

to 5/21/1949
Kerensky
Apehan
Method
Sis Cont
I'm now going over some...
Logic in the German. It is an experience.

IN THE GERMAN ORIGINAL THE EMPHSES ARE CONTINUALLY, CONTINUALLY, CONTINUALLY ON SELF & MOVEMENT. The actual underlined, italicized emphases. Reading the English ed. give you an entirely different impression, entirely different. The ques. therefore is why did Plekhanov who must have read it in German miss that completely? why did Lenin let in 1914 grasp that... historic reason.

What does Plekhanov do? He explains instead of explaining his. by ideas, he explains his. by (eco. dev.) For the matter of the 18th c. Fr. etc. he substitutes (eco. dev.) For individual men he substitutes social man. For static reflection, he substitutes (eco. dev.) reflection or explanation. But the method remains explanation. Explanation is contemplation. You look at at

obj. & say that it is the cause of something else. (But the obj. never moves of itself by its own negativity, creating dev. g. with its own dialectic. It remains a ding-an-sich. Hegel is through with the method of explanation. & by 1915 so is Lenin. See notes, p.17.

There are certain nodes points I am concerned with. The section on the Infinite, I, pp.161-9 then the transition to Being-for Self & to Quah. I feel that Lenin, notes, p.16 was trying to get at something there, couldn't quite make it & that we can make it today. Why are ex. of dial. always from the realm of Being?

They what is the difference between Hegel's concept of Ground & his concept of Abs. Substance. I don't think this is an academic ques. If we can break the back of these, I think we can do the commentary on the Logic, stage by stage, a wonderful beginning for which is the Nevada document. We have to do that, or have it clear in our minds for Marcuse. He has some pretty good ideas on it, but he didn't quite make it. We have to take it further. Bet. Being-for-Self & Essence intervenes quantity. Bet. Ground & Abs. Substance intervenes Existence, Appearance, Actuality. I think it is the diff. bet. bourgeois rev. & socialist rev., bet. Plekhanov & Lenin, bet. vulgar & dial. mat. And what made it clear for I was 2nd Int., as today Stalinism makes it clear for us.

RE Bukharin, p.2

From beginning to end, Bukharin is admittedly writing sociology explaining general laws of human evolution for which for him apply to all particular historical forms. For him sociology has a truth ind. & prior to history. "If, for ex., sociology est. the general doctrine that the forms of gov't. depend on the forms of eco., the historian must seek & find, in any given epoch, precisely what are the relations & must show what is their concrete specific expression.

"History furnishes the material for drawing sociological conclusions & making sociological generalisations, for those conclusions are not made up of whole cloth, but are drawn from the actual facts of his. Sociology in its turn formulates a definite point of view, a means of investigation, or as we now say, a method for his."

THIS is in diametrical oppo. to the Hegelian & Marxist method. Hegel would say that this is the synthetic method of abstract identity, requiring that all given material come from external reflection.

Wm. J. ...

Lenin, from the moment that he begins his notes on Hegel, is constantly reiterating that the forms are not external & attached to the content. (e.g. Notes, p. 4)

At the very end he reaffirms the unity of deductive & inductive in CAPITAL. Marx, at the moment he begins his critical study of relative s.v., insists on the unity of his logical. (p. 353)

At the very end in Vol III, p. 1030 he says: "The conception which regards only the conditions of distribution historically, but not the conditions of production, rests on a misconception, an identity of the process of social prod., with the simple labor process, such as might be performed by an abnormally situated human being without any social assistance. To the extent that the l.p. is a simple process bet. man & nature, its simple elements remain the same in all social forms of dev. Every historical form of the process develops more & more its material foundations & social forms."

Bukharin begins with the concept of law as uniformity & regularity. With this abstract conception of law, there can be included under law (the following are actual exs. which NB uses) the dev. of wkg. class under cap., cap. crises, night following day, the relative increase in quan. of beer consumed annually in Bavaria & loss of break not going on pine trees, p. 20.

Contrast this conception of law to Hegel's conception (pp. 128ff). At a given stage in the dev. of a society based on contradiction, the phenomena or immediate existents "appear" i.e., they are no longer in & for themselves but only posited (p. 128) Hence they have in themselves the negativity of Reflection which is the nature of essence, i.e., the contradictions in the immediate phenomena, the necessity of transition into opposite appears.

Law is the reduction (NB this concept of reduction) of this negativity to self-identity & indifference to external content. The realm of laws is the quiescent content of Appearance, Appearance is this same content but presents itself in unquiet change as Reflection into other. It is Law as Negative & just changing Existence, the movement of transition into opp., of self-transcendence & regress into unity. Law does not contain this side on UNquiet Form or of negativity. Appearance, therefore, as against Law, is the totality for it contains Law, but also more, namely the moment of Self-moving Form." (III, 133-134)

Since Law is not based upon the self-moving Form, its content is only empirically derived & a proof is still required, that is, a mediation for cognition, that the law not only operates but is necessary. The Law as such does not contain this proof & its obj. necessity. Consequently, Law is only the positive & not the negative essentiality of Appearance.

In the latter the content determinations are moments of Form, as such pass over into their other, & in themselves are just as much not themselves but their other. In Law then the positedness of one side is the positedness of the other, but yet their content is indifferent to this relation, & in itself, does not contain this positedness. Consequently, altho Law is essential Form, it is not yet Real Form, reflected into its sides as Content." (p. 134)

NB the emphasis upon this fetishism of law in Lenin's notes, p. 36 Capital cannot be understood without this concept of Hegel. In CAP. what Marx attacks in Smith & Ricardo is precisely the reduction of the form of value with its contradictions & transition into opp., to the law

Handwritten notes in a circle

Handwritten notes on the left margin

Phenomena are posited, appear in name of

Reflection

Appearance

Smith, Ricardo, Law, Form, Value

Resonance from the ...

Handwritten initials

Handwritten note: Red. Mediation

Handwritten note: not only ...

PROCESS

of value, or determination of value by labor-time. Throughout Marx deals with the form of appearance (Erscheinungsform) of the process of self-expansion of value, i.e., the contradictory self-movement of cap.

Thus the essence of Hegel's attack on the method of abstract use. The latter collapses mediation into immediacy, self-relating negativity into immediate self-relation, it equalized mediation & transforms it into immediate identity.

Bukharin, having est'd this abstract conception of law, begins immediately, almost as if he were following step by step Hegel's analysis of the method he is employing to ask: "If uniformity may be observed in the phenomena of nature & society, we may well ask what is this uniformity?" (p.21) i.e., he has to begin looking around empirically for content.

Bukharin can conceive of 2 types of uniformity: teleology & cause. His hostility to self-activity or self-determination is absolute. Teleology for him is conscious purpose. Causality, for him, is one event, cause, being followed by another event, effect.

His thinking is confined with these categories, - the 1st that of intell. planning, (what Hegel calls self-determination applied only externally, (p.391) the 2nd that of uniformed matter. In this respect he has not moved from the ancient greek dichotomy of form & matter, philosophers & slaves. As with all vulgar materialism there is for him "no diff. at all in regard bet. the social sciences & the sciences concerned with nature." (p.29) He is thus trapped in the fundamental alienation of philosophers in class society of identifying men & things.

On the basis of this identification the law of the centralisation of cap... is not an 'empirical law' but a real law of natural science. "If prod. units are competing with large ones, the victory of the latter is inevitable." (p.50)

IN THIS RESPECT NOTE WHAT HE TELLS HE CALLS THE TENDENCY TO TOTALITY IS MECHANISM. (p.376)

His degradation... of the specificity of a particular form of appearance to an abstract identity with an earlier stage absolutely precludes any comprehension of the process of centralisation of cap. as the specific form of appearance of cap. Anything in cap. society which is not characteristic of Nature thus becomes the product of reflection.

The essential diff. bet. Lenin of 1908 & the Lenin of 1915, or bet. vulgar mat. & dial. mat may be seen in Hegel's analysis of the relation bet. mechanism & teleology.

The basic premise of mechanism is the ind. of the Thing-in-itself, its Obj-ity. (p.347) Objectivity is the collapse into immediacy of the self-relating negativity of the Notion.

collapse into immediacy

Bukharin presupposed the Thing-in-itself

On the basis of this, he has only one fundamental dichotomy;

Handwritten notes on the left margin: (2) Hegel's Conceptualism, H. totally, 12. Mechanism, Specificity, 1908, 1915, Obj-ity, collapse, self-relating negativity, 1908, 1915, Bukharin's mechanism, 1908-1915 = collapse into immediacy.

Syllogism - Negativity

ignorance & knowledge. The difference bet. unorg'd. society & org'd. Communist society, his opposites, is that in the former, "the result obtained (social phenomena) does not coincide with the wishes of many persons. Or as M. & E. frequently said, social phenomena are ind. of the consciousness, the feeling & the will of individuals." (p. 39) In Communist society, "all the relations bet. men will be obvious to each & the social relation will be org. of all their wills....." (p. 41)

Hegel in 1909 expressed precisely this point of view in the most fundamental terms, describing dialectics as the dev. from ignorance to knowledge, or of what is in itself into what is for us. p. 77.

What is presupposed in this concept is the ind. of the Thing-in-itself. Kant is attacked not for the conception of the Thing-in-itself, but only for his skepticism regarding the possibility of ever knowing the Thing-in-itself. (pp. 84, 89, 99, 242)

Such a conception of the Thing-in-itself is necessarily complemented by a conception of the end as subjective, i.e., mechanism as external relation & indiff. of objects, is the other side of the coin to teleology as based upon an extra-mundane understanding. (pp. 374-5) Hegel, in fact, the concept of end is arrived at from the conception of mechanism. (p. 380) Hence, it remains infected with the idea of an external, opposed world, which it presupposes, but it also contains a higher truth, namely, determination of the manifoldness of the objects by a unity which is in & for itself.

pp. 376: "Adequacy to End now manifests itself in the 1st place as something higher in general, as an understanding which externally determines the manifolded.... In Mechanism they become essential thru the mere form of necessity.... But in teleology the content becomes imp. for Teleology presupposes a Notion, that is, something determinate in & for itself & THEREFORE self-determining."

This indiff. to specific content on the part of Mechanism precludes a recognition of the historical specificity of the prol., & requires a recognition of the his. specificity of the prol. requires the identification of the prol. with all sorts of trivial exs. The exs. NB used in his discussion of teleology & mechanism are such trivialities as heads & tails, a circle of people who have org'd. to sing together (pp. 41-3) with such trivial exs.

as Hegel so rightly says, mechanism seems to offer more freedom than teleology. (pp. 376-377) On the other hand, content is decisive to a dial. conception of teleology.

H: "Thus the End-Rel. is more than Judgment; it is the Syllogism of the ind. & free Notion, which thru Obj-ity binds itself together with itself."

How can this binding together of objectivity with itself be accomplished At 1st "the end is the subj. Notion as essential tendency & impulse towards external self-positing. In this process, it is saved from transition." (p. 381) Having reached itself from Obj-ity & THEREFORE at 1st only in its immediacy, it is at 1st "finite, altho formally it is infinite." (p. 382)

It can only overcome this subj-ity & finiteness by proceeding to cancel the presupposition of the End--that is, the immediacy of the Obj. & to posit the Obj. as determined thru the Notion. This negative attitude of the Object is equally a negative attitude to itself, a cancellation of the subj-ity of the End." (pp. 382-3) By doing this, End becomes transformed from a mere impulse & tendency into an ACTIVITY. P 386

Syllogism
Notion
2 obj-ity
Circle
Hegel
p 386

...that Hegel, as Lenin realized in 1915, began to lay down the premises of his mat., i.e., a transformation of the sub-ity of purpose by means of a neg. negating the obj. Opp. of subj. end to external obj. is only 1st negation (p. 387) 2nd negation takes place THRU the means in this case bet. 1st & 2nd negation we have the relation bet. vulgar mat. & the vulgar materialist never gets beyond opp. of subj. end to external obj.

At 1st Notion & Obj-ity are connected only externally in the Means, which insofar is a merely mechanical obj. of the end & contains its activity, then the mechanism which here operates is also self-return of obj-ity into the Notion, which, however is already presupposed as End, insofar the negative attitude to the obj. & the activity insofar the negative attitude to the obj. of the activity which is adequate to the end is not external, but is the change & the trans-obj-ity in itself into the End. (p. 387)

And as Hegel goes on to say: "The Means however is the external middle of the syllogism which is the realization of the end, ... In his tools man possesses power over external nature, even altho according to his Ends, he frequently is subjected to it."

"But the end does not only remain outside the Mechanical process; it also preserves itself within it & is its determination, ... but the simple abstraction of determinateness in its truth is the totality of the negative--the concrete Notion which posits externality within itself." (p. 388) ... This (1915 L) ... conception of instruments of labor is the only conception which enables us to escape preoccupation with determination of magnitude of value which in turn leads immediately to preoccupation with problems of distribution."

To sum up so far: We have the rel. bet. abstract & concrete the following forms:

- 1) Abstract & Concrete: Rev. as an abstraction
- 2) " " : Law as abstraction to which appearance is reduced
- 3) " " : Natural science as an abstraction to which human activity is reduced
- 4) " " : Abstract understanding super-imposed on concrete.
- 5) " " : Remaining at 1st negation & not going on to 2nd negation, contemplation & calculation vs. productive negativity.

nd of 1/78 Enkeby there was a third letter - since there is p. 6 & only other p. I have is

6 (9/15 p/13)

New

All the pitfalls involved in subsuming dial. mat. under vulgar mat. leap to the eye as soon as Bukharin begins to deal with Society (GH, IV) He begins the ch. by introducing us to the individual as if it were like anything else: "We encounter not only simple bodies, which at once impress us as constituting units (for ex., a sheet of paper, as Mr. Tom Smith) but also meet with compound units, intricate material bonds (p. 83(84?))"

It sounds incredible, this identification of a sheet of paper & a cow, but there it is in bl. & wh. & in i. & c. of all the positivism of bourgeois thinking.....

Thus, NB's presupposition from which he never moves is the div. of labor in society, i.e., pvt. labor. What relates this pvt. labor to the mkt. outside the workers? "All these wkrs., peasants, colonial slaves, even engineers, overseers, foremen, organizers are placed in various corners of the globe... And when masses of commodities pass from one country to another, from factory mkt.... all this constitutes material bond bet. all these persons." (p. 91)

As for what Marx calls div. of labor in the workshop, this, according to NB, is the rel. of individuals in time & space. "In other words, they are distributed thru the factory as distinct physical bodies; they are therefore in certain physical, material relations in time & space.... men give out energy & turn out a material product... also having its 'psychological' aspect" (p. 91)

Bukharin does not even begin to suspect the "essential" distinction which Marx makes bet. div. of labor in society & div. of labor in workshop. (I, p. 389) neither planned despotism over men "who form mere parts of a total mechanism belonging to the capitalist", nor Marx's transition from vulgar to dial. mat., revealing that the mechanism of the workers in the div. of labor of cap. prod. is a form of self-estrangement.

ALSO PART OF NB's Letter?

Logically, NB's thinking is in terms of a movement of a more integrated absolute substance -- Lenin's is in terms of a NEW BEGINNING which will determine the end.

1915, Dec: They are both against KK's conception of ultra-imp. By 1916, he is writing his own book & taking issue with Bukh. all over the place. *Because Messing also in his work except p. 14. Or perhaps in 1914 Eastern Europe*

Now for some abstract observations: I think NB's is using the method of thought of Essence--Identity, Opp. Ground, all going to Abs. Substance. Then at the end the prol. takes over this abs. substance.

Hence, to be noted & carefully thought out is the way that Hegel deals with the Notion of the BEGINNING, after Abs. Substance.

deals with Spinoza, Leibniz & Kant of the Notion insists that the dialectic of the realm of Notion is the movement of U, P, and I, rather than as in Being--Qual., Quan., & Measure; & in Essence--Identity, Opp. Ground, and Actuality.

THE ... beginning point = 02 =

I suspect that the his. content of the logical forms of Universality, Particularity & Individuality is U--Christianity, P--Bourgeois Democ., Individuality--Socialism.

I suspect also that in the dev. from Judgment to Syllogism is combined the dev. from the party of 1900 to Soviets of 1917. The Syllogism destroys opp. bet. sub-ity & obj-ity.

The polemic in the realm of the Notion... is against... the U int'd fixed particular (i.e. the U must be posited as P, but if the P is posited as U, the diff. becomes isolated as... also against destroying the individuality of the modes by getting to the abs. like a shot out of a pistol.

Development is absolute mediation of the U, P, I. Isn't this the Logic of Self-determination when growing internationalization? Destruction of state machine when bourgeois state has reached highest stage of org?

Incl. dev. of commodity prod. in Draft Program when state-monopoly cap. reached Brast-Litovsk. NEP when prol. state owns m.p. etc.etc.

From S-C WR; Elite Party ~~must~~ seeks to place... at disposal of party as prol. is at disposal of cap.

+ re Pablo-Germain end of any phil. method most serious of all theories of retrogression.

Gripped most terrible of all logics the logic of empiricism.

undisciplined verbiage --shifting generalization.

Handwritten notes: will... as that... open... capital...

History
Causality

P. 376
H deals with
totality Mechanics

P. 391
collapsing
potential

miell. S
only P
MS

With historical
context

Synthetic
identity
given

NB thought sociology, & did, a method

Low on NBs concept
is not negativity
of self-being

But not i negativity - as against Law Appearance & truth for us
C. system both N - negativity, etc.