

3) CRITIQUE OF THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC

....Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical ~~approach~~ to the Hegelian dialectic. He alone has made genuine discoveries in this sphere and ~~was~~ in general, has truly transcended the old philosophy. The greatness of the accomplishment and the quiet simplicity with which Feuerbach has given it to the world stand in a striking contrast to the reverse behavior of the critical movement.*

Feuerbach's feat consists in the following:

1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else than religion, translated into thoughts and worked out logically, that it is but another form and mode of existence of the alienation of human essence, and is, therefore, likewise to be condemned.

2) The foundation of genuine materialism and real science. To the extent that Feuerbach made the social relation of "man to man" the basic principle of theory, he laid

3) The counterposition of the positive which rests on itself and is positively grounded in itself to the negation of the negation which declares itself to be the absolute positive.

Feuerbach explains the Hegelian dialectic (and thereby justifies the departure from the positive, from sense-certainty) in the following manner:

Hegel proceeds from the alienation of Substance (logically: the infinite, the abstractly universal), from the alienation of absolute and fixed-absolute abstraction. Popularly speaking, his point of departure is Religion and Theology.

Secondly, he transcends the infinite, posits the actual, sensuous, real, finite, particular. (Philosophy, the sublation of Religion and Theology)

Thirdly, he again transcends the positive, reintroduces the ab-

straction, the infinite. Re-introduction of Religion and Theology.

Thus Feuerbach regards the negation of the negation only as the contradiction of philosophy with itself, as philosophy which affirms Theology (Transcendentalism) after it has denied it, and, accordingly, affirms it in opposition to itself.

The positive, or self-affirmation and self-confirmation which inheres in the negation of the negation, is here conceived as the positive which is not yet certain of itself, and therefore charged with its opposite, something which is doubtful of itself, and therefore in need of proof, something incapable of proving itself through its own existence, and hence unacknowledged. Consequently, the positive of sense-certainly, which is grounded in itself, is directly and immediately counterposed to it.

But inasmuch as Hegel comprehends the negation of the negation in accordance with the positive relation, which is immanent in it as the only truly positive, and in accordance with the negative relation which is immanent in it as the only true act and act of self-manifestation of all being, to that extent he has only discovered the abstract, logical and speculative expression for the movement of history. This is not yet ^{the} actual history of man as a presupposed subject, but only the act of generation, the history of the origin of man. We shall explain the abstract form as well as the difference between this moment in Hegel, in opposition to the modern criticism and the same process in Feuerbach's "Essence of Christianity." Or, we might say, that we shall explain the critical form of this movement which is still uncritical in Hegel.

A glance at the Hegelian system. We must begin with the Hegelian ^{source} Phenomenology, the true ~~starting point~~ and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy:

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Phenomenology:

A. Self-consciousness

- I. Consciousness
 - a) Sense-certainty or the This and the Mine
 - b) Perception or the Thing with its characteristics and illusion
 - c) Force and understanding, Appearance and the Supersensuous world.
- II. Self-consciousness. The Truth of Certainty of Itself
 - a) Independence and dependence of self-consciousness, Lordship and Bondage.
 - b) Freedom of Self-consciousness. Stoicism, Scepticism, the Unhappy Consciousness.
- III. Reason. Certainty and Truth of Reason.
 - a) Observing Reason: Observation of Nature and of Self-consciousness.
 - b) Realization of reasoning self-consciousness through itself. Desire and Necessity, the Law of the Heart and the Delusion of Conceit. Virtue & the Course of the World.
 - c) Individuality which is real in and for itself. The Spiritual realm of animals and the fraud or the fact itself. The Law-giving Reason. The law-testing Reason.

B. Spirit

- I. The True Spirit. Ethics.
- II. The Alienated Spirit. Culture.
- III. The Spirit sure of itself. Morality.

C. Religion. Natural Religion in the form of Art. Revealed Religion.

D. Absolute Knowledge.

Scine Hegel's Encyclopaedia begins with Logic, with pure, specu-
lative thought, and ends with Absolute Knowledge, self-conscious,
philosophic, or absolute spirit grasping itself, as philosophic or
absolute, i.e., superhuman abstract spirit, therefore the whole
Encyclopaedia is nothing but the expanded essence of the philosophic
spirit, ~~itxaxkifzwbjxkifkifxatixmx~~ Feuerbach still comprehends the
negation of the negation, concrete notion/^{as} transcending in thought
and as thought desiring to be ~~the~~ direct, contemplation, nature, actual-
ity, the objectification of thought. In the same way, the philosophic
12017 spirit is nothing but the alienated spirit of the world, thinking

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such a way that sensuousness, religion, state power, etc., are spiritual essences. For in Hegel, only the spirit is the true essence of man, and the true form of the spirit is the thinking spirit, the logical, speculative spirit. The humanity of Nature, and of the Nature produced by history, the products of man appear in it as products of the abstract spirit, and thus as spiritual moments, alienated essences.

The Phenomenology is, therefore, the hidden, still unclear even to itself, and mystifying critical philosophy. However, to the extent that it holds fast the alienation of Man--even if Man appears only in the form of Spirit--to that extent all elements of criticism lie hidden in it and are ^{often} already prepared and worked out in a manner extending or beyond the Hegelian standpoint. The sections on "Unhappy Consciousness", the "Honorable Consciousness", the fight of the noble and downtrodden consciousness, etc., etc. contain the critical elements--although still in an alienated form--of whole spheres like Religion, the State, Civic Life, etc. Just as the essence is the object, alienated, so the subject is always consciousness, or self-consciousness. Or, rather, the object appears only as abstract consciousness, man only as self-consciousness. The different forms of alienation which appear in the Phenomenology are, therefore, only different forms of consciousness and self-consciousness. Just as abstract consciousness in itself--as that by which the object is grasped--is merely a differentiating moment of self-consciousness, so the identity of self-consciousness with consciousness appears as the result of the movement, Absolute Knowledge, which no longer goes outside, but merely continues within its own process of abstract thinking. That is, the dialectic of pure thought is the result.

The greatness of Hegel's Phenomenology, and of its final result --the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle--lies in this, that Hegel comprehends the self-production of man as a process,

regards objectification as contra-position, as externalization, and as the transcendence of this externalization; that he, therefore, grasps the essence of labor and conceives objective man, true, actual man as the result of his own labor. The true, active relating of man to himself as species-essence, that is, as human essence, is only possible because man actually produces all the capacities ~~of his species~~ of his species--and this again is only ~~possible~~ ^{thanks to} the collective activity of men, is possible only as a result of history ~~and~~ ^{and} he relates ^{himself} to ~~it~~ ^{it} as well as to the object, which is ^{again,} at first possible only in the form of alienation.

We will now present in a detailed fashion the one-sidedness and the limitation of Hegel in the concluding chapter of the Phenomenology, in Absolute Knowledge, a chapter which contains both the summation and the quintessence of the Phenomenology, and contains the relation of the Phenomenology ~~to~~ to the speculative dialectic, and the view of Hegel regarding their mutual and many-sided relationship.

In a preliminary way, we will remark only the following: Hegel stands on the basis ~~of modern political economy~~ of modern political economy. He regards labor as the essence, as the self-preserving essence of man. He sees only the positive side of labor and not its negative side. Labor--man's becoming-for-self within the limits of externalization --is externalized man. Hegel knew and acknowledged only one form of labor, that is, abstractly spiritual labor. Therefore, what Hegel recognized as the essence of philosophy, and it is this in general which constitutes its essence, ^{is} the externalization of man knowing himself, or externalized science thinking itself. And it is for this reason that he is capable of summarizing the preceding philosophy in terms of its particular moments and presenting his philosophy as the philosophy. From the very nature of the activity of philosophy Hegel knows what all other philosophers have done--viz., that they have conceived particular moments of Nature and of human life as moments of self-consciousness, or rather of abstract self-consciousness. *Therefore his science is abstract.*

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We will now proceed to the question of Absolute Knowledge--the last chapter of the Phenomenology.

The essence of the matter is that the object of consciousness is none other than self-consciousness, or that the object is only objectified self-consciousness, self-consciousness as object. (Man = self-consciousness). Therefore, it is necessary to transcend the object of consciousness. Objectivity, as such, has the force of alienated relationship of man, not corresponding to the human essence, to self-consciousness. That means that the reappropriation of the objective essence of man as alien and produced under the determination of alienation, serves not only to transcend alienation, but also to transcend objectivity, i.e., man is regarded as an un-objective, spiritual essence.

Hegel describes the movement of transcending the object of consciousness in the following way:

The object ~~is~~ ^{does not show} itself ~~as~~ only as returning to the Self.

(That is, according to Hegel, a one-sided comprehension of that movement which grasps merely one aspect of it.) Man is ~~not~~ equal to Self. The Self, however, is only man abstractly conceived and abstractly produced. Man is Self-ish. His ^{eyes} ~~eyes~~, his ears, etc., are Self-ish. Each of his essential capacities has in him the character of Self-ishness. But on this account/^{it} is now quite false to say: Self-consciousness has eyes, ears, essential capacities. Human nature is not a quality of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, is, rather, a quality of human nature of the human eye, etc.

The Self, abstracted for itself and fixed, is man as abstract egotist, egotism in its pure abstraction, elevated to the level of thinking. (We will return to this point later.)

Hegel regards human essence, Man, as equal to self-consciousness. All alienation of human essence is, therefore, no more than alienation of self-consciousness. The alienation of self-consciousness is not regarded

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as an expression of the actual alienation of human essence. Rather, the actual alienation, which appears as real, is --according to its innermost concealed essence, first revealed through philosophy--nothing but the appearance of the alienation of actual human essence, of self-consciousness. The science which comprehends this is, therefore, called Phenomenology. All reappropriation of the alienated objective essence appears, therefore, as an incorporation into his self-consciousness. Man, insofar as he is taking possession of his essence, is only self-consciousness taking possession of the objective essence; return of the object to the self is, therefore, the reappropriation of the object.

If we are to express the self-sidedness
transcendence of the object of consciousness ^{consists of the} is as following:

- 1) the object, as such, presents itself to the self as a vanishing factor;
- 2) the emptying of self-consciousness itself establishes thinghood;
- 3) ~~the externalization~~ this externalization of self-consciousness has not only negative, but positive, significance;
- 4) significance not merely for us or per se, but for self-consciousness itself.
- 5) The negativity of the object, or its cancelling its own existence, gets for self-consciousness a ~~negative~~ positive significance. Or self-consciousness knows this nothingness because self-consciousness externalizes itself, for, in doing so, it establishes itself as object, or, by reason of the indivisible unity characterizing its self-existence, sets up the object as its self.
- 6) On the other hand, there is also the ^{other} ~~second~~ moment in the process, that self-consciousness has just really cancelled and superseded this externalization and objectification and, consequently, has resumed them into itself as such.
- 7) This is the movement of consciousness and is, therefore,

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the totality of its moments.

8) Consciousness, at the same time, must have taken up a relation to the object in all its aspects and phases, and have grasped its meaning from the point of view of each of them. This totality of its determinate characteristics makes the object per se, or inherently, a spiritual essence, and it becomes so in truth for consciousness when the latter apprehends every individual one of them as self, i.e., when it takes ~~up~~ toward them the spiritual relationship just spoken of.

ad. 1. That the object, as such, presents itself to consciousness as vanishing is the above mentioned return of the object to the self.

ad. 2. The externalization of self-consciousness posits the category of thingness. Since man is self-consciousness, his externalized objective essence, or thingness, equals externalized self-consciousness, and thingness is posited through this externalization. (Thingness is that which is object for him, and object is truly for him only what is essentially object, which is thus his objective essence. Since it is not actual man and likewise not Nature as such, --man is human nature-- which is made the subject, but only the abstraction of man, namely, self-consciousness, thingness can only be externalized self-consciousness.)

What is absolutely true is that a living natural being, endowed and gifted with objective, i.e., material essential capacities, also possesses actual and natural objects of its own essence, and it is just as natural that his self-externalization should be the determination of an actual objective world, which appears under the form of externality and not belonging to his essence and is more powerful ~~than the objective world~~ ^{than the objective world}.

There is nothing inconceivable and perplexing in this. Rather the reverse would be perplexing. But it is just as clear that self-consciousness, i.e., its externalization, could only posit thingness, i.e., ~~only~~ again only an abstract thing, a thing of abstraction, and not an actual thing. It is further evident that thingness, therefore, is not at all

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independent and essential over against self-consciousness, but is a mere creature, something posited by consciousness, and that that which is posited, instead of being something which confirms itself, is only a confirmation of the act of positing, which momentarily fixes its energy in the form of a product, and in appearance asportions to it the role--but only for one moment--of an independent actual ~~being~~ ^{being}.

When actual corporeal Man, standing on firm and well rounded earth, inhaling and exhaling all natural forces, thanks to his externalization, posits his actual objective essential capacities as alien objects, it is not the act of positing which is the subject. It is the subjectivity of objective essential capacities, whose action must, therefore, also be objective. Objective essence works objectively, and it would not work objectively if objectivity did not inhere in the determination of its essence. It creates, posits only objects because it is posited through objects, because fundamentally it is Nature. That means that in the act of positing, it does not depart from its "pure activity" in order to create the object, but its objective product confirms merely its objective activity, its activity as an activity of an objective natural essence. [We see here how thoroughgoing Naturalism, or Humanism, distinguishes itself both from Idealism and Materialism, and is, at the same time, the truth uniting both. We see, at the same time, how only Naturalism is capable of grasping the act of world history.

Man is directly a natural ~~being~~ ^{being}. As a natural ~~being~~ ^{being}, and especially as ^{of} living natural ~~being~~ ^{being}, he is endowed partly with natural forces, with living forces, he is an active natural ~~being~~ ^{being}. These forces exist in him as dispositions and capabilities, as instincts. As natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective ~~being~~ ^{being} he is, like an animal and ~~a~~ ^a plant a ~~subordinate~~ ^{distressed}, conditioned, and limited being. That, is, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him. But these objects are objects essentially serving his needs, essential objects

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indispensable to the action and confirmation of his own essential capacities, That man is ^acorporeal, natural, living, actual, sensuous, objective ~~being~~ means that he has actual sensuous objects as objects of his essence of his ~~life~~ expression of life, or that he is capable of expressing his life only in actual, sensuous objects. It is the same thing to be objective, natural and sensuous, or to have object, nature, sense outside oneself, or even to be object, nature, sense for a ^{third} ~~thing~~ being. Hunger is a natural necessity. Therefore, in order to satisfy and appease it, one requires a nature outside oneself, an objective outside oneself. Hunger is the objective need of a body for another, for an object outside itself, indispensable to its integration and expression of his life. The sun is object for the plant, an object indispensable to it, confirming its life. In the same way, the plant is an object to the sun, as expression of the life-producing power of the sun, of the objective essential forces of ^{the} sun.

~~An objective~~, which does not have its nature outside itself, is not a natural ~~essence~~, takes no part in the ~~essence~~ of nature. ~~An objective~~ which has no object outside of itself is not an objective ~~being~~. ~~An objective~~, which is not itself object for a third ~~being~~, has no ~~essence~~ for its object, that is, does not behave objectively; its being is not objective.

being a monstrous being.
A non-objective ~~essence~~ is ~~an essence~~.

Suppose there was an ~~essence~~ ^{being} neither itself an object nor having an object. Such an ~~essence~~ ^{being} would, first of all, ~~be the~~ ^{be the} ~~essence~~ ^{being} there would exist no ~~essence~~ ^{being} outside of it. It would exist alone and solitary. For as soon as there are objects outside of myself, as soon as I am not alone, I am an Other, another actuality than the object outside of me. For this third object I am thus an actuality other than it, i.e., its object. ~~An essence~~ ^{being} which is not object to another ~~essence~~ ^{being} presupposes thus that no objective ~~essence~~ ^{being} exists. As soon as I have an object, this object has me for its object. But an unobjective ~~essence~~ ^{being} is an unactual unsensuous ~~essence~~ ^{being}, merely thought, i.e., only ^{an} ~~essence~~ ^{being} ~~an essence~~.

of abstraction. To be sensuous, i.e., to be actual, is to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object; therefore, to have sensuous objects outside oneself, to have objects for one's sensuousness. To be sensuous is to be suffering.

Therefore man as an objective sensuous ^{being} ~~essence~~ is a suffering ^{being} ~~essence~~ and since he is ^{being} ~~essence~~ experiencing his suffering, he is a passionate essence. Passion is the essential power of man striving energetically toward its object.

However, man is not merely a natural ^{being} ~~essence~~, but he is also a human natural ^{being} ~~essence~~, i.e., an ^{being} ~~essence~~ which is for itself; therefore, a species-essence. As such, he must confirm and affirm himself both in his being and in his knowing. Human objects are, therefore, ^{not} ~~not~~ those objects of nature which offer themselves immediately, ^{In the same way,} ~~essence~~ human ^{is not} ~~essence~~ essence, insofar as it is direct and objective, human sensuousness, human objectivity. Neither Nature, taken objectively, nor Nature, taken subjectively, is immediately adequate to human essence. And just as all natural things must emerge, man also must have his act of emergence--history. This, however, is for him a known act of emergence and, therefore, an act of emergence which is transcended in consciousness. History is the true natural history of Man.

Thirdly. Since this positing of thingness is itself only an appearance, an act of contradicting the essence of pure activity, so it must also again be transcended. Thinghood must be negated.

ad. 3, 4, 5, 6.

3) This striving toward consciousness has not only negative, but also positive, meaning; and 4) this positive meaning is not only for us, or, in itself, but for it itself, for consciousness. 5) The negativity of the object, its transcendence of itself, has, for consciousness, a positive meaning, that is, it knows this nothingness because it externalizes itself. For in this externalization, it knows its own self as object, or the object for the sake of the inseparable unity of

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its for-itselfness. 6) On the other hand, the other Moment is herein implied, namely, that it has also transcended and withdrawn into itself this externalization and objectivity, and that, accordingly, it is in its own otherness, as such.

We have already seen that, for Hegel, the appropriation of alienated objective essence, or the transcendence of objectivity under the determination of alienation--which is to develop from indifferent strangeness into actually hostile alienation--has, at the same time, or even mainly, the significance of transcending objectivity because the stumbling-block in the alienation is not the determinate character of the object, but its objective character. The object is, therefore, something negative, something transcending itself, a nothingness. For consciousness, this nothingness of the object has not only a negative, but also a positive meaning, for this nothingness of the object is the self-affirmation of un-objectivity, of abstraction of itself. For consciousness itself, the nothingness of the object has, therefore, a positive meaning, namely, that it knows this nothingness, the objective essence as its self-~~externalization~~ ^{externalization}, that it knows that it only exists through its self-externalization: D

~~The~~ ^{The} way in which consciousness exists and in which something exists for it, ~~is~~ ^{is knowledge. Knowing} its sole act. Therefore, something exists for it to the extent it knows this thing. ~~Knowledge~~ ^{ledge} is its single objective relation. Consciousness knows the nothingness of the object, i.e., the absence of distinction of the object from it, the not-being of the object for it to the extent that it knows that the object is its self-externalization i.e., it knows itself--~~the object~~ ^{knowledge} as object-- because the object is only the appearance of an object, an artificial vapor and in its essence, no other than ~~knowing~~ ^{ledge}, which is counterposed to itself and therefore has counterposed to itself a nothingness, something which has no objectivity outside of ~~knowledge~~ ^{ledge}.

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In other words, knowledge
~~is not~~ knows that only to the extent that it is related to an object is it outside of itself, does it externalize itself, that it itself appears to itself as object, or that what appears to it as object is only itself.

On the other hand, ^{in the works of} ~~also~~ Hegel, there is also here contained the other Moment, namely, that it has likewise transcended and withdrawn into itself this externalization and objectivity. Hence, that in its otherness, it is ~~as such~~ by itself.

judgment
~~In this judgment~~ ~~are concentrated~~ all the illusions of abstract, ~~speculative~~ thinking, *are concentrated*

Firstly: consciousness, self-consciousness is with itself in its otherness as such. It is thus--or, if we abstract here from the Hegelian abstraction; and substitute for self-consciousness the self-consciousness of men--it is by itself in its otherness as such. In this is implied, on the one hand, that consciousness--~~knowledge~~ *as knowledge* thinking as thinking--pretends to be nothing less than the other of its self, pretends to be sensuousness, actuality, life. Thinking surpasses itself in thinking (Feuerbach). This aspect is here implied insofar as consciousness as mere consciousness meets an obstruction not in alienated objectivity, but in objectivity as such.

Secondly, what is implied here is that self-conscious man, insofar as he has recognized the spiritual world --or, the spiritual universal existence of this world--~~is~~ ~~as~~, nevertheless, ^{himself} confirms again in this alienated form and proclaims it to be his true existence, restores it and pretends to be with himself in his otherness, as such. Thus, after transcending, for example, religion, after the recognition of religion as a product of self-^{alienation} ~~exteriorization~~, he still finds himself confirmed in religion as religion. (Here we have the root of false positivism of Hegel, or his only apparently critical position, which Feuerbach characterizes as positing, negating and the restoring of religion or theology/which is, however, to be conceived more generally.

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Thus reason is by itself in unreason as unreason. Man who has recognized that in law, politics, etc. he is leading an ~~alienated~~ ^{alienated} life, pursues in this ~~alienated~~ ^{alienated} life, as such, his true human life. In this way, true knowledge and life are self-affirmation and self-confirmation in contradiction with itself, both in regard to ~~knowledge~~ ^{life} and to the essence of the object.

Thus nothing more need be said of Hegel's adaptation to religion, the state, etc., for this lie is the lie of his principle.

When I know that religion is ~~alienated~~ ^{alienated} human self-consciousness, I, therefore, know that in it, as religion, I confirm, not my self-consciousness, but my ~~alienation~~ ^{alienation} self-consciousness. I therefore know my self-consciousness, belonging to itself, and to its essence, is confirmed, not in religion, but, on the contrary, in a religion that has been negated, transcended.

In Hegel, the negation of negation is, therefore, not the confirmation of true essence, namely, through negation of apparent essence, but the confirmation of apparent essence, or of alienated essence in its denial, or the denial of this apparent essence as an objective essence existing outside man and independent of him, and its transformation into the subject. Therefore, transcendence plays a peculiar role, in which both negation, and preservation or affirmation, are ~~united~~ ^{united}.

Thus, for example, in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, transcended private right is morality; transcended morality is the same as family; transcended family the same as civil society; transcended civil society the same as the state; transcended state the same as world history. In reality, ~~private~~ ^{private} right, morality, family, civil society, the state, etc., remain in existence. Only they have become moments, forms of existence of men, which are not valid in their isolation, which resolve and produce one another, etc. Moment of the movement.

In their actual existence their moving essence is concealed. It appears and is revealed only in thought, in philosophy. That is why

my true religious existence is my religious-philosophical existence, my true political existence my existence in the philosophy of right, my true natural existence my existence in the philosophy of nature, my true artistic existence my existence in the philosophy of art, my true human existence my philosophic existence. In the same way, the philosophies of religion, nature, the state, and art are the true existence of religion, state, nature and art. If, however, the philosophy of religion, etc. is for me ^{the} only true existence of religion, I am truly religious only as a philosopher of religion, and thus I deny actual religiousness, and the actually religious man. But, at the same time, I affirm them, partly within my own existence or within alien existence which I counterpose to them, for this is only their philosophic expression; partly, in their peculiar original form, for to me they are valid only as apparent otherness, as allegories, as configurations hidden under sensuous husks of their own true existence, which is my philosophic existence. In the same way, transcended quality is the same as quantity, transcended quantity the same as measure, transcended measure the same as essence, transcended essence the same as appearance, transcended appearance the same as actuality, transcended actuality the same as notion, transcended notion the same as objectivity, transcended objectivity the same as absolute idea, transcended absolute idea the same as nature, transcended nature the same as subjective spirit, transcended subjective spirit the same as ethical, objective spirit, transcended ethical spirit the same as art, transcended art the same as religion, transcended religion the same as absolute knowledge.

On the one hand, this transcendence is a transcendence of essence insofar as it is thought, and hence, private property, as thought, is transcended in thoughts of morality. And because thinking fancies itself to be directly the other of itself, sensuous actuality, therefore, its action seems to it also to be sensuously

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actual. Thus, this transcendence through thinking which permits its object to remain in actuality, believes it has actually overcome the object. And, on the other hand, because the object has now become for it a moment of thought, this object is also taken by it in its actuality, as the self-confirmation of itself, of self-consciousness, of abstraction.

In one respect, therefore, the existence which Hegel transcends in philosophy is not actual religion, the state, nature, but religion as an object of knowledge, as a dogmatism. The same is true of jurisprudence, the science of the state, the science of nature. On the other hand, he opposes both the actual essence and direct philosophic science, or the unphilosophic notions of this essence. He therefore contradicts their accepted notions.

In another respect, the religious, etc. man can find in Hegel his final confirmation.

Now we must try to grasp the positive moments of the Hegelian dialectic, within the ~~limitation~~ ^{limits} of ~~alienation~~ ^{the category of} alienation.

a) Transcendence, as objective movement, withdrawing externalization into itself. This is the insight, expressed within alienation, of the appropriation of objective essence through the transcendence of its alienation, the alienated insight into the actual objectification of man, into the actual appropriation of his objective essence through the destruction of the alienated determination of the objective world, through its transcendence in its alienated existence. Just as atheism, as transcendence of God, is the becoming of theoretical humanism, and communism, as transcendence of private property, is the vindication of actual human living as its own property, which is the becoming of practical humanism, so atheism is humanism mediated by transcendence of religion, and communism is humanism mediated by the transcendence of private property. Only by the transcendence of this mediation, which is

nevertheless a necessary presupposition, does there arise positive Humanism, beginning from itself.

Atheism and communism, however, are not a flight or abstraction from, nor a loss of the objective world produced by man or his essential capacities brought to objectivity. It is not a poverty returning to unnatural, undeveloped, simplicity. Atheism and communism are rather the first actual process of becoming, the actualization of his essence become actual for Man, and of his essence as actual.

Thus Hegel, insofar as he grasps the meaning of the positive sense of the negation related to itself, even if in an alienated way, conceives self-alienation, externalization of essence, contraposition and the separation of man from reality as a process of self-conquest, alteration of essence, objectification and realization. Briefly, within an abstract framework, he considers labor to be the self-productive act of man, the relation to himself as an alien essence, and its manifestation as alien essence, as the developing consciousness and life of the species.

b) In Hegel, apart from, or rather as a consequence of the perversity already described, this act appears firstly only as formal because it is abstract, because human essence itself is regarded only as an abstract thinking essence, as self-consciousness.

Secondly, because the conception is abstract and formal, transcendence of alienation becomes confirmation of alienation. But as this movement of self-production, of self-objectification, as externalization ~~self-alienation~~ and self-alienation is, for Hegel, the absolute, therefore its self-purpose, resting in itself and arrived at its essence, is the final expression of human life. This movement, in its abstract form as dialectics, is, therefore, regarded as truly human living. Yet, because it is an abstraction, an alienation of human life, it is regarded as a divine process, hence as the divine

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process of men, a process carried out, in distinction from himself, by its abstract, pure, absolute essence.

Thirdly, this process must have a bearer, a subject, but the subject emerges only as a result. This result, the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness, is, therefore, God, absolute spirit, the Idea knowing and affirming itself. Actual man and actual nature become mere predicates, symbols of this concealed, unactual man and this unactual nature. Subject and predicate, therefore, have a relation of absolute inversion to each other, mystical subject-object, or a subjectivity extending beyond the object, the absolute subject as a process, a subject ^{alienating} ~~externalizing~~ itself and returning to itself from this ^{alienation} ~~externalization~~, but returning it at the same time into itself and the subject as this process, the pure restless circling within itself. We have a formal and abstract conception of the human act of self-production or the act of self-objectification of man.

Since Hegel supposes man to be the same as self-consciousness, the alienated object, the alienated actual essence of man is nothing else than consciousness, is only the thought of alienation, its abstract, and, therefore, empty unactual expression, negation. Therefore, the transcendence of this externalization is likewise only an abstract empty transcendence of the former empty abstraction, the negation of the negation. The full living sensuous concrete activity of self-objectification, therefore, becomes its mere abstraction, absolute negativity, an abstraction which is, again, fixed as such, and is thought as an independent activity, as simply activity. Because this so-called negativity is nothing but the abstract, empty form of the former actual living act, its content also can be a merely formal content produced by the abstraction from all content. Therefore, the abstract formulas, forms of thought, logical categories torn away from actual spirit and from actual nature, are the universal forms of abstractions, ~~at~~ ~~at~~, pertaining to every

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content, and, therefore, indifferent to all content and for that reason applicable to any content.

The positive contribution which Hegel has made in his speculative Logic is this: The definite concepts, the universal, fixed, forms of thought represent, in their independence of nature and spirit, the necessary result of the universal alienation of human essence and, hence, also of human thinking. And therefore Hegel has presented and collected them together as moments of the process of ~~abstracting~~ abstraction. For example, transcended being is essence, transcended essence is notion, transcended notion is the Absolute Idea. But what, then, is the Absolute Idea? It, in its turn, ~~again~~ transcends itself, if it not going to carry ^{over} again the whole previous act of abstraction, and if it is not going to be satisfied with being a totality of abstractions, or the abstraction grasping itself. But the abstraction grasping itself as abstraction knows itself as nothing. It must abandon the abstraction and arrive at an essence which is its very opposite, i.e., Nature. The whole Logic is, therefore, the proof that abstract thinking is nothing for itself, that the Absolute Idea is nothing for itself until Nature is something.

Aus. p. 22 - Logic, p. 379

The Absolute Idea, the abstract Idea which "when viewed on the point of this, its unity with itself, is Intuition." (Hegel, Encyclopaedia, 3, Aus. p. 22, which, "in its own absolute truth... resolve to let the 'moment' of its particularity or of the first characterization and other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflected image, go forth freely as Nature". This whole Idea, behaving in such a strange and baroque which has caused the Hegelians tremendous headaches, is nothing ~~more~~ else than mere abstraction i.e, the abstract thinker, who, made clever by experience and enlightened beyond its truth, has decided under many false and still abstract conditions, to abandon himself and to substitute his otherness,

Typeset ~~from~~ hand type of 41-42 as corrected.

*Logic of Hegel, p. 379.

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