



Existence - man "K" "Rev" "Hegel"

does not mean that thereby 'only theoretical' philosophical matters will be included...The entire 'existence' of man and 'human reality' is for Marx the decisive justification for the proletarian revolution as a \*\*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* total and radical revolution, unconditionally excluding any partial upheaval or 'evolution'." (pp 9 to 10)

The only place I have seen any critique of Marx bring in the question of ontology is precisely this essay, especially pp 12 - 13: "Despite the above development of the subject we would be loth to use the often misused term ontology in connection with Marx's theory, if Marx himself had not expressly used it here; thus he says that 'only through the medium of private property does the ontological essence of human passion come into being, in its totality as in its humanity' (KM p. 165) and he suggests that 'man's feelings, passions, and so forth, are not merely anthropological phenomena... but truly ontological affirmations of being (of nature)' (ibid.)." p. 12

P. 13 then continues with "man's act of self-creation or self-objectification...life-activity", HM's point being that all three formulations, even if Marx hadn't so identified them, "would still point to Hegel's ontological concept of labor" and at that point HM refers to "Being-for-self" in Phenomenology of Mind (pp. 238-240).

HM concludes that section, therefore, by pointing to the ~~Marx's~~ dimension (beyond the economic sphere: "we must first answer the question of how and from what starting point Marx defines man's existence and essence" (and only in that way can we really grasp) "the concept of estranged labour and for understanding the whole foundation of revolutionary theory." (p. 14)

The next section is all on humanism, "totality of human existence" and "objectivity". He ends this section by beginning on the differences between Marx and Feuerbach's coming to grips with a crucial problem of classical German philosophy: "But in Marx it is this concept of sensuousness (as objectification) which leads to the decisive turn from classical philosophy to the theory of revolution... As objectivity man's sensuousness is essentially practical objectification and because it is practical it is essentially a social objectification." (p. 21)

I consider it very original that HM at this point goes beyond Feuerbach, not directly to Marx, but NB NB NB "he (Marx) reaches back beyond Feuerbach to Hegel." At which point he goes to Marx's quotations on second negativity. Or rather Marx's praise of Hegel's conception of second negativity: "Things are not as simple as we would expect; the road from Feuerbach to Marx is not characterised by a straight rejection of Hegel. Instead of this, Marx ~~at~~ at the origins of revolutionary theory, once again appropriates the decisive achievements of Hegel on a transformed basis." (p. 22)

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
Humanism

Plus in Action  
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P. 29. "Even in Marx's extremely bitter struggle with German philosophy in the period of its decline, a philosophical impetus, lives on which only complete naivety could misconstrue as a desire to destroy philosophy altogether." The same page is where HM develops MARX's concept of total revolution. "What also belongs to this positive theory of revolution is... an investigation of the origin of reifications, an investigation of the historical conditions and emergence of private property."

Only in the last section (VI) beginning p. 40-48 does HM finally come to Marx's critique of Hegel. HM stresses that it is no accident why Marx insists that this essay should be the conclusion. It is almost wholly on second negativity, ~~and the reason that Marx insists that in Phenomenology "there lie concealed in it all the elements of a critique already prepared and elaborated, in a manner far arising above the Hegelian standpoint..."~~ HM concludes: "heraby Marx has expressed in all clarity the inner connection between revolutionary theory and Hegel's philosophy. What seems amazing, as measured by this critique -- which is the result of a philosophical discussion -- is the decline of later interpretations of Marx (even -- sit venia verbo -- those of Engels!) by people who believed they could reduce Marx's relationship to Hegel to the familiar transformation of Hegel's 'dialectic', which they also completely emptied of content... Marx's critique of Hegel is not an appendage of the preceding critique and foundation of political economy, for his examination of political economy is itself a continuous confrontation with Hegel." p. 48.



1) Economics Politics = (Cob) Laws of Th. y. Rev.

2) Paralelatic = one 2nd not only not phil. but Hegel, which

3) (white) history / piece of history / history \* (ump) 1887 / pram \*

4) Feuch's passion not a anthropological but (1) history

5)