

leaping-over obj. conditions

MAO TSE TUNG By Stuart Schram, 1966, revised 1967 (Conclusion written in 1967, Jan. Ch. 10 "On Search of A Chinese Way" p/277 ff

p.287: no evidence to support claim, made in 1963, that Mao disagreed immediate opp. to 2 doctrinal innovation of Khr at 20th RCP: (1) peaceful coexistence & (2) peaceful transition to soc. at 1st Mao did not call Hungarian rev. simply counter-rev but rather declared it a "black revolution" of the "disruptive" type. (The Hic. Experience of the Dic. of Prol., Peking, 1959, p.50)

"Conclusions" definitely after book was published, in which the whole is retold as if Cultural rev. flowed from it.

p.311: tries to make this (1.67) flow directly from 1962&1963 as if merely reasserting role of Mao as individual is at stake. But he does add "At the same time, recent events, altho in many respects they grow out of the traits which have characterized Mao's aims & methods in the past ARE SO SINGULAR & SO FRAUGHT WITH CONSEQUENCES FOR China & the world..." "But before doing so, I sum up dev. till beginning of '66. Makes it appear beginning is 1963 (whereas, Liu in 1946 claimed universality for Mao's thought)

p.314: "This double pretension to uniqueness & to universality emerges with particular clarity in the claims made for the thought of Mao Tse-tung."

p.318: There remain the solid accomplishments: a steel prod. 2 or 3 times that of India capacity to produce not only atomic bombs but a whole series of items such as trucks, locomotives, heavy machinery & scientific instrument which most countries of Asia & Africa must import from abroad.

p.319: "The Indonesian adventure remains an incomprehensible blunder".....(1)

again (p.322) just as he reached 1965, he doesn't go to 1966 but says "we must let go back & pick up certain strands in Ch. internal politics since 1961."

(RD: Actually "training successors" generations" was spoken in 1964 & addressed to Youth League, so that can't be the reason for Red Guards)

Finally, p.333: "What does Mao want to bring out of this chaos? His ambition is apparently to create a party org. of a new type with built-in safeguards against 'bur.'"

p.336: "levels --or at least forms--of irrationality, previously unknown even in Stalin's Russia."

v.g. p/337: "This involves...the conferring of magical virtues not only on Mao's thought but on the physical object--the little red plastic-bound volume of Quotations from Chairman Mao--which contains it."

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From Ma 12/11/309 // 309 // 309 // 309

of self-change.."(p.179) --But he was in a mt. fastness--
CHINGKANGSHAN. "Mao's experiment in rural Red bases for
Party & Army changed the his. of Ch." (p.187) AND IT WILL CONTINUE INTO
MAO & LI-li-san

CONTRAST WITH STUART SCHRAM's Ch. Ch5-Collaboration With Kuomintang, pp.72-105
6--The Yrs. in the Wilderness

5(p.80)"In this rel. of Moscow, the Kuo. & the CCP the positio
of Mao during the crucial yrs., 1925-7 was on the whole CLOSER TO
THAT OF THE KUOMINTANG than to that of either Stalin or Ch'en..

5/30/25 was one of the great watershed in the Ch. rev.

As Mao himself told Snow it was only "after the May 30 Incident &..the Hunan
peasantry became very militant." He had, in 1924 met Borodin &
FROM HIM, ESP. HIS LECTURE TO Kuomintang; "Ch. rev.
would depend entirely on organizing the peasants for a solution
on the land ques."

REWRITING OF HIS. BEGUN BY MAO IN 1936 when he
related to Snow but that rewrite was "considerably more honest
than many now writing."

p.84: CH'en Tu-hsiu proposed at pl. of CCP in 10/25 that the C-ist withdraw
frpm Kuomintang. (Cf. Documents on C-ism, Nat., Soviet Advisers in
Ch. Vol. 1, 1923 by C. Martin Wilbur & Julie How.

PEASANT MOVEMENT TRAINING INST., 1924, founded by
Kuomintang & Mao was both peasant work & principal resp. for
Propaganda Dept of KUOMINTANG or as Mao himself put it to Snow
chief of the Agitprop dep. -alternate member of Kuomintang
Central Exec Comm., even after he lost already his seat in CCP
led. of Kuoming organ, POL. WEEKLY And because 3/26 CP was to
meet to hear report on Far Eastern ~~affairs~~ by commission presided
by LT--Stalin changed line.

p.90--Obviously Mao still, in summer of 1926, looked forward to
long per. of collaboration with CHIANG KAI SHEK & KUOMINTANG
p.92 CCP likewise est a Peasant Depy. & Mao headed that but since
collaboration was still permitted with Chiang, it is that one
d 92 MAO'S ESSENTIAL WK. WITH PEASANTRY UP TO JULY
1927 was carried out under the auspices of the Kuomintang."
WINTER 1926-27 CRITICAL TO FORMING MAO'S later views of ON THEORY
OF PEASANT ARMY. "QQQQ from Hunan Report p.95

K.A. Wittfogel & Schwartzs debate CH. July 1 & 2/1960
As for stading for confiscation of labor from 'local bullies &
had sentry, corrupt officians, militarists & all counter-rev. elements
in the villages" --direct action by peasants refusing to pay rent
did make him left.

Ch. 6, p.106 +++++
(Stalin, even after April 1927, massacre of Shanghai wkrs kept up
collaboration for 5 more mos. (North & Eudin MNRoy's Mission to Ch.)
p.109 Mao's Report did NOT contain any recommendations for land reform.
p.120 Mao accused of "military opportunism: in Hunan Uprising. (AUG. @)
Aug. 20, 1927--EVEN AFTER APRIL 1927 massacre--MAO'S report reads

***** Ch. has long since reached 1917." ~~Ch.~~
p.122 "THIS VISION OF THE REV. AS A CEASELESS EFFUSION OF SPONTANEOUS
CONCEPTIONS WHICH MAO was beginning to develop in which ORG. & MILITARY
WAS TO PLAY LEADING ROLE

From
Reyn
Gunn
1925
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1932
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1960

Mao's criticism
of CC

Mao criticized CC for proposing 'a contradictory policy' consisting in neglecting military affairs & at the same time desiring an armed insurrection of the popular masses." By then he was indeed considering masses as 'insufficient force'. May 21 massacre at Changsha

SEPT. 15, Mao called off attack against Changsha & LED AWAY FROM THE PROVINCIAL CAP. TOWARDS COUNTRY SIDE which is what the CC then called "BETRAYAL" esp. p. 123-6

1928

1928
"CC" / 1928

concentration of forces
"SDs to avoid
being destroyed one
of Dec 1928"

7/1/28
Changsha

p. 136--What Mao was now developing in practice were BASE AREAS And as Mao himself wrote in 11/28: "wherever the Red Army goes the masses are cold & aloof" SW 1, pp. 97-8

Changsha