

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY & OTHER ESSAYS by Geo. Lichtheim, Random Hse., 1967

The 18th century is Human? From 1880's when Phil. seemed dead & Nietzsche's influence was dominant

Introd. claims a certain unity in these essays written bet. '62-'66, embracing no less than 3 centuries from Puritan upheaval in 17thc. "by way of the Fr. Rev." to totalitarianism.

Part I--3 Studies in Historical Logic.

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY (His. & Th. IVm2, '65)

p/4: "His...lly, the term 'ideology' made its 1st appearance at the time of the F. Rev., its author, Antoine Destutt de Tracy, being one of the group of savants whom the Convention in 1799 entrusted with the mgt. of the newly founded Institut de France." (ftn is to Georges Lefebvre, La revolution francaise (Paris, '57) p. 443 which shows the creation of Institute was for purposes of creating a nationwide system of higher learning committed to the spirit of the Enlightenment. Intellectual explosion counterpart of brilliant achievements in natural In the 1840's Marx used term in entirely different context. In any case the ideologues of the 18th c. were forerunners of POSITIVISM.

p.7: "The 2-fold character of the liberal "ideology", as a system of normative ideas & as an incipient critique of the very notion of absolute norms... Elements d'ideologie (1601-1815) presents a "Science des idees" for which he cites the authority of Locke & Condillac." who are praised for having inaugurated "the natural his. of ideas",--"that is the scientific description of the human mind."

The antecedents of this faith are Baconian and Cartesian. Helvetius: "Our ideas are the necessary consequences of the societies in which we live. "L'education peut tout," which is where Marx writes that the educators must themselves be educated.

p.11 GL returns to the historic in strict chronological order when he goes to the Hegelian tradition, holding that though Marx handled the Left Hegelians "German Ideology" were legitimate heirs of the ideologues, "actually" Hegel was "its true originator" who from his youthful Jacobinism had gradually moved to an almost Burkean worship of continuity, without ever quite renouncing his faith in universal reason & the rule of law." Q-Phil. of Rt. #209, p.134)

Q KM's HOLY FAMILY: (p. 116) "History, like truth, becomes a person apart, a metaphysical subj., of which the real individuals are merely the bearers."

GL is v.g. on p.17 when he says about Kierkegaard & Nietzsche but means also today's existentialists: Among the 1st universals to be cast overboard by these influential critics of rationalism was the concept of "HUMANITY."

His. now proceeds from Hegel to Marx

p.22 begins From Metaphysics to Positivism "sociology of ideology as "false consciousness" of positivist principles--themselves rooted in the world view of 18th c. Enlightenment--to the study of institutions." (Ftn refers to Beatrice Webb's Apprenticeship, upon which GL comments, "The study of Fabian origins in recent years has done much to clarify the manner in which the Comtean impulse reached these late-Victorian intellectuals by way of JS Mill & the novels of George Eliot."

Traces also Nietzsche's irrationalism from 1880s when phil. seemed indeed dead until rise of fascism. p.28: "From this irrationalism it was only a

Handwritten notes at the top of the page: "H.M. is 'bourgeois'!!" and "So Phen/ Categories as 'reality'".

short step to the BIOLOGICAL VITALISM of the 3rd Reich & its ideologists." Re Weber ftn. refers to Schumpeter's Cap., Soc. & Dem. p. 32: "Unlike Marx, for whom history as a whole exemplified a hidden rationality, he (Weber) relativized sociology by SEVERING IT FROM PHIL; every culture has its own norms & values which enter into the perception of what is called 'reality'. At this point the critique of ideology—originally a philosophical theme—turned into relativism."

The Sociology of Knowledge. As against the question of ideology, 1860-1920 as against earlier debate, Fr. Rev. -1848, Weber didn't "really" turn Marx upside down (e.g. in asserting that Protestantism was a key factor in the rise of cap.) but rather developed a 'bourgeois' counterpart to the Marxian theory of history."

Mannheim is treated by GL as epilogue to Weber. Claims link bet. them provided by Lukacs, 1923, "the ques. is asked how far the concept of ideology was clarified by this belated fusion of the Marxist & the positivist standpoint. (Evidently Mannheim didn't reveal the influence Lukacs exerted.) "Bourgeois Lukacs" ftn. p. 36 points to Lukacs' influence on SM, likewise unacknowledged altho GL doesn't put it that openly. pp. 35-36: "Not only was it the class destined to make an end of bourgeois soc.: its coming triumph signalled the practical resolution of theoretical problems insoluble from a bourgeois standpoint, incl. the Kantian problem & this conclusion was dev'd. not in the usual philistine manner, which virtually negated the very existence of phil., but thru an analysis of LOGICAL & EPISTEMOLOGICAL

CONCEPTS which sought to est. their essentially HISTORICAL character. Lukacs in 1923 not merely revived the Hegelian dialectic: in his own fashion he did what Hegel had done in PHEN. WHEN HE TREATED THE CATEGORIES AS MANIFESTATIONS OF SPIRIT."

p. 37: "Lukacs had seen well enough that empiricism can never attain to an intellectual grasp of the 'concrete totality' of history" i.e., metaphysics. Mannheim's solution was that it was the intellectual, not the prol., who had this subj=ob. But now what about consciousness in Lukacs?"

p. 38, summarizing Lukacs: "This self-awareness of not a scientific fact, for bourgeois illusions, & one which, if not overcome, must unfailingly promote the catastrophe of humanity. The conflict bet. bourgeois & prol. thus involves the fate of mankind. But p. 39 the empirical prol. is itself subjected to the ideological confusions & crises typical of bourgeois society in the era of its decomposition, & therefore—here Lukacs takes leave of classical Marxism & adopts the Leninist standpoint—it requires the leadership of rev. party which incarnates the consciousness in which literally everything depends—is once more that of a

group of individuals; for of course the party itself has to be led. In his later years Lukacs showed himself ready to face the implications of this dialectic: 1) Reason could be located in a group, 2) it could also be substituted by a temporary embodiment in an indiv. who had substituted himself for the group."

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2ND ARTICLE in Part I deals with Jordan & has no interest for us nor is it on same level. The 3rd article, renamed Oriental Despotism (In St. Anthony's Papers, XIV (Oxford, 1963) it was more correctly called "Marx and the Asiatic Mode of Production" is excellent but was summarized elsewhere.

GL SARTRE, MARXISM & HISTORY (His. & Theory, II(1963))

*Science is not an illusion*

p.300: "...one of his root assumption, that the inherent problems of dial. reasoning are ultimate ONTOLOGICAL."

p.301: "The Marxian antinomies of being & consciousness which came to light when the Hegelian synthesis collapsed, must be overcome through an effort to lay bare THE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HISTORICAL REALITY. The elucidation of this structure will demonstrate that Man does not simply submit to the dialectic, but that he makes it. (Critique, p. 231) This demonstration is the subj. of what Sartre calls his theory of ensembles pratiques."

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p.304: "Thus human nature is shown to have been conditioned by a state of affairs which bears a marked resemblance to a concentration camp"

whole of bk.2 is totalization--from group to history.

JPS calls Hegel's thought "the most ample philosophic totalization". But that would be Hegelianism pure & simple. Sartre (in this respect following Marx) believes that the meaning of the historical process can be grasped from the inside, as it were, only by those who are actively engaged in promoting its forward-movement. At the same time he is clearly fascinated by the Hegelian notion of a dialectical process which 'comes to itself' in the consciousness of the beholder. Thus he speaks of a constitutive dialectic that grasps itself... via the individual praxis which rather sounds as though the dialectic were an independent motive force; & in Hk II he expounds at length a METHODOLOGICAL principle best described by saying that he 'identifies 'totality' with structure. Although he makes the point that the "ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE GROUP" (p.438) is constituted by human praxis (instead of being 'organic' as with the Romantics) the praxis that constitutes the group is precisely the 'isart practicality of BK1."

p:307

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Hegel's thought  
the project  
this

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P.#):308: "Sartre on the whole remains 'abstract' in that he rarely succeeds in grasping the HISTORICAL MOMENT IN ITS UNIQUENESS. ... & finally the dialectic from being an intelligible principle of HISTORICAL EXISTENCE, becomes an ind. motive force."

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p.312: "S's phil. of his. presents itself as a speculative system which transforms the concept of Marxian analysis--HIS. PRAXIS, class conflict--into ONTOLOGICAL NOTIONS & then sets up a dialectic bet. them.... He therefore remains at the Hegelian level."

p.313: "It (S's concept of totalization, wholes) also presupposes, if not an 'ABSOLUTE moment' in time, at any rate a CRITICAL moment. Time need not stand still to oblige the philosopher, but there have to be privileged moments when the process discloses its meaning. In their different ways both Hegel & Marx thought they had lived thru & perceived such a moment. This sets the dial. off from his relativism with which it is sometimes confused.. If there are moments when his. discloses its own secret, we are relieved of the useful problems with which positivists & skeptical relativists occupy their leisure hrs."

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Thought is so close to reality  
p. 6. M. more  
parallels it at this point grasps the logic  
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S would reject the assertion that ONTOLOGY & historicism are incompatible....  
p.314: "What Man experiences in his. (at a remove in thinking about it) is simply his own being as it comes back to him MEDIATED BY THE TIME SEQUENCE. - The thinking that reveals the LOGIC OF HIS. at the same time makes transparent the ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE. The 2 come together in the act whereby Man creates himself & his world. (HISTORY IS CAUSA SUI.)"

"Compared with B/N the principal difference appears to be that while in that work S presented human existence as a foredoomed attempt to realize the union of being & consciousness.. he has now adopted the Marxist position that the project is executed in & thru HISTORY.... p.315 he has closed the gap in his own thinking about his. by inc. man's praxis in the dial. of being & consciousness. (IF) HUMAN NATURE can be shown to be of such a kind that it necessarily sets the historical process in motion, the dichotomy of phil. & science has been overcome & the world has ceased to be mysterious."

"S's Marxist critics have denounced the attempt to subordinate human praxis to ontology."

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