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fromVol.III.p. 220: 3 stages of Metaphysics(aft Understanding)
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The Drd stage is the union 1 telef, which is to be brought about behild is the only subject interest, comes to consciousness abecomes obj.

p.167-In to Middle Ages it was chiefly the vergy, dts.of theology who occupied themselves with phi. In the transition per. the philosophers showed themselves to be in an inward warfare with themselves ain an external warfare with their surrounds atheir lives were spent in a wild unsettled fashion...

p.169****Thus in earlier times bravery was individual; while mod. bravery consists in each not acting after his own fashion, but relying on his connection with others.

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A Tidealism Ascepticism—Berkeley E. Positive Aspect.

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a) Oop. bet. Sensation & Thought b) Montasculeu

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p.172 (re Francis Bacon who represents the English) For they appear to constitute that people in Europe which. limited to the undestanding of actuality, is destined, like the class of shopkeepers swokmen in the State, to live always immersed in matter, ato have actuality but not reason as obj.

p.177: Bacon thus divides hugan learning according to the faculties of memory imaginations reason. . (1) Under memory he considers his (2) under imagination, poetry dart; (3) under reason, phil. 4

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* PART III* MODERN PHILOSOPHY

p.153: With the discovery of gunpowder the individual passion of battle was lost. The romantic impulse towards a casual kind of bravery passed into other adventures, not of hate or revenge, or the so-called deliverance from what men considered the propose of innoceance but more harmless adventures. Introduction. p.159 wrongs of innocence, but more harmless adventures, the apploration of the earth, or the discovery of the passage the maploration of the carth, or the discovery of the passage to the East Indies. [America was discovered] its treasures epeople man, man himself; navigation was the higher romance of commerce. The present world was again present to man as worthy of the interests of mind; Thinking mind was again capable of action. Now the Reformation of buther had inevitably to come.

******* p.160Here thought is more independent, and thus we tash therefrom, just as with the Cks it separated itself from these forms again afill the mythological conceptions with the

p.166 with Descartes phil. of modern times as abstract thought properly speaking begins.

In 2nd place we have to consider negation, destruction of this metaphysicas—the attempt to consider knowledge padds pwd-act.&

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The 3rd stage is the union itslef, which is to be brought about & discharge the only subj. of interest, comes to consciousness & decomes obj.

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Ch.II--Transition Period

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p.409 the sequence of these (Kant, Fichte, Schelling philosophies shows the course which thought has taken. " Lection 3-RECENT GER. PHIL. 409ff B. Kant A. Jacobi C. Fichts (pp. 479-512) D. Schelling, E.Final Result p.409: In this great epoch of the world's his., whose inmost escaped is laid hole of in the philof his. (2) netions only have played a parts the Ber. athe Fr., athis in spire of their absolute opp., or rather because they are so opposite...

In Ger. this principle has burst forth as thought, spirit, Notion in Fr., in the form of actuality. The form into which Phil.has in Jacobi's case finally (fallen) which is that immediacy is grasped as absolute, manifests a lack of all critical faculty, of (all) logic. the Kantian philis the recognition of freedom. Even Rousseau represented the absolute to be found in freedom. Kant has the same principle, but taken rather from the no.426: "Theoretically the Kantian Phil. is the 'Illumination' or Aughlerung Feduca to the thod; it states that nothing true can be known, but only the phonomenal; it leads to knowledge into consciousness caelf-consciousness but from this standpoint maintains it to be a subj. Efinite theoretic side. " p. 479 (Fighte) this phil. is the Kantian phil. in its completion/p. 481 : Fighte's phil is thus the dev. of form in itself. fot indiv. but Notion of indiv; not Ego as both ego and as God. actuality but the Nop.499: The deficiency in the Fichtian phil.is thus latly that the ego retains the significance of the indiv. actual self-consciousness, as opposed to that which is universal or absolute, or ... tion of actuality 1ection p. 525: What is (knoking) in Schelling is thus the fact that the point or indifference of subl acbi-ity or the Notion of reason is absolutely (pre supposed without any attempt being made at showing that this CECHELLING: INTELLAINTUITION is the truth... and travelland p. 526: "In phil. when we desire to establish a position, demand proof. But if we begin with intell. intuition, that constitutes an oracle to which assulption intuition, that constitutes an oracle to which where given way, since the existence of intell.

Intuition was made our postulate. ""

Wp. 543: "UNSPIRITUAL FARPAGO OF WORDS" # Schelling's phil/ EFinal result, pp. 545-564 (see separate page) p. 5192 "On the one Schelling's vatem is related to the phil. of Fichted on the other hand, he, like dacobl, makes his principle immediate knowledge—the intelligent inuitive perception makes raikwhankakrankhimmekix
p. 544 locke's phil. "is combined with foolish self-conceit into the bargain." the bargain. " 14686

(Helgel: History of Phil.)

To this point the World-spirit has come, and each stage has its own form in the true system of Philosophy; nothing to lost, all principles are preserved, since Philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms. This concrete idea is the result of the strivings of spirit during almost twenty-five centurates of earnest work to become objective to itself, to know itself:

Tantae molis erat, se ipsam cognoscere mentem.

All this time was required to produce the philsophy of our day; so tardily end slowly did the World-spirit work to reach this goal. What we pass in racid review when we recall it, stretched itself out in reality to this great length of invested with its entire concrete development, its external subsistence, its wealth, is striving to bring spirit to perfection, to make progress itself and to develop from spirit. It goes ever on and on, because spirit is progress alone. Spirit often seems to have forgotten and lost itself, but inwardly opposed to itself, it is inwardly working ever forward (as when Hamellt says of the ghoot of his father will said, old mole: canst work if the ground so fast? In until grown strong in itself it bursts assunder the crust of earth which divided it from the sum, its Notlon, so that the earth crumbles away. It such a time, when the encircling crust, like a soulless decaying tenement, chumbles away, and spirit displays itself arrayed in new youth! the seven league boots are at length adopted. This work of the spirit to know itself, this activity to find itself, is the life of the spirit and the spirit itself. Its result is the Notion which it takes up of itself; the history of Philosophy te acrevelation of what has been the aim of spirit throughout its history; it is therefore the world's history in the imperment signification. This work of the history is the stages of reality; and there fore no philosophy oversteps its own time. The impertance which the determinations of thought possessed is another matter, which does not belong to the history of Philosophy. These Notions are the simplest revelation of the World spirit; In their more concrete form they are history!

We must, therefore, in the first place not esteem lightly what spirit has won, namely its gains up to the present day. Ancient Philosophy is to be reverenced as necessary, and as a link in this sacred chain, but all the same nothing more than a link. The present is the highest stage reached. In the second place, all the various philosophies are no mere fashionable theories of the time, or anything of a similar nature; they are neither chance products nor the blaze of a fire

1. Hamelt, Act L. Scene V.

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of straw, nor casual eruptions here and there, but a spiritual, reasonable, forward advance) they are of necessity one Philosophy in its development, the revelation of God, as He knows Himself to be. Where several philosphies appear at the same time, they are different alles which make up one totality forming their basis; and on account of their one-sidedness we see the refutation of the one by theother. In the third place we do not find here feeble little efforts to establish or to criticies this or that particular point; instead of that, each philosophy sees up a new principle of its own, another must be recognized.

If we glance at the main epochs in the whole history of Philosophy, and grasp the necessary succession of stages in the leading moments, each of which eloresses a determinate Idea, wefind that effect the Oriental whirl of subjectivity, which attains to no intelligibility and therefore to no subsistence, the light of thought dawned among the Greeks.

l. The philosophy of the ancients had the boolute Idea as its thought; and the realization or reality of the same consisted in comprehending the existing present world, and regarding it as it is in its absolute nature. This philosophy did not make its starting-point the Idea itself, but proceeded from the objective as from something given, and transformed the same into the Idea; the Reing of Parmenides.

2. Abstract thought, tous, become known to itself as universal essence of existence, not as subjective thought; the Universal of Plato.

3. In Aristotle the Notion emerges free and unconstrained, as comprehending thought, permeating and spiritualising all the forms which the universe contains.

4. The Notion as subject its independence, its inwardness, abstract separation, is represented by the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics) here we have not the Free, concrete form, but universality abstract and in itself formal.

5. The thought of totality, the intelligible world, is the concrete Idea as we have seen it with the Neo-Platonists. This principle is ideality generally speaking, which is present in all reality but not the Idea which knows itself: this is not reached until the principle of subjectivity, individuality, found a place in it, and God as spirit became actual to Himself in felf-consciousness. pecame actual to nimber. in self-consciousness.

this idea as spirit, as the idea that known itself. In order to proceed from the conscious idea to the self-conscious, we must have the infinite opicition, namely the fact that the idea has come to the consciousness of being absolutery quadered in twin. As spirit had the thought of objective existence, Philosophy thus perfected the intellectuality of the world, and produced this spiritual world as an object existing beyond prenant reslity, like Mature, —the first creation of spirit. The work of the spirit now consisted in bringing this keyond back to reality, and guiding it into calf-consciousness. This is accomplished byy self-consciousness thinking itself, and recognizing absolute existence to be the self-consciousness that thinks itself. With Descartes pure thought directed itself on that separation which we spoke of above. Self-consciousness, in the first place, thinks of itself as consciousness; therein is contained all objective reality (and the positive, intuitive reference of its reality to the other side. It is beinoza Taought and Being are opposed and yet identical; he has the intuitive perception of substance, but the knowledge of substance in his case is external. We have here the principle of reconciliation taking its rise from thought as such, in order to abrogate the subjectivity of thought; this is the case in Leibnitz's monac, which possesses the power of representation.

7. In the second place, self-consciousness thinks of itself as being self-consciousness; in being self-conscious it is independent, but still in this independence it

7. In the second place, self-consciousness thinks of itself as being self-consciousness; in being self-conscious it is independent, but still in this independence it has a negative relation to what is outside self-consciousness. This is infinite subjectivity, which appears at one time (as) the oritique of thought in the case of fant another time, in the case of Fichte, as the tendency or impulse towards the concrete. Absolute, pure, infinite form is expressed as self-consciousness, the Ego.

8. This is a light that breaks forth on spiritual substance, and shows absolute content and absolute form to be identical; --substance is in itself identical with knowledge. Self-consciousness thus, in the third place, recognizes its positive relation as its negative, and its negative as its positive, --or, in other words, recognizes these opposite activities as the same, i.e. it recognizes pure Thought or Being as self-identity, and this again as separation. This is intellectual perception; but it is requisite in order that it should be in truth intellectual that it should not be that merely immediate perception of the eternal and the divine which we hear of, but should be absolute knowledge. This intuitive perception which does not recognize itself is taken as starting-point as if it were absolutely presupposed; it has in itself

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intuitive perception only as immediate knowledge, and not as self-knowledge; or it knows nothing, and what it perceives it does not really know, -- for, taken at its best it consists of beautiful thoughts but not knowledge.

perceives it does not really know,—for, taken at its best it consists of beautiful thoughts but not knowledge.

But intellectual intuition is knowledge, since, in the opposed sides from the other, all external reality is known as internal. If it is known according to its essence, as it is, it shows itself as not existing of itself, but as essentially congiting in the movement of transition. In Heraclitean of Sceptical principle, individual thing, and thus in this consciousness—that the essence of each thing lies in determination, in what is unity with its opposite. Simplerly this unity is, in the Gecond place, to be recognized even in its essence; over into its opposite, or to realize itself, to become for itself something different; and thus the opposition into its opposition, in the Chiral place, that it is prought about by itself lagain, it may be said of the opposition, in the Chiral place, that it is eternal, &c. This is, however, itself an abstraction in only, another opposition is apprehended in a one-sided manner (supra, 2.556); but in fact it is form, as the essential mother has a constitute in the Absolute is apprehended in a one-sided manner of the measure of the Absolute. This abstraction in the Absolute is apprehended in a one-sided manner (supra, 2.556); but in fact it is form, as the essential mother, and that opposition is not the unrecting advanced to the opposition of the Absolute is prehended in a not the unrecting abscrive; the true reconciliation of the opposition is the perception that this opposition, when pushed to its absclute extreme, resolves itself; as schelling sayo, in themselves, but eternal life consists in the very troucles are in themselves identical—and not only in themselves, but eternal life consists in the very troucles are in themselves the troucles and ont only in themselves, but eternal life consists in the very troucles of the knowledge of this unity in its whole development by means of itself.

This is then the demand of all time and of Philosophy.

A new epoch has arisen in the world. It would appear as from itself all alies objective existence, and apprehending itself at last as absolute Spirit, in developing from itself what for its is objective, and keeping it within its own power, yet remaining at rest all the while.

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The strife of the finite self-consciousness with the absolute self-consciousness, which last seemed to the ciner to lie outside of itself, now comes to an end.

Finite self-consciousness has ceased to be finite; and lift this way absolute self-consciousness has on the other hand, atteined to the reality which it looked before. The inite is the whole history of the world incgeneral up the prisent time, and the history of Philosophy in particular, the sole work of which is to depict this etile. Now, indeed, it seems to have reached its goal, strife. Now, indeed, it seems to have reached its goal, when this absolute self-consciousness, which it had the work of representing, has beased to be align, and the work of representing, has beased to be align, and the spirit secordingly is realized as spirit. For it becomes such only as the result of its knowing itself to be absolute spirit, and this it knows in real scientific knowledge. Spirit produces itself as Nature, as the knowledge. Spirit produces itself as Nature, as the state; nature is its unconscious work, in the course of which it spears to itself something different, and not which it spears to itself something different, and not apprint; but in the State, in the deeds and life of Ilstory, as also of Art, it brings itself to pass with consciousness; it knows the various modes of the reality, yet they are only modes. It become then is the standpoint of the present day, and the series of spiritual forms is its only true existence. This them is the standpoint of the present day, and the series of spiritual forms is with it for the present concluded. The strife of the finite self-consciousness with the

The latest philosophy contains therefore those which went before; it embraces in itself all the different stages thereof; it is the product and result of those that preceded it. We can now, for example, be Platonists no longer. Moreover we must raise outvelves once for all above the pattinesses of individual opinions, thoughts, objections, and difficulties; and also above our own vanity, as if our individual thoughts were of any vanity, as if our individual thoughts were of any vanity, as if our individual thoughts were of any vanity, as if our individual thoughts were of any vanity, as if our individual thoughts were of any vanity, as if our individual thoughts were of any vanity, as individuals are like blind men, who are driven the whole, individuals are like blind men, who are driven the whole, individuals are like blind men, who are driven forward by the indwelling spirit of the whole. Our forward by the indwelling spirit of the whole. Our forward by the indwelling spirit, which in this way opposes as spirit, as absolute Spirit, which in this way opposes to itself another spirit, the finite, the principle of which is to know absolute spirit, in order that absolute spirit may become existent for it. I have tried to spirit may become existent for it. I have tried to severally may become existent for it. I have tried to successive spiritual forms perfaining to Philosophy in its progress, and to indicate the connection between its progress, and to indicate the connection between them. This series is the true kingdom of spirits, the them. In series is the true kingdom of spirits, the office of the winderstand thereby that one of its members merely follows on another; but in the very process of merely follows on another; but in the very process of coming to the knowledge of itself it is transformed into 14691

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