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THE DIALECTIC (SPECIFICALLY SCIENCE OF LOGIC, EVEN MORE SPECIFICALLY
SECTION 3 OF VOL 2, and MOST SPECIFICALLY AI) VS. THE
METHODOLOGY OF LUXEMBURG

Interestingly enough, one place that RR brings in a footnote from Hegel regarding RL is from nowhere else than the Absolute Idea, specifically page 472, where Hegel speaks of nothing short of the Absolute Method:

The concrete totality which is the beginning contains as such the beginning of progress and of development. As concrete it is internally differentiated... the absolute method, on the other hand, does not hold the position of external reflection; it draws the determinate element directly from its object itself since it is the object's immanent principle and soul.

Now it is true that RR becomes brave because he is talking against the neo-Harmonists and not against RL, but the truth is that when he stresses that they confuse "the method of analysis with the phenomenon to be analyzed", they may think it's equilibrium and he may think so, and she may think so, nevertheless it is exactly what she does and the only thing that RR is left with is "method of successive concretizations". What he is trying very hard to do is that unless one introduces dialectic mediation, there is no escaping the illusion that there is no "bridge" between the abstract and concrete.

What I am interested in now that he did bring out absolute, even though he tries very hard to make you think it is only method and not the absolute he is talking about, are the following:

Here On the one hand, Hegel. Let's not forget that Lenin considered section 3, "The Idea", as the best of all descriptions of the dialectic. That he then proceeded with his 16 point definition. Above all, he stopped at 2 places: (1) the Idea of the Good (pp 460 to 465) which has preoccupied me for a very long time and from which we have always quoted "the self-certainty which the subject has in the fact of its determinateness in and for itself, is a certainty of its own actuality and of the non-actuality of the world."

(2) At the end of that section (p. 465) : "In this result then cognition is reconstructed and united with the practical Idea ... not however (as in inquiring cognition) merely as objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, but as objective world whose inner ground and actual persistence is the Notion. This is the Absolute Idea."

Now this which introduces you to that final chapter is where Lenin very nearly doesn't stop quoting. In a word, after the 16 point definition, after stressing the objectivity of dialectics, he first gets this high

* RR must be quoting a different edition because here is what comes out on page 453, fn. 17: "The procedure of common sense finite cognition here is that it takes up again equally externally from the concrete that which it left out in the abstract of creation of this universal." Then the quotation is as above.

appreciation of subjectivity and directly after Lenin quotes Hegel against "the essence of anti-dialectics", and at that point he goes into the turning point of second negativity; "the richest is the most concrete and the most subjective". And then leaves out only the last half of the last para. of Hegel.

Hegel, himself, once he introduces the unity of theory and practice and comes to the Absolute Method, the page before the one RR quotes, Hegel makes clear what he means by this Absolute Method, first, that the immediate element of the beginning "must be inherently defective and must be endowed with the element for self-development. In the Absolute Method, however, the Universal does not mean the merely abstract but the objectively universal". Then comes p. 422 where the stress is that the Absolute is so "only in its completion". Then the para. RR quotes. I just cannot see how anyone could possibly think that it's a question just between Harmonists and ~~non~~-Harmonists. Why then, ~~RR~~ does RR correctly fall upon that great quotation from Hegel? Somewhere the question of dialectic mediation is reduced, in his mind, to mediator, even though that very same sentence stresses that when something comes before consciousness without coming into contact it is the essence of the anti-dialectic.

On the other hand, we do come to cause again, only this time it is not as it appears in ~~RR~~ Actuality but cause in the Notion. P. 423 "... cause is the highest stage in which the concrete Notion as beginning has an immediate existence in the sphere of necessity; but it is not yet subject..."

Something in Hegel himself on the question of mechanism and chemism as he approaches teleology is at one and the same time contrasted to it but teleology is none the less criticised. Grace once said on those same 2 pages (374-375) : "End as 'subject', i.e. mechanism as external relation and indifference of objects is the other side of the coin of teleology as based upon extra-mundane understanding. In fact the concept of end is arrived at from the conception of mechanism."

Now trying to apply the same thing to Bukharin that I applied to RL's mechanical attitude : "Indifference to a specific content precludes a recognition of historical specificity." And where Hegel? (p. 382) "Thus end-relation is more than judgement; it is the syllogism of the independent and free Notion which new objectivity binds itself together with itself". It can only overcome this subjectivity and finiteness by proceeding "to cancel the presupposition of the end". (2d- Re possible use for NQ) difference between RL ~~thinking~~ thinking in terms of the movement to a more integrated absolute substance and Lenin's in terms of a new beginning which will determine the end.