SECOND ALTERNATIVE LYOUTH AND

What Marx felt stirring in him as he worked on his doctoral dissertation -- his relationship with the left "egelians/approaching an end, and the search for new beginnings -- is seen clearest in his noise for the dissertation rather than the disscritation itself which was granted him on April 15, 1841. We will compare the two and note that directly after he turned first to journalism, which he considered the daily practice of philosophy, and with journalism came the direct confrontation with the consership from the russian state, totally different attitudes was to the peasants involved in the wood theft. And finally his resignation from the paper and his total break from the bourgeoisie in 1843. The 3 aspects -- philosophic dissertation, journalism which deals with daily life on different class levels, and the break with the bourgeoisle -- cannot be separated. To uct as if he was a mere! Hegelian idealist in writing the dissertation, or "at best" choosing a subject to which he would add mere details to the greater achievement of the analysis of the same submort by "egel, is not to understand what is meant by the new stirrings of a totally new view of life, of history, of science, of philosophy, at to think that the brushup against the injustices meted cut to the Moselle peasants was the cause of his turning "Marxist", is to fail to see the very contradiction of which was supposed to have achieved that central point of all philasophy, the unity of philosophy and reality; is to fail to see a genuine "root cause" that was inherent in both "egel's philosophy and the left Hegelians. That is to say, how total the break will be with Hegelianism, not because he has turned his back on Hegel half as much as on the Hegelians, but what is far more important that he was about to discover a totally new continent of thought.

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Let's take it step by step to see those three years 1841-44, year by year. First, then, /notes on the dissertation -- - the nodal points in the dievelopment of philosophy and 2) philosophy after its completion. In the first, Marx shows that the nodal point when a philosophy has achieved completeness, like Aristotle in the Ancient Society and Fegel at the beginning of the 19th century. The discontinuity, the break that occurs after completion, signifies philosophy turning its eyes to the actual world, the relationship of philosophy to reality. It is what Marx called a Shrovetide of philosophy, the testing which would reveal the . The contract the state of the sta discontinuity. In a word, two totalities confront each other -- the world of philosophy, and the make actualty, the world of non-philosophy. Marx says there is no reason to be frightened by the 'storm'; yes, there is a crisis in philosophy and there is a crisis in the world. Those who are frightened by historical necessity and want to retreat, such fearful souls take the reverse point of view of valiant commanders, They believe they are able to repair the damager by decreasing forces, by dispersal, by a peace treaty with real needs, while Themistocles, when Athens was threatened with devastation, persuade the Athenians to leave it for good and found a new Athens on the sea, on another element."

Very clearly, Marx thinks that that's the only way to have a new beginning, worthy of history and of philosophy, and that the reason why one shouldn't be afraid of the great diremption that a crisis orings is that once a new unity of philosophy and reality is achieved, the unity is a great as the diremption was. The proof of which, and the model, and the one Marx considers the greatest of all philosophers is

Promethens. Here is how he points to that new beginning; "Just as Promethens, having stolen fire from heaven begins to build houses and settle on the earth, so philosophy, having extended itself to the world, turns against the apparent world. So now with the EEgelian this assembly."

The first criticism of the Hegelians is the rapidity with which they ran from the ship and the same considered Hegel's reconciliation with the Prussian state as an accommodation, that is to say, explains opportunism. Marx insists that that considered himself consciously opportunism, was not only true but Hegelian himself consciously did so, it would prove nothing because "he is not conscious that the possibility of this apparent accommodation is rooted in the inadequacy of his principle ..." In a word what is serious is not whether the man is an opportunist or not but whether there is such a gaping inadequacy in the philosophy itself that it was inevitable that that would happen; and that's what his disciples must show. That is exactly what Marx will reveal in 1844 in the Critique of the Hegelsin Dialectic, which he will call a "lie." But here he is

For that task of the disciple Marx declares that "it is a psychological law that the theoretical mind, having become free in itself, turns into practical energy." He further insists that indeed the praxis of philosophy, however, is itself theoretical. It is criticism, which measures ... particular actually against the Idea."

Criticism is the key. Action is needed to realize philosophy.

"What seems to be, first of all, philosophy's wrong relation to and diremption with the world, turns secondly into a diremption of the individual philosophical self-consciousness in itself and finally appears as philosophy's external separation and duality, as two opposed philosophical direction."

The from saying that that's exactly what is happening in the actual thosis, he says that of course in the actual thosis, he says that of course in the admirably great and bold plan of his history of philosophy... it was impossible in some way to go into detail ... " It isn't grue however as the both academics and Marxists have claimed that he thereby shows he was still a total Hegelian. Unite the contrary — the same half sentence continues "and in some way the gigantic thinkor was hindered by his view of what he called the speculative idea par excellence from recognizing in these systems the great importance that they have for the history of Greek philosophy and for the Greek mind in general." (Livergood's translation, p. 61; my emphasis.)

I stressed the word, history, because that is the key to every0 thing, i.e. both to what he brings out that is deficient in Hagel and he knooses the very point in which Hegel is recognized as the greatest and on the very subject that Hogel considered the greatest — history of Greek philosophy and mind; and the very first sentence of that foreword dissertation to his stated "The form of this treatise would have been on the one hand more strictly scientific, on the other hand in many of its arguments less pedantic, if its primary purpose had not been that of a doctoral dissertation.

mss. for the Holy Family German Ideology, and when Engels found him decipering Marx's writing, he did help him and let him take some issues of <u>Deutsche Jahrbücher</u>. Finally Engels offered to expound for him Marx's doctoral dissertation, drawing attention to the fact that Marx even then was critical of Hegel and took him on in the very sphere in which Hegel was strongest, the history of thought.

In 1895, Engels made the statement that after the publication of Feuerbach's Essence of Christianiae (1841) they were all "for the present, Feuerbachians." (MEW 21, p. 272) tr. Moscow II, p. 367)

The truth is the exact opposite. First of all, it is not the 1841 thesis of Feuerbach that had gotten Marx excited; he had long since separated from religion and indeed, as early as 1842, criticised Feuerbach, saying, "his own ideas concerning the nature of religion would conflict with those of Feuerbach though only as regards the form (Fassung) and obviously not to the advantage of religion." (Nicholas Lobkowick, Theory and Practice; History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx; Notre Dame, Indiana 1967, p. 251, refers back to MEGA I, 1/2, p.272) This was obviously a remark Marx made in a perspective article on religious art. Before Marx left the RZ in March 1843, he wrote Ruge that he mark disliked Feuerbach's insistence on nature to the disadvantage of politics.

The third instance in which Marx spoke against Feuerbach (actually, I have an earlier third instance -- rd) is the letter to Schweitzer, Jan. 24, 1865;

the creative act of the dialectic, as against Feuerbach's "contemplative materialism." Engels evidently did not find this thesis until he was actually publishing his own book on Feuerbach in 1895, but he should have known the 1845 stand from the fact that they both collaborated in the German Ideology in which Feuerbach is criticised extensively.

We have already referred to the 1865 letter to Schweitzer.

Even more important is the April 24, 1867 letter to Engels himself® (NB NB NB -- the latest issue of Selected Correspondence, 1975 edition, does not include that letter), Marx was then with Mugelman who had a collection of Marx's early works, including the Holv Family upon which Marx remarks as follows: "I was pleasantly surprised to find that we need not be ashamed of this work; although the cult of Feuerbach produces a very humorous effect upon me now."

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Lobkowicz has a quite profound remark on the differences between Marx and Feuerbach on religion: [Marx, of course, understands religion in the same way as Feuerbach did. Like Hegel's Aufklärer and like Feuerbach's he mistakes an historically conditioned form of religion for religion's true nature. But, contrary to Feuerbach and together with Hegel, he does not treat religious alienation as an independent phenomenon, but reduces the escapism of belief to a more fundamental alienation. Thus, whereas Feuerbach remained a figure in a drama written by Hegel, Marx succeeded in truly rewriting Hegel's drama of the spirit alienated from itself... Feuerbach's 'alienation' ul-

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