

p.383 "Mr. Wagner forgets that ex. v. is not value" NA ex. v. is a commodity

ARBEITEN VON MARX, Bk.#5, Ed. Riazanov, Moscow, 1930

(Last writing of Marx found in his 1881 notebook --Very rough tr.--ff)

A. Wagner: Allgemeine oder theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre. B.I. Grundlegung, 2. Auflage, 1879.

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1) Conception of Mr. Wagner, "socially-just conception"(p.2)* finds itself "in consonance with Rodbertus, Lange and Shaffle"(p.2) In the fundamental points of his analysis he refers to Rodbertus & Shaffle. Even about piracy, which exists with many nations, Mr. Wagner speaks as of "unorthodox method of acquisition", which, it is true, is piracy only under that condition where "the existence of a genuine jus gentium (p.18, remark 3) is presupposed." He studies first of all "the conditions of eco. life of society" and "in correspondence with them determines the sphere of the eco. freedom of the individual."(p.2)

"The strife for satisfaction of needs" "do not act and should not act as purely natural forces, but, like every striving of man, it finds itself under the leadership of common sense and honesty. Therefore every action flowing from it is responsible and always belongs to moral judgment, which, it is true (1) is itself subjected to historical changes (p.9)

In application to "labor"(p.9,2) Mr. Wagner makes no distinction between the concrete character of every labor and the expenditure of labor, general to all these concrete aspects of labor. (p.9,10)

In the opinion of Wagner, his--just categories are "social categories" (p.13, ft.6)**

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2)..... Value. (In the opinion of Mr. Wagner Marx's theory of value comprises "the foundation (krayugolny) stone of his socialist system"(p.45) Since I had never created a "socialist system", this is no more than a phantasy of Wagner, Shaffle and tutti quanti. Further: Marx, it seems, "finds the general social substance of ex. v.--it is only the latter he has in mind here--in labor, and the measure of the ex. v. in the socially-necessary labor time etc." (p.45)

p.383: I have nowhere spoken about the "general social substance of ex. v." but stated that ex. values (ex. v. exists only in the existence of ~~ex. v.~~ (two values) express ~~nothing~~ something general about both, something "entirely independent of their use values" (i.e. of their natural form)), that is, its "value". Thus, for ex. we read "The general which is expressed in the ex. relation or ex. v. of the commodity is its value. The further course of investigation will again lead us to ex. v. as the necessary method of expression or the necessary form of appearance of commodity value; nevertheless this last must be examined again as such, ind. of this form." (2nd ed. p.13)

Hence I do not state that "labor" is "the general social substance of ex. v."; and since in a special division I analyze in detail the form of value, i.e. the dev. of ex. v., then it would be strange to reduce this "form" to a general social substance, to labor. Also Mr. Wagner forgets that my subject is not "value" and not "ex.v." but a commodity.

** (Riazanov note: Wagner distinguishes two aspects of eco. categories: 1) purely eco." or "purely natural" 2) "historically-just", or "social" Wagner, p.13, Anmerkung 6)

p.383 Further: "But this theory (of Marx) represents not so much a universal theory of value as a theory of costs flowing from Ricardo" (p.45). If Mr. Wagner could have, both from Capital and from the Works of Ziber (if he knew the Russ. language) see the difference between me and Ricardo, who I interested in labor only as a measure of the magnitude of value, and in the force of which he find no link between his theory of value and the essence of money.

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If Mr. Wagner says that this is not "a universal theory of value", then he is in his own understanding completely right since under a general (universal) theory of value he understands the recitation (umstrovaniya nastchet) of the word "value" this also gives him the possibility to remain in the traditional and traditional confusion by the German professors of "ex.v." and "value" since they both carry the common word "value". But when he further states that this is a "theory of costs" then this remark either is reduced to a tautology: commodities to the extent that they are the essence of value represent something social (human) labor and since the magnitude of value of a commodity is determined, in my view, by the magnitude of the labor time comprised in it, etc., i.e. by the normal quantity of labor which the subject costs prod., etc.; but Mr. Wagner demonstrates the opposite view by this that he assures us that this theory of value is not "general", since he, Mr. Wagner, holds a different view regarding "a universal theory of value". Or he asserts something false: Ricardo (after Smith) confuses value and expenses of prod.: I already in "A Critique of Pol. Eco." & also in the remarks to Capital clearly showed that value and prices of prod. (which only express in money the expenses of prod.) do not coincide. Why do they not coincide. On this account I had told Mr. Wagner nothing.

Besides I "act arbitrarily", since I bring "these costs to the so-called labor expenditures in the narrow sense of the word. But for this it is necessary in advance to show proof which is lacking until now, and that is proof of this that the process of prod. is fully possible without ~~xxxxxx~~ the activity of private capitalists, directed to the formation and application (primeneniya) of capital" (p.45)

for
Instead of vzvalivat ~~me~~ similar proof relating to the future Mr. Wagner, on the contrary, should have first of all shown that in numerous ~~xxx~~ communes, existing previous to the appearance of capitalists (ancient-Indian commune, Jugo-Slavic family commune, etc) the social process of prod.--not to speak of the process of prod. in general--has no place. Besides, Wagner could have ~~xxxx~~ said only the following: the exploitation of the wkg. class by the class of capitalists, in a word, the character of cap. prod. is described correctly by Marx, but Marx is mistaken when he considers this economy a transitional one as, on the contrary, Aristotle was in error when he did not consider slave economy transitional.

"So long as a similar proof has not been cited (in other words, so long as cap. eco. exists) the profit of capitalists in fact also (here is shown the hoof or ears of a donkey) comprises a "constituent" element of value and not, as the socialists think, only vychet or "robbery" "of the worker" (p.45, 46). What is "vychet from the wkr, vychet from his skin, etc. it is impossible to understand.

385: But in my analysis "the profit of the capitalist in actuality" is not only a deduction or robbery of the worker". On the contrary, I describe the capitalist as a necessary functionary of cap. prod. and in very detailed manner demonstrate that he not only "deducts" or "takes" but forces the prod. of s.v., consequently helps create that which is subjected to deduction; further I show at length that in commodity exchange when only equivalents are exchanged, the cap., as soon as he has pd. the wrk. the real value of his l.p., with full right, i.e. with the right which corresponds to this method of prod., acquires s.v. But all this does not make "the profit of the cap." "a constituent element" of value but only shows that in the value "constituted" not from the labor of the capitalist there is a part which he can appropriate "by right", i.e. without destroying the right which corresponds to commodity exchange.

"This theory is very one-sidedly examines only one moment determining value. 1) Tautology. This false theory, since Wagner has in mind "general theory of value", which diverts from it & therefore "value" of Wagner is determined by the "use v." which is proven by the magnitude of professorial wish; 2) Mr. Wagner passes off for value "the market price" of the given moment or the price of a commodity, which is something entirely different from value, (deviating from value that is on the expenses (costs, ff) and not on another moment, that is, the usefulness, the need, i.e. it does not confuse "value" with use v. as pryozhdenik confused man as one Wagner wished. It not only does not correspond to the formation of ex. v. in contemporary ex. (he has in mind the formation of prices which absolutely changes nothing in the determination of v.: in general there occurs the formation of ex. v. in contemporary ex., of course, as is known to every grunder, falsificatory of commodities etc., which has nothing in common with the formation of v. but closely follows the already formed values; besides, I, for ex., in the determination of the value of l.p. proceed from this, that the value is really paid in full, which factually is not true. Mr. Sheffle in "Capitalism" etc. states that such a supposition is "magnanimous" or something of the sort. But this is only a supposition, necessary from the scientific point of view, but, as Sheffle excellently and even definitively (!) shows in "Quintessenz" and especially in "Sozialer Korper" it does not tally with the conditions which are necessarily ~~formed~~ became formed in the Marxian hypothesis of a soc. state. (Thus, the soc. state, which Sheffle lovingly "formed" instead of me, has become transformed into a "Marxian" (and not a "soc. state" attributed to Marx in the hypothesis of Sheffle. One can show this convincingly in the ex. of grain etc., the ex. v. of which, under the influence of the fluctuating harvests under conditions of unchanged demand for it, even in the system of "social tax" would necessarily be formed by another method than in relation only to deductions" There are as many stupidities here as words. First of all, I have nowhere spoken about "social taxes" and (in the examination of value had in view bourgeois relations and not an application of this theory of value to a "soc. state", which, besides was stated not by me, but by Mr. Sheffle for me. Secondly, if under the circumstance of a bad harvest the price of corn is raised, then, 1st of all, its value is raised since a given quantity of labor is realized in less products; secondly to an even greater degree the sale price of corn is raised. What relation has this to my theory of value? To the extent that the price of corn exceeds its value, to that extent other products, in the natural or money form, are sold below their v. and even in that case where their money price is not lowered. The sum of values remains the same even if the money expression

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of this sum of values has grown, i.e. if, according to the terminology of Mr. Wagner the sum "of ex. values" has grown. This applies in that case where we presuppose that the fall in the prices for the aggregate of other commodities does not compensate the rise in price of corn (the excess of its price over their value). But in that case the ex. v. of money has fallen below their value to the same extent; the sum of values of these commodities remains the same, but it is not changed even in its money express if the quantity of commodities is included money.

Further: the rise in corn prices above the value of corn which has risen as a result of no harvest will, in "a soc. state", in any case, be less than under contemporary corn speculators. (rostovshchiki) "The soc. state" will in advance org. prod. so that annual predlosheniye of corn will only in the very slightest degree depend on the fluctuations of the harvest. The magnitude of prod., demand and consumption will be rationally regulated. Finally, does the "social tax"--even if we assumed that the phantasy of Sheffield in this case will be realized--signify anything in my favor or against my theory of value? As little as the forceful measures undertaken when there is an insufficiency on a ship or in a prison or during the Fr. rev. etc.--measures which have nothing to do with value--can destroy the laws of value "of cap. (bourgeois) state"; hence also the theory of value! This is nothing more than childish nonsense!

The same Wagner quotes with approval the words of Rau: "To avoid misunderstandings it is necessary exactly to establish what is to be understood under value in general & in correspondence with the Ger. language it is necessary to chose for this use v." (p.46)

The conclusions from the concept of v. (p.46 ff)

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According to the view of Mr. Wagner, out of the concept of v. it is necessary 1st of all to deduce use v. & (from the latter) ex. v. and not as I have done from the concrete form of a commodity. It is interesting to follow these scholastic exercises in his pub. "Grundluge "

"Natural strife of man is included in this to lead to a clear consciousness and understanding that relation in which the inner and outer riches (blaga) stand in relation to his needs. This is done with the help of his evaluation (evaluation of value) thanks to which riches, in part articles of the external world, there is given it value and the latter is measured" (p.46), & on p. 12 we read: "All means for the satisfaction of needs are called blagamy (welfare)."

If we will now place in the first supposition instead of the word "welfare", the logical content attributed to it by Wagner, then the 1st phrase of the above-quoted passage reads:

"The nature strife "of man" is comprised in this, that in order to bring that relation, in which "the inner and outer means for the satisfaction of his needs", to clear consciousness and understanding". This phrase we can simplify somewhat, omitting "the inner means" etc., as Mr. Wagner does in the next proposition with the help of the words "in part".

"Man"? If here we understand the category of "man in general", then he has "no kinds" of needs; if aggregate man is counterposed to nature, then it follows that we must examine him as any ne-stadno animal; if it is a man who lives in a society of a certain form--

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and that is what Mr. Wagner supposes since his "man", altho he does not possess a university education, masters, in any case, speech,—then as a point of departure one must accept a definite character of social man, i.e. a definite character of society in which he lives since hre prod., i.e. the process of acquiring life's means— already has a social character.

But with the professor-doctrinarian the relation of man to nature from the very start arise not as practical relations i.e. based on actions but as theoretical ones; in the very first proposition two relations of this sort are confused: since in the following proposition "outer means for the satisfaction of needs" or "outer welfare" are transformed into "articles of the outer world", then the first of the presumed relations acquires the following aspect: man finds himself in relation to articles of the outer world as to the means of satisfying his needs. But people in no wise begin from this that they "stand in a theoretical relation to the articles of the outer world". As other animals, they begin with this, that they eat, drink, etc. do not "stand" in some sort of relation but actively participate, with the help of actions master (acquire) certain objects of the outer world and thus satisfy their needs. (Consequently, they start with production.) Thanks to the repetition of this process, the capacity of these articles "to satisfy needs" of people sinks into their heads, people and bears ~~theoretical~~ learn "theoretically" to distinguish outer objects which serve to satisfy their needs from all other objects. On a certain level for further development, after the demands of people multiplied and further developed, and the aspects of activity by which they are satisfied, people give separate names to whole classes of these objects which they distinguished from

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the rest of the/world by experience. That necessarily follows since in the process of prod., i.e. in the process of the acquisition of these products, people are constantly finding themselves in a labor tie (werktätiger Umgang) with each other and with these articles and soon there also begins the struggle with other people because of these objects. But this arbitrary (alovesnoye) designation only expresses in the form of a representation that which ~~the~~ repeated activity has turned into experience, and that is that people living in a definite social relation (and such a proposition flows necessarily from the existence of speech) definite external articles serve for the satisfaction of their needs. People give these objects a special name only because they already know the capacity of these objects to serve for the satisfaction of their needs and they try with the aid of more or less often repeated activity to acquire them and retain them in their possession; they, possibly, call these articles "welfare" or something else which signifies that they in practice use these products, that the latter are useful to them; they attribute the article the character of utility as if it were characteristic of the article, although a bird hardly would consider ~~it~~ the fact that it is used for the food of man "a useful" characteristic of itself.

Thus: people started factually from this, that they acquired objects of the outer world as means for the satisfaction of their needs etc. etc., as a consequence of which they arrived at the conclusion that they alovesno began to name them means for the satisfaction of their needs—which they ~~were~~ in actual

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practical experience..If.....

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The "natural strife" of the Ger. professor of pol. eco. is comprised in this, to deduce an economic category of "value" from some sort of "concept" and that is reached by this, that that which is called in pol. eco. "use v." "in consonance with the German utilization of the word", is simply ~~xxxxxxx~~ renamed "value". And as soon as "value" in general is found, it, in its turn, serves to deduce "use v" out of "value in general". And for this it is necessary again to add before the word "value" the heretofore-omitted "Bebruchs"(use).

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One could also say: man, considering the articles of the outer world which satisfy his needs, "welfare", "prices" them; by that token the concept of "price in general" would be deduced from the method of action of "man" and ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ given ready-made to the Ger. professor. Whatever the professor himself cannot do he makes "man" do, who, however, in fact, is none other than the professorial man who thinks that he has understood the world when he has led himself under abstract headings (rubric). But to the extent that "to give value" to objects of the external world signifies here only another word for the attribute of "welfare", we can in no manner attribute, as Wagner assures us in a deceitful manner, "value" to the "welfare" itself, as a determination which is distinct from its "existence as welfare." We merely add (podstavlyam) the word "value" instead of the word "welfare". (As we see, we could here write the word "price". We could also write the word "treasure" (Schatz) since "man", stamping "welfare" on the "objects of the outer world" "treasures" them and thus his relation to them is as to a "treasure." As we see, three eco. categories: value, price and treasure can at once and in a volshchnym manner deduced by Mr. Wagner from "the nature strife of man" in order to present the professor his limited world of concepts (presentations). But in Mr. Wagner there lives the confused striving to chose out of the labyrinth of tautologies and with the aid of shrewdness to demonstrate "something further". Hence the phrase: "thanks to these welfare, in part objects of the outer world, value is attributed", etc.....

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Further conclusions from the concept of value.

Subjective and objective value. Subjective value or value of welfare in the general meaning of the word equals a meaning, which is "attributed" to welfare because of its utility..... This is not an attribute of these things in themselves, altho the utility of things (consequently, has the prerequisite "obj. value") has objective prerequisite...In the objective sense of the word under "value", "values" are understood also welfare (riches) which have value where (1) welfare and value of welfare and of value become essentially identical concepts." (p.46,47)

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After Wagner simply called "value in general" or "concept of value" that which is ordinarily called "use v." he cannot but remember that ~~the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ "value deducted (!) in this manner (thus, thus) is "use v."~~ After having "use v." "concept of value" in general "simply value", he with hindsight discovers that he only got it wrong latter since in the present time got it nonsense and conclude the essential "in essence" --are identical mental operations. But in this case we will learn what subjective circumstance unites Wagner with past confused "objective" concepts. He reveals a secret to us. Rodbertus has written him a letter --which one can read in "Tubinger Zeitschrift" for 1878, in which he explains why there exists "only one aspect of value", use value. "I" (Wagner) "have subscribed to that view, the meaning of which I underlined in the edition" (p.48). About the words of Rodbertus, Wagner remarks thus: "This is entirely correct and calls for a change in the ordinarily non-logical "division" of "value" into use v. & ex. v. which I have concluded already in the 1st edition" (p.48, footnote 4) and the same Wagner adds me (p.49, footnote) to the people in whose opinion "use v." should be entirely "eliminated" "from science."

All this is "nonsense". First of all, my point of departure is not "concepts", consequently not "the concept of value" and hence I have no need in the "division" of the latter. I proceed from the simplest social form, in which the product of labor is represented in contemporary society, and that is a "commodity". I analyze the latter and at that first in the form in which it appears. Here I find that, on the one hand, a commodity in its natural form is an article of use or use v. & on the other hand the carrier of ex. v. and from this point of view is itself "ex. v." A further analysis of the latter

394: shows me that ex. v. is only "the form of appearance", the independent form of the presentation contained in a commodity is value, and after that I proceed to the analysis of the latter. Hence I write clearly on p.36 of the 2nd ed: "When we at the beginning of this chapter said a c. has a use v. and an ex. v., then, strictly speaking, that is incorrect. A commodity is a use v., or obj. of use, and a "value". It reveals its dual nature when its value assumes a form distinct from its natural form, that is the form of appearance of ex. v. etc. I consequently do not subdivide value in general into use v. & ex. v. as the contrary concepts on which the abstract concept of "value" falls out the concrete social form (Gestalt) of the product of labor, a "commodity" is, on the one hand, a use v. and on the other a "value" -- and not an ex. v. since merely the form of its appearance does not comprise its content.

Secondly, only vir obscurus, not having understood a word in Capital could conclude: since Marx in one footnote in the 1st edition of cap. (Riazanov here remarks that is not in Capital but in Critique--ff) rejects the entire nonsense of the Ge. professors regarding "use v." in general and sends the readers who wish some information about the real use values to the "leaders in commodity trade", then the use v. plays no role with Marx. It, of course, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ does not play the role of its counterposition, "value" which from the first has nothing in common, except the word "value". With as much right he could have said that I leave aside ex. v. since it is only the form of appearance of value and not "value" itself because for me "value" of a commodity is neither its use v. nor its ex. v.

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If we wish to analyze a "commodity" as this simplest economic concrete phenomenon--then we must leave aside all relations which have nothing in common with the given object of the analysis. Hence what is necessary to say about a commodity to the extent that it is a use v., I said in a few words, and on the other hand I underlined the characteristic form in which the use v., a product "of labor & hence an object which can be of use and a product of human labor and yet may not be a commodity. He who satisfies his own need by his a product of his labor creates only a use v., not a commodity. In order to produce a commodity he must produce not merely a use v. but a use v. for others, a social use v.

395: (p.15) (In this is the essence of "social use v." of Rodbertus) Thanks to this use v.--as a use v. of a "commodity" it itself possesses a historically-specific character. In primitive communes in which, for ex., the means of existence ~~exist~~ (gemeinschaftlich) were produced commune-like and distributed between the members of the commune, the general product satisfied directly the life needs of each member of society, of each producer and the social (gesellschaftlicher) character of the product or use value is here included in its generally-useful (gemeinschaftlicher) character. (Mr. Rodbertus, on the contrary, transforms "the social use v." of a commodity into a "social use v." in general and hence says nonsense (neset che,ukhu)

As is obvious from the above, it would be sheerest nonsense in the analysis of a commodity --on the basis that it is on the one hand a use value or blage and on the hand as a "value"--"to link" (privyazyvat) every type of banal arguments regarding use values or welfare in general, not related to the sphere of commodities, as "state blaga", "commune blaga" etc., as Wagner Ger. professors in general do, or regarding the blaga of "health", etc. There where the state itself is a capitalist producer, as in the case of the exploitation of rudnikov, foress, etc., its product is a "commodity" and hence possesses the specific character of every other commodity.

On the other hand, vir obacurus has glossed over the fact that already in the analysis of a commodity I have not stopped on the dual form in which it appears, but immediately proceed to the fact that in the dual stage of a commodity is expressed the dual character of labor, product of which it is:--of useful labor, i.e. concrete aspects of labor, creative of use value and abstract labor, labor as an expenditure of l.p., irrespective of which "useful" form it is expended (on this later is based the description of the process of prod.); that in the dev. of the form of commodity value, in the last instance its money form, i.e. money, value of one commodity is represented in the use v., i.e. in the natural form of another commodity; that sv itself is deduced (vyvoditsa) from the specific use v. of l.p. characteristic exclusively of the latter, etc; that, consequently with the use v. plays an entirely different important role than in previous pol. eco. but --and it is necessary to note this--it enters ~~character~~ in the analysis (betracht) only then when such an analysis flows from the analysis of the given eco. forms (Gestaltungen), and not from the a recital (umstrvovany) relating to concepts and words "use v." & "value."

Therefore in the analysis of a commodity, even then when it is a question of its "use v.", we do not give there definitions of "capital" which would be sheer absurdity at the time when we are still analysing the elements of a commodity.

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But what dissatisfies Mr. Wagner about my analysis is that I do not give him the satisfaction and do not follow the native Ger. professor "striving" to confuse use v. with v. Altho Ger. society --it is true, with great tardiness--more and more goes over from feudal, natural economy or, at least, from preponderance of such to cap. eco., but the professor still stand with one foot in the old navoz, which is naturally, from krepostnykh landowners they have turned into krepostnykh state, bulgo govt. Hence our vir obscurus who did not even notice that my analytical method, proceeding not from man in general but from a given socio. par. of society, having nothing in common with the Ger-professorial method of linking concepts ("with words disputes are led, from words systems are created" (R. notes that that is from Faust--ff), writes: "In accordance with the views of Rodbertus and Sheffle I ~~may~~ assert that every value has the character of use v. and especially underline the ~~extimate~~ evaluation of use v., since the evaluation of ex. v. simply does not apply to many use values, (This makes him say; consequently, in the capacity of a servant of the state he feels himself obliged to confuse use v. with value.) for ex. to state and its functions, as to other relations of public eco." (p.49, ftnote). (This.....) This boltovnya reduces itself to the following: Since many uses (blaga) and precisely the state (Use! blago) and its "functions" (in particular the functions of its professors of pol. eco.) are not essentially "commodities", then the contrary characteristics of "commodities" themselves (which besides are clearly revealed in the commodity form of the product of labor) must be confused with each other. In general Wagner & Co. could hardly have shown that for them it is more comfortable that the "functions" should be priced according to their "use values", according to their objective "content", than if they were "evaluated" according to their "content" (in correspondence to the "social tax" as Wagner expresses himself) i.e. by their cost.

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(The only thing that clearly lies at the basis of the Ger. nonsense is that the word "value" (Wert) or significance (Wurde) were at first applied to the most useful things which existed in the form of products of labor long before they became commodities. But with scientific determination of commodity "value" this has as little in common as the circumstance that the word, salt, was used by ancient peoples for povarenny sold and as a consequence from the times of Pliniya sugar, etc. told figures as varieties of salt.....)

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Let us proceed to the witness to which our dark man (ignorant, that is) refers to Robertus (whose article one can see in Tubinger Zeitschrift). Our ignorant man quotes the following from Robertus--p.48 of text-- "There is only one aspect of value and that is use value....."

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If Rodbertus--I will show why he could not see that below--had further analyzed the ex. v. of commodities --for the latter exist only there where there are commodities in the plural, various aspects of commodities--he would have found that form of appearance of "value". If he further analyzed value, he would have found that here a thing, "use v." appears (gilt) only as the materialization of human labor, as an expenditure of an equal amt. of human l.p., & hence the content represents itself as a material character of things, characteristic of it itself as things although this materiality does not appear in its natural form (which, however, calls forth the necessity of a special form of value). Consequently he would have found that the "value" of a commodity merely expresses in a historically developed form that which exists also in the natural form.

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 in all other historical social formations, and that is precisely the social character of labor, to the extent that the latter expenditure of social lab. If in this manner the "value" of a commodity is only the definite, historical form of something that exists in all social formation, then this relates to "social use value" to the extent that it characterizes the "use v." of a commodity. Rodbertus took the gauge to measure value from Ricardo; but as little as Ricardo he analyzed or understood the very substance of value, for ex., "social (gemeinsamer) character of labor in primitive commune, representing the social organism linked between each other of labor power and consequently their labor in the process of expending these.

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~~Further~~ More on the absurdities of Wagner on this theme is unnecessary.

The measure of magnitude of value.

Here Mr. Wagner accepts me, but finds, to his sorrow, that I "eliminate labor in the formation of capital." (p.58, footnote 7)

"In the exchange, regulated by social organs, the determination of taxed value or taxed prices must be formed (sobrazovatsa) with this moment of deductions (that is how he calls the quantity of labor expended in production) since this in principle held a place in previous administrative and tsekhovskh taxes and as it necessary will again hold a place under any new system of taxes (a socialist system of taxes is here presumed). But in free exchange deductions are not the only basis of determination of exchange values and prices and cannot serve as such under any conceivable social structure. Because, irrespective of deductions, the fluctuations of use value and needs the influence of which on ex. v. & on prices changes and must change the influence of deductions" etc. (p.58) "This sharp (precisely this) correction to the analysis of socialist theory of value is the service of Sheffle" (who writes in Sozialer Körper, III, p.278: "Under a given influence of society on needs the prod., quantitative and qualitative balance of all needs with prod. cannot always be preserved. But if that is so, then the social indicators of expenditures cannot simultaneously serve as the proportional social indicators of use v." p.59, footnote) That all this is reduced only to the trivial circumstance about the rise and fall of market prices higher or lower than value and to the presupposition that in a "socialist state of Marx" has force the theory of value, developed for bourgeois society these phrases of Wagner demonstrate: "They (prices) will temporarily move away from, more or less, them (expenditures), they will be raised for benefits, ~~the~~ the use v. of which decreased. Only for a lengthy period of time can expenditures prove their action as a decisive regulator" etc. (p.59)

Law

Right. For a characterization of the fantastic representations of our vir obscurus about the creative influence of law on economy one sentence, although it includes an absurd viewpoint, is sufficient, he describes it in many places: "Individual (yedinichnoye) economy has at its head, as an organ of its technical and economic activity.. some kind presence in the capacity of a legal and economic subject. It is not a purely economic phenomenon but simultaneously depends upon the character of law. Because the latter decides who is recognized as the authority and, consequently, can stand at the head of the econom" etc. (p.65)

Means of communication and transport
replacement

On p.82 "change in (natural) component parts of the mass of benefits" (of some kind of economy) called by Wagner "change of benefits" is presented by him as "a social exchange of things" of Sheffle (this, to a smaller degree, one instance of the latter: I used this nomenclature also under "natural" process of prod. in the sense of exchange of things between man and nature); it is acquired (zaimstvovana) by me; with the exchange of things appears at first in the analysis of MOCMQ, and in the further interruptions in the change of forms are designated as the interruptions in the exchange of things.

That which Wagner says further about "the inner exchange" either about benefits founds in one branch of prod. (what he calls in one "single economy") partly in the application to their "use v", partly in application to their "value" is likewise described by me in the analysis of the first phase of MOCMQ, that C-M. See pp.85.86.87 in Capital, in the ex. where at the end it is said "Our commodity owners thus demonstrate that the very division of labor which makes them independent private producers makes ~~them~~ at the same time ~~transparent~~ the process of social prod. and their social relations in this process independent of them, so that the independence of persons one from another is supplemented by a system of all-around material dependence." (Capital, p.87)
goods

Agreements for the utilization of benefits by means of exchange. Here out vir obscurus places everything on its head: First there exists, according to him, right, then exchange (Verkehr); in actuality the action occurs the other way around: First there is exchange and only after that there develops from it a legal order. In the analysis of commodity exchange I showed that under a developed exchange the persons practicing exchange silently recognize in each other equal personalities and owners of benefits exchanged by them; they do this already then when they offer each other their goods and achieve a purchase. This factual relation, arising only thanks to this exchange and in the exchange receive later a legal form in the form of an agreement, etc; but this form does not create neither its content, exchange, nor the relations of people to each other existing in it, but the contrary. In a contrary sense Wagner says:

"This acquisition (of goods with the help of exchange) necessarily presupposes a legal order on the basis of which (!) exchange is accomplished." etc. (p.84)

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Credit. Instead of developing the significance of money as a means of payment, Wagner immediately transforms the means of exchange to the extent that it is accomplished in such a form that both equivalents in C-M do not counterpose each other simultaneously -- into a credit sdelka. (p.85ff) and then adds that it is often linked with payment of interest money; this serves also for this in order to present as a basis of "credit" "demonstration of confidence" and thus "confidence".
property

About "juridical concept of wealth" of Fichte and others, in accordance to whom there belong to the latter also debts as a negative component part (p.85, footnote 6).

"Credit" is either "consumption credit" or "production credit" (p.86) The first predominates on the lower steps of culture, the latter on the "higher".