Extracts on Labor (Ru. P. R. 189)

Hegel - Jenenser Resiphilosophie, ed. Hoffmeister, Leipsie

Vol. I, 820-22

Animal doubte is an animal consciousness in which destruction shocks itself and the structure of the opposition is only set up to be transcended. Desire is comething compelling to descruction, the desired as such as the being transcended itself; and its identity and the enecking of it are sempated in time. But the becoming actual or the transcendence, the quieting of the desire is an immediate becoming transcended without any ideality, without consciousness. Human desire must be transcended, ideal in the transcendence itself, and the object must remain in its transcendence; the means as the remain ing becoming transcended of both, exists opposed to both.

Practical relation is a elation of consciousness, i.e., the simplicity of destruction must in its simplicity breakspart and be one in itself checked and opposed.

transcending of both oppositos, and at the same time the means by which they are one and by which they cut themselves off from their transcending as from their unity. The one side of the opposition, which aspearing as active, the unity of the individual, must work on the other appearing as pactive. In labor the decire anatches the object to be destroyed from its connections the particularized it and sets it up as related to a desiring. Insectional as the desire exists as such, both are only ideally transcended, remaining in this relation, both at rest. It must transcend the object and itself as destruction, but in this

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transcendence itself, consci usness is an ideality of transeendence. Thus, the individual as working is active and the object is transcended, both remaining. Desire in its destruct ion does not unbieve satisfaction, and the objective even as destroyed, remains. Labor is this practical consciousness as the relation of both the general and of the singular. It must likewise exist as the means whereby they are related as opposed. and whereby they remain as thus separated. It is thus that work as such has a constant existance. Labor is itself a thing In margin: recaining active through dealer and passive against it and active against the object]. The tool is the existing reasonable medium, the existing generality of the practical process. It appears on the side of the active against the passive, is itself passive from the point of view of the working, and scrive against the thing worked on. It is that whereby the work maintains itself; What alone remains from the working and the worked on, and whereby its contingency is inmortalized. It propagates itself in traditions, while both desiring and the desired exist only as individuals and perishe It is a limited destruction through necessity or an absolute external. The freedom of consciousness transcends this necess sity and checks the destruction in enjoymentsthrough itself. It makes both seyes conscious of one another, for one another, continuing to exist; thus, in the for-itself of the other, each is himself, each is in the consciousness of the other, that is in his existence, in his for-him:elfness is consciousness of himself, is for himself. And the sex relation is such a relation that, in the being of consciousness of each, each himself is one with the other, i.e., ideal relation. Desire thus

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frees itself from relation to anjoyment, it becomes an immediate unity of the absolute-fur-itselfness of both, i.e., it becomes lowe. And anjoyment is in the supect of itself in the being of the other's conscioness. The relation itself is in this summer the being of both and remaining as the being of both, i.s., it becomes asrriage.

Yol. I. pp. 236-41.

as one such, so possession is simply that of a particular Just as labor becomes in the particularity a universal, in the same way that they are related in their concepts. Just as labor rests on the needs of the particular as one such, so possession is simply that of a particular.

Just as labor becomes in its particularity a universal, in the same way does possession.

I. Labor which rests on the needs of a particular becomes a universal in its abeing the labor of a particular individual and also being based on his needs.

All work as such the requirement must exist. When it is seknowledged, it will have the form of universality. When it appears as semething external, as inorganic nature and must be learnt, it is a universal mode, a rule of all labor which is semething for itself. However, this universal is for labor the true essence, and the native lack of skill must overcomeitzelf in learning the universal. Labor is not an instinct but a rationality which among people makes itself into a universal and thereby is opposed to the particularity of the individual which must overcome itself. And to work does not exist as instinct but in the mode of spirit, just because what is the subjective activity of a particular must nevertheless become an other, a universal rule, and the skill of the particular first returns through this process of learning to the other-becoming of itself.

The acknowledgement of labor and skill runs the same course

into the universal that it did in the particular individuals through learning. Against the universal skill the particular sets itself up as a specific (skill), separates itself therefrom, makes itself more skilled than the others, and invents useful tools. But it is the sks invention of a universal which is a true universal in its specific skill. The others learn it, thenseend their specificity and it becomes issediately a universal good.

The tool as such postpones for asn his material denial. But it remains in it his form; it remains his activity which is directed against a deed thing. Of course, his activity is essentially the death of itself, if it is torn out of its living context and set up as something to be destroyed as such. In the mashine the man transcends this his formal scrivity and lets it work for him completely. But this transcendence, which he practices against nature and with which he keeps within his particularity, evenges itself against him. What he gains from it, the more he subjugates it, the lower he himself becomes. While letting nature do the work through all kinds of machines, he does not transcend the necessity of his labor, but only shoves it out, estranges it from nature and directly himself as semething not living to it as something living. But it essapes this negative living and the work that is left to him itself becomes mechanical. He reduces it only for the whole but not for the particular. Rather he increases it, for the more mechanical labor becomes, the less value it has, and the more he must labor in this menner.

To wit, his labor, as he labor of a particular individual for his needs is at the same time a universal, ideal. Men esticios his needs well with it but it satisfies his needs not with this product as determined by him. Rather in that it satisfies his needs, it is another than it is. (Merches: "The individual satisfies his needs by his labor but not by the particular product of his labor. The labor to fill his needs, has to become other than it is.")

Man no longer produces what he needs or he no longer needs what he hasproduced. Rather it becomes instead of the actuality of the satisfection. His labor becomes formal, abstractly universal, a particular. He limits himself to labor for one of his needs, and exchanges himself for his other needs. His labor is for necessity, for the abstract of needs, and as a universal, not for his needs. And the satisfaction of the totality of his needs is a labor of all.

The labor of the whole people intervenes between this range of the needs of the particular and his activity therefor. The labor of each becomes in regard to its content a universal for the needs of all, just as the adjustment took place for the satisfaction of all of his needs. That is, it has a value. His labor and his possession are not, what they are for him, but what they are for all. The satisfaction of needs is a universal dependence of everyone upon everyone class. For each there disappers all security and dertainty that his labors as a particular are directly suitable to his needs. As a single needy individual, he becomes a universal. Trhough the particularization of labor, the skill of each is immediately greater for this labor. All relationships of nature to the

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particularity of men come more under his control. Comfort is increased. This universality in which the particular need and the labor is elevated to this adjustment is a formal universality. Its sconsciousness is an not an absolute in which these relationships are destroyed, but is directed to transcending this particular in order to free working from its dependence on nature. The needs and labor are elegated to the form of consciousness. They simplify but this simplicity is abstract, formally universal, the dissection of the concrete which achieves in this dissection an empirical infinity of particularity. And in this formal false manner, while it subjugates nature in itself, the individual only increases his dependence upon it.

of products. In an English factory 18 con work on one pin.

(in margin: Hegel cites A. Smith). Every one has a specific enginerally aspect of the work and only this aspect. A particular individual would not be able to make 120 perhaps not even one. When each of 18 (kinds of) work are divided smong 10 men, they makes 4000 in one day. But if the work of these ten were divided among 18, we would get 48,000 in a day. However, in this same proportion as the produced aggregate soars, the value of labor falls.

Labor becomes the more absolutely dead as it becomes machine labor. The skills of single persons become more infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the factory worker is tessed down to its lowest stupidity.

and the connection of the particular kinds of work with the whole infinite mass of needs becomes quite incomprehensible (unubersichtbar), and a blind dependence. Thus, an isolated operated. often makes the work of a whole class of men, who satisfy their needs with it, suddenly checked, superfluous, and unnecessarily. Just as the assimilation of nature is achieved through the insertion of the links of greater comfort, so these stages of assimilation are infinitely divisible and the aggregate of comforts makes it mains just as absolutely uncoefortable.

These manifold labors of needs as thing must realize their concept, their abstraction. Thier universal concept must be a thing just as the thing presents everything as universal.

Money is this concept in its material existence, the form of unity or the possibilities of all things needed. Need and labor elevated to this generality thus form for themselves among a great people a mammoth system of community and mutual dependence, a moving life of the dead, which in its movement is blinded and primitively moving here and there and like a wild snimal needs constant and strict control and curting.

movement, has its resting place in possession. Possession in its particularity likewise becomes among the whole of a people a universal. It remains possession of this carticular but only insofar as it is posited through the general consciousness, or insofar as in it everybody likewise possesses his own, i.e., it becomes property. Its exclusion is such that everyone communeally excludes every one else, and in the determinate possession of each is the possession of all. In respection there is the contradition that a thing is as thing a universal, and

researcheless only a particular possession. This contradiction transcends itself through the consciousness while it is opposed in itself as the opposite of itself. It is the acknowledgment of the individual possession and the universal possession at the same time making every one possesses in this particular possession. The assurance of my possession is the accurance of the possession of all. In my property everyone has his property. My possession has attained the form of consciousness. It is determined as my possession. But as property it he not related to me alone but universal.

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Just as in the foregoing power (Marcuse calls this medium), labor and need has particularlized itself absolutely - sc property particularizes itself in this medium. Particularization is the placing of the concrete in the universal. Differences which it in itself has opposed as identity, fall to pieces and become an abstraction for it. The totality of particularity which wes wholly in every particular individual but(is no lenger because of(the extension of its existence to that which it itself makes, is transcended only in the whole of the posple. And the particularity of needs and possession collapses in the nature of its individuality. Consciousness as to tality of the particulars was the oneness of ignelf and its externality, its possession. While both fall apart, the particular ceases to have the honor which placed its whole escence in every particular. In this particularization that which is related to it directly as an organization constituting what was called its person, and that which appears externally to it as matter of fact, fall apart, since forthe honor this distinction does not exist which in every relationship posite every possession itself as the whole.

Vol. II, 213-217

Actual Spirit

The spirit is setual nother as intelligence nor as will, but intelligence exists as will, i.e., in intelligence this unity of two universals, and in the universal will exists this complete self. It is a knowing of its existence and its being is spiritual - the universal will. In these elements the foregoing has now to be presented; in it, just as in the will the abstract intelligence has transcended itself or has achieved its object, through itself, so here the abstract will is to be transcended or as transcended to produce in the elements of universal schnow-ledged existence this spiritual actuality. Just as possession thereby transcended that right, so labor earlier transcented of the intelligence in the general deed and enjoyment of all, and the difference of the individual becomes a knowledge of good and evil - personal right and not-right.

Acknowledged Existence

Acknowledgents immediate actuality, and in its element swe have the person first as for itself in gneral. It is enjoying and working. Here first desire has the appearance of right, for it its actual, i.e., it itself has universal spiritual being. Work of all and for all, and enjoyment - the enjoyment of all. Everyone serves every one else and helps, or the individual here first has particular existence. Before it was only abstract or untrue. Spirit can set itself (rest?) easily in an abstraction, analyse itself, and give itself an existence as the animal cannot, wherever the self that places itself in a system, becomes ill (?), but

it has only momentary disappearing existence. Here is desire. Opposed to me I as abstract for-iteeliness stands its inorgania mature as existent. It relates itself negatively to it and transcends this in the unity of both, but in this way, that it Piret forms itself ess a self, observed its/form and consumes itself accordingly. The existence, the scope of natural needs -fin margin: a) immediate I of work a) immediatemovement of doing that is not taken up in knowing; its work has the character of abstraction. It works not as partiicular concrete totality of needs as an element of being in general, a multitude of needs. The things which serve for their satisfaction are manufactured (verarbeltet), their general inner possibility set up as external, as Form. This manufacturing, however, is itself a manifold. It is the meking-of-itself-into-a- thing of someclousness. But it is in the element of universality that it becomes an abstract working. The needs are many; to take up thin manyness into the I, to work, is the abstraction of the universal forms (Bilder) but a self-moving formation (billen). The I-for-itself is abstract. It is to be sure working, but its labor is accordingly abstract. need in general is analysed into its many aspects. The abstract in its moving is the for-itselfness, the doing, the working. Becam se it is worked only for the needs as abstract, for-itselfness, so it is also only abstractly worked. This is the concept, the gruth of desire, which oxists here. As its concept is, so is its work. Estisfaction of all the needs of the particular is not; as it develops into the exist publicat, what is brought before hime Universal labor in, accordingly, division of abor, goonomizing. Ten can make as many pins as a hundred. Every particular, accordingly, because he is here particular, works for a need. The conneeds of many, and every one does the same. Accordingly, each satisfies the needs of many and the satisfaction of his many special reads is the labor of many others. Since his labor is this abstract (kind), he relates himsel: assbatract I or accordingly to the mode of thinghood, not as comprehensive, internally rich, circumspect, spirit which controls a great range and is master over it. It has no concrete labor but its strength consists in the analyzing, in the abstraction, in the tearing apart of the concrete into many abstract aspects. His labor itself becomes quite mechanical or relative to a simple determination.

abstract activity, and thus he is capable of extracting himselffrom labor and in the place of his activity, substituting that
of external nature. He needs more movement and this he finds
in external nature; may the pure movement is just the relation
of abstract forms of apace and time - the abstract external
activity, the machine.

Between these manifold abstract products there must now be found a movement whereby it again becomes concrete needs, that is, needs of a particular; --- (in margin; determination in itself; return to particularity)---- this becomes a subject which contains in itself many of the same ---- (in margin; He has made it a being for the needs of others, just as in family possession he held it in opposition to itself. The ground is, because has simple existence is universal. His possession has now the meaning of being for another)-----The judgment which it analyzed,

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opposes as determined abstraction; its universality to which it attained, is the equality of the same or value. In this they are the same. This value itself as thing is money. The meturn to concretion, to possession is exchange. ---- (in margin: b) In his abstract labor he observes the universality of himself, of his form, or that it is for others. He will accordingly posit, to share with others or these others should be viewed therein. The second movement which contained the movements of the first develops. I I is doing against another I, and of course se, as acknowleded by him, as comething that relates it wolf to my possession, but this it will have only with my will, just as I direct mysell to his with his will. The equality of both is scknowledged - Value, meaning of the thing. The thing has the meaning of relation to another. To be for another, existence is scknowledged existence, i.e., it is the specific will of every particular in it. and their equality, and thus for everyone there is the will of another - unity of absolute difference. }----

The abstract thing appears in exchange as it is, namely, to be this alteration, to return from themshood to the I, and of course thus, since its thingness consists in this, to be the possession of another. Every one gives himself his possession, transcends his eviatence, and since it is acknowledged therein, the other preserves it with the willingness of the first. They are acknowledged, each receives from the xmm other the possession of the other, so that he receives it only insofar as the other is the negative of itself, i.e., as property. It is through mediation of every one, the negating of his being, his having; and this is mediated through the negating of the others. Only

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Only because the other disposes of his matter of fact (Seche), do I do it. An this equality in the thing as its inwardness is its value, which has my complete consent and the intention of the other - the positive mine and thus the being, the unity of my will and his, and my will passes as actual, existent. The acknowledged being is the existent. Thereby, my will is valid. I possess. Possession is transformed into property. In possession being has the unspiritual meaning of my having as this particular (India.) Here, however, (we have) the acknowledged being, the being of the possession, that the thing is and I am and averyone grasps it as myself. Here is the being of the universal self and having is mediated through the other or is universal. The universal is value, the sensuous movement is the exchange. The same universality is mediation to property, as knowing movement, accordingly, immediate leving whichis mediated through being acknowledged, i.e., its existence in spiritual existence--- (in margin: a) Forms b) Momory. Value ----Here the contingency of seizure by the possessor is transcended. I have (transformed) everything through labor and through exchange into an acknowledged being. I am thus a universal - not this particular person but at the same time family. I.e., property is a) the movement of things in exchange. Inhereitance is therefore (simply) a change in the indvidual, the family is the constant - this does not yet appear here.-- in margin: I am the contingency of possession. My skill, minclination, telent - better more accessible accident I myself absolutely necessary ---- The source, origin of property is here that of work, of my doing itself - immediate self and being acknowledged. Grund. I am the cause just because I have willed - the purpose bn exchange is the cause. The ground is the universal. I have willed in exchange to posit my thing as value,

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is inner mycement, inner doing, as work that is mink into being.
It is in both cases the same allenation.

A I make myself immediately into a thing, into a form whose being is work.

Thus I alienate myself from this my existence, make it spendthing strange to me, and preserve myself therein. Just in this way I viet my maknowledged existence, being as known. There my immediate I, here my for-myselfness, my person.

accordingly, I consider here my acknowleded being as existence and my will is this validity.

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B. This law of immediate existence of the individual exists as law of its will, or it achieves this as such in the disappearance of contingent existents. Trhough the death of the parents, it becomes positive; it appears as the existent, since they were before in the state. It is the actual validity of property, the element of satual existence through the work of all. The law properts the family, leaves it in its being, but it is, was like the family, the substance and necessity of the particulars. It is the unconscious guardian over the particulars whose families have died. Thus it (ar?) appears as particular. It is substance and necessity - its hard side in which it appears.

protecting everyone in his immediate possession, heredity and exchange. But this is only formal right, that in view of the special cases remains quite free (contingency of heredity.) The individual appears as acquiring through labor. Here it is messly his law, that what he produced and what he exchanged belongs to him. But the universal is at the same time his necessity which secrified him in his free right.

The universal is a) pure necessity to the particular workings. He has his unconscious existence in the universal. The
society is his nature, on whose elementary blind movement he
depends, which preserves or transcends him spiritually and physically. b) he is there through immediate possession or heredity.
completely accidental. He works an abstract labor. He conquers
mature just as much. But this becomes another form of sontingenby.

P.R. 19.

a. He can work more but this discreases the value of his labor; he does not thereby depart from the universal relationships. h Meede are thoroby multiplied. Every particular is divided. into many. Testes are refined. They get more variations. A dressing is demand which brings the things to be used continuelly nearer to quatom. The demand is made that all sides of his malajustments (incapacities) be provided for. (cork, corksores, candlesnuffers). He is cultivated as a saturally enjoying person. gatt at the same time he becomen through the abstraction of missing labor, mechanical, stupefied, spiritless. The spiritual, this preserved self-consciouen lving, becomes an empty doing. The strength of the celf consists in its wealth of range; this is lost. He can let free some work as machinery; the more formal thereby becomes his own doing. His dull work confines him to one point and lator is more perfect the more one-sided it is. But this variety produced the mode, the changeableness, the freedom in the use of the forms of these things. Outs of clothes, kinds of ameublements are not constant. Their alteration is essential and rational, more rational than attoking to one fashion in which particular forms are declared to be fixed. The beautiful is cast in no mode. Otherwise there would be found no free beauty but a charming one, i.e., the sagam ornament of another; drive, desire is aroused for this which belongs to others and would be accordingly contingent. (Just as undesisting is the wrestling for mbx simplification of labor, invention of new machines, etc. The skills of the particular (indiv) is the possiblity of this preserving his existence. This is subjugated to the complete entage entanglement of the accidents of all. A multituxder is

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insequre and unskilled labor of factories, manufactories, mines. eto. Thole branches of industry which supported a large bulk of the pop lation suddenly fold up because the made changes or hecause the values of their products fall on account of new inventions in other countries or for other reasons. Whole masses ere thus abandoned to helpless poverty. The conflict between vast wealth and west powerty steps forth, a property unable to improve ite condition." Weslth, like every mass, makes itself powerful. Accumulation of wealth occurs, partly through accident, partly through the universality of its distribution. It le an interest point in was way which that whosver caste his clance over the universal vastness, collected around him, how a large mans attracts the smaller to it. Tho has, to him it is given. Acquisition in a many-sided system that brings in from all sides, which a smaller business cannot use. The highest chatraction of labor renches the most particular kind and attains a wider scope. This inequality of wealth and the poverty, this need and necessity becomes the highest dismemberment of will, inner revolt, and hate. The necessity which is the perfect contingency of particular existence is just the preserved substance of it. State power steps in and must provide that every sphere be preserved, intervenes, seeks ways out, new channels of commerce in other lands, etc. which make activity more difficult to the extent that it en croaches too much to the disadvantages of others Freedom of trade remains necessary; the interve-tion must be as unapparent as possible - for it is the field of arbuitrary discretion (Willkur). The appearance of power must be avoided and one should save nothing which is not murto be a ved, but occupy the suffereing classes in other ways. The state power is the 12286

sundemned accordingly to the wholly stupefying, unhealthy,

universal overseer; the particular is only kan buried with the particular. Trade becomes to be sure left by itself but with sacrifice of this generation and increase of poventy. Poor taxes and institutions are demanded. In military affairs, also, Hegel was forced to tacklethe essence of the problem. No nuiter people is more willing to shed its blood for Germany than the German people; no people more capable militarily. It is hence not covardice or military incapacity which makesthe German army the laughing stock of Europe. The German armies must indulge in negotations between various armies and aut conduct a war with orders from above because of its lack of an organic unity between states.

Fights carried out the struggle for nationalism as an active propagandist and colitician. At the samo time, he worked out a metaphysics to correspond In both theory and practice to this activity. the individualist ideology of the past century, and his metaphysics was essentially that of the isolated Ego. Hegel, on the other hand, wkthownxesutergousp persevisive relative seemed to stand saids from the active political struggles, Extrapresitary busingsexhuxhumyan scute sense of historical development, led him to concentrate on the growth of the social opganism rather than the role of the individual agitator. Indeed, he went further, counterposing the social will to the private will as an inevitable higher stage of development of revolutionary activity for the achievement of the nation. Over and over again he contended that the unification of particular wills by laws and phrases did not make Germany a state. As such it was merely a formal and not an organic unity. This distinction between an aggregation (Menge) and an organism (Gemeinshaft), between the particulars (Einzelnen) and the Exx unity (Einheit), as applied to the German nation, was the beginning of Hegel's philosophy. More specifically, he railed against the existing state of political affairs, wherein"the State counted emong its subjects, serfs, bourgeoisie, free nobility and princes, who themselves in turn have subjects and whose relationships exist not as pure political structures but in infinite modifications." 12289

transcendence itself, consci usness is an ideality of transcendence. Thus, the individual as working is active and the object is transcended, both remaining. Desire in its destruction does not achieve satisfaction, sud the objective even as destroyed, remains. Labor is this practical consciousness as the relation of both the general and of the singular. It must likewise exist as the means whereby they are related as opposed, and whereby they remain as thus separated. It is thus that, work as such has a constant existence. Labor is itself a thing (in margin; remaining active through desire and passive against it and active against the object). The tool is the existing reasonable medium, the existing generality of the practical process. It appears on the side of the active against the passive, is itself passive from the point, of view of the working, and active against the thing worked on. It is that whereby the work maintains itself; What alone remains from the working and the worked on, and whereby its contingency is inmortalized. It propagates itself in traditions, while both desiring and the desired exist only as individuals and perish. It is a limited destruction through necessity or an absolute external. The freedom of consciousness transcends this necess sity and checks the destruction in enjoyments, through itself. It makes both sexes conscious of one another, for one another, continuing to exist; thus, in the for-itself of the other, each is himself, each is in the consciousness of the other, that is in his existence, in his for-himrelfness is consciousness of himself, is for himself. And the sex relation is such a relation that, in the being of consciousmess of each, each himself is one with the other, i.e., ideal relation. Desire thus 12290

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frees itself from relation to enjoyment, it becomes an immediate unity of the absolute-for-itselfness of both, i.e., it becomes love. And enjoyment is in this aspect of itself in the being of the other's consciousness. The relation itself is in this manner the being of both and remaining as the being of both, i.e., it becomes marriage.

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particularity of men come more under his control. Comfort is increased. This universality in which the particular need and the labor is elevated to this adjustment is a formal universality. Its sconsciousness is an not an absolute in which these relationships are destroyed, but is directed to transcending this particular in order to free working from its dependence on nature. The needs and labor are elevated to the form of consciousness. They simplify but this simplicity is abstract, formally universal, the dissection of the concrete which schieves in this dissection an empirical infinity of particularity. And in this formal false manner, while it subjugates nature in itself, the individual only increases his dependence upon it.

of products. In an English factory 18 men work on one pin.

(in margin: Hegel cites A. Smith). Every one has a specific mankwanky aspect of the work and only this aspect. A particular individual would not be able to make 120 perhaps not even one. When each of 18 (kinds of) work are divided among 10 men, they makes 4000 in one day. But if the work of these ten were divided among 18, we would get 48,000 in a day. However, in this same proportion as the produced aggregate soars, the value of labor falls.

M Labor becomes the more absolutely dead as it becomes machine labor. The skills of single persons become more infinitedly limited, and the consciousness of the factory worker is tossed down to its lowest stupidity.

Whole infinite mass of needs becomes quite incomprehensible (unubersichtbar), and a blind dependence. Thus, an isolated operated - often makes the work of a whole class of men, who satisfy their needs with it, suddenly checked, superfluous, and unnecessarily. I Just as the assimilation of nature is schieved through the insertion of the links of greater comfort, so these stages of assimilation are infinitely divisible and the aggregate of comforts makes it agains just as absolutely uncomfortable.

Those manifold labors of needs as thing must realize their consept, their abstraction. Thier universal concept must be a thing just as the thing presents everything as universal. Honey is this concept in its material existence, the form of unity or the possibilities of all things needed. Need and labor elevated to this generality thus form for themselves among a great people a mammoth system of community and mutual dependence, a moving life of the dead, which in its movement is blindly and primitively moving here and there and like a wild animal needs constant and strict control and curbing.

G. Likewise this activity of labor and of needs, like the movement, has its resting place in possession. Possession in its particularity likewise becomes among the whole of a people a universal. It remains possession of this rarticular but only insofar as it is posited through the general consciousness, or insofar as in it everybody likewise possesses his cwn, i.e., it becomes property. Its exclusion is such that everyone communally excludes every one else, and in the determinate possession of each is the possession of all. In possession there is the contraditioton that a thing is as abing a universal, and is

nevertheless only a particular possession. This contradiction transcends itself through the consciousness while it is opposed in itself as the opposite of itself. It is the acknowledgment of the individual possession and the universal possession at the in that same time matter every one possesses in this particular possession. The assurance of my possession is the acsurance of the possession of all. In my property everyone has his property. My possession has attained the form of consciousness. It is determined as my possession. But as property it he not related to me alone but universal.

Just as in the foregoing power (Marouse calls this medium) labor and need has particularlized itself absolutely - so property particularizes itself in this medium. Particularization is the placing of the concrete in the universal. Differences which it in itself has opposed as identity, fall to pieces and become an abstraction for it. The totality of particularity which was wholly in every particular indx idual but (is no lenger because of the extension of its existence to that which it itself makes, is transcended only in the whole of the peeple. And the particularis of needs and possession collapses in the nature of its individuality. Consciousness as to tality of the particulars was the oneness of igself and its externality, its possession. While both fell apart, the particular seases to have the honor which placed its whole essence in every particular. In this particularization that which is related to it directly as an organization constitutig what was called its person, and that which appears externally to it as matter of fact, fall apart, since forthe honor this distinction does not exist which in every relationship posits every possession itself as the whole. 12297 <

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Actual Spirit

The spirit is actual neither as intelligence nor as will, but intelligence exists as will, i.e., in intelligence this unity of two universals, and in the universal will exists this complete self. It is a knowing of its existence and its being is upiritual - the universal will. In these elements the foregoing has now to be presented; in it, just as in he will the abstract intelligence has transcended itself or has achieved its object, through itself, so here the abstract will is to be transcended or as transcended to produce in the elements of universal acknowledged existence this spiritual actuality. Just as possession thereby transcrime itself into right, so labor earlier transports itself into the general. What was the family good, in which marital enjoyment knew itself, becomes the general deed and enjoyment of all, and the difference of the individual becomes a knowledge of good and evil - personal right and not-right.

Acknowledged Existence

Acknowledge is immediate actuality, and in its element swe have the person first as for itself in gneral. It is enjoying and working. Here first desire has the appearance of right, for it its actual, i.e., it itself has universal spiritual being. Work of all and for all, and enjoyment - the enjoyment of all. Everyone serves every one else and helps, or the individual here first has particular existence. Before it was only abstract or untrue. Spirit can set itself (rest?) easily in an abstraction, analyse itself, and give itself an existence as the animal cannot, whereever the self that places itself in a system, becomes ill (?), but

it has only momentary disappearing existence. Here is desire. Opposed to the I az abstract for-iteeliness stands its inorganic nature as existent. It relates itself negatively to it and transcends this in the unity of both, but in this way, that it first forms itself asm a self, observes its/form and consumes itself accordingly. The existence, the scope of natural needs --(in margin: a) immediate I of work a) immediatemovement of doing that is not taken up in knowing; its work has the character of abstraction. It works not as partiicular concrete totality of needs as an element of being in general, a multitude of needs. The things which serve for their satisfaction are manufactured (verarbeitet), their general inner possibility set up as external, as Form. This manufacturing, however, is itself a manifold. It is the making-of-itself-into-a- thing of consciousness. But It is in the element of universality that it becomes an abstract working. The needs are many; to take up this manyness into the I, to work, is the abstraction of the universal forms (Bilder) but a self-moving formation (bidden). The I-for-itself is abstract. It is to be sure working, but its labor is accordingly abstract. Need in general is analysed into its many aspects. The abstract in its moving is the for-itselfness, the doing, the working. Because se it is worked only for the needs as abstract, for-itselfness, so it is also only abstractly worked. This is the concept, the truth of desire, which exists here. As its concept is, so is its work. Satisfaction of all the needs of the particular is not, as it develops into the exists object, what is brought before him. Universal labor is, accordingly, division of abor, economizing. Ten can make as many pine as a hundred. Every particular, accordingly, because he is here particular, works for a need. The content of his labor extends beyond his need. He works for the needs of many, and every one does the same. Accordingly, each satisfies the needs of many and the autisfaction of his many special needs is the labor of many others. Since his labor is this abstract (kind), he relates himsel: assbetract I or according to the mode of thinghood, not as comprehensive, internally rich, circumspect, spirit which controls a great range and is master over it. It has no concrete labor but its strength consists in the analyzing, in the abstraction, in the tearing apart of the concrete into many abstract aspects. His labor itself becomes quite mechanical or relative to a simple determination.

But the more abstract it becomes, the more it is only abstract activity, and thus he is capable of extracting himself from labor and in the place of his activity, substituting that of external nature. He needs more movement and this he finds in external nature; arx the pure movement is just the relation of abstract forms of space and time - the abstract external activity, the machine.

Between these manifold abstract products there must now be found a movement whereby it again becomes concrete needs, that is, needs of a particular --- (in margin: determination in itself; return to particularity)---- this becomes a subject which contains in itself many of the same ---- (in margin: He has made it a being for the needs of others, just as in family possession he held it in opposition to itself. The ground is, because has simple existence is universal. His possession has now the meaning of being for another)------The judgment which it analyzed,

opposes as determined abstraction; its universality to which it attained, is the equality of the same or value. In this they are the same. This value itself as thing is money. The Beturn to concretion, to possession is exchange. ---- (in margin: b) In his abstract labor he observes the universality of himself, of his form, or that it is for others. He will accordingly posit, to share with others or these others should be visued therein. The second movement which contained the movements of the first develops. I I is doing against another I, and of course se, as acknowleded by him, as something that relates itself to My possession, but this it will have only with my will, just as I direct myself to his with his will. The equality of both is acknowledged - Value, meaning of the thing. The thing has the meaning of relation to another. To be for another, existence is acknowledged evistence, i.e., it is the specific will of every particular in it and their equality, and thus for everyone there is the will of another - unity of absolute difference.)----

The abstract thing appears in exchange as it is, namely, to be this alteration, to return from thenghood to the I, and of course thus, since its thingness consists in this, to be the pessession of another. Every one gives himself his possession, transcends his eristence, and since it is acknowledged therein, the other preserves it with the willingness of the first. They are acknowledged, each receives from the xxxx other the possession of the other, so that he receives it only insofar as the other is the negative of itself, i.e., as property. It is through mediation of every one, the negating of his being, his having; and this is mediated through the negating of the others. Only

Only because the other disposes of his matter of fact (Sache), do I do it. An: this equality in the thing as its inwardness is its value, which has my complete consent and the intention of the other - the positive mine and thus the being, the unity of my will and him, and my will passen as actual, existent. The acknowledged being is the existent. Thereby, my will is valid. I possess. Possession is transformed into property. In pouneusion being has the unspiritual meaning of my having as this particular (indiv.) Here, however, (we have) the acknowledged being, the being of the possession, that the thing is. and I am and everyone grasps it as myself. Here is the being of the universal self and having is mediated through the other or is universal. The universal is value, the sensuous movement is the exchange. The same universality is mediation to property, as knowing movement, accordingly, immediate having whichis mediated through being acknowledged, 1.e., its existence is spiritual existence -- (in margin: a) Forms b) Memory. Value) ---- Here the contingency of seizure by the possessor is transcended. I have (transformed) everything through labor and through exchange into an acknowledged being. I am thus a wiversal - not this particular person but at the same time family. I.e., property is a) the movement of things in exchange. Inhereitance is therefore (simply) a change in the inavidual, the family is the constant - this does not yet appear here.--(in margin: I am the contingency of possession. My skill, minclination, talent - better more accessible accident I myself absolutely necessary) ---- The source, origin of property is here that of work, of my doing itself - immediate self and being acknowledged. Grund. I am the cause just because I have willed - the purpose on exchange is the cause. The ground is the universal. I have willed in exchange to posit my thing as value, 12302

ite inner avoement, inner doing, as work that is sink into being.
It is in both cares the same alienation.

No I make myself immediately into a thing, into a form whose being is work.

A Thus I alienate myself from this my existence, make it something strange to me, and preserve myself therein. Just in this way I view my acknowledged existence, being as known. There my immediate I, here my for-myselfness, my person.

Accordingly, I consider here my acknowleged being so existence and my will is this validity.

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E. This law of immediate existence of the individual exists as law of its will, or it achieves this as such in the disappearance of contingent existents. Trhough the death of the parents, it becomes positive; it appears as the existent, since they were before in the state. It is the actual validity of property, the element of actual existence through the work of all. The law protects the family, leaves it in its being, but it is, the like the family, the substance and necessity of the particulars. I.e. it is the unconscious guardian over the particulars whose families have died. Thus it (er?) appears as particular. It is substance and necessity - its hard side in which it appears.

First of all, it is the universal right, property in general, protecting everyone in his immediate possession, heredity and exchange. But this is only formal right, that in view of the special cases remains quite free (contingency of heredity.) The individual appears as acquiring through labor. Here it is messely his law, that what he produced and what he exchanged belongs to him. But the universal is at the same time his necessity which macrifised him in his free right.

The universal is a) pure necessity to the particular workings. He has his unconscious existence in the universal. The
society is his nature, on whose elementary blind movement he
depends, which preserves or transcends him spiritually and physically. b) he is there through immediate possession or heredity.
completely accidental. He works an abstract labor. He conquers
nature just as much. But this becomes another form of sontingency.

A He can work more but this discreases the value of his labor; he does not thereby depart from the universal relationships. Beeds are thereby multiplied. Every particular is divided into many. Tastes are refined. They get more variations. A dressing is demands which brings the things to be used continually nearer to custom. The demand is made that all sides of his malajustments (incapacities) be provided for. (cork, corksorew, candleanuffers). He is cultivated as a naturally enjoying person. West at the same time he becomes through the abstraction of winny labor, mechanical, stupefied, spiritless. The spiritual, this preserved self-consciousa lving, becomes an empty doing. The strength of the self consists in its wealth of range; this is lost. He can let froe some work as machinery; the more formal thereby becomes his own doing. His dull work confines him to one point and labor is more perfect the more one-sided it is. But this variety produced the mode, the changeabloness, the freedom in the use of the forms of these things. Cuts of clothes, kinds of ameublements are not constant. Their alteration is essential and rational, more rational than sticking to one fashion in which particular forms are declared to be fixed. The beautiful is cast in no mode. Otherwise there would be found no free beauty but a charming one, i.e., the segge ornament of another; drive, desire is aroused for this which belongs to others and would be accordingly contingent. Just as undesisting is the wrestling for max simplification of labor, invention of new machines, etc. The skills of the particular (indiv) is the possiblity of this preserving his existence. This is subjugsted to the complete emings entanglement of the accidents of all. A multituader is