

Notes On

HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY*

The whole of the Phenomenology, with its six stages of consciousness, can be divided into two major departments: I. Comprising Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Reason, being the summation of both the relationship to, or rather awareness of, a world outside oneself through feudalism to the beginning of capitalism, i.e., commercial capitalism; and II. Comprising Spirit, Religion, and Absolute Knowledge, which takes us from industrial capitalism and its ideological predecessors covering the field from Christianity through the enlightenment to the Jacobins of the French Revolution, all the way to "the new society" (Absolute Knowledge) with its "predecessor" in Greek art and the Greek city-state.

In the case of Subdivision I., once we have gone from consciousness--whether that's only first awareness of things (sense-certainty) or perception, or actual understanding where the forces of the world of appearance with its laws which "leave out their specific character,"--we immediately enter the true relationship between people and not just things. Thus, in self-consciousness we are thrust into a production relationship--lordship and bondage. So that once the bondsman gains "a mind of his own," he is compelled to see that there is more to freedom than either stubbornness or a mind of one's own. That is to say, if freedom is not "a type of freedom which does not get beyond the attitude of bondage," it must first now confront objective reality. Otherwise, a mind of his own would be little more than "a piece of cleverness which has mastery within a certain range, but not over the universal power nor over the entire objective reality." (p. 240)

In the struggle to realize freedom, we confront various attitudes of mind that sound heroic, but are in fact adaptations to one or another form of servitude. Thus, stoicism is nothing more, Hegel reminds us, than "a general form of the world's spirit, only in a time of universal fear and bondage." (p. 245)

Even skepticism, Hegel tells us, which corresponds to some form of independent consciousness, is very negative in its attitude, so much so that it leads to nothing but "the giddy whirl of a perpetually self-creating disorder." (p. 249) That is why both stoicism and skepticism lead to nothing but the Unhappy Consciousness, or Alienated Soul.

The interesting thing about this unhappy consciousness for the Christian philosopher, Hegel, is that it is a description not only of the disintegration of the Roman Empire, but the Roman Empire at a time when it had adopted Christianity to try to save all from the debacle. Of course, the Lutheran in Hegel may have consoled himself by the fact that this Christianity, as the Christianity of the Borgias in Renaissance Italy, was "Catholic," and it really was not until the Reformation, etc., etc. We are not interested in any rationalization, but in the objective pull upon the mind of a genius which describes this individually free person with his unhappy consciousness as a "personality confined within its narrow

Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Translated with an Introduction by J.B. Baillie, Unwin Publishers, 1931.

self and its petty activity, a personality brooding over itself, as unfortunate as it is pitifully destitute." (p. 264) You will recall that in Marxism and Freedom, I have a footnote on this which uses the specific personalities of the old radicals who cannot find a place for themselves in bourgeois society or in the movement as examples of this unhappy consciousness. Be that as it may, Hegel's point is that until this alienated soul has "stripped itself of its Ego," it will not be able to execute the leap to Reason.

Before we proceed to Reason, however, let's retrace our steps back to the Preface and the Introduction which, in a very great sense, also comprise his Conclusions. At any rate, it is a constant paean to "ceaseless activity," "equal necessity of all moments," which constituted the "life of the whole"; which, however, cannot be seen before being seen; that is to say, it is all a question of a process of "working the matter out," on which the purpose depends. This constant emphasis on process, on experience (the experience of Consciousness no less than "objective" experience) of self-development that must have, nay, must go through "the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative," that must not take "easy contentment in receiving, or stinginess in the giving"--all of which signify "a birth-time and a period of transition"--amounts to the very reason for being of Dialectics and Absolute Knowledge in his principle that "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well." (pp. 80-81)

The work, the purposive activity, the mediation, the self-directive process, the subject in the objective movement, and the objective movement in the subject or mind which Hegel calls Science is in fact not only a Preface to his Philosophy, but to the entire human spirit as it has developed through thousands of years, historically, nationally, internationally, and as it is going to develop via opposing all contemporary philosophies from mysticism to Kantianism--all this on the day after, so to speak, the French Revolution, which demands the reorganization of all previous thought. With Hegel, "immanent" rhythm and strenuous toil are one and the same thing. And finally, the man puts his faith in the public rather than the philosophers, "those 'representatives' who are like the dead burying their dead." (p. 130) This man was really saying, "To hell with all parties (representatives) who are out to lead." And instead, he was hewing a pathway to Science which would reach "a position where, in consequence, its exposition coincides with just this very point, this very stage of the science proper of mind. And finally, when it grasps this, its own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute knowledge itself." (p. 145)

To return to the last section of this first major division--Reason--we see here the first Hegelian development of actuality, that is to say, the reality of the objective world and the reality of thought. The historic period is the one which preceded his own, or the period before the French Revolution. There is an awakening of the scientific world of thought which sees beyond the empirical, but cannot unify the objective and subjective. He hits out against both Kant's "Table of Categories" and the "Abstract empty idealism" of Fichte. Of Kant's discovery he says, "But to pick up the various categories again in any sort of way as a kind of happy find, hit upon, e.g., in the different judgments, and then to be content so to accept them, must really be regarded as an outrage on scientific thinking." (p. 277)

He, therefore, proceeds to examine the process of observation, both of organic nature and of self-consciousness. The sections on the so-called laws of thought are quite hilarious, and are a perfect slap at modern psychoanalysis, of

which he knew nothing then. Indeed, if anyone thinks that the very long section on Phrenology merely reveals the backward state of science at that time, and not our age, he fails to understand that thought or, for that matter, feeling, have no meaning apart from the reality with which thought is concerned, and which builds up "feelings."

Although we are in the realm of the phenomenal, reality and thought are so inseparable, practical reason as well as theoretical combine to show the inadequacies of mere observation, which does not mean that purposive activity can do away with one-sided subjective idealism. On the contrary, the criticisms of Rousseau and the whole Romantic Movement, which Hegel makes under the heading, "The Law of the Heart, and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit," apply to the labor bureaucrat and his "earnestness of a high purpose, which seeks its pleasure in displaying the excellence of (his) own true nature, and in bringing about the welfare of mankind." (p. 392) When it meets up against mankind's opposition to this personal interpretation, "the heart-throb for the welfare of mankind passes therefore into the rage of frantic self-conceit, into the fury of consciousness to preserve itself from destruction." (p. 397)

It is at this point that individualism tried to take refuge in the concept of "virtue." How many windbags, from Castro to some of our best friends, are not included in the following beautiful passage: "The vacuousness of this rhetorical eloquence in conflict with the world's process would be at once discovered if it were to be stated what all its eloquent phrases amount to. They are therefore assumed to be familiar and well-understood. The request to say what, then, this 'well-known' is would be either met by a new swell of phrases, or in reply there would be an appeal to the 'heart' which 'inwardly' tells what they mean--which is tantamount to an admission of inability to say what the meaning is." (p. 410)

As Hegel hits out against this form of self-expression, he digs deep into the objective base. We reach here the section which could equally describe Mao's China, Castro's Cuba, and Djilas' counter-thesis to the new class, which Hegel calls "Self-Contained Individuals Associated as a Community of Animals and the Deception Thence Arising: The Real Fact." This section should be studied in detail, especially so pages 434-438, on the "Honesty" or "Honorableness" of this type of consciousness which, actually, since it concerns a reality not involving action, but merely good luck, is summed up simply as follows: "The true meaning of this 'Honesty,' however, lies in not being so honest as it seems." (p. 434) By the time Hegel gets through exposing the deception of himself, as well as of others, his conclusion is an uncompromising one: "The moments of individuality which were taken as subject one after another by this unreflective incoherent stage of consciousness...." (p. 438)

The second major subdivision--Spirit--is the cornerstone of the entire work. Since alienation has by no means disappeared with the "realization of Reason," i.e., the rise of industrial capitalism, we get here the really revolutionary impact of the dialectical philosophy which refuses to be confined even where the sciences have been liberated, the individual has been freed, and production "progresses."

Whether it's nation and the family, "law and order" (legal status), or the moral laws and ethical action that proceeds with both guilt and destiny, we find that Personality or the master and lord of the world, the power of destruction, continues. Indeed, Hegel is here dealing with what he calls "titanic

excess" (p. 505), not only insofar as his point of reference is the Neros who fiddled while Rome burned, i.e., slave societies, but also insofar as free enterprise is concerned--Hobbes' Leviathan. Thus, not only stoicism, skepticism, the unhappy consciousness, but also Spirit finds itself estranged: "What in the case of the former was all harmony and union, comes now on the scene, no doubt in developed form, but self-estranged." (p. 506)

It is this spirit of self-estrangement which Hegel also defines as "the discipline of culture." That is to say, it is a critique of everything from the Industrial Revolution to the French Revolution, and including what Marx called the "fetishism of commodities," as well as what Hegel calls a spiritual, but factual, "reign of terror"--the intellectual run amok. Throughout, we will be seeing the contradiction between the individual and society or between what we would call petty bourgeois individualism and the truly social individual.

Let us remember also that we will find here what Marx thought contained the critique, though in still mystical form, of the capitalist state:

Spirit in this case, therefore, constructs not merely one world, but a twofold world, divided and self-opposed. (p. 510)

The self-opposition deepens not only because of its opposition to reality, but the internal opposition which first is "Pure Insight," which completes the stage of culture, which "extinguishes all objectiveness." That is to say, in fighting against faith and superstition, it is Enlightenment, but in trying to be an island of safety for Spirit, it confines it from further self-development. In this critique of 18th century deism and utilitarianism, Hegel writes:

Enlightenment upsets the household arrangements, which spirit carries out in the house of faith, by bringing in the goods and furnishings belonging to the world of Here and Now... (p. 512)

The sphere of spirit at this stage breaks up into two regions. The one is the actual world, that of self-estrangement, the other is that which spirit constructs for itself in the ether of pure consciousness, raising itself above the first. This second world, being constructed in opposition and contrast to that estrangement, is just on that account not free from it... (p. 513)

It is important to keep in mind that by culture Hegel does not mean only the Humanities or the Sciences. He means material wealth and the state, as well as the intelligentsia and their ivory towers. If you keep in mind what Marx meant by super-structure, you will be able to swim along with Hegel's critique of Culture.

In criticizing Empiricism (especially Bacon's idea "knowledge is power"), Hegel criticizes not only his principles, but the reality on which these principles rest: "The extent of its culture is the measure of its reality and its power." (p. 515)

He then moves from the "power of culture" to the power of state. Here we can see that ordinary psychological or moral terms like good and bad have a very different and altogether profound meaning in Hegel:

...these bare ideas of Good and Bad are similarly and immediately alienated from one another; they are actual, and in actual consciousness appear as moments that are objective. In this sense the first state of being is the Power of the State, the second its Resources or Wealth. (p. 519)

Until Hegel reaches the attitude of "thoroughgoing discordance" (p. 535), Hegel has the time of his life criticizing both the Good and the Bad, both the State and Wealth, both the Attitudes of Nobility and Authority in a way that could encompass everyone from Proudhon, whose anarchism had no use for the state, to Mao Tse-tung, who completely identifies himself with this state. This is what is so extraordinary about Hegel, that he catches the spirit of an epoch in crisis, and, therefore, its ramifications extend into both Ages that are marked beyond the one he analyzes, and Personality beyond those that he has known in his own period or in history. Think of Mao and read the following:

The noble type of consciousness, then, finds itself in the judgment related to state-power... This type of mind is the heroism of Service; the virtue which sacrifices individual being to the universal, and thereby brings this into existence; the type of personality which of itself renounces possession and enjoyment, acts for the sake of the prevailing power, and in this way becomes a concrete reality... The result of this action, binding the essential reality and self indissolubly together, is to produce a twofold actuality--a self that is truly actualized, and a state-power whose authority is accepted as true... It has a value, therefore, in their thoughts, and is honored accordingly. Such a type is the haughty vassal; he is active in the interests of the state-power, so far as the latter is not a personal will (a monarch) but merely an essential will. (pp. 526-528)

Not only is the critique of state power total in its essential respects, but also in its language, for to Hegel speech contains "ego in its purity." The heroism of dumb service passes into the heroism of flattery: "This reflection of service in express language constitutes the spiritual self-disintegrating mediating term..." (p. 533) One doesn't have to think or be too bright to remember, in this respect, expressions that must have been in Hegel's mind, such as that of Louis XIV, "I am the State." No wonder that Hegel added (p. 537) that this was the type of "pure personality to be absolutely without the character of personality." Indeed, on pages 537-548, there is a beautiful description of Existentialists, fellow-travelers, people who break with the "East" to go to the "West" like Djilas, as well as vice versa, like C. Wright Mills. In each case we find that "in place of revolt appears arrogance." (p. 539)

This type of spiritual life is the absolute and universal inversion of reality and thought, their entire estrangement the one from the other; it is pure culture. What is found out in this sphere is that neither the concrete realities, state-power and wealth, nor their determinate conceptions, good and bad, nor the consciousness of good and bad (the consciousness that is noble and the consciousness that is base) possess real truth; it is found that all these moments are inverted and transmuted the one into the other, and each is the opposite of itself. (p. 541)

The perversion is not ended when culture moves over to "belief and pure insight." It has always been a wonder to me how Hegel keeps trying to reassert religion as an absolute and yet at every concrete stage or form of religion, actual religion is criticized. For example, he does not deny that belief or religion has always been a form of alienation which man had to rid himself of in order to face reality; he has been devastating when it was the unhappy consciousness that confronted him, and again in the form of culture, and now as "merely belief"--in the nether world, as pure ego (see Kant: "Pure ego is the absolute unity of apperception") or "pure thought," and finally as Enlightenment. Naturally, Hegel does not deny the good enlightenment accomplished in its struggle with superstition and in its clearing the ground for the French Revolution. But when it is made into something absolute, he feels the revolutionary impulse to overthrow this idol. Note in the following quotation how Hegel moves from a critique of idolatry to a critique of any "dead form of the spirit's previous state" which would equally be applicable to something like Trotsky's forced identification of nationalized property and "workers' state":

On some 'fine morning,' whose noon is not red with blood, if the infection has penetrated to every organ of spiritual life. It is then the memory alone that still preserves the dead form of the spirit's previous state, as a vanished history, vanished men know not how. (p. 565)

That is why Hegel concludes that "enlightenment itself, however, which reminds belief of the opposite of its various separate moments, is just as little enlightened regarding its own nature." (p. 582)

Hegel leaves himself one loophole that this is just an empty absolute. In proof of this, he hits out against what we would call vulgar materialism:

...pure matter is merely what remains over when we abstract from seeing, feeling, tasting, etc., i.e. it is not what is seen, tasted, felt, and so on; it is not matter that is seen, felt, or tasted, but color, a stone, a salt, and so on. Matter is really pure abstraction... (p. 592)

Read this along with Marx's description of the five senses in his "Private Property and Communism." Hegel is hitting out both against Descartes and the Utilitarians.

The last section of the Spirit in Self-Estrangement that we have been dealing with, Hegel entitles "Absolute Freedom and Terror." It is an analysis of what happened to the French Revolution as factionalism broke up the unity of the revolution so that for "pure personality" the world became "absolutely its own will," so that terror succeeded so-called absolute freedom, since, by being only negative it was "merely the rage and fury of destruction." (p. 604) In a word, Hegel considers that if you have not faced the question of reconstruction on new beginnings, but only destruction of the old, you have, therefore, reached only "death"--a death that achieves nothing, embraces nothing within its grasp; for what is negated is the unachieved, unfulfilled punctual entity of the absolutely free self." (p. 605) This is where he identifies that absolutely free self with a "faction." The victorious faction only is called the government;...and its being government makes it, conversely, into a faction and hence guilty." (pp. 605-606)

It is not only government that Hegel criticizes here, but the philosophic transformation of enlightenment into Kant's "thing in itself." In a word, he is criticizing all forms of abstraction, whether in thought or in fact, when fact is narrowed to mean not all reality, but only aspects of it. He, therefore, concludes that this self-alienated type of mind must be driven to opposition:

Just as the realm of the real and actual world passes over into that of belief and insight, absolute freedom leaves its self-destructive sphere of reality... (p. 610)

This central part of the Phenomenology--Spirit--ends with the section called "Spirit Certain of Itself: Morality," which is just another form of talking about the state and consequently the certainty is by no means peace. On the contrary, it moves from Dissemblance that deals with what Kant called, according to Hegel, "a perfectness of thoughtless contradictions," through the so-called "beautiful soul" (Jacobi) but which to Hegel is really "self-willed impotence" (p. 666) that can only lead to hypocrisy. And on this note he ends the part on "Evil and Forgiveness." (You might return to the section on "Guilt and Destiny," pp. 483-599, and compare the similarity between moral and the ethical action which had previously led us into "Spirit in Self-Estrangement" or the "Discipline of Culture and Civilization.")

In a word, Spirit, or what I call capitalist society, as it was on the eve of the French Revolution and developed through the terror to Napoleonic France, has found no harmony either with its culture or its state, its literature or philosophy as enlightenment, or philosophy as absolute a la Jacobi. Therefore, the human spirit has not been able to shake off alienation and reaches Religion.

Religion, which is the second major section of the division into two of the whole Phenomenology, as I have been tracing it through here, is just one step before Absolute Knowledge. Religion is subdivided into three sections: (1) Natural, which takes up both nature, plants, animals, concept of light and the "artificer" (Egyptian religion); (2) Religion in the form of art; (3) Revealed Religion, or Christianity.

In his introduction to this section, he says that religion has of course entered before this, i.e., in the four stages of consciousness we have heretofore dealt with Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Reason and Spirit, but more or less on a low level. That is to say, when we were at the first stage of consciousness, Religion was "devoid of selfhood"; when we reached Self-Consciousness, it was merely "the pain and sorrow of Spirit wrestling to get itself out into objectivity once more, but not succeeding." (p. 685) The third stage of Consciousness--Reason--more or less forgot about Religion since it first discovered itself and, therefore, looked to the immediate present--empiricism, science, etc. Even when we reach Spirit, whether of the ethical order where we have to fight fate "devoid of consciousness," or we reached and perished in "the religion of enlightenment," or finally reached the religion of morality, the best, says Hegel, that we accomplished there was to face "Absolute Reality." Therefore, it is only now in religion that we really confront the Spirit of Religion: "But only spirit which is object to itself in the shape of Absolute Spirit, is as much aware of being a free and independent reality as it remains therein conscious of itself." (p. 688)

Outside of the little subsection on the artificer, which in fact relates not only to Egyptian religions and pyramids and obelisks, but to what in our age would be called "the confidence man," there isn't much that I can see in the

section on Natural Religion, except I see that I wrote down two expressions, "fetishism of commodities," and "Dr. Zhivago" near the following expression of Hegel: "The darkness of thought mated with the clearness of expression." And it is through this clearness of expression that we reach religion in the form of art, which is again subdivided into Abstract and Living and Spiritual Work of Art. (Since this section I took up a few days ago those two pages would be considered part of this summation and I will not concern myself here with it, except that I want to contrast the question of language as it is considered in this section with the manner in which it was considered in the section on Culture.) Under Culture, Hegel deals with language as still one other form of estrangement (p. 529), as the speech of the ego, of the haughty vassal, of the arrogant monarch: "L'etat c'est moi" (I am the State). Under Art, on the other hand, he traces language from the manner in which the idea presents itself--Epics--through the act, i.e., the drama, so that the language of the minstrel is transformed into that of Tragedy: "In regard to form, the language here ceases to be narrative, in virtue of the fact that it enters into the content, just as the content ceases to be merely one that is ideally imagined. The hero is himself the spokesman..." (p. 736) He then breaks up the question of language as it appears when it is "double-tongued" in the oracles or via witcher, and to that in which it is thought (Hamlet), and finally via action. "The process of action proves their unity in the mutual overthrow of both powers and both self-conscious characters," action both as in Tragedy and in Comedy. (p. 743)

The last section on Religion, which deals with Christianity, is even more contradictory, for here Hegel is supposed to reach, more or less, the height of his thought, the step before Absolute Knowledge, and has been put by him in a section beyond Greek Art, and yet we know that to Hegel Greek Art was certainly a great deal greater than the appearance of One God among the Jews, or even the Christian God as it was with the Catholics, for to Hegel the Lutheran Reformation to make the alleged unity of freedom and Christianity is anything but abstract. I have a feeling that the whole section, as it has been expanded in his volumes on the Philosophy of Religion, will, in actuality, turn out to be a devastating critique of the Church or the Party. But I have no chance to go into this. In any case, to make explicit what is only implicit in Religion, we must turn to Absolute Knowledge.

As we reach this apex of Hegelianism--the consummation of experience, of philosophy--we will confront the end of the division between object and subject.

This takes the form of making consciousness itself the object. Hegel lists three specific aspects: "This knowledge of which we are speaking is, however, not knowledge in the sense of pure conceptual comprehension of the object; here this knowledge is to be taken only in its development...." (p. 790)

Development is of the essence. It is the beginning out of which something arises. It is the middle through which something must be passed. It is the end, "the mediated result," which is really not an end of anything but a process of development which is the beginning of another process as much as it is the end of a former one. Therefore, it is development where the question is one of understanding the method of grasping the object, that is to say, confronting consciousness. In confrontation you meet the second aspect--Relatedness; from Relatedness you must go to Action. Therefore, Action, the deed, practical activity, mental activity, spiritual activity, in a word, doing something, is always the only proof there is of the thought, and therefore stands in the center of all Hegelian philosophy:

It is through action that spirit is spirit so as definitely to exist; it raises its existence into the sphere of thought and hence into absolute opposition, and returns out of it through and within this very opposition. (p. 797)

This is the movement towards Science, that is to say, from individual experience through social experience, to a universal generalization of the experience which goes to make up the action: "As to the actual existence of this notion, science does not appear in time and in reality till spirit has arrived at this stage of being conscious regarding itself." (p. 798)

Time is just the notion definitely existent....Time therefore appears as spirit's destiny and necessity. (p. 800)

It is peculiar how Hegel is constantly returning to the simple feelings even when he has reached Absolute Knowledge. He says, in fact, that "nothing is known which does not fall within experience, or (as it is also expressed) which is not felt to be true...." (p. 800)

We reach explicitness here, and have to deal with the transformation of Substance into Subject (not just Things versus Human Beings, but Substance as God into living "gods" or the human and divine merged into an extension of human power).

In a single page (802) Hegel sums up the entire development of Philosophy and Science from Descartes to himself. Thus, we move from Observation, which analyzes what is and "conversely it finds in its thought existence" (Descartes), to Substance, that is to say, God as both Thought and Reality, though abstractly stated (Spinoza). The abstraction of this forced unity brings about "the principle of Individuality" (Leibnitz). We have entered Private Enterprise, or the first stage of capitalism, only to move to Utilitarianism into which the enlightenment had "perished." Here the Individual Will (Kant) comes to the rescue of Absolute Freedom, or to put it in more human language, men of good will will yet straighten out this topsy-turvy world of private capital versus labor, freedom versus terror, etc., etc., and since this really doesn't happen; we jump back from Kantianism to the Absolute Ego of Fichte, or Absolute as "intuited" by Jacobi, and finally land into the Empty Absolute of Schelling. In a word, Hegel shows the birth of our modern world as Science rejected theology to strike out on its own, met up with a first statement of the dialectic in Kant, who tried to unify Thought and Science by sheer will, and when that philosophic exertion failed to meet the challenge of the time, the contemporary philosophers--Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi--slid back. To go forward, Substance had to become Subject. This is where Hegel comes in. The last three pages of the Phenomenology are an outpouring of "simple mediating activity in thinking" where the whole process releases itself, History and Science, Nature and Spirit: "born anew from the womb of knowledge--is the new stage of existence, a new world, and a new embodiment or mode of Spirit." (p. 807)

This new world, which Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge, is the unity of the real world and the notions about it, the organization of thought and activity, which merge into the new, the whole truth of the past and the present, which anticipates the future.

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Rough Notes on

HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC*

Volume I: Objective Logic

Book One: The Doctrine of Being

Between the title of Volume I and Book One, we are confronted with two Prefaces, one of which was written when Volume I was first published in 1812, and the second Preface is one of the last things Hegel did before his death in 1831. Thus, the second Preface not only encompasses the first volume, but also the second volume (which contains Books Two and Three), which was published in 1817, and all of his other works; in fact, it followed the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences.

The historic period of Hegel's life will be one point of departure. The other point of departure will be 1914 when Lenin read this work. I will refer to his Philosophic Notebooks so that you in turn can study them simultaneously with the Logic. Finally, we must have also our own historic period in mind.

Philosophically speaking, Lenin's period was summarized by himself dialectically as "the transformation into opposite"; our period has been characterized by ourselves as the Absolute Idea, or the unity of theory and practice, which must be further concretized as Freedom--the realization of Freedom in life, most of all, and in thought. That is to say, in Hegel's philosophy the Absolute Idea also stands for unity of theory and practice and its point of departure and return is likewise Freedom. But it is abstract.

A better way, perhaps, to express it is to say that while in Hegel the unity of object and subject--the unity of the Universal and Individual--is in mind alone, in the Marxist-Humanist outlook, the individual is the social entity, or as Marx put it, there is no proof of freedom in society except through the individual who is free. I do not mean to burden these notes with too many random thoughts. On the contrary, I mean to follow Hegel in quite some detail, but history and dialectic method is Hegelianism and hence very brief references to the current situation will be made.

One other item in regard to Lenin. Along with the Philosophic Notebooks, we will consider the 4½ pages called "On Dialectics," which are on pp. 81-85 of his Selected Works, Vol. XI, but which are actually part of his Philosophic Notebooks. I did not translate these because they had already been translated, but were put in quite undialectically by the Stalinists as if they and Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism which follows it are by one and the same Lenin, whereas in fact the latter is quite mechanical and the exact proof of what Lenin had in mind when he wrote at the end of the Notebooks that none of the Marxists (in plural, that is, including himself, and the plural was the emphasis Lenin himself put in that word) had understood Marx's Capital for the last half century. In fact, in

* Hegel's Science of Logic, translated by W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers, Macmillan Co., N.Y. 1929

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this short essay, "On Dialectics," he criticizes not only everyone from Pickhanov to himself, but even Engels, although he excuses the latter, who, he says, has treated dialectics inadequately, by way of "examples, 'a seed,' 'for example, primitive Communism.' The same is true of Engels. But with him it is 'in the interests of popularisation...' and not as a law of knowledge (and as a law of the objective world)."

Hegel's very first sentence in the first Preface is a reference--"The Complete Transformation which Philosophical thought has undergone in Germany during the last five and twenty years." The reference is to 1787 and Kant's work. Hegel's dissatisfaction with even this great step is due to the fact that it has not lived up to the challenge of the times, i.e., the French Revolution, 1789, up to the Napoleonic Period: "There are no traces in Logic of the new spirit which has arisen both in Learning and in Life. It is, however (let us say it once and for all), quite vain to try to retain the forms of an earlier stage of development when the inner structure of spirit has become transformed; these earlier forms are like withered leaves which are pushed off by the new buds already being generated at the roots." (Hegel, Vol. I, p. 35)

The necessity for the new, the Hegelian departure, arises from the times and a new concept of philosophical method, not the dialectic in general, which Hegel had reached for, but Hegelian Dialectic, the form of thought which was as one with the movement of mind: "This movement is the Absolute Method of knowledge, and at the same time the immanent soul of the Content of knowledge.--It is, I maintain, along this path of self-construction alone that Philosophy can become objective and demonstrated science." (Hegel I, pp. 36-37)

Actually, this is only the fourth page of his Preface (the pagination of 36 and 37 is due to the fact that the stupid publishers did not use a separate pagination for Haldane's Introduction, Table of Contents, etc.) and already we have covered, or rather Hegel has covered, the two fundamental movements of his entire work--the logical-dialectical and the polemical. These, in turn, contain reality--historic reality of the period in which he lived and historic reality as evolution up to that time. And sure enough, Lenin at once noted the two essences of the dialectic: (1) The emphasis on movement, "the movement of scientific cognition--that is the essence"; (2) "'the path of self-construction' = path (here lies the nub, in my opinion) of true cognition, knowledge, movement."

The Preface to the Second Edition is once again full of "immanent activity" and "necessary development," which leads Lenin to say in the very first paragraph: "What is necessary is not lifeless bones, but full-blooded life" and he stresses "an important beginning." And Hegel, indeed, in the very approach to philosophic category in the second paragraph is going to remind us that "so natural to man is Logic--indeed, Logic itself is just man's peculiar nature. But if Nature in general is opposed, as physical, to what is mental, then it must be said that Logic is rather that something Super-natural which enters into all the natural behaviour of man--Feeling, Intuition, Desire, Need, Impulse--and thereby alone transforms it all to something human--to ideas and purposes." (Hegel I, p. 40)

For a man so full of profundities, he never forgets impulses, feelings, intuition, desires, needs; indeed, it is quite obvious that he refuses to make a distinction between physical and mental, and to this day, the so-called behavioral sciences, psychoanalysis included, cannot shine this great philosopher's shoes, much less his divine (yes, divine) concept of human ideas and purposes.

Historical materialism, strange as that may sound as any attribute of Hegel, is nevertheless basic to Hegelian analysis and in this Preface he traces philosophy back in a manner in which it is quite clear that the elements of that total philosophy with which Marx is mainly associated were present in Hegelian philosophy; and this sense of history is present also in his polemical critique of Kant: "In the still spaces of Thought which has come to itself and is purely self-existent, those interests are hushed which move the lives of peoples and of individuals." (Hegel I, p. 42) Lenin emphasized this expression as well as the one in which Hegel said "When the Critical Philosophy understands the relation of these three Terms so as to make Thoughts intermediary between Us and Things in such a sense that this intermediary rather excludes us from things than connects us with them..." (Hegel I, p. 44) At this point Lenin remarks: "In my view, the conclusion essentially is: (1) in Kant knowledge hedges off (separates) nature from man; in actuality, it unites them; (2) in Kant 'the empty abstraction' of the thing-in-itself is put in place of the living procession (shestviya); the movement of our ever deeper knowledge of things."

Hegel in this second Preface takes issue also with those who have criticized him since the Phenomenology and this first book were published. The severest of all criticisms is for those who assume a category, which, first of all, has to be proved, which he calls an "uninstructed and barbarous procedure." It is good to have in mind here our opponent, for the whole of Russian Communist theory follows precisely this barbarous procedure of assuming that Socialism already exists and then blithely goes on. If, however, one thinks that it is sufficient merely to know that the Russians assume what is first to be proven to be able to get to the bottom of their usurpation of Marxist language, Marcuse's "Soviet Marxism" is there to prove the opposite. Despite all of his knowledge of both Hegel and Marx and even Russian society, Marcuse still falls into the trap of apologetics on the basis that their professed theory discloses actual reality. The fundamental reason for the blindness is, of course, his complete isolation from the class struggle. But it is not the whole of the reason. The other part is the failure to create a category--state capitalism in this case--for the new state of the world economy in general and Russia in particular. Without a category, an intellectual is just lost, since he has none of the proletarian instincts to carry him through on trodden paths and, therefore, falls into eclecticism.

Before Hegel begins Book One we have, besides the two Prefaces, also an Introduction. In the Introduction, his reference to the Phenomenology will set us, too, in the proper spirit of continuity: "In the Phenomenology of Mind I have set forth the movement of consciousness, from the first crude opposition between itself and the Object, up to absolute knowledge. This process goes through all the forms of the relation of thought to its object, and reaches the Concept of Science as its result." (Hegel I, p. 59) Having assumed absolute knowledge as the truth of all forms of consciousness, Hegel can now proceed to treat both knowledge and reality in the form of categories because they do include historical reality, present reality, as well as the long road of thought about it. That is precisely why he is opposed to the other form in which thought is presented in the philosophies that have not met the challenge of the times. Thus, in criticizing that the structure of logics has undergone no change, despite all the revolutionary development, he says: "For when Spirit has worked on for two thousand years, it must have reached a better reflective consciousness of its own thought and its own unadulterated essence. A comparison of the forms to which Spirit has risen in the worlds of Practice and Religion, and of Science in every department of knowledge Positive and Speculative,--a comparison of these with the form which Logic...has attained shows...a glaring discrepancy." (Hegel I, p. 62)

Therefore, the need for the transformation of the structure of logic and its actual transformation are present here. Hegel does give Kant credit for having "freed Dialectic from the semblance of arbitrariness...and set it forth as a necessary procedure of Reason," (p. 67) but the actual exposition is not, says Hegel, "deserving of any great praise; but the general idea upon which he builds and which he has vindicated, is the Objectivity of Appearance and the Necessity of Contradiction," (p. 67) It is Hegel's contention that only when you get to consider Universals, not as abstractions, but as concrete totalities of the whole historic movement, does Logic deserve to become the universal philosophy: "It is only through a profounder acquaintance with other sciences that Logic discovers itself to subjective thought as not a mere abstract Universal, but as a Universal which comprises in itself the full wealth of Particulars." (p. 69)

It is at this point that Lenin refers the reader to Capital, repeating Hegel's description of Logic as "not a mere abstract Universal, but as a Universal which comprises in itself the full wealth of Particulars" and then goes into paeans of praise, "a beautiful formula," and again repeats the phrase, adding "tres bien!" From now on, it is Capital which Lenin will have in mind throughout his reading of the two volumes (three books) of Logic.

I would like to note also, although I will not elaborate upon this until much later, that the whole of the Logic, as well as each section of the Logic, as well as each separate thought in the Logic, will go through the following development, both as history, as reality, as thought: the movement will always be from U (Universal) through P (Particular) to I (Individual). Lenin takes it in the same form as U-P-I, but reverses the order more often precisely because he is thinking of the proletarian individual, who is also the social individual and the universal of socialism. Thus, when he concludes his Philosophic Notebooks in those four pages of the Dialectics I referred to, he says (the translator here used the word "singular," where the strict term is "individual," and "general," where the strict term is "universal"); "To begin with the simplest, most ordinary, commonest, etc., proposition, or any proposition one pleases; the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the singular is the general. Consequently, opposites (the singular as opposed to the general) are identical; the singular exists only in the connection that leads to the general. The general exists only in the singular and through the singular." (Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. XI, p. 83)

In conclusion to his Introduction, Hegel returns once again to Kant, explaining that those who would just disregard him are the very ones who take his results and make the whole philosophy into a "pillow for intellectual sloth." (Hegel I, Fn., p. 73) (You will remember that that is the quotation I used in Chapter 9 of Marxism and Freedom, which deals with the Second International.)

We are finally ready to begin Book One, but we had better remember the broad outline of the whole Logic into two volumes, Objective Logic and Subjective Logic; more definitely, it has three parts, namely:

1. The Doctrine of Being
2. The Doctrine of Essence, and
3. The Doctrine of the Notion

Book One: The Doctrine of Being

Section One: Determinateness (Quality)

Chapter I: Being

There are only three short paragraphs in Chapter I on Being, Nothing and Becoming, whereupon Hegel goes into no less than five Observations which stretch over twenty-five pages, which, in fact, cover very nearly the whole of preceding philosophies, from the Orient through the Greeks to his own time on this question of Being. Thus: Observation One - the Opposition of Being and Nothing in Imagination contrasts Parmenides' "pure enthusiasm of thought first comprehending itself in its absolute abstraction" to Buddhism where "Nothing or Void is the absolute principle," to Heraclitus, whose opposition to both one-sided abstractions of Being and Nothing led to the total concept of Becoming: "All things flow," which means everything is Becoming. (Hegel I, pp. 95-96)

Hegel does not stop either with the Orient or with the Greeks, but proceeds to consider Spinoza, as well as the Kantian Critique. Not only that, it's quite obvious that both in philosophy and in science Hegel is the historical materialist: "What is first in science has had to show itself first too, historically." (Hegel I, p. 101)

If Observation One dealt with the Unity of Being and Nothing as Becoming in a profound manner, Hegel hurries to criticize this, too, in Observation Two - The Inadequacy of the Expression "Unity" or "Identity of Being and Nothing." The point is that Unity "sounds violent and striking in proportion as the objects of which it is asserted obviously show themselves as distinct. In this respect therefore mere Unseparateness or Inseparability would be a good substitute for Unity; but these would not express the affirmative nature of the relation of the whole. The whole and true result, therefore, which has here been found, is Becoming..." (Hegel I, p. 104)

He, therefore, proceeds to Observation Three - The Isolation of these Abstractions, in order to stress that the Unity of Being and Nothing have to be considered in relationship to a third, i.e., Becoming, and therefore, we must consider the transition. Otherwise, we would constantly be evading the internal contradictoriness, although Hegel admits that "It would be wasted labor to spread a net for all the twistings and objections of reflection and its reasonings, in order to cut off and render impossible all the evasions and digressions which it uses to hide from itself its own internal contradictoriness." (Hegel I, p. 106) He here hits out at his two main enemies, Fichte and Jacobi, whom he compares to the abstractions of Indian thought or the Brahma: "this torpid and vacuous consciousness, taken as consciousness, is Being." (With this should be read the section on Oriental philosophy and Hegel's Philosophy of History. It used to annoy me very much because I thought it showed German arrogance to Oriental philosophy. But it is, in fact, so objective an analysis of Hinduism that it will explain a great deal of modern India's difficulties in stamping out castes.)

In both an observation for Incomprehensible Nature of the Beginning and the next Observation - The Expression to Transcend, Hegel has shifted both the actual and the philosophic, not alone from Being and Nothing to Becoming, but transcended Becoming, which is the first leap forward from an abstract being to a determinate, or specific being, with which Chapter II will deal. All we need to remember at this point is that "what is transcended is also preserved." (Hegel I, p. 120)

Chapter II: Determinate Being

The structure of Logic has now been set. We will at each point, though not in as overwhelming a manner, state a fact or proposition and then proceed to an Observation; in a word, the polemical movement in Logic follows right alongside, and inseparably, with the affirmative statement. You may recall that that is the form of Marx's "Critique of Political Economy." As you know, he was quite dissatisfied with the form, discarded it for Capital. This was not only due to the fact that he decided that the polemical, as history of thought rather than class struggle, should all be placed together in a separate book (Book Four). That much is obvious and would not have, in itself, produced such utter blindness on the part of Marxists who could quite easily see that the historical, to Marx, was not history of thought, but history of class struggle, since, as a matter of fact, Kautskian popularizations dealt with the class struggle without much concern to thought. No, it is the dialectics, the new, the creative dialectics of the class struggle, which did not separate philosophy--how long is my working day?--from the class struggle, which remain a mystery to the materialists who were so busy "opposing the mystical" in Hegel. But the fact that the Hegelian structure could not be "copied" by Marx, but had to be recreated, does not mean that the Hegelian structure for Hegel was wrong. On the contrary, he deals with Thought, and the logical form of the Universal there is the Notion.

We have moved from the Universal, General, Abstract Being to a definite Being or Something, but this assumption of a definitive quality immediately moves Hegel to an observation--Quality and Negation. "Determinateness is negation posited affirmatively," is the meaning of Spinoza's omnis determinatio est negatio, a proposition of infinite importance; only, negation as such is formless abstraction. Speculative philosophy must not be accused of making negation, or Nothing, its end; Nothing is the end of philosophy as little as Reality is of truth." (Hegel I, p. 125)

But it must not be imagined that Hegel is only arguing with other philosophers, though that is his world. He is also moving to evermore determinate stages of the concrete, for what pervades everything in Hegel--everything from Absolute Idea to the simple Something of a chair or a leaf or a seed--is his fundamental principle that the Truth is always concrete. Because, however, what was most concrete with him was Thought, and because this early in the Logic when he deals with Something, he is already dealing with it as "the first negation of the negation," Lenin gets furious with him at this point and returns to a warm feeling toward Engels by referring to the quotation about "abstract and abstruse Hegelianism." And yet only a few short pages beyond this, when dealing with finitude and against the Kantian thing-in-itself to which he counterposes the concept of "Other," Hegel states that "Things are called 'in themselves' insofar as we abstract from all Being-for-Other, which means that they are thought of as quite without determination, as Nothings." (Hegel I, p. 133) Here Lenin remarks that this whole attack on the Thing-in-itself is "very profound" and again "sehr gut!" and straightaway makes that conclusion of the essence of the dialectic which he is going to repeat throughout his reading and which will indeed become the basis of all his writings from there on from Imperialism to the Will. Thus, it is near Hegel's remark against the critical philosophy, i.e., Kant, on p. 135 of the Logic that Lenin writes: "Dialectic is the doctrine of the identity of opposites--how they can be and how they become identical, transforming one into another--why the mind of man must not take these opposites for dead, blocked (zastvzhiye), but for living, conditioned, mobile, transforming one into the other. En lisant Hegel..." This, mind you, is said not in Book Three on Notion, nor even in Book Two on Essence,

nor even in Section Three of Book One on Measure where we are "practically" ready to jump into Essence, but in the very first section of Book One, Chapter II.

At this point Hegel comments that in the question of determination the chief point is "to distinguish what is still in itself and what is posited...and being-for-other. This distinction is proper only to dialectical development and is unknown to the metaphysical (which includes the Critical) philosophy." (Hegel I, p. 135) It is here that Lenin has his first definition of dialectic as the doctrine of the identity of opposites, before which generalization he writes: "This is very profound; the thing-in-itself and its transformation into the thing-for-other. (cf. Engels). The thing-in-itself, in general, is an empty, lifeless abstraction. In life in the movement all and everything is used to being both "in itself" and "for other" in relation to Other, transforming itself from one condition (sostoyaniye) to another."

Hegel proceeds next to analyze Finitude and Ought. The Ought in turn is followed by an Observation where he tangles with Leibniz (p. 148) and with Kant and Fichte (p. 149) who, he insists, have the standpoint, precisely because they get stuck in Ought, "where they persist in Finitude, and (which is the same thing) in contradiction."

Lenin is again moved here to speak about the profound analysis Hegel makes of the Finite, saying "The Finite? that means movement has come to an end! Something? that means not what Other is. Being, in general? that means such indeterminateness that Being = Not-Being. All-sided, universal flexibility of concepts--flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites."

In the section which follows on Infinity, the critical point is transition: "Ideality may be called the Quality of Infinity; but, as it is essentially the process of Becoming, it is a Transition, like that of Becoming in Determinate Being, and it must now be indicated." (Hegel I, p. 163) Two other observations followed this one. One is on "Infinite Progress": "Bad Infinity," says Hegel, like progress to infinity, is really no different than Ought, "the expression of a contradiction, which pretends to be the solution and the ultimate." (p. 164) The second observation is on "Idealism," where he contrasts Subjective and Objective Idealism, and which brings us to Chapter III, "Being-For-Self."

Somewhere in this chapter--in fact, in the first Observation--ideality is taken up both as it applies to Leibniz's Monads, as well as Elastic Being, and also the Atomistic philosophy, and again, there are many observations ending with the one on Kant's "Attraction and Repulsion." Now on the one hand, Lenin is very specific in his interpretation here, calling attention to the fact that "the idea of the transformation of the ideal into the real is profound; very important for history...against vulgar materialism," and yet the whole chapter on Being-For-Self, when Lenin first approaches it, is considered by him to be "dark waters." At this point, during the correspondence with J. and G. in 1949, G. developed her thoughts on this chapter as one dealing with the developing subject as it first arose, 500 B.C., to the Absolute Idea, or the conditions for universality in the modern proletariat. She seemed to think that Being-For-One coming from Being-For-Self was unclear to Lenin because he did not understand abstract labor as we did. I doubt that was the reason since in the Doctrine of Being we are, comparatively, at a low stage of development in Hegelian thought. The fact, however, that he can at this "low stage" be so profound and point to so many of the conditions which we will meet in the Absolute Idea shows that you can, in fact, not make sharp divisions

even in those most sharply pointed to by Hegel himself--Being, Essence, Notion-- as is shown over and over again by the fact that he deals with Kant, who was the greatest philosopher before him, in this very section.

Indeed, Lenin here notes--evidently it struck him for the first time--that the self-development of the concept in Hegel is related to the entire history of philosophy. In any case, in the Observation on the Unity of the One and the Many, he deals also with the dialectic of Plato in the Parmenides. What is true is Hegel's very sharp opposition to so-called independence in the One: "Independence having reached its quintessence in the One which is for itself, is abstract and formal, destroying itself; it is the highest and most stubborn error, which takes itself for highest truth; appearing, more concretely, as abstract freedom, pure ego, and further as Evil. It is freedom which goes so far astray as to place its essence in this abstraction, flattering itself that, being thus by itself, it possesses itself in its purity." (Hegel I, p. 185)

Section Two: Magnitude (Quantity)

We have first now reached the transformation of Quality or Determinateness into Quantity, Being-For-Self having concluded Section One, and having in turn been divided into three--Being-For-Self as such, the One and the Many, and Repulsion and Attraction.

In the first observation on Pure Quantity, as well as in the second observation on Kant's "Antinomy of the Indivisibility and Infinite Divisibility of Time, Space and Matter," the concept that we are approaching is that of Continuous and Discrete magnitude. But before he deals with these concepts, Hegel feels he must attack not only the concept of Quantity as simple Unity of Discreteness and Continuity, but also the idea that Kant had of four Antinomies, as if that number exhausts Contradiction instead of the fact that every single concept is in fact an antinomy. In attacking Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," the attack is on Kant for being "apagogic," that is to say, assuming what is to be proved and thus repeating the assumption in the conclusion. Hegel protests that Kant's proofs are "a forced and useless Tortuosity," "an advocate's proof," which sounds exactly as if it says he is a "Philadelphia lawyer." He considers the dialectic example of the old Eleatic school of thought as superior to Kant, despite the fact that so much of actual history had occurred since that period, which certainly should have led to a more profound conception of dialectic.

Discreteness, like Continuity, is a moment of Quantity and in fact it is only both moments, their unity that is, that produces Quantum. At the same time, both in this chapter and in Chapter II on "Quantum," we sense Hegel's sharp distaste for mathematical proof as being unworthy of philosophy, even though at its start, in the theorems of Pythagoras, they were of the essence, and there is no doubt also of their importance, and in fact necessity, to Newtonian science and differential and integral calculus. Although I know next to nothing of this, and I am sure that modern mathematics which has reached into economics, automation, and space science, in essence all that Hegel says here is inescapably true as is all that he says on "Bad Infinity," and I dare say that any infinity that is not human is bad. I note that Lenin, who did know a great deal about calculus, makes very short shrift of this whole section precisely because he agrees with Hegel in his Analysis on Conclusions.

Section Three: Measure

With the very first statement, "Abstractly the statement may be made that in Measure, Quality and Quantity are united" (Hegel I, p. 345), Lenin once again becomes excited and at the end of it, he makes all those observations--leaps! LEAPS! LEAPS! The observation on Nodal Lines Lenin copies out nearly in full. There is no doubt whatever that a transition from Quality into Quantity as a leap, in opposition to the concept of any gradual emergence, is the transition point for Lenin himself, breaking with the old Lenin, not because the old Lenin was ever a "gradualist," but because the objectivity of these leaps in all aspects of life is not anything merely quantitative or merely qualitative, or as Hegel puts it: "The gradualness of arising is based upon the ideas that that which arises is already, sensibly or otherwise, actually there, and is imperceptible only on account of its smallness...Understanding prefers to fancy identity and change to be of that indifferent and external kind which applies to the quantitative." (Hegel I, p. 390)

To sharpen his own very different concept, Hegel goes over to this question of gradual transition of Quantity to Quality in Ethics, and says, "A more or less suffices to transgress the limit of levity, where something quite different, namely, crime, appears; and thus right passes over into wrong, and virtue into vice." (Hegel I, p. 300)

The third chapter of this section is called "The Becoming of Essence" and is the transition, therefore, to the Second Book.

Book Two: The Doctrine of Essence

Section One: Essence As Reflection Into Self

Chapter I: Show

The profundity of Hegel is seen in the fact that even where he thinks that something is relatively unessential and is, therefore, mere show, even there the show is also objective. He considers "show, then, is the phenomenon of skepticism...skepticism did not dare to affirm 'it is'; modern idealism did not dare to regard cognition as a knowledge of Thing-in-itself." (Hegel, Vol. II, p. 22) Hegel hits out against all idealisms of Leibniz, Kant, or Fichte. Hegel writes, "It is the immediacy of Not-being, which constitutes Show; but this Not-being is nothing else than the Negativity of Essence in itself." (p. 23) In fact, on the page before he said this, when he criticized both skepticism and idealism, Lenin noted: "You include all the manifold riches of the world in Schein and you reject the objectivity of Schein!" And again: "Show is Essence in one of its determinations...Essence thus appears. Show is the phenomenon of Essence in itself." Lenin further notes that in this section on the reflection of Essence, Hegel again accuses Kant of subjectivism and insists on the objective validity of Show, "of the immediate given," and Lenin notes: "The term, 'given' is common with Hegel in general. The little philosophers dispute whether one should take as basis the Essence or the immediately given. (Kant, Hume, Machists). Hegel substitutes and for 'or' and explains the concrete content of this 'and.'"

Chapter II: The Essentialities or Determinations of Reflection

We will deal here with the three developments in Essence: first, simple self-relation or Identity; secondly, Variety; and thirdly, Contradiction. But before Hegel develops these three, he has an observation on so-called "Laws of Thought," which allegedly prove that A cannot be at one and the same time A and not be A. That is absolutely hilarious. "Category, according to its etymology and its Aristotelian definition, is that which is predicated or asserted of the existent.--But a determinateness of Being is essentially a transition into the opposite; the negative of any determinateness is as necessary as the determinateness itself; and each immediate determinateness is immediately opposed by the other." (Hegel II, p. 36)

When Hegel gets to Observation Two, which he called the Law of the Excluded Middle, he again hits out at the idea that something either is or is not A, that there is no third, insisting that there is a third in the very thesis since A can be both +A and -A: "The something thus is itself the third term which was supposed to be excluded." (p. 66) At this point, Lenin remarked: "This is very profound. Every concrete thing, every concrete something stands in diverse and often contradictory relations to all others, ergo, it is itself and an Other."

As for the observation which follows on the law of Contradiction where Hegel defines Contradiction as the "root of all movement and life, and it is only insofar as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity," (p. 67) Lenin copies out in toto this entire section, at the end of which he makes his famous generalization on Movement and Self-Movement, and also the generalization that the idea of Movement and Change was disclosed in 1813 by Hegel, that is, by philosophy, and was applied by Marx first in 1847 and by Darwin in 1859. Indeed, Lenin can hardly stop himself from becoming a complete Hegelian and stressing over and over again how stupid it is to think that Hegel is abstract and abstruse, and how profound is the concept of Contradiction as the force of Movement and how different Thinking, Reason, Notion is to ordinary understanding: "Thinking reason (notion) sharpens the blunted difference of variety, the mere manifold of imagination, to the essential difference, to Opposition. Only when the contradictions reach their peak does manifoldness become mobile (regsam) and lively in relation to the other,--acquire that negativity which is the i n n e r - p u l s a t i o n of self-movement and life."

Chapter III: Ground

The very first sentence--"Essence determines itself as Ground"--lets us know that we are approaching the climax to Section One of Essence. As soon as Hegel, in the first observation on the Law of Ground, finishes his Critique of Leibniz's Law of Sufficient Ground, he develops, in Absolute Ground, all the essentials of Form and Essence, Form and Matter, Form and Content where it becomes quite clear that these cannot be separated; that Form and Matter "presuppose one another" (Hegel II, p. 79) and Content is the "unity" of Form and Matter. (p. 82) And as we move from Absolute to Determined Ground and approach Complete Ground, it becomes quite clear that manifoldness or content-determinations could be used indiscriminately so that you could cite something as much for as against something, which is exactly what Socrates correctly argued against as Sophistry, because, of course, such conclusions do not exhaust the thing-in-itself in the sense of a "grasp of the connection of things which contain them all."

It is at this point that we reach the transition from Ground to Condition, which moves Lenin to say, "brilliant: all-world, all-sided living connection of

everything with everything else, and of the reflection of this connection--materialistisch auf den Kopf gestellter Hegel--in the concept of man, which must be so polished, so broken-in, flexible, mobile, relative, mutually-tied-in, united in opposition, as to embrace the world. The continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the dialectical working out of the history of human thought, science and technique." And at the same spot, Lenin re-thinks Marx's Capital, thus: "And a 'purely logical' working out? Das fällt zusammen. It must coincide as does induction and deduction in Capital."

We have now reached the third subsection of Ground--Condition, which could be defined as History. In 1950, G. wrote quite a good letter on that subsection, but J. was no help whatsoever; indeed, he could never develop the strong point of G. on Philosophy. But we can gain something by quoting her letter at this point: "The essence of H's argument is this: It is necessary to get rid of the concept of Ground as a substratum, but when you get rid of this concept of something behind the immediate you have not by any means gotten rid of the fact that the immediate is the result of a MEDIATING process. It is the self-mediating, self-repelling, self-transcending relation of Ground which externalizes itself in the immediate existent. Hence the relentless phrasing and re-phrasing of his thesis that 'The Fact Emerges Out of Ground.'"

The exact statement from Hegel reads: "When all the Conditions of a Fact are present, it enters into Existence. The Fact is before it exists..." (p. 105) Now at this point, Lenin wrote: "Very good! What has the Absolute Idea and Idealism to find here? Remarkable, this 'derivation' of Existence." We may be bold enough to answer the question, or better still, recognize that Lenin answered his own question when he reached the last part of Hegel precisely on the Absolute Idea, and thereupon noted: (1) That one must read the whole of the Logic to understand Capital; (2) that man's cognition not only reflects the world, but "creates" it; (3) and noted in his conclusions that there was more sense in Idealism than in vulgar materialism, which made him so anxious to try to get the Encyclopedia Granat to return his essay on Marx, so that he could expand the section on dialectics.

I want to return to the question of Condition as History, as well as to the expression that "The Fact is before it Exists." The History that Hegel had in mind was, of course, the historic period in which he lived, following the French Revolution, which brought not the millenium, but new contradictions; i.e., philosophically speaking, Ground had been transformed into Condition and we did get a totality of Movement--the Fact-in-itself. The new contradictions will once again show that facts, facts, facts can also hide "the unity of Form is submerged." And of course we know that our historic epoch, much more than Hegel's, demands more of reality than just a sound of "immediates." For example, scientifically with Einstein, we get to know that facts, too, are relative. So that once again we need self-transcendence and therefore, in the expression "the fact is before it exists," we recognize the process of emergence of something new, and in its emergence we therefore get the transition to Existence. For our terms, if we think of the actual historical development of the working class in Marx's Capital, we have "Ground in Unity with its Condition."

Section Two: Appearance

Here again, the very first sentence is a leap forward: "Essence must appear." So we can no longer merely contrast Appearance to Essence, because, while

there may be much Appearance that is only "show," it also contains Essence itself, (which in turn will soon mean we are moving to a real crisis or Actuality).

The three subsections on Appearance are: (1) Existence, (2) Appearance and (3) Essential Relations.

(I might state that Sartre's Existentialism is nowhere near this important section of Hegel's Logic, for in Hegel "whatever exists has a Ground and is Condition," whereas in Sartre, both the Ground and the Condition are quite subordinate to the Ego's disgust with it all.)

The real tendency, as well as actuality, that we should have before us in studying this section on Appearance is Stalinism and its non-essential critique in Trotskyism. That is to say, if Essence--the present stage of capitalism or the present stage of the counter-revolutionary appearance of the labor bureaucracy--must appear, then Stalinism, which has appeared, is not just any old bureaucracy that has no connection with a new economic state of world development. On the contrary, the Appearance--Stalinism--and the Essence--state-capitalism--are one and the same, or the Form of a new Content. Trotskyism, on the other hand, by putting up a Chinese wall between what is mere Appearance and what is true Essence (and to him, the Essence is not capitalism, but the form of workers' state) has not been able to analyze either Stalinism or state-capitalism. I mean, either Stalinism as a mere perversion of the early Soviets, or Stalinism as the absolute opposite of that early workers' state.

To get back to Hegel and Lenin's notes on Hegel, Lenin is quite impressed with Hegel's Analysis of the Law of Appearance, the World of Appearance and the World-in-Itself, and the Dissolution of Appearance, which are the subsections of Chapter II of this section.

Lenin keeps stressing at this point "the remarkably materialistic" analysis that flows from this objective analysis which will, of course, become the basis of Marx's analysis of the economic laws of capitalism, and when Hegel writes "Law, then, is essential appearance" (p. 133), Lenin concludes, "Ergo, Law and Essence of Concept are homogeneous (of one order) or, more correctly, uniform, expressing the deepening of man's knowledge of Appearance, the world, etc." Finally, "The essence here is that both the World of Appearance and the World which is in and for itself are essentially moments of knowledge of nature by man, stages, changes or deepening (of knowledge). The movement of the world in itself ever further and further from the world of appearance--that is what is not yet visible in Hegel. NB. Do not the 'moments' of conception with Hegel have significance of 'moments' of transition?"

Chapter III: Essential Relation

"The truth of Appearance is Essential Relation." (Hegel II, p. 142)

The relationship of the Whole and the Parts, you may recall from my various lectures on Hegel, has to me been a key, not merely to this section of Hegel, but to the entire philosophy of both Hegel and Marx. Thus, when I say that the whole is not only the sum total of the parts, but has a pull on the parts that are not yet there, even as the future has a pull on the present, it is obvious that we have moved from Abstract philosophic conceptions to the actual world, and from the actual world back again to philosophy, but this time as enriched by the actual.

As Hegel puts it, "the Whole and the Parts therefore condition each other" (p. 145), "the Whole is equal to the Parts and the Parts to the Whole...But further, although the Whole is equal to the Parts, it is not equal to them as Parts; the Whole is reflected unity." (p. 146) "Thus, the Relation of Whole and Parts has passed over into a Relation of Force and its Manifestation." (p. 147) Indeed, we will move from that to the relation of Outer and Inner, which will become the transition to Substance and Actuality.

On the relationship of Outer and Inner, Lenin stresses what he calls "the unexpected slipping in of the criteria of Hegel's Dialectic"--where Hegel notes that the relationship of Inner and Outer is apparent "in every natural, scientific, and, generally intellectual development" (p. 157)--and Lenin concludes, therefore, "that is where lies the seed of the deep truth in the mystical balderdash of Hegelianism!"

Section Three: Actuality

The introductory note will stress that "Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence...This unity of Inner and Outer is Absolute Actuality." He will divide Actuality into Possibility and Necessity as the "formal moments" of the Absolute, or its reflection. And finally, the unity of this Absolute and its reflection will become the Absolute Relation "or, rather, the Absolute as relation to itself,--Substance." (p. 160) At this point in the Preliminary Note, Lenin gets quite peeved at the idealist in Hegel and he divides the expression on p. 162, that "there is no becoming in the Absolute," into two sentences by stating "and other nonsense about the Absolute." But, as usual, it will not be long before Lenin is full of praise of Hegel and his section on Actuality.

To me, the most important part of Chapter I of Section Three, the Absolute, is the Observation (pp. 167-172) on the philosophy of Spinoza: "Determinateness is negation--this is the absolute principle of Spinoza's philosophy, and this true and simple insight is the foundation of the absolute unity of Substance. But Spinoza does not pass on beyond negation as determinateness or quality to a recognition of it as absolute, that is, self-negating, negation." (p. 168) Hegel's conclusion is that though the dialectic is in it until Spinoza gets to Substance, it there stops: "Substance lacks the principle of Personality." And again later (p. 170) Hegel writes: "In a similar manner in the Oriental idea of emanation the Absolute is self-illuminating light."

From now on, the polemical movement in Logic will take a very subordinate place; the observations will do the same. Indeed, for the rest of the entire work, Hegel will have only two observations, as contrasted to the beginning of the Science of Logic, where after but one single page on Being, he had no less than four observations (really five when you consider the one on Transcendence of Becoming) which took up no less than twenty-three pages. In a word, the closer he approaches the Notion, especially the Absolute Idea, that is to say, the climax of his system as it has been comprehensively and profoundly developed both historically and polemically, the more he has absorbed all that is of value in the other systems of philosophy, rejected that which is not, and presented a truly objective world-view of history and philosophy, which contains the elements of a future society inherent in the present. (We will return to this point at the end.)

Of Chapter II on Actuality, the categories dealt with--Contingency, or formal Actuality, Possibility and Necessity--are all to pave the way to Chapter III, the Absolute Relation, which is the apex of the Doctrine of Essence and will bring us to the Notion.

Lenin begins to free himself of any residue of taking the empiric concrete as the Real or Actual. Near the question of the relationship of Substantiality and Causality, Lenin writes: "On the one hand, we must deepen the knowledge of matter to the knowledge (to the concept) of substance, in order to find the causes of appearance. On the other hand, actual knowledge of causes is the deepening of knowledge from externality of appearance to substance. Two types of examples should explain this: (1) out of the history of natural science and (2) from the history of philosophy. More precisely: not 'examples' should be here--comparison n'est pas raison,--but the quintessence of the one and the other history--the history of technique."

A couple of pages later, Lenin will note that Hegel "fully leads up to History under Causality" and again, that the ordinary understanding of Causality fails to see that it is "only a small part of the universal connection," and that the small part is not subjective, but the objectively real connection. Indeed, Lenin very nearly makes fun, along with Hegel, of course, of Cause and Effect. Where Hegel wrote, "Effect therefore is necessary just because it is manifestation of Cause, or because it is that Necessity which is Cause" (p. 192), Lenin noted that, of course, both Cause and Effect are "only Moments of the universal interdependence, of the universal concatenation of events, only links in the chain of the development of Matter." And by the time he has finished with this chapter and met up with Hegel's definition of the next and final part of the Logic, the Notion, "the Realm of Subjectivity or of Freedom" (p. 205), Lenin translates this without any self-consciousness over the word "Subjective," as follows: "NB--Freedom = subjectivity ('or') goal, consciousness, striving."

It is important to note that Herbert Marcuse in his Reason and Revolution also chooses this, not only as the climax, which it is, to the Doctrine of Essence, but more or less as the Essence of the Whole of Hegelian philosophy. Thus, on p. 153, he states, "Without a grasp of the distinction between Reality and Actuality, Hegel's philosophy is meaningless in its decisive principles."

Volume II: Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion

With the Notion, we reach, at one and the same time, that which in philosophic terms is oldest, most written about, and purely intellectualistic; and, from a Marxist point of view, least written about, most "feared" as idealistic, unreal, "pure" thought--in a word, a closed ontology.

And yet it is the Doctrine of the Notion that develops the categories of Freedom, and, therefore, should mean the objective and subjective means whereby a new society is born; it is true that consciously for Hegel this was done only in thought, while in life contradictions persisted. But what was for Hegel consciously does not explain away the objective pull of the future on the present, and the present as history (the French Revolution for Hegel), and not just as the status quo of an existing state. Be that as it might, let's follow Hegel himself.

Before we reach Section One, there is the Introductory "On the Notion in General." We will meet in Lenin constant references to Marx's Capital from now on. Thus, in this early section, Lenin notes that Hegel is entirely right as against Kant on the question of Thought not separating from Truth, but going toward it, as it emerges from the Concrete and moves to the Abstract: "Abstraction of matter, of natural law, of value, etc., in a word, all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truer, fuller. From living

observation to abstract thinking, and from this to practice--such is the dialectic road to knowledge of truth, the knowledge of objective reality. Kant degrades knowledge in order to make place for belief; Hegel elevates knowledge believing that knowledge is knowledge of God. The materialist elevates knowledge of matter, of nature, throwing God and the philosophic rabble defending him into the dung-heap."

The section to which Lenin refers in Hegel is from p. 226: "It will always remain a matter for astonishment how the Kantian philosophy knew that relation of thought to sensuous existence, where it halted, for a merely relative relation of bare appearance, and fully acknowledged and asserted a higher unity of the two in the Idea in general, and, particularly, in the idea of an intuitive understanding; but yet stopped dead at this relative relation and at the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separated from reality; so that it affirmed as true what it pronounced to be finite knowledge, and declared to be superfluous and improper figments of thought that which it recognized as truth, and of which it established the definite notion." (p. 226)

It could also be said that Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and Kant's indifferent coexistence of Absolute and the Particular or Reason and Understanding coincide also in the fact that Kant does see a dialectical relationship between the two, unlike Leibniz, who saw only harmony arising from it.

Section One: Subjectivity

Chapter I: Notion

The forms of the Notion are: Universal, Particular, Individual. These three forms of Notion are the categories which express development in this entire book, even as in the Doctrine of Essence it was the categories of Identity, Difference and Contradiction; and in Being, it was Quantity, Quality and Measure, with this difference: that the movement in the Doctrine of the Notion from Universal to Particular to Individual could characterize the movement of all three books of the Science of Logic, thus, Being standing for Universal, Particular standing for Essence, and Individual standing for Notion.

It is this first meeting with U-P-I that makes Lenin say that it reminds him of Marx's first chapter in Capital. Not only that; he begins immediately thereafter (that is, after dealing with Chapter II--Judgement--and in the Approach to Chapter III on Syllogism) to make the famous aphorisms: (1) Relating to the relationship between Abstract and Concrete: "Just as the simple value form, the individual act of exchange of a given commodity with another already includes in undeveloped form all major contradictions of capitalism--so the simplest generalization, the first and simplest forming of notions (judgements, syllogisms, etc.) signifies the ever-greater knowledge of the objective world connections. Here it is necessary to seek the real sense, significance and role of Hegelian logic." (2) Where he rejects Plekhanov as a vulgar materialist, or at least for having criticized Kant only from a vulgar materialist point of view. (3) Where he includes himself when he says that all Marxists at the beginning of the twentieth century had done so. And (4) where he concludes that it is impossible to understand Capital without understanding the whole of Hegel's Logic. (The friends should re-read the whole chapter on Lenin in Marxism and Freedom.)

I have had to skip a great deal which at another time must be studied more carefully, both on the question of the Judgement--where Hegel lists four major forms and a total of twelve for a subsection--and the syllogism where we have three major sections, each containing four subsections. It is not only because I am hurrying to get to the sections which have not been dealt with in any great detail by Marxists, but also because for our age this section on Subjectivity is not the subjectivity which has absorbed all objectivity and which we will first read in the Absolute Idea. One phrase from the last paragraph in Hegel's section on the Syllogism will, however, be of the Essence: "The Syllogism is mediation--the complete Notion in its positedness." (Hegel II, p. 342) The key word is Mediation. It is of the Essence in all thought, as well as in all struggles. Indeed, it could be said that mediation is the conflict of forces. For example, all of Essence could be summed up in the word Mediation, or, if instead of Essence, you're thinking concretely of production in Capital, then of course it is production relations. So that what U-F-I does in showing the general movement in Logic, Mediation does in showing the concrete struggle and appears in all three books: in Being, it is Measure, which is, of course, the threshold of Essence; in Essence, it is Actuality, or more specifically, Causality which, as Reciprocity, brings us to the threshold of Notion; in Notion, it is Action, Practice, which supersedes Subjectivity of Purpose and thus achieves Unity of Theory and Practice.

Section Two: Objectivity.

The three chapters in this section--I, Mechanism; II, Chemism; III, Teleology--are devastating analyses of Bukharin's Historical Materialism over one hundred years before it was ever written. G. had a quite excellent, though a bit on the abstract side, thirteen-page analysis of Bukharin, whom she called the "philosopher of the abstract universal." It was written in October, 1949, and sometime or other should be studied since, as usual, with J. it got lost in the struggle.

For us, what is important is Lenin's profound understanding in 1915, as against the period when he gave the green light to vulgar materialism with his Materialism and Empiric-Criticism, of the fact that the mechanical, chemical and even teleological--that is to say, subjectively purposful--are no substitute for the self-developing subject. Lenin notes here that Hegel laid the basis for historical materialism, quoting Hegel's statement on p. 308: "In h's tools man possesses power over external nature, even although, according to his Ends, he frequently is subjected to it. But the End does not only remain outside the Mechanical process: it also preserves itself within it, and is its determination. The End, as the Notion which exists as free against the object and its process and is self-determining activity, equally is the truth which is in and for itself of Mechanism..."

Lenin further defends Hegel for his seeming strain to "subsume" the purposeful activity of man under the category of Logic because, as Lenin states it: "There is here a very deep content, purely materialistic. It is necessary to turn this around; the practical activity of man repeated billions of times must lead the consciousness of man to the repetition of the various logical figures in order that these can achieve the significance of an axiom."

I believe that Hegel here is criticizing what we will much later in history know as The Plan. Intellectual planning, or what Hegel would call "Self-Determination applied externally, is certainly no substitute for the self-developing subject, not even as idealistically expressed by Hegel in the Absolute Idea.

Section Three: The Idea

Lenin notes that the introductory section to this is very nearly the best description of the dialectic. It is in this section that we will go through Chapter I on Life; Chapter II on the Idea of Cognition, which will not only deal with Analytic and Synthetic Cognition, but will take up the question of Practice, Volition, the Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good; and finally, Chapter III on the Absolute Idea. It is the section in which Lenin will write, although he will not develop it, that "man's cognition not only reflects the world, but creates it." He will also stress over and over and over again totality, Interdependence of Notions or all Notions, Relationships, Transitions, Unity of Opposites and various ways of defining dialectics from the single expression that it is the transformation of one into its opposite, to the more elaborate threefold definition of dialectic, as including Determination, Contradiction and Unity; and finally, the sixteen-point definition of dialectic, which passes through Objectivity, Development, Struggle and finally Negation of the Negation. Lenin will also do a lot of "translations" of the word Idea, the word Absolute, which in some places he uses as no different than Objective, but in other places as the Unity of Objective and Subjective. It is obvious that Lenin is very greatly moved by the fact that Practice occupies so very great a place in Hegel, but feels that, nevertheless, this practice is limited to the theory of Knowledge. I do not believe so. (See my original letters on the Absolute Idea, May 12 and 20, 1953.)

Let's retrace our steps back to the beginning of this whole section on the Idea. On p. 396, Hegel argues against the expression "merely Ideas": now if thoughts are merely subjective and contingent they certainly have no further value... And if conversely the Idea is not to be rated as true because, with respect to phenomena, it is transcendent, and no object can be assigned to it, in the sensuous world, to which it conforms, this is a strange lack of understanding, for so the Idea is denied objective validity because it lacks that which constitutes appearance, or the untrue being of the objective world." Hegel gives Kant credit for having rejected this "vulgar appeal" to experience, and for having recognized the objective validity of thought--only to never have Thought and Reality meet. Hegel breaks down the Determinations of Idea as, first, Universal; second, a relationship of Subjectivity to Objectivity, which is an impulse to transcend the separation; and finally, the self-identity of Identity and Process so that "in the Idea the Notion reaches freedom..." (p. 399)

On that same page he states, in very materialistic terms indeed, that the "Idea has its reality in some kind of matter." Hegel will then take Idea through Life through what he calls the Idea of the True and the Good as Cognition and Volition.

In the Idea of Cognition, Hegel will inform us that his Phenomenology of Mind is a science which stands between Nature and Mind, which in a way seems contradictory since it has served as the "introduction" to his Logic, and he will further summarize it when he comes to the Philosophy of Mind.

He will hit out a great deal sharper at Jacobi than at Kant, although he gives Jacobi credit for showing that the Kantian method of demonstration is "simply bound within the circle of the rigid necessity of the finite, and that freedom (that is, the Notion, and whatever is true) lies beyond its sphere and scope." (p. 458)

But he gets less and less interested in other philosophers, the more he reaches the question of Freedom, Liberation, Unity of Theory and Practice: "In this result then Cognition is reconstructed and united with the Practical Idea; the actuality which is found as given is at the same time determined as the realized absolute end,--not however (as in inquiring Cognition) merely as objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, but as objective world whose inner ground and actual persistence is the Notion. This is the Absolute Idea." (p. 465)

This is because, in reaching this final chapter, the Absolute Idea, he is through with all that we would politically describe as "taking over"; that is to say, capitalism will develop all technology so perfectly for us that all the proletariat will have to do will be to "take over." As we reject this concept politically, Hegel rejects it philosophically. He has now so absorbed all the other systems that, far from taking over, he is first going back to a TOTALLY NEW BEGINNING.

Here is what I mean: Take a philosopher like Spinoza. Despite his profound dialectical understanding that "every determination is a negation," he went to God taking over. This concept of Absolute, Absolute Substance, Hegel rejects, even as he rejects the Absolute Ego of Fichte and Schelling, and the Absolute of the General Good Will of Kant. Note how every single time, in no matter which section of the Logic you take, Hegel reaches an absolute for that stage, he throws it aside to start out all over again. So that when he reaches the Notion, he is dealing with it as a new beginning after he rejected Absolute Substance, and that even his Notion has the dialectic of further development; indeed U, P, I is the absolute Mediation, or the development of the Logic. If, for example, we stop in the Absolute Idea at the expression: "the self-determination in which alone the Idea is, is to hear itself speak," we can see that the whole Logic (both logic and Logic) is a logic of self-determination and never more so than at the very point when you have reached an Absolute--say, growing internationalization of capital. You then go not to taking over, but breaking it down to the new beginning in the self-determination of nations; or when the state had reached the high stage of centralization, you most certainly do not go to taking over, but rather to the destruction of the state.

Hegel can reach these anticipations of the future because a very truly great step in philosophic cognition is made only when a new way of reaching freedom has become possible, as it had with the French Revolution. If at that point you do not cramp your thoughts, then you will first be amazed at how very close to Reality--the reality of the present which includes the elements of the future--thought really is.

To me, that is why Hegel makes so much of the method. It is not because that is all we get from Hegel--Method--but because the end and the means are absolutely inseparable. Thus, on p. 468, Hegel writes: "The method therefore is both soul and substance, and nothing is either conceived or known in its truth except in so far as it is completely subject to the method; it is the peculiar method of each individual fact because its activity is the Notion." It isn't true, for example, as Lenin stated, that Hegel ended this chapter at the point (p. 485) where Notion and Reality unite as Nature, which Lenin translated to mean as Practice. In this final paragraph, Hegel proceeds to show the link back from Nature to Mind, and of course we know that those two transitions were in themselves two full books. Or as Hegel puts it: "The transition here therefore must rather be taken to mean that the Idea freely releases itself in absolute self-security and self-repose. By reason of this freedom the form of its determinateness also is

utterly free--the externality of space and time which is absolutely for itself and without subjectivity." (p. 486)

Marcuse thinks that it is this statement about the Idea releasing itself freely as Nature, "this statement of putting the transition forward as an actual process in reality that offers great difficulty in the understanding of Hegel's system." But he himself doesn't attempt to overcome these difficulties. On the contrary, he disregards them, accepting the idea that it is a closed ontology and the best we can do is take this method and use it as a critical theory.

One thing is clear to me, that when Hegel wrote (p. 477) that the "transcendence of the opposition between Notion and Reality, and that unity which is the truth, rests upon this subjectivity alone," the subjectivity was certainly not to be that of the philosopher, despite all of Hegel's hopes that it would be, but that of a new, lower, deeper layer of "world spirit," or, to be specific, the proletariat and those freedom-fighters in backward Africa, who just will freedom so much that they make it come true. For what happens after, however, that truth must arise not only from the movement from Practice, but also that from Theory. The negation of the negation will not be a generality, not even the generality of a new society for the old, but the specific of self-liberation, which is the humanism of the human being, as well as his philosophy.

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THE LOGIC OF HEGEL

The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences

This book is known as the smaller Logic and since it is Hegel's own summation of the Science of Logic and very much easier to read than the latter, I will be very brief in summarizing its contents, concentrating almost exclusively on the sections which are not restatements of what is in the larger Logic, but which are new.

The first thing that is new is both the easy style and the different subject matter taken up in the Introduction. (Incidentally, I have a rather old edition* with different paginations than the current one, and, therefore, I will cite paragraph numbers, which are the same in all editions, rather than page numbers.)

The simplicity of the style is, of course, deceptive since it embodies as profound a theory as does the more involved style, and may lead one to think that he understands something, even though he doesn't see all of its implications. For example, Paragraph 2 defines philosophy as a "thinking view of things... a mode in which thinking becomes knowledge, rational and comprehensive knowledge." But if the reader would then think that philosophy is then no more than common sense, he would be a victim of the simple style. In actuality that very simple Introduction consisting of eighteen paragraphs is the ultimate in tracing through the development of philosophy from its first contact with religion through the Kantian revolution up to the Hegelian dialectic, and further, the whole relationship of thought to the objective world. Thus, look at the priceless formulation about "the separatist tendency" to divorce idea and reality: "This divorce between idea and reality is a favourite device of the analytic understanding in particular. Yet strangely in contrast with this separatist tendency, its own dreams, half-truths though they are, appear to the understanding something true and real; it prides itself on the imperative 'ought,' which it takes especial pleasure in prescribing on the field of politics. As if the world had waited on it to learn how it ought to be, and was not!" (par. 6)

That same paragraph expresses the most profound relationship of materialism to idealism and if you will recall both the chapter in Marxism and Freedom on the break in Lenin's thought which all hinged on a new relationship of the ideal to the real and vice versa, then this simple statement will be profoundly earth-shaking when you consider that it is an idealist who is saying it: "The idea is not so feeble as merely to have a right or an obligation to exist without actually existing."

Actuality, then, is Hegel's point of departure for thought as well as for the world and its institutions. So far as Hegel is concerned, his whole attitude to thought is the same as to experience, for in experience, says Hegel, "lies the unspeakably important truth that, in order to accept and believe any fact, we must be in contact with it." (par. 7) The whole point is that philosophy sprang from

* The Logic of Hegel, translated by William Wallace, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, London, Humphrey, Milford, 1892

the empirical sciences and, in fact, the empirical sciences themselves could not have progressed further if laws, general propositions, a theory had not resulted from them, and in turn pushed empirical facts forward.

You will be surprised to find that actually I "stole" from Hegel that sentence in Marxism and Freedom that created so much dispute among intellectuals, that there was nothing in thought, not even the thought of a genius, which had not previously been in the action of common man. The way Hegel expressed it was by saying that while it is true that "there is nothing in thought which has not been in sense and experience," the reverse is equally true. (par. 8)

The reason he opposes philosophy to empiricism, then, is not because we could do without the empirical, but because, in and of themselves: (1) those sciences lack a Universal, are indeterminate and, therefore, not expressly related to the Particular: "Both are external and accidental to each other, and it is the same with the particular facts which are brought into union: Each is external and accidental to the other." (par. 9) And (2) that the beginnings are not deduced; that is to say, you just begin somewhere without a necessity for so doing being apparent. (Cf. Larger Logic, Vol. II, Absolute Idea, "...no beginning so simple...") Of course, says Hegel, "To seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he has learned to swim." (par. 10) But, for any forward movement, one must then go from the empirical to the critical to the speculative philosophy.

Not only is Hegel empirical and historical ("In philosophy the latest birth of time is the result of all the systems that have preceded it, and must include their principles...." par. 13). But he insists that you cannot talk of Truth (with a capital T), that is to say, in generalities: "For the truth is concrete; that is, whilst it gives a bond and principle of unity, it also possesses an internal variety of development." (par. 14) In fact Hegel never wearies of saying that the truths of philosophy are valueless "apart from their interdependence and organic union...and must then be treated as baseless hypotheses or personal convictions."

Chapter Two--Preliminary Notion

You will note that this is something that Hegel would have opposed had someone asked him to state in a preliminary way what was his idea of notion at the time he wrote the Science of Logic and told you to wait to get to the end. In fact, Marx said the same thing in Capital when he insisted you must begin with the concrete commodity before you go off into general absolute laws. In this encyclopaedia, however, Hegel does give you a preview of what will follow. Some of it is in the form of extemporaneous remarks that he had made while delivering the written lectures. (All of the paragraphs which are in a smaller type than the regular text were spoken by Hegel and taken down by his "pupils.") He is showing the connection between thought and reality, not only in general, but in the specific so that you should understand how the Greek philosophers had become the antagonists of the old religion: "Philosophers were accordingly banished or put to death as revolutionists, who had subverted religion and the state, two things which were inseparable. Thought, in short, made itself a power in the real world..." (par. 19) The reference, of course, is to the execution of Socrates.

Interestingly enough, Hegel is not only rooted in History, but even in the simple energy that goes into thinking: "Nor is it unimportant to study thought even as a subjective energy." (par. 20) He then proceeds to trace the development of thought from Aristotle to Kant, the highest place, of course, being taken by

Aristotle: "When Aristotle summons the mind to rise to the dignity of that attitude, the dignity he seeks is won by letting slip all our individual opinions and prejudices, and submitting to the sway of the fact." (par. 23)

We get a good relationship of freedom to thought and the Logic in general into its various parts, thus: "For freedom it is necessary that we should feel no presence of something else which is not ourselves." He relates the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind, as a syllogism; "The syllogistic form is a universal form of all things. Everything that exists is a particular, a close unification of the universal and the singular." "If for instance we take the syllogism (not as it was understood in the old formal logic, but as its real value), we shall find it gives expression to the law that every particular thing is a middle term which fuses together the extremes of the universal and the singular."

While the Logic is what he called "the all-animating spirit of all the sciences," it is not the individual categories he is concerned with now, but the Absolute: "The Absolute is rather the ever-present, that present which, so long as we can think, we must, though without expressed consciousness of it, always carry with us and always use it. Language is the main depository of these types of thought..." (par. 24) He will not allow philosophy to be over-awed by religion, though he is a very religious man, but he insists over and over again "the mind is not mere instinct; on the contrary, it essentially involves the tendency to reasoning and meditation." He has a most remarkable explanation of the Fall of Man and the fact that ever since his expulsion from Paradise he has had to work by the sweat of his brow: "Touching work, we remark that while it is the result of the disunion, it also is the victory over it." (Note how very much like Marx the rest of the paragraph sounds.) "The beasts have nothing more to do but to pick up the materials required to satisfy their wants; man on the contrary can only satisfy his wants by transforming, and as it were originating the necessary means. Thus even in those outside things man is dealing with himself."

The last paragraph of this chapter (par. 25) deals with objective thought and decides that to really deal with it, a whole chapter is necessary and, in fact, the following three chapters are devoted to the three attitudes to objectivity.

Chapter Three--First Attitude of Thought Towards the Objective World

Everything in pre-Kantian thought from faith and abstract understanding through scholasticism, dogmatism and metaphysics is dealt with in the brief chapter of twelve pages. It is remarkable how easy it sounds when you consider the range of subjects taken up. This is something, moreover, that he has not done in the larger Logic. All the attitudes to objectivity are something that appear only in the smaller Logic.

Chapter Four--Second Attitude of Thought Towards the Objective World

This deals both with the empirical school and the critical philosophy. He notes that we could not have come from metaphysics to real philosophy, or from the Dark Ages to the epoch of capitalism without empirical studies and the shaking off of the bondage of mere faith. At the same time, the method of the empiricists' analysis is devastatingly criticized. Somewhere later he is to say that it is equivalent to think that you can cut off an arm from a body and still think you are dealing with a living subject, when you analyze that disjointed arm. Here he

states: "Empiricism labours under a delusion, if it supposes that, while analysing the objects, it leaves them as they were; it really transforms the concrete into an abstract....The error lies in forgetting that this is only one half of the process, and that the main point is the reunion of what has been divided." (par. 38) And finally in that same paragraph, he states: "So long then as this sensible sphere is and continues to be for Empiricism a mere datum, we have a doctrine of bondage; for we become free when we are confronted by no absolutely alien world, but by a fact which is our second self."

With the critical school, it is obvious that we have reached a revolution in thought and yet that it stopped being critical because of its divorce of thought from experience; "This view has at least the merit of giving a correct expression to the nature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man's endeavours is to understand the world, to appropriate and subdue it to himself; and to this end the positive reality of the world must be as it were crushed and squashed, in other words, idealized."

He further accuses Kant of having degraded Reason "to a finite and conditioned thing, to identify it with a mere stepping beyond the finite and conditioned range of understanding. The real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature....Absolute idealism, however, though it is far in advance of the vulgarly-realistic mind, is by no means merely restricted to philosophy." (par. 45)

He, therefore, considers Kant's system to be "dualistic" so that "the fundamental defect makes itself visible in the inconsistency of unifying at one moment what a moment before had been explained to be independent and incapable of unification." And yet his greatest criticism of Kant is that his philosophy fails to unify, that is to say, that its form of unification was completely external and not out of the inherent unity; "Now it is not because they are subjective that the categories are finite; they are finite by their very nature..." Note how in the end Hegel both separates and unites Kant and Fichte:

After all it was only formally that the Kantian system established the principle that thought acted spontaneously in forming its constitution. Into details of the manner and the extent of this self-determination of thought, Kant never went. It was Fichte who first noticed the omission; and who, after he had called attention to the want of a deduction for the categories, endeavored really to supply something of the kind. With Fichte, the 'Ego' is the starting-point in the philosophical development...Meanwhile, the nature of the impulse remains a stranger beyond our pale...What Kant calls the thing-by-itself, Fichte calls the impulse from without..." (par. 60)

Chapter Five--Third Attitude of Thought Towards the Objective World

To me, this chapter on what Hegel calls "Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge" and which is nearly entirely devoted to Jacobi, is the most important and essentially totally new as distinguished from the manner in which Hegel deals with the other schools of thought in his larger Logic. The newness comes not from the fact that he does not criticize Jacobi (and Fichte and Schelling), as devastatingly in the larger Logic, but in the sense that he has made a category out of it by devoting a chapter and by making that chapter occur when, to the ordinary mind, it

would have appeared that from Kant he should have gone to his own dialectical philosophy. Hegel is telling us that one doesn't necessarily go directly to a higher stage, but may suddenly face a throw-back to a former stage of philosophy, which thereby is utterly "reactionary." (That's his word, reactionary.)

The first critique of Jacobi's philosophy is the analysis that even faith must be proved; otherwise there would be no way to distinguish in anyone's say-so whether it is something as grandiose as Christianity, or as backward as the worshipping of an ox. No words can substitute for Hegel's:

The term Faith brings with it the special advantage of reminding us of the faith of the Christian religion; it seems to include Christian faith, or perhaps even to coincide with it; and thus the Philosophy of Faith has a thoroughly pious and Christian look, on the strength of which it takes the liberty of uttering its arbitrary dicta with greater pretensions to authority. But we must not let ourselves be deceived by the semblance surreptitiously secured by means of a merely verbal similarity. The two things are radically distinct. Firstly, Christian faith comprises in it a certain authority of the church; but the faith of Jacobi's philosophy has no other authority than that of the philosopher who revealed it. And, secondly, Christian faith is objective, with a great deal of substance in the shape of a system of knowledge and doctrine; while the contents of the philosophic faith are so utterly indefinite, that while its arms are open to receive the faith of the Christian, it equally includes a belief in the divinity of the Dalai Lama, the ox, or the monkey, thus, so far as it goes, narrowing Deity down to its simplest terms, to a Supreme Being. Faith itself, taken in the sense postulated by this system, is nothing but the sapless abstraction of immediate knowledge... (par. 63)

You may recall (those of you who were with us when we split from Johnson) that we used this attitude as the thorough embodiment of Johnsonism, and in particular the series of letters he issued on the fact that we must "break with the old" and stick only to the "new" without ever specifying what is old and what is new, either in a class context or even in an immediate historic frame. This is what Hegel calls "exclusion of mediation" and he rises to his highest height in his critique of Jacobi when he states: "Its distinctive doctrine is that immediate knowledge alone, to the total exclusion of mediation, can possess a content which is true." (par. 65) He further expands this thought (par. 71):

The one-sidedness of the intuitional school has certain characteristics attending upon it, which we shall proceed to point out in their main features, now that we have discussed the fundamental principle. The first of these corollaries is as follows. Since the criterion of truth is found, not in the character of the content, but in the fact of consciousness, all alleged truth has no other basis than subjective knowledge and the assertion that we discover a certain fact in our consciousness. What we discover in our own consciousness is thus exaggerated into a fact of the consciousness of all, and even passed off for the very nature of the mind.

A few paragraphs later (par. 76) is where Hegel uses the term "reactionary" --"reactionary nature of the school of Jacobi. His doctrine is a return to the modern starting point of the metaphysic in the Cartesian Philosophy." You must remember that Hegel praises Descartes as the starting point of philosophy, and even shows a justification for any metaphysical points in it just because it had broken new ground. But what he cannot forgive is that in his own period, after we had already reached Kantian philosophy, one should turn backward:

The modern doctrine on the one hand makes no change in the Cartesian method of the usual scientific knowledge, and conducts on the same plan the experimental and finite sciences that have sprung from it. But, on the other hand, when it comes to the science which has infinity for its scope, it throws aside the method, and thus, as it knows no other, it rejects all methods. It abandons itself to the control of a wild, capricious and fantastic dogmatism, to a moral priggishness and pride of feeling, or to an excessive opinion and reasoning which is loudest against philosophy and philosophic themes. Philosophy of course tolerates no mere assertions, or conceits, or arbitrary fluctuations of inference to and fro. (par. 77)

Chapter Six--The Proximate Notion of Logic with its Subdivision

This is the last chapter before we get into the three major divisions of the Logic itself. In a word, it took Hegel six chapters, or 132 pages, to introduce the Logic which will occupy, in this abbreviated form, a little less than 200 pages. On the other hand, this smaller Logic will be such easy sailing, especially for anyone who has grappled with the Larger one, that you will almost think that you are reading a novel and, indeed, I will spend very little time on the summation because I believe you are getting ready to read it for yourself now.

To get back to the Proximate Notion, Hegel at once informs you that the three stages of logical doctrine--(1) Abstract or Mere Understanding; (2) Dialectical or Negative Reason; (3) Speculative or Positive Reason--apply in fact to every logical reality, every notion and truth whatever.

There are places where Hegel is quite humorous about the dialectic as it is degraded for winning debater's points: "Often too, Dialectic is nothing more than a subjective see-saw of arguments pro and con, where the absence of sterling thought is disguised by the subtlety which gives birth to such arguments." (par. 81) And yet it is precisely in this paragraph where he gives the simplest and profoundest definition of what dialectic is, thus: "Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work." Over and over again, Hegel lays stress on the necessity to prove what one claims, and the essence of proof is that something has developed of necessity in such and such a manner, that it has been through both a historic and a self-relationship which has move it from what it was "in itself" (implicitly), through a "for itself-ness" (a process of mediation or development or suffering), to what it finally is "in and for itself" (explicitly). Or put yet another way, from potentiality to actuality, or the realization of all that is inherent in it. Finally, here is the simple way: Logic is subdivided into three parts: I. The

Doctrine of Being; II. The Doctrine of Essence; III. The Doctrine of Notion and Idea. That is, into the Theory of Thought: I. In its immediacy (the notion implicit and, as it were, in germ); II. In its reflection and mediation (the being-for-self and show of the notion); III. In its return into itself, and its being all to itself (the notion in and for itself... "For in philosophy, to prove means to show how the subject by and from itself makes itself what it is").

Chapter Seven--First Subdivision of Logic--The Doctrine of Being

I will not go into the separate categories of Quality, Quantity, Measure or the question of Being, Nothing and Becoming. Instead, all I will do here is point to the examples from the history of philosophy so that you get a feeling for yourself about the specificity of his thinking and realize that his abstractions are not abstractions at all. Two things, for example, from the section on Quality will speak for themselves:

In the history of philosophy the different stages of the logical Idea assume the shape of successive systems, each of which is based on a particular definition of the Absolute. As the logical Idea is seen to unfold itself in a process from the abstract to the concrete, so in the history of philosophy the earliest systems are the most abstract, and thus at the same time have least in them. The relation too of the earlier to the later systems of philosophy is much like the relation of the earlier to the later stages of the logical Idea: in other words, the former are preserved in the latter, but in a subordinate and functional position. This is the true meaning of a much misunderstood phenomenon in the history of philosophy--the refutation of one system by another, of an earlier by a later... (par. 86) Opinion, with its usual want of thought, believes that specific things are positive throughout, and retains them fast under the form of Being. Mere Being, however, is not the end of the matter.

Remember that the sections in the smaller type are the ones that Hegel quotes orally and then you will get a view of his response to his audience when, say, they would look with blank faces when he would speak of something like "Being-for-self." And now read the following:

The Atomic philosophy forms a vital stage in the historical growth of the Idea. The principle of that system may be described as Being-for-self in the shape of the Many. At present, students of nature who are anxious to avoid metaphysics turn a favourable ear to Atomism. But it is not possible to escape metaphysics and cease to trace nature back to terms of thought, by throwing ourselves into the arms of Atomism. The atom, in fact, is itself a thought; and hence the theory which holds matter to consist of atoms is a metaphysical theory. Newton gave physics an express warning to beware of metaphysics, it is true; but, to his honour be it said, he did not by any means obey his own warning. The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do not think; while man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician. (Read the rest of paragraph 93 for yourself--it is too important to miss.)

Chapter Eight--Second Subdivision of Logic--The Doctrine of Essence

Here again I will not go into the categories such as Identity, Difference, Contradiction, etc., all of which I dealt with when summarizing the L.L. and which you will find comparatively easy to read here. What interests me are the so-called examples and once in awhile the easy definitions like "The aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and to learn the necessity of things." (par. 118) So we go back to the historical basis which always throws an extra illumination on the generalization that follows, thus: "The Sophists came forward at a time when the Greeks had begun to grow dissatisfied with mere authority and tradition in the matter of morals and religion, and when they felt how needful it was to see that the sum of facts was due to the intervention and act of thought...Sophistry has nothing to do with what is taught: that may always be true. Sophistry lies in the formal circumstance of teaching it by grounds which are as available for attack as for defense." (par. 121)

I want to recommend the studying in full of the final part of this section called "Actuality." It is not a question only of content or its profound insistence on the relationship of actuality to thought and vice versa ("The idea is rather absolutely active, as well as actual"). It is a movement of and to freedom within every science, philosophy, and even class struggle (though Hegel, of course, never says that) that nevertheless must go through the actuality of necessity and the real world contradictions that are impossible to summarize in any briefer form than the eighteen paragraphs Hegel includes here. (pars. 142-159) You have heard me quote often the section on Necessity which ends with: "So long as a man is otherwise conscious that he is free, his harmony of soul and peace of mind will not be disturbed by disagreeable events. It is their view of Necessity, therefore, which is at the root of the content and discontent of men, and which in that way determines their destiny itself." Now you go to it and study those pages.

Chapter Nine--Third Subdivision of Logic--The Doctrine of the Notion

This last section of the Logic is the philosophic framework which most applies to our age. From the very start where he says "The Notion is the power of Substance in the fruition of its own being, and therefore, what is free," you know that on the one hand, from now on you are on your own and must constantly deepen his content through a materialistic, historical "translation." And, on the other hand, that you cannot do so unless you stand on his solid foundation: "The Notion, in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of Thought merged in it. It certainly is a form, but an infinite and creative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the plenitude of all that it contains." (par. 160)

I would like you to read the letter I wrote to Olga on Universal, Particular and Individual and then read Hegel on those categories, and you will see how little of his spirit I was able to transmit and how changeable are his own definitions. For example, he says, "Individual and Actual are the same thing... The Universal in its true and comprehensive meaning is one of those thoughts which demanded thousands of years before it entered into the consciousness of men." (par. 163) Just ponder on this single phrase "thousands of years."

These categories--Universal, Particular and Individual--are first described in the Notion as Notion, then they enter Judgement, then Syllogism, and then throughout to the end, and in each case they are not the same, and you can really

break your neck if you try to subsume them into a definitional form. They must not--will not--be fenced in. Hegel, himself, has something to say on this fencing in of the syllogism, for example, which in "common logic" is supposed to conclude so-called elemental theory, which is then followed by a so-called doctrine of method, which is supposed to show you how to apply what you learned in Part I: "It believes Thought to be a mere subjective and formal activity, and the objective fact, which confronts thought, it holds to be permanent and self-subsistent. But this dualism is a half-truth...It would be truer to say that it is subjectivity itself, which, as dialectical, breaks through its own barriers and develops itself to objectivity by means of the syllogism." (par. 192)

(I want to call to your attention that it is the last sentence in paragraph 212 which J. so badly misused in justifying our return to Trotskyism, Note that the quotation itself speaks of error as a necessary dynamic, whereas J. spoke of it as if it were the dynamic: "Error, or other-being, when it is unlifted and absorbed, is itself a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result." The phrase underlined was underlined by me in order to stress that J. had left it out.)

The final section on the Absolute Idea is extremely abbreviated and by no means gives you all that went into the Science of Logic, but it will serve, if you read it very carefully, to introduce you to its study in the L.L. I will quote only three thoughts from it:

The Absolute Idea is, in the first place, the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, and thus at the same time the unity of the idea of life with the idea of cognition...The defect of life lies in its being only the idea implicit or naturally: whereas cognition is an equally one-sided way, the merely conscious idea, or the idea for itself. The Unity... (par. 236)

It is certainly possible to indulge in a vast amount of senseless declamation about the idea absolute. But its true content is only the whole system of which we have been hitherto examining the development....(par. 237)

I love the expression that to get to philosophic thought one must be strong enough to ward off the incessant importance of one's own opinion:

The philosophical method is analytical, as well as synthetic...To that end, however, there is required an effort to keep off the ever-incessant impertinence of our own fancies and opinions. (par. 238)

The final sentence of the whole book in the smaller Logic is what pleased Lenin so highly that he wrote as if the Larger Logic ended the same way, stating that the "rest of the paragraph" wasn't significant. It is that "rest of the paragraph" in the L.L. around which the whole reason for my 1953 Letter on the Absolute Idea rests. The sentence Lenin liked because it held out a hand to materialism is: "We began with Being, abstract being: where we now are we also have the idea as Being: but this idea, which has Being is Nature." This is the oral remark which followed the written last sentence: "But the idea is absolutely free; and its freedom means that it does not merely pass over into life, or as finite cognition allow life to show in it, but in its own absolute truth resolves to let the 'moment' of its particularity, or of the first characterisation and other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflection, go forth freely itself from itself as Nature."

Raya Dunayevskaya, 2/15/61