

English title: The Challenge of Mao Tse-Tung

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毛澤東的挑戰

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編者按：本文係Raya Dunayevskaya 所著「馬克思主義與自由 (Marxism and Freedom)」一書中的第十八章，下分四節：一、中共的反革命行爲；二、毛澤東思想的演變；三、國家資本主義的強制經濟；四、中蘇共可能發生戰爭嗎？按原作者曾任托洛茨基秘書，對共產主義運動的發展與分裂，有其獨到的見解。茲由秋照女士譯成中文，交由本刊發表，敬希讀者留意。

一、中共的反革命行爲

「有一些人認爲馬克思主義可以醫治百病，我們應該告訴他們，教條並不如牛糞好，牛糞還可以做肥料。」

——毛澤東

(一) 戰爭與革命的八股文

中蘇共的分裂，使得中國共產黨大放革命口號，他們把毛澤東說成是一個毫無污點、全副革命武裝的馬克思列寧主義者。西方的新聞界，正傾其全力注意著中蘇共間的權力爭奪，未過揭穿中共這隻幼稚的神話。中蘇共公開的引經據典的論戰開始於一九六〇年，毛澤東向蘇列寧所著的「國家與革命」，赫魯曉夫則採用列寧所著的「共產主義運動中的左傾幼稚病」。在他們的爭論中，文字變得毫無意義，只不過是與恰如毛澤東所說的「八股文」空話而已。

儘管中共不斷叫嚷著好聽的革命口號，整個毛澤東的歷史都證明他是一個反對教條主義的戰士，而不是反對修正主義的。毛澤東與赫魯曉夫是一個懦夫，從長權種子詐進而畏懼革命，赫魯

曉夫對「中國同志」的加入反動「原子戰爭份子及狂人」表示「惋惜」，他們的這些相互指責都是因權力政治而發出的。雖是如此，這並不等於說理論之爭就沒有它自己的邏輯性，也不會影響到權力爭奪。我們不要讓自稱爲共產黨員的雙方所蒙蔽，忽視了他們的階級本質，其實，雙方都是徹頭徹尾的資本主義者。在他們的權權統治之下，國家資本主義僅是採取了另一形式，內容並沒有改變。促使他們公開衝突的內在力量並不是偶然的。中蘇共第一次分裂的一九五九年，不僅是赫魯曉夫欲提出「大衛營」精神，拜訪美國；不僅是中共侵入印度邊界的那一年（一九六二年），在這時期，蘇聯與中共的內部都有著嚴重的事務發生。尤以中共內部，事態更為嚴重。自然災害之外，還加上人為的災害，這是那些極權統治者欲藉大躍進——加於人民的罪惡人逆奴役，一躍而將全國工業化、集體化和公社化。其結果，不但在一年之內建立起新的社會秩序，反使六億五千萬人民陷於飢荒或接近飢荒的邊緣。

革命的呼聲是從中國大陸內部發出的，而不是外來的。但是，中蘇共這極權引經典著作的論戰卻是指向國外，因為，這兩個自稱共產黨的國家資本主義政權正在新的非洲、亞洲和拉丁美洲爲自

己的影響力而進行着劇烈的競爭。馬克思的有關解放的理論對這些地區的自由戰士具有極大的吸引力，而中共與蘇聯在爭論時都是引經據典地自命爲正統的馬克思主義者。我們所處的時代，不僅是核子時代，也是一個思想鬥爭的時代。任何對「最惡毒的與帝」的論爭都需要一個超越黨派的理論作武器，這種理論武器與「實力」同等重要。我們必須從這個角度去分析，才能了解中蘇共之間的衝突與毛澤東如何向赫魯曉夫爭奪整個共產主義世界的領導權。

毛澤東對於征服世界有極大的野心，他並不畏懼或推諉可能引起核子災難的責任。他自嘲笑的口吻說，假若核子戰爭爆發，中國受害最重，「即使我們有二億人死掉了，也還有五億人會留下來。」這種狂妄使全世界驚駭。他還說笑所謂核子戰爭，把所有害怕核子戰爭的人都說成是懦夫或「修正主義者」。紅旗宣稱：「現代修正主義者被核子戰爭政策嚇壞了，他們害怕核子戰爭逐漸變爲害怕革命。」

中共這種以革命爲榮的態度是指向國外的革命而說的。其實，中國內部的黨案才真是想要革其統治階級和毛澤東的命。在短促的「百花齊放、百家爭鳴」期間，反對一黨專政的呼聲是如此清晰和堅決，致使爭鳴者遭到殘暴的迫害。

若不了解一九五六—一九五七年全球上所發生的事件，就很難明白中共領導者當時在國內外、外所面臨的局勢。匈牙利革命不能被看作只是一個國內的革命，同樣，中國國內的不滿也不能只作爲是一國之事。中共向匈牙利當時的情形都可以導致這些國家資本主義社會中的階級關係

China Monthly, No. 39, June, 1967

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的改變，並發展為世界歷史的轉折點。

一九五六年，爭取自由的鬥爭在世界史上展開了新的一頁。它開始於二月蘇聯吞併捷克斯拉夫的大林化。赫魯曉夫希望藉此緩和東歐革命社會的許多不安因素。這一年以匈牙利革命作結束。匈牙利革命使人無容懷疑地清楚了這些自由而奮鬥的戰士所要求的自由是應當與共產主義社會那過去爭取的。

一九五七年二月，毛澤東頗為自信地認為他可以如一個仁慈的「太陽」，允許「百家爭鳴，百花齊放」不會有危險。孰料中國人民「爭鳴」「齊放」得如此激烈，它暴露了中國的統治階級與被統治階級之間的不可調和的矛盾，更進而揚棄了把毛澤東捧為實現馬克思解放理論的英雄的謊話。

官僚主義者的瘋狂和他們對於邏輯與現實的無知，使他們總是要想盡辦法使現實事物去適應他們的理想，一旦發現人們不能按照他們的意願被改造時，便認為這些人應當被毀滅。這正是偉大的哲學家黑格爾——分析精神的自我脫離的抽象哲學演變——所謂「現實與思想的絕對顛倒，它們間的完全脫離」的一個活生生的實例。

在中共，自一九五七年五月八日開始到六月中間的短期公開爭論，說明了中蘇共的基本分歧和中蘇共對美國的基本爭執，同時，戰爭與革命的問題也被提到要點上來。雖然爭論自由在中國只基於花一現；雖然中國官方並未將反對方面的言論完全公佈，但要求自由的呼聲衝破了這些阻礙，猶如它能衝破言語的隔閡一樣。對於全世界愛好自由的人民來說，匈牙利自由戰士所說的不是他們的馬克思話，非洲革命志士所說的不是他們的士蒂希利話，他們的言論能將所有的人民所擁護，我們聽到了來自中國的爭取自由的呼聲。

聲，我們便自覺地與他們站在一邊。他們的行動是人類爭取自由的語言，讓我們揭起他們的革命呼聲吧！

(二) 反叛的呼聲

林希爾，廿一歲：「真正的社會主義是極其民主化的，但是，我們這裏的社會卻沒有民主，這種社會我把它是基於封建主義的社會主義」。人民日報一九五七年六月卅日轉載說：「她稱它們（我們社會中的某種氣氛）為階級制度，就它（即階級制度）已經深入到我生活中的各方面……她別有用心地說蘇聯和中國的生產力都非常低，這兩個國家並沒有消除階級差別……而且，引用恩格斯的不能在一個國家中建設社會主義的理論，和列寧對社會主義即是消除階級的論斷作出結論，說現在的蘇聯和中國都不是社會主義。她大聲疾呼地要求去尋找真正的社會主義，並且宣稱要用激烈的手段改變目前的社會制度。」

瀋陽師範學院共青團宣傳部主任，張寶盛 (Chang Po-sheng)：「所有的重要事情只憑六個人就決定了，這六個人是毛主席、劉少奇、周恩來和幾個高於中共中央書記處的首長。六億人的命運就操在這六個人的筆下，他們怎麼能瞭解下面的實情呢？最多不過去黃河視察一趟或游過長江。」(瀋陽日報，一九五七年六月十一日)。

「自去年來，本省的工人發起了十三件罷工和鬧事事件。」(新華社廣州通訊一九五七年六月十四日)。

工會被稱為「官僚主義的舌頭」，「工會被撤在一邊，因為這些工會組織不關心或不支持群眾的正當要求……所以廣州、長沙、武漢、新

鄉、石家莊等地的一些工人，把本來是代表自己利益的工會，叫作行政領導下的「工人管理科」，「官僚主義的舌頭」和「行政的尾巴」等等……工會脫離群眾到這種程度，不是工會工作的「危機」嗎？」(李峯，八千里走馬觀花記，人民日報，一九五七年五月九日)。

中國人民工業經濟系講師葛佩琦：「一九四九年共產黨進城時，老百姓都是『歡天喜地』、『以迎王師』來歡迎。今天老百姓對共產黨是『敬鬼神而遠之』……黨員起了監視羣眾的便衣警察的作用。這事不能怪黨員，因為黨組織叫他們作情報……羣眾可以打倒你們，殺共產黨人，推翻你們。這不能說不愛國，因為共產黨人不為人民服務……」(人民日報，一九五七年五月卅一日)。

瀋陽師範學院校刊編輯黃清濤 (Huang Qing-tao)：「共產黨有一千二百萬黨員，不到全國人口的百分之二，六億人民變作了這百分之二的人的馴服臣民，這是甚麼原則！」(瀋陽日報，一九五七年六月十一日)。

中國民主同盟，天津民房計劃局工程師蘇培英 (Su Pei-ying)：「當共產黨進入天津時，他們說這是革命，我們的革命不是改朝換代。現在，我看起來，革命比改朝換代還壞，活在這個社會裏真是傷心。」(新華社通訊，一九五七年六月九日)。

民革副主席龍雲：「第二次世界大戰時，美國給了她的盟國一部分貸款和借款，後來，有些盟國拒絕償還，美國也就答應免除了這些國家的債務。假若我們能還清蘇聯的借款，至少也借十幾年，並且我們還要付利息。中國是為了社會主義打仗，你看得到這樣的結果。」(新華社通訊，一九五七年六月十八日，龍雲的聲言略誌)。

新華社記者，一九四四年加入共產黨，歐
洪：「舊的統治階級雖然已經被推翻，但是一個
新的統治階級上來了。這極的演變將會引起與
台對合併」。新華社，北京，八月十七日繼續報
道：「匈牙利事變發生後，歐洪不贊成蘇聯出兵
幫助匈牙利和德意志革命軍。他污蔑人民的
新聞事業是「愚民政策」。他處處攻擊新華社的
領導。」

新華社，廣州，一九五七年五月十四日：
「中共廣東省委會勇敢而徹底地揭發了目前在省
的工作中所找到的矛盾……領導與羣衆之間的矛
盾，它們主要表現在幹部的不民主作風上，幹部
口無法紀、缺少訓練，用強迫和命令方式執行政
策；拒絕公開賬目，引致部分合作社的幹部貪污
腐化；幹部不參加體力勞動，他們的補給工資過
高。所有這些都使得羣衆不滿……從去年冬天，
全省有十一萬七千九百一十六個農戶陸續從合作
社中退出，現在已有十萬二千一百四十九戶重新
加入了。」

鳴放運動開始了六個星期，但斷然被中共
所禁止。這些聲譽性特高的中共領袖們，在他們
所開放的小民主國中，並未開着花香，只見滿園
「毒草」。當然，他們不能允許這些「毒草」生存
下去。再說，即是這個僅活六個星期的民主也是
得來不易。毛澤東針對知識分子的「百花齊放，
百家爭鳴」政策是早在一九五六年五月就提出
出來的，但是，原稿並未發表。其後，隨著運動
的展開，引致一些學生、工人的鬧事行動，同
時，匈牙利的解體也爆發成了革命運動，但毛澤
東仍然覺得，他可以把中國的有限經濟控制在在
的一黨專政的老虎籠內，因此，一九五七年二月
廿七日，他重訂作了一次名為「正確處理人民內
部矛盾問題」的講話。究其內容，既無自由，也

無矛盾，把人民說成非敵非友，總之，鳴放被弄
上了許多框框，完全失去了原意。他還覺得不夠，
再加上許多註釋補充，到一九五七年六月十八日
最後發表時，竟變成了攻擊右派的工具和藉口。
中共的言論自由，就這樣被摧殘地摧殘了。

中共採取極端政府慣用的鎮壓反對派的辦
法，在漢陽，將三個學生領袖在萬餘觀眾面前公
開處死；在其他地方，不是把這些「右派分子和
知識分子」關進監牢，便是送去荒野地開勞改。
面對廣大的反對勢力，毛澤東不但沒有退縮，更
進而抬出了駭人聽聞的「人民公社」的招牌。

(三) 人民公社

一九五八年四月，中共試行舉辦第一個模範
人民公社，為紀念一九五七年十月蘇聯解放衛
星，它被命名為衛星公社。那次蘇聯解放衛星，
在赫魯曉夫與毛澤東身上所產生的反應頗為不
同。赫魯曉夫明白，所謂蘇聯的「超過」美國並
不是全面的。蘇聯匈牙利革命和將歐控制蘇聯
聯軍撤下之代價已經非同小可，為了對東歐國
家的一億元短期信用貸款，蘇聯便不得不割讓對
中共的大債援助，並且，匈牙利革命，既擾亂了
本國的經濟，又影響了蘇聯五年計劃的執行。這
些都促使赫魯曉夫考慮到與美國進行談判一項長
期貸款方式的具體貿易。因此，一九五九年十一
月蘇聯會主席國家共產黨大會的宣言中不僅讚賞
了「修正主義」，同時重申了「和平共處」政策。

當時在蘇聯的毛澤東並不作如此想。他認為
蘇聯的人道主義已使國際均勢劇烈改變。共產主
義陣營已能從小戰到大戰，不論採取任何方式的
交鋒，均可向「美帝」挑戰。因此，毛一面簽署
「一致通過」的宣言，一面私下授意蘇聯另走一
條對抗美國，並同時超越蘇聯共產主義的提

徑。該年的豐收，加上毛的狂妄自負，都助長了
此種幻想，以為可用軍事化的方法，將全國勞動
力組織起來，就可以戰勝科學。

史大林的名言「消滅富農階級」與毛澤東的
「人民公社」相形之下，應大有愧色。毛將中國
所有農民——中國的人口總數為六億五千萬，共
中約五億人為農民——都趕進了他的人民公社。
他們住在被圍定的宿舍裏，照軍隊編制，被關
起晝夜不停的工作。晚飯後，他們不是去開
會，便是去修水庫，或者成羣結隊的去燒土法
煉鋼的小高爐，總之是不許他們有空閒。毛澤東
還計劃在城市組織人民公社。這種勞動力的軍事
化和集中使用，被稱為「動員政策」或「眾路
線」。毛澤東說，照這種方式解放出來的巨大生
產力，能在十年之內完成蘇聯需要四十年時間才
能完成的工作。他並說中國可以長期直入的實行
共產主義。

這個極端政府是這樣的急功近利，不擇手
段，它於八個月之內便將一億二千萬農戶——原
來的七百四十萬農業合作社，每社以一百六十戶
計——組成二萬四千個人民公社，每社平均不下
五千戶。它們宣稱這樣同時就把成千成萬的婦女
從家庭中解放出來了。解放的結果，是她們必需
跟男人們一樣地整日在田間工作。孩子們被送去
托兒所，老人們被送進「幸福院」。全體都在公
共食堂吃飯，以前只為家人燒飯的婦女現在還要
為八千人進食的食堂準備伙食。

中共中央決議：「人民公社的活動，包括當
地的工業、農業、交通、教育和軍事工作。」
他們吹噓要在幾個月內，實際上，花費了許
多精力把鋼鐵運到農場，但經小土爐所煉出來
的廢品，還是能賣幾分錢的。——所全體買太
多，連煤鋤頭都拒絕使用。北京最後不得不承

即，一九五八年在各地方上所運出來的鋼中有三百零八萬噸是不能作工業原料的生鐵，應將此數在鋼產總數中扣除。總路線的方針沒有把生鐵力解放出來，只帶給人民無盡的痛苦。公社中的紊亂現象，非人的生活環境和勞動力的浪費，其嚴重程度會使那些極權政府的官僚感到震驚，他們還惡惡為憤地說，每天工作十至十二小時就足够了，工間操和開會的時間不能把八小時睡眠之外的時間全部佔去。他們也被迫承認了最低限度的個人自由。「公社是領導社員參加集體生活的，每人每天必須工作十小時，理論學習兩小時。……中共中央規定：所有社員，在每天十小時工作，兩小時理論學習之外，其餘的時間可以自由利用；丈夫與妻子可以有單獨的房間；社員可以在宿舍中自備茶水；婦女可以利用開水機洗衣做鞋。……對於中共中央上述規定，社員們極表歡迎。」（新華社一九五八年十一月廿日電）。

中共在人民公社中的工業並未全面發展開來，它的全國工業產值卻「超過了生產指標」，使他們有「喘一口氣」的餘地，於是他們又叫出「工業為主導，農業為基礎」的口號。如果進步不是以人民的生活水平為標準，而僅以工業發展來衡量，如水利灌溉是完全在強迫勞動之下完成的，不可否認，中共是有些進步的，它的工業上升的速度，遠超過亞洲另一個國家——印度。

中共一九五八年計劃中的巨大目標對於落後國家，有過巨大的吸引力，然而現在中共面臨的境況，卻又使那些落後國家不得不重新考慮！這是中共狂妄的領導，不顧社員生活是多麼艱苦，一貫用暴力迫使人民不分晝夜地工作，以圖一夜之間在全國實現工業化的結果。下面是他們自己公佈的統計數字：

第一次所公佈的修正後所公佈的
項 目 一九五八年產品 一九五八年產品

鋼(百萬公噸)	一一·〇八	八·〇〇
鐵(百萬公噸)	三七五·〇〇	二五〇·〇〇
棉花(百萬公噸)	三·三三	二·〇〇

中共尚未公佈目前農業產品的統計數字。大家知道，中共在口頭上雖然仍用「公社」的名稱，實則已將權利下放到生產隊為單位。大的生產隊包括二百到三百戶，約為一個村莊，與農業合作化運動時的合作社無異。小的生產隊只包括三四十戶。公社生產的所有權在名義上屬於生產大隊，而勞動力、土地、農具和牲畜的調配應用等權力，則操在生產小隊的手裏。

所謂新的工作方法，並沒有採用大躍進的離奇方式，而仍是依據著第一個五年計劃以蘇聯為榜樣而進行的。中共將饑荒的責任推在那些不瞭解政府政策的幹部身上，並說有人「利用自然災害和基層幹部的缺點進行破壞活動。」那麼，再來一個新的整風運動似乎是勢在必行的了。

其結論是將「那些不瞭解全局，做事粗枝大葉又不虛心學習的領導生產的幹部，下放勞動改造」。新的指示是「合理評定工資，按多勞多得的原則」，這一原則，實際上已涵蓋著濃厚的計件工資的氣味。

中共雖然認識到技術設備、專家設計，降低成本和農業生產的重要性，但他們並未放棄大躍進、人民公社和建設社會主義總路線這三面紅旗政策。他們指向亞非拉的宣傳是，落後地區也可以通行無阻地由工業化進入「共產主義社會」；「整風路線」比先進的科學更能創造奇蹟。

無須等待中共兩年後才發表的對大躍進的修改數字來證實，赫魯曉夫早就看到沒有科學技術

基礎的國家，要工業同時並舉、齊頭並進，完全是一種荒謬的做法，他更不欣賞毛澤東把妄想說成是理論，中國通向共產主義的道路並不比蘇聯的更簡捷優越。

中共的破裂，不是在公社運動時，而是當毛澤東企圖告訴赫魯曉夫如何指揮對美國爭鬥時發生的。一九五九年九月十五日，赫魯曉夫不顧毛澤東的反對去到美國會晤艾森豪威爾。此大衝動精神一直維持到一九六〇年五月廿二日開飛機事件為止。莫斯科與北京對戰爭與革命的不同解釋的根本矛盾是權力爭奪，並不是什麼理論不同。形成這些權力爭奪和對理論的不同解釋自有其客觀因素，下一節我們將討論這些客觀因素的根源。

二、毛澤東的思想演變（一九二五—一九四九）

「……叛亂之處，出現霸道。」——黑格爾

在不同的環境下產生不同的思想。毛澤東從一九二五—一九二七年的革命失敗到取得大陸政權的廿二年間，他的思想隨環境變化的必然結果，與斯大林如出一轍，通過一系列的對馬克思主義的修正而走到它的絕對反面——頭一黨專政的極權共產主義。在這點功績上毛澤東可說是有兩點貢獻：（一）軍隊：包括在政府體制內和體制外的軍隊。（二）思想改造：洗腦最初原是毛的「四個階級聯合政府」的附屬品，結果它被應用到每一個階級身上。上述兩點貫穿著毛澤東的所有活動和著作，並成為這些著作和活動的前提，尤以實踐論與矛盾論兩篇為官方指為「毛澤東思想中創造性地運用馬克思主義」的典範。我們必

須明白，事物轉化為它的相反面並不總是一個學術問題，它是客觀存在的事實。要探尋毛澤東思想的形成，一九四九年取得全國政權與一九五八年開始的中蘇分裂同屬重要，它的根源更應追溯到一九二五—二七年的革命失敗時期。毛澤東自己也說，中國的革命趨於那時，因為，從那時起才開始有革命戰爭。此處，我們不妨也附和毛澤東，將一九二五—二七年的革命失敗時期作為毛澤東思想的起點，因為毛澤東從那時起就開始信奉馬克思主義。

(一) 革命的失敗

一九二五—二七年中共初期革命的失敗，不僅是無產階級，同時也是農民失敗。雖然，在城市——蔣介石的政府、軍隊、監獄和警察的中心——無產階級很難逃脫「反革命」的報復，在鄉下，卻可逃往深山野峽去避難。

估計毛澤東早期，在逃避蔣介石不斷的追剿時，必然發現了兩件事——中國之所以有許多軍閥存在並不是偶然的，和軍隊必須與農家的力量相結合。他將游擊戰術，而不是農民革命，放進了他的理論。於是紅軍，不是窮苦農民的組合，卻變成了一個包羅萬象的——政治、軍事、哲學和經濟的——綜合動力。共產黨攻陷鎮，每佔領一地，即用紅軍的武力實行土地改革，那時，它可能得到農民的支持。但是，當共產黨政府依據軍隊的力量來控制農民時，是否仍能得到廣泛的支持，就有疑問了。這是問題之所在，儘管，毛澤東此時還不會於此作他的理論。

一九二七年，毛澤東在他的動人的處女作，有關自發的農民革命的文章中——一九二七年三月「湖南農民運動考察報告」——沒有把農民在革命中的任務作為一種理論來敘述，也就是這

個原因。毛對史大林的「四大階級」政策完全同意，這政策在導致革命失敗的原因中所佔的分量並不少。儘管毛的報告充滿了革命熱情，他在劃分階級成分時，只描述了「開明紳士」和「土豪劣紳」，「誠實的官員」和「貪污的官吏」，只說「新的民主秩序」而未提及社會革命和一個無產階級的社會。

農民起義是中國幾千年歷史的特徵，一九二五—一九二七年的革命也不例外。不過，毛澤東於革命失敗後在湖南組織的紅軍並不是農民的自發運動。恰恰相反，「這個紅軍並沒有農民的支撐，在許多地方人們把他們當作土匪看待」。當被問到他的軍隊裏是否有土匪和流氓時，毛澤東的回答卻很風趣，他說：他們是很好的戰士。這支在戰爭中成長的紅軍頗有訓練。一九三四年十一月，它衝破了蔣介石的第四次圍剿，開始了縱貫中國南北二萬五千里的戰略行軍，亦即著名的具有戰略意義的長征。

然而，這個常規被及的長征卻有被人忘卻的另一面（此處未提及朱德，他的任務雖然很重要，但並不影響毛澤東主權），那就是：他們在途中停留時，到處佔領村莊，搶掠糧食，建立「蘇維埃」政權。這些由中國共產黨自上而下一手包辦的「蘇維埃」所管轄的地區正是中共紅軍的控制地區。人所共知，在這些以前從沒有任何一個共產黨領袖在還沒有發動運動的地方建立一支軍隊並稱它為「蘇維埃」的。

這些為了保護自己，求取安全和生存的手段都被放進了「革命理論」。不僅如此，毛澤東自其早期開始，對其黨內反對派攻擊之殘酷，比對蔣介石更甚。所以，當時主張基於馬克思原則，以城市無產階級為革命重心的李立三路線就被打倒了；所以毛澤東大言不慚地解決了在城市中建立

的江西蘇維埃，毛澤東親口對史說，反叛者應當立即被「解除武裝和消滅」。就這樣，在一九二七年失敗之後，毛澤東完成了恰如反革命蔣介石所做的，使共產黨與工人的關係完全脫離。一九三六年，毛澤東把反對他的「農民蘇維埃」政策的張國燾打敗了。隨後，與蔣介石組織聯合陣線，共同抗日。此後，便又開始打擊贊成「第三陣線」或「列寧陣線」的托派分子。毛把他們都稱為「頭號敵人」，把對他們的攻擊看得比抗日和反蔣國爭還重要。

毛澤東在取得政權前後，在行動和理論上，都是以攻擊「教條主義」著名的。我們找不到他有一點反對修正主義的痕跡，直到最近他與赫魯曉夫為爭共產世界的領導權而發生爭執時，他才忽然發現他有自稱「正統」的必要。這種自充正統的姿態完全是做給中國以外的人士看的。為避免人們揭發他的偽裝，他只好把重慶放在他對「馬克思主義創造性的貢獻」上。說他創造的是真的。從毛的起家到取得政權，他沒有一點與馬克思主義有共同之處。試看他的由鄉村包圍城市的戰略，並非策動工人革命，而是要他們在他奪取城市時繼續生產。

固然，當毛覺得需要把他的取得政權的途徑說成是適用於世界，尤其是落後國家的革命理論時，他的「正統」便不能止於「創造性」的了。於是，在一九六六年第廿一期紅旗雜誌中，一篇題為「從中國人民革命勝利經驗所得出的結論」的文章，一再廣泛地強調取得政權的途徑是先在鄉村建立革命的小據點，開始時，這些據點為數不多，逐漸由數個發展為許多個，然後再包圍城市，直到最後佔領城市為止。

點，然後繼續充發展，這樣，便一步步地接近了取得全國政權的目標。」

毛澤東並沒有強調農民在革命中所起的作用，那樣便會相對地減輕了工人的地位，他反過來這指責早期中共領袖們所創的農村蘇維埃，雖然，他當時不是坐第一把交椅，但至少也是其中的領袖之一。他分析那時的情況說：「對於上層小資產階級和中等資產階級經濟成分採取過左的鎮壓的政策，如像我們黨在一九三一年至一九三四年間所犯過的那樣（過高的勞動條件，過高的所得稅率，在土地改革中侵犯工商業者，不以發展生產、繁榮經濟、公私兼顧、勞資兩利為目標，而以近視的片面的所謂勞動者權利為目標）。」（「目前形勢和我們的任務」，一九四七年十二月二十五日。毛澤東文庫第四冊第一二五頁）

一九三六年十二月西安事變發生，蔣介石被他的部下扣留西安，毛澤東運用政治壓力，使蔣介石得以被釋放，並恢復了全國統一戰線領袖的地位，這些都是毛的功績。

在「目前形勢和我們的任務」中毛又說：「我們的方針是依靠農民，鞏固地聯合中農，消滅地主階級和舊式富農的封建的和非封建的剝削制度。地主富農應得的土地和財產，不能超過農民大眾。但是，會在一九三一年至一九三三年間實行過所謂『地主不分田，富農分地田』的過左的錯誤政策，也不應重複。……各地在平分土地時，仍應注意中農的意見，如果中農不同意，則應向中農讓步。」

再則：「我們已採取不充公富農土地的決定……我們也不會將大、小資家、商人的財產、工廠充公。我們保護他們的企業……在反抗帝國主義侵略的鬥爭中，資本家與工人的利益是

一致的。……我們認為使其他政黨、社團對我們不懷敵意，最為重要。全體一心一意，抗日救國。至於其他問題或有不同意見，我們不認為重要。」

總之，毛的支持農民，是革命的農民，有如屠根種子把他們吊起，有容無利。在第一個「蘇維埃共和國」的土地法——主張將中農以上的田地全部無償充公——被廢除以後，在無產階級領導權在黨內全部崩潰以後，一九三七年毛終於成了中國共產黨的絕對領袖。

毛反對對城市工人時，他就站在農民一方面；他要打擊反對他的地主時，他就站在貧農一方面；當他需要利用地主抵抗日本人時，他又去保護地主的權利，甚至對地主收租了。在農民中，只有他的農民軍隊才是他始終不渝地關心着的。這樣以軍隊和黨組織作為兩個平行的政權工具，即是在所有執政的共產黨中，也僅在中國一個。為了要把毛澤東捧成「救世主、救國明師、革命領袖、政治家和現代馬列主義理論家」，就必須先把著作實踐論和矛盾論的毛澤東吹成是個「哲學家」。我們現在來看看他這兩篇論著吧！

(一) 延安時期的「哲學」：毛澤東歪曲列寧

「我們反對革命隊伍中的死硬派……我們反對左傾空談主義。」

——毛澤東

中共由第一個「蘇維埃」時期（一九二八—一九三四）到延安時期（一九三五—一九四五）之間的政策的激劇轉變，引起了許多共產黨員的懷疑；抗日時期與蔣介石軍隊的合作，又被許多紅軍中人士目為反動，毛澤東稱這些人是教

條主義者。毛與教條主義的鬥爭和毛對馬克思主義哲學的貢獻同時進行着。

實踐論與矛盾論的寫作時期，經過一些人的客觀研究，認為頗有懷疑。這兩本書是一九五〇—一九五二年才出版的。不管怎樣，我們只好接受中共官方所說的日期，尤其是這兩篇文章被當成是既客觀又主觀，既可論為昨天又可論為明天之用。毛的崇拜者當然更不在意毛是否把日子說得早些以證明他有先見之明，或是遲些以便利目前的需要。那就是說毛為了要推行他的階級合作政策，正面攻擊教條主義還嫌不夠，更採用了「哲學論文」的形式作為幫手。這兩篇論文是如此空洞抽象，使人找不到它的主題和目標。

在實踐論中毛寫道：「辯證唯物論的認識論……認為人的認識一點也不能離開實踐。」認識若真是一點也不能離開實踐，他倒應該先說明他說的是什麼實踐。他不但未曾講清楚，反而把實踐論模糊地說成是閉關性，並似出自列寧的哲學筆記。毛摘引列寧的句子「實踐高於（理論的）認識」，他沒有說明，列寧在此地，只是重述黑格爾對「實用概念」與「理論概念」在結合之前的關係所作的分析。列寧說：「恰正是在認識論中。」

列寧決不會把理論降低到成為「實用性」，就在毛所引用的句子的同一段中，列寧說：「人的意識不僅反映客觀世界，並且創造它」。此句就在毛所引用句子的前面，毛不可不補充完整解釋它的意義，除非毛是有意歪曲列寧。不管換藉毛澤東所穿的是什麼，他的目的是如此卑鄙——迫使人服從他與蔣的聯合陣線，人們就不會把他的這篇東西認作哲學著作了。

只是因為這個國家資本主義的暴君控制着不下六億五千萬人，才有人要去分析他的「對馬克

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思主義的創造性的貢獻。

很明顯地，毛並未說服他的聽眾或讀者，於是，另一篇哲學論文又跟着出來了，叫作矛盾論，是針對教條主義者而發的。他說，這是一九三七年七月，毛澤東在延安抗日軍政大學所作的演講詞。

在矛盾論中，毛又運用了他的「實用性」的伎倆。不過，它的好處是，至少能由此文中，看到他如何篡改歷史，以便糾正那些黨內反對蔣介石的教條主義者的錯誤。他說國民黨在一九二五年的統一戰線時期是「革命的、有朝氣的」，一九二七年以後，國民黨變到了與此相反的方向。他把革命的失敗歸罪於蔣介石的「右傾機會主義」和「中蘇蘇聯」(現稱革命根據地)的喪失歸罪於機會主義分子的錯誤，而不提蔣介石的罪則。

「一九三五年以後，毛澤東談到矛盾論的哲學意義時，在推測了一大堆空洞的詞藻之後，更誇其談的說：「它(中國共產黨)又糾正了冒險主義的錯誤，領導了新的抗日的統一戰線。」接着，「一九三六年十二月西安事變後，它(國民黨)又開始向停止內戰，聯合共產黨共同反對日本帝國主義這個方面轉變。」此時，蔣介石是毛澤東聯合陣線中的朋友，毛所指的當然是一「正確的革命方面」。在矛盾論中，毛澤東還個個吹捧合作者溫柔地說：「我們中國人常說相反相成。」

毛澤東的骨子裏浸透了孔夫子的思想。恐怕連他自己都不知道他的矛盾論已把黑格爾——馬克思的發展論歪曲得面目全非。一九一五年，列寧曾批評黑格爾的邏輯學時，就看到其中的深奧。列寧認為事物的发展過程，係通過對抗而轉化到相對方面，這就使他想到了當時的馬克

思主義者們——第二國際——的失敗的根源。

毛澤東對於哲學上事物的矛盾、對抗及其發展一無所知。他發明了一個「矛盾的主要方面」。這倒真是他的創作。他將「主要矛盾」與「矛盾的主要方面」區別開來，這就與他篡改歷史一樣，他篡改了哲學。於是，這篇文章的旨意現在就變成在某種情況下「甚至主要的矛盾便暫時地降到次要和服從的地位」，又由於「發展不是順利的」和「互利的轉化」，以致對於基礎會「降為次要」了。為了掩飾他的赤條條的主觀主義，毛再對讀者說，共產黨員當然是唯物論者，「總的看來，他們認為物質決定意識……」。毛澤東的東拉西扯，混淆不清，則是康德所指的「宇宙論證」是「一筆萬沒頭腦的矛盾」。

有一位近由中國大陸歸來的人說，他聽見一個陝西(Shanxi)的地方黨支部書記說：「經過理論學習，我明白了不斷革命論和革命分段的原理，並把它們應用到保衛工作上來。」這個地方黨委的話雖然無聊，可是正是他們的「領袖」將理論降至「實用」的結果，這些中國人踐踏了他的名譽「教條比牛糞還無用」。

上面講述哲學時，說到毛澤東的卑鄙，真使人作嘔，當然，更不願再去談論這個擴張中國疆土地叫作的「毛澤東思想」，不過，我們不能忘記毛澤東的權力。我們記得，當毛促使中共採取與蔣合作的聯合陣線，實行他的「三、三、三」制方針——共產黨行政機關內有三分之一共產黨員，三分之一國民黨，三分之一無黨派人士——時，正是抗日戰爭進行最激烈的時候。那時有些前去訪問的外國記者，雖然他們的文化水平比毛的軍隊高許多，毛的有關文藝方面的演講卻使他們驚嘆不已。他們對國民黨的基靈頓感到寒心；

對於共產黨的積極抗日，組織黨報，發展辦學和土改政策，贊揚備至。再說，毛的溫和的土地改革政策不但吸引了許多小資產階級，甚至一些地主和反共人士也說把共產黨當作了只是些土地改革者而接受他們。毛澤東除了抽去馬克思主義政治論中的階級內容外，對馬克思主義毫無貢獻。可是，他的的確確開闢了一條走向權力的特殊途徑。要弄清楚這些，就必須把他所謂的「三個法寶」合起來看。

(三)「三個法寶」

史大林把工人的國家改變成了一個國家資本主義式的社會，並將它理論化，稱為「在一個國家裏建設社會主義」。這個假定只能在蘇聯不受外力攻擊時，才能實現。因此，史大林便將世界共產主義運動變作了保護蘇聯安全的前哨，不使它擔任獨立的階級任務和工作。在中國，它便是這個精心製作出來的「四大階級陣線」，把中國共產黨有效地降為會促使一九二五到一九二七年的革命失敗的國民黨的附庸。毛澤東為權力鬥爭和成功前後，都以這「四個階級陣線」又稱「聯合陣線」為他思想的經緯。

毛將史大林的對外政策應用到內政上來。他是一個實際主義者。他是絕對的「神奇」，可以看到所有階級中的積極因素，這樣當他踏上了權力之途後便通行無阻，取得政權後，他只消除了「官僚資本家」和「土豪劣紳」，而末把資本家或地主當作一個應消滅的階級而除去。他自信，認為可能從思想上改造資本家和地主，這就是他的「整肅」與史大林的「消滅」不同的原因。他看不見自己統治下的階級間的區別，相信一個「協和的世界」，難怪，所有的矛盾都是「相成」的了。

紅旗雜誌上近有一篇文章——「統一線——使得中國人民取得勝利的法寶」——更爲明顯地把聯合陣線說成爲一種沒有階級階級的矛盾哲學。實際上，它也是毛澤東在得勝前後一貫牢不可破的法寶。自一九三七年毛澤東把它當作了思想和現實的綱領，近來，中共中央刊物上的這篇文章又把它的現實意義推展到今天。毛在大陸鞏固政權以後，在一九五二年的三反——反浪費、反貪污和反官僚主義——時，和在其後的五反——反行賄、反囤積、反私私舞弊、反盜竊國家資財和反盜竊國家經濟情報——中，它都仍是毛手中的法寶。此後一段時期，毛因爲要爲他的國家資本主義在經濟基礎上和政治建築上打下根基，他便打擊他會自抗日戰爭一直帶領過來的私人資本家和地主階級。

爲此，他不得不加緊他對無產階級、農民和知識分子的攻擊，這些人還在相信這是步入社會主義的運動。一九五七——一九五八年的整肅仍是在一九三七年哲學綱領下進行的，這事並不是偶然的，不過，矛盾論現在發展成了「論正確處理人民內部矛盾問題」，同時，一黨專政的老虎鉗，一下子鎖住了「百家爭鳴」。

毛永遠就是這一個數學家，「早在一九三九年，基於黨的十八年的豐富歷史經驗」，他把一個法寶發展成了「三個法寶」：「統一戰線，武裝鬥爭和黨的組織」是中國共產黨三個法寶的基本問題，是中國革命打敗敵人的三個主要的「法寶」。

除了統一戰線、軍事鬥爭和黨的組織三個法寶之外，又有了國家權力，這個法寶「四個階級聯合陣線」的馬克思主義革命家毛澤東想起了他是應當支持無產階級革命及無產階級專政的。對於手中有三個法寶的毛澤東，這當然不會有困

難。毛說：「人民的民主專政是在工人階級的領導下進行的。」誠然如此，但是如何進行的呢？對中共的主席來說，這太簡單了，有如在向一團中跳進跳出，反正，中國只能有一個統治的政黨，那就是「通過共產黨」體現無產階級專政。毛簡單地又把三個法寶歸納成爲一個無所不包的：「將我們的經驗總結集中爲一點，就是在工人與農民的聯合基礎上，以工人（通過共產黨）爲領導的人民的專政。」

毛已準備用一步「大躍進」直接進入「共產主義」，不用說，他當然不會在躍進「和諧的大同世界」之前，停留在「工人與農民的同盟」上。「小資產階級的民主和小資產階級的共和國，通過工人階級的領導，已經讓位於人民的民主和人民的共和國了。這就使得通過人民共和國，完成社會主義和共產主義建設，消滅階級，進入一個和諧的大同世界，成爲可能。」

三、國家資本主義的強制經濟

儘管中共方面的文件極讚歌頌功績的能事，許多學者對中共又超用了「東方的專制政治」這一名詞。這種議論甚至影響到一位馬克思主義者，他在對「毛的中國」經過一番研究之後，恰當地把它稱爲國家資本主義社會。毛本人充滿了軍閥主義的色彩；他的修正的馬克思主義下面，隱藏着一層牢固的中國民族主義；他的思想徹底地沒透了儒家精神——他所建立的國家資本主義完全是一個暴力政治——從這些方面就容易得出「東方專制政治」的結論，而這種結論又似乎很合邏輯。仔細考察中國的社會，從她的家庭生活、主導思想、工業，一直到農業，國家資本主義的標誌都極爲明顯。

不能弄清楚的經濟演變，也不能說明中蘇共的衝突。同時，毛的中國與印度正在亞、非和拉丁美洲，爲了各自的影響而競爭。這些都使我們感到有對目前中國的經濟和理論作重新研究的必要。

(一) 農業方面

毛成功的根基並不是建立於一種停止在靜止的農業生產狀態中的東方專制政治之上的，恰恰相反，在毛的十餘年統治中，中國的農業狀態不斷地在起變化，似乎從來沒有「平靜」過。事實上，正是這個國家資本主義的機構，策動了從第一次土改，經過執政後的土地改革運動，直至人民公社一系列的農業改革；也正是這個國家資本主義的機構，幫助中共渡過了危機，免於崩潰。

一九五〇——一九五三年的土改中，只有三百萬農民未受影響，假若說這就是把土地分給了農民，真是對長期受困的貧苦農民的一個莫大的恩賜。每個農民在土改中分得的土地平均不到二畝（一畝等於六分之一英畝），有二千萬地土被清除了；據估計被殺的不下五百萬。很明顯，全中國的剝削階級中的大資本家和大地主的總數不會有五百萬，毛爲了要剷除他在革命隊伍和反革命隊伍中的敵手，把所有反對他的人統統稱爲「官僚資本家」、「大地主」或「右派分子」，在這等名目下，他又把成千上萬的人送去勞改場，修馬路或做水利工程。同時，爲了保證中共全面控制國家政權，他剷掉了一些會幫助他取得政權的「土家劣紳」和資本家，並使中共政府得以轉過頭對付那些分得不夠維持生活的二畝地的農民。

舉辦合作社的初期，只是被動農民加入互助組和初級合作社，推動頗爲緩慢，到一九五五

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年，步伐轉趨急進，全國百分之九十六的農戶都組成了合作社，社員對自己的土地仍有所有權，也允許保有私產，社員可以為自己的十分之一的土地耕種。這段時期中的農產品的猛增和豐收是毛澤東後來的異想天開的「人民公社」打下了基礎。

中共的大躍進並沒有成功，上述一九五八年的狂妄企圖的失敗是人所共知的。不過，我們不應忽略，中國的領袖統治者所叫聲的，不備高度技術，只走「羣衆路線」就可實行的「不斷革命」——「不停止的革命」，對於其它工業落後的國家所發生影響。

紅旗雜誌近期會說：「在使農業機械化成為可能以前，發展農業、提高生產力以促進工業的發展是更有可能的」。我們的中國理論家，並沒有因自己的錯誤而有所顧慮，繼續提倡他們的有關工業應與農業同時性論：「如毛澤東同志所指出，這個新基礎是由兩方面同時逐漸並進的。一方面是社會主義工業化和資本主義商業的社會主義改造；另一方面是通過合作社的農業社會主義改造。走這條路，我們就會……讓所有農村的人民共享大繁榮。」

儘管這個「大繁榮」最後變作了不可掩飾的飢荒，對於這個東方式的專制政權有什麼關係呢？對於人口過多的亞洲和人口不足的非洲，能打動人心的是那些現代化口號，又不是東方式的專制政治。

(一) 軍事與工業

國民政府在大陸的某些缺點雖然曾幫助了毛的軍隊取得政權，但不難說毛的成功全是歸功於此。如果我們把國民政府在大陸的缺點當作毛的成功的一個因素，則是忽視了毛在內戰中的戰

功，和中共廿年中被隔絕於城市所賴以維持生存的組織。無疑的，毛的統治根基仍是舊的中國，包括她的階級和腐化，軍閥和官吏。我們現在所要分析的是那些區別時代的標誌，並不是那些模糊視線，使我們分不清其是新的、舊的是與我們時代的相同之處。

我們的時代是國家資本主義、民族革命和工人起義的時代。只有羣衆才能創建一個真正的新社會秩序，除非你是置身於他們的行列之中，否則，離開國家資本主義之外，你無路可走，而且，不管它是怎麼樣的個人活動，或是中國的農業社會，都不能例外。至於中國，它的農業發展是如此遲緩，致使它不能需要建立在一個新的人力的基礎上便需要走國家資本主義的道路。比如，歐洲在日本統治時期曾有些工業建設，勝利後，這些工業建設成了無主之物了。即使國民政府也看到下一步必做的工作，一九四三年，蔣在中國之命運中說：「最後地改組資本為國家資本是如此地迫切，我們必需採用計劃經濟。」毛澤東在取得政權後，立即着手這一項工作——國有化工業。附加一句，他用的是以前政府或其他資本家同樣的剝削工人的方法。

蘇聯對中共的一百五十六項重要工業裝備——鋼、鐵工廠、煉油廠、化學工業、電力廠——的幫助，使中國得以開始其第一個五年計劃（一九五三——一九五七），國有制這在中國實行起來，工人從此便接管經營「加緊生產」。一九五〇年曾允許私人資本家繼續存在：「中國的工人們！鞏固你們的隊伍，團結民族資本家」，該年五一勞動節的口號中，「加緊生產」當然被放了進去。一九四七年，他鼓勵「合理的利潤」，就是為了「勞工和資本家」的共同利益。雖然，那時是為了資本家，現在則是為了政府的利益。

當資本家把利潤累積得太多時，他就來個五反運動；工人反對不合理的十二小時工作或無個人自由的工作環境時，他就發動「整風」。政府將被稱為國家資本主義的公私合營企業轉變為真正的國家資本主義企業時，他們叫這國家資本主義為「社會主義」，資本家同時被留在原企業中做經理，如此：「假如你對發展你的企業會花費心機並有好的成績，也會把你的兒女培養成第一流的技術家，很自然地你當然會被安置在國家企業中的負責崗位上，你會發現做一個社會主義企業中的經理比做業主賺得還多。」難怪，很多資本家就這樣作了企業中的經理了。

(三) 洗腦

洗腦這個名詞源出於朝鮮戰爭，當時美國士兵被迫或因於誠意地改變立場，參加到中國方面之後，他們的悔過詞與惡名昭彰的莫斯科大逮捕案中的自白頗有類似之處，當然，其中還有不少名譽。不過，毛的不停地整風的新奇處是它不僅限於外國人或敵人，或黨內的清洗，他把「思想改造」的概念推廣到了哲學領域中，又同時應用到日常生活中來。

毛的洗腦對中國人並不成功，對中國之外的某些自由主義的人士卻成功了，他們相信毛的洗腦不是強制的，指出現在中共在位的領袖們皆是從前革命的指揮者，以證明毛與史大林之不同，毛沒有殺掉革命時的同志。這些淺薄的論調忘掉了「一九二五——一九二七年革命的失敗讓蔣介石

「毛澤東做了更其必須親自動手的事——監察或役革命同志，包括陳獨秀。不僅如此，毛在成功之前，即已用殘酷的手段迫害革命隊伍中的對手，一九三〇年，在李立三指揮下的工人，佔據了長沙數日，於是，毛「將叛徒解除武裝而清算了」。一九三六年，對張國燾亦是如此。抗日戰爭時，毛取消第三陣線，目的也是同一手段。毛澤東在實際上取得政權後沒有類似莫斯科案件的事發生，只是因為「革命戰爭中的幹部」都跟隨他的階級合作途徑取得政權，執政後，又贊成他的國家資本主義政策。

「毛澤東」中的唯一真實處是毛相信「思想改造」，雖然，這些精確者並沒有把它當作理由。真正的理由是，為了要在絕大部分為農耕的中國土地上建立國家資本主義，為了避免無階級階級的革命，說服部分資本家和地主在國家總計中擔任如經理等職務是必要和渴禱的了。

最其技巧的洗腦不是在對朝鮮戰爭中的美國士兵，也不是在中共取得全國政權之後，它披顯著的成就是在對於那些沒有權力，但又願意獻身為工人階級政權服務的馬克思主義小資產階級知識分子身上。在目前這國家資本主義的時代，世界上無可避免地有一種風氣，即一些中資階級知識分子把「個人主義」解釋成「非階級主義」，那就是說財產和行政權歸公有化，一切由國家計劃，在戰後的年代中，這種風氣在落後國家中更為盛行，實際上，區別洗腦者於「新政」智識階層，是洗腦者的領袖毛澤東會是一個馬克思主義革命家，他善於運用馬克思的名詞。他更運用這種技巧去煽動魯曉夫挑戰，與蘇聯爭奪世界共產主義的領導權。同時，毛也吸引了「一些托派分子的空想，他們在很大程度上變成了毛澤東追隨者，儘管托派與毛曾理論上的爭執，這些托派可

以證明在國家資本主義的時代，「國家計劃」為神明的知識分子的精神狀態，他們甚至於要求受精神上的洗腦。而對可能引起核子戰爭，他們毫不批評，寧願為正確的「原則」犧牲。儘管左派共產主義分子以東方和西方來區分共產主義陣營，為要更仔細的研究中蘇衝突，我們不應忽視蘇聯在衝突之後的權力政治。

四、中蘇共可能發生戰爭嗎？

(一) 一九六〇——六二年：最初的磨擦

一九六〇年，中共利用列寧誕生九十週年(四月二十二日)的機會，在紅旗雜誌第八期中發表社論「列寧主義萬歲」，將權力衝突轉變成了「革命的理論」。(見北京周報，第十七期)這篇社論長約四十頁，摘錄了許多列寧有關無階級革命的言論。一方面力貶「現代科學」(即國際飛彈、氫彈和人造衛星)，認為這是「今日世界上技術進步的特種小節」；另一方面極力攻擊「現代修正主義」，在提及秋托時，很容易看出是指魯曉夫。由于一切說明美國的好戰性是在赫魯曉夫訪問莫斯科以後的一段時期內得出的，這就不難看到「戰爭不可避免」其實並不是列寧的理論的問題，而是針對魯曉夫的和平共存原則而發的。

赫魯曉夫正陸地認為這篇有關列寧的冗長社論不僅在「毛澤東思想」上，在毛奪取共產黨領導權的野心上，而且在影響落後地區以及在計劃對美國戰爭的戰略方面，都是一個新階段。講傳，中蘇開會討論合組太平洋區域，因赫魯曉夫怕被毛捲入台灣海峽的戰爭中而取消了。但這篇社論絲毫不起作用，這是五月一日蘇聯上空的美

國(一)間諜飛機事件所使然。此事件給赫魯曉夫一個機會，不但取消他早經製備的高峯會議，而且召開了一個共產主義國家的會議來懲戒毛。赫魯曉夫只是那個會議的開幕。誰都知道赫魯曉夫在聯大大會中用鞋敲桌子的新聞。他利用那個機會宣稱他是共產主義陣營中的領袖，是非洲革命所帶來的世界的新希望。

一九六〇年十二月七日，八十一個共產黨在莫斯科開會。赫魯曉夫在此會中將他在聯合國演說變成了新的共產主義宣言，宣稱蘇聯是「歷史上第一個領導人類進入共產主義的先鋒」。當時在莫斯科開會的絕大多數的共產黨都要求毛澤東在宣言上簽字，以對英帝表示共產陣營中的一致。毛無法拒絕簽字，否則，便會露出他對蘇聯的敵意。結果，毛簽了字，但中國國內和亞、非、拉丁美洲卻仍繼續着他自己的路線。

中國不因此一九六〇年在莫斯科宣言上的簽字而改變她為國家利益而走的分歧道路，這與法國在北大西洋公約上簽字後，戰而樂於自定自己的尋求光榮之路一樣。戰後，六十年代的中國，與歐洲和中國都在破壞中的四十年代大為不同，那時，它們都需要援助，也不得不接受馬歇爾計劃和華沙公約中所聯帶的「哲學」。為了達到目的，毛的革命詞句，連珠炮似的發出，而蘇聯則滔滔不絕的談論「法國的威嚴」。他們兩人都為了自己國家有向世界擴展的野心而在本陣營中搞分裂活動。

(二) 間諜飛機被發現後，赫魯曉夫又取得了主動。他欲孤立中共，在蘇共二十二大會個領草案中，只用了十個字，輕描淡寫地提到中國的革命。所以如此，並不是因為草案只是為一個國家的共產黨而寫的。它是因為蘇聯的革命有若世界的意義，一九一七年的革命開闢了一個新

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時代，一九五七年的人造衛星又超過了美國。再則，赫魯曉夫強調蘇聯的劃時代性不僅有別於美國，也與中共不同，因為蘇聯是在「建設共產主義」。因此，赫魯曉夫在大會上譴責阿爾巴尼亞（實指中共），周恩來為阿爾巴尼亞辯護，責備赫魯曉夫未經預先商議沒有權利在會中公開發難阿爾巴尼亞，周恩來大會作爲抗議，這些事實都是毛不足怪的了。他們的互相攻擊、辯護與理論一樣，都是假裝，毛與赫魯曉夫在這些假裝下進行着激烈的競爭。

一九六二年十月二十二日甘丹地與赫魯曉夫在古巴飛彈事件上的對峙，引起了可能導致核子災難的危險，全世界都屏息注視着，毛澤東認爲這又是一個可在中蘇衝突中爭取主動的機會。甘丹地明白表示，除非赫魯曉夫撤回在古巴的飛彈裝置，則美國不惜冒核子戰爭的危險，一爭短長。在此背景下，赫魯曉夫退縮了。毛立即拉赫魯曉夫，說他的行爲是「在帝國主義面前的懦弱表現」。毛由此更進一步想採取社會主義陣營的領導權，並要求社會主義陣營在印支戰爭中支持中共。

(二) 新的階段：一九六三年六月十日：「關於國際共產主義運動總路線的建議」

中蘇共同這種新的本質上的不同使得它們的衝突更發爲公開的挑戰。在理論方面，亦復如此。一九六三年六月十四日，在中共一封名爲「關於國際共產主義運動總路線的建議」給蘇共中央的信中，完全是這氣憤的口吻。這封信發表以後，立即又被印成十幾種不同語言的小冊子，分發到有關國家和地區。

中共的工業雖是落後，從鋼、水庫、到原子能的應用方面都缺乏，但是，它的軍隊從數量到裝備上卻是上乘的。第一，它有世界上最大陸軍；第二，這陸軍是亞洲大陸上最其現代化的軍隊。儘管蘇聯對毛澤東，說他在歷史上的將會被記爲「如體育運動中一幕跳高的失敗」，但毛在中印戰爭中卻沒有失敗。「毛的思想」精工於它的若軍事事，因此，毛又在這上面產生了一個新的理論，在六月十四日的六十一頁的信中，毛用了許多邏輯和空話來闡述這個理論，結果適得其反，它只是加重表現他的控制世界的野心而已。

六月十四日的信件中，由五個不同方向談到了「國際主義的銜金石」（第十頁）不再是保衛蘇聯。第一個理由是，保衛蘇聯作爲國際主義的行動原是因爲當時世界上只有一個社會主義國家——蘇聯，但是，「現在有了十三個國家的社會主義陣營」。拉赫曼的「第二階理由是，「所以」，「假若任何人……幫助資本主義國家攻擊兄弟的社會主義國家，它即是背叛了整個國際無產階級和世界人民的利益」。所謂這種叛徒的行爲很明顯的是指安南蘇聯未會支持中共入受印度。對蘇聯的第三階理由是「在歷史的發展潮流中倒退」即等於「爲資本主義復辟服務」，這是針對蘇聯人民而發的。南斯拉夫被指爲罪犯，其真正意向卻是指蘇聯。

既然亞、非、拉丁美洲國家都是「世界革命風暴的中心，它們正與帝國主義以直接的打擊」，這爲中共中央的宣傳便將無產階級革命一下子變成了民族鬥爭，「從一方面來說，每個國際無產階級革命運動的關頭，繫於這些地區的人民革命的成敗上」。

拉赫曼「不再是……」的第四點，將重心轉移到列寧的理論（一九二〇年第二次國際共產主義大會）上去，那是以聯合殖民地國家來的廣大羣衆，幫助他們反帝國爭爲先進技術國家中無產階級的迫切任務。列寧的這個新出發點，在經濟落後國家中資本主義發展的不可避免性是基於假設上的：假若，「最先進國家中無產階級的援助」是大量的。因此，列寧強調蘇聯無產階級在理論上和實際行動上援助其他革命運動是無階級國際主義的明確。毛澤東將列寧的這個說法斷章取義地用作爲與赫魯曉夫爭奪誰去領導新的第三陣營的工具。在爭奪的過程中，毛拋棄了把世界分成敵對的社會主義國家陣營和資本主義國家陣營的概念，這與劃分世界爲兩個陣營的概念被毛利用來代替每個國家中的階級鬥爭，現在，他又把這個概念拋棄了。爲了要把他舊的久已廢止的「四次階級」政策搬出來，毛又把人民的意識擴大到包括「愛國的民族資產階級，甚至王公貴族，只要他們是愛國的」。

當中共在其國際性的宣言中列舉蘇聯「不再是……」的第五點，也就是最後一點時——這是針對蘇聯是「全體人民都在建設共產主義的國家」而發的——我們突然面對着所有開個東論的精華。「關於無產階級國際主義總路線的建議」這篇文章一再重申「在無產階級取得政權後的一段時期裏」，在完成「社會主義工業化和農業集體化的數十年後或更長一段時期」，「階級鬥爭繼續存在，這是不依賴人們的意志而存在的一條客觀規律」。不管心懷何測的主觀意向何在——很明白，它的用意是反對蘇共在二十二次大會中所宣稱的蘇聯在「建設共產主義」——這是所有倒退論中最危險的一個。我們現在不僅有了資本主義開個東回到法西斯的理論，還有社會主義

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開價單的理論，那就是說一個階級沒有階級的社會裏面，竟存在着「不同的階級和階級鬥爭，所有的社會主義國家無一例外地皆是如此」。從來沒有一個稱爲「馬列主義原則」的有這樣離奇的說法。

一九四八年斯大林政權爲了民族獨立抵抗強大的蘇聯時，它還不敢讓西方陣營中的政敵，獨闢一條光榮的新道路，而毛的野心卻廣大如中國的大陸——它的幅員不僅是目前的中國，它包括了帝國版圖的頂點——明朝、元朝所征服的緬甸、泰國、越南半島，當時中國皇帝遣派兵去即尼，逮捕錫蘭的皇帝，勒令回教國至少是聖地亞哥加朝貢。一九五四年北京出版的「歷史手冊」中有一幅地圖引起了尼赫魯的驚異，這幅地圖將遠東、蒙古共和國、南、北朝鮮、柬埔寨、泰國、馬來亞、緬甸、阿齊（印度國界的五萬里地方）、不丹、錫金、尼泊爾、康貝島和一部分靠近菲律賓的羣島都劃進中國的版圖裏去了。一九六二年以前，除了尼赫魯外沒有人注意到這個問題。

一九六二年赫魯曉夫引用了毛的話「在帝國主義面前，我們表現了『亂利毛澤東』，說毛只顧叫高調而不去從事起『他自己國土上——台灣、香港、澳門』的殖民主義者。人民日報和紅衛兵刻反駁說：『有些人願意我們在這裏提出不平等條約的問題，……他們知道這會產生甚麼樣的後果嗎？』中共接着解釋由「帝國主義對中國領土的貪婪（一八四〇——一九一九），早期民主革命時期」，談到對「舊中國」的控訴，中國目前的統治者將那些根本不會承認自己是中國屬地的可汗、酋長的統治地都概括了進去。（毛澤東寫在過去帝國的光榮，把泰國的獨立也指爲「帝國主義的侵略」，泰國過去是屬於中國皇帝

的，毛希望有一天會恢復中共中央現時所指的「舊中國」的邊界。）

毛處處都顯露出他欲從共產主義陣營出發，進而控制整個世界的企圖。蘇聯撤出對中國的技術援助之後，中國爲了戰略的原因，不得不引用另一種「在一個國家中建設社會主義的理論」（「每一個社會主義國家必須依賴自己以求建設」，第四十五頁），因此，它不但向蘇聯，而且向現時共產陣營中大多數的政府挑戰。它警告說：「不應當看『誰是多數』，或『誰是少數』而附和所謂多數……」（第四十七頁），提議以「全體一致」去代替贊成多數的規定，那就是說中國對於蘇聯和其它大多數共產黨共同制訂的政策有否決權。可見，目前中蘇共的分歧，不但與一九四八年斯大林爲民族獨立與奧地利的衝突有基本的不同，而且與毛自己在一九五七年與一九六〇年間的不一致也有所不同，當時，分歧只限於共產主義陣營之內，還有被平息下來的可能。

赫魯曉夫與毛澤東可共同發覺的唯一事實是他們新社會的不容懷疑的無生存力。國家資本主義作爲一個新社會秩序的生存力是同樣地被私人資本主義的發展規律所證實。那即是說，它們對國內人民的剝削和對外發動戰爭都是不由自主的。我們現在面臨一個驚人的問題：「在這兩個自稱共產主義的政權之間會發生戰爭嗎？」

(三) 回到「戰爭與革命」：中蘇交戰？

一九五六年匈牙利革命，這個向極權國家挑戰使得蘇聯與中共有了史大林時期和馬林可夫——赫魯曉夫時期都未曾有過的合作。反革命對無產階級革命的鎮壓首次徹底地暴露了它的階

級內容。中共，在表示與蘇聯帝國反對匈牙利革命的一致之後，即刻加強它自己的國家權力。

儘管蘇聯樂於皮地提問：「理論上的爭執嗎？其發展理論？」一九六三年六月十九日，赫魯曉夫在記者招待會上的無理行爲並不能掩飾他的核子野心，這是他趕不上毛的地方。較之官不備地發出死亡的叫聲：「法國不會因莫斯科協議而不爲自己裝備其它國家所擁有的具有無限毀滅力的工具。」相反地，毛可以咒罵赫魯曉夫，說他「曲意迎合美帝的需要」，同意一個「從事……避免促使、鼓勵或參加在任何地方的任何核武器爆炸試驗或核爆炸」，並說這是「徹頭徹尾的背叛社會主義國家和所有被壓迫國家的行爲」，它一面禁止這些國家獲得核子武器，一面卻鞏固了美國的「核子壟斷地位」。中蘇的爭論既然已經上了馬克思主義的外衣，辯論中的勝負便沒有多大的真實意義了。

目前蘇聯與中共之間看不到戰爭的跡象。從蘇聯方面來說，不僅因爲它本身是一個擁有核武器的國家，而且蘇聯不願破壞仍以國家計劃爲標準而區別自己「布爾喬亞社會」的世界共產主義運動。從中共方面來說，毛的實力尚不足以向蘇聯巨入挑戰，毛又深信杜勒斯惡名昭彰的以實力爲後盾的談判政策，除非毛能爭取到西歐和執政的亞洲（北朝鮮、北越）共產黨，再加上非共產陣營中的非洲或拉丁美洲的支持，中共發動與蘇戰爭，實無異自殺。

再則，這個國家資本主義列強間的國爭發生在核子時代，全世界上的人民都是絕對地反對核子戰爭的，因此，赫魯曉夫寧願將與毛的爭執縮小爲僅是對於「和平共存」問題的分歧。如消息報所載，蘇聯並不贊成西方的軍國主義者和反動派都是「原子戰販和狂人」，但是，「中國同志

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與這些狂人同聲吶喊「卻使蘇聯感到無比驚訝和悲哀。事實上，反對核子戰爭的力量是如此強大，兩個敢於公開地反對核子條約的國家——毛澤東的中國與波蘭的法國——不能不聲明它們這種舉動都是「為了和平」。毛澤東更提出一個反建議，要求「絕對的、徹底的、完全的、堅決的禁止和毀滅核子武器」，由此，毛不但得以攻擊條約本身是「一個大騙局」和「出賣蘇聯人民」，同時，還可以揚聲那些「熱情地投入帝國主義懷抱的人們的奴顏婢膝」。毛說「揚發這些牛鬼蛇神，使它們露出原來面目對於人民的革命鬥爭和世界和平是一樁大好事」（《人民日報》，八月二日）。其實，毛對於核子災難的恐懼並不比別人為少，不過，他認為這一次這些「有」的國家——美國與蘇聯——將最先的相互攻擊而遭毀滅。即以保存人類文明為念，也不能使毛放棄這種想法。

無可置疑，中共對世界戰時的考慮基本上與蘇聯不同的。只有中共才有這個膽量談到核子戰後「在廢墟上建設社會主義」。不過，這並不是中蘇衝突的原因，也不是最近中共企圖以種族為理由將蘇聯趕出許多亞非會議的決定點和分歧點，它們的根源是毛澤東擴張的權力野心，在毛與大林的鬥爭中就很明顯，中國一採取得政權，即刻要將所有殖民地國家都奉「毛澤東思想」為他們爭取權力的基本理論。

一九五〇——一九五三年朝鮮戰爭時期和一九五七年韓、毛聯合宣言反對佈多中心論時，中蘇間的齟齬便暫時消失了。很自然地，幫助國外的革命是每個統治階級都願意做的事。蘇聯新的統治階級初登政壇時，因為比它所推翻的舊統治者擁有更多的力量，大都活力充沛，但是，目前這些掌握權力的國家計劃者，即在本土

上還未能證實他們有走上歷史舞台的權利之前，便已覺勢所迫，有發動對外戰爭的需要了。

戰爭與革命意識不同，它們是相對的兩件事。既然，毛未曾採用史大林要他維持與蘇介石合作的勸告而取得了政權，毛現在的這些革命大話背後真正的正事是：①中國只有在把發動戰爭的時機才發動戰爭，如在西藏與印度的初期衝突，隨後即停止于侵犯印度的邊界；②中國為達到目的，可以在作為殖民地自己的國土上如香港與澳門，與西方帝國主義和平相處，更正確地說是狡猾的「和平共存」；③「四大階級」政策是「毛澤東思想」獨創的，雖然如此，毛為了保護自己的領土野心，曾用馬克思主義的技巧卻比蘇聯的夫商明得多。實在，一旦受到美國，世界上最強大的軍事力量挑戰時，毛並不「更為勇敢」，在臺灣、金門和馬祖，他都輕騎下來，比蘇聯的夫，見到甘乃迪真會為古巴的火箭裝置打核子戰時而輕騎下來的次數多；④不管毛澤東的革命大話多麼空濤，在其體事件上，毛卻是個運用帝國主義插隊的專家，他甚至形容「法西斯政權」為「愛好和平的」。中印戰事去後生時，毛稱巴基斯坦的軍政府為「法西斯」，一旦中印戰事發生，毛又急忙與巴基斯坦聯絡，巴基斯坦也樂然變成「愛好和平的國家」了；⑤毛在亞、非洲、口稱「保衛革命」，實想有一天能全部控制這些地區。他稱其他共產主義國家為「修正主義分子」，「保衛革命」的範圍也因此把這些國家也包進去，同時，正如我們所知，他在另一面又包容了「民族資產階級，甚至愛國的王公貴族」。

毛身上奇妙地混合著機會主義與冒險主義，加上他的帝國主義野心（包括共產黨陣營內和陣營外，如在服西歐，侵犯印度，垂涎緬甸、越南、尼泊爾……直至柬埔寨）這些都是與他要在思想戰線上取得勝利分不開的。這也就是他不負責任地濫用馬克思主義語言——「不斷革命」通過國家計劃長驅直入「共產主義問題」的由來。

因此，揭發「毛澤東思想」論證所引進的毛胡可將世界導致災難一事，和指出一條與國家資本主義及其與美國在世界各處爭霸的相反的道路，是很急迫的。也即是說指明一條通向自由的道路現在是急需的。

所得結論：兩種主觀主義
「超乎概念與真實之間的對立之上」；只能賴於主觀性。」黑格爾：邏輯學
「在這篇最具唯心主義的黑格爾著作中，唯物主義最少，唯心主義最多。『矛盾』吧，可是事實！」列寧：哲學筆記
右兩種主觀主義是我們所指的國家資本主義和工人革命時代的特徵，其一是我們所談到的「毛」的主觀主義，不管客觀情況，以為國家權力就是將六億五千萬人趕進所謂「人民公社」；認為一小撮持有武力的優秀分子就可以操縱人們的活力，「改造」人們的思想。這種類型的主觀主義，充滿了黑格爾所說的「確信自身的現實性和世界的非現實性」正準備投入核子災難的旋風中。

第二種主觀主義，則基于「超越在概念與真實之間的對立之上」，它「吸收」了客觀性，那就是說，由于要力爭自由，它不得不去瞭解和應付客觀存在的真實。它的成熟顯示，如馬克思在《黑格爾辯證法批判》中說：「當一個肉體的人，站在物質在在的地球土地上，吞吐所有的自然力……並沒有離開地球的『種活動』去創造客觀對象……此處我們見到徹底的自然主義或人道主義和唯心主義及唯物主義間的區別，它同時又是結

合此二者的真理。」

我們的時代是一個思想鬥爭的時代，我認爲在此國爭中，要保持頭腦的清醒，就需要先弄清這兩種主義，可惜，此處，我只能略爲提示一下。

一九五六年匈牙利，這兩種主義直接發生了衝突。匈牙利革命使人知道，工人、農民和知識分子是不能被洗腦的；共產主義和馬克思主義不是一樣東西，爲了從共產主義之下解放出來，它超越了馬克思人道主義的旗幟。馬克思說過，共產主義「不是人類發展的目的及人類社會的形式」。匈牙利自由戰士反對極權政府的集中制度，將工人委員會、青年委員會、知識份子委員會由中央分離出去——即是一種個人與社會不相敵對的統治形式，因爲只有個人的自由才是一切自由的基礎。

反革命階級用武力將這極權的初步活動和思想組織血淋淋地鎮壓下去了，加以中國同伴的相助，共同稱呼這個人道主義爲「修正主義」。毛澤東之所以幫助蘇聯當然有其原因，他說：「匈牙利事件發生時，我們國內某些人很高興，他們希望中國也會發生同樣的事情……」。由於毛能引起公開的內戰而把反對派剷除下去；由于毛攫取了馬克思主義的旗幟——一般的及特殊的，如用「公社」一詞，對於馬克思主義者，其意義爲自我解放（一八七一年巴黎公社）——許多新獨立的非洲國家都把它吸引了。

雖然如此，人民公社中的大錢還是不可能隨手得到的，同樣，如每一個現代國家，中國國內存在着許多有基本差異的階級，這一事實也是掩飾不了的。要把這些階級的矛盾變爲是毛所說的「新」、「舊」的差別，毛還沒有這樣大的本領，它們不僅不是存在與否存在之間的對立，

它們簡直是同時存在的兩種真實的敵對形式之間的公開衝突。難道人才要被壓迫者同時存在，才是它的決定因素，也是自稱共產黨的中國國家資本主義的不能生存的決定因素。

毛承認，與普通的私人資本主義一樣，中國社會的基本矛盾「仍是生產關係與生產力之間，上層建築與經濟基礎之間的矛盾」。正是這個致命的弱點，迫使蘇聯的理論家，在一九四三年修改了馬克思關於社會主義的價值論。

資本主義生產關係，不管它被稱作什麼名字，所顯示的卻是它的剝削性。蘇聯修改了馬克思的經濟理論，中國修改了馬克思的哲學，其原因是中國兩國在工業上有很重要的差別和種種世界危機所致。

蘇聯已演進成了一個重要的工業地區，一個具有價值的國家，而中國則還是一大片落後的地域，有的是六億五千萬人口而不是機器。正是這落後狀態使得中國只有用人海的戰術去應付危機——不是解決危機。無論如何，這種二元性，中國新的統治階級與被剝削的人民間的不可調和的二元性，是阻礙不住的。此外，另一顯明的事實是，世界被兩個爭霸的核子巨人——美國和蘇聯——所分裂，這種分裂活動已擴展到各個陣營中的小凱撒——西方的較高樂和東方的毛澤東身上。

毛的「熟習哲學」與他的不熟習辯證法哲學，二事互不相干。辯證法哲學是一種自由的選擇，只有從事于自由而作實際鬥爭的人才能領悟它。這正是人類努力能按充分利用的關鍵，也正是理論與實踐間的關係。這種關係可以減少工業化時的痛苦。此外，另一種類型的主觀主義，就是那種假使使毛澤東把思想鬥爭變爲替人「洗腦」的主觀主義。

現實的邏輯性發展是殘酷的，在它的局限下，毛所精心思慮出來的只能是一個關於倒退的理論，不是革命的理論。中國國家資本主義的特性和其殘暴方式是產生這種理論的客觀力量和根源。資本主義精神上的破產總是伴隨着資本主義本身的破產而來；同樣的，毛的幼稚的完全沒有哲學方法的思想，正與其國家資本主義進入所謂「人民公社」而俱生。史大林承認在他的「社會主義國家」裏，價值規律仍然有效，他爲了要否認社會主義社會中仍有階級存在，就不得不把價值規律和剩餘價值規律分別開來。毛澤東高聲宣稱這就是「社會主義」。雖然，毛對於社會主義的概念完全是資本主義式的；雖然，他極度的剝削中國人民；雖然，中共侵犯了其他國家的領土；雖然，中國國內不斷地發出反抗共產統治者的呼聲，毛澤東的抽象的革命叫聲在國外卻受到許多好戰人士，特別是共黨內外的知識分子的熱烈歡迎。談到我們的時代；談到現今自稱馬列主義者對羣衆自我活動缺乏信心的程度，真令人傷心。他們的戰鬥精神只有在國家權力支持時才能振作起來。這就是現在國家資本主義時代的特徵。我們的「革命的」小資產階級害怕無階級級羣衆的自發動員比那些無政府權力支持便一無所記的列強國家更甚。

另一方面，人民羣衆爲自由而奮鬥的主觀性提示了，我們對於理論與實踐間的關係的需要。爭取自由的鬥爭並不局限於匈牙利、非洲、蘇聯或中國，美國與西歐也包括在內。這個挑戰是爲了得到在概念與真實間的一壘新的結合。這種概念與真實間的新的結合將會把人類無限的不受約束的活力解放出來，因而永遠地結束了馬克思所說的「史前的人類」，真正的歷史將由此開始。

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TWAYNE

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN •

THE CHALLENGE OF MAO TSE-TUNG

A. Communist Counter-Revolutions

"There are people that think that Marxism can cure any disease. We should tell them that dogmas are more useless than cow dung. Dung can be used as fertilizer."—Mao Tse-tung.

1) *Of Wars and Revolutions as an "Eight-Legged Essay"* 257

The Sino-Soviet rift has produced a raft of r-r-revolutionary statements from the Chinese Communist Party that picture Mao as a "Marxist-Leninist" in unsullied revolutionary armor who carries on a single-handed global struggle against "revisionism." The West's daily press does nothing to upset the simplicity and coherence of this fairy tale because it is all too eager to stress the power rift between Russia and China. The battle of quotations that first broke out openly in 1960, with Mao leaning heavily on Lenin's *State and Revolution*, and Khrushchev favoring Lenin's *Infantile Sickness of Leftism in Communism*, is, to use a phrase of Mao's on another occasion, an "eight-legged essay." In the process all words have lost their meaning.

* I wish to thank a young scholar, Jonathan Spence, for some of the research for this chapter, and I am indebted for his knowledge of the Chinese language. The analysis of the material and the political conclusions are, naturally, mine alone.

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The whole history of Mao proves him to have been a fighter, not against "revisionism," but against "dogmatism," the present revolutionary-sounding statements that thunder out from Communist China notwithstanding. Mao's accusation of Khrushchev as a coward who moved over from "fear of nuclear blackmail" to "fear of revolution," and Khrushchev's expression of "sadness" that the "Chinese comrades" could join the reactionary "atom mongers and madmen," are no more than tools forged to serve the narrow purpose of power politics. This is not to say that the ideological battle is without influence on the power struggle, and, moreover, has a logic of its own. But we must not let the fact that both contestants call themselves Communist hide their class nature: both are capitalistic to the marrow of their bones. State-capitalism changes the form, not the content, of these totalitarian regimes. It is no accident that the propulsion toward open conflict came from internal, not external causes. 1959, the first breaking point between Russia and China, was not only the year of Khrushchev's visit to the United States where he helped create the "spirit of Camp David"; nor is it only the year of China's first incursion into Indian territory. It is the year of crisis within Russia and within China, especially the latter. This was brought about by a combination of natural calamities and an inhuman drive by the totalitarian rulers to industrialize, collectivize and "communize" the vast land with one "Great Leap Forward." Instead of achieving overnight any new social order, 650 million human beings²²² were to face famine and near famine conditions. The voices of revolt came from within, not from without, mainland China. The battle of quotations, however, are directed toward the outside. Because these two state-capitalist regimes calling themselves Communist are involved in a contest for influence over the new African, Asian and Latin-American world, where the Marxian theory of liberation is a polarizing force for freedom fighters, the battle is fought out in the language of "Marxism-Leninism." Because ours is not only a nuclear age but the age of the struggle for the minds of men, any contest with "the most vicious enemy, American imperialism," requires that one have ideological as well as power "positions of strength." It is within this context that we must view the challenge of Mao Tse-tung, and, indeed, it is within this framework that Mao threw down the

gauntlet to Khrushchev for leadership over the entire Communist world.

To crown his world ambitions Mao has not shirked from taking on responsibility for a possible nuclear holocaust. The Chinese rulers have shocked all mankind by their cynical statements that China would suffer "least" were such a holocaust to break out. "Even if 200 million of us were killed, we would still have 400 million left."²⁵⁹ Mao has laughed at "nuclear war blackmail" branding all who fear nuclear war as cowards and "revisionists." As Hongqi (Red Flag) put it: "The modern revisionists are panic stricken by the policy of nuclear war blackmail. They develop from the fear of war to the fear of revolution."²⁶⁰

This glorification of revolution is not meant for mainland China, however. It is directed against other lands. The Chinese masses would like nothing better than a revolution against their ruling class and its head, Mao Tse-tung. For one brief period voices were heard, loud and clear, in uncompromising opposition to the single party state. They were, as they expressed it, "blossoming and contending" in line with Mao's speech "let 100 flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought contend." This opposition was soon ruthlessly crushed.

It is impossible to understand the situation the Chinese rulers face now, either internally or externally, without understanding the critical years 1956-1957. Just as the Hungarian Revolution was not only a national revolution, so the discontent in China was not confined to its borders. Both events mark an historic turning point in world development as well as in class relations within state-capitalist societies.

1956 opened a new world epoch in the fight for freedom. The year began with Khrushchev, in February, calling for de-Stalinization. He hoped this would guarantee the containment of revolutionary unrest. The year ended with the Hungarian Revolution showing, beyond any peradventure of doubt, that what the Freedom Fighters want is freedom from Communism.

In February, 1957, Mao felt certain that it was still safe for him to act the benevolent "sun"²⁶¹ that would allow "100 schools of thought to contend." The Chinese people "bloomed and contended" so vigorously that they exposed the contradiction, the live,

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antagonistic contradiction between rulers and ruled, thus giving the lie to Mao's claim that he is an exponent of the Marxist theory of liberation.

The bureaucracy's incredible fanaticism and blindness to reality and to logic meant that everything had to fit into its world. If people could not be "remolded" to fit, they had to be destroyed. We face, as the starkest and most palpable reality today, what the great German philosopher Hegel—analyzing the abstract philosophic development of the "Spirit in Self-Estrangement"—had called "the absolute and universal inversion of reality and thought, their entire estrangement one from the other."²³

The brief period of open dispute in China, from May 8 to mid-June, 1957, illuminates both the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the fundamental struggle of China and Russia against the United States. The life and death question of war and revolution is thereby brought into focus. Though the right to any freedom of expression in China was short-lived, and though the official sources²⁴ did not by any means reveal the full extent of the opposition, the true sweep of freedom broke through these barriers as well as through the barriers of language. Just as the Hungarian Freedom Fighters spoke in a more universal language than Magyar, and the Swahili language of the African revolutionaries is understood by all, so, for the same reasons, we feel at one with the Chinese. They all speak the human language of freedom. Let's listen to the voices of revolt.

2) *Voices of Revolt*

Lin Hsi-ling, age 21: "True socialism is highly democratic, but the socialism we have here is not democratic. I call this society a socialism sprung from a basis of feudalism." The People's Daily, June 30, then continues, "She called them (certain phenomena in the life of our society) a class system, saying that it (i.e., class system) had already entered all aspects of life . . . she said with ulterior motives that the social productive forces in both the Soviet Union and China were very low and that these two countries had not yet eliminated class differences . . . Moreover, quoting Engels' theory that one country cannot construct socialism and Lenin's dictum that socialism is the elimination of class, she arrived at the

conclusion that present-day China and Russia are not socialist. She loudly demanded a search for 'true socialism' and advocating using explosive measures to reform the present social system."

Chang Po-sheng, head of the propaganda department of the Communist Youth League in the Normal College of Shenyang: "All kinds of important questions are decided upon by six persons—Chairman Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Premier Chou En-lai and those above the rank of the Secretary General of the Party center. The destiny of six hundred million is dictated by the pen of these six men and how can they know the actual situation? At best they can make an inspection tour of the Yellow River and swim the Yangtze." (Shenyang Daily, June 11).

"Since last year, workers in the province have involved themselves in thirteen strikes and trouble-making incidents." (Reported by New China News Agency, Canton, May 14).

Trade Unions called "Tongues of the Bureaucracy." "Trade unions were cast aside because they were concerned with production and not with the workers' welfare . . . that is why some workers in Canton, Changsha, Wuhan, Hsinhsiang and Shikiachwang dubbed their trade unions 'workers' control departments' led by the administration, 'tongues of the bureaucracy,' and 'tail of the administration,' etc. . . . Is it not a 'crisis' in the trade union work that trade unions are divorced from the masses to such a degree?" (From Li Feng's "On an 8,000-li Tour of Hurried Observations," People's Daily, May 9).

Ko P'ei-chi, Lecturer, Department of Industrial Economics, China People's University in Peking: "When the Communist Party entered the city in 1949 the common people welcomed it with food and drink and looked upon it as a benevolent force. Today the common people choose to estrange themselves from the Communist Party as if its members were gods and devils . . . The party members behave like plain-clothes police and place the masses under their surveillance. The party members are not to be blamed for this, for the party organization instructs them to gather information . . . The masses may knock you down, kill the Communists and overthrow you. The downfall of the Communist Party does not mean the downfall of China. This cannot be described as

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unpatriotic for the Communists no longer serve the people . . ." (Reported in People's Daily, May 31).

Huang Chen-lu, editor of the school paper at the Normal College of Shenyang: "The Communist Party has 12 million members, less than two per cent of the total population. The 600 million people are to become the obedient subjects of this two per cent of the people. What sort of principle is this!" (Reported in Shenyang Daily, June 11).

Su P'ei-ying, China Democratic League, and Engineer of Tientsin Civil Housing Designing Board: "When the Communists first entered Tientsin, they said it was a revolution and our revolution was not a change of dynasties. They way I look at it now is that the revolution was worse than a change of dynasties and living in such a society is heartbreaking." (Reported in New China News Agency, June 9).

Lung Yun, Vice Chairman KMTRC¹⁰⁴. "During the Second World War, the United States granted loans and leases to her allies. Later, some of these allies refused to pay back the loans, and the United States excused some from repayment. It will take our country more than ten years to repay the loans from the Soviet Union, if we can ever repay them. Besides, we have to pay interest to the Soviet Union. China fought for socialism, but look at the result." (Reported by the New China News Agency, June 18, as "Lung Yun's Absurd Views").

Tai Huang, New China News Agency journalist, who had joined the Communist Party in 1944: "The old ruling class has been overthrown, but a new ruling class has arisen. The evolution of this will lead to an amalgamation with Taiwan." NCNA, Peking, August 17, continues its report: "After the outbreak of the Hungarian incident, Tai Huang disapproved of the dispatch of the Soviet troops to help Hungary to suppress its counter-revolutionary rebellion . . . He slandered the people's journalistic enterprises as a 'policy to make the people ignorant.' He maliciously attacked the leaders of the New China News Agency everywhere."

NCNA, Canton, May 14: "The Communist Party Kwantung Committee has courageously and thoroughly exposed the contradictions found in current work in Kwantung . . . the contradictions

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between the leadership and the masses. These find main expression in undemocratic behaviour on the part of the cadres which leads to the practice of having work carried out by coercion and command and the violation of law and discipline; the refusal to make public the accounts which has permitted quite a number of co-operative cadres to indulge in corrupt practices; the non-participation of co-operative cadres in manual work and the payment of compensation wages to them at too high a rate. All this dissatisfies the masses . . . From last winter, a total of 117,916 households have pulled out at different times from co-operatives in the province. At present, 102,149 households have rejoined."

Suddenly, six weeks after the open forums first started, the Communist rulers called an abrupt halt to the "100 flowers" campaign. It was felt that, instead of 100 flowers, they found 1,000 weeds and, "of course," weeds must be rooted out. The road that had led to those six weeks was a tortuous one. Mao's original speech, "Let 100 flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought contend," which had been delivered as far back as May, 1956, and was intended for intellectuals only, had never been published. Nevertheless the limited freedom expanded itself. China was confronted with student strikes and worker strikes. Meanwhile, the Hungarian "thaw" had developed into a full-scale revolution. Mao still thought he could limit the Chinese thaw by fitting the limited freedoms into the vise of single party domination. Thereupon, (February 27, 1957) he delivered a new speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." He redefined "contradiction" (Mao's favorite thesis) to where both it and freedom lost all meaning. He further redefined "the people" to where they were either "people" or "enemies." Mao put so many limitations to the permissible contradictions that "blooming and contending" was diverted. Even then, however, he felt called upon to introduce so many "additions" to the text of his speech that when it was finally published, on June 18, 1957, "the correct handling of contradictions" soon turned into a relentless hunt for "rightists." The right to free expression ended abruptly, ruthlessly.

Whether this took the form of outright execution, as in the case of the three student leaders at Hanyang, who were hanged before the horrified eyes of 10,000; or whether it took the form of

sending "rightists and intellectuals" to work in the fields, or to serve prison terms, the shock was not exhausted by the typical totalitarian state's crushing of the opposition. Far from retreating in the face of widespread opposition, Mao soon came out with a real brainstorm called "The People's Communes."

3) "The People's Communes"

The first "model Commune" had been initiated in April, 1958 and was named "Sputnik." The name was not chosen accidentally. The October, 1957 Russian launching of the sputnik produced two very different reactions on the part of Khrushchev and Mao. The former knew that Russia's "superiority" over the United States was not "total." He knew, also, the cost of crushing the Hungarian Revolution and bringing the whole of Eastern Europe back under full Russian control. At the same time, the one billion dollars²² in short-term credits to Eastern Europe prevented aid to China in as massive doses as had been previously given it. Above all, the Hungarian Revolution blew sky high, not only Hungary's State Plan, it undermined also Russia's Five Year Plan. This was scrapped and Khrushchev began to think of some substantial trade, on a long-term loan basis, with the United States. Hence, the Manifesto of the ruling Communist parties, in November, 1957, was by no means limited to exercising "revisionism." It also reaffirmed the line of "peaceful co-existence."

Mao, who was present, thought otherwise. He believed that the sputnik had produced so radical a shift in the world balance of power that the Communist orbit could now undertake little wars, "just wars" and all sorts of adventures with which to taunt U.S. imperialism. While he signed the "unanimous statement," he decided upon a very dramatic departure not only vis-a-vis the United States, but a dramatic short-cut to try to outstrip Russian Communism. This illusion of Mao's was fostered by one bountiful harvest, and his vainglorious confidence that he could, by militarizing labor, outstrip science.

What Mao's "People's Communes" far outstripped was Stalin's dictum "to liquidate the kulak as a class." In these "Communes" all the peasants—of China's population of 650 million, no less than

500 million are peasants—were to be herded into barracks-like quarters where they were to function “along military lines,” working from sun-up to sundown. After dinner they were either to attend meetings, or work in fields, or on construction, or in steel “mills”—or wherever they might be ordered to work. Then Mao planned to organize “Communes” in the cities. This total regimentation and militarization of labor was called “mass mobilization,” or “mass line.” This, said Mao, was going to unleash such vast productive forces that they could accomplish in one decade what it took four decades to accomplish in Russia. Moreover, the fantasy went on, they could go, “without interruption,” to Communism.

The totalitarian state was in so great a hurry that in eight months it herded 120 million peasant households—formerly in 740 thousand agricultural producers’ cooperatives of 160 families each—into 24,000 “People’s Communes” each averaging no less than 5,000 families. This, it was claimed, “liberated” tens of millions of women from household chores. They therefore had to work alongside their men in the field full time; their children were taken away from them and sent to nurseries; old parents were sent to “old peoples’ happy homes.” All eating was done in public mess halls, hence the women who were “freed” from household chores had to cook, instead of for one family, for approximately 8,000.

“The People’s Commune,” read the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee Resolution, “is the combination of industry, agriculture, commerce, education and military affairs within the scope of their activity.”²¹⁶

Pretentious claims were made that steel was being produced on the farms. Actually only a low-grade of pig iron—full of slag, and quite useless to the steel mills—was produced at the cost of transporting the bulky ore to the farm kilns. In the end, Peking itself had to admit that in 1958 no less than 3.08 million tons of “locally made pig iron” had to be scrapped because it was no good for industrial purposes. Instead of unleashing vast productive forces, all that the “mass line” unleashed were aching backs, and miserable barracks conditions of work and of living. The chaos, disorganization, intolerable living conditions, inhuman relationships, and just plain exhaustion compelled even the totalitarian bureaucracy to call a halt and proclaim benevolently that “ten to twelve hours was

sufficient" to work; that calisthenics and meetings should not take all the rest of the time since "people should sleep eight hours." The determination persisted for the recognition of personal freedom. Hence, a new dictum: "Members of the Commune are directed to lead a collectivized life. Each person must work ten hours and engage in ideological studies for two hours a day. They are entitled to one day of rest every ten days . . . The CCP committee rules that all members are free to use their time as they wish outside of the ten hours of labor and two hours of ideological study each day; that husband and wife may have a room of their own; that members are permitted to make tea and other refreshments in their own quarters for themselves; and that women members may use their spare time to make shoes and mend clothes . . . The Commune members have enthusiastically welcomed the small personal freedoms granted them by the CCP committee." (From a New China News Agency report of November 20, 1958).

While the Communes never did develop as the over-all form of production in industry, industry was alleged to have met its production targets "so far ahead of time" that a halt could be called. Once again it was to be recognized that while industry is "the leader" agriculture remains "the basis." There is no doubt that some progress was made, if the measure of progress is not the way in which people live, but the way industry is developed. Irrigation projects were constructed with forced labor, and the rate of industrial growth far outdistanced that in another Asiatic country—India.

Whatever attraction the fantastic goals set for 1958 had for the underdeveloped countries, if the gullible thought that ordering the masses about like soldiers and making them work endless hours would produce industrialization overnight, if the cynical failed to recoil from the "Communal living" which was short on sex life and love, and long on public mess-halls and work, the present famine conditions compel second thoughts. Here are the figures:¹¹⁷

	First Claims on 1958 Output	Revised Claims on 1958 Output
Steel (million metric tons)	11.08	8.00
Grain (million metric tons)	375.00	250.00
Cotton (million metric tons)	3.32	2.1

No current statistics are released for agriculture.²⁶² It is known, however, that while the word "Commune" is retained, it is actually the production brigade rather than the whole Commune that has become the operational unit. The large production brigade embraces from 200 to 300 families, equivalent to what it was in agricultural producers' co-ops, or a single large village; and the small production brigade consists of only forty families. Again, while the large production brigade has the right of ownership, the small production brigade has the right of use of labor, land, draft animals, and farming tools and equipment.

The "new" method of work follows along the road of the First Five Year Plan modeled on the Russian line, rather than the lines of departure mapped out with "The Great Leap Forward." The blame is placed on those who didn't understand, and thus are in need of yet a new rectification campaign since there are those "who have taken advantage of the difficulties created by natural calamities and shortcomings in basic-level work to carry out destructive activities."

The dictum is: "Reform some comrades who are crudely unconcerned with details, unwilling to understand and often have no idea whatsoever of complete conditions, but yet who direct production." The "new" principle has all the sound of sweated piece-work pay, thus: "The principle of exchange for fair prices, distribution according to work, and work-more-earn-more."²⁶³

We must not think, however, that the recognition of a need for technological build-up, or the need to concentrate on agricultural production, or the need for "specialists" and "lowering of production costs" means the abandonment of the Chinese Communist "three-sided banner" that is, socialist construction, the "Great Leap Forward," and the "Commune."

Directed to the Afro-Asian world was the claim that it is possible for the underdeveloped areas to go uninterruptedly from industrialization into "Communism," and that "the mass line" can achieve greater miracles than advanced science.

Khrushchev didn't have to wait two years for the revised figures on the achievements of the "Great Leap Forward" to be published for him to know the preposterousness of the so-called simultaneous development of agriculture and industry in a country that had no

advanced technological base for either. Nor did he appreciate Mao's attempt to transform the fantasy into a "theory" to prove the superiority of the China Road over Russia's more arduous long road to "Communism." The breaking point, however, came, not on the question of the "Commune," but at a time when Mao tried to tell him how to conduct the struggle against the United States. He disregarded Mao's opposition to his meeting with Eisenhower, and arrived in the United States on September 15, 1959. The "spirit of Camp David" for a summit was adhered to until the U-2 spy plane incident in May, 1960. It is true that these considerations of power-politics, and not any theoretical differences, are the basic reasons for the different interpretations from Moscow and Peking on war and revolution. The objective forces that compel the different interpretations are, however, by no means exhausted by pointing to the obvious power-politics involved. Mao's and Khrushchev's "theories" are as objectively founded as are their power politics. It is, therefore, necessary to trace them through to their sources.

B. The Dialectic of Mao's Thought From the Defeat of the 1925-27 Revolution to the Conquest of Power

"... in place of revolt appears arrogance."—Hegel

Different conditions produce different modes of thought. The twenty-two year long struggle for power—from the defeat of the Chinese Revolution of 1925-27 to Mao's assumption of full power in mainland China in 1949—determined the dialectic of "Mao's Thought" as a corollary to Stalin's long series of basic revisions of Marxism which ended in its total transformation into opposite—the monolithic single party state power of totalitarian Communism. To this, and not to Marxism, Mao made two original contributions: (1) the role of the Army, in and out of state power; and (2) "Thought Reform," that is to say, brainwashing which, as the natural adjunct to his "four-class politics," is applied equally to all classes. These are the underlying premises of all of Mao's actions and writings, including the two essays officially cited to prove the

"originality of Mao's Thought as creative Marxism": *On Practice*, and *On Contradiction*. We must never forget that the transformation into opposite is not just an academic question. It is objectively grounded. To grasp the ideology at its source, however, we cannot begin with Mao's conquest of power in 1949, much less with the Sino-Soviet Rift beginning in 1958. Its true beginning is the defeat of the 1925-27 Revolution. Indeed, Mao dates the Chinese Revolution from its defeat because it is then, as he puts it, that the "Revolutionary War" began. In this case we are willing to follow Mao's method of back-dating because it is there that his undermining of Marxism began.

1) Defeat of Revolution

The defeat of the 1925-1927 Chinese Revolution meant the defeat of the peasantry as well as the proletariat. However, where the proletariat could not in any way escape the counter-revolutionary vengeance of Chiang in the cities where his power—state and military, prison and police—was centered, it was possible, in the vast land of China, to find some escape in the mountainous countryside.

Very early during his running from Chiang's endless "extermination campaigns," Mao must have decided that warlordism is no accidental feature of Chinese life, and that "mass power" too should be coordinated with the military. Guerrilla war, and not peasant revolution, was soon made into a theory. The "Red" Army, and not the poor peasants, became the new all-encompassing reality—political as well as military, philosophic as well as economic. The Party armed with military might won support from the peasantry when it took over in a definite piece of territory and fostered agricultural reform. But whether or not it had such wide support, its military control of an area gave the Party state power over the peasantry. This is the quintessential element. Theory can wait.

This is why Mao did not make his only original and moving piece of writing of spontaneous peasant revolt and organization—"Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," February, 1927—into a theory of the role of the peasantry in revolution.²⁷ Mao had no disagreement with Stalin's policy of "The

Bloc of Four Classes," which contributed no small share to the defeat of the Revolution. Despite its revolutionary fervor when it reports the actual revolutionary actions of the peasantry, Mao's Report describes divisions of society as those between "good gentry" and "bad gentry," "corrupt officials" and "honest ones," and speaks of "a new democratic order," not of a social revolution and a new classless society.

The peasant revolts which have characterized the whole of Chinese history since before Christ, deeply characterized, of course, the 1925-27 Revolution. But Mao's "Red Army," which arose after the defeat of the Revolution including the peasantry in Hunan, did not spring from any large scale spontaneous peasant movement. Quite the contrary. "The Red Army had no support from the masses. And in many places it was even attacked like a bandit gang." 271 When asked whether his Army hadn't included some lumpen-proletariat and even some bandit chiefs, Mao's answer was characteristic, that is to say, practical: They were excellent fighters. The Army was kept disciplined and in action. By the time of Chiang's fourth extermination campaign, it was capable of the historic military feat, the phenomenal long march, which began in October, 1934, into the vastness of China, and stretched over no less than 6,000 miles.

What, however, is forgotten in the oft-telling of this military exploit—I leave aside the decisive role of Chu Teh because it does not change the character of Maoism—is that the long march meant also stops; conquests of villages; acquisition of food supplies by whatever means; and the final method of establishing power when it did set itself up as the supposed "Soviet Republic." The so-called Soviet areas always coincided with the Red Army's sphere of action including the setting up of the "Soviet" from above by the Chinese Communist Party. One thing is clear and indisputable and absolutely new: Never before had a Marxist leader built an Army where there was no mass movement and called the territory of its operation a "Soviet Republic."

The running for safety, the need to survive, the compulsion to protect oneself, was to be elevated into "a theory of revolution." Not only that, every aspect of this survival was so transformed. For example, early in his career, Mao was ruthless against opponents,

more ruthless against revolutionary opponents than he was against Chiang Kai-shek. Thus Li Li-san, who tried to base himself on the urban proletariat and some revolutionary Marxist principles, had to be destroyed. Thus, Mao liquidated the Kiangsi Soviet which, in 1930, tried to base itself on the city. As he himself put it to Edgar Snow, the rebels were "disarmed and liquidated."²² Thereby, Mao completed what the counter-revolutionary Chiang Kai-shek achieved with the defeat of the 1927 Revolution—physical divorce of the Party from the working class.

He repeated this in 1936 as he moved again "to liquidate" Chang Kuo-t'ao²³ who opposed his "peasant Soviets." Mao followed the same policy after his new united front with Chiang in the war against Japan, when he moved against Trotskyists who stood for a "third front" or "Lenin front." Indeed, he branded these as the "principal enemies," which means that fighting against them took priority over fighting either Chiang or Japan.

The struggle against "dogmatists" characterized Mao, in action and in theory, before and after power. We will not get the slightest whiff of fighting "revisionists" until Mao has to fight Khrushchev for power within the Communist world and suddenly finds it necessary to appear "orthodox." The pretense of orthodoxy is strictly limited to the world outside of China. Since the concrete there gives the lie to this claim of orthodoxy, the emphasis is on Mao's "original contributions." Original they truly are. Indeed they have nothing whatever to do with Marxism as was seen over and over again on his road to power. His outflanking of the cities was of one piece with his appeal to the workers, not to revolt, but to continue production, and remain at work while he "took the cities."

Mao's "orthodoxy" has more than a tinge of "originality" since he feels compelled to transform his road to power into a universal theory applicable to all, and especially so to the under-developed countries. Thus, a recent article in *Hongqi* (Red Flag) Number 20-21, 1960, called "A Basic Summing Up of Experience Gained in the Victory of the Chinese People's Revolution," expansively states, over and over again, that the road to power was the establishment of "small revolutionary bases in the rural areas," the moving from

"a few" of these to "many," and thus encircling "the cities by the rural areas (led) to the ultimate taking over of the cities."

And again: "Com. Mao Tse-tung maintained that, above all, the bases in the country which at the beginning were small in area and still few in number should be firmly held and continuously expanded and developed. In this way, it would be possible 'to come ever nearer the goal of attaining nation-wide political power.'"

Mao is not stressing the role of the peasantry as against that of the city workers in order to give the peasantry a special role in the revolution. On the contrary, he denigrates the early peasant Soviets in China, of which he was a leader, but not yet the undisputed leader. Here is how he analyzed that period: "We must by no means allow a recurrence of such ultra-left, erroneous policies as were adopted toward the petty and middle bourgeoisie by our party in the period from 1931 to 1934 (the advocating of uneconomically high standards in working conditions; excessively high income-tax rates; . . . the shortsighted, one-sided view of the so-called 'welfare of the toilers' instead of making our objective the development of production, the prosperity of our economy, the taking into account of both public and private interests and benefits of both labor and capital.)" 274

Mao launched his new policy by securing Chiang Kai-shek's release after his own Kuomintang subordinates had kidnapped him at Sian in December, 1936. Mao then had Chiang re-instated as head of the united national forces. This is what it meant:

"Our policy is to rely on the poor peasants and maintain a stable alliance with the middle peasants in order to destroy the system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation by the landlord class and the old type of rich peasants. The land, the properties which the landlords and rich peasants receive, must not exceed those which the mass of peasants get. But neither should there be a repetition of the ultra-left, erroneous policy carried out between 1931 and 1934, the so-called policy of 'distribute no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants.' It is necessary to heed the opinion of the middle peasants . . . if they do not agree, concessions should be made to them." 275

And again: "We have already adopted a decision not to confiscate the land of the rich peasant . . . we are not confiscating the

property and the factories of the big and small merchants and capitalists. We protect their enterprise . . . The common interests of both capitalists and workers are grounded in the struggle against imperialist aggression . . . What we consider the most important is that all parties and groups should treat us without animosity and bear in mind the objective of the struggle against Japan for salvation of the country. We shall hereafter consider of no importance any difference of opinion on other questions." 276

In a word, Mao "supports" the poor peasant, the revolutionary peasant, like a rope supports a hanging man. Only after the abrogation of the Land Law of the first "Soviet Republic" which had stipulated the confiscation of the land, without compensation, of all landowners above middle peasant—and only after the total disintegration of the proletarian leadership—did Mao finally (1937) become the undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist Party.

He is "for" the peasant when he wants to fight the city worker. He is "for" the poor peasant as he moves against the landlord who opposes him. When he needs the landlords as "part of the nation" that opposes Japan, he promises them their rights, and he even collects their rent for them in this period! The only peasant he is truly for is the peasant Army. Of all the Communists in power, only the Chinese list the Army along with the Party as the two instruments of power. Since the attempt to establish Mao as nothing short of "the greatest and most outstanding revolutionary leader, statesman and theorist of Marxism-Leninism in the modern era" begins with establishing him as "the philosopher" who wrote "On Practice," 277 and "On Contradiction," 278 it is to these we turn.

2) *The "Philosophy" of the Yen-an Period: Mao Perverts Lenin*

"We are opposed to the die-hards in the revolutionary ranks . . . We are opposed to the idle talk of the 'left.'"—Mao Tse-tung.

The drastic change from the first "Soviet" period (1928-34) to the second (Yen-an period, 1935-1945) was naturally questioned by

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many Communists. When some in his "Red Army" called the merger with the Chiang regular Army "counter-revolutionary," Mao replied that they were "dogmatists." This political struggle underlies the period of Mao's alleged original contribution to the philosophy of Marxism.

Objective research has since cast considerable doubt as to the date (1937) when the essays "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" were written; they weren't published until 1950-52.²⁷⁹ We, however, are willing to accept the official date for their writing at face value because they are objectively, subjectively, for yesteryear and for today, so very Maoist that it does not matter that Mao may have back-dated them to make them appear prescient or re-written them to suit his present style. The point is, in order to sell the policy of class collaboration, Mao evidently thought a frontal attack on "dogmatists" would be insufficient. Hence he chose the form of "Philosophic Essays." These are so filled with empty abstractions that it is difficult to discover either his subject or his aim.

In "On Practice," Mao writes, "The epistemology of dialectical materialism . . . regards human knowledge as being at no point separable from practice." If knowledge is at no point separable from practice, he would have done well to tell us what practice he is talking about. But, no; Mao is anxious to make this reduction of theory to "practicality" appear to be based on nothing less authoritative than Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*. Mao quotes Lenin's sentence, "Practice is more than cognition (theoretical knowledge)." He fails to tell us, however, that Lenin was only restating Hegel's analysis of the relationship of the Practical Idea to the Theoretical Idea before the two are united, as Lenin puts it, "precisely in the theory of knowledge."

Far from theory being reduced to "practicality," Lenin asserts, in the very section from which Mao quoted one sentence, the following: "Alias: Man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it." Since this preceded the quotation Mao used, it would have seemed impossible for even a Confucian like Mao so totally to have misunderstood its meaning—unless, of course, he had set out deliberately to pervert Lenin. In any case, the world the sophist Mao created was for such a low purpose—to compel

obedience to a new united front with Chiang—that one hesitates to dignify the writing as "philosophy."

Only because this state-capitalist tyrant rules over no less than 650 million souls is one compelled to attempt an analysis of his "original contribution to Marxism."

Evidently, Mao failed to convince his hearers or his readers (we are not told which) because he soon followed with still another "philosophical essay," once again directed against the dogmatists," and this time called "On Contradiction." We are told that it was delivered as a lecture at the anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yen-an, August, 1937.

In "On Contradiction" Mao used some "practical" examples. This has at least one virtue: it shows exactly how he has to rewrite his own previous period of rule in order "to balance" the mistakes of "dogmatists" against those of the Kuomintang. It turns out that only "after 1927 (my emphasis—R.D.), the Kuomintang turned in the opposite direction" from the "revolutionary and vigorous" period of united front in 1925. The defeat of the Chinese Revolution is now laid at the door of "Ch'en Tuh-siuism," that is to say, the revolutionary Trotskyist leader, Ch'en Tuh-siu! Even the loss of "Soviet China" (now called merely "revolutionary bases") is blamed, not on Chiang's extermination campaigns, but on the "mistakes of adventurism."

"Since 1935," Mao pompously continues amidst a great deal of pretentious phrasemongering on the philosophic meaning of "Contradictions," "it (the Communist Party) has rectified these mistakes and led the new anti-Japanese united front." It follows that after "the Sian Incident in December, 1936, it (the Kuomintang) made another turn," obviously in the "right revolutionary direction" since they are once again in a united front. In "On Contradiction," this demagogic class collaborationist says benignly, "We Chinese often say: 'Things opposed to each other complement each other.'"

So permeated to the marrow of his bones is Mao with Confucianism that it is doubtful he is even conscious that he is thereby perverting in toto the Hegelian-Marxian theory of development through contradiction. Seen in all its profundity for the first time by Lenin, in 1915, as he re-read and commented upon Hegel's *Science of Logic*, this development through contradiction, trans-

formation into opposite, helped Lenin get to the root of the collapse of established Marxism, the Second International. Blind to the developing oppositions, contradictions, antagonisms, Mao on the other hand invented a "truly original" division in the concept of contradiction, which he called "Principal Aspect of the Contradiction." This division between "the principal contradiction" and "the principal aspect of contradiction" permits Mao to make as complete a hash of philosophy as he has previously made of history. Thus it turns out that under certain conditions, "even principal contradictions are relegated temporarily to a secondary, or subordinate, position" and because of "uneven developments" and "mutual transformations," the economic basis becomes "subordinated" while "political and cultural reforms become the principal and decisive factors." Trying to make up for this insipid subjectivism, Mao proceeds to tell his readers that Communists "of course" remain materialists since "as a whole," they see that "material things determine spiritual things . . ." All one can say of such a hodge-podge is what Kant said of "the cosmological proof," that it was "a perfect nest of thoughtless contradictions."

A recent traveler to China cited what a local party secretary from Shensi said: "Through the study of theory, I clearly understood the principles of uninterrupted revolution and of revolution by stages and put them into concrete application in pig breeding."²⁰ Senseless as the local party secretary's statement is, it is only the logical conclusion of "The Leader's" reduction of theory to "practice" compelling the Chinese to follow his dictum that "dogmas are more useless than cow dung."

Before, however, we flee in disgust from the vulgarities that pass for "philosophy," and become too anxious to dismiss what totalitarian China lovingly calls "Mao's thought," let us bear in mind his present power. Let us remember, also, that when Mao made the Chinese Communist Party accept the new united front with Chiang and initiated his "three-thirds" principle—that one-third Communist Party members, one-third Kuomintang, and one-third non-party people constitute the administration in Communist areas—the fight against Japan stiffened. This was the period when visiting foreign journalists, whose cultural standards were greater than those of Mao's cohorts, were impressed with his "exciting

speeches on culture." Wearied of the Kuomintang corruption and its ineffectualness in fighting Japan, they were impressed by the Communists, not only in the fight against Japan, but in the dedication "to go to the people," i.e., to establish schools among the peasants in remote areas, and proceed with agricultural reforms. Still others, including many of the bourgeoisie and landlords, were attracted by the moderate agricultural program, and hence, many anti-Communists began accepting the Chinese Communists as mere "agrarian reformers." Mao contributed nothing to Marxian philosophy, and denuded its politics of its class content. But he certainly carved out an original road to power. It is this which we must look at again from still another aspect which he calls "three magic weapons."

3) *"Three Magic Weapons"*

Stalin's rationalization for transforming the workers' state into a state-capitalist society was called "building socialism in one country." It was based on the supposition that this could be done if only Russia were not attacked from the outside. To assure this Stalin transformed the world Communist movements into outposts for Russia's defense. He allotted them no independent class role to play. In the case of China it resulted in the elaboration of "the bloc of four classes" which effectively subordinated the Chinese Communist Party to the Kuomintang which helped defeat the 1925-1927 Revolution. The "bloc of four classes," renamed the policy of the "united front," became the warp and woof of Mao's thoughts and actions both as he strove for power and after he achieved it.

What Stalin had used for the outside, Mao applied inside China. Mao is a positivist. He is positively "magical" in seeing "positive" elements in all classes. It stood him in good stead on the road to power; and when he achieved it, he proceeded to liquidate "the bureaucrat capitalists" not the capitalists as a class; the "bad gentry" and not the landlord as a class. He feels positive he can "remold" the capitalists and landlords mentally. This is where his "rectification campaigns" differ from Stalin's purges: he is so blind to the actualities of the class divisions tugging at his rule that he believes in "a world of Great Harmony," where all contradictions, of course, "complement each other."

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A recent article from Hongqi²¹—"The United Front—A Magic Weapon of the Chinese People for Winning Victory"—sheds more light on the united front as the actual "philosophy" of the de-classed concept of "contradiction." Truly it is "the magic weapon" by which Mao swears throughout his development, in and out of power. As Mao made it the very warp and woof of existence and thought in 1937, the recent article from the fortnightly of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party extends its existence to the present day. It was "the magic weapon" after he consolidated power in mainland China and, in 1952, when Mao began his three "antis" campaign—anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratism. It continued into the later campaign of the five "antis"—anti-bribery, anti-tax evasion, anti-theft of state property, anti-cheating on government contracts, and anti-stealing of economic information for private speculation. So much for the period in which he tried to break the back of the private capitalists and landlords whom he brought with him from the anti-Japanese war, and as he laid the basis for state-capitalism in the economic foundation as well as in the political structure.

He then had to increase his campaign against the proletariat and peasantry and intellectuals who still thought this meant a move to socialism. The "rectification campaign of 1957-1958" is not accidentally launched under the same "philosophic" banner of 1937, only this time "On Contradiction" gets extended to "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." Simultaneously, the vise of the single party state rule is clamped on the "100 schools of thought contending."

A perennial mathematician of sorts, Mao had, "as early as 1939, on the basis of the rich historical experience of the Party over a period of 18 years," expanded the single magic weapon into "three magic weapons":²² "the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental problems of the Chinese Communist Party's three magic weapons, its three principal magic weapons, for defeating the enemy in the Chinese Revolution."

Since he is supposed to be a Marxist revolutionary, this leader "of the bloc of four classes," having state power in addition to these "three magic weapons" of "the united front, armed struggle and Party-building," remembers that he is supposed to stand for pro-

letarian revolution and the rule of the proletariat. To a man in command of "magic weapons" this obligation presents no problems. "The people's democratic dictatorship" in China, says Mao, functions indeed "under the leadership of the working class." How? To the Chairman of the Communist Party, the one and only ruling party in China, it is all as simple as jumping through a hoop: the proletariat lives "through the Communist Party." Mao makes it easy indeed as he moves to sum up and reduce the "three magic weapons" into the single omnipresent one: "To sum up our experiences and concentrate it into one point, it is: the people's dictatorship under the leadership of the workingclass (through the Communist Party) and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants."²²³

For one ready, with one great leap, to go directly to "communism," he cannot, needless to say, stop long at this "alliance of workers and peasants" before he jumps into the "world of Great Harmony": "Bourgeois democracy has given way to people's democracy under the leadership of the working class, and the bourgeois republic to the people's republic. This has made it possible to achieve socialism and communism through the people's republic, to abolish classes and enter a world of Great Harmony."²²⁴

C. Oriental Despotism, Brainwashing—Or the Economic Compulsion Of State-Capitalism

In contrast to the panegyrics from Chinese Communist sources, scholars are once again reviving the appellation of *Oriental Despotism*.²²⁵ A good dose of this thesis has even affected one Marxist who made an original study of *Mao's China*, correctly designating it as a state-capitalist society.²²⁶ There is so much war-lordism in Mao; so solid a substratum of Chinese nationalism underlies his revision of Marxism; so thoroughly saturated with Confucianism is "Mao's Thought"—and the state-capitalist society he established is so great a tyranny—that it is all too easy to arrive at such a seemingly logical conclusion as "Oriental Despotism." That nothing quite misses the mark by so great a margin is obvious from the total overhaul of Chinese society, its family life as well as its industry, its ruling ideology as well as its agriculture.

Neither Chinese economic development nor the Sino-Soviet dispute is greatly illuminated by harking back to the past of any alleged continuous development called "Oriental Despotism." At the same time the fact that Mao's China is vying also with India for influence in the Afro-Asian and Latin American worlds compels a second look both at the ideology and economics of present-day China.

1) In Agriculture

The victory of Mao is not rooted in some sort of unchanging Oriental despotism resting on a static agricultural mode of production. The very opposite is true. There have been so many changes in the agricultural pattern of China in the single decade of Mao's rule that it looks as if there were no points of "equilibrium" at all. The fact, however, is that it is the state-capitalist structure which keeps it from collapsing now in its period of crisis, and underlies all agricultural changes from the first land reform, upon gaining power, until the "People's Commune."

Thus, the land redistribution of the period from 1950 to 1953 left a mere three million peasants unaffected. To say that this gave the land to the peasants would be the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the perpetually betrayed poor peasants. The redistribution made the average land-holding per capita something under 2 mou (1/6th of an acre equals 1 mou). The redistribution did eliminate 20 million landowners; it is estimated that no less than five million were killed. Obviously there weren't as many as five million top capitalists and landlords in the exploitative class. The pattern of Mao's ridding China of revolutionary opposition, as well as "counter-revolutionaries," has been to brand all opposition as "bureaucrat capitalist" or "rich landlord" or "rightist." This stood him in good stead for it allowed hundreds of thousands to be sentenced to forced labor and sent to build roads and irrigation projects.²⁷ At the same time, enough "bad gentry" and capitalists were liquidated to assure full state power to the Communist Party, which had come to power with their help. And enable it to turn against the peasants who had been granted 2 mou but could not possibly eke out a living from it.

The first period of cooperatives proceeded, however, at a slow pace, with peasants being encouraged to form mutual aid teams and small cooperatives. By 1955, the tempo had quickened to such an extent that no less than 96 per cent of the peasant households were reported as organized in cooperatives. The peasants were permitted to have "ownership" of their lands, private property was allowed, and they could work 10 per cent of their land for themselves. This was the period when high increases in production were attained, and when the bountiful harvest created the foundation for Mao's brainstorm about the formation of "People's Communes."

Instead of "the Great Leap Forward," we know the results of this 1958 phantasmagoria, dealt with above. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss the impact on the non-industrialized world of what the Chinese totalitarian rulers called the "uninterrupted revolution"—"a revolution without pause" that, moreover, can be accomplished, without high technology, by the mere application of a "mass line."

As *Hongqi* recently put it:²²⁸ "Before it was possible to equip agriculture with machinery it was possible to develop agricultural and productive forces and thereby promote the development of industry." Not in any way deterred by thus standing matters upside down, our Chinese theoretician proceeds to develop the concept of "simultaneity" as the new basis of "the worker-peasant alliance": "That basis is, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out, 'simultaneously, gradually, to bring about on the one hand, socialist industrialization and socialist transformation of handicraft industry and capitalist industry, and commerce, and, on the other, the socialist transformation of agriculture as a whole through cooperation. In that way we shall . . . let all people in the rural areas enjoy a common prosperity.'²²⁹

It is obvious that "prosperity" has become famine, but what has this to do with Oriental despotism? Far from an Oriental despotic ring, it has a most modern ring which lends it appeal to overpopulated Asia and underpopulated Africa.

2) *Military and Industrial*

Nor is Mao's victory accountable solely to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's regime was so corrupt and discredited that it literally fell apart by itself. Although that certainly helped Mao's Army achieve power, we fly in the face of the facts of Mao's military exploit in the "Long March," as well as the organization needed for bare existence for two decades in isolation from all urban centers, if we limit Mao's victory to Chiang's ineffectuality. Mao's rule, no doubt, has its roots in old China, both its magnificence and its corruption, its war lords and Mandarins. What needs analysis, however, are the distinguishing marks which set off one epoch from another, not the similarities which blur what is new, what is of our age.

Our age is the age of state-capitalism, national revolutions and workers' revolts. Unless one is ready to base himself on the masses who alone can initiate a truly new social order, one has no place to go but to state-capitalism. This is so not only irrespective of personal traits but even of the basic factor that China is overwhelmingly agricultural. Insofar as China is concerned, industrialization has come so late on the stage that, either a new human basis will be laid for it, or the exploitative industrial form will need to go via state-capitalism. The very occupation and industrialization of Manchuria by Japan, for example, meant that a great deal of industry became "ownerless" once China regained its independence. Even Chiang Kai-shek recognized what would next have to be done: "We must adopt a planned economy," he wrote in 1943 in his *China's Destiny*. "It is imperative that we eventually accomplish the objective of 'transforming' capital into state capital." The minute Mao consolidated his power in mainland China, this is precisely what he embarked on—statification of industry. And, it needs to be added, with the same method of exploitation of the masses as Chiang or any other capitalist would have followed.

The First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) began with substantial aid from the Soviet Union, mainly in the form of 156 complete projects and key industries—iron and steel plants, oil refineries, chemical works, power plants. For the first time state ownership was fully established, and the workers were forever admonished

about "production and more production." This part didn't change from the May Day slogans of 1950 when he allowed private capitalists to function: "Members of the Chinese working class! Consolidate your ranks and unite with the national bourgeoisie." Just as, in 1947, he stressed that he was "for both labor and capital," "reasonable profits" were greatly encouraged, first for private capital, and now for the State. The five "antis" campaign was launched as the capitalists amassed too much profit—and the "rectification campaigns" proceeded apace when the workers struck against inhuman working conditions, whether that was 12 hours of labor, or lack of any freedom in their personal lives. The State moved from joint private and state enterprises which it had called state-capitalist to "socialism," that is to say, real state-capitalism. The appeal to the capitalists to remain managers of business did not stop. Thus: "If you do a really good job in developing your business, and train your children to be first-class technical experts, you will be the obvious people to put in charge of the nationalized enterprise and you may find that you earn more as managers of a socialist enterprise than as mere owners." No doubt many of them have become managers of industry.

The workers were forbidden to strike. The trade unions were made into pure organs of disciplining the workers and seeing that production plans were carried out. Forced labor was a regular feature of Chinese state-capitalism calling itself Communism. It is not in this that it differs from its Russian model. It does differ in its concept of "thought reform."

3) *Brainwashing*

Brainwashing, as a word coined in the Korean War to denote either forced or genuine changing of sides on the part of American soldiers joining the Chinese, gives the appearance of yet one more form of the confessions made so famous during the infamous Moscow Frame-Up Trials. No doubt there is much of that in them. What is new in Mao's perennial "rectification campaigns" is that they are neither limited to the "foreigner" or "enemy," nor meant as a purge limited to members of the Party. No. Mao has raised the concept of "thought reform" both to a philosophic category and a veritable way of life.

While he has not succeeded in brainwashing the Chinese, he has succeeded in brainwashing certain liberals outside of China who take this belief in thought reform to mean that there is no violence against the people. Contrary to Stalin, these believers in Mao's order maintain that Mao has not killed "the general staff of the revolution." As "proof" they point to the fact that those in command are the very ones who led the "Revolution." This crude misconception conveniently forgets that, with the defeat of the 1925-1927 Revolution, Chiang Kai-shek did for Mao what Stalin had to do for himself—kill or imprison the revolutionaries, including Ch'en Tu-hsui. This is first of all, but not all. For even in those years when Mao did not have full power, he was ruthless against revolutionary opponents. We saw this in 1930 when the workers under Li Li-san attacked Changsha and held the city for a few days, whereupon Mao "disarmed and liquidated the rebels." This was repeated in 1936 with Chang Kuo-t'ao. And again during the war with Japan when he "liquidated" the Third Front. There were no Trials comparable to the Moscow Trials after Mao Tse-tung gained power in mainland China only because the "general staff of revolutionary war" were those who followed his class collaborationist path to power, and state-capitalist rule in power.

The one grain of truth in the apologia is that Mao believes in "thought reform." However, this is not for the reasons the apologists give. No, it is for the needs of a state-capitalism that must be developed in an overwhelmingly agricultural land, and therefore wishes to convince part of the capitalist and landlord class to remain as managers of the state economy in the hope of obviating the inevitability of proletarian revolution.

The most amazing feat of brainwashing is neither that made famous in Korea among American soldiers, nor that within China once power was achieved. The phenomenal aspect is that achieved among intellectuals who do not have state power and are supposedly giving their lives to achieving workers' power; in a word, the petty-bourgeois Marxist intellectual. The inescapable fact is that in this epoch of state-capitalism the middle class intellectual, as a world phenomenon, has translated "individualism" into "collectivism," by which he means nationalized property, state administration, State Plan. The post-war years gave this phenomenon the appearance of

a new emanation from the under-developed countries. In actuality, the only thing that distinguishes the brain-washers from the capitalistic Brain Trust of the New Deal days is that their master, Mao Tse-tung, was once a Marxist revolutionary himself and is adept in the use of Marxist terminology. This now has expanded itself into a challenge to Khrushchev, or more precisely, Russia's leadership of world Communism. The fact that Mao has also captured the non-existent imagination of the Trotskyists who, despite Trotsky's historic and theoretic fight against Mao, have all become "Maoists" to an embarrassing degree is only further proof of the administrative mentality of the intellectuals in a state-capitalist age who have made such a fetish of the State Plan that they, literally, are begging to be intellectually raped.²⁹ They do not even flinch in the face of a possibility of thermonuclear war so long as they will die for the right "principles." We must, therefore, analyze further the Sino-Soviet conflict. In doing this let us not forget that which the "left" Communist splits, East and West, disregard with such bohemian abandon: the power politics behind the conflict.

*D. CAN There Be War Between Russia and China?
The Non-Viability of State-Capitalism*

1) 1960-62: Preliminary Sparring

In 1960 China took advantage of the 90th anniversary of the birth of Lenin (April 22) to transform the power conflict into a "theory of revolution." It was called "Long Live Leninism," and appeared as an "Editorial" in *Red Flag*, No. 8, 1960 (translated in the *Peking Review*, No. 17, 1960).

This "Editorial" is a full-sized pamphlet of some 40 pages. It is heavily sprinkled with quotations from Lenin, which stress proletarian revolution. While the editorial itself plays down "modern science" (that is, ICBM's, H-bombs, and sputniks) as mere "specific details of technical progress in the present-day world," it unleashes an attack on "modern revisionism" in a way that makes it very easy to read "Khrushchev" where the editorial says "Tito." Since all the proofs of the war-like nature of the United States are drawn from the period after Khrushchev's visit with Eisenhower,

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it is easy to see that "the inevitability of war" is, in truth, not a question of Lenin's theory, but is specifically directed against Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence.

Khrushchev correctly judged that lengthy editorial on Lenin as a new stage, not merely in "Mao's Thought," but in Mao's ambitions for leadership in the Communist orbit, in influence over the underdeveloped areas, and in planning the strategy of any war with the United States. It is rumored that a discussion between Russia and China regarding a joint Pacific Fleet was cancelled by Khrushchev for fear that Mao would push him into a war over the Formosa Straits.²²¹ The "Editorial," however, was a still-birth. The May 1, U.S. U-2 spy plane over Russia made it so. It also gave Khrushchev the opportunity he needed not only to break up the summit conference he had heretofore planned, but also to convolve an international conference of the Communist world to discipline Mao. Khrushchev's appearance at the UN was part of the preparation for this conference. In the well known shoe-pounding incident at the UN Khrushchev got his opportunity to announce to the whole world that he is not only master of the Communist world, but the only hope of the new world opened up by the African Revolutions.

On Dec. 7, 1960, Khrushchev convened the 81 Communist Parties for a conference in Moscow.²²² There he transformed his UN speech into the new Communist Manifesto which declared Russia to be "the first country in history to be blazing a trail to communism for all mankind." The overwhelming majority of the Communist Parties present in Moscow demanded Mao sign the Declaration so that a "unanimous" Communist front be shown American imperialism. Mao could not refuse to do so without exposing the fact that China considered Russia to be the enemy. Mao signed, but continued his independent road not only in China but throughout the third Afro-Asian-Latin American world.

China's signature to the 1960 Moscow Manifesto did not stop its deviationary road along its own national interests any more than France's signature to NATO stopped De Gaulle from seeking his own glory road. The post-war world of the 1960's, is, after all, a very different world from what it was in the late 1940's when both Europe and China lay in ruins, and each had to accept aid and,

with it, the "philosophy" underlying the Marshall Plan and the Warsaw Pact respectively. Mao is trying to do with a barrage of revolutionary phrases what De Gaulle is trying to achieve with spoutings about "French grandeur." In both cases, however, the split within their respective orbits is due to national ambitions for world expansion.

The initiative, however, had returned into Khrushchev's hands after the U-2 spy plane discovery. He used it to isolate China further. In 1961 the Draft Program for the 22nd Russian Communist Party Congress relegates the Chinese Revolution to the total of 11 words. This was done, not because it is the program of a national party, the Russian, but because Russia as a world phenomenon began the 20th century with the 1917 Revolution as a new epoch and continued it with the 1957 Sputnik which outdistanced even the United States. Moreover, Khrushchev insisted, this Russian age is not only different as against the United States, but as distinct from China, because the Russians are "building Communism." "No wonder Khrushchev at the Congress itself chose to attack Albania (meaning China) and Chou En-lai chose to walk out after defending Albania (meaning China), and challenging Russia's right to bring such disputes into the open without "prior consultation" with the Communist world. These attacks and defenses are as counterfeit as the "theories" in which Mao and Khrushchev wrap themselves as they carry on their bitter competition.

The October 22, 1962 confrontation of J. F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev over missiles in Cuba, the historic moment when the whole world held its breath for fear of nuclear holocaust, gave Mao Tse-tung the opportunity to regain the initiative in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The moment Khrushchev backed down when Kennedy made it clear he was ready to plunge the world into nuclear war unless Khrushchev removed those missiles from Cuba, Mao launched the new stage of conflict by accusing Khrushchev of "cowardice in the face of imperialism." Then he moved to take over "leadership" of the "socialist world" by demanding that it come to his support in the Sino-Indian war.

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2) *New Dateline: Peking, June 14, 1963: "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement"* 294

The new, the qualitative difference in the Sino-Soviet conflict crystallized into an open challenge theoretically as well. It took the form of a "letter" of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC of the CPC) to its Russian counterpart, dated June 14, 1963, and entitled "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement." Soon thereafter it was published as a pamphlet in a dozen different languages of East and West.

China's industrial development may lack everything from steel to dams and atomic energy. Its Army, however, has everything from overwhelming numbers to military equipment. In the first instance, it is the largest land army in the whole world, and in the second instance it has the most modern equipment on the Asian continent. Russian humor may have pinpointed Mao's historic image when it says history will record him "as an athletic failure in the broad jump." But he was no failure in the Sino-Indian War. As "Mao's Thought" thrives on military engagements, it has given birth to yet a new crop of "theories." These are developed with much subterfuge and great wordiness in the 61-page June 14th "letter." They add up to a single and total ambition for world mastery.

In five different ways the June 14th "letter" states that "the touchstone of internationalism" (p. 10) should no longer be the defense of Russia. The first reason given for the new thesis is that the defense of the Soviet Union was originally the touchstone of internationalism because it was the only "socialist country" but "Now that there is a socialist camp of thirteen countries" the whole "socialist world" has become that "touchstone of internationalism." "Therefore," reads the second point of indictment against Russia, referred to as "anybody": "If anybody . . . helps capitalist countries attack fraternal socialist countries, then he is betraying the interests of the entire international proletariat and the people of the world." (p. 10) The accusation of betrayal is obviously aimed at Russia for its failure to support China's invasion of India. The third variation of "Russia no longer" is an appeal for adherents

within the country under attack since the "step back in the course of historic development" is declared to be tantamount to "doing a service to the restoration of capitalism." Yugoslavia is named as the culprit but, clearly, Russia is meant.

The Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is now prepared for the big jump, the shift from proletarian revolutions to national struggles "since" the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are "the storm centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism." (p. 12) "In a sense, therefore, the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggle of the people in these areas . . ." (p. 13)

This shift of pivot—the fourth variation on the theme, "Russia no longer"—is supposed to be based on Lenin's thesis (at the Second Congress of the Communist International, 1920) about the imperative duty of the proletariat of the technologically advanced countries to unite with the peasant masses in the colonial countries struggling to free themselves from imperialism. Lenin's new point of departure in the theory of non-inevitability of capitalist development for backward economies is based on a big "if": if "aid of the proletariat of the most advanced countries" is extended unstintingly. Lenin stresses that the only proof of proletarian internationalism, therefore, is for the Russian proletariat to extend this aid along with the theory and practice of revolution. All of this is reduced by Mao to a matter of his competition with Khrushchev as to who will "lead" this new, third world. In the process, Mao moves away from his concept of the division of the world into two camps, "the socialist countries" against "the capitalist countries." Although he had taken great pains to bring this concept in as a substitute for the class struggle in each country, he now disregards it. In order to reintroduce his old, ruinous "four class policy" he broadens the concept of "the people" to include "also the patriotic national bourgeoisie, and even certain kings, princes, and aristocrats who are patriotic." (p. 15)

By the time Chinese Communism reaches the fifth and final theme of its international manifesto of "never, no, never again Russia"—this time directed against Russia being "a state of the whole people building communism"—we are suddenly confronted

with the most sinister of all theories of retrogression. Over and over again "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist World" proclaims that "for a very long historic period after the proletariat takes power" (p. 36); "for decades or even longer after socialist industrialization and agricultural collectivization" (p. 37) have been achieved, "the class struggle continues as an objective law independent of man's will" (p. 36). This holds true in all "socialist countries." Now whatever the subjective impulse for concocting this—all too transparently it is meant to lay the foundation for opposition to the 22nd Russian Communist Party Congress which enunciated that Russia was "building Communism"—it is the most serious of all theories of retrogression. We now have not only the retrogression of capitalism to fascism, but the retrogression of socialism, that is to say, a supposedly classless society, to one in which "there are classes and class struggles in all socialist countries without exception." (p. 40) Surely no more deadly deviation has ever been proclaimed "a principle of Marxism-Leninism."

Where the tiny state power of Yugoslavia, in 1948, when it fought the giant, Russia, for national independence, could not allow itself any new glory roads à la De Gaulle in the Western camp. Mao's delusions are as vast as the Chinese continent—and not only as it is now constituted, but as it was at the height of its imperial glory under the Yuan and Ming Dynasties when China conquered Burma, Thailand, Indochina Peninsula, debarked troops to Indonesia, imprisoned the king of Ceylon and once even imposed annual tribute from the Moslem world or at least from the Holy City of Mecca. Before 1962 only Nehru had questioned the map included in "A Manual of History" which was published in Peking in 1954.²⁹ This shows a great part of the Soviet Far East as well as the Republic of Outer Mongolia, North and South Korea, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, Assam (about 50,000 miles of Indian territory, in fact), Butan, Sikkim, Nepal, the island of Sakhalin as well as some islands in the Philippines, as having been part of China.

When, in 1962, Khrushchev dared to quip at Mao's phrase about "cowardice in the face of the imperialists" by saying it ill-behooves Mao to speak so when he is doing nothing presently to

drive the imperialists from "his own territory—Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao," the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* hit back with: "Certain persons would like us to raise the questions of unequal treaties here and now . . . Have they realized what the consequences of this might be?" Whereupon the Chinese began explaining "the imperialist encroachments on Chinese territory (1840-1919). Period of the Early Democratic Revolution." And, in expanding themselves on what Tsarist Russia took from "old China," the present Chinese rulers included territories taken from Emirs and Khans who most assuredly did not consider themselves vassals of the Emperor of China. (Nor, for that matter, did Mao's dream of China's past glories stop itself from designating as an "imperialist encroachment" Thailand's becoming independent; that too "belonged" to China of the Emperor and he means "to redress" some day the borders of what the CC-CPC designates only as "old China.")

Mao opts for nothing short of mastery of the world, of the Communist world to begin with. Though, for tactical reasons, and because of the withdrawal of Russian technical aid, China had to fall back on a variation of "the theory of socialism in one country" ("Every socialist country must rely mainly on itself for its construction." p. 45), the CC-CPC challenges not only Russia but the majority of the presently constituted Communist world. It warns that "one should not emphasize 'who is in the majority' or 'who is in the minority' and bank on a so-called majority . . ." (p. 47). In the place of following majority rule, he proposes the rule of "unanimity," that is to say, China's right of veto over policies formulated by Russia and the majority of other Communist Parties. Thus, the present Sino-Soviet conflict differs fundamentally not only from Yugoslavia's 1948 conflict with Stalin for national independence, but also from Mao's own differences both in 1957 and in 1960 when the conflict could be hushed up because it was fought within the Communist world.

The one and only thing that both Khrushchev and Mao prove, the one and only thing that is beyond the peradventure of any doubt is the non-viability of their "new" social order. *The non-viability of state-capitalism as a "new" social order is proven by the same laws of development as that of private capitalism, that is to*

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say, the compulsion to exploit the masses at home and to carry on wars abroad. A shocking question faces us now: Can there be a war between two regimes calling themselves Communist?

3) Back to "Wars and Revolutions":
Russia and China At War?

The challenge to totalitarian power that was issued by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 brought Russia and China closer together than they had ever been, either in Stalin's era or in Malenkov-Khrushchev's times. The class content of the counter-revolutionary crushing of the proletarian revolution is crucial to all else that has happened since. Directly after the show of solidarity with Russian imperialism against the Hungarian revolutionaries, China, as we saw, moved toward expanding its own state power.

Despite De Gaulle's derisive question, "The ideological split? Over what ideology?" his display of arrogance at his news conference on July 29, 1963, could not clothe his nuclear ambition as Mao does his. Its death features stood out in all their goriness: "France will not be diverted by Moscow agreements from equipping herself with the means of immeasurable destruction possessed by other powers." By contrast, Mao was enabled to exorcise Khrushchev for "servilely meeting the needs of United States imperialism" by his agreement to a treaty which "undertakes . . . to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere . . ." This, said Mao, means "out and out betrayal" of "the socialist countries and all oppressed countries" since it would keep them "from acquiring nuclear weapons" while consolidating the United States' "position of nuclear monopoly." The superiority of arguments, carefully clothed in Marxist garb, however, cannot be maintained when both contestants are so clothed.

For the time being no war is in the offing between Russia and China. From Russia's side, this would make no sense not only because it is the "have" nation, but also because it certainly would break up the international Communist movement that still considers the State Plan as a fundamental division between itself and

"the bourgeoisie." From China's side, such a war would be suicidal not only because Mao isn't strong enough to challenge the Russian goliath, but also because he is a firm believer in the infamous Dulles policy of negotiating from "positions of strength." Those he will not have unless he first wins to his side both the West European and the Asian Communist Parties which are in power (North Korea, North Viet Nam), and also the African non-Communist world—or that of Latin America.

Moreover this struggle between state-capitalist powers is taking place in a nuclear age. Because the opposition of all the peoples of the world to nuclear war is total Khrushchev would like nothing better than to reduce all his differences with Mao to a disagreement on "peaceful co-existence." As *Izvestia* put it, Russia was not surprised that militarist, reactionary forces in the West were "atom mongers and madmen," but it was most "sadly" surprised to find that the "Chinese comrades should join their voices to the screams of those madmen." Indeed, so total is the opposition to nuclear war that the only two countries which dared openly oppose the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—Mao's China and De Gaulle's France—had to claim that they did so "in the name of peace." Mao went so far as to offer counter-proposals for nothing short of "complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons." That did not prevent him from attacking the actual treaty not only as "a big fraud" and "betrayal of the Soviet people," but also as an exposure of "the servile features of those who warmly embrace imperialism. The exposure," he said, "of these freaks and monsters in their true colors is an excellent thing for the revolutionary struggle of the peoples and the cause of world peace." (*People's Daily*, Aug. 2) Mao, indeed, is no less scared of a nuclear holocaust than the rest of the world. But he does not allow the question mark this puts over the very survival of civilization to divert him from his feeling that this time the "have" nations—the United States and Russia—will first of all eliminate each other!

There is no doubt that China expounds a global strategy basically different from that of Russia. It alone has the audacity to speak of a time to follow a nuclear war when "socialism will be built on its ruins." Nevertheless, this is not the point in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Nor is that divisive and decisive point to be found

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in China's recent attempts to exclude Russia from Asian and African meetings on racial grounds. Both points are only the culmination of something that began as Mao strove for power. It had been obvious in all Mao's fights with Stalin and as soon as the Chinese Communist Party took power it demanded that "Mao's Thought" become the underlying theory for all conquests of power in "colonial countries."

This theme was muted during the Korean War of 1950-53 and again in the "joint" Khrushchev-Mao 1957 Manifesto against the proliferation of polycentrism. Naturally, every ruling class has found it easy to support revolutions—abroad. But, whereas new ruling classes, when they first come on the historic scene, proved themselves full of vitality because they did have a wider support among the masses than the old ruling classes they overthrew, the State Planners of today feel compelled to embark on wars before ever they have proved their right to historic existence on native soil.

Wars and revolutions are not synonymous. They are opposites. Here, then, are the actual consequences of Mao's revolutionary thunder since he won power against Stalin's advice to maintain his coalition with Chiang Kai-shek: 1) China embarks on wars only when it is sure to win, as against Tibet first, and limited to incursions into borders of India now; 2) When it suits its purpose, China peacefully, or, more correctly, shrewdly "co-exists" with European imperialist outposts on its own territory, like Hong Kong and Macao; 3) If Mao, whose "Thought" could exude nothing more original than "a four-class policy," is nevertheless more adept than Khrushchev in the use of Marxist terminology to hide his territorial ambitions, he is no "braver" in facing a challenge from the greatest military power in the world—the United States. Mao has backed down more times, not only on Taiwan, but on Quemoy and Matsu, than did Khrushchev when he saw that Kennedy was actually ready to go to nuclear war over missiles in Cuba; 4) Despite his revolutionary thunder, in the abstract, Mao is, in the concrete, an expert in imperialist maneuvering and in dubbing even "fascist regimes" as "peace-loving." Thus, before the Sino-Indian war, Mao called the military regime in Pakistan "fascist," but the moment China was engaged in war with India, Mao lost no time in making a deal

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with Pakistan which had suddenly become a "peace-loving nation"; 5) Nor does his "revolutionary defense" of the Afro-Asian world he hopes one day to dominate keep him from excluding other Communist lands whom he calls "revisionist" while including, as we saw, "the national bourgeoisie, and even certain kings, princes, and aristocrats who are patriotic."

The odd mixture of Mao's opportunism and adventurism, the ordinary imperialist power struggle (both within the Communist world and outside, as in the conquest of Tibet, incursions into Indian territory, and covetous glances cast from Burma to Viet Nam, and from Nepal to Laos) cannot be separated from the struggle for the minds of men. It is here that the irresponsible abuse of Marxist language--on the question of "revolutions without pause" proceeding in a straight line from State Plans to "Communism"--makes it imperative to show, not only the blind alley into which the dialectic of Mao's thought has led and from which it may catapult the world into a nuclear holocaust, but also to show that which is opposite from both the state-capitalist powers and the general global struggle with the United States for world domination. That is to say, it is imperative to illumine the path of freedom.

In Place Of A Conclusion: Two Kinds of Subjectivity

"... the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality... rest upon this subjectivity alone." -- Hegel's *Science of Logic*

"... in this (*Science of Logic*) most idealistic of Hegel's works, there is the least idealism and the most materialism. 'Contradictory' but a fact!" -- Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*

Two kinds of subjectivity characterize our age of state-capitalism and workers' revolts. One is the subjectivism that we have been

considering—Mao's—which has no regard for objective conditions, behaves as if state power is for herding 650 million human beings into so-called "People's Communes," as if a party of the elite that is armed can both harness the energies of men and "remold" their minds. We have seen the results of this type of subjectivism permeated with, to use a Hegelian phrase, "a certainty of its own actuality and the non-actuality of the world," ready to ride the whirlwind of a nuclear holocaust.

The second type of subjectivity, the one which rests on "the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality," is the subjectivity which has "absorbed" objectivity, that is to say, through its struggle for freedom it gets to know and cope with the objectively real. Its maturity unfolds, as Marx put it in *Critique of the Hegelian Dialectique* "when actual corporeal Man, standing on firm and well rounded earth, inhaling and exhaling all natural forces . . . does not depart from its 'pure activity' in order to create the object . . . We see here how thorough-going Naturalism, or Humanism, distinguishes itself both from Idealism and Materialism, and, at the same time, is the truth uniting both."

Our epoch is the epoch of the struggle for the minds of men. To engage in this struggle, and clear one's head, it appears to me necessary to focus on these two types of subjectivity of which I can give here* only a few indications.

In 1956 these two types of subjectivity came into head-on collision in Hungary.³⁹ The Hungarian Revolution put an end to the illusion that workers or peasants or intellectuals can be brain-washed. It put an end to the pretense that Communism and Marxism are one. It raised the banner of Marxist Humanism as freedom *from* Communism. In the great tradition of Marx who had written that Communism is "not the goal of human development, the form of human society," the Hungarian Freedom Fighters moved away from totalitarian state centralization to decentralized Workers' Councils, Youth Councils, Councils of Intellectuals—that is to say a form of rule where the individual and society are not opposed to each other because the freedom of the individual is the proof, the only proof, of the freedom of all.

* This is the burden of my new work in progress.

This outburst of elemental activity and organization of thought was bloodily suppressed by the counter-revolutionary might of Russia which, with the help of its Chinese cohorts, branded this Humanism as "revisionism." Mao had good reason to help his Russian partner because, as he himself put it, "Certain people in our country were delighted when the Hungarian events took place. They hoped that something similar would happen in China . . ." ²⁵⁷ To the extent that Mao was able to suppress his opposition without an open civil war, to the extent that he usurped the Marxist banner—both in general and in the specific use of one word, "Commune," that has always stood among Marxists for self-liberation (the Paris Commune of 1871)—to that extent some newly independent African nations were attracted to it.

However, just as it is impossible to hide the hunger rampant in the so-called "Peoples Communes," ²⁵⁸ so it is impossible to cover up the fact that within China, as within each modern country, there is a fundamental division into classes. Mao has no magic by which to turn these antagonistic contradictions into a mere difference between what he calls the "old" and the "new." Far from being a mere opposition between the existent and the not-yet-existent, it is an open struggle between two antagonistic forms of reality that co-exist. *The co-existence of oppressor and oppressed is the determining factor also in proving the non-viability of Chinese state-capitalism that calls itself Communist.*

Mao admits that, just as under ordinary private capitalism, the basic contradictions in Chinese society "are still those between the relations of production and the productive forces, and between the superstructure and the economic base." This is precisely the fatal flaw which, in 1949, compelled the Russian theoreticians to revise Marx's economic theory of value.

No matter by what name they are called, capitalistic relationships, at the point of production, reveal their exploitative nature. Why Russia "chose" to revise Marx's economic theories, and why China "chose" to revise Marx's philosophy, is due both to the totality of the world crisis and to the important industrial differences between the two countries.

Russia has become an important industrial land, a country that possesses values. China is a vast underdeveloped land, whose

main possession is not the machine, but 650 million human beings.

It is precisely this backwardness which has pushed China forward to pose—only to pose but not to solve—its crisis in human terms. It cannot hide, however, the duality, the irreconcilable duality between China's new ruling class and the millions it exploits. Nor can it cover up the fact that the division of the world into two nuclear giants fighting for world domination—the United States and Russia—extends to the little Caesars in each camp—not only de Gaulle in "the West" but Mao in "the East."

Mao's failure to grasp dialectic logic has nothing whatever to do with "understanding philosophy." Dialectic logic is the logic of freedom and can be grasped only by those engaged in the actual struggle for freedom. Therein lies the key to the fulfillment of human potentialities and therein lies that new relationship between theory and practice which could lessen the birthpangs of industrialization. Anything else is the type of subjectivism which hides Mao's compelling need to transform the struggle for the minds of men into a drive to brainwash them.

The remorseless logic of this engulfed Mao himself and led him to elaborate a theory, not of revolution, but of retrogression. The objective compulsion for such "theories" flows, of course, from the brutal form of state-capitalism characteristic of China. Just as the bankruptcy of capitalism in general was accompanied by the bankruptcy of its thought, so the extension of state-capitalism into the misnamed "communes" was accompanied by Mao's threadbare thought, the true end of the absence of any philosophic method. Where Stalin, when admitting that the operation of the law of value in his "socialist country," felt compelled to force a separation between the law of value and the law of surplus value in order to try to deny the existence of classes under socialism, Mao proclaims this loudly as "socialism." Despite this thoroughly capitalistic concept of socialism; despite the concrete and total exploitation of the Chinese masses; despite the concrete invasions by China of other lands; and despite the voices of revolt within China itself against its Communist masters, Mao's abstract revolutionary thunder abroad gets the supports of militants, especially intellectuals, in and outside of the Communist Parties. It is a sad commentary on our times and exposes how totally lacking in any confidence in the

self-activity of the masses are today's claimants to the title, "Marxist-Leninist." Their militancy gains momentum only where there is a state power to back it up. It is the mark of our state-capitalist era that our "revolutionary" petty-bourgeoisie fears the self-mobilizing of the proletarian masses even more than do the powers that be, and seem incapable of acting without the support of a state power.

The subjectivity of the millions struggling for freedom, on the other hand, poses the need for a new relationship between theory and practice. The freedom struggles are not limited to Hungary or Africa, Russia or China; they include the United States²⁹ and Western Europe as well. The challenge is for a new unity of Notion and Reality which will release the vast untapped energies of mankind to put an end, once and for all, to what Marx called the *pre-history* of humanity so that its true history can finally unfold.

(1) of reducing the Negro question to the absurdity of demanding "for" the Negroes "Self-Determination in the Black Belt;" and (2) asking the Negroes to forget their fight for democratic rights the minute Russia became an ally of America during World War II.

²⁵⁴ 1958 finally saw the publication of a biography of Phillips. *Prophet of Liberty: the Life and Times of Wendell Phillips*, by Oscar Sherwin, Bookman Associates, New York.

²⁵⁵ The only thing that tops Henry Luce's attempt to sell "the American way of life" abroad is the bombastic presumptuousness of his high-powered publicity attempt to sell the American public Djilas's *The New Class* as something "that will rock Marxism."

²⁵⁶ Hegel's *Logic*, paragraph 147, p. 269.

²⁵⁷ Mao Tse-tung, *On Contradiction*, International Publishers, New York, 1955.

²⁵⁸ 650 million was the figure used in 1959. In 1958 it was 600 million. Since 1960 the population references have jumped all the way to 700 and even 750 million. There is no accurate count.

²⁵⁹ Statement of the Chinese War Minister to Sam Watson of the British Labour Party, quoted in *Time*, Dec. 1, 1958.

²⁶⁰ Quoted by Thomas Perry Thornton in his "Peking, Moscow and the Underdeveloped Areas" in *World Politics*, July, 1961.

²⁶¹ Chinese children must learn the rhymes:

"Mao Tse-tung is like the sun:
"He is brighter than the sun . . ."

And one Chinese governor came up with this one:

"The sun shines only in the day, the moon shines only at night.
"Only Chairman Mao is the sun that never sets."

(Quoted in *Mao's China* by Ygael Gluckstein)

²⁶² *Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 541, The Macmillan Co., New York.

²⁶³ The indispensable book for the English reader is *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* by Roderick MacFarquhar (Stevens and Sons Limited, London; Frederick A. Praeger, New York). It has a minimum of comment and a maximum of translations from official Chinese sources. The quotations used here are all from that book.

²⁶⁴ Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang. As all parties permitted to exist in China, it had to accept "the leadership of the Communist Party." In the case of Lung Yun, who was born in 1888 and had been a member of the Kuomintang Central Committee, 1931-49, but expelled from it for defecting to the Communists, he had been given high governmental posts in Communist China.

²⁶⁵ See *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, documented and analyzed by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar; Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961. Also see *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61* by

Donald S. Zagoria, Princeton University Press, 1962; and *The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking* by Edward Crankshaw, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England, 1965.

²⁵⁶. *Communist China Digest*, May 2, 1960.

²⁵⁷. Consult Chapter 3, "Economic Development," *Communist China and Asia* by A. Doak Barnett, Harper Brothers, New York, 1960; *Mao's China* by Ygael Gluckstein, Allen and Unwin, London, 1957. See also Chao Kuo-chun, *Economic Planning and Organization in Mainland China, 1949-57*.

²⁵⁸. One of the best books on agriculture is *Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1959* by Chao Kuo-chun, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1960.

²⁵⁹. Quoted by H. F. Schurmann in his "Peking Recognition of Crisis," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1961.

²⁶⁰. The report is included in *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairchild, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952. Also see *Soviet Russia and The East, 1920-27*, a documentary survey by X. J. Eudin and Robert C. North, Stanford University Press, 1957.

²⁶¹. From "The Military Bulletin of the Central Committee," Shanghai, quoted by Harold Isaacs in *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, 1938 edition.

²⁶². Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*. Consult also *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-27*, by Conrad Brandt, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1958.

²⁶³. *Chinese Communism and The Rise of Mao* by Benjamin Schwartz. See also Robert North, *The Kuomintang and The Chinese Communist Elites*.

²⁶⁴. Quoted by John Kautsky in *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, Technology Press of MIT and John Wiley and Son, New York, 1956.

²⁶⁵. *On the Present Situation and Our Tasks*, December 25, 1947. Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1961.

²⁶⁶. Address to the members of the All-China Salvation League, quoted by Isaacs, *ibid*.

²⁶⁷. International Publishers, n.d. Judging by the reference notes which go through the year 1949, this pamphlet was probably published in 1950.

²⁶⁸. International Publishers, New York, 1953; Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1961.

²⁶⁹. "How Original Is 'Maoism?'" by Arthur A. Cohen in *Problems of Communism*, November, December, 1961.

²⁷⁰. Audrey Donnithorne, "Economic Development in China," in *The World Today*, April, 1961.

²⁷¹. Translated and published in *Peking Review*, June 16, 1961.

²⁷². *Ibid*.

²²³. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1961.

²²⁴. *Ibid.* Also see, George Palotzi-Horvath, *Mao Tse-tung, Emperor of the Blue Ants*, Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1963.

²²⁵. *Oriental Despotism* by Karl A. Wittfogel, Yale Univ. Press, 1957.

²²⁶. Ygael Gluckstein thus spoils an otherwise fine study, *Mao's China*, which we recommend.

²²⁷. *Ibid.* Also the *China Quarterly* carries competent current articles, and the *Peking Review* gives the official Chinese Communist view.

²²⁸. Translated and published in the *Peking Review*, May 26, 1961.

²²⁹. Mao Tse-tung, "The Question of Agricultural Cooperation," quoted above, *ibid.*

²³⁰. I do not mean to say that had the Trotskyists followed Trotsky's "line" they would have had "the correct solution." Far from it. The fact that Trotsky had never accepted the theory of state-capitalism and to his dying day maintained, in his theory of permanent revolution, his underestimation of the revolutionary role of the peasantry, precluded that. (See my pamphlet, *Nationalism, Communism, Marxist-Humanism and the Afro-Asian Revolutions*, pp. 21-22. News & Letters, Detroit, Mich., 1959; Cambridge, England, 1961.) What I do mean is that Trotsky wrote voluminously against the class-collaborationist policy of Stalin for China, against Mao Tse-tung's military conception of encircling the towns instead of appealing to the proletariat within them to rise and lead the struggle of the peasantry, and against the concept of a "Soviet China" — in caves! (See Leon Trotsky: *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, with Appendices by Zinoviev, Vuyovitch, Nassunov and others, Pioneer Publishers, 1932; *The Permanent Revolution*, Pioneer Publishers, 1931; Introduction to Harold R. Isaacs' *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*; Appendices II & III to *The History of the Russian Revolution*, Simon & Shuster, 1957; "Summary and Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution" in *The Third International After Lenin*, Pioneer Publishers, 1936; and *Stalin*, Harper & Bros., 1941.) Leon Trotsky's widow, Natalia Sedova, was so shocked when the French press (*France-Soir*, Nov. 7, 1961) attributed to her the statement that Leon Trotsky was "the spiritual father of Mao Tse-tung" that she wrote them (Nov. 9) indignantly:

"1—A great revolutionary like Leon Trotsky could not in any way be the father of Mao Tse-tung who won his position in direct struggle with the Left-Opposition (Trotskyist) and consolidated it by the murder and persecution of revolutionaries just as Chiang Kai-shek did. The spiritual fathers of Mao Tse-tung and of his party are obviously Stalin (whom he always credits as such) and his collaborators, Mr. Khrushchev included.

2—I consider the present Chinese regime, the same as the Russian regime or all others based on the latter model, as far from Marxism and the proletarian revolution as that of Franco in Spain."

²³¹. See Edward Crankshaw in *The London Observer*, February 12 and 19, 1961.

NOTES

²⁹² The English translation, released by *Tass* was published in *The New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1960. In view of the fanciful interpretation by Russian "experts," especially Isaac Deutscher (*Reporter*, Jan. 5, 1961) about how the "compromise" between Khrushchev and Mao was achieved at this meeting of the 81 Communist Parties which was supposed to have been "very nearly a revival of the old Communist International," it is important to get "first reactions" and compare them with the present stage of the Sino-Soviet rupture. See my analysis of this "New Russian Communist Manifesto" in *News & Letters*, January, 1961.

²⁹³ See the Draft Program of the 22nd Russian Communist Party Congress released by *Tass* July 30, and published in *The New York Times*, Aug. 1, 1961. Consult also "The 22nd Party Congress" by Merle Fainsod, issued as a special supplement of *Problems of Communism*, Nov.-Dec. 1961.

²⁹⁴ Issued in English by *Foreign Language Press*, Peking, 1963. The page numbers cited here are to this edition. The reply of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on July 15 was published in *The New York Times*, July 15, 1963.

²⁹⁵ This map is reproduced in the *New Republic* of 4/20/63 in an article, "China's Borders," the third of a series of articles by J. Jacques-Francillon. The other articles appear in the issues of 3/16/63 and 3/23/63. (See also R. Shiva Rae's article in the *National Observer* of 7/23/63.)

²⁹⁶ By now the books on the Hungarian Revolution are legion, and yet few go fully into the Workers' Councils, and fewer still bring out the Humanism of Marxism as it developed in the disputes among Communists. Nevertheless, the following are the best in presenting the record of the revolutionaries and the type of eye-witness accounts that concentrated on them: *The Hungarian Revolution*, a White Book edited by Melvin J. Lasky, Praeger, 1957; *Behind the Rape of Hungary* by F. Fejto, N. Y., McKay, 1957; *Imre Nagy on Communism: In Defense of the New Course*, Praeger 1957. Consult especially *The Review*, published by the Imre Nagy Institute, No. 4, 1960; Vol. III No. 2, 1962. "My Experiences in the Central Workers Council of Greater Budapest" by Miklos Sebestyen. The magazine *East Europe* also carried (April 1959) "Eyewitness Report of How the Workers Councils Fought Kadar." Also consult "Spontaneity of Action and Organization of Thought: In memoriam of the Hungarian Revolution," published by the Marxist-Humanist Group of Glasgow, Scotland, November, 1961.

²⁹⁷ Mao Tse-tung, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*.

²⁹⁸ See "Hunger in China, Letters from the Communes - II," Introduction and Notes by Richard L. Walker, special supplement to *New Leader*, May 1961.

²⁹⁹ See *American Civilization on Trial*, second edition, *News & Letters*, Detroit, Mich., August, 1963.