

HEGEL: A Re-Examination by J. N. FINDLAY, '58 Allen & Unwin (Macmillan, NY)

NB

(Wallace's "unfortunate omission of the invaluable editorial Zusätze to the letter work) in PHIL. OF MIND.

Ch. I - Introductory & Bloc. 1) H & Mod. Preconceptions pp. 17-33
11. Hegel's Life & Writings

p. 18: "We produced several highly original thinkers, e.g. Royce in Am. & Bradley in England... France after producing such inspired Hegelian scholarship, has in our own age excelled all previous Hegelian studies in the obj-ty, the scholarship, & the illumination of M. Jean Hypolite's excellent translation & commentary. Hegel has also had an immense, left-handed influence on thought thru the reaction he inspired in the wilfully narrow, passionately perverse, religious soul of the mid-century Dane Kierkegaard... Hegel has further had an unassessable influence on the thought of India & the Far East. This (re Marxism) has created a comprehensive background & mould of thought for millions of our contemporaries; in it, in fact, a whole new world of historic culture is growing up."

p. 19: Hegel is misconceived (1) as transcendent metaphysician
(2) as subjectivist
(3) as one thought mind made up the world
(4) as rationalist who seeks to deduce nature & experience from the abstract demands of notions; "who tries to do a priori what we now hold can only be done a posteriori."
(5) as thoroughgoing pol. reactionary

p. 20: "And we shall suggest, finally, that there is nothing irrelevant or unctemporary in Hegel's ideas & that he has as much to say to us as to previous generations of thinkers."

"Considering these was (PHEN., ENCYCL starting from immediate) there can be no doubt at all that Hegel sees what is 'absolute' in nothing which lies beyond the experiences & activities of men. The Absolute, he says, is 'what is entirely present' (das darchaus Gegenwärtige), what is 'on hand & actual', not 'something over above things or behind them' (etwas drüben und hinten). One might say, in fact, that there never has been a philosopher by whom the Jenseitige, the merely transcendent, has been more thoroughly 'gone away with', more thoroughly shown to exist only as revealed in human experience."

p. 21 It was Bradley, not Hegel, who believed in some Abs. Experience within which the objects of our ordinary hu an experience would be unbelicvably fused & transformed... And it was McTeargart, not Hegel, who made the Abs into a timeless fellowship of spirits..

p. 22: "Hegel is no idealist in the sense of holding that to be is to be perceived, for that to be is to be conceived... Even less is he an idealist in the sense of thinking that the mind imposes its form on the material of sense, or that it 'constructs' the world in its activities of imagination or thought."

p. 23 There is... as much materialism in Hegel as in Marx since matter for him is certainly a stage in the 'Idea'! (Just as there is certainly also a strong strain of teleological idealism in the supposedly scientific materialism of Marx.)

Handwritten notes on the left margin:
- "Empirical consequences"
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- "Facts"
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Handwritten notes at the top right:
- "Aristotle"

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p.23: Having disposed of the 'subj-ist charge' against Hegel, we may likewise dispose of the view of him as a relentless a priorist, one who sought to deduce the detail of nature & his. from the relationships of abstract concept... They are rather precepts which urge us to pass from notions in which some principle is latent, to other notions in which the same principle will become manifest; they do not, like deductive principles, march on a single level of discourse, but proceed rather from one level to the next..

p.26: "greatest contemporary relevance of many aspects of his thought."

p.27: "Only while mod. thought ascribes this freezing, exaggerating action to misunderstanding by philosophers of the fluid forms of language, Hegel ascribes it to 'Understanding', the factuality of 'hard-2-fast' abstract thought... Wittgenstein says: 'Phil. is a battle against the bewitchment of our understanding thru the instruments of our speech.' Hegel says in highly similar language: "The battle of Reason consists in this, to overcome the rigidity which the Understanding has brought in." (Encyc., p.67)

Ch.2-The Notion of Spirit

p.39: the historic roots of the notion

Ch.3-The D.M.

p.67 Hegel, Encycl. #82 Zus (approximate, W. pp.152-3 but, remember Wallace missed Zus.). "As far as its content goes, the reasonable is so little the exclusive property of phil., that it is rather present in all human being, at whatever level of cultivation or spiritual dev. they may find themselves for which reason was of old called a rational being."

p.75: "In the same way, in his theodistic phil. of his, he bases himself on ordinary sources & documents, on actual wks. & products, on the researches of scholars, on the work of reflective but non-philosophical historians & critics. The owl of Minerva only wings its interpretative flight--to modify one of Hegel's most famous statements--when all this common-or-garden spade-work has been completed. And even the Logic which professed to study concepts in the medium of pure thought is full of notions employed in the empirical science of Hegel's own day."

"We may note, finally, that the Hegel has offered 3 dial. demonstrations of the primacy of self-conscious spirit--(1) in the medium of indiv. culture & experience, (2) in the abstract medium of concepts, & (3) in the concrete medium of nature & social mind.... p.76: The lower categories & forms of being really break down because they are felt to be inadequate approximations to the sort of self-differentiating unity which is to be found only in self-conscious spirit. This is the secret standard by which all ideas & performances are judged... Anyone who does not feel impelled to think in terms of this sort of self-differentiating unity, will not find his inferior categories breaking down, nor leading him on to Hegelian results."

Ch.4-The PHEN. OF SPIRIT--I. Consciousness, Self-Conscious & Reason

p.95: "Having reached the stage of Self-consciousness along the epistemological route followed in Sec. A of the PHEN., the Dialectic suddenly swings over into the social sphere. Hegel becomes much more lucid & illuminating when he has to deal with such concrete & congenial notions as Master-Servant, Stoopid, Scepticism & the 'Unhappy' Religious Consciousness."

Ch.5-THE PHEN.-II. Spirit, Religion & Abs. Knowledge

p.119: "The (self-estranged) phase of consciousness to which the dial. now passes is a state of mind chiefly manifest in post-Renaissance & 18th c. Europe, when the breakup

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Mind", "Wittgenstein", "p.75", "p.76", "p.77", "p.78", "p.79", "p.80", "p.81", "p.82", "p.83", "p.84", "p.85", "p.86", "p.87", "p.88", "p.89", "p.90", "p.91", "p.92", "p.93", "p.94", "p.95", "p.96", "p.97", "p.98", "p.99", "p.100", "p.101", "p.102", "p.103", "p.104", "p.105", "p.106", "p.107", "p.108", "p.109", "p.110", "p.111", "p.112", "p.113", "p.114", "p.115", "p.116", "p.117", "p.118", "p.119", "p.120", "p.121", "p.122", "p.123", "p.124", "p.125", "p.126", "p.127", "p.128", "p.129", "p.130", "p.131", "p.132", "p.133", "p.134", "p.135", "p.136", "p.137", "p.138", "p.139", "p.140", "p.141", "p.142", "p.143", "p.144", "p.145", "p.146", "p.147", "p.148", "p.149", "p.150", "p.151", "p.152", "p.153", "p.154", "p.155", "p.156", "p.157", "p.158", "p.159", "p.160", "p.161", "p.162", "p.163", "p.164", "p.165", "p.166", "p.167", "p.168", "p.169", "p.170", "p.171", "p.172", "p.173", "p.174", "p.175", "p.176", "p.177", "p.178", "p.179", "p.180", "p.181", "p.182", "p.183", "p.184", "p.185", 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concealed presence of H. 3
Sinnung
Consciousness
Unconscious activity
Hegel's abstract

of mediaevalism & feudalism, with their profound ethical & religious unity, had led to a more expansive, experimental, power-seeking & wealth-amassing state of society. Much of the intense obscurity of this text is here due to the concealed presence of an historical framework.

p.121: "The culmination of this spirit of sheer culture & civilization is found by H in the brilliant, sophisticated, precious, witty & disintegrated inhabitants of the 18th c. (p. 121-122), the people who made David Hume look on Paris as the most agreeable city in the universe." (Diderot's nephew of Rameau)

p.145: "H's words are dark (PHEN., p. 798), but their purport is clear. Since the existence of a 'subj.' or 'self' is for him nothing beyond the universalizing activity of thought, a self's consciousness of itself is simply the consciousness of this universalizing activity (which is also an exercise of this activity) & in this consciousness of self all particular acts of universalization are in some manner summed up: they will be rethought as thoughts, or "given the form of self."... what Aristotle means when he refuses to differentiate bet. thinking of this or that ideal form, & thinking of one's thought in so thinking. Hegel can therefore pass from pure self-consciousness which is the crowning stage of the PHEN., to the study of the categories & other abstract determinations of thought & being, which are the content of Systematic Science."

p.146: (after quoting p. 800 of PHEN. on "Time therefore appears as the doom & the necessity of the Spirit that is not yet perfected in itself."): "In this passage Hegel is not teaching any doctrine of the 'unreality' of Time, such as is accepted by McTaggart & Bradley & is widely thought to be Hegelian. On the contrary, he is holding that it is only by achieving self-consciousness through a temporal process that self-conscious Spirit can be at all.... 'annulment' stands for no metaphysical or theological timelessness, but for the annulment in & for phil. It means that, for the philosopher, concepts are universal & principles true, & that the precise moment at which anyone appropriates them is completely unimportant."

Ch. VI -The Logic--I. The Doctrine of Being

Ch. VII -The Logic --II. The Doctrine of Essence

p.220: Supplementary note: It will simplify the approach to the concepts of disposition. What enjoys Gesetzseyn in something else is what is virtually, dispositionally present in it. While the concepts of the sphere of Sein deal only with what manifestly is, the concepts of the sphere of Essence deal also with what is latent, with what would or could be in certain circumstances. They are therefore a class of concepts much to the fore in contemporary discussion, e.g., in analyses of physical objects & mental states."

Ch. VIII -The Logic--III. The Doctrine of the Notion.

p.222: "We should be able to see what Hegel means by 'the Notion' by seeing how its concept develops out of the 3 concepts of Substance, Causality & Reciprocal Interaction. Necessity there 'swung over' into the concept of Substance was replaced by the concept of the Notion. H on absolute negative as creative element SL III, 237"

p.223: "The Notion is accordingly one with a man's thinking being, the same universal thinking nature in all, but individualized in this or that thinking person... Hegel, like Kant, identifies the self with the unifying, universalizing agency of thought, with the emergence of unity & universality out of the confused mass of sense-experience. Such agency is not subj. in the sense of being arbitrary: the unity of consciousness for Hegel alone constitute the relation of thoughts to objects, & thereby their

SUBSTANCE
CAUSALITY
RECIPROCAL
Freedom

teleology

objective validity."
p.224: "The self in short is the Universal in action...
The Hegelian Notion is, in fact, an entity straddling
(several spheres) that can be approached from several directions. It
is an element in the individual's experience... as in PHIL. OF SPIRIT.
It can be approached in terms of an ideal spiritual education as
was done in PHEN. But its logical aspects are concerned solely
with the self-revelation of objects, in terms of various universals."

p.253: "The origin of the Idea in the notion of teleology throws
immense light on Hegel's philosophy. The Idea does not
explain things by being their cause, or their underlying
Substance or the Whole of which they are the parts: it explains
by being the end towards which they must be thought of as tending. It
is, however, an external end imposed on the world by a pre-existent
intelligence, but one which the things in that world by their nature
pursue. And it is an end, moreover, which it is impossible to divorce
from the means which bring it about or the process through which it
is realized."

- Ch. IX--The Phil. of Nature
- Ch. X--The Phil. of Subj. Spirit.
- Ch. XI--The Phil. of Obj. Spirit
- Ch. XII--Absolute Spirit & Retrospect (Hegel's Aesthetics, Phil. of Religion & His. of Phil.)

p.344: "They (Hegel's exegeses) can seem arid & false to those
who see nothing mysterious & god-like in the

FACTS OF HUMAN THOUGHT."

(On p.346 Findlay begins section on "Appraisal of Hegel as an Anti-Metaphysician, Empiricist, Idealist & Dialectician.")

p.351: "But though Hegel remains within the world of common
sense & science, & does not undermine its reality,
his approach to it is neither commonsensical nor scientific: he sees
the fact of that world in a revolutionary manner, which is not that of
any other philosopher.... experiences where there will cease to be
a barrier bet. the self & other persons, or bet. the thinking mind &
the world confronting it. This principle, we have suggested, may
have certain remote, long-term empirical consequences, which we cannot
precisely locate or pin down. Its meaning is not, however, exhausted
by these latter, since it would remain a way of regarding the facts
of experience, a peculiar conceptual slant, whatever these facts might
turn out to be."

p.354: "We may also praise him as the philosopher
of the 'abs. negativity', the believer in nothing that does not spring
from the free, uncommitted, self-committing human spirit."

*Facts of Experience
which are
from the
forms of
experience*

*A way of thought
as a way of life
characterizing all
civilized*

