, out of his self-development you have to be able, as a theoretician, to make explicit what has only been implicit in his actions, BUT YOU CANNOT LECTURE DOWN TO THEM WHETHER YOU ARE JUST A MARX OR AS GREAT A REVOLUTIONARY AS ROSA who, after all she said of revolution and spontaneity, and proletariat, proletariat, and only proletariat, turned around when they actually were building a new form of organization -- the Shop Stewards -- and said, Well, now, you cannot build dual unions, you must return to the union structure and fight from within, etc., etc.

I cannot go into the current world capitalist economy other than to say its crises has nothing whatever to do with absorption or non-absorption of non-capitalist world, its crises stem not from markets but from Automation and wars, and if there is anything Marc is more wrong on, it is to say that just when capitalists have absorbed all, it would have "no labor reservoir to draw on for production": Holy cats, if capitalism will have anything -- it is millions and millions of workers out of production. And, far from the national struggles "only helping capitalism", it has not given capitalism a moment of peace though it had won the war, "even won the peace" so far as Europe and the Marshall Plan was concerned. Who is keeping it in turmoil if it isn't all the struggles for national liberation from Africa to Latin America, Algiers to the Middle East, Vietnam to Djibouti?

You must develop a method, internalize the method I used in Marxism and Freedom by studying (next year) all these new lectures on Philosophy and Revolution, for all any one can give another is method. It isn't however anything that can be gotten either through blueprints, formulae, or science. It requires a lot of hard labor, patience, seriousness and suffering of the "negative" but nothing has ever been more needed if we want to overcome not only capitalism but the regressions of revolutions. Hope this has helped some.

Yours,

HAYA

* "Fixed Particular" is a Hegelian phrase which means you get stuck in the form a certain universal came on in historically. In the case of Trotsky it was nationalized property that didn't let him return either to the universal of socialism or the concrete of self-activity, of Subject. In the case of Rosa Luxemburg it was the opposition to self-determination of peoples because "nationalism" -- the fixed particular -- was "below" internationalism. Marc went as far as refusing to participate in the Resistance movement in France. Where such "fixed particulars" aren't sheer escapism from actual activity, it is nevertheless an absolutely paralyzing force.

COVERING LETTER THAT ACCOMPANIED ROUGH DRAFT OF PART I OF PHILOSOPHY
AND REVOLUTION --- "ECONOMIC REALITY AND THE DIALECTICS OF LIBERATION"

Dear Friends,

Here, finally, is part I. Or is it? The question mark refers, however, only to the enumeration and not to the content. It should, besides the sections on the technologically underdeveloped and technologically developed countries, have still a third section, especially devoted to China as to whether that is the alternative path. However, I have written so much on China, and you are so well acquainted with the analysis of it, that I decided not to write a new section just now.

Instead, I am including a new part that will probably revert back to the Why Hegel? Why How? part. I would like to explain why this so-called "missing link" has presently been written. Originally, I had thought that, in view of the fact that the Grundrisse is available only in German, whereas my book is directed, mainly, to the American worker and student, that the abbreviated form in which I referred to it in the Chapter on Marx was sufficient. Two things changed my mind. One is the fact that the most cogent topic of our day -- the Third World -- cannot be fully understood if all the myths about what Marx said or did not say on the Peasantry, what he did or did not say on "Oriental Despotism", and what he said and did not say on the "priority" of revolutions in industrialized countries as against "backward" ones, from Russia to China, were cleared away. Secondly, that section of the Grundrisse has finally been published under the title Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations which you can get from the International Publishers for \$1.95, and anyone who doesn't have it, should immediately rush to get it. It is some of the most beautiful writing Marx ever penned, as you can see from the Frontispiece which accompanies this chapter.

Finally, we must also consider the sudden fame that has come to Herbert Marcuse with One Dimensional Man, or at least as One Dimensional is understood by the so-called New Left. Anything at all that makes things "easy" -- from guerrilla warfare to psychedelic posters -- is preferable to some as a substitute for "the labor, the patience, the seriousness, the suffering of the negative," that is demanded by both Hegel and, above all, by the urgency of the times, the need to resolve contradictions rather than to compound them, and laying the foundations for a totally new society, beginning, ending and never deviating from human power, "in and for itself".

This will be the last part that you will be getting before the convention itself, from now on I will rework, more or less alone. I would, however, like to get discussion on this no later than May.

Yours,
Raya

March 19, 1968

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RAYA TO ALAN

May 6, 1968

Dear Alan,

Because I was impressed with the seriousness of your critique of the rough draft of my work, "Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Liberation", I hurried at once to acknowledge receipt and assure you of its publication, although I had no time at the moment to comment on the points you raised. Now that I have a free moment I wish to analyze what you call the "uncanny structure" and I call the self-movement of the subject matter. I do not mean to say that I have succeeded in giving precise expression to the dialectic emerging from the subject under discussion. Rather, what I am saying is that, unless a critic compares results with aims, critic and author are likely to talk different languages. The point is to see that we do understand each other.

Your thesis seems to be that "in its present form, the chapter seems to offer little that is not known about the Third World to even the most cursory observer of the situation." May I ask: who, in discussing the subject, holds that the tragedy of the African Revolutions is due neither to neo-colonialism alone, nor to internal corruption alone, and that, therefore, what is needed is to work out the relationship between the compelling objective forces and ruling ideologies of the East and West, on the one hand, and the mass quest for universality, on the other hand? I know none but myself.

Note, please, that both the objective forces and the ruling ideologies (used in the strict Marxian sense of false consciousness) are put to one side, while the proletarian ("mass") - peasant striving is placed at the opposite pole. This means that on the side of philosophy and revolution stand the masses and only the masses while a question mark is placed over the leadership of these masses, as is clear from my constant repetition of the isolation of these leaders from the masses the day after the revolution.

What has been happening ever since the death of Lenin is that no leader of revolution has faced that which first appeared with the Russian Revolution -- the division between leaders and masses the day after the revolution; the administrative mentality that then overcame even the most theoretical of Bolsheviks (like Bukharin) who were all too eager to once again make "objects" of these subjects of revolution: "the masses." For years we argued with Trotskyists, Stalinists -- and, yes, anarchists and syndicalists on the question. When it comes to the question of the Third World we have entirely new types of revolutionaries and we wish to pose that crucial question not as if they must bear the brunt of

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the past, but, rather, on the basis of the new reality.

You dismiss the new reality -- isolation of the leaders from the masses, the very ones who made the revolution. You dismiss the actuality as a "may have been." You say, "Amen", to my analysis of the compelling objective forces, but what you do is the very opposite for you indulge yourself in a list of "probables", ranging from plots by CIA agents to international cartels "ganging up" on Ghana. This substitution of subjectivity for objectivity reaches its climax when you take official Soviet figures (used by me merely to show that, relatively even these show that Mr. Big -- the S.U. -- gets bigger and bigger while the satellites vegetate, even as do the decolonized around the former colonial power) to arrive at some unfounded conclusions. To wit, that the Third World could show a comparable phenomenal growth "even without a massive infusion of capital." This flies not only in the face of reality but also in the face of such non-comparables as a pre-revolutionary Russia, occupying one-sixth of the world's space, some 200 million people, and, though technologically backward as compared to Western Europe or the US, still one of the biggest empires on earth, on the one hand, with such tiny newly-decolonized states as Ghana or Guinea, on the other hand.

I am belaboring the obvious not in order to win a "debater's point", but in order to get you back to the subject in dispute -- the relationship of the dialectics of liberation to economic reality as it appeared in the late 1950's and early 1960's. For that problem-- the working out of a new relationship between theory and practice -- a methodology is needed which is independent of existing state powers but rather flows from THE greatest "energizing principle" -- the mass quest for universality, the Third World fight for freedom, total freedom, that is to say, one that refuses to subordinate the fight against class structure within a country to any "two camp theory" as if the struggle between "East" and "West" is the one that will liberate the "Wretched of the Earth."

To get back to the point at issue, the task History has set for our age, our age and none other, permit me, dear Alan, to ask you some more "who's". I began my comments on your thesis by asking who (except Marxist-Humanists) poses the questions relating to the Third World in a way that, both objectively and subjectively, takes its point of departure and return from where the masses are -- what they do, what they think, how they propose to solve the contradictions, including those between leaders and ranks, intellectuals and workers? May I add: (1) Who (except us) holds that to plan or not to plan is no longer the pivotal question? (2) Who (except us) holds that affluence notwithstanding, not only do the poor countries get poorer and the rich richer, but within the technologically advanced countries the crises deepen since even the good old capitalistic principle (so profoundly analyzed by Marx as the lifeblood of capitalistic "progress") of new economic growth made possible on the basis of the destruction of capital only

leads to: (a) unprecedented militarization; (b) chronic poverty* and unemployment, (though attenuated from Depression days, it is organic that it seems impossible to shake it off even at its most affluent points; (c) planning even where denied, i.e., under private capitalism, (whether this be DeGaulle's France or USA) on the one hand, and planning where admitted (both in "socialist" countries and in the Third World) equally helpless to resolve the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, private and state, since the law of value cannot be abrogated except through a total reorganization of relations of production at the point of production?

You glossed over asking these questions, much less looking for the answers, by, on the one hand, going into semantics rather than facing the reality of the human factor, and, on the other hand, by asking your own "who": "Who is this 'it' who has a totally different concept of a human social order?" Finally, what is meant by the 'struggle to break from the governing law of value operative in the world market'? This seems to imply some sort of transcendence of objective reality!"

O.K. let's begin where you are. The "it", the "dominating force which governs also the still fluid situation in the underdeveloped countries as against the malaise in the developed countries" (P. 6, not P. 5, incidentally) is the human being, the mass force, the masses not only as physical force but "as Reason" to use Lenin's expression. You knew that all along, didn't you? But if you had admitted that, bad grammar notwithstanding, you knew all along that the human factor is the governing factor, is the social vision, is not only the future, but the present, then, first, you could not have rated the Soviet Union quite so high, quite so different from the US, and, second, the answer to your question about how to break the law of value, would likewise be obvious: THE HUMAN BEING. And, in conclusion, instead of putting an exclamation point alongside the allegedly impossible "transcendence of objective reality", you would have answered: But, of course, only when human beings, the oppressed human beings who create all values, transform themselves from the source of value and surplus value into the SUBJECT WHICH the day after the revolution would abolish, or begin abolishing, the division between Notion and Reality, between Subject and Object, between Theory and Practice, between Philosophy and Revolution, between Mental and Manual labor, and reconstitute the wholeness of the human being, thus putting an end to what Marx called "the pre-history" of humanity so that (his and hers, but not its any more) true history can first begin and the new human dimension unfold.

This is what is known, in Hegelian terminology, as the second negation. (The first is "mere" overthrow of capitalism which looks so hard before the revolution, but the day after, that vanishes as a problem, and the second negation is what one must embark on.) In Marxian terms, it means the abrogation of the law of value, the beginning of a new unity of mental and manual labor, of which very nearly nothing is known. Historically, once the Paris Commune showed Marx that the whole

fetishism of commodities, of value, is all in the form, the value-form which not only hides the exploitation of man by man, but, above all, is the fantastic form which is the reality of dead labor dominating living, of transforming the living worker into an appendage to a machine, of making persons into things -- once all that became crystal clear to Marx, he summed up the heroism and achievements -- all the achievements of the Paris Commune -- in the simple statement that the greatest thing about the Commune was "its own working existence."

But there was no chance to concretize that "abrogation of the law of value" other than stating that "freely associated labor" would decide everything since (1) the law of value is a law of the world market whereas the Commune existed in a single city, and (2) it lasted only 2 months whereas that is a protracted and most difficult struggle full of all sorts of lapses and what Lenin called historical deformations. But Lenin did live to see a successful proletarian revolution in a whole nation which, at his death, had lasted six years. He therefore had a greater historic experience and he concluded that (1) whereas that abrogation of value can begin on a national level, it cannot fulfill itself unless it will be done on an international level; (2) while working for the world revolution, the single revolution cannot rest still but must prove itself in the lives, conditions of working of the most lowly paid, doing the heaviest work, and (3) so simplifying the affairs of state that any worker can and does do them so that "all become bureaucrats and therefore none are. Finally, and not by any means least, Lenin left a Will in which he not only asked for the removal of Stalin, nor only pointed to the administrative mentality of Trotsky, but also said that the most beloved of all the Party and its greatest theoretician, Bukharin, just "didn't understand the dialectic."

(All this is taken up in State-Capitalism and Marxist-Humanism, and, as I pointed out at end of section 1 of Ch. 1, will become part of this chapter on economic reality and dialectics of liberation. Note also, please, that the chapter is also to include an analysis of Maoism-- see New Politics for my latest on that -- for "transcendence of objective reality" is not, is not Maoist voluntarism which slips over objective reality whereas masses transform objective reality through continuing revolution).

I am ever so grateful for your critique which forced me to clarify my thoughts, but I cannot answer your questions in their entirety without writing a new chapter. However, I cannot let pass the assertion that Marx's statement about man's "totality", within the context I give it in the second section of the chapter on Grundrisse,** "is not a substantive conclusion." Two questions were singled out by me to substantiate the question of "totality". One referred to Marx's concept of history-- historical conditions, historical working out of contradictions, history as philosophy rather than "economics"; "And 'economics' is not referred to except as economic structure, which, in turn, involves the totality of relations, the conditions of production,

with a distinction made between material transformation and philosophic ones." Further to concretize this statement about what "historical materialism" meant to Marx, I bring in the question of today -- how what Marx said on machine-ism in the Grundrisse was, on the one hand, (by the Stalinists) reduced to "scientism" and "working harder", increasing "labor productivity" by bending to the automation machine. And, on the other hand, transformed by Herbert Marcuse as leading to "One Dimensional Man," adding: "The irony is that it isn't only the proletariat that thereby gets degraded, and not only the intellectual, but philosophy too." The original title of One-Dimensional Man, when it was delivered as a series of lectures in France at the end of the 1950's and reproduced in Arguments was: From Ontology to Technology. In a word, Marcuse is saying that technology has overwhelmed thinking, thereby denying the very soul of the dialectic, of development through contradiction, that the more abysmal the degradation, the more intense is the quest for universality.

The whole point is that Automation, as the new stage of production, has produced two opposite class reactions. On the one side stands not only the capitalist but also the intellectual who thinks that all the productivity now comes from the machine, not man, that "scientism" is classless. On the other side stands the proletariat who not only shows that Automation has not lightened labor, not only has created the ever lengthening line of the unemployed even though, for the moment, hidden by militarization and actual war, but, above all, tends further to separate the mental from the manual powers. He therefore asks: what kind of labor should man do? Why the division between mental and manual? How to reconstitute the wholeness of man? We concluded that it was not accidental that the "backward worker", not the advanced, party-minded intellectual, even when he is a Marxist, raised the question of Humanism, made it the urgent question of the day. To summarize not only the chapter, Alan, but the whole of the book I propose the frontispiece to be used for reproducing Marx's statement on totality from the Grundrisse. And here it is again: "When the narrow bourgeois form has been peeled away, what is wealth if not the universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive powers, etc., of individuals, produced in universal exchange? What if not the full development of human control over the forces of so-called 'nature'? What, if not the absolute elaboration of his creative dispositions, without any preconditions other than antecedent historical evolution which makes the totality of the evolution -- i.e., the evolution of all human powers as such, unmeasured by any previously established yardstick -- an end in itself? What is this, if not a situation where man does not reproduce himself in any determined form, but produces his totality? Where he does not seek to remain something formed by the past, but is the absolute movement of becoming?" IT IS THIS "ABSOLUTE MOVEMENT OF BECOMING" THAT MAKES MAN INTO A SHAPER OF HISTORY, THOUGH NOT OUT OF THE WHOLE CLOTH; A TRANSCENDER OF "OBJECTIVE REALITY" AS THE GIVEN REALITY OF A CAPITALISTIC SOCIETY THAT NEEDS TO BE TORN UP BY ITS ROOTS; THE PRESENT RECREATOR OF A NEW POSITIVE THEORETICAL GAIN, A NEW HUMANISM, I.E., HUMAN POWER WHICH IS ITS OWN END.

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* It is not my economics which is questionable; it is existing poverty in "communist lands." Moreover, I quoted their own sources and their own need to explain the lower standards of living as compared to those under private capitalism by blaming it all on "technology."

** The Grundrisse section in Ch. I, as I already explained to you and in the covering letter, was put in out of context -- it belongs in the chapter on Marx -- in order to make sure that I do not again forget to deal with it at length. These notes to myself, so to speak, argue against Hobsbawm's side remarks against Hegel not because I am subjective but because this is one work of Marx's which cannot be "written off" as belonging to the "young" Marx. It is the mature Marx, speaking in full Hegelian terms, fully "idealistic", fully "subjective", with revolution of one piece with that new human dimension which comes from that "absolute movement of becoming"; in a word, to sideswipe at Hegel in an Introduction to this work is in truth, to attack Marx himself, only shamefacedly, as Hobsbawm should indeed be.

4301

October 13, 1968

Dear Friends:

This is my first letter since the convention assigned me to devote full time to trying to complete the draft of PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION — 2nd draft for most chapters and first for those chapters that have only heretofore been in my mind. Here is Chapter 1, "Hegel's Absolutes as New Beginnings". As you see by its expansion to 40 pages, it may become necessary to transform the sections (each of the 3 sections is devoted to an outstanding work of Hegel) into 3 chapters.

Beginnings are always difficult and none more so than the one that attempts for the first time to deal with all of Hegel's major writings from a Marxist-Humanist viewpoint. Insofar as specific works of Hegel are concerned, Marx left us his analysis only of the Phenomenology of Mind (plus, of course, the one on Hegel's Philosophy of Right, which first signalled Marx's break with the bourgeoisie. But this does not directly concern us here since I have restricted myself to the strictly philosophic works, not the philosophy of the political sphere like Philosophy of Right, or Philosophy of Religion, like the Lectures on the same topic). Though Marx expressed his desire to write on the "rational" in the Hegelian philosophy, he did not live long enough to complete, to his own satisfaction, all his original discoveries, much less to demonstrate the dialectical process by which he arrived at his theories. That task he left for future generations: it remains our task.

Lenin did leave us his Notes on the Science of Logic, but, indispensable as these are, they are only Notes, that is to say, they have a cryptic air since they are not fully developed except in his own mind where they remained to guide him through the thrilling but also heart-breaking 6 years of the Russian Revolution. Though Bukharin and Deborin went on to publish them at least in Russian, their introductions are worthless, full of meaningless abstractions, since, by then, Stalin had won the power struggle and none were brave enough to dare make them concrete. Not a single revolutionary opponent of Stalinism, from Trotsky down, bothered with laying a philosophic foundation for the struggle against Stalinism; each was too busy leaping like a bolt out of the blue to political conclusions as if these could signify total opposition without philosophy both as foundation and perspective for new revolutions. As a consequence, neither Trotskyism as stillbirth nor Existentialism's pretensions to Marxian Humanism are accidental. That is to say, Communism, having given up its moorings in Marxian Hegelianism, outsiders—those outside the revolutionary movement, movement and not merely "the Party"—tried filling the vacuum.

Those too young to have lived through one phase of our development — state-capitalism — must nevertheless see that it is no small matter that even a correct economic analysis of the new stage of world capitalism and a valiant attempt to face the philosophic challenge "stopped dead" (to use a Hegelian expression of incompleting dialectic of Kant) before Hegel's Absolutes and therefore was overcome by the new impulses emanating from the Afro-Asian Revolutions.

Again, the task remains for us to complete even as the singling out of the Humanism of Marxism as the theoretic need of our age came from us at the very moment when the movement from practice fulfilled the same task via actual revolutions, both in Europe and Africa as well as the black revolts in the U.S.

As for the bourgeoisie, its theoreticians have so little use for Hegel's abstractions precisely because they see in them "the algebra of revolution" that Hegel's Science of Logic, written in 1816-21, wasn't even translated³ into the English till 1929! The French, who think themselves vastly superior culturally to the "Anglo-Saxons" didn't tackle Hegel seriously till the period between the two world wars, and mainly through "Lectures" and "Abstracts" rather than in the original. Despite the millions of words about Hegel's works, there is barely a work existing which tackles the whole of his works. It did take a new third world to arise, though those philosophers are absolutely unconscious of the impulses pulling at them, finally to bring about, at the end of the 1950's, one good, i.e., comprehensive analysis: Hegel: A Re-Examination by J.N. Findlay. I still consider the very finest work of analysis to be that of Karl Lowith's From Hegel to Nietzsche which is far superior even to Marxist works, not to mention the fact that his analysis preceded theirs without due acknowledgment. However, it also has a superb analysis of the Left Hegelians which thereby gives us a chance to see them on Hegel, while they worked in collaboration with Marx, and later as they broke up.

It is true that, from a Marxist viewpoint, Herbert Marcuse's Reason And Revolution is outstanding. But since it is, as an intellectual, that he debates with the other interpretations, the "examples" are all about other philosophies without any examples arising either from practice or from history. The result is that even in the section on Marx, specifically on alienated labor where he does a magnificent job proving there is no difference between the young and "mature Marx", he propounds a "thesis", a thesis of humanism he has been denying ("modifying") ever since.

In a word, though I just have given you the bibliography⁴ you asked for at the convention, it is, in fact, impossible to cite a bibliography that would "back up" the chapter enclosed for none have done what we are attempting to do. In truth, we must study it as the discoverers we in fact are.

Yours,
Raya

- 1) Actually, it is not "here" since there is only one copy per local and therefore only the full NEB members get it in N.Y., LA, Detroit and it is up to comrades to work out with him or her how to make more copies for the local.
- 2) See Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic appendix to 1st ed. of Marxism And Freedom; Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right was never fully translated into English but an important section of it is included both in Bottomore's Early Writings of Marx and the Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat's Doubleday Anchor Book.

3) I should have said published rather than translated. It was translated some quarter of a century before it was published, and it is as good a demonstration of the American roots of Hegelianism as was our proof of the American roots of Marxism, and again it remains an unknown chapter of American history. At the time of the Civil War there was, in St. Louis, a German refugee, Brockmeyer, and a New Englander, T.W. Harris who Brockmeyer taught to love Hegel and, in turn, he translated Science of Logic. He also started the first philosophic journal in this country, "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy" and that was Hegelian. Since Brockmeyer decided to run -- and win -- the Lieutenant Governorship of St. Louis and Harrison became First U.S. Commissioner of Education, the "theoretical" work went by the board. By 1920's, his heirs offered his translation of Science of Logic to many publishers, none of whom accepted, so England gets credit for the first translation. (See ftn. 53 in K&F).

4) Perhaps it would be best to list them as a whole: HEGEL: Phenomenology of Mind, Science of Logic, Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (specifically, Philosophy of Mind) and with it all the 4 vols. of Lectures on the History of Philosophy which is much easier to read than the written works.
 Marx: Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.
 Engels: FEUERBACH, which was the standard we all lived on instead of studying either Hegel or Marx, and we are suffering ever since; still it is easier to read.
 Herbert Marcuse: Reason And Revolution.
 Karl Lowith: From Hegel to Nietzsche.
 J.N. Findlay: Hegel: A Re-Examination.
 Walter Kauffman: Hegel: A Reinterpretation -- with much caution because this overly conceited latest philosopher to tackle Hegel thinks it can be done by reducing Hegel to his size.
 N. Lobkowitz: Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx.

October 23, 1968

To the REB-MEB

Dear Colleagues:

I've made some important changes in the form of the book which I'd like to discuss with you as I'm sending the friends the new section on the Grundrisse. If you will now look at Part I, Why Hegel? Why Now? which is now complete, you will see at once the new decision. It is to have each part of Philosophy and Revolution end on the current scene. In this case, the appearance of reality is via State-Capitalism and Marxist Humanism, which I have decided belongs here instead of, as I originally conceived it, when I analyze Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Liberation. Thus, Part I now contains the following: Chapter 1 -- Hegel-- 40 pages. Now that a new section on the Grundrisse has been added to Chapter 2 -- Marx-- that chapter has grown to 54 pages. Chapter 3 -- Lenin-- will have, besides the 12 pages sent last, State Capitalism and Marx's Humanism. As you see, this works out logically as well since, though that pamphlet deals with the state-capitalism of our age, it, in fact, revolves totally around Lenin's conception of the proletariat as "Subject". (I don't recall how many pages the pamphlet is, but I would guess that Part I as a whole, now numbers over 125 pages and thus constitutes half of the whole book.)

As I now conceive Part II, Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Liberation, that first chapter I sent out will be very much revised and expanded as well as go back in time to the 1930's, though only briefly. For the new, really new here is that Chapter 2 would be Leon Trotsky and Mao as Theoreticians. Paradoxically as that sounds the two do belong together since not only chronologically did they remain after Lenin's death, but, in fact, each was an alternative also to Stalin. It is true that Leon Trotsky always thought of himself as the link with Lenin and, while we have demolished that pretension, we still allowed him to appear as within the Marxist movement, while Mao was excluded from it and treated, more or less, as a continuation of Stalin. It just isn't true. Of course, he didn't fight Stalin, and Trotsky died doing so. But Mao was creating something quite independent of Stalin. Jamming Trotsky against Mao means that his theory of permanent revolution will not only be dealt with theoretically, but as undergoing the test of objective reality by way of another's theory who considered himself a Marxist, and who, in any case, did answer within a movement that was not in power, with a very different theory than either Lenin or Stalin, Trotsky or the latecomer Castro. That I shouldn't have seen Trotsky and Mao as facets of a single problem appears to me now to be a "leftover" of treating Trotsky as link with Lenin though we have long denied it. It was some sort of Trotskyite hangover. In any case, this brings us through World War II, which was something that Lenin couldn't possibly have imagined, and ends only when from practice comes the Hungarian Revolution and from theory Marxist-Humanism and we appear.

To work all this out will take some time -- a month at least, maybe more. In any case, I do not wish to bother now with Sartre who was thought of as alternative and probably will still appear so for the new French situation makes him very important still; though he is not of the Movement neither is the New Left of the Marxist movement. What is a great deal more important, and for the moment I remain stuck, is this: How to bring in "black thought" ?

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I would like to call a "black conference" in Detroit at the beginning of the new year. Though all of us will be present, the point is I want all white members (except me, ah!) to sit in back while the black members plus those they invite talk up after I have presented the problem from the book's viewpoint. What do you think?

Yours,

RAYA

4306

October 25, 1968

COVERING NOTE FOR CHAPTER 2. SECTION 2 OF THE GRUNDRISSE

Dear Friends:

Because to this day there has been no English translation of the Grundrisse which Marx had written in 1857-58, the difficulties of working out a bibliography are tenfold. In essence, however, it illuminates the question of references in a way that could not be achieved when I sent you Chapter I with its references. For it makes it possible to elaborate on another question, the more important one of working out for ourselves our own unique contributions, and doing so collectively.

As so much else that Marx had written, the Grundrisse has a totally new meaning for our epoch than it had for his. Take the question of the role of the Orient in world civilization, the role of underdeveloped countries in the revolutions of our day, the movement of history at transition points where the future intersects the past and present both. Marx had written the particular section on other epochs of history as almost no more than an aside to the question of the relationship of money to capital, or, more correctly, the transformation of money into capital by way of exploitation of living labor. His answer was that, since man became free only as wage laborer freed from his "natural laboratory, the earth", he was, in fact, a wage slave, robbed of all of his capacities, except just one, that of laboring and it was necessary to see what man was like before the glories of capitalism made him "free".

Now it happens that this is the one section of the Grundrisse, after a century's delay, that has been translated and published in English under the title: Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. It is introduced by a big-shot historian, an English Communist (though I am not sure that he admits to his Communism) who has expanded himself to the tune of 65 pages of his own words, which is no more than Marx's own text. He is also an anti-Hegelian and since it is most difficult to hold to that stance when introducing something by Marx that is as totally Hegelian as this is, he keeps stressing "the mystical" in Hegel as against "the material" in Marx. By the time, however, you reach the end of his introduction, you find as always with these Communists, that whom he is really opposing is not Hegel, but Marx, and that all of his adjectives of praise for Marx were only in order to warn the reader against "the automatic acceptance of all Marx's conclusions."

What is important about this Introduction -- it is by no means a vulgar one, but quite elaborately done with lots and lots and lots of "new" facts in the century since Marx wrote it -- is that the historian who does not have confidence that the masses can shape history without the "leadership of the Vanguard Party" is really lost no matter how honest and faithful to the Marxian precepts he might have been. In a word, it takes a Marxist Humanist, plus the self-mobilized proletariat of our epoch to be able to read Marx in a way that would prepare him to make his own contribution.

The reason I am stressing the word our, both in the epoch and in the contribution we make is not due to any conceit either on our part or on the part of the age in which we live. Rather it is due to the fact that no one, not even a genius as great as Marx, can be aware of all the ramifications of his theory. Only practice can prove a theory; only human practice by the shapers of history can realize the potentialities of the unified theory and practice. Thus, there was no third world on the historic stage when Marx wrote about the Orient. To the extent to

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-2-

which there were now rebellions in China, they were definitely not "proletarian revolutions", and Africa definitely was not on the scene at all. The prophecy of Marx at a later period, but a great deal earlier than 1917, that the revolution could first happen in backward Russia, provided it stimulated a revolution throughout Europe, is, of course, ours to build on. But, there is no substitute for the concrete just as I must add, there is no substitute for theory.

Or, take the question of Automation. (Please note that we will be the first ones to translate the quintessential section on Machinery in the Grundrisse. It will appear as an appendix to Philosophy and Revolution.)

There is surely, in this case, an excessive amount of references in books, in magazines, in the daily press. But who except us listen to what the workers say on the question? Marx did. That is why he was unhappy with the section, brilliant as that was, in the Grundrisse. He proceeded afterward, first, himself to take a course in Machinery. (He was very unhappy with himself, whom he called the great dumbkopf whenever it came to doing anything practical). Then, he asked Engels to write him what was actually happening in the factory, which strata of workers were replaced by the machine, which became "new labor" and how was the resistance of the workers manifested. Thirdly, he studied the factory inspectors' Reports (the famous little "Blue Books"). He was the only one who did. And he had immense contacts with workers, both in the international and out of it. For the most comprehensive illustration of what concrete really means is to compare the beautiful, but generalized, section on Machinery in the Grundrisse with that which appears in Capital.

Finally, on the question of economic categories that are truly philosophical, no chapters are better, if I may say so, than the four chapters (5, 6, 7, and 8) in Marrism and Freedom. If you can't reread all of them, do reread 7 and 8 (One of these days, these Chapters should be issued as a separate book.) Since the section attached is actually part of Chapter II, which must be read as a whole, plus adding to it the pamphlet State Capitalism and Marx's Humanism, your references include very nearly all of the works of Marx. As you can see by my adding the pamphlet here instead of inserting it, as I originally thought, with the part on Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Liberation, I have decided that each part of the book must end on a current note. Begin from now on to see the book as a whole. You now have the whole of Part I, so take Chapter I on Hegel, Chapter II on Marx, making the enclosed part as section 2, and moving up by one the previous sections 2,3 and 4; Chapter III on Lenin and Chapter IV will be the pamphlet.

Yours,

RAYA

4308

March 7, 1969

Dear Friends:

I am rushing to complete Part III before I depart on the lecture tour. I wish to tell you about a possible restructuring of the form of the book insofar as Parts II and III are concerned.

As I was working on Part III, I began to feel that, instead of "isolating" the chapters, Leon Trotsky, Mao Tse-tung and Sartre in Part II, "Alternatives", they should form an integral part of Part III. These authors of other "Subjects" and other roads to revolution should, instead, become part of the "Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Liberation", and, therefore, be placed alongside the corresponding revolutions or failures of revolutions in our epoch.

Thus, the chapter on Trotsky could end Part I, "Why Hegel? Why Now" since, though formally recognizing the relationship of philosophy to revolution, Trotsky got so stuck in "the fixed particular" that he failed to follow the self-movement of both thought and practice to the stage of development that followed the death of Lenin.

At the other extreme, Mao, as a true original master of substitution, with no orthodox Marxian theory to guide him, acted as if the guerrilla can "take the place of" social revolution.

If I do "merge" Part II into Part III then it may also be possible to deal with Fidel Castro after all, since both of these theoreticians of guerrilla warfare would be analyzed at the very point when we discuss the African Revolution and the Black Revolution in America. It is impossible to make a decision now because so much will depend upon the tour, especially the philosophic conference for ourselves that we will hold in each locality. But I think you should know my train of thought and that you should read Part III with that in mind.

Part III now consists of two chapters: "The African Revolutions and the World Economy" and "New Passions and New Forces". I am not very sure, under the circumstances, how and if the chapter on Jean-Paul Sartre can fit into Part III, though he, too, is best seen, not so much in the period immediately following the conclusion of World War II, but rather during the last decade.

The main point is to view the book as a whole. Therefore, no matter how roughly the draft has been written -- and the final chapter is not only rough but a mere outline of what it may become after the tour -- we can discuss the matter comprehensively when finally I get to your particular locality. Each of you, I hope, will have read the whole before I come.

Even if you have not discussed the whole collectivity, it is important that you read it individually. No doubt I will also give one public lecture on the book.

Yours,

PAYA

4309

December 7, 1968

Dear Friends:

Under separate cover, I am sending you Part II -- THE INTERREGNUM: Void and Retrogression vs. Movement from Practice. In view of the fact that it will be very easy to read, as contrasted to Part I on Hegel, I hope you will forgive the long title, especially if you realize that it may very well be junked and called merely "Alternatives". The "alternatives" to Marx and Lenin from within the movement that calls itself Marxist are Trotsky and Mao; and from outside the movement, Jean-Paul Sartre. As you know, the chapters on Trotsky and Sartre had been written previously and, under the circumstances, some repetition is unavoidable, but I still consider that there is no substitute for seeing the draft of the book as a whole. I did not, after all, combine Trotsky and Mao into one chapter, first because they are of different historic periods; secondly, by relating each body of thought to a specific historic period, it gave me the opportunity to expand the parts dealing with the objective situation. You will find, for example, that the chapter on Mao, despite the fact that I have written so much on him over approximately a decade, is put in a quite new context because he is "accepted" as a great revolutionary and talks so endlessly of revolution that it was very important to develop further how that thought tilted into its opposite -- retrogression -- and to deal with that, not just politically, but philosophically.

-- Raya

Here is the outline or "table of contents" for Part II

The Interregnum: Void and Retrogression vs. Movement from Practice

Chapter I - On the Eve of World War II

- A. The Depression and the Theoretic Void
- B. Leon Trotsky as Theoretician

Chapter II - The Postwar World

- A. Marx's Humanism vs. the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung"
- B. The Retrogressionism of Mao Tse-tung

Chapter III - Sartre's Search for a Method

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Excerpts from the REB Minutes of Dec. 15, 1968

Raya reported on Part II, The Interregnum, calling attention to the fact that this section may be called Alternatives, since, though it deals with the whole period from the death of Lenin to the Post-War world, it concentrates on the reflection of the problems in the theories of Leon Trotsky and Mao Tse-tung from within the Marxist movement, and Jean-Paul Sartre outside the movement, all of whom based themselves on their own, as against Lenin's views of the objective situation. Chapter I has two sections, A. Even of World War II and B. Leon Trotsky as Theoretician. The very first sentence reads: "The Great Depression kept the world in shambles," and the paragraph shows that with the Depression and the rise of Nazism, not in some "backward" land, but in the very heart of "civilized" Europe that "civilization had evidently reached the end of something." As against these developments, there was the great Spanish Revolution but even the revolutionaries who were very much in it made no "special category" of it and, instead, based their theories on the old categories of nationalized property workers' state. Thus, Leon Trotsky's theory helped disorient the whole generation, not only of Marxists but also all of the new forces that had become disgusted with capitalism. This then (Leon Trotsky as Theoretician) concludes the chapter and contrasts the theory of permanent revolution to Lenin's theory on the colonial and agrarian questions.

Chapter II, The Post-War World, likewise has two parts -- A. is Marxist Humanism vs. The Thought of Mao Tse-tung. What is especially important in this section is that, for the first time, we not only showed the East German revolt as a Workers' Revolt starting a new page in history, but we also trace the changes in philosophy. It is true that the intellectuals were on the sidelines only then, but something new was occurring (the only section in English from Ernst Bloch that people can read is included in Socialist Humanism). The totally new philosophic additions, however, are in the section B. Mao as Retrogressionist. Although we are including much of what we said before and even re-producing a part on the "Cultural Revolution", the point is that heretofore I had been speaking of trying to work out Hegel's Third Attitude to Objectivity as if it applied to Trotsky. Trotsky stood still, theoretically speaking, and there was some moving backwards in anything that stands still, but he did not build a theory on it. Quite the contrary with Mao. Beginning with 1958 and the failure of the "People's Communes", Mao began to develop the view that even if it "takes a century", workers must continue to build that statecapitalist monstrosity. Because he had garbed it in so much revolutionary sounding verbiage, this didn't become clear. Everyone should read, especially carefully, the last three pages of this chapter. Although the third chapter on Sartre will be reworked somewhat, it is not necessary to have it in any other draft than you have it now.

Part III ECONOMIC REALITY & THE DIALECTICS OF LIBERATION will not be written until after the Conference we are calling Black/Red on January 12.

* * *

November 11, 1970

Dear Friends:

Because Chapter 2, "Marx's Transcendence of, and Return to, Hegel", will, like the other chapters of this final draft, not be available for circulation but will have to be read a central place (office or organizer's home), I'm asking Olga to please send this covering letter out to each individual member. In that way we will be able to continue a dialogue on this happy occasion which will finally make you see the completed Part I, Why Hegel? Why Now? as a totality. Moreover, I believe that this chapter, along with Chapter 3 (the one on Lenin published, as experiment, in Telos) will make it possible for you to return to that most difficult of all chapters, Chapter 1 on Hegel. (More on that later.)

You'll note easily enough that before you read even a sentence of this new chapter the three quotations which precede the text set the whole thesis -- inseparability of black dimension from "The Idea" and of both from Marx. The quotation from Nat Turner is, indeed, on the same level of freedom as is the dialectics of liberation, and it is exciting, indeed, that the young Marx, even before he became a Marxist and broke from bourgeois society, was moving precisely in that direction by making a "psychological law" out of the transformation of the freedom of mind into "practical energy."

What may not be as easily recognizable are the new elements in some of the ideas that have always characterized us. Thus, section 1 on the 1840's is entitled "The Birth of Historical Materialism." Now, it is true that, throughout, in our emphasis on the Humanism of Marxism we meant that, since we have never separated the young from the old Marx. But to be able to express it that simply as birth of materialism shows how far the attacks of Communists, Trotskyists, Anarcho-Syndicalists have led to the clarification not just of our ideas but of what, precisely, Marx was doing when. Also, you will note that, throughout, whether in actual text or only in footnotes, I keep bringing in the today-ness of the subject. For example, there is no more vulgar materialist than the Communist follow-traveling professor Donald Clark Hodges, who is working day in and day out to reduce Marx's theory of alienated labor to economist, legalist, vulgarian phraseology: "In the manuscripts of 1844, alienation involves a specific economic transaction between an alienor and alienee." This, in 1966! By referring to that date in 1844 I hope I bring the problems of today into historic-philosophic problems of yesteryear.

On the other hand, the transition point to Section 2 on the Grundrisse, or Economic Notebooks of 1857-8, brings the chapter back to the rigors of logic with its simultaneous ceaseless process of change in the dialectic. There, therefore, I show not merely that Marx, when he was supposed to have become finally "scientific economist", had not at all departed from the Hegelian dialectic. On the contrary, it was precisely because he remained dialectician that, in the very process of discussing money, capital, wage labor, he asks: how did the worker get to have nothing but his ability to labor to sell just when he became "free", and thereby is off on pre-capitalist formations -- only to arrive at revolution, the revolt in China, the T'aiiping Rebellion.

At the same time, it is the analysis of the Machine, and its opposite, resistance of workers to it, that has given in our day of Auto-

mation, birth to all the nonsensical ideas of one-dimensionality of man. Thus, once again, I reach into today, taking up both Herbert Marcuse and the wild dreams of Communists to somehow do away with revolts of workers. As for the pseudo-anarchists who are so busy being for "the act" as to skip over philosophy altogether and muckrake (at this late date!) about that reactionary Prussian philosopher, Hegel, they have yet to answer why, when philosophy and revolution do not unite -- as they do in Marx -- do we have nothing but aborted revolts, not to mention mindless terrorism. In the cases of both the technologists (and that's all philosophers of one-dimensionality are!), and men and women of the "pure act" there has resulted both the throwing out of the proletariat as revolutionary force and substitution of themselves for it, and the death of the dialectic. For, as Mao should know, who tried it in the so-called Cultural Revolution, if you see only one aspect (be it subjective or objective) of a problem, and reduce the inborn and objective contradiction to something manipulable, there is no forward movement.

Finally, section 3 on the "Adventures of the Fetishism of Commodities" -- an interpretation of which is as specifically Marxist-Humanist today as it was uniquely Marx's after he witnessed the greatest mass act of creativity of his day, the Paris Commune. We arrive at the integrality not only of economics and dialectics, but also of mass action and individual genius able to set that historic act of creation down in a way that we can get a glimpse of the future -- not because Marx was prophet, but because he left us his historic insights as task for us to shape for our day.

Now then, I have two suggestions to make, one for a public act and one for ourselves. Since I believe that with this chapter you will be able to grapple with that first chapter, to which you'll have to return with each new part and only fully grasp in the very last part on economic reality and dialectics of liberation, let me say, and not only as excuse, that beginnings are always difficult for they have the "temperament" of cutting from virgin rock even when it is Marx you're recreating and not something originally us. Still, how many have bothered with the actual works of Hegel, and from the point of today, and on the basis of a movement from practice? In any case, if you follow the subheadings rather than those "scary" works of Hegel so that Phenomenology of Mind becomes "Experiences of Consciousness"; Science of Logic is read as "Attitudes to Objectivity"; and The Philosophy of Mind as "A Movement from Practice", we'll all be on the way to a comprehension that will create a direction for the actions of today.

The practical proposal I wish to make is that you schedule, as the very first public educational (I assume by then you will have completed the classes on American Civilization on Trial) of the new year, a presentation of Chapter 2, and call it something like WHAT HAS MARX TO SAY TO US TODAY? And, though you need to deal with it on a theoretical plane, I believe you can make it concrete, for theory too must be practiced. Good luck.

Yours,
RAYA

P.S. I suppose there is no need to say that the ending of the chapter on Lenin's Philosophic Ambivalence will not be the same as in Telos not merely because 1970 will be gone by the time the book is finished, but, more importantly, because the chapter must lead to Part II, which is to deal with Alternatives -- Trotsky, Mao, Sartre -- against the objective background of the 1930's and 1940's. I decided, nevertheless, to add the brief postscript so that you keep before your mind's eye the historic periods we're covering from Hegel to the Marxist-Humanism of our day -- that is to say, from the French Revolution through the Russian to those of our day.

4313

December 14, 1970

Dear Friends:

Now that you are being sent Part Two* of Philosophy and Revolution I can continue the discussion on methodology begun when Part One was sent out where I raised the question of the changing dialectics in presenting in book-form what had previously been presented in individual chapters and separated parts. This appears clearest, I believe, in the chapter on Mao. Though there is no difference in conclusions drawn, there is in the form of presentation.

This is no mere technicality. As you know, in Hegel, form may be mere show as contrasted to content, but form is also, and above all, a concrete universal. To speak Marxistically, the Paris Commune form of the state is a non-state, a totally new set of human relations. So, though nowhere yet on that level, nevertheless the fact that, in the previous form, political conclusions dominated the philosophic reason for being of "Mao's Thought," whereas now the opposite is the dominant form of presentation, we can watch the self-development of ideas. Put in another way, we do not dismiss Mao's ideas because they deviate from Marx, but follow them, their transformation into opposite where, on the one hand, they compel Mao himself in a direction unanticipated by him, and, on the other hand, see opposition to him emerge in China itself. We must not forget that, where before the so-called Cultural Revolution, Mao had no New Left to bother him, he has one now.

One of the basic reasons why even the most objective and erudite of the analysts of Mao's China and opponents of Russia long before Mao did so for his own reasons, still could not see any serious elements of similarity between Stalin and Mao is due to the fact that Mao did differ from Stalin not only as one Big Power from another, but because of the philosophic approach to the "mass line." One of the best of these analysts, shocked at the "excesses" of the so-called Cultural Revolution, did think it "irrational" discontinuity from thought. When I said it appeared irrational only because he did not wish to acknowledge that Mao was accepting state-capitalism as the next stage of world development, putting socialism off to the Greek calends, I appeared to him "subjectivist." The philosophic point at issue was that any one as "voluntarist" as Mao couldn't possibly also be a "fatalist." That voluntarism and fatalism are opposites is true, but, dialectically, they are united in Mao's Thought, that is to say, they are the intellectual reflection which express the antagonisms of the capitalist order and its inability to resolve its problems. How can it be otherwise when the only resolution to class contradictions is proletarian revolution?

Do study the changes introduced in the writing of the chapter on Mao, as compared to what I had written in the analysis of the Cultural Revolution "by itself." The dialectics that will now emerge should help you in trying your hand at analyzing current events. That is, after all, the purpose of the book, that "the labor, patience, seriousness and suffering of the negative" over the historic periods and dialectic philosophers, from

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the French Revolution and Hegel, through the 1848 and 1871 Revolutions and Marx to our day will make each one of us the type of revolutionary dialectic philosopher that philosophy and revolution will finally unite en masse. Mao who, as poet, though not as ruler, always has a word for it, declared at the start of the Cultural Revolution, "We are all critics and revolutionaries. China has 700 million critics and revolutionaries." All he failed to add was that it was in the very Humanist Essays that he was attacking that Marx first defined dialectics as "critical and revolutionary." But then Sheng-wu-lien acted those characteristics out in a manner history will never forget who talks blarney and who both talks and "makes" revolutions.

Yours,

Raya

* Actually, it is not complete since the last chapter of Part Two, which will need to be totally rewritten — Jean-Paul Sartre — I had to put away for the time being. The reason is that I felt strongly that Part Three, or rather the last chapter in it, "New Passions and New Forces," should have the collaboration of Allen. He accepted the challenge and is flying here New Year's weekend. Therefore I must skip to that chapter. We will also try to take advantage of Allen's being in Detroit to have a discussion with black revolutionaries interested in this work. It is not to be a Black/Red type of philosophic conference where we were interested in all voices. This time we must concentrate on those blacks who want to develop, not their own ideas, but those of Marxist-Humanism.

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