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Rough Draft PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION, by Raya Dunayevskaya

Part III. - ECONOMIC REALITY and the DIALECTICS OF LIBERATION

Self-Determination in which  
 alone the Idea is to hear  
 itself speak.

-- Hegel

Chapter I - The African Revolutions and the World Economy.

In the realm of thought man can claim to be the brain of the world, but on the concrete level of real life, where any occurrence will affect both the physical and spiritual being, the world is always the brain of man... So who could claim to exclude any one school of thought, any one kind of thought, or any one human family, without by so doing, excluding himself to some extent from the total society of man?

-- Sekou Toure

The African Revolutions opened a new page in the dialectic of thought as well as in world history. At a time when the African Revolutions were redrawing the map of the world, the arrogance of white civilization, not only among the ruling class but even among some of the Left, persisted. Thus one socialist\* wrote about the African contribution as if its theory was all comprised in Tom Mboya's "one man, one vote." Leaving aside for the moment that "one man, one vote" disclosed nothing short of a revolution against white domination that parades as "democratic civilization," these intellectuals have a long way to go before they equal the African's intellectual grasp of his tasks and responsibilities, not to mention his courage, daring and totality of devotion to the struggle for freedom. Whether the idea was expressed as simply as Kkrumah expressed in the early 1950's, at the beginning of the struggle for independence from British imperialism: "Ready or not, here we come"; or whether, once the revolutions succeeded, the idea of freedom could be expressed more comprehensively, as in the words of Sekou Toure:

The science resulting from all human knowledge has no nationality. The ridiculous disputes about the origin of such and such a discovery do not interest us since they add nothing to the value of the discovery. It can therefore be said that African unity offers the world a new humanism essentially founded on the universal solidarity and cooperation between people without any racial and cultural antagonism and without narrow egoism and privilege. This is above and beyond the problem of West Africa and as far removed from the quarrels which divide the highly developed countries as are the conditions and aspirations of the African people.\*\*

\* Sidney Lens, "The Revolution in Africa," Liberation, Jan., Feb., March, 1960.

\*\* Sekou Toure's speeches are from those excerpted by Abdullayo Diop in his "Africa's Path in History." See Africa South, April - June, 1960, Capetown.

The point at all times was to keep, as one, the underlying philosophy of revolution and the "making" of revolution. Like the freedom fights against the Communist rulers in East Europe that began in East Berlin in 1953 and culminated in Budapest in 1956, the African revolutions against Western imperialism at the end of the 1950's were searching for a new humanism, seeking to work out a new relationship between theory and practice. Here is how Leopold Sedar Senghor put it in his report to the Constitutive Congress of his Party of African Federation in June, 1959:

A nation that refuses to keep its rendezvous with history, that does not believe itself to be the bearer of a unique message - that nation is finished, ready to be placed in a museum. The Negro African is not finished even before he gets started. Let him speak; above all, let him act. Let him bring like a leaven, his message to the world in order to help build a universal civilization.

He further singled out the Humanism of Marxism as most relevant to the African scene: "Let us recapitulate Marx's positive contributions. They are: the philosophy of humanism; economic theory; dialectical method."

Whether sloganized as "one man, one vote" or Pan-Africanism, Negritude or humanism, "Izwe Iathu" or "African Personality," Uhuru or African Socialism, "Seek yet first the political kingdom" or "Ujama," the call for freedom now reverberated around the world. Where "backward" Africa was charged with a dynamism of ideas that opened new paths to revolution, the Cold War reigning in advanced U.S. produced no pervasive malaise among bourgeois intellectuals that they proclaimed "an end to ideology."

Any traveller in Black Africa who is at all sensitive to freedom's call is under a compulsion from the surge of the liberation movement to become engaged. The dynamism of "Freedom Now" infuses even old ideas with a force capable of piercing any shield of apathy.

A mild American demurrer that there are "too many tribal languages" brought a heated response that there is always some African who knows the other tribe's language. Indeed, the sound of a single drum beat, or the sound of a truck with party flag flying, brings out an entire village. In less time than it takes the visitor to get out of the truck the whole village has assembled, with minstrel present to transmit loudly, for all to hear without benefit of wireless, the words of the most bashful of any tribe. In a flash the bantaba becomes transformed from a place of gossip to one charged with political discussions lasting far into the night. On many occasions I have had cause to doubt that Africans sleep at all! Nevertheless, despite the instant mass mobilizations and despite the fact that the search for new humanist beginnings that would unite philosophy and revolution, theory and practice, which was by no means limited to intellectuals, but was a need most urgently felt by the masses themselves, we must soberly face the present bleak reality. For, just as these revolutions reshaped the map of Africa in less than a decade, they just as rapidly reached the crossroads. Thus, though the revolutions sprung out of deep indigenous roots, and by their own force, achieved their emancipation independent of both "West" and "East," they were externally not quite as "non-aligned" after gaining power, and, internally, there was a separation between the leaders and the led. The latter remained workers and had to work harder

While the leaders became the rulers. Sucked into the world market dominated by advanced technologies, the technologically underdeveloped lands moved headlong to tragedy.

In the mid-1960's, no less than 17 out of the 37 newly-independent African states gave way to military coups. The tragedy of this movement backwards was starkest in Ghana where none had risen to the defense of Nkrumah, although he had been the first to have led a black freedom movement to its freedom, the first to have embarked upon the course of liberation with full awareness both of the need of a theory of revolution as well as mass participation in reconstruction of the country on new beginnings, and the first who attempted to work out perspectives for the whole of Africa, if not for the whole of the new Third World.

The fact that Nkrumah's revolutionary rhetoric fell far short of a theory of revolution in the full tradition of Marxism\*\*\* does not mean that it can be dismissed as nothing but a rationalization for a new elite headed by "most corrupt" Osagyefo, as the military that overthrew him now claims. On the other hand, we cannot take, at face value, Nkrumah's insistence that his downfall was nothing more than a neo-colonialist plot.

The truth is that the Ghanaian masses did not come to Nkrumah's defense. They danced in the streets instead. They demolished the statutes he had raised everywhere to his own glorification, not because "Western Imperialism" paid them to do so, much less because they were "backward" and failed to understand the great philosophy of freedom called Marxism, but degraded to "Nkrumahism," but because the gulf between theory and reality could no longer be bridged. The downfall was caused, not only by external causes, but by internal ones.

On the other hand, this doesn't mean that neo-colonialism is just a figment of super-heated imagination of African nationalists and/or Communists. To see the reality in all its complexities, we must, therefore, first of all look at the objective world situation and the contradictory relationship, not only between the technologically advanced and the technologically under-developed countries, but also the relationship between the advanced countries themselves. It is only then that we will be able to return to the internal causes and examine again the relationship between the rulers and ruled in the newly independent African countries.

The 1960's were supposed to have been a Decade of Development. Instead of that U.N. designation becoming a reality, we have actually witnessed a movement backward insofar as the technologically advanced countries are concerned and their "aid" to the new countries. The first flurry of "Western" concern or interest was stimulated by trying to keep on to their former empires now that these were no longer colonial enterprises, and then stimulated by fear to lose the politically independent countries to Communism. The interest lasted all too brief a time. The U.N. economic survey, in 1966, after some 200 pages of statistical tables and analyses, was forced to conclude that when you compare year 1961, with the year 1958, you find:

\*\*\* One apologist for Nkrumah who had been a Marxist did a tribute to him by claiming that Nkrumah "single-handedly outlined a programme based on the ideas of Marx, Lenin and Gandhi..." (Facing Reality by Grace Leo, J.R. Johnson, Fiore Chaulieu). Outside of Nkrumah's immediate entourage who degraded the whole of Marxism to "Nkrumahism," most analysts inside and outside of Ghana were well enough aware of the mutilation of the very concept of theory by Nkrumah.

The considerable gaps in level of activity and extent of industrialization between the industrialized and the developing countries, each considered as a whole, remained essentially of the same dimensions in 1961 as 1938. (p. 234)

It does not take great imagination to realize how very heavily the West still weighs down upon Africa when one keeps in mind that 1938 was the year of the great un-ending depression when colonialism reigned supreme while 1960, "The Africa Year" was the year when no less than 16 countries had gained their independence, when the advanced lands supposedly welcomed these countries with open arms and the World Bank. Clearly, neo-colonialism is not something invented, either by the Communist or the African but is the truth of existing world capitalism. It becomes all the more evident when the analysis is not limited to one year of independence but extends to six years of the "development decade."

Indeed, if allowance is made for the reverse flows (of interest and profit and indigenous capital) and for the fact that a large proportion of receipts consists of transfers in kind (much in the form of designated 'surplus' commodities) or of reinvested profits earned in the developing countries themselves, it is evident that the amount of new, external, disposable purchasing power being made available to the developing countries has declined to a very low level. (1966, p. 3. emphasis mine).

The lack of flow of investment capital to the technologically underdeveloped countries is certainly not due to the fact that they are supposedly so backward, so lacking in technical personnel that they could not put capital to use. Even so conservative a person as David Rockefeller has estimated, in 1967, that the countries could absorb easily three to four billion dollars more annually than they are now receiving. No, the reason no capital flows that way insofar as the "West" is concerned is that private capital does not get invested there at all now that they have found that they can get greater rates of profit in the developed countries in Western Europe.

To see the tragedy in all its implications, let us first look at the decline even in agriculture in the underdeveloped countries and then compare it to the phenomenal growth of West Europe. The U.N. study shows that "between 1954-65, the total agricultural production is estimated to have been a mere 1%, well below the growth in population." Worst of all, as distinct from agricultural production, food production per capita has diminished by 2% in 1965-66 as compared to the five year average from 1952-3 to 1957-8. Finally, the "Christian West" never even came up to the meager sum of 1% national gross product to be contributed to the developing countries. Instead it declined to 0.84% in 1961, 0.62% in 1967, while the U.S. Congress cut the President's budget for 1968 from \$3,200 million to \$2,300 million, the lowest in its 20 year post-war history!

Now look at the "sensational 50's" as seen from the vantage point of the advanced technologies:

Per Capita Gross Domestic Products by Major Regions  
1955 and 1960

	Average annual compound rate of growth	
	1950-55	1955-60
Developed market economies	3.4	2.0
North America	2.5	0.5
Western Europe	4.2	3.3
Japan	7.6	8.5
Developing Market economies	2.5	1.8
Latin America	1.9	1.6
Africa	2.2	1.6
Far East	2.4	1.8
West Asia	3.0	2.4

(Source: World Economic Survey, UN, New York 1965, p. 31)

Now compare just the technologically advanced countries of this decade as against the whole period, 1913-1950:

	1913-50	1950-60
France	1.7	4.4
Germany	1.2	7.6
Italy	1.3	5.9
Sweden	2.2	3.3
United Kingdom	1.7	2.6
Canada	2.8	3.9
United States	2.9	3.2
<u>Average</u>	1.9	4.2

(Source: A. Maddison, p. 28)

There is no doubt about the phenomenal growth, but there is a great deal more than the introduction of plan involved. Though the latter helps, the decisive feature is the holocausts of world war and the spurt to growth of capital given after the total destruction! On the other hand, it does not aid the underdeveloped technologies who had no capital to begin with, as the UN study shows.

The underdeveloped countries have learned that for those who have no accumulated capital, the new technological revolutions to industrialize more rapidly have no value whatever. They remain monocultures, the price of their one crop buffeted by the price structure of the world market, and whether they plan or do not plan, has little effect on the neo-colonialist structure. When the price of their one crop falls drastically, as cocoa did in Ghana in 1965, there are all the preconditions for a downfall. For that matter, even where a state, like Cuba, is protected from the worst whims of the world market and whose state plan is total, the price of sugar is still dependent upon the socially necessary labor time established by world production. In a word, to plan or not to plan is not the decisive question. The state of technological development and the accumulated capital are the determinants.

This is an age when from a "purely economic" point of view, Marx's forecast of capitalist collapse has moved from theory to life. The decade of the 1950's underlines vividly the problem of capital in narrow capitalistic terms while, at the same time, it illuminates Marx's extreme assumption that capitalism would collapse even if "the full twenty-four hours a day... (of the labourer) were wholly appropriated by capital."

Marx's contention was that the system would collapse because surplus value comes from living labor. Yet the contradictory tendency in capitalist development that rests on this exploitation of labor is to use less of living labor and more of machines. The contradiction between needing ever lesser amounts of living labor to set in motion ever greater amounts of dead labor creates, at one and the same time, a massive unemployed army and a decline in the rate of profit.

In the heyday of imperialism, the super-profits extracted from the carve-up of Africa and the colonization of the Orient seemed to contradict Marx's prediction so that not only bourgeois economists, but even Marxists of the stature of Rosa Luxemburg wrote that we might as well wait for "the extinction of the moon" as wait for the decline in the rate of profit to undermine capitalism.

Lush as the mass of profits are, and heavily as the extraction of unpaid hours of labor weighs on workers' backs, the truth is that there isn't enough capital produced to keep the crazy capitalist system going with self-same profit motive on an ever-expanding scale. Interestingly enough, it was not in a Marxist work on the decline in the rate of accumulation of capital but the 1961 study of Capital in American Economy that proved that there has been a steady rate of decline in the accumulation of capital and not just over a short period, but in the long term run. Thus, the rate of accumulation declined from 14.6% in 1869-1888 to 11.2% in 1909-28 down to 7% in 1945-55. Moreover, this decline in the rate of accumulation occurred despite the fact that since World War II, the labor productivity increased 3.5% annually. In a word, despite the tremendous growth in mass production, despite the expansion of American capital, there had been no "automatic" growth in rate nor in "market."

It is for this reason that we couldn't get out of the 1929 depression; it simply was absorbed into World War II, and then only by virtue of the expansion of state intervention into the economy did production keep increasing.

The start of serious intervention began, not with World War II, but with the depression; between 1929 and 1957 there was a four-fold increase in production, but a ten-fold increase in government expenditures, from 10.2 billion in 1929 to 110.1 billion in 1957. Moreover, despite the fact that the U.S. had the highest output in the world, per man hour, the profits in the 1950's were lower than in Western Europe. In summation, just as the 1929 world crisis made the decline in the rate of accumulation apparent in the advanced countries, so the Afro-Asian revolutions in the 1950's and 1960's disclosed that, even in prosperous times, the advanced countries do not have capital sufficient for the development of the underdeveloped economies. So long as the motive force of production continues to be the accumulation of surplus value (or unpaid hours of labor) -- whether for private plants or for state space-ships -- the straining of the ruling class to appropriate the full 24 hours of man's labor still fails to create sufficient capital to industrialize "the backward lands."

Theory and fact have moved so close to each other that it would be hard to find anyone who would claim today that there is an excess of capital anywhere in the world. This is obvious when one looks at underdeveloped economies like India, China, Africa and Latin America. It is just as obvious in Western Europe, the United States and Russia.

After two centuries of world domination by capitalism, the capitalist ideologists have to admit that (1) until the end of the nineteenth century, no country outside of Western Europe had been industrialized; (2) that since the 20th century, the two countries that had entered the industrialized world, (one through social revolution) -- the addition of Russia and Japan to the industrialized orbit -- hardly touched the total world population. That is to say, even with these additions, there was a change of only 0.3 billion out of a world population of 2 billion; and (3) two-thirds of the world is still starving while the other elite industrialized nations are busy inventing ways to appropriate ever-more unpaid hours of labor, both from its own workers and those in its former colonies.

In a word, World War II. did nothing to change the two basic laws of capitalist development -- the law of value and surplus value, on the one hand, and the law of concentration and centralization of capital, on the other -- which is at the root of the general crisis of world capitalism, private or statified. Quite the contrary, where previously economic crises were sufficient to destroy obsolescent capital and restart the growth cycle, this time not even so catastrophic and prolonged a crisis as the world depression of the 1930's could restart value production. As one of the most scholarly and profound of modern economists, Simon Kuznets put it:

Thus, emergence of the violent Nazi regime in one of the most economically developed countries of the world raises grave questions about the institutional basis of modern economic growth - if it is susceptible to such a barbaric deformation as a result of transient difficulties.\*\*\*\*

Furthermore, even under those barbarous conditions, the value production that "ended unemployment" laid the foundation for the holocaust. The name for the fierceness of international competition is world war. The phenomenal growth of Western Europe in the 1950's was only further proof of the fact that new growth depended on the equally phenomenal destruction of capital in the holocaust of World War II. Contradictions deepened as growth of production meant increase of capital as well as its concentration and centralization. Of necessity, therefore, this expansion was limited to the elite one-seventh of the world, i.e., the industrialized countries, excluding the underdeveloped countries altogether. The industrialization of the underdeveloped lands was an unwanted task, indeed, an impossible task for capitalism.

\*\*\*\*Simon Kuznets, Postwar Economic Growth. The Bellknop Press of Harvard University Press, 1964.

The world market is the instrument through which the most advanced in world production sucked in, not only the underdeveloped countries, but the developed ones. Thus, despite the "miracle of the 1950's" in the development of Western Europe, the American Behemoth is now being described, to use Wilson's phrase, as "industrial helotry." While the miracle lasted, it created a new growth fetishism. Many figures were cited to show that, in contrast to the depression and the aftermath of World War II, Western Europe was no longer buffeted about by anything that happens to the United States. Although it was recognized that the U.S. economy, in its aggregate even when it is nearly stagnant as it was in the 1950's -- was still as large as the whole of industrialized Europe, the claim was nevertheless made that because the government had assumed so important a role in the economy, these technologically developed countries were now, not only free from major depression but that "what appears as the business cycle is nowadays mainly a reflection of phases in government policies." (Angus Maddison, Economic Growth in the West, Twentieth Century Fund, New York 1964, p. 99)

The truth is the exact opposite. The growth fetishism covered up the business recessions as if they were merely temporary governmental decisions. Now that the governmental decisions are all for growth, plus "independence" from American industry, but the actual movement is in the opposite direction, the claim that "the pattern has changed completely since 1958" (p. 160) can hardly stand up.

Again, the point is that here, too, to plan or not to plan has ceased to be the pivotal question, first, because it is not a panacea, much less a substitute for a fundamental reorganization of the relations in production. Not that planning isn't a feature of modern capitalism. Even where it is disclaimed altogether, as in the U.S., it is, in actuality, operative. The illusion that there is no state plan in the U.S., "a private free enterprise" country, if ever there was one, is only one more example of what Marx called "the fixity of a popular prejudice."

All one has to do to see the state interference into the economy, the state planning that, in fact, determines the direction of private capital investments, its full empire over the field of science is to look at the statistics of any years beginning with this year and rolling it back to the depression.

Thus: (1) federal expenditures take up no less than 10% of the total output of goods and services even in the "sensational 60's" where there has been private capital investment. As for the 1950's, where the economy was sluggish, it was practically the government alone which accounted for capital investment.

(2) These lush military contracts do not mean that private capital could be kept within the national boundaries when the profits were higher through investment in Europe while its "narrow" profitability in the U.S. was unavoidable because of the preponderance of constant capital.

(3) No less than twenty four billion dollars was expended in 1967 alone for Research and Development. That is more than the gross national product of all but twelve countries in the world. At the outbreak of World War II, government investment amounted to only 3% of the money spent in Research. It is now no less than 53%.

(4) Towering above everything else is the militarization of the economy. Even before the escalation of the Vietnam War, it had grown at a fantastic rate. Here is what Wassily Leontief and Marvin Hoffenberg write:



The Federal Government of the U.S. has been spending somewhat more than \$40 billion per year on maintenance of the military establishment and the procurement of arms. These outlays have absorbed about 10% of the gross national product and they have exceeded by several billion the combined net annual investment in manufacturing, service, industry, transportation, agriculture.  
 (U.S. Armament and the Economy, 1963, p. 89)

Emile Benoit who edited that volume on Disarmament shows the great drop in industrial output, on the one hand, and rise in unemployment, on the other hand, following the end of the Korean War. Moreover, with militarization decreased, there was absolutely no rise in real investment in producers durable equipment, so that by 1958-61 it dropped 16% below the 1956 level.

Recently, Mr. Benoit edited still one more volume on disarmament, this time in relation to World economic interdependence. This first comprehensive standardized tabulation of economic resources covers 36 nations -- and these account for 97% of the world's military spending of 133 billion dollars -- communist and non-communist countries alike, including such different types of politics and of underdevelopment as China, Israel and the UAR. It is this militarization of the world's economy which gives the lie to the supposedly miraculous growth of the phenomenal "50's" and the "sensational 1960's". The "socialist" countries as well as private capitalist ones -- include militarization of their economies as if that were true industrialization of their economies, and as if that somehow helped industrialize the technologically underdeveloped countries because either "Western" aid to the Volta project in Ghana or Russian aid to the High Aswan dam made it so. The Russian statistics detailed the share of this orbit in world industrial production as follows:

Share of "Socialist Countries in the World Industrial Production

1917	.....	Less than 3 per cent
1937	.....	Less than 10 per cent
1950	.....	about 20 per cent
1955	.....	about 27 per cent
1965	.....	All Socialist Countries*.. about 38 per cent

\* Includes U.S.S.R. which in itself represents almost one-fifth of the world industrial production.

(Source: Narodnoe khozjajstvo SSSR v 1965 g., Statisticheskij obozrenie, Centralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Moskva 1966, p. 82.)

To explain why, with all that growth in industrial production, and a full half century after the Russian Revolution, the standard of living of the workers still had "to catch up" with that under private capitalism, the Communists were compelled to go back to the pivot on which all capitalist production revolves -- labor productivity. Since that is highest in "the West," especially in the U.S., they had a thoroughly capitalistic answer to the problem: the workers must continue to work and work harder -- "otherwise it is impossible to explain why the worker in the U.S. gets more wages than the Polish worker." (World Marxist Review, December 1967)

In a word, the mainspring of statified production, calling itself Communism, is precisely that of private capitalism -- the law of value, i.e., the exploitation of labor. The state plan, which has been christened "socialism," turns out to be the form of rule that Marx had always defined as "the despotic plan of capital." At the same time, militarization of the economy, Gargantuan as it has become in a

nuclear armed world, only intensifies the general crises; it cannot overcome the law of value. Rather, it itself is the proof that there is no other law for capitalist development, except that the ferocity of the world competition at this stage of capitalist development ends in world war. No matter what the differences between statified and private production, the fundamental laws of capitalism are operative, both internally and externally. This holds true also in the relationship between the advanced and the underdeveloped countries. That of Russia, whether it be to Egypt or even its former Communist ally, China, does not differ fundamentally from that of the U.S. to Latin America or Africa. State capitalism can no more industrialize the underdeveloped countries than private capitalism. In all instances, the technological revolutions further increased the accumulated capital needed to keep automated production going on an ever-expanding scale. Since, however, the immensity of this accumulated capital employed, relatively, less and less living labor, the most industrialized and most affluent capital experienced a decline in the rate of profit.

Hence, the U.S. not only did not industrialize the unindustrialized countries but proceeded to invest in Western Europe where the rate of profit was higher, earning itself the name of "industrial heletry."

Atomic energy and automated machines could accelerate the whole industrial development to a point where Biblical miracles would be poor imaginative material. This is not utopia, nor tomorrow.

Technologically this is today. Power plants fueled by atomic energy are already in operation. Russia claims plans to blast lake sites in barren Russian areas. Big business circles in America say there are plans in progress for blasting a huge harbour in northern Alaska with a single atomic explosion.

But if atomic energy is used to create man-made lakes in the Sahara and Gobi deserts, to move mountains so that rain may fall where now there is drought -- if these are not utopian dreams but things technologically possible today, it would nevertheless be the height of naivete to imagine that capitalism, private or state, is or will be capable of their realization.

Not only will capitalism not do it for the underdeveloped countries, it cannot do it for itself. Brezhnev's Russia, like private corporations in America that demand "cost plus" contracts, must spend billions on rocket development, not for the touted "space exploration," but for intercontinental ballistic missile production. Both poles of world capital are busy forcing science to work for a nuclear war, a war that might very well spell the end of civilization as we have known it. Trying hard to get into the exclusive nuclear club is not only De Gaulle's France but Mao's China, and for the same reasons, the domination of world labor, for when all is said and done, labor, living labor is the only source of surplus value, that is to say, unpaid congealed labor.

This is why the crisis is so total -- labor will no longer consent to be mere object. That this is seen clearest in the underdeveloped world speaks of the high political maturity of our age and the "full knowledge" that such a relationship of capital to labor has never led either to full industrialization or a different way of life for the masses. Thus, if we take the long view -- a half century -- the gap between Asia (except Japan) and Africa had already created such a wide gulf that, when Russia and Japan shifted over to be industrialized countries, this shift hardly

touched the world's total population since, in population, the two countries accounted for only 0.3 billion of a total close to 2 billion. And that estimate (Simon Kuznets, Postwar Economic Growth, 1964 (Cambridge)) does not take into account either Latin America or Eastern Europe! If, then, we consider the entire range to which this question of relationship of developed lands to underdeveloped ones in the post WW II world, which, of course, includes these two countries among the developed ones, the situation has not at all improved. The full extent of the ever-widening, of the unbridgeable gulf, can be seen at its starkest if we look at an underdeveloped land in Asia that the "West" is most anxious to help as a bulwark against Chinese Communism, India. The per-capita gross domestic product in the U.S. in 1958 was \$2,324 as against only \$67 for India, or a ratio of 35 to 1! There is no capitalist way to overcome such fantastic disparity.

The situation does not improve much if, in relating advanced to backward, we compare Russia and China. It is true that the collaboration in the first years was much more effective than any in the Western World and China certainly appeared, in comparison to India, to be vastly superior, in its rate of growth, not to mention its social overturn as against the static village economy of India with its caste restrictions and cow superstition.\* The fact, however, that China was not satisfied with the pace of industrialization and that the Sino-Soviet conflict emerged as a world challenge (with which we will deal in great detail later) can be measured statistically if we continue with our comparison of the underdeveloped countries with the American Colossus; China with its 700 million souls, California alone out-produces that vast land; \$84 billion as against 80 billion. Africa -- East, West, North, and even including rich apartheid South Africa -- produces only a little more than the State of Illinois; \$50 billion to \$48 billion. In a word, just as there is no solution along the private capitalistic path, so there is no way out along the path of state capitalism calling itself communism.

Nevertheless, neo-colonialism couldn't have been reborn so easily had the revolutionary situation continued to deepen. The dialectics of liberation which had torn the African states from out of the domination of imperialism was proof enough of the miracles that can be accomplished with the upsurge of revolution. The uniqueness of revolution is that it so alters human experience that totally new human relations open up. These new human relations put an end to the separate oppositeness of subject and object. The release of untapped energies that shook empires and gained freedom also compelled the empire states into giving aid to their former colony.

And where De Gaulle's France deprived Guinea of even its telephones, the daring of the Guineans inspired others to help. The prime element then was the mass confidence that it is they, and not dead things (be they machines or lack of machines) that shape the course of history. The spontaneity of their united action did, indeed, deliver blows to the law of value at home and in the world market.

The tragedy of the African revolutions began the day after revolution because, first, leaders were so weighted down with consciousness of their technological backwardness, that they turned away from the masses and turned instead to one of the two poles of world capital. The isolation from the masses deepened so that the new rulers began to look at them as mere labor power. The result was, not only a drop in wages -- the rise directly after independence proved a temporary feature -- and the aid the countries received from both nuclear titans lessened, but also they began to speak different languages. The leaders could think of nothing more than pressing down upon the workers; the more revolutionary the rhetoric, the more exploitative the reality.

Thus, as Ghana moved ever closer to the Communist orbit, and state planning, the gulf between the leaders and the led so widened that there was a general strike. By 1961, Ghana was full of plans -- a three-year developmental plan; a seven-year plan for "work and happiness" -- which, while aiming at nothing short of self-sustaining industrial growth by 1967, went hand in hand with a demand for a 5% compulsory savings. The day the pay envelopes reflected this 5% reduction, the general strike broke out in the most industrialized sector of the economy.

Ghana was one African country that did try to diversify production. Despite the fact that cocoa remained king, Ghana had, with the Volta project, begun an industrial complex. It was precisely in Sekondi-Takoridi where the railway workers, dock workers, commercial employees, civil servants and market women joined the protest against the wage reductions. These workers were supported by the transport workers in Accra and Kumasi. The reaction of the leaders was exactly that of rulers everywhere. The worker-leaders of the strike were arrested. Those trade union officials that had supported rank-and-file demands were expelled from the trade unions and the Convention Peoples Party. The workers were forced back to work.

It is these internal developments, and not neo-colonialism, which widened the gulf between leaders and led. At the same time the isolation from the masses caused the leaders to play the game of neutrality on the world political scene, where they were more neutral to one pole of capital than the other, gaining nothing from either. The whole economy was thereby sucked into the world market to so decisive a degree that the fall of price of cocoa, the main commodity, laid the foundation for the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime. Not that this happened overnight, or by a single blow, rather it was the climax of a movement that began some two or three years after independence.

When I got to Accra in April, 1962, the massive strikes had ended. The Trades Union Congress was organized under the banner of "Toward Nkrumahism." When I interviewed Mr. Magnus-George, Deputy Acting Secretary of the Ghanaian Trades Union Federation, I did not ask for further enlightenment on that question, but limited myself to questions as to the loss of independence of the trades union movement with its merger with the CPP. A blustery individual, Mr. Magnus-George spoke belligerently:

We do not see the reasons why people in Europe always ask us why we are an integral part of the CPP. It is not their business to tell us what to do. We're living in a free country and can do what we like. We're an integral part of the CPP and have no separate trade union card. We're going to step up productivity with the Three-Year Development Plan (July 1961 to July 1964)... It will be very interesting for you to know that any time there is a misunderstanding with the state and workers down tools, after their grievances are redressed, they work free to make up lost time.

This wasn't the story that I got either from the Ghanaian workers or from other African trade unionists, who had to deal with the Ghanaian trade unions, that had followed the slogan of the East German trade union propaganda slogan, "defeat the imperialist by economic accomplishments through the productivity pledge movement." Thus, M.E. Jallow, who heads the Gambia Workers Union and who had been characterized by Magnus-George as a "lackey of imperialism," said to me:

I have the highest respect for President Toure and Nkrumah as fighters; they are trying to adapt socialism to African realities; but, to be realistic, the AATUP was built up for ideological reasons. And now in Ghana they call workers' strikes 'labor indiscipline'. We will never bow to such an attitude to labor. We will not bow to an organization that calls workers' strikes 'labor indiscipline.'

An old-timer who was in the union office then added: "the old saying was 'the sun never sets on the British Empire and the wages never rise' and now we are going through the same type of thing. What our new leaders don't recognize is that organizations come very quickly, especially among the youth, but they also disappear quickly. But revolutions never stop. We will have ours."

That same theme was sounded also in Senegal. While President Senghor speaks most eloquently about African Socialism, the country itself has undergone very little economic changes after gaining political independence. Senegal still follows De Gaulle France all too closely and not only in foreign policy. The truth is that the relationship of worker to management at the point of production and the relationship of the great masses as consumers to the petty trades is pretty much what it was before political independence was achieved. Indeed, one African friend was so infuriated as we walked from the beautiful wide boulevards of Dakar into the back street slums and, on the way, passed the markets where ownership remains in non-African hands that he said bitterly, "as we embark on our second revolution, these white settlers will make of Dakar another Algiers."

Nor is such talk limited to West Africa; either where there has been very nearly no change in economic dependence on the "mother country" since gaining political independence, or where there have been military over-turns of the leaderships that won independence. It extends also to East Africa, again not only in countries where an opposition party exists and points to a different road of development, as in Kenya, (see Not Yet Uhuru, by Oginga Odinga) but in Tanzania where Julius Nyerere has himself changed courses, both on the question of industrialization and in relation to the existing elite in his own party. Where, to outsiders, Nyerere's famous Arusha Declaration appears to be no more than a recognition of the "correctness" of Renee's Dumont's False Start in Africa, Nyerere's emphasis on agricultural development rather than industrial spectaculars because 75% of Tanzanians live on the land is a confrontation, not only with the economic realities of Africa but with the self-development of Africans theoretically. Not only does the U.S., as a global power, limit its "friendship" for Nyerere only so long as he is considered as not having fully fallen into the Chinese orbit, but even intellectuals who are not connected with the State Department are totally deaf to the voices that come from African self-development. The superior air of non-Marxists, who speak of the "deceiving simplicity of dialectic" (Christopher Bird, "Scholarships and Propaganda" Problems of Communism, March-April, 1962) is too filled with complacency to let any knowledge, either of Marxian dialectics or of African reality filter in as the Africans, not the Americans, understand them. Those who try to force an identity of Marxism, a theory of man's self-emancipation, with Communism, the practice of state capitalist exploitation, bar an objective rational approach, both to theory and to practice. Were it even true that Nyerere didn't consider himself an independent socialist (except that he does), it would still be a fact that throughout newly independent Africa, the great majority especially the youth, considers socialism the only road to real freedom,

rejects capitalism outright, and feels sure that the "seeds of revolution" that have been planted cannot be destroyed, not even by the superior might of the technologically advanced countries that reach for outer space, while millions are killed or allowed to starve.

This attitude is pervasive among all strata of Africans. Even at the formal meetings of the U.N., African leaders express agreement with Marx who, they feel, is closer to the realities of Africa than the living Africanists. Thus, at the second UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) meeting in New Delhi, February, 1968, Mali's director of economic planning quoted Marx's statement, "man's economic conditions determines his social consciousness, not his social consciousness the economic conditions" for the purposes of warning the West what might happen next. (A.I 8/9/68)

The much-touted 1% of the GNP that the "Christian West" was supposed to have set aside for development of the newly independent Afro-Asian countries, small enough as it was, never became a reality. The 1961 figures show the aid to have been 0.87% and this had further fallen to a low of 0.55% in 1967. Moreover, this decline in aid came about just when the trade of the underdeveloped countries in the world market fell from 27% in 1953 to 19% in 1967, and the prices of primary goods fell again by 7% while the manufactured goods the underdeveloped lands had to import rose by 10%. As Yame Sangare of Liberia put it: "And even worse, they (the developed countries) feel little moral guilt for the increasing gap between the two worlds." (*Africa Today*, August-September, 1968) And so, after two full months of discussion, the 1600 delegates representing 121 member states, and 44 international organizations left UNCTAD with a lot of pent-up anger at the do-nothingness and indifference of the big powers.

One African educator wrote me recently that, utopian as it might sound, "theory is more imperative for Africa at this stage than even economic help. Without a theoretic framework we will continue to go nowhere fast." It isn't that he is living on the moon; it is that, living very much in the African reality, he is insisting that theoreticians must stop dividing theory from practice "a la Senghor" who can speak of the humanism of Marxism in the same breath as he follows the policies of DeGaulle, and must instead, work out a new relationship of theory to practice which arises out of the practice of the masses. It is a fact that among the youth, workers included, and among those intellectuals who do not identify too closely with the existing state power in their own country, the ideas that aroused them in the struggle for freedom continue to be debated. The disgust is not with Marx and humanism but, as one put it,\* with the "new breed of Africanists who serve up some undigestible concoction of Marxism, Pan-Africanism and Nkrumahism" as if Nkrumah's fall was nothing but a neo-colonialist plot.

It is not possible to comprehend the African reality outside of both the compelling objective forces of world production, the pull of the world market, and the underlying philosophy of the masses which Marx called "the quest for universality." The fact is that the new "energizing principle" was not sucked into the world market and even now, after all the set-backs, shows nothing as disastrous as the malaises which beset affluent U.S.A. Far from rigor mortis having set in among "the poor Africans", they are continuing the discussion of the relationship of philosophy to revolution, and not only among themselves but internationally. The whole point seems to be to hold on to the principle of creativity, and the contradictory process by which creativity develops. Isn't this the truth that assured the forward movement of humanity on the new level of thought that became a reality ever since the French Revolution?