puls derhogado 61 &Therry, II, 1963) also in George Lichthein Concept of Ideology&Other Essays Random House,195?) I. By way of Introd. GL writes "In postwar France the philosophers were resplied not to interpret the world but to change it. For a few yrs. it looked as the the forces let loose at the liberal fork society Abridge the gap bet the intellectual elite athe masses. But his refused to be 1977777 rewritten, the rev. did not tatake flace, athe philosophers returned to their studies. Sartro is the inheritor of this failure."(p.869) Then House says JPS GI/thence tried anew intell.synthesis; aborted revolutions to produce philosophical sanctuaries. As assingt B/N which attributed its failure to unite being &consciousnes? to "L'homme est une passion inutile," in Critique de la raison dialectique deals not with individual but with society., and as JPS puts it, "reconquery man inside Marxism." (GL here, p.293 has ftn to say finely a Marxistiphilosof instead of an existentialist --M. Louis Althusser-- had since then attempted to same, Pour Marx, 1966) Merely to introduce why Intra. Question de mothede is to be treated as the method which is 1st to be tested by its application. in the Critique text itself. p.298. "if history is not simply a via a tergo, it is because consciousness represents the element of freedom which enables the perticipants to educate themselves through what Harx called praxis." Her anticipants the future by shaping their circumstances in accordance with their desires The elements of freedom is embedded in the TIME SEQUENCE, inasmuch as men rale themsolves consciously(-.299) to their future as well as to their past (198) (pp.63-66 n) The dialectic as a movement of reality collapses if the is of the future as such. "This is how JPS expects to integrate his version of dialectic with his version of consciousness as in B/N, thereby grafting Existentialism upon Mrism. In any case it leads back to the transitional themes of ONTOLOGY: existence, essence, freedom, immortality. TPS's root assumptions "that the inherent problems of dialecti reasoning are ultimately ONTOLOGICAL &GL refers you to Part II of Critique,pp.120=127, where he shows that Marx by inverting Hegel "Taid bare the true contradictions of realism." (JPS's phra Marx wanted to retain the dialectic though he est donce for all that reality is irreducible to speculative thinking hey then can we be sure that the logical concepts in our heads correspond to compathing in the structure of reality.

Meaning of history must be discovered in the his circle process itself that meaning of history must be discovered in the historical process itself, what an investigation of man's activity, his praxis. Cf JPS (Critique,p.131) about how man not only submits to the dislectic, but makes it RD; to me the key is in the task, not fulfilment, is stated correctly by JPS when he says dualities of being &conscioueness can only be overcome when one state, "lays bare the ontological structure of reality." This, evidently, is what JPS sate himself to do with Critique, now that we are finally over Method, &down to text, which PS calls Theorie des ensembles pratiques due HIS THEORY OF HIS. p. 301 But here . instead of plunging into his . "we are made to embark upon an enormous &very wearisons detour into anthropology." Trouble bagins with the "practice-inerte "by which he made designates the un-S's concept of related practice of human beings caught up in the Immediacy of their daily toil practice of human beings chught up to the convenient of scarcity. the latter designating at once a social milieu and a time sequence from

the primitive tribe to presently society." Instead I corrently men wighther with furthe start eye other in enemy

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12023 JfS even sats Mx Tailed to fully consider scarcity as the negative unity (impo by matter via labor &the conflicts of men."(Cr.p.221)"Violence constant inhumanity of human conduct"(sic!) 1s the  $j_{i}$  where  $j_{i}$ GL(p.305)"In fact, his(S'E) whole theory hinges on thin because everyone sees in his neighbor primarily the Other that history has dev as it has. "GL also correctly calls attention to the fact that the 2 concrete examples are nothing new but have been often used by historians &economists(1) deforestation of Ch. (2)&17th cfimport of gold from Am. thru selfodefeating attempts of European govt, to by this without causing a price rise. In Change in Cituctors Totalization here comes into "its own" (as than the dial. of action, thought, etc.

p. 305: "As a former Cartesian who an effort of WILL has turned himself into a thinker of the modern post-Hegelian kind. S remains hauted by the Cartesian problem of relating the outside world to the solitary init while at the same time his intellectual conscience tells him that he ought be thinking about the ongoing historical process. "Q Lefebyre' precisely be he pursues speculatively the search for the foundation, he(S) does not at all anything fundamental." JPS's theory of state is Hobbesian accours at end of work. (p.586ff)Q S'Produit par la terreur, le souverain doit devenir l'agent responsable de la terreur l'agent responsable de la terreu (RD, So Stalinist in his concepts is JPS that nothing stops him from rewriting All as inescapably forevermore Stalinist: "Historical experience has undeniably revealed that the lat moment of stalinist: "Historical experience has undeniably revealed that the 1st moment of socialist society in process of construction could ONIX(sici be ... the indissoluble aggregation of the bureaucracy, the Terror and (sic!) the cult of personality. The last 21 pp of GLis critique are the most challenging &original in trying to come to grips with both theory & practice objectively so that S as a matter of fact gets more credit than he deserve; but it does show the positive in S's contribution as "original". Thus: (1)0.303:"Now to say that 'the Whole'is intelligible is tantamount to saying that it has identifiable structure. It also presupposes, if not an 'absolute moment' in time, at any rate a critical moment. Time need not stand still to oblige the philosophem, but there are have to be PRIVILEGED MOMENTS when the process discloses its meaning. In their different wave both Hegel &Marx thought they had lived thru &perceived such a moment," p.314) "The thinking that reveals the logic of history at the same time makes transparent the ONTOLOGICAL structure of human existence. The 2 come together IN THE ACT (hwereby Man creates himself & his world. History 15 causa sui . There is nothing 'benind it'. noither God nor Nature. Sartre expressly refuses to ground his mat. in dial mat. There is no dialectic of nature to render plausible the human story as a special case within the universal process. The pour spi has no need of a metaphysic to sustain itself in its flight from the frozen past of the en-soi." 3) As against B/N JPS here adopts the Mxist position that the unity of being any rate closed the gap in his own thinking about history by incorporating man's prexis in the dialectic of being a consciousness III human nature can be shown to be of such kind that it necessarily sets the distorical process in

motion, the dichotomy of phil. &science has been overcome. & the world has ceased

to be mysterious."

( Oper Condre Generally)

SARTRE, MARXISM and HISTORY

(The Concept of Ideology and other Essays,) by George Lichtheim

(R. 301) But Sartre is persuaded that the meaning if history can never be approached by this route. It must be discovered in the historical process itself, through an investigation of man's activity, his praxis. The Marxian antinomies of being and consciousness, which come to light when the Hegelian synthesis collapsed, must be overcome through an effort to lay bare the intological structure of historical reality. The elucidation of this structure will demonstrate that Man deem not simply submit to the dislectic, but that he makes it. This demonstration is the subject of what S artre calls his theory of the timesembles pratiques... The trouble begins with his notion of the impratice inertim by which he designates the unrelated practice of human beings caught up in the immedizey of their daily toil. This is done through a process to whose analysis Sartre devotes over two hundred pages of hairsplitting ingenuity. The finert practicality of society - that is, the failure to comprehend itself as society is traced back to its anthropological ground in the blim activity of isolated beings, each of whom takes Itself as the sole center of reference. The traced back to its bond that unites them is need in an environment of scarcity.

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(p. 307) .. in Book II he expounds at length a methodological principle best described by saying that he identifies "totality" with structure. Although he makes the point that the "ontological structure of the group" (p. 438) is constituted by human praxis (instead of being "organic" as with the Romantics) the praxis that constitutes the group is precisely the ("inert practicality" of Book I, which is turn exemplified no more than a certain community of destiny imposed by uncomprehended material-ecessity. Sartre's humans do not cooperate: they are thrown together, or as he puts it "serialized", by danger, by hunger, by external pressure, hy group hostility, by machinery, or simply by having to wait for the bus.

(p. 308) It may seem a trifle harsh to say, as lefebvre does, that "precisely because he pursues speculatively the search for the foundation, he does not attain anything fundamental," but one sees what his critic has in mind. Notwithstanding some brilliant excursions into applied sociology, Sartre on the whole remains "abstract" in that he rarely succeeds in grasping the historical moment in its uniqueness. "Matter" and "consciousness", when brought face to face, turn out to be linked only by the tenuous bond of his own speculative construction; the transition from one stage to the next is managed only with the greatest difficulty. There as hundreds of pages are devoted to the analysis of static relationships; and finally the dialectic from being an intelligible principle of historical existence, becomes an independent motive force. None of this is surprising to the student of his earlier work, or indeed of the literary and philosophical tradition in which he grew up.

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(p. 314) What Man experiences in history (and at a remove in thinking about it) is simply his own being as it comes back to him mediated by the time=sequence. The thinking that reveals the logic of history at the same time makes transparent the botological structure of human existence. The two come together in the act whereby Man creates himself and his world. History is caus sui. There is nothing "behind it", neither God nor Nature. Chartre expressly refuses to ground hastorical materialism in dialectical materialisms. There is no dialectic of nature to render plausible the human story as a special case within the universal process. The pour-soi has no need of a metaphysic to sustain itself in the flight it has made the world of history and can never cease to project itself of the same the world of history and can never cease to project itself of the same willess quest for a union that cannot be attained.

Sumpared with Lieve et le neart the principal difference appears to be that while in that work Sartre presented human existence as a foresooned attempt to realize the union of being and consiousness (en-soi-pour-soi)s, he has now adopted the Marxist position that the project is executed in and through history of being and consiousness (en-soi-pour-soi)s, he has now adopted the Marxist position that the project is executed in and through history of being and consciousness. . . . . From the opposite stamipoint, Sartre's Marxist critics have denounced the attempt to subordinate human praxis to ontology. Conceivably Sartre has overreached himself and fallen between the positions has each to transcend. It is nonotheless apparent that his tour de force has created a new situation for the philosophy of history: things are never going to be quite the same again. For whatever he may have failed to do. Sartre has demonstrated that if "historicism" is pushed to its furthest limit, it becomes a self-consistent position and thus has to be taken seriously.

Historica Comments