

FROM HEGEL TO NIETSCHE, the revolution in 19th c. thought  
 by Karl Löwith  
 (Translated from Ger. by David E. Green, Holt, Rinehart & Winston,  
 NY, 1964; 1st ed. in Zurich 1941; foreword by author signed Sendai, Japan,  
 Spring 1939)

THIS IS ABSOLUTELY THE MOST BEAUTIFUL AND PROFOUND WORK ON HEGEL AND  
 MARK DESPITE HIS ANTI-MARKISM & IN A GREAT SENSE ALSO ANTI OR AT LEAST  
 NON-HEGELIANISM AND TOTALLY PRO-CHRISTIANITY. Such profound understanding  
 of "enemies" is certainly not true of a single person writing nowadays.

Foreword, "In contrast to academic petrification of Hegel's system by  
 scholars of Hegel...  
 vi"...even if only to be able to transcend an age as an age, a point of view is  
 necessary which will transcend the bare events of the age...  
 The process of shift of meaning is never concluded, because, in his, it  
 is never determined at the beginning what will result at the end. The  
 purpose of these studies is solely to point out the decisive turning point bet.  
 Hegel's consummation & Nietzsche's new beginning, in order, with the light of the  
 present, to illumine the epoch-making significance of an episode which has  
 fallen into oblivion."

PART ONE

I The Eschatological Meaning of Hegel's Consummation of the  
 His. of the World & the Spirit

p.31: "For Hegel, the his. of phil. is not a process parallel to or outside of the  
 world, but the 'heart of world his.' that dominates both equally is the  
 Absolute in the form of 'world spirit', the essence of which is movement, & hence  
 his. & historical-political discussions

unconditioned power of his. is presented as 'time which conquers all.' & 'primal  
 of itself in every form, either crude or highly developed, but in any case,  
 follows phenomenology, as the his. of the unfolding of the spirit of the cultural  
 p.32 stages of knowledge, here the systematic stages of thought & his. relationships are  
 even more inseparable, since they have no empirically determined relationship,  
 but rather interpenetrate."

p.32: "On the principle of freedom of the spirit Hegel also constructs  
 the his. of the world with a view toward a fulfilled end."

p.35: "But because Hegel displaces the Christian expectation of the end of  
 the world of time into the course of the world process & the absoluteness of  
 faith into the rational realm of his., it is only logical for him to understand  
 the last great event in the his. of the world & the spirit as the consummation  
 of the beginning."

Q Hegel, Briefe, I, 194 (p.403, ftn38) "when the realm of ideas has been revolutionized,  
 reality can no longer resist."

Opp. 43.

Q Heine: "The heads which phil. has used for reflection can be  
 cut off later by the rev. for whatever purposes it likes. But  
 phil. would never have been able to use the heads cut off by the  
 rev. if the latter had preceded it."

Handwritten notes on the left margin: "Hegel's system is a system of world history", "Hegel's system is a system of world history", "Hegel's system is a system of world history".

Handwritten notes on the right margin: "Hegel's system is a system of world history", "Hegel's system is a system of world history", "Hegel's system is a system of world history".

Handwritten note: "World spirit is an absolute".

Handwritten note: "Phil. is a system of world history".

Handwritten note: "Beyn".

Handwritten note: "Q".

With Reason

after conclusion

II. Old Hegelians, Young Hegelians, Neo-Hegelians  
Lb with calls attention to Mr's view of div. of world of theory & practice into 2  
c.K. Marx (1818-1883) mutually exclusive totalities

p.92: "Of all the leftwing Hegelians, he was not only  
the most radical, but also the only one who was  
a match for Hegel in conceptual acuity & also  
in erudition. How well schooled he is in Hegel  
is shown less by his early writings referring directly to Hegel, which were  
influenced by Feuerbach, than by Das Kapital. The analyses presented in this  
wk., altho far removed from Hegel in content, are unthinkable without the incor-  
poration of Hegel's manner of reducing a phenomenon to a notion."

Mr's  
p.92: "His 1st & also last criticism of Hegel begins with an antithesis to  
Hegel's consummation. The ques. which moves Mr in his dissertation concerns  
the possibility of a new beginning after that conclusion."

Here Lb with quotes from Marx's doctoral dissertation: "Greek phil. seems  
to encounter what a good tragedy should not encounter: a feeble ending.  
With Aristotle, the Macedonian Alexander of Greek phil., the obj. his  
of phil. in Greece comes to a halt. Epicureans, Stoics, skeptics, all seem an  
inappropriate postscript, completely out of proportion to their mighty premises."  
1/1/13 (then, after showing that "decomposition products" of Gr. phil. became

p.93  
archetypes of Roman spirit, Mr continues: "Furthermore, is it not  
a remarkable phenomenon that new systems appear after the Platonic  
& Aristotelian philosophers who made phil. all-inclusive, systems  
which do not depend upon these previous ample intellectual forms,  
but rather, reaching further back, turn to the simplest schools:  
in physics, to the natural philosophers; in ethics, to the Socratic school?"

(Then, after the parallel to Hegel & what can come after his  
all-incl. system? Obviously, only after a radical disengagement  
of Hegel's phil. through a "suspension" of it which will also  
"realize" it. Lb with summarizes Mr, thusly: "PHIL. IS ALWAYS

SUCH A 'NODAL POINT' WHEN its abstract principle has become totally concrete, as  
in the case of Aristotle & Hegel. Then the possibility of cont'd. dev. in a  
straight line is interrupted; a full circle has been described. 2 totalities now  
stand confronting each other: an all-incl. phil. & opposite it, the actual world of  
complete non-phil. For H's reconciliation with reality was not within reality,  
but only with it, in the element of comprehension. Now phil. must turn outward  
& engage the world." (p.95) For Hegel's principle is also Mr's principle (the unity

of reason & reality, & reality itself as a union of  
essence & existence. Therefore, Mr is forced to attack  
in 2 directions: against the real world & against existing phil.  
This is so because he seeks to unite both in an all-incl. totality of theory &  
practice." Q Mr: "Here we can see the curriculum vitae of a phil. narrowed down  
to its subj. point, just as the death of a hero can be  
made to tell the story of his life."

As a  
rational  
this  
thought  
he has  
made  
change  
change  
change  
change

2 totalities  
1/1/13  
7/12/15  
no accident  
the critic  
order  
by the young  
branch into  
present from  
Opp. L  
back  
future

Reality = ...

From p. 3 to p. 3 (Stn/p. 186 re Kierkegaard; his uniqueness of this movement cannot be pinned down by such vague terms as "irrationalism" (not a mere byproduct of his pol.-eco. analyses; they are p. 98 re Mr's his. studies: "they are an essential component of his basic conception of the entire human world as being historical...")

p. 99: "With regard to the role of phil. in reality, Marx took up a 2-fold position: he opposed the practical demand of a simple negation of phil.... The one side believes that Ger. phil. does not belong to reality & would like to abrogate phil. without realizing it. True criticism must do both. It is a critical analysis of the modern state at the same time a dissolution of prev. pol. consciousness; the final, most universal expression of which is H's phil. of right.... (p. 100) This duality in Mr's evaluation of Ger. phil. & reality differentiates him from both Old & Young Hegelianism, which still lacked the practical or material viewpoint necessary for the comprehension of the real his. of the world."

Q Mr's Ger. Ideology (section on Feuerbach re Young Hegelians): "Their polemic against Hegel & against each other is limited to the fact that each takes a page of the Hegelian system & turns it against the whole as well as against the pages taken out by the others."

Lowith also recognizes effect of Marx's discovery on his opponents as well as followers: "In opposition to this entire Ger. ideology, Mr developed his materialist view of his, which has since determined the thought of non-Marxist anti-Marxists more than they themselves realize" Q Mr against "abstract empiricists" & their "lifeless facts." "Marx declares this conditionality of all his existence alone to be unconditional. Hegel's metaphysics of the his. of the spirit is developed THEREBY TO THE MOST EXTREME POSITION POSSIBLE, MADE TEMPORAL & PLACED IN THE SERVICE OF HIS." [p. 115] He term *existenz* & *schleier* (NB NB NB Lowith is also excellent on Kierkegaard p. 110ff: "If Kierkegaard is not taken as a mere 'exception' but as an outstanding phenomenon WITHIN the his. movement of his age, it becomes clear that his 'INDIVIDUALITY' WAS NOT AT ALL INDIVIDUAL, but a widespread reaction to the contemporary condition of the world.")

See part on Schelling on p. 115f & listeners to his 1841 Berlin lecture incl. Kierkegaard, Bakunin, Engels & Brecht & on p. 118: "In Schelling, the problem of being in the anti-Hegelian movement arrived at the point where Heidegger once more took it up. For who could deny that the 'facticity' of Dasein which lies in the brute fact of Dasein, that Geworfenheit & Entwurf correspond to "immediate existence" & "breaking away" from this necessary accident?

p. 204 p. 414: "Only 1 (inadequate) attempt has been made to work out the his. connection bet. Heidegger's phil. position & that of both Kierkegaard & Mr: the essays of M. Beck & H. Marcuse in the special issue devoted to Heidegger's Sein und Zeit of Philosophische Hefte No. 1 (Berlin, 1928) Feb 1948

Re "exhaustion" of Hegelian phil. & return to Kant, p. 120: "Seen in the context of the real total course of the century, however, this apparently so unmotivated return to Kant can be explained: THE BOURGEOIS INTELLIGENTSIA HAD CEASED IN PRACTICE TO BE AN HISTORICALLY ORIENTED CLASS, thereby losing the initiative & impact of their thought."

Refurbishing of Hegelian Phil. by the Neg-Hegelians, B. Croce's distinction bet. "dead" (re not only phil. of nature & religion but logic) & living (obj. spirit) to the extent that its abs. systematic claim can be reduced to an his. claim: [p. 120]

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From H to N - p.4

p.166 When you Hegel says the spirit is dead, it is not the spirit of the world, but the spirit of the world of men.

Contrary to all expectations, Hegel seems to be resurrected. After no new printing for 80 yrs Logic appeared in 2 new complete editions posthumous wks. published together with commentary on early wks + Hegel lexicon & LIT. WHICH ALREADY PASSED COUNTING. p.66

Die Key...  
Hegel's...  
1910

Hegel Society & Hegel Congresses

2nd & 3rd Hegel Congresses (1931) attended both by Kroner & Lunacharsky!!!

as against the forgetting of Hegelianism in Ger. in Russia the Hegelianism of the '40s, in the form of Marxism-Leninism, underwent continuous dev. down to the present & MADE HIS. In '31 3 congresses on occasion of centenary of Hegel's death, in Moscow & others in Rome & Berlin. In spite of their mutual antipathy, they belonged together as had the Hegelian right & left of the previous century. That these 2 dogmatic & mutually opposed critics of Hegel were both under the spell of his concepts demonstrates the power of the spirit which could produce such extremes.

p.152c The difference bet. Hegel's "system of wants" & Mx's "criticism of pol. eco." is shown by the fact that Mx attacks as an alienation of man from himself what Hegel views as a positive component of all activity: self-renunciation. The result of this movement (in Hegel's view) of the spirit is mediation at every stage bet. its own being & all other beings, a tendency to become proportionate to itself in the otherness of its own being. (SL 123) (In contrast to Hegel's view of mod. domestic vs. slave) Marx concludes from the system of prod. that really exists that even a "particular" activity can surrender the entire man, even tho he legally his own master since nobody compels him to sell his labor. (p.153) For Marx the wage earner incorporates the problem of bourgeois society, the eco. nature of which consists in the production of a depersonalized world of merchandise.

p.154: "A phenomenological analysis of this universal problem is given in the 1st part of Das Kapital in which Marx exhibits the mercantile character of merchandise where Mx used commodity. He sees revealed the basic ontological structure of our entire physical world. Its commodity form value form. (Here Lowith refers reader to Lukacs after which for "the human" point, instead of more fun, in Mx, Lowith goes back to 1842 debate on theft of woods. (NB NB Lowith also refers back to dissertation where Mx called alienation, "externality" as "materialism" & hence referred to himself as idealist. Then to Gbt. Ideology. Thence to fetish form of commodities.)

In "Estrangement as the Source of Hegel's Reconciliation" Lowith traces Hegel's reconciliation with that which is, where in 1st system, Sept. 14, 1800 he decides upon "agreement with the age" Nevertheless estrangement remains presupposition. The other presupposition is only as the predetermined goal. Same at Berner Frankfurt. "Hegel experienced this 2-fold presupposition of the absolute as the primary source of the need for phil." Then comes Hegel's analysis of world crisis in an epoch of transition. (p.163) Hegel anticipated many features of that criticism which Marx developed fully later."

p.165 Hegel "How blind are those who would like to believe in the continued existence & endurance of institution, constitutions, laws which no longer agree with the needs of mankind, from which spirit has fled."

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John...  
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From N. P. 2

Part Two Studies in the His. of the Bourgeois-Christian World  
I. The Problem of Bourgeois Society  
II. The Problem of Work

p. 274 Lowith says that the 1844 MSS. "together with the Ger. Ideology is the most significant event in the His. of post-Hegelian phil."

- Lowith's (or his translator's) translation of Mx is worth noting; (ftn. (re Fern ch.) 1. The object as such presents itself to the consciousness as vanishing.
2. The alienation of self-consciousness produces reification.
  3. This alienation has a positive meaning as well as negative.
  4. It has the aspect of the obj. of its self-removal, has the positive meaning, or comes to know the worthlessness of the same, through its alienation of itself as an obj. or as the object for the sake of the inseparable unity of prosely.
  5. It has this meaning not only for us or in itself but for its own self.

6. This also implies the converse aspect; it likewise abolishes & refacts this alienation & objectification, thus keeping its otherness as such."

And in the text itself Lowith summarizes Marx's position, thus (p. 279): Hegel's self-consciousness flatters itself with the illusion that its active knowledge in its otherness has reconstituted the self, because it knows nothing of any real externality; it knows only a recoverable alienation of itself. But the fact that self-consciousness is at one with itself in its own otherness means that man possesses his true human nature in the existing order of law, politics & economics. The merely theoretical abolition of alienation in practice leaves the alienated world exactly as it is. Hegel's apparent criticism which formally denies the existing powers while actually assuming their content is a false positive. A phil. dissolution & restoration of empirical reality... What he describes is not a human process at all: it is divine process within man, & its actual subj. is A. I."

And Lowith even sees the true nature of materialism as Marx conceives it: "Material existence of real men & things...." But Lowith insists that, when he turns to Marx's statement that the obj. conditions must 1st be abolished to achieve wholeness of man, "this incidental modification which turns 'abolition' into destruction differentiates Marx methodologically from Hegel, & to this extent represents a basic divergence; for the rest, he takes over H's CATEGORIES & PRESENCE (REV. IN MATERIAL FORM, EVEN IN CAPITAL." (Reference is to I, 1, 6. Also ft. 62 on p. 436: CAP. III, 166, "This reduction of dial. negation to a one-sided concept of simple destruction is typical of the radicalism of all the leftwing Hegelians...." But the way Hegel, not Lowith is very profound also on sociology & even defends, in a way, Engels's claim to the prol. being heir to Ger. phil., saying "However repugnant this statement might appear to bourgeois phil., it was not without foundation. Ever since the turn of the 19th it has been the basic weakness of bourgeois education that it has been the education of an educated class, bldg. a wall of separation against the wkg. class closing the spiritual horizon for the universal problem of work." AND THE FTN. 73 (p. 436) is to Heidegger's concept of care, which, "in accordance with its theological origin in Augustine's cura, HAS NO CREATIVE OVERTONES."

Lowith's remark (p. 289) that Hegel still considered humanistic education that which educated man for life in the polis reminds me of Marx's quotation from H. on education in a ft. in CAP., where he says it is curious for a bourgeois to say that he says about educ. & everyman, but hurrah, etc. He calls von Humboldt's "humanism" "aristocratic educ. individualism."

III. The Problem of Education

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NB While in Ger. H underwent eclipse "in Russia the Hegelianism of the 40s in the form of Biblical Marxism, Leninism, underwent accontinuous dev. down to the present. made his (p.135)

Phil in service of his essence

\*\*\*\*\*  
Q Mx I, p. 668: "it is therefore the duty of his, the beyond of truth having vanished, to est. the truth of this world. Philosophy is in the service of his. Its primary duty, once the sacred image of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in all its unholy forms..." Together with phil. eco. criticism stands in the service of his. THIS IS THE STARTING POINT FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF HEGEL'S PECULIARLY "HIS." MAT. His historical studies... are not a mere by-product of his pol. eco. analyses; they are an essential component of his basic conception of the ENTIRE HUMAN WORLD AS BEING HIS."

Phil + Rest

p.99: With regard to the rel. of phil. to reality, Mx took up a bold position: he opposed the practical demand of a simple negation of phil., & also the merely theoretical criticism of the pol. party.. TRUE CRITICISM MUST DO BOTH..

p.102  
Q Mx on real his. -- I believe it is from Ger. Ideology.

Future Phil. will provide this

\*\*\*\*\*  
P. 128: "Hegel did not claim absolute validity for system; rather, as a result of his HIS. knowledge, he was more the master of systematic thought than any before or after him. In his unification of all previous his. the accent does NOT lie on the 'previous', accented by Kroner, as the no. ref. to the FUTURE were intended. RATHER, the accent is on the other: 'true far now', that is 'finally', the world spirit has come, and this entirely is deliberate goal..."

Phil in service of his essence  
this was anticipated

p.129: He, more than anyone else, encounters the present in an his. context based on the recollected past. IT IS NOT ACCIDENT THAT HIS IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS CARRIED THEIR PHIL. INTO AN ANTICIPATED FUTURE, only to view their own per. from that point of view as "his." in the opposite sense of the word.

While H brought into the PRESENT what had been & what come to be in the past, the criticism of the existing order by the Young Hegelians brought into the present, from the opposite direction, the task of the future...

like an ever present aspect of IMMANENT actuality

p.129: "the absolute claim can be explained from the fact that H lived in the consciousness of having grasped the absolute (for the 1st time) as it SHOULD be grasped IF IT IS TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON REALITY, namely, as 'constantly relativizing itself.' The absoluteness of his system would then consist in ABS. RELATIVISM, because Hegel, -- in contrast to Kant -- represents the ABSOLUTE AS AN EVER PRESENT SPIRIT, IMMANENT IN REALITY."

IMMANENT actuality

"In any case, a basic evaluation of H's meaning for the present has to proceed from the fact that he was the first to make phil. aware of itself as the thought of time; this thesis affect the ENTIRE REL. of phil. to his his. reality of our times. The JOINING of the temporal character of phil. to its substantial content guarantees the PERMANENT IMP. OF HEGEL. Every phil. is the self-consciousness of its age, but this does mean that it is a mere (p.130) mirror of its age, BUT RATHER THAT EVERY GENERATION MUST UNDERTAKE THE TASK OF PHIL. WITH NEW STRENGTH & IN ITS OWN WAY PRECISELY BECAUSE THERE IS NO philosophy perennis in any external sense of eternity... thus phil. becomes an eternally LIVING ACTIVITY... by viewing the past as having an effect on FUTURE, phil. becomes the consciousness of the age, & CONTINUITY becomes the principle of the his. process..."

NOT mere mirror of every task

p.133: For H the Fr. Rev. was the great event; but he intentionally overlooked the possibilities arising from it, even though in his own per. it was obvious that the AGE OF REVOLUTIONS WAS JUST BEGINNING."

Phil as living activity



My MS on SL (p. 19) a Memorandum (Edm. Subj. of P. 19)  
 MS 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

MS 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

his science of the way in which knowledge appears, their phen., ..alone." (p. 808)  
 as they manifest themselves;  
 So that His Science form know not only the recollection but the Golgotha of Abs Spirit/alone"

Lowith, summarizing Mx. (p. 277)  
 "Crucial for an understanding of H's viewpoint on w..."

is the phenomenology in whose various forms, and the same movement, appears again  
 (again) the dial. of consciousness & self-consciousness. By means of this "intell.  
 construction", whose principle is noble negation, Hegel ingeniously transcends real  
 human expression & alienation, depersonalization & estrangement. The phenomenological  
 movement therefore comes to an end with AI. Thus the entire his. of alienation &  
 the entire withdrawal of alienation are nothing but the his. of prod. of  
 abstract, i.e. abs., thought. (III. 2, 159) (TR) Estrangement, which is the actual  
 concern of alienation & its abolition, is conceived as the diff. bet. alienation  
 & its abolition, is conceived as the diff. bet. self-consciousness &  
 self-consciousness, bet. obj. & subj. within which the real, material contrasts & other  
 other contrasts & motions of these contrasts are merely manifestation, the hull; the  
 exoteric form of these contrasts which alone are of interest, which comprise the  
 sense of other, profane contrasts. It is not that human nature becomes depersonalized

"Like alienation, the appropriation of human abilities, considered as mere objects,  
 is simply a movement of thought.... The vindication of the obj. world of man... therefore  
 this appropriation or insight into this process, is brought forward by Hegel in such  
 a fashion that materiality, religion, pol. power, etc. are spiritual objects; for only  
 the spirit is the true form of the spirit is the thinking spirit."

.... Instead of returning to man our historically determined world of real objects  
 as self-generated, H dialectically equates the obj. of consciousness with self-  
 consciousness.... H's self-consciousness PLAYS ITSELF WITH THE ILLUSION THAT ITS  
 ACTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN ITS OTHERNESS has reconstituted the self, because it knows  
 nothing of real externality; it knows only a (RECOVERABLE ALIENATION OF ITSELF)  
 (Here Lowith refers to Mx's summation of AK & translated in rtn. 52, p. 435'2, The  
 alienation of self-consciousness produces petrification....)

self-consciousness is at one with itself in its own OTHERNESS means that man poses  
 his true human nature in the EXISTING ORDER OF LAW, POLITICS, & economics. The  
 merely theoretical abolition of alienation in practice leaves the alienated obj. world  
 exactly as it is. HEGEL'S APPARENT CRITICISM, WHICH FORMALLY DENIES THE EXISTING  
 POWERS WHILE ACTUALLY ASSUMING THEIR CONSENT IS A FALSE COSTIVISM, a phil.  
 dissolution & restoration of empirical reality.... What Hegel describes is not a  
 human process at all: it is a divine process within man & its actual subj. is AI.  
 "A corporeal man...."

ON THE BASIS OF HIS CRITICISM OF HEGELIAN SPIRITUALISM  
 MX DEVELOPED THIS "MAT. VIEW OF HISTORY AS THE ONLY TRUE NATURAL HIS.... The 1st formula-  
 tion of his mat. as a naturalistic humanism is determined by the criticism which takes  
 as its starting point, not the Abs. Spirit but 'anthropological nature.'.... Therefore  
 the real abolition of alienation (p. 280) cannot come about in a non-obj. or spiritualistic  
 fashion, but only through an 'obj. action' which alters EXISTING conditions.

"In spite of this basic reflection of the 'standpoint' of  
 Hegel's phenomenology, Mx's criticism is positive, recognizing H's distinctions  
 retaining them, & furthering their realization. "HEGEL'S PHEN. IS ??? HIS OWN HIDDEN  
 CRITICISM" TO THE EXTENT THAT IT PORTRAYS THE ALIENATION OF MAN--even if

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man appears only in the form of spirit, it contains within it  
the element of alienation. (frequently prepared & worked out in a manner  
which is transparent to the external standpoint, the unhappy consciousness, the honest  
consciousness, the struggle of the noble & the consciousness, etc. these individual  
sections contain, though in alienated form, the critical elements of  
SUCH AS RELIGION, THE STATE, BOURGEOIS LIFE, ETC. ENTIRE SPHERES

The greatness of H's phen. lies in the  
comprehension of 'man's self-generation' as a process... Thus H views work as  
man's development in 'proseity'//////Aside of from this positivism of idealistic  
speculation, H achieved an abstract understanding of the essential action of man  
AS he generates himself in the world, within his speculative system, he made  
distinctions which reach the nub of the matter. He had an "estranged insight"  
into real depersonalization, estrangement & reappropriation of man BUT REAL REAPPROPRIATION  
CAN COME ONLY THROUGH THE 'DESTRUCTION' of the estranged condition of our obj. work.

(RD Then Lowth notes that the incidental modification  
which turns 'abolition' into destruction DIFFERENTIATES MARX methodologically from  
& to this extent represents a basic divergence" but I do not understand since both  
H & M uses 'abolition, not, "destruction" but M of course means genuine abolition  
& not just in thought. But then, I with confide" (for the rest, he takes over H's  
categories & preserves them in material form, never in DAS Kapital.

Communism" tools constructed according to  
the concept of Hegelian phi. It is intended as the realization of the dial.  
unity bet. ind. action & depersonalization which is the outcome of (H's HIS OF PHIL...  
(refers here to CAP? I.6; labor process) It is the practical way in which man,  
living in society, keeps the entire obj. world in subjection, as self-generated & also  
remains himself in his OTHERNESS. a total return of man who has become a stranger  
to himself within the obj. world which he has generated... (p.281)

"True C-ism on the other hand as Marx the Hegelian  
conceives it is a reappropriation of human nature.... Within this context (cap.)  
it is a 'genuine resolution of the conflict (bet. existence & essence,....  
It is the riddle of his solved.'

1840's text  
Not covered against Underline  
but a