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PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION

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PART ONE -- WHY HEGEL? WHY NOW?

	pages
(52 pages) <u>Chapter I - Hegel's Absolutes As New Beginnings</u>	4
<u>Section A - THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, Or Experiences of Consciousness</u>	7
<u>Section B - THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC, Or Attitudes to Objectivity</u>	20
<u>Section C - THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: A Movement <u>From</u> Practice?</u>	39

13128

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Part One - Why Hegel? Why Now?

"...insofar as it [our age] has made us touch our limits I shall say that we are all metaphysical writers ... For metaphysics is not a sterile discussion about abstract notions which have nothing to do with experience. It is a living effort to embrace from within the human condition in its totality." -- Jean-Paul Sartre

Because the transformation of reality is central to the Hegelian dialectic, Hegel's philosophy comes to life, over and over again, in all periods of crisis and transition when a new turning point is reached, the established society is dug up by its roots, and a foundation is laid for a new social order. Hegel, himself, lived at just such a historic turning point, under the impact of the Great French Revolution, created his philosophy. Marx lived in another period of crisis, of proletarian revolt, and openly grounded his totally new philosophy of liberation, of Historic Materialism, "a thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism [which] distinguishes itself both from idealism and materialism, and is, at the same time the truth uniting both" - ^{and was grounded} in the praxis of the proletariat as well as in Hegel's dialectic. Lenin, at the outbreak of World War I and the collapse of established Marxism, also felt the compulsion to return directly to the Hegelian dialectic as he searched for a concrete universal to emerge from new mass actions.

No such philosophic re-examination emerged either from within established Communism, or by its most famous critic, Leon Trotsky, at the time the Hitler-Stalin Pact helped set off the holocaust for which Hitler

13129

had long worked. World War II and its aftermath did, however, produce a rebirth of studies of Hegel that went hand in hand with a rediscovery of Marx's Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, 1844, which revealed that Marx's critique of the Hegelian dialectic was, at the same time, a critique of "vulgar communism" as not being "the goal of human development, the form of human society."⁽¹⁾ The postwar three-cornered debate between Communists and the new philosophers -- Sartrean Existentialists and Catholic Humanists -- ^{was} ~~was~~ confined to debating halls far removed from the ongoing mass struggles. Existentialism did break new ground in discerning and elaborating an inner connection between idealist and materialist dialectics. ^{But the agencies of} ~~But the~~ ~~the~~ ~~intellectual and the worker~~ never did meet until a new turning point in history, ^{when} ~~at~~ a movement from practice that emerged following the death of Stalin, on the one hand, and the East German Revolt in 1953, on the other.

Under the impact of this workers' revolt, the East European intellectuals began to raise the question of "the young Marx". By the time of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the Humanism of Marxism and the Hegelian dialectics were brought to the front center ^{of} ~~the~~ historic stage. ^{There have} ~~It has~~ remained there ever since, as the revolts in East and West Europe in the Spring of 1968 showed. Nor was the revolutionary awakening in the 1960's limited to Europe. On the contrary, the African Revolutions signalled the birth of a new, Third World. Even US intellectuals who, through the McCarthyite 1950's, had luxuriated in the euphoria of the illusion of "the end of ideology", were rudely awakened by the simultaneous appearances in 1960, "the Africa Year", of this new Third World and the Black revolution within the United States. ^{that} ~~that~~ ~~helped~~ ~~produce~~, by the mid-1960's, a whole new

(1) Marx, Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic. I happen to have been the first to translate into English the now famous Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, 1844, and am quoting from it (Appendix Marxism and Humanism, 1958 edition, p. 307). Since then, many translations have appeared. See bibliography for a listing.

generation of revolutionaries, white as well as Black, who refused to separate their ^{feelings} of alienation in the ivory towers of education, from their opposition both to racism and the United States imperialist war in Vietnam. In a word, the movement from practice -- whether it was in the form of outright revolutions in East Europe, in Cuba, in Africa, or missed revolutions as in Paris or Czechoslovakia, or more revolts in Japan and in the United States -- refused to be stilled either in practice or in theory.

It is true, that especially in the United States, ^{that} the new academic revival of Hegel remains worlds apart from the second rediscovery of Marx's Humanist essays, and vice versa. It is true that empiricism is so integral to the nature of the Anglo-Saxon world, a part of its very organism, that even the revolutionary youth who wish to uproot the capitalistic system, who have become aware of themselves as revolutionaries through relating their feeling of alienation in academia to Marx's theory of class alienation, still separate what history had joined together. Marx's beginnings in a new Humanism from a culmination of the Hegelian philosophy in the Absolute Idea. It is equally true, however, that the objectivity of the force that brought the youth face to face, at one and the same time, with reality and with Marx's theory of alienation, will also compel them to come to grips with the Hegelian dialectic, *this dialectic the young Marx* which ~~was~~ as a young man, described as one in which "all elements of criticism lie hidden in it, and are often already prepared and worked out in a manner extending far beyond the Hegelian standpoint" and the mature Marx, in Capital, reiterated was "the source ... of all dialectic." (2) It did not then, and certainly cannot now, mean, an evasion, but ^{rather} a confrontation with Hegel's Absolutes.

____ (2) Capital, Vol. I, p.

This is not to say that we can dismiss, out of hand, the contention that Hegel's Absolutes are a restatement of Aristotle's Absolutes, if not a throwback to Plato's concept of philosopher-king ^{which} reflected Greek society where slaves did all the labor, and the intellectual class, who did not labor, did all the philosophizing. But, to this writer, the contention fails to come to grips with the reason why, as against the Greek philosophers who remain in academia, there is the multiple and new rebirth of Hegel studies. If the counter-revolution ^{and} military might of Communism (Chinese as well as Russian), not to mention the ~~mere shallowness~~ of their attacks on "bourgeois idealism", could not stem the tide of world history which transformed Hegel into a contemporary, how can academic aloofness or empiricism?

Chapter I - Hegel's Absolutes as New Beginnings

"Just as Prometheus, having stolen fire from heaven, begins to build houses and settle on the earth, so philosophy, having extended itself to the world, turns against the apparent world. So now with the Hegelian philosophy." -- Marx

The very fact that Hegel's concepts of Reason and Freedom are "in the air" points to an urgent need for a new examination, ^{of them.} Not for the sake of Hegel, but for our sakes. We are the ones who are in need of a philosophy that can meet the challenge of our times. Now that a movement from practice is raising philosophic questions of the most profound kind, we can no longer disregard the philosopher who lived at a "birth-time" of history -- the beginning of an age of revolutions.

Our age of absolutes, when the counter-revolution is not just outside, but within the revolution itself, demands that we put the Hegelian dialectic to the test. Hegel held that the dialectic, which he called the Absolute Method, to be, ^{is} at one and the same time, in constant motion, and so "adamant"

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-5-

as to refuse to bow to any Absolute Substance precisely because it is the dialectic of the Subject, the continuous process of becoming, the self-moving, self-active, self-transcending method of "absolute negativity", how could its discoverer, Hegel, possibly have stopped its incessant motion? If "nothing is either conceived or known in its truth, except so far as it is completely subject to method," (3) why not subject Hegel's Absolutes to ^{dialectical} it? Why not test the logic of Hegel's Logic? Why not roll the film of Hegel's ontological Absolutes back to their first public appearance in the Phenomenology?

The young Marx, in grappling with "Absolute Knowledge" as containing "both the summation and the quintessence of the Phenomenology" (4) found it to be the path to the discovery of Historical Materialism. This was by no means a question of "standing Hegel rightside up" a la Feuerbach. Unfortunately, Marxists, even those like Lukacs, who have probed deeply into the origins of Marxism in Hegelian philosophy, viewed clear of the Absolutes, preferring to translate Hegel's concept of "Subject" and Marx's concretization of it as the proletariat into the concept of the Vanguard Party. (5). By the time, however, that Lenin reached the final chapter, "Absolute Idea" of the Science of Logic, he ^{was} so excited over Hegel's Absolute Method that he called attention to Engels's conclusion that "the system of Hegel is materialism turned upside down." (6) Be that as it may, Marx's problems of the 1840's and 1850's,

(3) Science of Logic, Vol. II, p. 468.

(4) Marxism and Freedom, p. 310

(5) "Once the Party is recognized as the historical form and the active carrier of class consciousness, it simultaneously becomes the carrier of the ethic of the struggling proletariat." (Georg Lukacs, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, chapter on "Rosa Luxemburg, Marxist.")

13133

RD

Engels's of the 1880's, Lenin's in the period of the first World War, Lukac's in the early 1920's are not ours. ⁹ Hegel's philosophy has a validity all of its own and we must see it with eyes of today. Existentialism, from its origins in the religiosity of Kierkegaard, through Heidegger's ontological "Being and Time", to Sartre's revolutionary Being and Nothingness, was a revolt against Hegel's system. Yet, after Being and Nothingness, after Sartre's experiences in the Resistance and in the postwar period debates with Communist ideologues, Sartre found it necessary to express his indignation at the trivialities uttered about the Absolute: "It is unfortunate that a man can still write today that the absolute is not man." (6) This is not the place (7) to ask why Existentialism did not then come to grips with Marx's own expressions that Communism was "not the goal of human development, the form of human society". (8) On the face of it, ~~it would have appeared~~ ^{we would think} that existentialism would have been drawn to Marx's sharp distinction between economic solutions -- abolition of private property -- and creative human relationships, especially as the mature Marx expressed it: "the development of human power which is its own end, the true realm of freedom." (9) The point here is that by the start of the 1960's, existentialism found something lacking in itself ^{where} as it could not meet the challenge of ^{that} the most turbulent decade, and it is ^{this} decade which has imparted a new urgency to the task of grappling with Hegel's Absolute as possible new beginnings.

(6) Situations, IV, p. 315.

(7) The chapter on Sartre appears in Part II, Alternatives.

(8) Being and Freedom, p. 303.

(9) Capital, Vol. III, p. 954.

Section A -- THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, or Experiences of Consciousness

"...Our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things hitherto prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking ..." -- Hegel

The Phenomenology of Mind and the Science of Logic -- Hegel's "voyage of discovery" and ^{his} logic of abstract categories -- are a summons for men "to let the dead bury the dead" (10) while the living go forth to meet the challenge of the times," (11) and "give ear to its (Spirit's) urgency." (12) But, where the Science of Logic is without "concretion of sense," the excitement of the actual, of the arrival of a new epoch, permeates the whole of the Phenomenology. So alive is this "presence" in the struggles of consciousness with the objective world, the struggles of self-consciousness with Other, the consciousness of others -- be that between Lordship and Bondage, or of self-consciousness with its own unhappiness -- that the reader is ready to follow Hegel upon the long, tortuous 2,500 year trek of Western philosophy from its birthplace in Greece some 500 B.C. to its leap to "absolute freedom" in the great French Revolution. Hegel did not consider it a mere coincidence that he was completing the Phenomenology as Napoleon on horseback entered Prussia. (Since Hegel does not allow the reader to forget another "presence" -- that of Absolute Spirit whose "time has come" -- history itself, it is true, ^{is} a manifestation of the World Spirit.) Nevertheless, what we follow is the

(10) Phenomenology, p. 130

(11) Science of Logic, Vol. III, p. 35: "there are no traces in Logic of the new spirit which has arisen both in Learning and in Life."

(12) Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 583.

"experiences of consciousness". It is, in fact, impossible to separate the two -- reality and spirit, -- and not because Hegel has imposed spirit upon reality, but because spirit is immanent in reality.

Throughout Phenomenology's 163 year existence, "the immanent rhythm of the moment of conceptual thought" (13) has cast a spell on critics and followers alike. The discoverer of Historical Materialism, Karl Marx, criticized the old materialism for its failure to grapple with actuality, which led to the "active side" being developed by idealism.

It is true that the Phenomenology was "the hidden still unclear even to itself, and mystifying critical philosophy. However, to the extent that it holds fast the alienation of Man -- even if Man appears only in the form of Spirit -- to that extent all elements of criticism lie hidden in it and are often already prepared and worked out in a manner extending far beyond the Hegelian standpoint. The sections on 'Unhappy Consciousness', the 'Honorable Consciousness', the struggle between the 'noble' and 'base' consciousness, etc., etc., contain critical elements -- although still in an alienated form -- of whole spheres like Religion, the State, Civic Life, etc." (14)

That is to say, despite the fact that Man is nowhere present in the Phenomenology; despite the fact that Hegel analyzes the development of consciousness and self-consciousness as disembodied spirits; despite the fact that Freedom and Reason likewise appear only as activities of the mind; despite the fact that Hegel's "estranged insight" has caught only "the abstract, logical and speculative expression for the movement of history"; the dialectic nevertheless, concludes Marx, reveals "transcendence as an objective movement." Marx singled out transcendence as an objective movement, not in order to show merely what was "behind" the struggles of consciousness and self-consciousness -- the actual history of man's history. Marx was also arguing against the narrow materialists who didn't understand that

(13) Phenomenology, p. 117
 (14) Marx and Engels, p. 309.

it was idealism that had developed "the active side" while they, themselves, failed to see self-development in actuality as well as in the struggles of consciousness. It is ^{this} self-development, the fact that no outside force propels a movement forward, that allowed the most encyclopedic mind of Europe to see the development of thought as "parallel" (15) to world history.

Whether one accepts Marx's critique, and sees the multitudinous stages of alienation, of subject and object, of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, of Reason and Revolution, of Spirit in Self-Estrangement, not to mention the division within the Absolute itself, as an "estranged" insight into self-development of labor and its production relations, or whether one remains with Hegel, confined in the realm of thought, or, whether one departs from both spheres, and sees "Other" existentially as "Hell is other people", the crucial point is not only that there is a corresponding historic stage for every stage of phenomenological development, but that thought molds its experience in a manner that, never again will it be possible to separate these two opposites into separate realms. The method of uniting the two, dialectics, is irresistible because it comes from within. Although the historic periods are not specified by Hegel, neither are they superimposed by others on the stages of consciousness. History remains the innermost core of all of Hegel's philosophic categories. J.N. Finlay is absolutely correct when he writes that "Much of the intense obscurity of Hegel's text is here (Section on Spirit in Self-Estrangement)" due to the concealed presence of an historical framework." ¹¹¹ In a word, Marxists and non-Marxists alike have grasped the truth, the deep historical nature of Hegelian philosophy.

(15) Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol III, p. 547

(16) Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 119.

The re-appearance of one and the same movement -- the dialectic as a continuous process of self-development, a process of development through contradiction, through alienation, through double negation, ~~we~~ begins with sense-certainty and never ^{stops} stopping its ceaseless motion, not even at its apex, Absolute Knowledge. It is the development of mankind's history from bondage to freedom, and from the French Revolution to German philosophy, or the French Revolution transformed into dialectic method.

The plenitude (and suffering) of consciousness in self-development that Hegel has gathered together for his "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" allows for varying interpretations (very often by the same discerning reader upon each re-reading of a passage). But they can do so because, and only because, Hegel created his universals through a most painstaking and rigorous examination of the movement of no less than 2,500 years of history. The fact that this laborious development of mankind culminated in the period of the French revolution drove the genius to break with the introversion of his philosophic contemporaries.

Because Hegel is dealing with universals, as not separate from the individual's "experience", it doesn't matter if one dwells on a single stage of alienation or on the alienations in their totality. How many exegeses -- from Josiah Royce's religious preoccupation with the "Contrite Consciousness" to Herbert Marcuse's concern with "technological reality" and its "Conquest of the Unhappy Consciousness," (17) haven't depended on Hegel's Alienated Soul or Unhappy Consciousness? Were one even to go to the extreme and superimpose just two divisions upon the whole of the Phenomenology, even this would not be "wrong". Thus, "What Happens Up to the Day of Revolution?"

(17) One-Dimensional Man, pp. 56-83.

could be the heading over Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Reason, and all the remaining stages of development -- Spirit, Religion, and Absolute Ideas -- could then be titled "What Happens after the Revolution?" Even such oversimplification or, if you wish, vulgarization, wouldn't be violating the spirit of Hegel, providing this was done for the purpose of penetrating Hegel's analysis of development as self-movement. For it is the self-development that is the sum and substance, the soul and spirit of the dialectic in thought as in life, in history as in society, in philosophy as in literature. Because, in thought, Hegel was a great revolutionary, all of world history was to him a history in the "progress and the consciousness of freedom." (18) It served as the point of departure and point of return of his greatest works.

Naturally, the reader can still object, saying: "Isn't it true that all alienations, oppositions, contradictions come to rest in the surmounting of the object of consciousness -- self-consciousness -- and becoming Absolute Knowledge? While it is true that the end, in Hegel, is but consummation of the beginning, nevertheless, ontologically, hasn't Hegel "transcended" all opposition, absorbed it all in Absolute Knowledge? No doubt he did replace theology with philosophy, but it is an Absolute all the same, isn't it? And isn't freedom just consciousness of freedom, not actual freedom?

It does, indeed, seem that at the end Absolute Knowledge, pure thought, has devoured actual freedom. This may have been Hegel's conscious aim. Using the philosopher as the yardstick, Hegel, no doubt meant to do just that, since "knowing", as Marx expressed it, "is his only act".

(18) Philosophy of History, p. 12.

Nevertheless, his "estranged insight" into man's actual development was driven by the dynamic of reality, the irresistible dialectic method, beyond the confines of Absolute Knowledge, because "Absolute Negativity" is the incessant motion, even the Absolute Idea does not escape negation; it becomes the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit. Let's follow Hegel into "Absolute Knowledge" and see.

Hegel begins and ends the final chapter, "Absolute Knowledge", by stressing that recollection of all stages of development is one way of grasping method of how the opposition between self-consciousness and its object was transcended in life. He begins his recall with the first section, with immediate "sense-experience" and its relatedness to "Other", partly as perception, and essentially as understanding. However, instead of going on to the next sequence -- self-consciousness, either as it expresses itself as Lordship and Bondage, Stoicism, Scepticism, or the Unhappy Consciousness -- Hegel stops in order to draw out what is the quintessential, not only of Section I, but of the entire Phenomenology and, indeed, of the whole "system", not a page of which had yet been written. Here is what he writes:

The object as a whole in the mediated result (the syllogism) or the passing of universality into individuality through specification, also the reverse process from the individual, to universal through cancelled individuality or specification. (19)

The ~~deceptive~~ simplicity of this logical conclusion is likely to catch the reader unaware that Hegel is here introducing the three central categories -- the Universal, Particular and Individual -- of the yet unwritten Science of Logic. It is to be noted that, though these categories are bound together into a syllogism, each remains itself, or more precisely, ~~is~~ is not-reducible to the other.

(19) Phenomenology, p. 790.

It has often enough been noted that the Phenomenology, ^{which} that has been conceived as an "Introduction" to the Logic, had ^{grown} grown to 800 pages and contained, in fact, many of the major ideas of the Logic, which would take nearly a decade to complete. However, this fact is stated merely in order to explain the difficulties in understanding the Phenomenology. The explanation is also used to separate what Hegel had called "the bacchanalian revel" from the "system"; as if the Logic had, in deed, swallowed up not only the passions of Self-Consciousness, of Man, but that the vision itself had been lost in "the still spaces of thought."

There is no doubt that the ten years separating Hegel's "voyage of discovery" from his "system" saw a reconciled philosopher. But it is not true, as we shall see later, that the driving forces no longer characterize the Logic. In any case, that is the very reason for the being of the Phenomenology. Hegel underscores that double negation, which characterizes the movement from Abstract (the Universal) to the concrete (the Individual) "through specification" (the Particular), holds true also when the process is reversed. In a word, of the negation, not "synthesis", characterizes also "the reverse process from the individual to the universal." (20) In his summation, Hegel demonstrates that this is so in every single stage of the development, and, therefore, from the very first section to the last, it is this which characterizes the whole of the Phenomenology.

It is crucial to grasp this movement from the abstract to the concrete as a self-movement, and not, as if it adheres to some sort of static triadic form. Though it was not Hegel, but Fichte and Schelling, who spoke

(20) Ibid.

of a philosophy as a development of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, this statement has so often been misread as an expression of Hegelian dialectic, that we must tarry a moment longer to show that the three categories mentioned here are not a "triplicity" (21), not a synthesis, not synthetic cognition, but the dialectic of self-development through a double negation. No matter what the phenomena are, thought molds the form of experience in a way that determines both the experience and "the ways in which consciousness must know the object as itself." Nor is the negation of the negation a "nullity". The positive is contained in the negative, which is the path to a new beginning. It characterises not only the Logic but life; or, more correctly put, it is a movement in the Logic, in the Phenomenology, and in the dialectics in general, because it is a fact of history as of life. It is ceaseless movement, a veritable continuous revolution. It is the life-blood of the dialectic. This is not because Hegel "imposed" it upon his Logic, or the Phenomenology, or the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. It is the nature of development. It is a fact of life.

Having underlined "this method of grasping the object, Hegel sends the readers back to the remembrance of things past, at the stage of Reason

(21) Later, when we grapple with the Logic, we shall hear Hegel laugh at the whole construct of triplicity, insisting that it's really a quadruplicity: "If number is applicable, then in the whole course this second immediate is the third term, the first immediate and the mediated being the other terms. But it is also third of a series composed besides of first (or formal) negative and absolute negativity or second negative; now, since the former (the first negative) is itself the second term, the third term may now be counted as fourth, and the abstract form of it may be taken as a quadruplicity in place of triplicity. (Science of Logic, Vol. II, p. 478)

where he had made his critique of the philosophies based on "pure ego".
 He notes that the moment came before consciousness as Pure Insight and Enlightenment, which may appear more relevant to our age.

This enlightenment completes spirit's self-estrangement in this realm, too, whether spirit in self-alienation turns to seek its safety us to a region where it becomes conscious of the peace of self-equipoise. Enlightenment upsets the household arrangements, which spirit carries out in the house of faith by bringing in the goods and furnishings belonging to the world of Here and the Now. (22)

There was
 The point is that in each case, no resolution of contradiction turns out to be but first negation must undergo a second negation. Thus, though the Enlightenment "upsets household arrangements in the house of faith" and succeeded in "bringing in the goods and furnishings belonging to the world of Here and Now," "pure culture" could not negate the "universal inversion" of reality and thought, their entire estrangement, the one from the other:

What is found in this sphere is that neither the concrete realities, state-power and wealth, nor their determinate conceptions, good and bad, nor the consciousness of good and bad (the consciousness that is noble and the consciousness that is base) possess real truth; it is found that all these moments are inverted and transmuted in one into the other, and each is the opposite of itself. (23)

No heaven is reached at the end of the highway of all other stages of alienation. The needed revolutions (24) never end. As Hegel himself expresses it in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy:

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 512. (23) *Ibid.*, p. 541

(24) No doubt, Hegel would have objected to the word, revolutions, but he himself, in the preface to the Phenomenology (p. 106) rears that his description that "the method is nothing else than the structure of the whole in its pure and essential form", when contrasted to his consideration that hitherto the question of philosophical method was dealt with in absolutely obsolescent forms, "may perhaps seem somewhat boastful or revolutionary..." He kept denying this. Yet, in the Encyclopedia, he boasted that "thought deprived existing institutions of their force. Constitutions feel victim to thought. Religion was assailed by thought... Philosophers were accordingly banished or put to death as revolutionists ..." (paragraph 19, Addition.)

"All revolutions, in the sciences no less than in general history, originate only in this, that the spirit of man, for the understanding and comprehension of himself, for the possessing of himself, has now altered his categories, uniting himself in a ~~far~~ deeper, more intrinsic relation with himself."

The crux of the matter is that this movement through double negation characterizes the transcendence of each stage of alienation as well as the whole "Science of the Experience of Consciousness," not excluding the Absolute, though the goal has been reached and a new unity of opposites achieved. If there is finally to be "a release", (25) a plunge into freedom, it can come only through the overcoming of internal opposition. Each new unity of opposites reveals that the opposition is within. The overcoming of the opposition can only occur through action. Though the reference is only to the activity of thought, practice does here become pivotal.

"Action", writes Hegel, "is the first inherent division of simple unity of the notion, and the return out of this division." (26) And again: "By this Knowledge." (27) It would appear that this meant action in thought only. Hegel, as Marx put it, "has separated thinking from Subject," from the human being who thinks, and by such "dehumanization" of ideas has created the illusion that the activities of knowledge can transcend the alienated world, whereas it can only be abolished by actions of real man. Nevertheless, even within Hegel's abstractions, one cannot help but feel the drive of existence -- time and reality. Hegel considers them as integral to "the last embodiment of spirit -- Absolute Knowledge", and notes that science does

(25) Ibid, p. 808.

(27) Ibid, P. 793

(26) Ibid, p. 793

(28) Ibid, p. 797

not appear in time and in reality till spirit had arrived at this stage /
of being consciousness regarding itself. 2

Hegel, it is true, remains in the realm of thought and idealizes time "as spirit's destiny and necessity". All the same, Time straightaway does things. Hegel, himself, tells us not to forget the sensuous feelings, just because we have reached Absolute Knowledge: "...nothing is known which does not fall within experience, or (as it is also expressed) which is not felt to be true ..."(29)

No matter which way you look, it is the movement, the self-creating "Subject", which is the principle underlying the Absolute, thereby distinguishing it from "the empty Absolutes" of other philosophers. Over and over and over again, Hegel points out that "It is inherently the movement which is the process of knowledge -- the transforming of that inherent nature into explicitness, of Substance into Subject, of the object of consciousness into the object of self-consciousness, i.e., into an object that is at the same time transcended -- in other words, into the notion. This transforming process is a cycle..."(30)

It now turns out that this "transforming process" is nothing short of History: "The process of carrying forward this form of knowledge of itself is the task which spirit accomplishes as actual History."(31) So that all the shadowy phrases on the following page^{s?}, which seem to project philosophers from Descartes, Leibnitz, ^{or 1?} Spinoza, to Kant, Fichte and Schelling, actually deal with specific historic periods. Nor can the serious reader fail to recall that his present attacks on "empty Intuition" were indicated as early

(29) Ibid. p. 800

(31) Ibid. p. 803

(30) Ibid. p. 801

(32) Ibid. p. 802

as the Preface* (which was actually written after the work was completed).
 "The arbitrary caprice of prophetic utterance" (32) was his own concept of
 "the seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labor of the negative."³

In opposition to such "arbitrary caprice", Hegel thrusts us straight
 against a new negativity: "Knowledge is aware not only of itself but also of
 the negative of itself, or its limit. Knowing its limit means knowing how to
 sacrifice itself ... This last form into which Spirit passes, Nature, is its
 living immediate process of development ..." (33)

This is certainly an upside-down way of presenting Nature. Some
 famous philosophers have analyzed this literally^y as if Nature "came out" of
 Spirit. Wrong as they are, the question of revealing the truth of the state-
 ment is nothing^{so} simple as standing Hegel right-side up. For one thing,
 Hegel quickly enough showed that the other aspect of Spirit is History.
 And today's commentators make no such gross errors in interpretation. The
 difficulty arises because Hegel seems here to shut the door on all reality
 as we reach the climactic last paragraph. Absolute Knowledge is said to have
 found "its pathway in the recollection of spiritual forms (Geister) as they
 are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their spiritual
 kingdom ... Both together, or History (intellectually) comprehended (begriffen),
 form at once the recollection and the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit, the reality,
 the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it were lifeless,
 solitary and alone." (34)

In truth, as we see, we have reached not heaven, but the Golgotha
 of Absolute Spirit. Hegel tries softening the shock of reaching death at the

*The reader should consult, along with the standard Baillie trans-
 lation from which we quote here, the new translation of the Preface by
 Walter Kaufmann. (Hegel, Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary, pp. 358-458)
 (33) Ibid. p. 807. (34) Phenomenology. p. 808.

very pinnacle of Theologians, among others, have, of course, not failed to call attention to the fact that Hegel was replacing Christian Theology with his own philosophy, which ^{This} is true and not true at the same time. Theology has been replaced by philosophy there; but Hegel, having spoken about ~~the new~~ world-spirit, having been "born anew from the womb of knowledge -- the new stage of existence, a new world, and a new embodiment or mode of Spirit," (35) has been referring to more than other "embodiments" of "World Spirits."

The whole chapter has been an outpouring of the "simple mediating activity in thinking" (36) which has led to this "release" of Spirit in History and Science, in Nature and Recollection, and in the birth of "a new world." This "new world", it is true, is nothing tangible. It will continue as the pure conceptual thought-categories of Science of Logic, for which the Phenomenology was the "Introduction." But this cannot obscure the fact that Absolute Knowledge was not, after all, the end. As usual, the end is the culmination of the beginning, which becomes a new point of departure, ^{the} ground for a new beginning. Hegel isn't standing stock-still as Absolute Knowledge becomes the foundation for a new level of truth, the dialectical development (or) which he will analyze in the Science of Logic. Neither have the objective world and the mass movement come to a stop. The movement is ceaseless. (37)

(35) Ibid. p. 806 .

(36) Ibid.

Jean Hyppolite, who traced, in detail, the relationship of the actual stages of the French Revolution to the sections of the Phenomenology (Genese et structure de la Phenomenologie de l'esprit de Hegel, Aubier, Paris, 1946), has also called attention to the fact that the new documents of Hegel's intellectual development -- Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung, p. 269, reproduced Hegel's remarks on "Sansculottismus". Not without interest for the American reader is that this document (p.249) quote; Hegel on the American Revolution as follows: "The tax imposed by the English Parliament upon tea imported into America was minimal, but the belief of the Americans that by accepting the payment of that sum, however insignificant in itself, they would be yielding at the same time their most precious right, made the American Revolution." Both quotations are part of Hyppolite's chapter, "The Significance of the French Revolution in Hegel's Phenomenology," in his book, Studies on Marx and Hegel, (Basic Books, 1969),

Section B -- SCIENCE OF LOGIC, or Attitudes to Objectivity

"The self-determination in
which alone the Idea is to
hear itself speak." -- Hegel

"Philosophy is not an illusion;
It is the algebra of history. --
Merleau-Ponty

As against the tangible struggles of consciousness and self-consciousness, in the Phenomenology, the "subject" of The Science of Logic is the abstract philosophic category. This does not mean that Hegel had returned to traditional metaphysics. It does not mean that his revolt was directed only against the petrification that metaphysics had undergone since Aristotle's Metaphysics. Nor were Hegel's dialectic concepts a mere counterposition of the dynamic to the static. Whatever elements of the dynamism of reality that had been present in Aristotelian philosophy, it was not that of the revolutionary period in which Hegel lived and ^{which} inspired his unique vision of a single dialectic process in actuality and in thought. Hegelian dialectical concepts of development through contradiction reflected that singular revolutionary reality. It allowed nothing, no "thing-in-itself", no abstract categories, no Absolutes, to escape the test of this new dialectic.

Hegel's concept of philosophy as "the thought of its time" involved, at one and the same time, a separation from the "empty Absolutes" of his philosophic contemporaries, and meeting the challenge of the times in a way ^{which} would both absorb past philosophies and yet be a historic continuity that was totally new, as new as the age of revolutions.

History has its own way of illuminating a serious work of philosophy. And the history of World War I, ^{which} on the one hand, caused the collapse of established Marxism (the German Social Democracy), and, on the other hand, led the most militant materialist of all, Lenin, to a new study of Hegel's idealism ^{Lenin's study} has lessons for our day. It led him to the conclusion that "Intelligent idealism is nearer to intelligent materialism than

"is stupid materialism. ~~It is~~ dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, vulgar, static instead of stupid." (37)

In our day, ironically enough, there are Hegelian scholars who are so eager to return Hegel to academia, cleansed of the "subversions" first by Marx and then by Lenin, that they find themselves in a veritable agreement with Communists, who, for their own reasons, wish Hegel kept in a closed ontological world. In any case, whether one feels that Hegelian philosophy is an impenetrable closed ontology, or the open road from which to view mankind's development as a totality, and ^{so} turns to the dialectic as to "the algebra of revolution," the point is that Hegel himself had not displaced reality when he entered the realm of "pure thought".

Quite the contrary. ~~It is~~ the pull of objective history which grounded Hegelian philosophy ⁱⁿ the principle of freedom, so much so that the successive "manifestations of the World Spirit" are forever finding themselves inadequate to the task of realizing this principle, and "perish^{ing}". Now it is true that the "perishing" is through aufhebung, which is not only negation, but "preservation." But that doesn't seem to speed us to the Absolute. Each realm -- Being, Essence, Notion -- starts afresh with new categories, on new grounds, and when we do reach the Absolute Idea, it, too, becomes a foundation for other "Manifestations" -- Nature, Mind.

The structure of the Logic shows no straight line to the Absolute; rather, the Logic is a circle. Each of its realms is a circle, ^{and not} only that.

Since, insofar as Hegel is concerned, the acceptance of any category at face value is an "uninstructed and barbarous procedure" (38), we must first examine each

(37) Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic. I happen to have ~~was~~ been the first to have translated this philosophic commentary of Lenin's. It appeared as Appendix B in the 1958 edition of Marxism and Freedom, and it is to that work that I will be referring. Since then, it has had an "official" translation in Moscow, and the reader can refer to Lenin's Collected Works, Vol. 38.

(38) Science of Logic, Vol. I, p. 36.

category before we can proceed forward. || The first question that Hegel poses is: "With What Must Science Begin?"

Here we are in the Science of Logic, having already gone through the whole of the Phenomenology and reached Absolute Knowledge, only to have Hegel ask, "With What Must Science Begin?" We are told, further, that if we are looking for an immediate, blatant, something that has as yet not undergone any mediation, we should know "there is nothing in Heaven, Nature, Spirit, or anywhere else, which does not contain immediacy as well as mediacy." (39) The same theme will be repeated at the very end of the "Doctrine of the Notion" — The Absolute Idea — but ^{we} are confronted all over again with the need for new beginnings! "There is neither in actuality nor in thought anything so simple and abstract as is commonly imagined. Such a simple entity is a mere illusion." (40)

In a word, Hegel's decision to begin the Logic with the "Doctrine of Being" shows the movement of the whole Logic ^{to be} from immediacy through mediation and return to immediacy. Or, to put it differently, using Hegel's revelation when we had reached Absolute Knowledge in the Phenomenology and were sent back to the remembrance of things past, the categories — Universal, Particular, Individual — which we will not meet until we reach the Doctrine of the Notion in the Logic disclose the movement from Abstract to Concrete. Whether you look at the Logic as a whole or any section of it, this will hold true. Hegel will never allow the readers to forget double negation as the motive force. ^{Thus} In a word, it isn't the first negation, say, of Essence versus Appearance, that overcomes a contradiction. It is only when it has reached the

(39) Logic, Vol. I, p. 80. (40) Ibid., Vol II, p. 477.

second negation that contradiction is transcended. ~~It is~~ True, that you cannot get to second negation without having undergone first negation; you have to negate what is immediately before you. But that does not resolve contradictions. It is only the second negation which has the positive in it, which creates a new foundation, a new beginning. The new beginning here, now that Hegel has decided to begin the Logic with the "Doctrine of Being", is Being and Nothing, both of which "perish" into becoming, which is what the Hegelian philosophy is all about -- a continuous process of becoming.

The exposition of this continuous process of becoming is followed throughout the Logic by "Observations", differentiating his philosophy from other philosophies. Nowhere is this more detailed than in Chapter I where, after three short paragraphs on Being, Nothing, Becoming, there follow no less than 22 pages of "Observations". What is crucial, however, is not the detail, but the relationship, ^{the} "Observations" have to a new structure that appears only in the "Smaller Logic", that of "Attitudes to Objectivity."

In Chapter I of the Science of Logic, in Observation 3rd (which is a critique of the isolation of the abstractions \leftarrow Being and Nothing, \leftarrow so that becoming could never have emerged out of them), Hegel remarks that "the most eloquent description -- perhaps already forgotten," (41) was given by Jacobi.

(40) A decade later, when Hegel prepared the much expanded second edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, he had evidently decided that, whether or not such an attitude was "forgotten", it would always recur in the movement or becoming when, in the process of transcending contradiction,

(41) Science of Logic, Vol I, p. 107

the subject becomes impatient with all the stages of negation it must suffer through, and instead rolls back into intuitionism. Hegel, therefore, introduces a whole new structure called "Attitudes to Objectivity". ¶ It consists of three chapters.

(1) Far from this triad signifying any sort of "synthesis", it signals, instead, a dismemberment. There is a forward movement from the first attitude, (which covers all pre-Kantian thought -- simple faith, the old metaphysics, abstract understanding, scholasticism, and dogmatism --) to the second attitude, which is devoted to both empiricism and Kantianism. But, instead of going forward from the empirical and the critical to the dialectic -- and, naturally, Hegel considered his dialectic the highest stage, the absolute -- there is a retrogression to Intuitionism; "the school of Jacobi", "which rejects all methods". (42) It becomes "wild", returns to the "dogmatic metaphysic of the past from which we started". Thus, it shows the "reactionary nature of the school of Jacobi." (43)

This backward step is seen also in the fact that Jacobi has reduced "mediation to the immediate, the intuitive," with "its passwords, 'Either-Or'" (44) Hegel calls attention to the fact that the whole of *his* Doctrine of Essence, § "a discussion of the intrinsically self-affirming unity of immediacy and mediation." (45)

(42) Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. Since what is known as the "Smaller Logic", included in it, has several editions, we will, instead of quoting pages, quote the paragraph number. This is paragraph 77. The further references will always say Encyclopedia, paragraph.

(43) Encyclopedia, par. 76

(44) Ibid., par. 66

(45) Ibid., par. 66.

You can hear Hegel's anger rising to a crescendo ^{at} the "one-sidedness" of the Intuitionists, ^{who take such reduction as a reluctant refusal} of the truth from something ^{which} arising from the "nature of the content", ^{but not to} pure subjectivism:

"Since the criterion of truth is found, not in the character of the content, but in the fact of consciousness, all alleged truth has no other basis than subjective knowledge, and the assertion that we discover a certain fact in our consciousness. What we discover in our own consciousness is thus exaggerated into a fact of consciousness of all and even passed off for the very nature of the mind." (46)

^{no para} The Science of Logic makes clear enough how sharply he separates his Absolutes from the "empty Absolutes" of his philosophic contemporaries.

¶ Our bringing in the attitudes to objectivity from Encyclopaedia here throws, we hope, ^{began to} a further illumination on what we started pointing out when we said its structure shows no straight line to the Absolute. Not only that. We shall now see that each realm has, so to speak, "its own" Absolute. Which is what Sartre may or may not have meant when he said that what was original with Existentialism was that the War and the Occupation "made us" rediscover the Absolute at the very heart of relativity itself." (47) Insofar as Hegel is concerned, the form of the Absolute that emerges in the Doctrine of Being was found to be relative, even as its categories -- Quality, Quantity, Measure -- were found wanting.

Conceptually, the Absolute that emerges in any specific realm is found to be relative. This is so, not merely because the Absolute, say, in the Doctrine of Being, is of a rather lowly kind -- Absolute Indifference, and, as such, it does not "attain to Essence, (48) though it is a transition to it. Even when we reach the ground of Essence, are done with Being and its quantitative measurements, turn to such essentialities as Identity, Difference, Contradiction, Appearance, Existence, Actuality, the contradictions only become the sharper. They are not so much synthesized as gathered for a life-and-death struggle.

(46) Ibid. par. 71. (47) Joan-Paul Sartre, What is Literature, p.148
 (48) Science of Logic, Vol I, p. 460

Now, whether one thinks of the categories in the "Doctrine of Being" as early stages of thought-development, or of previous societies in the history of mankind, or ^{3.5} separate stages of development within a given society, as, ^{for example,} Marx thought of the market phenomena under capitalism, these categories simply fall apart as one moves to a different stage of development, whether that be in history, philosophy or economics. Thus, when Marx left the deceptive sphere of market equality, of exchange of commodities and money, even as Hegel left the 'Doctrine of Being' with its quantitative measurements, to enter the crucial labor process and there meet relation of labor and capital at ^{the} point of production, he had fully transcended the restricted Hegelian concept of labor (49), ^{accusing} Hegel of limiting his own dialectic to a ^{the} exterior (consciousness) rather than ^{the} interior (man) form. But Marx did not end his greatest theoretical work with the analysis of the labor process, as Hegel had not ended his Logic with the Doctrine of Essence. What is exciting in that section is that the form of the Absolute makes its appearance in Actuality.

The categories from the Doctrine of Being, having broken down as they had to reflect the reality in its essentials, Hegel introduces new categories -- Identity, Difference, Contradiction. To this day, philosophers have not "forgiven" Hegel for placing contradiction in the center of reality. Hegel went his way: "Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only insofar as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity." (50) As he continues on his separate way from the old metaphysics,

(49) Nicholas Lobkowitz is about the only philosopher-theologian who, despite his antagonism to Marx, pinpoints what it was that Marx criticized in Hegel's analysis of labor: "In short, Marx does not accuse Hegel of having treated labor as if it were a thought activity. Rather he accuses him of having in the Phenomenology described human history in terms of the dialectic of consciousness, not in terms of the dialectic of labor. When he shows that the only labor which Hegel recognizes is abstract mental labor, he has in mind the structure of the Phenomenology and, in fact, of Hegel's whole philosophy, not the passages of labor in the Phenomenology and other writings of Hegel." (Theory and Practice, p. 322) *Marx's Critique of Hegel's Phenomenology of Ideas* (See chapter 10, block)

(50) Science of Logic, Vol. II, p. 67.

moreover, it is clear that essence is not merely something "behind" appearance. From the very start of the "Doctrine of Essence", Hegel establishes the reality even of show, for Essence, too, must appear and get to Essence only from the unity of Existence and Appearance. The truth is always concrete.

All contradictions, grounds, conditions develop, become more acute, as we reach Actuality, in which historic materialists can see the totality of the crisis of capitalism. What Hegel does is have the Absolute make its appearance directly in Actuality, at its very start. What seems even less understandable to adherents of "empty absolutes" is that the Absolute fails to develop Actuality in a satisfactory manner. The contradiction between the Absolute and Actuality becomes explicit. It is true we are not facing Hegel's Absolutes. The self which does the transcending of opposites here has moved from the abstract principle of so doing (Leibniz) to Absolute Substance (Spinoza). "Determinateness is negation -- this is the Absolute principle of Spinoza's philosophy, and this true and simple insight is the foundation of the absolute unity of Substance. But Spinoza does not pass on beyond negation as determinateness or quality to a recognition of it as absolute, that is, self-negating, negation ... Therefore, Substance lacks the principle of personality ..." (51)

The fact that the polemical movement in the Logic here occurs in Actuality illuminates the objective drive as well as the historic conflict in a manner far beyond a conflict of categories. One needs to be almost oppressively aware of this polemical movement as a conflict of fact (52)
 (51) Ibid., p. 168

(52) "Free, philosophic thought has this direct connection with practical freedom; that as the former supplies thought about the absolute, universal and real universality ... On account of this general connection between political freedom and the freedom of thought, Philosophy only appears in History where and in as far as free institutions are formed." (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol I., p. 95)

as well as of Thought. The objective pull of history will be unmistakably clear in the Philosophy of Mind: "When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength, just because it is the very essence of mind, and that as its very actuality." And, it is this which literally breaks down the categories of the Doctrine of Essence at the stage where Actuality moves from the form of the Absolute as Substance to its form as Contingency, Necessity, Causality and Reciprocity, as we approach the Doctrine of the Notion that Hegel characterized as "the realm of Subjectivity or Freedom." (53).

As Hegel let us know in the Phenomenology he has no use for "the sceptic of genius" who does not wish to go through "the seriousness, labor, patience, suffering of the negative" who wishes to reach for the Absolute "like a shot of the pistol." What he said, when he, Schelling, Fichte, the romanticists in mind, Hegel, in more temperate terms, as we saw, directed in the Science of Logic against his Absolutes from those of Leibnitz and Spinoza specifically in the section on the Absolute as it appears in the Doctrine of Essence.

Now that we are in the Doctrine of the Notion, it would seem, on the surface, that we had reached the end of the polemical movement. As against some thirty "Observations" in Book I and fourteen in Book II, there are only two in the whole of Book III. In fact, however, the polemical movement is just as intransigent, but it is no longer separated as if they were "side remarks" and are directly in the text.

Hegel obviously feels that the turning point of the whole movement of Notion -- the second negativity which will transcend the opposition between

(53) Science of Logic, Vol II, p. 205.

Notion and Reality, two "enemies" must again once and for all be "negated".

(1) synthetic cognition which recognizes the relationship between Universality and Particular, "stops dead", will not move to the second negativity, to the concrete, the individual; (2) Intuitionism which sees "nullity" as only possible result from absolute negativity or double negation. Hegel, therefore, wants to define what exactly is "the most important part of rational cognition." How one must hold on to the positive in the negative: "To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole Logic consists of these." (54)

~~Lenin's view of it is~~
 As if it were indeed an intransigent political debate against all other "parties", from the Social Democracy (Kant to Hegel) to Anarchism (Intuitionism to Hegel), Lenin was inspired by the Movement, Doctrine of the Notion, not only to separate himself from all other tendencies but to break with his own philosophic past, and, at that subjective point in the Doctrine of the Notion, to work out the relationship between the objective and the philosophic movements in mankind's development:

check paragraph

"When Hegel tries -- sometimes even strains himself and worries to death -- to subsume the purposeful activity of man under the categories of logic, saying that this activity is the 'syllogism' that the subject plays the role of some sort of 'member in the logical figure; of the syllogism, etc., then this is not only a strain, not only a game. There is here a very deep content, purely materialistic. It is necessary to turn this around: The practical activity of man, repeated billions of times, must lead the consciousness of man to the repetition of the various logical figures in order that these can achieve the significance of an axiom. This nota bene." (p. 343) (55)

(54) Ibid., p. 476

(55) Appendix B, Marxism and Freedom, p. 343.

The Doctrine of the Notion deals with the categories of freedom, of subjectivity, of reason, the logic of a movement by which man makes himself free. Despite the fact that its universals are thought universals, they are concrete. (56) Hegel keeps reiterating that even when Notion realizes itself through "otherness", even when "through the transcendence of this reality" it has "established absolute reality",¹⁷ so that the "result" is "truth"; in a word, even when he has "comprehended" it all, even then it has not been "properly comprehended by forms of judgment like 'the third term is immediacy and mediation', or it is their unity, for it is not a quiescent third term, but, as this unity, is self-mediating movement and activity." (57)

The movement has not come to a halt. The dialectic is still at work. It cannot be otherwise: "The beginning was the universal; the result is the individual, the concrete and subject ..." Nor is subjective any longer separate from objective; the negation of the negation "is the innermost and most objective movement of Life and Spirit." (58)

The Doctrine of the Notion expresses man's subjective determination, the need to master himself. What is being worked out in thought categories is the real history of humanity. Whether ^{or not} the Hegelian concept of self-relation is being "subverted" as revolution in Marx's "translation," the point is that to Hegel, too, it is a constant transformation of reality and of thought which

(56) The Lenin Institute Archives (425977), says Adoratsky in his Introduction to Lenin's Philosophic Notebooks (Leninski Sbornik, Vol XII, 1930, edited by Bukharin, Molotov, Savelov), have a record of the books by and on Hegel that Lenin read in the critical years 1920 and 1921. He notes also that the theologian Ilyin's work on Hegel so impressed Lenin that he interceded ^{to gain} for his release from jail.

(57) Science of Logic, Vol II, p. 479. (58) Ibid., p. 478.

prepares for a "new world". This is why from the outset of the Doctrine of Notion we see Hegel constantly trying to set his dialectic apart from Kant's:

"It will always remain a matter of astonishment how the Kantian Philosophy knew that relation of thought to sensuous existence, where it halted for a merely relative relation of bare appearance, and fully acknowledged and asserted a higher unity of the two in the Idea in general, and particularly, in the idea of an intuitive understanding: but yet stopped dead at this relative relation and at the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separated from reality; so that what is announced to be finite knowledge, and declared to be superfluous and improper figments of thought that which it recognized as truth, and of which it established a Notion. (59)

For the next 250 pages Hegel has kept developing from the spot where Kant "stopped dead" by putting an impenetrable "thing-in-itself" between thought and feeling. Because our concern is with the Absolute Idea, to be seen with eyes of today, we cannot go into analysis of how Hegel breathed new life not only into the traditional categories of Subjectivity--Universal, Particular, Individual as well as into the Judgments and Syllogisms,--and the categories of Objectivity--Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology--which separated him both from scientism and subjectivism. Suffice it to say that it is precisely the Doctrine of the Notion which gave Lenin so great a feeling of a plunge to freedom that he exclaimed: "Practice in the theory of cognition. Alias: Man's cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it." (60)

There is a dialectic in practice. There is a dialectic in thought. It seems to go its own way. But, says Hegel, in the very first sentence, of the final chapter: "The Absolute idea has now turned out to be the identity of the Theoretical and the Practical Idea; each of these by itself is one-sided ..." (61) Thus, neither can pass beyond the contradiction. Anyone who was looking for the end of all contradictions once we reached the Absolute better look elsewhere, for here they are first to confront a real snocker as Hegel informs that the Absolute Idea contains the highest opposition within itself." (62) It is true he will, in the same paragraph, also tell us that the "Absolute Idea alone is Being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and the whole of truth." But, far from stopping

(60) APPENDIX C. PRACTICE AND FREEDOM, p. 347
 (61) LECTURES ON AESTHETICS, VOL. III, p. 400. (62) IBID

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there, the greater part of the whole chapter will concern itself with the dialectic method. As against the way of the Phenomenology, when we were sent on a remembrance of things past when we reached Absolute Knowledge, in the Science of Logic, when we reach Absolute Ideas we find it is not a review of the stages by which the Absolute was reached. Instead, of concerning ourselves with either the past or the content, self-determination of the idea is Hegel's preoccupation: "The self-determination therefore in which alone the Idea is, is to hear itself speak." (63)

Naturally revolutionary contemporaries are a great deal more concerned with the self-determination of nations than of ideas, but the goal, Freedom, and how to achieve it, is not so far removed from the self-determination of the idea of Freedom as may appear at first sight, and the principle of Freedom is the ground of ^{Hegel's} his whole philosophic system. In any case, what Hegel is driving at is this "having-been witness to the overcoming of the opposition between content and form in thought, the only thing that still remains to be done, is to consider "the universal element of its form -- the method." (64)

The development of what the dialectic method is as far removed from the mechanical triplicities of thesis, antithesis, synthesis as earth is from heaven. And it is the earthy character of liberation, which is the very bones and sinews of Hegel's universals. Though they are enclosed in thought, these universals are concrete, full of life and development. Not single unification, whether of subject and object, or theory and practice, or *concept*

(63) Science of Logic, Vol II, p. 467

(64) Ibid.

and reality, is merely subjectivist and external. Nor is Hegel, excluding his Absolutes from the need to be subjected to the dialectic method: "The method therefore is both soul and substance, and nothing is either conceived or known in its truth except insofar as it is completely subject to the method; it is the peculiar method of each individual fact because its activity is the Notion. (65)

Now, whereas up to ~~to~~ ^{Notion}, though the climax of the three books of the Science of Logic, was only the first section of this third book, Notion now becomes "everything", that is to say: "the pure correspondence between Notion and Reality" (66). As opposed to the method in inquiring, analytic cognition, where it was a mere "tool" in "truth", that is to say, dialectic cognition, there is ^{here?} no distinction between means and end. There is no other way to reach the goal, except through the dialectic. Once again there is a need for new beginnings. Now that we have reached a concrete totality, the key concept of Hegel's philosophic system, "as concrete, it is internally differentiated..." This is the type of differentiation that serious revolutionaries of our day confronted with Stalinism's transformation of a revolutionary state into its opposite, ^{and} have recognized to be the counter-revolution within the revolution. Philosophically, too, Hegel is searching for new beginnings.

The concrete Universal manifests itself as absolute activity, activity without restriction, either external or internal, for the method is the form of the Absolute Idea, the new stage of identity of theory and practice. It allows no opposites merely peacefully to co-exist, or, to use Hegel's words, to come "before consciousness without being in contact", "but engages all in battle."

(65) Science of Logic, Vol II, p. 468

(66) Ibid.

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The movement of the Absolute Idea, as of the Logic in general, has been from the recognition of opposition and refusal to stop in sight of them as if they were "fixed", to seeing them as transitions "in and for themselves"; from awareness of just how objectively grounded the universals^{are}, to the realization that the Absolute Idea is only an "in itself", only a potential which will determine itself through its own dialectical self-development; from consciousness that the beginning is not only an empirically "given", that the immediate is itself a mediated result, to the concept of the concrete as concrete totality and therefore ^{it} itself contains self-differentiation; and finally this, above all: the movement of viewing the dialectic moment as the "equally synthetic and analytic moment of the Judgment by which original universal determines itself to be its own "other" ^S inevitably propelling one, not just to the first, but to the second negation, ~~the~~ turning point of the whole movement: "It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between Notion and Reality, and the unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone." (65)

Think of it: here is the man of the Absolute reaching the heights and what does he pound away at? Absolute negativity. Is this negation of the negation just another abstraction? The very opposite; the crux, he says, is not the abstract but the concrete: "Each new stage of exteriorization, of further determination is also an interiorization, and the greater extension is also the most concrete and subjective term and that which carries itself back into the simplest depth is also the most powerful and comprehensive." (66)

(65) Science of Logic, Vol. II, p. 477

(66) Ibid., p. 483

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-358-

Throughout the chapter on the Absolute Idea, Hegel "sums" up the whole Logic by constantly contrasting what the dialectic is here against what it was in the Doctrine of Being, what it became in the Doctrine of Essence, and how it is that a new emerged not only in the Doctrine of Notion in general, but in the Absolute Idea in particular, for the highest contradiction is in cognition itself. From the very first sentence in this final chapter he stressed that the Theoretical and Practical are each "by itself one-sided and contains the Idea itself only as a sought beyond and an unattained goal." (67) And now that we have reached "the equally synthetic and analytic moment", Hegel makes us trace our steps to where we first met "Other" in the Doctrine of Being, where the dialectic movement was confined to a transition into something else. In the Doctrine of Essence we found that the "something else" was the very thing we were examining, the something itself, its other. Now that the Doctrine of Notion shows us what was immanent in the objective movement itself was that it was "its own Other." What is its significance, not as ontological Idealism's "delusion", to use an expression of Marx's, that thinks it can "absorb" the objective world into itself, but as an ideal toward which man aims?

Hegel's answer is that it is the turning point of the whole movement of the notion: "It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between Notion and Reality, and the unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone." (68) Think of it: here is the man of the Absolute reaching the heights and what does he pound away at? Absolute negativity.

(67) Science of Logic, Vol II, p. 466

(68) Ibid., p. 477.

Anyone who thinks that the achievement of this self-relation can be contained by Hegel because he, as philosopher, has attained it in the Prussian state, is, in fact, denying the compulsions of a birthtime in history when, in outline, or as in a flash, we get a glimpse of the future not of a revolution, but the age of revolutions.^{Even} As Hegel consciously thinks only of different spheres, disciplines, sciences, concerned only with the "totality"; seeing each as a "fragment" of a chain, each of which "has a before and an after ... or rather, each has only a before, and in its conclusions shows its after." (69) He sees that the "systematic development in itself a realization." (70) And "as totality in this form, it is Nature". (71)

Precisely where Hegel sounds most abstract, seems to close the shutters tight against the whole movement of history, there he lets the lifeblood of the dialectic -- absolute negativity--pour in. It is true Hegel writes as if the resolution of opposing live forces can be overcome by a mere thought transcendence. But he has, by bringing oppositions to their most logical extreme, opened new paths, new relationships of theory to practice which Marx had worked out as a totally new relationship of philosophy to revolution and which today's revolutionaries can turn their backs on at their own peril.

Professor Findlay may be right in saying that Hegel's exegeses "can seem arid and false to those who see nothing mysterious and god-like in the facts of human thought." (72) But it is equally true that those who stand only in terror before social revolution can neither "comprehend" an actual revolution nor the revolution in thought and Hegel did revolutionize philosophy. Professor Findlay himself admits: "But though Hegel remains within the world of common sense and science, and does not undermine its reality his approach to it is neither commonsensical nor scientific: he sees the fact of the world in a revolutionary manner, which is not that of any other philosopher."

(69) Ibid., p. 484. (70) Ibid., p. 486
 (71) Ibid., p. 485 (72)
 (72) Hegel: A re-examination. p. 344.

The red thread that has run throughout this final chapter on the Absolute Idea, the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, to that form of life which is the activity of the Notion, is free creative power. And fantastic as it may sound to those who insist Hegel was talking only of ideas when he himself talks of reality as well, it is Hegel, who after identifying Freedom with Idea, wrote "The Idea is not so feeble as merely to have a right or an obligation to exist without actually existing. (73) That is why the chapter of the Absolute Idea is overwhelmingly just about method, the new stage of identity of theory and practice which we have reached, and not just about previous forms of cognition, analytic or synthetic, empiric or intuitive. It is the shock of this recognition which made Lenin interpret the last page as the eve of the transformation of idealist dialectic into dialectical materialism: "This phrase on the last page of the Logic is exceedingly remarkable. The transition of the logical idea is to Nature. It brings one within a hand's grasp of materialism." (74) Whatever one may think of Lenin's interpretation, it certainly cuts through the fantasies of the neo-Hegelians who philosophized endlessly about "deducing" Nature from Thought. That Lenin's statement is not as far-fetched as it sounds will become clearer when we will follow Hegel's transition from Logic to Philosophy of Nature, and from that to Philosophy of Mind, the completion of his Encyclopedia, not as it sounds when it is merely anticipated in a single paragraph at the end of the Logic but as it is developed in full in Absolute Mind.

This author is not attempting anything as idiotic as "identifying" Hegel and Marx, nor to fly in face of the fact that Hegel, the most encyclopaedic mind, the intellectual titan of the 19th century who took such sharp exception to the empty Absolutes of other philosophers and tried so valiantly

(73) Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, para. 6

(74) Appendix B, Marxism and Freedom, p. 352

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-38-

to extricate himself from closed ontologies, nevertheless ended his own philosophy in a series of Absolutes. In the Phenomenology of Mind, Absolute Knowledge was the unity of History and Science, or History intellectually comprehended. In the Science of Logic, the Absolute Idea was the unity of theory and practice that has overcome all opposition between concept and reality. In the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, it was Absolute Mind where Hegel, soon after his return from the Philosophy of Nature writes "the Absolute is Gaist -- this is the supreme definition of the Absolute" (75) happens to be where the young Marx broke off his "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic". This is where we shall begin. (P. 384)

(75) Encyclopaedia, para. 384

A/10

Section C. — THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: A Movement from Practice

" The heads which philosophy used for reflection can be cut off later by the revolution for whatever purpose it likes. But philosophy would never have been able to use the heads cut off by the revolution if the latter had preceded it. — Heinrich Heine

" The main shortcoming of all materialism up to now (including that of Feuerbach) is that the object, the sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of intuition; not, however, as sensuous human activity, Praxis; not subjectively. Hence, the active side was developed abstractly in opposition to materialism by idealism ... — Marx

" We are now entering the rarified atmosphere of the "system". The Philosophy of Nature intervened between the Logic (the abbreviated version of The Science of Logic) and the Philosophy of Mind. The voluminous debates on the transition from Logic to Nature, which gave Hegelians, to use Marx's phrase, "terribundus headache" have not stopped to this day when most Hegel scholars (76) very nearly disregard the Philosophy of Nature. The reason for this neglect is supposed to be due to the fact that science has made such great strides that the book is obsolete and irrelevant. This was not the reason for Marx's criticism.

Marx's sharpest criticism was directed to the need for Hegel to go to Nature after the Logic. "The whole Logic is, therefore, the proof that abstract thinking is nothing for itself, that the Absolute Idea is nothing for itself, until Nature is something." (77) In doing so, continues Marx, Hegel falls into the same error for which he had attacked abstract understanding, i.e. the retention of the antithesis between Subject and Object, thereby revealing that

(76) The exception is Professor J.N. Firsirot. See his Hegel Reinterpretation.

(77) Appendix A, Marxism and Evolution, p. 322

the philosopher, even when he reaches a concrete universal must nevertheless again go to external reflection for content and objectification of the Absolute which had been reached by the dialectical development of thought; the mere transposition of which is first in life, in reality -- Nature -- would not have helped for Man is nowhere to be seen. And here Marx lashes out against Hegel for separating "thinking from the subject". (78) "Man, alienated from himself, is also the thinker who is alienated from his essence, i.e., his natural and human essence. His thoughts are therefore fixed spirits, residing outside Nature and Man."

Different historic periods bring in new views also among revolutionary materialists. Thus, Lenin, regaining from the shock that it was formal, established, materialist Marxism that betrayed the proletariat by voting credits to the Kaiser's Germany in WWI, saw even Hegel's idealism in a new light. As we saw before, Lenin interpreted the last page of the Logic, which pointed out the transition to Nature as "stretching a hand to materialism." The elements of materialism, of objectivity, of practice, of a world outside of, and independent of Mind -- these are what Lenin stressed in the Logic is "going to" Nature.

In the immediate post WWII period, Existentialism, which was engaged in battle with the narrow "determinism" of French Communism's petrified Marxism which reduced everything, including History and Nature, to "matter" regulated by "iron laws", economic and scientific and behavioral, hailed Hegel's profundity in analysing Nature as "exteriority". The post WWII French revival of Hegel studies survived the split within Existentialism, this time on the question of reality. Unfortunately, Merleau-Ponty's The Adventures of the Dialectic confirmed the confinement of the Hegel, as well as of Marx to its own rarified intellectualism.

(78) Ibid., p. 323

On the other hand, the period following the death of Stalin, which lifted the weight under which East Europe had lain prostrate, witnessed absolutely unprecedented, totally new, spontaneous proletarian revolts from under totalitarian Communism's overlordship. These new leaps to freedom led to totally new departures for thought. The ideological debates that followed then on both Marx and Hegel had now to probe the new beginnings from practice. Nor were they restricted to East Europe or West Europe for that matter. These new impulses from below, from practice, -- be that from political practice of the masses in East Europe or from the workers battles against Automation in the U.S. (79) -- compelled new reinterpretation of Hegel and of Marx. The debates on the humanism of Marxism and the dialectics of Hegel escaped the intellectual confines of the previous decade. In all cases, no matter how profoundly the groundwork has been laid by co-thinkers, academic or revolutionary, it became necessary to once again re-examine Hegel with eyes of today.

In viewing Hegel with eyes of today, it is impossible to escape the fact that what led to the re-examination of Hegel was a movement from practice. Naturally, Hegel did not, could, and no doubt would have opposed ^{any} view of his construct as if it arose "from below." The point at issue, however, is not Hegel's own consciousness, but the logic of absolute negativity that he had caught from the objective historic movement as well as from "the pure movement of thought."

It is true that we have reached the rarified atmosphere of the system "on completion" and, by no means as either thoroughgoing or moving a work as either The Phenomenology or the Science of Logic, nor are the subjects as comprehensively dealt with as in the vast series of Lectures, one volume of the Philosophy of History, three volumes on History of Philosophy, four on Aesthetics and the last complete work from his own pen, Philosophy of Right. Nevertheless, even in the abbreviated "revised" Encyclopaedia, so heady is the earthy quality of Freedom that it is still built into the very structure of the Philosophy of Mind. Freedom is indeed the construct of the world Hegel

built. Though it went by the name of World Spirit and even that was only the "manifestation" of Absolute Spirit, it was always the reality of freedom that created the conditions for the freedom of the mind. Even Hegel's own reconciliation, not with a rational but the most irrational state of Prussia, this still could not, in the strictly philosophic development, put brakes on the drive of the dialectic.

Thus, from the very first paragraph of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (80) Hegel stresses the new now that we are facing "man's genuine reality" "the universal, man as man". Naturally, Hegel adds "and that always must be, as mind." "But, first, here "Mind has for its presupposition Nature"(81) and, secondly, the identity here of subject and object does not escape "absolute negativity" for the essential feature of mind is "is Liberty, i.e., it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity." (82)

Any who still persist in saying that Hegel's concept of freedom is only conceptual must answer why, when Hegel reaches the last paragraph of Section I, Mind Subjective -- Free Mind -- he spells it out as actual, full-blown; inherent, absolute, unconditioned "The Good is the Good that is the Good in itself, just because it is the very essence of mind, and that as its very actuality. . . . The Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, did not have it. On the contrary, they saw that it is only by birth (as e.g. an Athenian, or Spartan citizen), or by strength of character, education, or philosophy (-the sage is free even as a slave and in chains) that the human

(79) See the Chapter on Automation and the New Humanism in Marxism and Freedom; also Workers Battle Automation by Charles Denby. Opposite conclusion than either those drawn by myself or the auto worker, Charles Denby, were made not only by "scientists" but also by philosophers from the Existentialist to Herbert Marcuse. (See his One-Dimensional Man.)

(80) Philosophy of Mind, para. 377.

(81) Ibid., para. 381.

(82) Ibid., para. 382.

being is actually free. It was through Christianity that this idea came into the world." (83)

Further, to stress that freedom is of the essence of man as man, Hegel continues: "If to be aware of the idea - to be aware, i.e. that men are aware of freedom as their essence, aim, and object - is matter of speculation, still this very idea itself is the actuality of man - not something which they have, as man, but which they are." (84)

The young Hegel, fired by the enthusiasm for the French Revolution and concerned with "negative labor" wrote: "I shall demonstrate that, just as there is no idea of a machine, there is no idea of the State, for the State is something mechanical. Only that which is an object of freedom may be called an idea." (85)

The old Hegel, in his final system, still cannot resist writing: "the will is the immediate individuality, self-instituted-- an individuality, however, also purified of all that interferes with its universalism, i.e., with freedom itself." (86)

The unity of the individual and the universal, the path of total liberation, is the path toward Absolute Mind. At this, the pinnacle of Hegel's system, philosophy is the ultimate manifestation of Absolute Spirit, Hegel, nevertheless, attacks "systems". Just as Hegel separated his Absolutes from those of other philosophies, so he separated his system from all others philosophic systems. It is precisely in this last section on philosophy that he attacks the very concept of system. "They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute only as substance ... They represent the Absolute as the utterly universal genus which dwells in the special or existences, but dwells so potently that these

(84) Ibid., (85) Dokumente zu Hegel Entwicklung, quoted by Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution.

(86) Philosophy of Mind, para. 481.

existences have no actual reality. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind."⁽⁸⁷⁾

This was Hegel's principle from the outset, beginning with the Preface to the Phenomenology where he told us that "The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things ... (and set about its own transformation." It remained his principle throughout, evidenced in the last lecture on the History of Phil-
osophy when he summoned his students "to give ear to its (Spirit's) urgency, when the mode that is within, forces its way out -- and we have to make it a reality."

In Hegel, of course, it signifies the "unfolding" of the World Spirit or the Absolute or God. So strong is the objective pull of the dialectic of history -- and Hegel considered philosophy to run "parallel" with it -- that one could, not too misleadingly, "translate" the Absolute as new society. After all, he himself, in the PHENOMENOLOGY, refers to "a new world." Let us see what Hegel does now as he approaches the penultimate of his life's work. Just as Hegel had, in the second (1827) edition of the Encyclopaedia, created room for the summation of and many and varied historic and philosophic attitudes to objectivity by jamming them up into but 3 Attitudes to Objectivity, so in the last year before his sudden death, in preparing the 1830 ed. he added 3 new syllogisms (para. 573-77) to sum his whole system.

As usual with Hegel, for whom philosophy is a circle of circles, we no sooner reach the end than he returns us to the beginning. The first of the 3 last syllogisms reads: "The first appearance is formed by the syllogism which is based on the logical system as starting point, with Nature for the middle term which couples mind with it. The logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. (88)

⁽⁸⁷⁾ Ibid., para. 573 (f.) Ibid., para. 575

Once again we see the movement from Nature. In the Logic, too, we must not forget the Absolute Idea emerged out of the Practical Idea which we were told was higher than the Theoretical Idea since it had not only the "dignity" of the universal, but was "immediately actual." Our age should not encounter unsurmountable difficulties in understanding the movement from practice inherent in the final syllogisms of Absolute Mind for it is after all our postwar world that pulled Hegelian dialectics out of the academic halls and philosophic books on to the living stage of history. It is true that this transformation of Hegel into a contemporary has been via Marx. It is no accident, however, that established Communism's attack on Marx has been via Hegel. Because they recognize in the so-called mystical Absolute "the negation of the negation" the revolution against themselves, Hegel remains so alive and worrisome to the Communist rulers today. The Hungarian Revolution still haunts them. For one thing these intellectual bureaucrats sense correctly. Hegel's concept of the Absolute and the international struggle for freedom are not as far apart as it would appear on the surface.

What is needed, it seems to this writer, is to be aware, even oppressively aware, of the simple truth that Hegel's categories are not only permeated with reality, but the Idea itself is real, lives, moves, transforms reality. It was, after all, Hegel, who, at the very pinnacle of the system we are now considering, he pointed to the fact that there was movement from Nature or practice to logic.

245

Naturally he wasn't aware of any such movement as the present writer describes. Not only because it wouldn't happen for more than a century, but because, as a philosopher, isolated in an ivory tower, he couldn't have imagined that masses in motion, their self-development rather than that of ideas, or the custodian of ideas -- the philosophers -- would humanize, so to speak, "the absolute negativity", unite freedom and reality. Nevertheless -- and here precisely lies Hegel's genius -- Hegel simply couldn't keep himself from carrying through the development of an Ide to its logical conclusion. Let us now follow him as he shows us how Nature sunders itself: "Nature standing between the Mind and its essence sunders itself from them: for the syllogism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a starting point, the negative factor and as implicitly the Idea." (90)

Note that this is stated, not in Objective Mind, but in Absolute Mind. Yet the sundering has been neither to mount "the extremes of finite abstractions, nor as mere link between practice and theory. Being "implicitly the idea" prepares us for the next syllogism (91) where Geist, "as mediating agent in the process, presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea; Philosophy appears as a subjective cognition of which liberty is the aim, and which is itself the way to produce it."

In a word, on the one hand, philosophy appears as a subjective deed, the act of knowing, cognition. On the other hand, it, itself, is the means by which liberty is achieved or, more precisely put, it is not "on the one hand", "on the other hand" but the integrality of aim and means.

Now that there is no separation between means and aim, we can also move to the unity of object and subject, "the self-knowing universal" that Hegel

(90) Ibid., para. 575

(91) Ibid., para. 576

analyses in the last syllogism. The idea of philosophy which has self-knowing universal for its middle term; a middle which divides itself into Mind and Nature, making the former its presupposition, as process of the Idea's subjective activity; and the latter its universal extremes as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea .. It is the nature of the fact, the notion which causes the movement and development; yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. (92)

First to be noted is that here, too, Hegel as the philosopher of "absolute negativity" is the statement that the Idea of philosophy likewise sunders itself so that Mind becomes the presupposition — the interchangeability of presuppositions and mediating agents, thus stressing that the self-movement is ceaseless, and that even "the absolute universal" can play the role of "mediating agent", or what Lenin called "the bacillus" of proletarian revolution when he insisted that the "dialectic of revolution" ** was such that even a national revolution, such as the Easter Uprising in Ireland, could be the impulse to international revolution. The fact that either the Universal or the Particular or the Individual could be "the beginning" gives yet another facet to the concept of subjectivity when there are real men to carry through "the historic mission" (Hegel's own words in the early works) of transforming reality both in theory and practice. We will develop this further when we come to working out its implications for our own age. Here, where we are tracing the self-development of the Absolute as Hegel saw it, it is of the essence to recognize that even at the end Hegel puts the stress on the fact that the whole movement emerges, and that the subjective action of cognition is at one with "the nature of the fact."

(92) Ibid., para. 577

At the very end -- the last sentence -- the eternal does "take over":
The eternal idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work,
engenders and enjoys itself as Absolute Mind."

Most academicians of "the West", especially in the United States, have too easily dismissed Marxist interpretation as "subversion." One profound exception is Karl Lowith, who, despite his opposition to Marx, hesitates neither to trace the integrality of Hegelian and Marxian dialectic, nor to point to the petrification of Hegel studies brought on by the Hegel scholars themselves because "The bourgeois intelligentsia had ceased in practice to be an historically oriented class, thereby losing the initiative and impact of their thought." (92) What is needed, it seems to this writer, is to be aware, even oppressively aware of the simple truth that Hegel's categories are not only saturated with reality, but the Idea itself is real, lives, moves, transforms reality. It was, after all, Hegel, who, at the very pinnacle of the system we are now considering, had pointed to the fact that there was a movement from Nature or practice to Logic. Naturally he wasn't aware of any such movement as the author described. (Not ~~only~~ only because he wasn't aware of any such movement as the author described.) Not only because it wouldn't happen for more than a century, but because, as a philosopher, isolated in an ivory tower, he didn't, he couldn't have imagined that masses in motion their self-development rather than that of ideas of the custodian of ideas -- the philosophers -- would humanize, so to speak, "the absolute negativity", unite freedom and reality. Nevertheless -- and here precisely lies Hegel's genius -- Hegel simply couldn't keep himself from carrying through the development of an Idea to its logical conclusion.

The pluri-dimensional in Hegel, his presupposition of the infinite capacities of man to grasp through to the "Absolute", not as something

(92) Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought. (p. 120)

isolated in heaven, but as a dimension of the human being, even though Hegel thinks only of the philosophy, reveals what a great distance humanity has travelled from Aristotle's Absolutes. Because Aristotle lived in a society based on slavery, his Absolutes existed in "pure form" -- mind of man would meet mind of God and contemplate how wondrous things are. Because Hegel's Absolutes emerged out of the French Revolution which put an end to serfdom, reads Absolute Mind as God, one cannot escape the earthly quality of the unity of theory and practice and grasp through to the Absolute Reality as man's attainment of total freedom: inner and outer, and temporal. The bondsman, having, through his labor, gained, as Hegel put it, "a mind of his own," becomes part of the struggle between "consciousness-in-itself" and "consciousness-for-itself." Or, more popularly stated, the struggle against alienation becomes the road to freedom.

In Hegel's Absolutes there is imbedded, though in abstract form, the fully developed of what Marx would have called the social individual, and what Hegel, as we saw, called individuality "purified of all that interfered with its universalism," i.e. freedom itself. Freedom, to Hegel, was not only his point of departure; it was also his point of return. This is what makes him so contemporary. This was the bridge not only to Marx, but to our day, and the foundations for it were philosophy. As Lenin was to discover when he returned to the Marxian philosophic foundations in Hegel in the very midst of the First World War, the revolutionary nature of the dialectic was not superimposed upon Hegel by Marx; it is in Hegel.

The simple truth is that, philosophically, Hegel never, not even when he matured as a conservative Prussian philosopher, did get over the compulsion to comprehend the meaning of that epochal development of his time -- the Great French Revolution. Neither the fact that he himself was so good a Lutheran that he placed the Reformation "after" that event so that Protestantism, "the revealed

"religion" comes as the "higher" stage, the conciliator of the "self-destructive" nature of revolutions; nor the fact that he was himself bourgeois to the marrow of his bones could, however, transcend that event, its development.

The mystical veil that Hegel threw over his philosophy appears total. Yet, it would be a complete misreading of Hegel's philosophy were we to think that his Absolute is either a mere reflection of the separation between philosopher and the world of material production, or that his Absolute is the empty absolute of pure or intellectual intuition of the subjective idealists from Fichte through Jacobi to Schelling, whose type of bare unity of subject and object — as Prof. Baile has so brilliantly phrased it — "possessed objectivity at the price of being inarticulate."

Whether as with Hegel, Christianity is taken as the point of departure, or whether as with Marx — the point of departure is the material condition for freedom created by the industrial Revolution, the essential element is self-evident: man has to fight to gain freedom; thereby is revealed "the negative character" of modern society.

The dialectic has rightly been called "the algebra of revolution." That its creator could not "divine" all its implications is proof of only one fact: genius, too, cannot overcome the historic barrier. In this instance, the recognition that alienated labor which the young Hegel so poignantly described was "absolute negativity," was "Subject", the active force who would transform reality. But the fact that the young Hegel put those manuscripts of his First System away; never to return to them, not only could not stop history, it continued to have a pull on him, the pull of future, a future he refused to recognize but one that recognized him. Thus was the monopolist of the meaning of world history himself made "to take in partners." And the self-drive of the dialectic drove through the historic barriers Hegel could not meet. By the time the proletarian revolutions of the 1840s opened a new epoch the philosopher, who could hear those voices from below was himself a revolutionary: Karl Marx.

The real question, therefore, is not the one concerning Hegel's specific ontological ordering over human relations. The real question is this: is it possible to make a new beginning for the spirit of another age upon Hegel's Absolutes without breaking totally with Hegel? Marx didn't think so. He never made the error of considering Hegel's Absolutes as no more than a return to Aristotle's. This was so not only because Hegel lived in a totally different age, but also because even the "pure" form of the movement of thought, when 25 full centuries are the point of observance, disclose a dialectic so different that objective development and "pure thought" run, to use Hegel's phrase, "Parallel." It is precisely because Hegel summed up a 25 century long trek of human thought and development that he continued to be the focal point for Marx's theories, and has that great importance for us today.

In any case, the question is not so much of the need to break with Hegelianism as mysticism. That historic question has, after all, long ago been achieved by the discoverer of historical materialism, Karl Marx. That it was no simple "turning Hegel right side up" will be seen clearly enough when we further analyze Marx's works. But already it is clear that the "materialist" adherents of Hegel didn't, by turning Hegel "right side up" instead of letting him remain standing on his head, thereby become "revolutionaries." The more they retrogressed in life, and outlook, the more their perspective was not of revolution, the more, in philosophy, did they return to Kant. It is no accident that Eduard Bernstein, in turning to reformism, struck out against both the revolutionary and the "Hegelianism" in Marx.

The class challenge to the rulers from below -- the development of the class struggles that came into the open during the last year of Hegel's life and developed into full-fledged revolutions in Marx's time -- marked the beginning of a totally new age and, therefore, also of philosophy -- "the nature of the fact and of cognition."

The real question then is not the need for a historic break with Hegel in mid-19th century when new revolutions covered Europe, but why, after the break, there has been a continuous return to Hegel, both by the creator of Historical materialism and theorist of proletarian revolution, Marx, and by Marx's most famous adherent and "practitioner" of 20th century revolutions, Lenin. We turn to them now not only to grasp their tasks that have already entered history, but for the illumination that they may shed for the new challenges of our age.

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