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MARKISM-HUMANISM: PERSPECTIVES ON LABOR

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This issue of the *Quarterly Journal of Ideology* is truly special in a number of respects. First, it is the first issue of an academic journal in the United States to be devoted exclusively to the philosophy of Marxism-Humanism centered around the work of its founder in the United States, Raya Dunayevskaya. To many American academics, the expression "Marxism-Humanism" may conjure up phenomenology, existentialism or ethnomethodology. Actually, Marxism-Humanism contains a body of specific ideas which are grounded in a certain interpretation of the writings of Hegel and Marx and which are set apart from and in opposition to that which usually passes for Marxism and the various bourgeois perspectives. Marxism-Humanism also poses a unique analysis of contemporary political reality. The essays in this issue will give the reader a solid introduction to its unique analysis as well as some of the basic theoretical problems addressed by Marxism-Humanism.

Second, this issue is special in the sense that it is not only inter-disciplinary but its contributors are not only academics, but production workers and political activists. One of the guiding principles which has informed the *Quarterly Journal of Ideology* since its beginnings in 1976 is that the process of educational critique must be extended to the scientific and academic realms of knowledge as well as that of everyday life. Concomitantly, it has been a principle of the *Quarterly Journal of Ideology* that the "critique of conventional wisdom" is a process that must not be limited to scientists and academics but must be encouraged throughout the entirety of society. Thus, with this issue, the voices of those outside academia, as well as those within it, will be heard.

Third, what is also special about this issue are the contributions themselves. With this issue, we are thrilled to present an essay by the Yugoslav dissident philosopher, Zagorka Guibovic, which offers a novel interpretation and critique of the Marxian concept of revolution. Her essay is an excellent introduction to the content and spirit of inquiry of Marxist-Humanist analysis. We are equally proud to be able to include an essay by Raya Dunayevskaya which surveys the development and central themes of her work. The essays by Kevin Anderson and Lou Turner contain important discussions of the philosophic sources of Marxism-Humanism. Anderson's article contains considerations of the humanist contributions of Frantz Fanon, the Czech philosopher, Karel Kosik, and Dunayevskaya herself, while Turner's essay discusses the embryo of humanism in Hegel's philosophy and shows its development through Marx, Lenin and Dunayevskaya.

The next four essays relate Marxist-Humanist philosophy more closely to the contradictions of the capitalist labor process. In the first of these, Ron Brokmeyer presents a discussion of Marx's *Mathematical Manuscripts* as a humanist basis for critiquing the repressive dimensions of "computer consciousness" and its one-sided logic. It should be noted that this essay is one of the first treatments of Marx's *Mathematical Manuscripts* in English and it is the first humanistic treatment of them to appear in an academic journal. This is followed by Terry Moon's timely discussion of the centenary of the Haymarket tragedy in Chicago and Eleanor Marx's visit to Chicago in 1886. What is significant in this essay is the interrelationship Moon identifies between the struggles of labor and women. David Ranney's discussion of plant closings is another timely expression of Marxist-Humanist philosophy in that he argues that labor itself, not the state, not the capitalist class and not the union bureaucracies, is the active subject of the movement to fight plant closings. John Dwyer presents a fascinating personal journal of one labor

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activist's development of a Marxist-Humanist position which originated in the broader contradictions of the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. What is most remarkable is how clearly Dwyer's personal odyssey speaks to the problems of labor, not only in the 1930s, but in Reagan's America today.

Upon concluding this issue of the *Quarterly Journal of Ideology* it is my expectation that readers will identify the real parallels and complements between these articles. Furthermore, it is my hope that readers will see this issue not as an end, but as a beginning of a dialogue with Marxism-Humanism. The essays themselves will give readers further guides to relevant literature with which they can pursue such dialogue. However, readers who desire to continue their dialogue beyond these sources are encouraged to contact me.

**RECONSIDERING MARX'S IDEA OF SOCIALISM:
FOR A HUMANIST PARADIGM**

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When reconsidering Marx's idea of socialism one should be reminded of the following passages: one from *Grundrisse*, the other from the *Communist Manifesto*—both laying grounds to the understanding that socialism is inseparably linked with emancipation. It refers, firstly, to what is conceived of as the ultimate end of the emancipatory process, and secondly, to a strategic approach to this end, by the means of which the demarcation-line can be drawn between a libertarian/humanist concept of socialism ("socialism with a human face") and its perverted product called "real socialism" which led to totalitarianism.

According to the number of texts but most precisely expressed by the following passage, Marx quite clearly stated that:

"The absolute working out of human/creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. *the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a prede-termined yardstick*" (1973:489).

Which is to say, the aim of a socialist transformation is defined in terms of the liberation of all human powers which should serve as the substantial criterion of the programmes and achievements of the revolutionary movements. In other words, self-actualization of human beings as unique individuals unfolding their capacities as *human powers*, suppressed and frustrated by the given course of history, is indicated as a measure of the emancipatory perspective in the struggle of class liberation; as against either an essentialist concept relying upon the abstractly conceived ideals of a "good society", or expressing an economic/sociologic view with no interest whatsoever for concrete human, individuals' needs and aspirations.

The former passage is completed by the famous, but in the practices of the socialist movements, almost forgotten idea from the *Communist Manifesto*, which reads: "A free development of each individual is the condition of freedom for all" (Marx and Engels 1972:353). The latter defines the basic strategy of a revolutionary movement which should integrate two components: the liberation of individuals and a deep social transformation, for only in this twofold perspective can the realization of the ultimate end be achieved, i.e. in approaching human emancipation.

The perspective suggested by the quoted passages is qualitatively different than one practiced in the "real socialism." Because when socialism is viewed as primarily an *emancipatory movement* it implies: (a) that all achievements be evaluated from the point of view of the emancipatory effects, and (b) given the conditions that a socialist transformation emerges through the movement and can be realized by the participants' free commitment alone, the struggle for socialism presupposes the variety of alternatives, the choice of which will depend on the concrete historical possibilities combined with individuals' capacities and aspirations. Thus, democracy and human liberties appear as inseparable from the concept of socialism, for the emancipatory movement's aims can be attained insofar as the foundation is laid to a democratically organized society, wherein the civil rights are guaranteed to all citizens in order that they can themselves determine their life conditions according to their own choosing.

Thereby, the key points of a humanist-socialist paradigm may be defined in terms of: (a) the abolition of alienation of "producers" (in general terms) both in regards to their

work conditions and the appropriation/disposition of their products, which means an extermination of exploitation, and (b) the abolition of the system of domination of the entire structure of social relationships. Or, if expressing in positive terms, it means a reintegration of all components of human praxis and reaffirmation of the right of creators of social values to dispose of the conditions and the products of their creations, in order that they themselves be in the position to determine their individual and social organization of life, without being subordinated to the external social forces.

When the humanist approach is introduced, it defines the *human conditions* necessary to be met in order that the practice of social transformation in question be measured by the society's advancement along the line of emancipation. Hence, when evaluating the concepts and practices of socialism the answers to the following questions are to be given: Do they open rooms to a new quality of life and a greater expression of individual and social potentialities? How far have the conditions been laid to society's self-organization and individual self-determination: Have new forms of a humanized communication emerged? How much of the creative energies of society's members have been liberated?

As one can recognize at first glance, these criteria are based on quite a different ground than those derived from an extremely "objectivized" concept of socialism characterizing both Bolshevism and Stalinism, primarily conceived of in terms of industrialization and institutional transformation. A Stalinist concept of socialism contradicts a humanist-socialist conception, because when the claim for liberation of the working class is not seen in terms of human/individual emancipation, it logically turns into its opposite. When relying on the "masses," which is an amorphous group with no dynamics of its own, the true carrier of the emancipatory movement is missing, for liberation of human potentials, creativeness and initiatives are rooted in individual differences and uniqueness, not in uniformity and the stereotyped behavior of the masses. The concept of the *mass* as a key category of the idea of socialism simply hides the aspiration of the new power elite to reestablish its domination in the name of a "collective freedom" that excludes individual liberties and demands a complete submission of individual needs to the collectivistic ethos. So, socialism became, paradoxically, a concept of "free society" with no freedom of individuals, whose submission and obedience were lifted on the highest ladder of the "socialist morality." At this occasion I cannot go into an analysis of the characteristics and consequences of narrowing the concept of socialist revolution in a Stalinist interpretation, reducing the complexity of social/anthropological components to merely the effects of a political revolution and the accelerated industrialization as well as enforced collectivization (Golubovic 1981). However, the appropriate question to be posed is the following: what has still remained vague in Marx's idea of socialism that could have supported such interpretations detaching socialism from emancipation?

The limits of Marx's concept of socialism come primarily out of the spirit of the 19th century civilization which put the emphasis to a philosophical notion of emancipation within its humanist tradition. However, this preoccupation with a broad philosophical meaning of human emancipation in Marx's writings has both a positive and a limiting effect. First refers to a clear distinction made by Marx between the concept of political emancipation and a general human emancipation. The passage from *The Jewish Question* demonstrates the limits of a political emancipation as the fact that "... the state can liberate itself from a constraint without man himself being *really* liberated; that a state may be a *free state* without man himself being a *free man* (1963:10-11). The conclusion states that political emancipation alone does not automatically lead to human emancipation in the true sense of the word-which sounds almost prophetic in regards to the consequences of this fatal confusion which the protagonists of the October

revolution failed to recognize. Unlike merely a *political* emancipation which ends with guaranteeing political liberties (however whose enormous validity the socialist movements must not disregard but should incorporate into their broadly defined ends), *human* emancipation aims at "... bringing down of man's world, of human relations to the very existence of man" (1953:10-11). That is to say, it implies a liberation of each individual in terms of his/her reappropriation of their own "species being" powers, at the same time revitalizing his/her unique potential. The latter form of emancipation thus penetrates into the very interior of human existence, far beyond the use of civil rights and liberties.

Although conditioning society's liberation by the achievement of individual freedoms, Marx's idea of emancipation bears the limits of an overemphasized philosophical approach relying, first and foremost, on the concept of "human nature." Emancipation thus primarily concerns a revitalization of the "roots of man," i.e. a reappropriation of "human powers" referring to the universal potential of human beings and to the realization of "fundamental human needs." The concept of individual as a concrete mode of existence characterized by very often contradictory dispositions and needs is out of Marx's philosophical consideration of human emancipation, though it comes into existence in certain of Marx's historical/sociological analyses. Individuals as living in everyday life conditions, who are far below the possibility of grasping an abstract philosophical meaning of the controversy between human essence and human existence, did not come into the context of this general concept of human emancipation, that becomes justifiably a matter of criticism by certain authors (Benhabib 1984:296). This is the reason why the true libertarian elements of the concept of emancipation remained quite vague and were not incorporated into the theory of the so-called "scientific socialism". Neither were they built-in the political strategies of the workers' movements of the 19th century struggles and throughout the first half of the 20th century.

I believe, it is here where a possibility may be found for a Stalinist inversion of the original Marx's concept of socialism laying grounds for the separation of revolution from emancipation. This was inspired, as far as the bolsheviks are concerned, by an extreme anti-individualism focusing on exclusively collectivistic interests and by an overestimated role of political revolution but without political emancipation; the consequences of which were: the changing of the ultimate end of revolution-from the working class, and more general, man's liberation to the establishment of the so-called "workers' state: as an end-in-itself; and last but not least, a complete inversion of means and ends, when instead of treating the latter as a necessary precondition for the emancipation of society's members, it becomes the ultimate end to be defended and preserved by all means, even at the cost of waging a war with the working class, which is supposed to be the "ruling class" (as was the case in Poland when the Marshal law was introduced in December 1981).

Due attention to the controversy between the working class' liberation and individual emancipation-that still remains an unresolved problem within Marxism-is not paid even by those great figures of the critical Marxism, such as Karl Korsch, Rosa Luxemburg and Georg Lukacs. In this respect they remained Leninist, even though Korsch and Luxemburg had criticized Lenin's theory of revolution and its practice. Rosa Luxemburg touched upon the problem when focusing her critique to the direction that the October revolution was taken generating the monopoly of party apparatus' power; however, she also more relied on freedom of the true representatives of the working class (i.e. insisting that the liberation of the working class should be done by the class itself, not by its avant-garde), rather than being aware that it was necessary to link class liberation with the realization of individual liberties and human emancipation in general (Dunayevskaya 1981:119). Accordingly, the critical Marxists failed to make such a reconceptualization

of the notion of revolution which would incorporate a twofold perspective: one regarding the historically evolved social forces capable of carrying out the revolutionary action, and the other viewing the revolutionary potential from the angle of individuals' needs and value-orientations, i.e. from the point of view of society's members' true interest for a revolutionary transformation and their readiness to take part in changing the given social conditions, including their own choice of the direction.

It was not by accident that a renewal of the humanist approach to socialism was brought about in the mid-fifties by the Marxists who experienced themselves the reality of "real socialism." They offered their contributions to the process of destalinization, first of all, by critically reexamining Marx's tradition. Their main contribution can be briefly summarized as turning attention to the value of a real human being who can no longer be simply treated as the munition of the revolution and sacrificed to the altar of an unreachable "radiant future," but should become the core of a "socialist construction," in order that human emancipation as the ultimate end of the socialist revolution, become attainable. A revitalization of the humanist potential within Marxism enabled them to critically approach reality of the "real socialism" in the name of its humanist and democratic transformation.

The critical analyses of the practices of postrevolutionary societies revealed the truth that this problem remained unresolved even in those societies and workers' movements which had broken the ties with the Stalinist pattern, referring for example to Yugoslav society and the Eurocommunist parties. Because in their conceptions still dominates the idea of class liberation that disregards emancipation in terms of an "unfolding of human individual powers," which is the way to make it possible for all men to "reappropriate their alienated wealth." For this reason it is right to speak of the postrevolutionary societies and the workers' movements as still remaining the prisoners of the ideology of non-freedom, being that they have failed to recognize that a true liberation of society leads only, however not exclusively, through the emancipation of society's members as individuals. Society's liberation can be brought about inasmuch as its members become independent and autonomous subjects capable of matching with all external pressures and internal contradictions, when being motivated to change the alienated social conditions by the mutual and coordinated social actions.

Within the reassessment of the idea of socialism it is a critical reevaluation of the Marxist concept of revolution which is the next step necessary to be taken.

One of the principal controversies of the Marxist concept of revolution generates from an ambivalent view on philosophy of history. The gap has not been bridged yet between an early Marxian anthropological conception concerning "man's making his own history" thanks to the creative energies of the historical praxis, and a deterministic concept of history upon which Marx's later writings more rely, and what has been transmitted by Engels as the only true Marx's heritage. This dilemma, precisely expressed by Cornelius Castoriadis, reads:

"Either history is really governed by laws, and in that case a truly human activity is impossible, except perhaps in a technical sense; or men really make their own history, and then the task of theory will not be directed to discovering 'laws,' but to elucidation of the conditions within which human activity unfolds, the regularity of their appearance, and so on" (1984:125).

In regards to the historical-social practices the consequences greatly differ dependent on the answers to this theoretical dilemma.

One of the answers is Lenin's concept of revolution representing a rather strange mixture of an overestimated role of the conscious social forces that led to a voluntaristic

conception of the "construction of socialism," with the metaphysically conceived "course of history" in terms of its merely unfolding the "iron laws" which cannot but be followed, allowing to those who can "read the laws of history"—to which the party leadership is entitled—to spread its course and ensure the victorious march to the "kingdom of socialism," thus explaining the meaning of freedom in terms of the "cognition of necessity." However, this apparent controversy is very well reconciled in the Bolshevik ideology, precisely thanks to the definition of the role of the party which becomes the only recognized "conscious subject" that can "read history." This is how a metaphysical approach to history turns into a sheer voluntarism, and *vice versa*, how the voluntaristic irresponsibility is hidden behind the "highest principles" of historic/socialist laws.

In this context it is worthwhile mentioning a statement of Lucien Seve, who points at an inadequate use of the term "determining," which is often confused with "conditioning" (1975:155). When using the latter term to explain the environment-human action relation, man's freedom is implied as the *conditio sine qua non* of historical development, because history is not seen in fatalistic terms, while freedom is *eo ipso* denied in a strictly deterministic view of history.

According to the latter, socialism is viewed as merely resulting out of the inevitable march of history, which revolution can only accelerate by aiding its birth. Thereby, the concept of revolution does not assume the action of active/autonomous subjects but rather implies their passivity determined by the fact, that social change does not depend on their commitment and free participation but is affected by the external forces, acting independently of the participants' needs and interests.

The objectives of a revolutionary change is another aspect which a critical reassessment should take into account in order to more clearly define the meaning and the range of social action/transformation. I refer to an "objectification" of the socialist aims and their materialization in purely objectivized/depersonalized terms. When socialism is taken to mean a "promised land," in a literally utopian sense, or is interpreted in terms of the "dictatorship of proletariat," it has nothing to do with the needs of the real members of the given society, nor with their own conceptions and preferences of what a "good society" should look like. The concept of "socialism" is thus imposed over the given population by force legitimized as a means of revolution regardless of whether it is desired or not, and irrespective of whether the population is ready to support it by its committed participation—which would be the only true guarantee of a fruitful socialist revolution, viewed as a deep social transformation, not in terms of insurrection.

The objectification of the revolutionary ends results from the aforementioned reductionist viewpoint which narrows the concept of socialist revolution, when extracting solely political revolution as an act *per se*. Unlike the one-dimensional concept of political revolution which can simply be interpreted in terms of the "overthrowing" the existing ruling class' power and changing the corresponding institutions, a social revolution in broader terms assumes the changing of the entire social reality. Hence, the former, as a process of short duration, goes hand in hand with violence used to alter the given political order, but not necessarily penetrates into the changing of the power structure nor the structure of social division of labour, as well as the established social inequalities; the latter concerns a long-term transformation which does not and cannot end with seizing power from the bourgeoisie.

However, when the structure of social inequalities and domination remains intact, a purely political "socialist revolution" inevitably produces the counter-effects generating a new structure of inequalities and domination, instead of their abolition. Which is to say, a limited political revolution is by definition an *unfinished revolution* being that it

merely replaces one structure of exploitation and domination by another maintaining the old problems unresolved. For as far as the population is concerned, it does not matter *who* is in the saddle, but what matters is that society's members remain dispossessed of the right to make decisions concerning their own destiny.

When looking from this angle, it becomes evident that the concept of the "dictatorship of proletariat" as well belongs to the old ideology of domination not representing a model of radical liberation as being advocated. Because the idea of the working class liberation defined as an end-in-itself and separated from human emancipation to which the interests of the other social strata and individuals are to be subjected and even disregarded, inevitably turns into its opposite, i.e. it hides the aspiration for domination that comes logically out of the aspired hegemony of one class or its self-nominated representatives over the rest of the population. It is also where the concept of the vanguard party comes into being relying upon the unshaken concept of hegemony. Therefore, the true problem of nonrealization of the socialist ends does not lie in the fact that the "dictatorship of proletariat" has not been materialized in the "real socialism," given the conditions that it has been replaced by the dictatorship of the party apparatus. The true problem lies in the very claim that socialism, as a project of human emancipation, may be grounded upon a new structure of domination and class hegemony, irrespective of whose hegemony is in question. Because a true liberation/emancipation of both the working class and the rest of the population and individuals is not achievable unless *domination as a mode* of both inter- and intra-class *communication* is rooted out. For domination and hegemony always rest upon the usurpation of social power, when one class alone tends to represent the wholeness of social interests imposing its own interpretation of the "general will" and using force to implement it. No matter who is entitled to represent the ascribed "social interest," if the class representing it claims its right to take decisions outside the democratic mechanisms and procedures, it creates the insurmountable obstacles to the emergence of the independent social movements and autonomous actions from the part of social groups and individuals, which alone can guarantee a continuation of the original transformation initiated by a socialist revolution.

Following this line of reasoning I am inclined to think though it may seem contradictory to what is said so far, that the main difficulty of a Marxian concept of the revolutionary subject does not lie in the ascribed historical role of the working class alone, implying that a solution is laid insofar as the broader concept of a bloc of "historical forces" is defined. In fact, what characterized such a conception oriented to "social forces" alone, is its comprehension of the subject of radical social changes, aiming at human emancipation, in entirely *depersonalized* terms. Thus, when the entire social dynamics are located in the external forces, vis-a-vis man's existence, it is the political party which alone plays an active role in conditioning and consciously inspiring the desired social change.

This is the reason why the dynamic energies of social forces and personal potentialities have not been reconciled in the Marxist concept of revolutionary movement. Paradoxically, but it happened within the workers' movements that the outstanding role is recognized only to the so-called "great personalities" (i.e. the highest party figures), while the rest of the party members, let alone non-party men, were completely dispossessed of their own dynamics becoming the cogs of the party machinery. When an impersonal force is legitimized as the only recognized subject of revolution-no matter if it is defined in terms of a "class for itself"-it can merely deal with the external alterations of the institutional and structural changes. However, irrespective of how deeply the changes penetrate into the social structure relations, they can, at best, provide the *conditions* of emancipation which cannot be taken as a substitute to the process of

emancipation itself. Without the personal motivation expressing the individuals' commitment to the goals of emancipation, social forces which initially appear as the carrier of the revolutionary transformation, will inevitably turn into the holders of domination. Because they will come, sooner or later, to the position to find it necessary to defend revolution by force from those who have participated but lost interest in furtherly supporting it, when the latter realize that their interests and those of the leading figures do not go parallel. And it happens when the meaning of revolution is altered to mean the establishing a "new order" and representing the "best of all worlds," hence, it is from there that the right to defend it by all means even against the will and interest of the working class is derived.

For the above-mentioned reasons it was a *heteronomous value-orientation* which prevailed in the revolutionary movements following a Marxist tradition, as against the autonomous value-orientation which could have laid grounds to a true emancipation. Accordingly, the old concept of socialization, taken in terms of a necessary adjustment of individuals to social/cultural demands or norms, has won the prevalence over those implied by an autonomous orientation. The latter suggesting the ends of social/cultural institutions to be defined in terms of human needs satisfaction implying the adjustment of institutions to human needs, not the other way round, in order that the unique individual capacities be optimally developed.

In other words, what is missing in Marx's concept of a socialist transformation is a look from inside the individual existence involving subjective needs and forms of alienation. This dimension is necessary to be included in order that liberation can embrace the totality of man's life, not merely the alteration of the external conditions. Or, as it is put by one author, the Marxists primarily paid attention to what had to be eliminated in the course of liberation, while failing to "discover what could be meant by 'humanity,' 'liberation' and 'autonomy'" (Nautia 1985:374). They simply assumed that, when once started, the process of social transformation would automatically liberate the human potential, and the autonomy of individuals would come on its own.

As I have tried to elaborate so far, these shortcomings have resulted from the reduction of Marx's philosophical notion of revolutionary change understood in terms of a general human emancipation, to the narrow meaning in which the slogan of the "workers' power" had dominated becoming synonymous with the concept of the working class' liberation. When being thus inverted, the "liberation of the working class" ceased to indicate its emancipation, but on the contrary, focused on the conquest of power. Under the circumstances-characterized by the existence of a non-emancipated working class-an alibi was provided for the replacement of the class by its "conscious" vanguard, whose ruling aspirations were hidden behind its proclamation that it rules "in the name of the working class," thus the working class' emancipation did not mean an action of the class itself, but rather as mediated by the party as the only conscious subject of revolution.

This is the reason why the emancipatory potential of the working class and individuals has been captured for so long and the actions of the spontaneous social movements suspended. Hence, a paternalistic attitude of the "vanguard party" toward its class prevailed enabling the working class to become the subject of its own liberation. The attempt of the Polish workers to do so has ended by crashing the independent social movement which asserts that the aforementioned principle is still the rule in societies of this type.

In order to unclothe this closed circle of a perpetuated domination, regardless of in whose name it is proclaimed, it is necessary to reveal its roots in Marxism, even though the inversion of a theory of emancipation (of Marx) into the theory of domination (in

Stalinism) may have resulted merely out of the vagueness of the concepts. However, the latter also speaks in favour of the conceptual reassessment of the 19th century viewpoints so as to make the Marxist theory of human society relations, and respectively of the concept of social change, more adequate to the modern societies' conditions and demands.

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**UNCHAINING THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION:
AMERICAN ROOTS AND MARX'S WORLD HUMANIST CONCEPTS**

Raya Dunayevskaya
Chicago, Illinois

What is significant to us here, in Marx's transformation of Hegel's revolution in philosophy into Marx's philosophy of revolution, is how it was extended in his last decade. It led us to call the 1880's a "trail to the 1930's." Marx deepened and concretized what he had originally called a "New Humanism" throughout his life. After 40 years of labor in the field of economics, which culminated in the 1872-75 French edition of *Capital* in the same decade in which he wrote his *Ethnological Notebooks* (1872), Marx hewed out a new moment. It is seen in his critique of the Russian Populist Mikhailovsky; in Marx's draft letters to the Russian revolutionary Marxist, Vera Zasulich; and in nothing less important than the Introduction to the Russian edition of *The Communist Manifesto*, where he predicted that revolution could begin in the backward "East" rather than in the technologically advanced West. He singled out Russia as that "East." That was in 1881! No wonder we call this the "trail to the 1930's."

Strictly philosophically, our first unchaining of the dialectic began with my breakthrough in the May 12th and 20th, 1953 *Letters on Hegel's Absolute Idea* (1953). We have recently traced the breakthrough in its embryonic appearance in the three preceding years, 1950-53. It is true that the breakthrough in the 1953 *Letters* showed that within the Absolute Idea itself is contained the movement from practice as well as from theory.

But the 1950 Coal Miner's Strike was the real manifestation. It is therefore imperative to combine what Hegel called "the Self-Thinking Idea" with what was present in the spontaneous movements of the Miner's General Strike, that which we later called the "Self-Bringing Forth of Freedom." It should not be necessary to explain the obvious, but such explanation is "required" against the vulgar materialists to assure them that, of course we knew it is not the Idea that thinks; it is people who think. What must be added, however, is that the dialectic logic of the Idea moves in the direction of what was implicit in the movement from practice.

By the mid-1950's, the category I had worked out as the movement from practice provided the structure for my major philosophic work, *Marxism and Freedom, from 1776 until Today* (1958). That was the first of what we now call the "trilogy of revolution." It illuminated the fact that the movement from practice was itself a form of theory.

It is this concept of philosophy as being rooted in the movement from practice which creates a challenge for theoreticians to work out a new stage of cognition. It created the structure of *Marxism and Freedom*, where we first concretized those American roots of Marxism—from Abolitionism to the then ongoing Montgomery Bus Boycott which opened the Black Revolution. In that work, the world Humanist concepts were also spelled out, not alone in the United States, but in the very first mass revolts from under Communist totalitarianism in East Europe—East Germany, 1953; Poland, 1955; Hungary, 1956.

In the 1960's we began recording the new voices of a new generation of revolutionaries, and in 1968 had to face the aborted near-revolution in France, which made imperative our return to Hegel on an altogether new level. What was needed was a working out of the Hegelian dialectic, this time in and for itself, as well as how it was grappled with by Marx and Lenin. This resulted in the second unchaining of the Hegelian dialectic for our age as the dialectics of revolution. We examined, as well, the Alternatives: Trotsky, Mao, and the outsider looking Sartre.

1973 saw the publication of *Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao*. I there extended the concretization of Absolute Idea not just as a totality—but as the development of Absolute Idea as New Beginning.

The first chapter of *Philosophy and Revolution* was entitled, "Absolute Negativity as New Beginning: The Ceaseless Movement of Ideas and of History." Here I argued that seeing Absolute Idea as a unity of theory and practice, as totality, is where the task first begins. Absolute Idea as New Beginning challenges all generations to work out concretely such a new beginning for their own age.

We see the development of theory in Frantz Fanon, who, in *The Wretched of the Earth*, likewise called his philosophy "a New Humanism."

The 1970's also saw the emergence of a new revolutionary force: Women's Liberation, which had grown from an idea whose time had come, to become a Movement. Its uniqueness expressed itself in their refusal to put off for "the day after the revolution" the questions they demanded answers to. The so-called Marxists at first would not even bother to listen to the women who proclaimed that "male chauvinism" was by no means restricted to capitalism. It not only appeared long before capitalism, but is present right now and has reappeared after the revolution. It must be faced here and now. The women insisted that the Left must face the male chauvinism within that movement, and must recognize the need to grapple with this question before, during, in and after the revolution.

It became the impulse for the third major philosophic work, *Rosa Luxemburg: Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* which completed what we call the "trilogy of revolution." Here is how I therefore summarized today's women's Liberationists demands:

"Don't tell us about discrimination everywhere else; and don't tell us it comes only from oppression; look at yourselves. You will have to understand that our bodies belong to us and to no one else—and that includes lovers, husbands, and yes, fathers."

Our bodies have heads, and they too belong to us and to us alone. And while we are reclaiming our bodies and our heads, we will also reclaim the night. No one except ourselves, as women, will get our freedom for us. For that we need full autonomy" (1982:100).

For me, it became necessary here to also focus on one of the inadequacies of the Women's Liberation Movement; its disregard of Rosa Luxemburg. Indeed, this was a stimulus for my new work, though my scope was by no means limited to unearthing Luxemburg's heretofore unknown feminist dimension.

When I began my study, it was just on Luxemburg—and the intended climax was to have been the year 1910. This was the year when her flash of genius, in grappling with the new phenomenon of imperialism, resulted in her break with Karl Kautsky, the leader of the German Social Democracy. This was some four years before the outbreak of World War I and the Second International's betrayal. It was four years before any male Marxist, Lenin included, saw the coming betrayal.

And yet, suddenly, even this seemed to me to be inadequate, because Luxemburg remained a member of the German Social Democracy as if her break with Kautsky was "personal."

I felt the need for a decisive philosophic grappling, which I worked out as Part III of the Luxemburg book: "Karl Marx: From Critic of Hegel to Author of *Capital* and Theorist of Revolution in Permanence."

As against Luxemburg's half-way dialectic, Marx's multilinearism of human development, of paths to revolution, as they related to so-called backward countries, to Women's Liberation, and to nationalist opposition—all made me question not only Luxemburg but all post-Marx Marxists, beginning with Frederick Engels, whose unilinearism permeated the whole German Social Democracy. Post-Marx Marxism, to me, became a pejorative.

Engel's unilinearism was glaringly revealed in the very first work he wrote after the death of Marx—*The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. Engels claimed it was a "bequest" of Marx, but it expressed anything but Marx's view either on the Man/Woman relationship or on the relationship between advanced and backward societies. Nor was there similarity between Engel's view of primitive communism and Marx's.

Marx's magnificent, original, historic unchaining of the dialectic was the creation of such a new humus. This unchaining began, of course, with his refusal to consider that Hegel's Notion was related only to thought.

Once Marx discovered a new continent of thought and of revolution, the task he assigned himself was that of uniting Philosophy and Reality. The proof of that unity came from uncovering the hidden Subject—the driving forces of the revolutions to be—the Proletariat—and at the same time focus on the Man/Woman relationship, as alienated and alienating, which must be totally uprooted as the way to full human relationships.

Marx had rejected Feuerbachian abstract materialism, not alone because it failed to see the social relationship. He opposed Feuerbach as well as for rejecting the revolutionary Hegelian principle of "negation of the negation," a principle Marx cited again even in his technical *Mathematical Manuscripts* of 1881-82 (1983).

Instead, his concept of revolution-in-permanence contended that only after the historic transcendence by the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, would there first begin the development of a new human society and a new Man/Woman relationship.

Now listen to Marx in his last decade, writing on his relationship to Hegel—which he left with his papers for Engels for Volume II of *Capital*, but which Engels left out:

"My relationship with Hegel is very simple. I am a disciple of Hegel, and the presumptuous chatter of the epigones who think they have buried this great thinker appear frankly ridiculous to me. Nevertheless, I have taken the liberty of adopting... a critical attitude, disencumbering his dialectic of its mysticism and thus putting it through a profound change..." (1968:528)

Between Marx and our age only Lenin seriously returned to Marx's roots in Hegel. But while Lenin commented profoundly and brilliantly on the whole of Hegel's *Science of Logic*—including the Doctrine of the Notion, where he embraced and concretized Hegel's principle that "Cognition not only reflects the world but creates it"—he nevertheless concretized only the single dialectical principle of transformation into opposite (1981:212).

Unfortunately, other questions, especially the one on Organization, Lenin left untouched within the vanguardist confines of his 1902-03, *What is to be done?* (1929).

Our age has focused on the dialectics of revolution as the determinant. Nothing, including Organization, the Party, can find any escape route from that determinant. Even the Absolute Method itself is but the road to the Absolute Idea, Absolute Mind. When the Self-Thinking Idea comes with the Self-Bringing Forth of Freedom we will have actual total freedom.

Though I have but a little space before concluding, I do wish to give you a brief view of my new book that came off the press in 1985: *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future*.

The first thing I noticed in re-reading that 35-year compilation of articles—with a focus on a single revolutionary force as Reason, Women's Liberation—is that the Dialectics of Revolution is characteristic of all the four forces we singled out in the United States—Labor, Black, Youth, as well as Women. All are moments of revolution, and nobody can know before the event itself who will be the one in the concrete, particular revolution.

This determined my 1985 Introduction and Overview to the new book, which culminated in what we call the "trail to the 1980's." This is true not just as a summation, but rather as a new beginning. Just as Marx's concept of "revolution in permanence" made it clear that the revolution does not end with the overthrow of the old but must continue to the new, so you begin to feel this presence of the future in the present. This is the time when every man, woman and child feels this newness precisely because it is now rooted in such new beginning.

And here is how I have introduced my new, fourth book:

"With Marx's first founding of his new continent of thought and of revolution, he wrote: 'To have one basis for life and another for science is *a priori* a lie.' The truth of this statement has never been more immediate and urgent than in our nuclear world, over which hangs the threat to the very survival of civilization as we have known it" (1985:15).

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**SOURCES OF MARXIST-HUMANISM:
FANON, KOSIK AND DUNAYEVSKAYA**

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As developed in the 1950's and 1960's by writers such as Frantz Fanon, Karel Kosik and Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxist-Humanism is a challenge to contemporary social theory. Humanism was so central to the thought of the young Marx that he wrote in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*: "Communism as a fully-developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully-developed humanism is naturalism . . . It is the solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution" (Marx 1961:127). The publication of these writings touched off international debate around the issue of humanism and Marxism (Fromm 1965).

The attempts of Althusser (1969) and others to close off this debate by relegating Marx's humanism only to the young Marx were challenged not only by Marxist-Humanists (Dunayevskaya 1969), but by the wide discussion of Marx's *Grundrisse* in the 1970s. There, too, Marx had underlined his humanism, stressing that:

"In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productivity forces etc. . . . the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming?" (1973:488).

All of this made intelligible the explicit humanism found once again in the conclusion of Volume III of Marx's *Capital*:

The realm of freedom really begins only where labor determined by necessity and external expedience ends . . . The true realm of freedom, the development of human power as an end in itself begins beyond it" (1981:958-959).

Grounding themselves in these central humanist categories in Marx, but especially in the young Marx, numerous writers have discussed Marx's humanist and Hegelian roots since the 1950's.

Too often obscured in this discussion has been the variety of views among the writers who have taken up these issues. Neo-Marxists—whether in the German "Frankfurt School" or the French "Existential Marxists"—were and are distinct from each other and from Marxist-Humanism. Neo-Marxism generally involves revising central Marxist categories in order to integrate Marx's thought with non-Marxian social theory; such as Freudianism, existentialism, phenomenology or Weberianism. In the case of the Frankfurt School this meant an explicit critique of Marxist-Humanism, but one which did not answer contemporary Marxist-Humanists.

Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School eventually drew even the far more revolutionary-minded Herbert Marcuse to his own rejection, not only of the working class as a revolutionary subject, but even of the possibility of a society free of alienation and reification (Marcuse 1964). In the seventies Marcuse, in a conversation with Raya Dunayevskaya, questioned what Marx "meant" by his phrase in *Critique of the Gotha Program* of a new socialist society where "labor," from a mere means life, has become the prime necessity of life" (Dunayevskaya 1979). As a recent account puts it: "In short, for all its fury against the reification and alienation fostered by capitalism, the Frankfurt

School could not join the Marxist-Humanists in positing a world entirely free of those conditions" (Jay 1985). Neither could the French existentialists, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Jay errs, however, in considering Georg Lukacs' and Karl Korsch's writings in the 1920's as Marxist-Humanist. These Hegelian Marxists were truly original, but they never made a central category out of humanism. Nor did they discuss the *1844 Essays* in a comprehensive way once they were published in German in 1932.

Marxist-Humanism arose in the 1950's as a heterogenous school of thought, more than a decade after the Frankfurt School had developed its views. The starting point for Marxist-Humanism was the discussion of the writings of the young Marx as the foundation for a Marxist critique both of established Marxism and of non-Marxian social theory. It also had distinct political implications, as seen in Dunayevskaya's call in the early 1960's for the unity of the East European, U.S. and African Marxist-Humanists:

Just as the fight for freedom on the part of the Hungarian revolutionaries (who had been raised on Marxian theory only to be betrayed by its usurpers) has made them theoretical Marxist-Humanists, the plunge to freedom has made the African revolutionaries the activist Marxist-Humanists of today. The Marxist-Humanists of other lands are ready to listen and, with your help, to establish that new international which will be free from state control and will aspire to reconstruct the world (Dunayevskaya 1963).

Marxist-Humanism thus arose some time after the Lukacs, Existential Marxists and the Frankfurt School had written their key works. Marxist-Humanists were aware of Sartre, Lukacs, Korsch, Marcuse and Adorno. Most of the Marxist-Humanist writings cited these earlier thinkers and critiqued them. By the 1980's many works of European Neo-Marxism have been translated—as has Marx's *Grundrisse*—giving the U.S. audience the necessary background for the first time to grasp the larger theoretical and philosophical themes raised by Fanon, Kosik and Dunayevskaya. These writers had anticipated, participated in and critiqued the revolutionary social movements of the 1950's and 1960's including the women's liberation movement, in ways that the low level of theoretical discussion among radical intellectuals in that period missed. In the 1980's we thus are able to view these Marxist-Humanist writings in a more comprehensive manner.

Frantz Fanon: Dialectics of the African Revolution

Nowhere is this truer than in the case of the best-known and most-studied of the three writers under consideration, Frantz Fanon. While his writings have generated a world-wide discussion, most of it until the 1970's had centered on his concepts of revolutionary violence and Black consciousness, and not his critique of neo-colonialism in post-independent Africa, on his concept of spontaneity, or most importantly of all, on his underlying concept of a humanist revolutionary dialectic, which involved critiques of single-party states in independent Africa itself.

Typical of the 1960's discussion was a French Trotskyist writer who reduced Fanon's theory to one of "armed guerrilla struggle" which he likened to Castroism (Pablo 1962). Even Sartre's preface to *The Wretched of the Earth*, focused almost entirely on the question of violence in the anti-colonial revolutions, thereby eschewing the philosophical issues raised by Fanon (1965).

In the 1970s and 1980s the newer studies focused more on Fanon's theoretical depth first as a psychologist and political theorist (Caste 1970; Genzler 1973; McCulloch 1983) and then most recently as a humanistic philosopher of revolution (Onwusnibe 1983; Turner and Alan 1986). No Third World thinker of the post World War II era has

generated so many theoretical studies in recent years. At the same time his work continues to be discussed widely within revolutionary movements, such as in South Africa.

Yet Fanon's thought has still tended to be marginalized and excluded from much contemporary discussion on dialectics, as if Fanon's concept of revolutionary dialectics was specific to the Third World, and not universal. Onwuanibe (1983:xiii) argues against such a limited view of Fanon:

"Fanon has a vision or project of a 'new humanism' in which he wants 'to discover, and to love man, wherever he may be' . . . he is a man struggling to reconcile the apparent contradiction between genuine humanism and violence. In order to reconcile his humanism and his espousal of violence one must consider his conception of revolution in light of the principle of self-defense on the part of the oppressed. Fanon attempts to achieve this reconciliation by placing humanism and violence in a dialectical tension."

Turner and Alan connect Fanon's humanism to his revolutionary vision of a new society in Africa in their Marxist-Humanist study of his work:

"*The Wretched of the Earth* was to re-create the dialectics of liberation for the colonial world as it emerged out of the actual struggle of the African masses for freedom. Fanon saw the double rhythm of the colonial revolutions reflected in both the destruction of the old and the building of a totally new society" (1986:40).

While Fanon did not explicitly avow himself a Marxist, his thought can be considered in Marxist-Humanist terms.

In his famous and most-discussed chapter in *The Wretched of the Earth*, "Concerning Violence," Fanon's overall humanist and dialectical view emerges:

"In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem . . . The natives' challenge to the colonial world is not a rational confrontation of points of view. It is not a treatise on the universal, but the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute" (1968:40-1).

When Fanon makes this type of dialectical analysis, showing the philosophical dimension to his thought, such ideas are frequently not seen as original. Some argue that he derived them from Sartre or from the Negritude writers such as Aime Césaire (McCulloch 1983).

In fact, Fanon had in 1952 made a very sharp critique of Sartre. Turner and Alan argue against any notion of Fanon as Sartre's "pupil."

"In quoting Sartre's analysis of class as the 'universal and abstract' and race as the 'concrete and particular,' which led Sartre to the conclusion that 'negritude appears as the minor terms of a dialectical progression,' Fanon writes: '*Orphee Noir*' is a date in the intellectualization of the experience of being black. And Sartre's mistake was not only to seek the source of the source but in a certain sense to block that source . . . he was reminding me that my blackness was only a minor term. In all truth, in all truth I tell you, my shoulders slipped out of the framework of the world, my feet could no longer feel the touch of the ground'" (cited in Turner and Alan 1986:40).

In 1955, Fanon included another sharp critique, this time of Ce'saire's concept of Negritude, in an article he published in the French journal *Esprit*:

"Before Ce'saire, West Indian literature was a literature of Europeans . . . In *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal* (logbook of a return to the native land), there is an African period, for on page 49 we read:

'By dint of thinking of the Cougo I have become a Congo humming with forests and rivers . . .'

It thus seems that the West Indian, after the great white mirage, is now living in the great black mirage" (Fanon 1967:27-28).

This rather sharp critique, as shown later on in *Wretched of the Earth*, was because Ce'saire's Negritude was cultural only. Fanon turned against Ce'saire's view because "to Fanon, culture without revolution lacks substance" (Turner and Alan 1986:50).

In Africa, where Black consciousness became political and revolutionary in the 1950's, Fanon still argued that it needed a universal humanist revolutionary dimension if it was not to become a narrow nationalism:

"This new humanity cannot do otherwise than define a new humanity both for others . . . National claims, it is here and there stated, are a phase that humanity has left behind . . . We however consider that the mistake, which may have very serious consequences, lies in wishing to skip the national period . . . The consciousness of self is not the closing of a door to communication. Philosophic thought teaches us, on the contrary, that it is its guarantee. National consciousness, which is not nationalism, is the only thing that will give us an international dimension" (1968:246-247).

In the above passage, Fanon talks in universal humanist terms while simultaneously cautioning against "wishing to skip the national period" for peoples who have been humiliated and oppressed by colonialism. His is a truly dialectical view of the relationship of national consciousness to internationalism in the Third World revolutions.

To be sure, this was rooted in Fanon's experiences in the cauldron of the hard-fought Algerian Revolution, and his own position there as a Black Caribbean in a Muslim Arab society. But it was also a development from his own earlier, pre-Algeria writings on Black consciousness. As early as 1952, he had quoted Marx, "The social revolution . . . cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future," in the concluding chapter of his *Black Skin, White Masks* (1957).

In that work he had included a discussion of the dialectic of the master and the slave in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, a topic of much discussion among French intellectuals in the 1940's. But Fanon, while greatly appreciating Hegel, also took exception to his dialectic if it were to be applied unchanged to the Black slave and the white master:

"I hope I have shown that here the master differs basically from the master described by Hegel. For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work" (1967:220).

This original critique of Hegel which nonetheless preserved many of Hegel's categories, especially his concepts of self-consciousness and self-development, parallels some of Marx's own 1844, "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic". It also differs sharply from the 1940's French existentialist view of Hegel's master/slave dialectic with which Fanon was familiar. Following Alexandre Kojève, the French existentialists had made this the main point of affinity between Hegel and Marx, thus grossly oversimplifying their relationship.

Fanon's dialectic of revolution rooted itself in the African peasantry and included a critique of the elitism of post-independence African leaders and nationalist parties. But as we have seen, his vision was not only political and cultural, but also philosophical. Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* was published posthumously, after cancer struck him down at the age of 36 in 1961. It offers a world concept of revolutionary dialectics. Fanon had seen the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 for example as an anti-colonial struggle, referring explicitly to Budapest (Fanon 1963:79). He had wanted to keep the new Third World independent not only of the West, but from Russian and Chinese communism as well.

Karel Kosik's Marxist-Humanism:

Totality and the Dialectics of Freedom in Eastern Europe

Born one year after Fanon, in 1926, Kosik began to attain prominence in the 1950's for his sharp critiques of mechanistic, established Marxism, which in its Stalinist form had been transformed into a state ideology. A number of his articles and one book, *Dialectics of the Concrete*, have appeared in English and other Western languages. Many writers on Kosik (Piccone 1977; Bakan 1978; Zimmerman 1984) have praised his originality, but have seen it rather patronizingly as emerging not from his Marxist-Humanism in an East European context, but rather from the influence of Husserl and Heidegger. Others essentially agree with these interpretations of Kosik, but because of their own vantage point, imply that Kosik is guilty therefore of "right wing revisionism" (Moran 1983).

One Catholic Marx specialist did argue forcefully that Kosik's originality was rooted in his Marxism in an early review of *Dialectics of the Concrete*:

"Kosik's use of an existentialist terminology . . . is neither a revolt against Communist ideas nor a cheap device of an author eager to create a sensation . . . He harvests whichever of the fruits of non-Marxist thinkers he likes, trying in each case to show that Marxist-Leninism rather than positivism or existentialism is the legitimate harvester" (Lohkowitz 1964).

Had Lohkowitz caught the difference between "Communism" and "Marxism-Leninism" on the one hand, and Marxist-Humanism on the other, then he would have seen how Kosik was sharply critiquing established Communism as well.

Raya Dunayevskaya drew a sharp contrast between Kosik's book and Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*:

"Thus, though abstractly and indirectly articulated, no one doubted that it was an attack on the ruling bureaucracy, even if that were expressed, not in political terms, but a philosophic critique of fetishized existence. In his sharp first chapter's critique on the pseudo-concrete—an important new contribution of Karel Kosik's—he reminds the readers that "man's fetishized praxis . . . is not identical with the revolutionary-critical praxis of mankind" (1978:5).

Unfortunately, the belated 1972 publication of *Dialectics of the Concrete* in English seemed almost to end rather than begin wide discussion of Kosik among radical intellectuals. One of the translators of the book attributed the failure of even the "radical intelligentsias" in the West to take up Kosik's thought to their view that "theoretical insights come from Frankfurt and Paris" (Schmidt 1977).

Kosik's work was part of a flowering of Marxist-Humanist thought in East Europe, initially pioneered by Yugoslav Marxists who not only aided their land when it broke with Stalin in 1949, but have continued their philosophical probing and political opposition to this day with the journals *Praxis* and *Praxis International* (Markovic 1965, Golubovic 1985).

The first chapter of *Dialectics of the Concrete* begins with a searing critique of the "pseudococoncrete" world of "fetishized praxis", holding that: "To interpret the world critically, the interpretation itself must be grounded in revolutionary praxis" (Kosik 1978:7). Another critique of the pseudococoncrete is its failure to see thought as activity:

"Cognition is not contemplation. Contemplation of the world is based on the results of human praxis. Man knows reality only insofar as he forms a human reality and acts primordially as a practical being" (1978:9).

This parallels Lenin's famous statement in his *Philosophical Notebooks* on Hegel: "Cognition not only reflects the world but creates it" (Lenin 1981:12).

Kosik sharply attacks reductionist thinking's inability to catch the new: "Reductionism is the method of 'nothing but' . . . the new is 'nothing but'—the old" (1978:14). But he is not concerned only with positivists and mechanical Marxists. He also h's out at Georg Lukacs' concept of totality when he writes:

"The category of totality has also been well received and broadly recognized in the twentieth century, but it is in constant danger of being grasped one-sidedly, of turning into its very opposite and ceasing to be a *dialectical* concept. The main modification of the concept of totality has been its reduction to *methodological* precept, a methodological rule for *investigating* reality. This degeneration has resulted in two ultimate trivialities: that everything is connected with everything else, and that the whole is more than the sum of its parts" (1978:17-18).

Kosik opposes a "ready-made or formalized whole determining the parts because the genesis and development of totality are components of its very determination" (1978:29), here criticizing as well Lukacs' French student Lucien Goldmann.

Kosik's critique of totality was developed further in a 1978 article on "The Latin American Unfinished Revolutions" by Raya Dunayevskaya in a discussion of world-wide revolutionary impulses:

"What is new are the new groups that are appearing from the left, who want to see with the eyes of today the past two decades that would not separate the Latin American struggles from those in East Europe, or the Black revolution in the U.S. from the present struggles in South Africa, or new class struggles in West Europe from the so-called "ultra-Lefts" in China, much less allow Women's Liberation to be relegated to "the day after" the revolution. *The new is that the struggles must be considered as a totality, and as a totality from which would emerge new beginnings*" (1985:166).

Dunayevskaya had written the above article just after having reviewed Kosik's book (Dunayevskaya 1978). Kosik ends his discussion of totality with a quote from the *Grundrisse* on totality as "a process of becoming . . . of development."

Kosik's discussion on "Economics and Philosophy" first appears to challenge Marx's concept of labor based on Heideggerian categories, but then moves to call this view nothing more than "an alienated escape from alienation" (1978:42). Further on, he argues that in the twentieth century, "Scientism and all manner of irrationalism are complementary products" (1978:59). His specific reference is to Stalinism, but it could equally describe Reagan's combination of Star Wars with "creationism".

His profound four-part description of dialectical reason includes within it the concept of "a process of rationally forming reality, i.e., the realization of freedom" (1978:60). A provocative discussion of art and literature begins with the statement, shocking to the Stalinized Czechoslovakia of 1963 or today: "Poetry is not a reality of a lower order

than economics" (1978:67). He ends this chapter with a veiled but nonetheless ringing critique of totalitarianism: "... man is not walled into the animality and barbarity of his race, prejudices and circumstances ... he has the ability to transcend toward truth and universality" (1978:85).

The discussion on "Philosophy and Economics" turns directly to Marx's *Capital* where Kosik disputes phenomenological Marxism's view that *Capital's* "economic content lacks a proper philosophical rationale" which "can apparently be furnished by phenomenology" (1978:92). He also rejects the view of established Marxism that "the transition from the 1844 *Manuscripts* to *Capital* is a transition from philosophy to science" (1978:101).

At the same time, however, he rejects the Frankfurt School, especially Marcuse and Horkheimer, for turning revolutionary dialectics toward traditional social science:

"A different way of abolishing philosophy is to transform it into a 'dialectical theory of society' or to dissolve it in social science. This form of abolishing philosophy can be traced in two historical phases: the first time during the genesis of Marxism when Marx, compared with Hegel, is shown to be a 'liquidator' of philosophy and the founder of a dialectical theory of society, and the second time in the development of Marx's teachings, which his disciples conceive of as social science or sociology" (1978:104).

In a footnote he specifies that he is referring to Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* where the "transition from Hegel to Marx is poignantly labeled 'From Philosophy to Social Theory'" (1978:128). Moreover, Kosik also critiques Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason*: "Although Sartre correctly states that the intellectual horizon of Marxism cannot be crossed in our epoch, he 'neglects' to add, also of Marxism as an 'ontology of man'" (1978:130). Hence, Sartre's argument that Marxism needed the "additive" of existentialism to take up individualism and subjectivity in a humanistic manner was based on a limited view of Marx.

Thus, Kosik sees not only Stalinism, but even the Frankfurt School as promoting the abolition of philosophy within Marxism. This has negative consequences for the individual.

"Abolishing philosophy in dialectical social theory transforms the *significance* of the seminal 19th century discovery into its very opposite: praxis ceases to be the sphere of humanizing man, the process of forming a socio-human reality as well as man's *openness* toward being and toward the truth of objects; it turns into a closedness: socialness is a cave in which man is walled in ... man is a prisoner of socialness" (1978:106).

This is a truly revolutionary statement, given the political conditions in Czechoslovakia.

In his final statement on "Praxis and Totality", Kosik gives his own view of praxis:

"Praxis is both the objectification of the human and the mastering of nature, and the realization of human freedom ... Praxis is not the human's being walled in the idol of socialness and of social subjectivity, but her/his openness toward reality and being" (1978:139).

In this sense, Kosik's book is a voyage from the pseudoconcrete to the dialectics of freedom.

Dialectics of the Concrete was seized upon hungrily by the Czechoslovak intellectual world in 1963—philosophers, artists, writers, and film makers—which according to one account "accepted Kosik's concepts as its own" (Kusin 1971:53). At the Kafka

Conference of 1963, many other intellectual critics emerged and debated each other. Another historian noted that "for the first time on the soil of a socialist state and against the common front of scholars from other socialist countries, Kafka was interpreted as an artist who depicted not only the shortcomings of the capitalist society in which he lived, but also the universal human condition in modern times" (Zeman 1982). Kosik's speech on "Hasek and Kafka" deduced an explicit concept of humanism in that "while Kafka depicted the world of human reification and showed that man must experience and live through all types of alienation to be human, Hasek showed humans as capable of transcending reification and being irreducible to objects, to reified products or relations. One posited a negative, the other a positive scale of humanism" (Kosik 1975). This speech was followed in 1964 by an article on dialectics and ethics which contained a sharp critique of "the commissar" and ended with the statement: "The morality of the dialectic is revolutionary praxis" (Kosik 1977).

Kosik's contribution to Fromm's 1965 symposium *Socialist Humanism* discusses many issues, including a sharp Hegelian-Marxist critique of both Sartre and Husserl (1965). His last pre-1968 discussion was on the individual and history at a symposium held at Notre Dame University on "Marx and the Western World" in 1967 (Kosik 1967). It develops further some themes from the last chapter of *Dialectics of the Concrete*, partly out of a sharp debate with A. James Gregor, a condescending Western discussant. It concludes with Kosik's argument "that Marxism does not entail either a negation of the individual in terms of a history consisting of suprapersonal forces or an interpretation of the individual as a means." Kosik's rejoinder was so abstract that it left the impression that his Marxist-Humanism was not as sharp a break with Western liberalism as it was with Stalinism. Dunayevskaya argues in her analysis of the East European Marxist-Humanists, that many of them ultimately did not see the historic reason manifested in mass revolts in their countries, preferring instead, she argues, "to interpret these upsurges as if *praxis* meant the workers practicing what the theoreticians hand down" (Dunayevskaya 1973:265).

Kosik's most openly political period was brief in the crucial year of 1968, but in fact his political critique of the system in Czechoslovakia had begun in 1958 with his article on the class structure of society which argued that "nationalizing the key industries of Czechoslovakia" did not by itself create "socialism" (cited in Zeman 1982).

During this activist period in 1968, Kosik did not separate philosophy from political praxis. He held then that it is impossible to create humanistic socialism without clarifying certain basic philosophical questions (Kosik 1970). He also raised philosophical questions about the relationship of intellectuals and workers:

"... we speak metaphorically about the relationship of workers and intellectuals as the union of hands and brains, or as the union of practice and theory, without realizing how false and misleading such concepts may be. The hands-brain analogy implies that workers have no brains and intellectuals have no hands, and that the union is thus based on mutual insufficiency" (Kosik 1970:395).

At the underground independent Communist Party Congress held during the Russian intervention inside a factory guarded by the working class, Kosik was elected for the first time to the Central Committee. Throughout this period he held firm. Prevented from publishing since 1968 and even having two book manuscripts stolen by police in 1975, which were returned only after direct intervention by Sartre, Kosik is an "unperson" in "normalized", i.e., Stalinist, Czechoslovakia. His thought stands to this day as a high point of East European Marxist-Humanism, which not only sums up the 1968 movement theoretically, but reaches beyond its defeat to the future.

Raya Dunayevskaya: Marxist-Humanism as Source and as New Beginning

Russian-born Raya Dunayevskaya emerges from an earlier generation of the 1920's to whom the Russian revolution was the focal point. A Communist in the 1920's and later a Trotskyist, she served as Leon Trotsky's secretary in Mexico in 1937-38, and emerged after her break with Trotsky as an original theorist with her writings on state capitalism in Russia in the 1940's (Dunayevskaya 1986). Her work on Marxist-Humanism has been almost entirely outside academia. It began in a full sense in the 1950's when her *Marxism and Freedom* (1958) for the first time considered humanism as a central category from which to grasp the whole of Marx. While that book contained the first and to this day the clearest English translation of two of Marx's key 1844 essays, as well as Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, its discussion of Marxist-Humanism included not only the 1844 writings, but also a substantial chapter on "The Humanism and Dialectic of *Capital*, Volume I." Marcuse's preface to the book rightly stressed its attempt "to recapture the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: in the humanistic philosophy" (Dunayevskaya 1958:8), but took issue with her concept of labor, prefiguring his later work on the one-dimensional society (Marcuse 1966).

One of Dunayevskaya's most original concepts is that of Hegel's absolutes as new beginnings. To be sure, she sees Hegel's central contribution to be his dialectic of freedom or of negativity. But where other Marxists such as Marcuse or Lukacs held that Hegel gives up freedom and negativity at the stage of his absolutes, thus grounding their Hegelian Marxism on earlier stages of his dialectic, Dunayevskaya plunges directly into Hegel's absolutes, as the source of her own revolutionary dialectic. This is the philosophical ground of her Marxist-Humanism. In her paper presented to the Hegel Society of America, she begins by quoting Hegel's *Science of Logic* on the absolute idea containing "the highest opposition in itself" (Dunayevskaya 1980).

As early as 1958, she had elaborated aspects of this view in relationship to political ferment in Eastern Europe, when she wrote:

"Until the development of the totalitarian state the philosophic foundation of Marxism was not fully understood . . . we live in an age of absolutes—on the threshold of absolute freedom out of the struggle against absolute tyranny" (Dunayevskaya 1958:21-24).

The full development of her concept of Hegel's absolutes as new beginnings came her writings of the 1970's. After discussing this concept in two of Hegel's works, *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic*, her *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973) then turns to the conclusion of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Here is what she writes on the section on absolute spirit, paragraph 577: "Finally we are at 'the ultimate' the final syllogism. 'Suddenly' the sequence is broken . . . not only does Logic not become the mediating agent; Logic is replaced by the self-thinking Idea . . . the self-movement is ceaseless" (Dunayevskaya 1973:41). The vision she presents of Hegel is of an open dialectic reaching for the future rather than his absolutes as a closed ontology.

She connects this directly to the East European revolts of the early 1950's: "The revolt that erupted in East Germany in 1953 and came to a climax in the Hungarian Revolution was articulated also in new points of departure in theory . . . It was as if the 'Absolute Universal,' instead of being a beyond, an abstraction, was concrete and everywhere" (Dunayevskaya 1973:45).

That concrete universal was the birth of Marxist-Humanism, with its stress on the individual as the social entity:

"In Hegel's Absolutes there is embedded, though in abstract form, the fully developed 'social individual', to use Marx's phrase, and what Hegel called

individuality "purified of all that interfered with its universalism, i.e. freedom itself." Freedom, to Hegel, was not only his point of departure; it was also his point of return. This was the bridge not only to Marx and Lenin but to the freedom struggles of our day" (Dunayevskaya 1973:43).

Dunayevskaya is well aware, as she puts it, that even Marx "did not think" that it was "possible for another age to make a new beginning upon Hegel's Absolutes" (Dunayevskaya 1973:45). But Marx did not, she argues, live in an age of totalitarianism emerging out of post-revolutionary societies, specifically Stalinist Russia. That is our problematic today, however, which necessitates a new look at Hegel:

"What Hegel had shown were the dangers inherent in the French revolution, which did not end in the millenium. The dialectic disclosed that the counter-revolution is *within* the revolution. It is the greatest challenge that man has ever had to face" (Dunayevskaya 1973a:287).

All of this has created sharp debates with other Hegel scholars.

Louis Dupre (1974) and Georg Armstrong Kelly (1978) have argued that Dunayevskaya is very nearly "subverting" Hegel by substituting for Hegel's dialectic "an unchained dialectic" (Kelly 1978). Kelly's comments and her rejoinder are excerpted in Dunayevskaya's 1982 introduction to the second English edition of *Philosophy and Revolution*. That book includes, in addition to the new view of Hegel's absolutes, probing discussions of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao and Sartre as well as the revolts of the 1950s and 1960s in Africa, Eastern Europe and the U.S.

By the 1980's her *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982) had appeared, soon followed by an important discussion on Marxist-Humanism and women's liberation in *Praxis International* (Dunayevskaya 1984) and by the book of collected essays, *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* (1985). By 1985 the whole of her work was being recognized in a new way at the Wayne State University Labor Archives, which opened a large exhibition on her life's work.

It is important to note that her probing into Marxist-Humanism began initially in the 1940's when she studied and wrote on Marx's concept of alienation from his 1844 *Essays* as part of her studies on state capitalism. This part on alienated labor, "Labor and Society", was unfortunately refused by the editors of the Trotskyist *New International* when they did publish her economic analysis of state capitalism in those years. Her own collected papers at Wayne State show this process (Dunayevskaya 1986). That preoccupation with Marxist-Humanism continued through her first full elaboration of the concept in *Marxism and Freedom* (1958), written soon after her 1955 break with Caribbean Marxist C.L.R. James, with whom she had worked since 1941 right up through her most recent work today. Her writings on Marxist-Humanism thus preceded those of Kosik and Fanon by several years. Her *Philosophy and Revolution* directly focused on their work as part of a critical discussion of African and East European developments (Dunayevskaya 1973).

In *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982), Dunayevskaya presents a major new overview of Marx's humanism in relationship both to women's liberation and the revolutionary Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg. This book's substantial section on Marx begins with chapter nine entitled "Marx Discovers a New Continent of Thought and Revolution." There, she criticizes the limits of Lenin's Hegelianism in that he "kept his direct encounter with Hegelian dialectics—his *Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic*—to himself" as part of the "economic mire" into which all "post-Marx Marxists" of the period "had sunk." She also critiques

Luxemburg's apparent dismissal of the *1844 Essays* after she saw parts of them, and discusses the mechanistic character of Engels' *Origin of the Family*. The conceptions of these "post-Marx Marxists"—Lenin, Luxemburg, and Engels—are contrasted to Marx's own development, beginning with his 1841 doctoral thesis, and continuing through to his *1844 Essays*:

"What we may call "the self-determination of the Idea," Historical Materialism, which was born out of his concept of Alienated Labor, was the culmination of the critique Marx began in 1841 when he was telling his Young Hegelian friends that it was not enough to criticize Hegel for "accommodating" to the Prussian state, that what was needed was to discover the principle in Hegelian philosophy that led to that accommodation. Only in that way could one transcend the inadequacy in to genuinely historic a way as to create a new ground for a philosophy of freedom. Freedom was the bones and sinew, the heart and soul, the direction for totally new beginnings" (Dunayevskaya 1982:125-26).

This 1841 probing by Marx even before he broke with bourgeois society is connected to his dialogues in 1844 with Parisian workers, and to his pathway toward the *Communist Manifesto*.

Dunayevskaya's discussion of the *Grundrisse* stresses the dialectical nature of Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production, as opposed to Wittfogel's "twisted" view of "oriental despotism":

"It was precisely because he (Marx) was relating all development to epochs of revolution that he could see how primitive man conserved some elements of primitive communism "in the midst of oriental despotism." Far from making a fetish of it, as the modern Wittfogels would have it, Marx was tracing the actual historical development, the forward movement from humanity's origin as a "herd animal" to its individualization in the process of history" (Dunayevskaya 1982:138-39).

But she also sees limits in the *Grundrisse*, as against the fuller development of the humanist dialectic in *Capital*.

In *Capital*, she argues, "the Subject—not subject matter, but subject—was neither economics nor philosophy, but the human being, the masses" (Dunayevskaya 1982:143). New discussion of the fetishism of commodities connects that concept to Marx's view of primitive and modern society, to his doctoral thesis, and to the "economics" of Vol. III of *Capital* as well. She points out that in the French edition of Vol. I of *Capital* (to this day unavailable in English), Marx introduced "the question of the ramifications of the extension of capitalism into the world market once the mechanization reaches a certain point and capitalism 'successively annexed extensive areas of the New World, Asia and Australia'" (Dunayevskaya 1982:146).

Chapter eleven, "The Philosopher of Permanent Revolution Creates New Ground for Organization" points to the surprising failure of post-Marx Marxists to take seriously Marx's concept of revolutionary organization in the famous *Critique of the Gotha Program*. She writes that "no revolutionary studied these notes not just as a critique of a particular tendency, but as an actual perspective for the whole movement" (Dunayevskaya 1982:157). She argues that Marx's concept of "revolution in permanence" was also ignored even as Marxists have debated Trotsky's concept of permanent revolution. She holds that, unlike Trotsky's concept, Marx's concept not only included the peasantry, but more importantly, was not "in any way separated from the total conception of philosophy and revolution" (Dunayevskaya 1982:160). These perspectives on revolutionary organization are termed especially relevant for the 1980's, when social revolutions as well as revolutionary thinkers are searching for a way out of the stranglehold of the vanguard party to lead, while holding onto Marx's overall dialectics of revolution.

Her ground-breaking chapter twelve is entitled "The Last Writings of Marx Point a Trail to the 1980's". Her Marxist-Humanist discussion of Marx's last writings there centers mainly around his 1880-81 *Ethnological Notebooks* where Marx critically assessed and summarized anthropological works on India, on Native Americans, and on Australian Aborigines. At this point, she integrates the dimension of women's liberation:

"... whether Marx focused on the equality of women during primitive communism or on Morgan's theory of the gens, his point of concentration always remains that revolutionary praxis through which humanity self-developed from primitive communism to the period in which he lived... Marx was not hurrying to make easy generalizations, such as Engels' characterization of the future being just a "higher stage" of primitive communism. No, Marx envisioned a totally new man, a totally new woman, a totally new life form (and by no means only for marriage)—in a word, a totally new society" (Dunayevskaya 1982:186).

In her critique of Engels, the deterministic stages of history in his *Origin of the Family* are contrasted to Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks*. "Marx drew no such unbridgeable gulf between primitive and civilized as Engels had," she writes (Dunayevskaya 1982:185), because his preoccupation was not the origin of humanity, but the revolutions-to-be in those lands being penetrated by imperialism and "development". Even Marx's famous analysis of the Russian communal village which saw its structure as a possible starting point for a socialist society, in a draft of a letter to Vera Zasulich in 1881, was connected directly to the *Ethnological Notebooks*. This point was totally missed by Engels. Marx did not make a structural analysis of that village commune for, as she argues, Marx's "preoccupation is not 'the commune' but the 'needed Russian Revolution'" (Dunayevskaya 1982: 186).

She ends that penultimate chapter with a critique of revolutionary activism that "spends itself in mere anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism without ever revealing what it is for" (Dunayevskaya 1982: 194) and returns to her own concept of Hegel's "Absolute Idea as New Beginning". Marx's revolutionary humanism is the central focus, however:

"What is needed is a new unifying principle, on Marx's ground of humanism, that truly alters both human thought and human experience. Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks* are an historic happening that proves, one hundred years after he wrote them, that Marx's legacy is not mere heirloom, but a live body of ideas and perspectives that is in need on concretization. Every moment of Marx's development as well as the totality of his works, spells out the need for "revolution in permanence". This is the absolute challenge to our age" (Dunayevskaya 1982:195).

In her over forty years of writing on Marxist-Humanism, Dunayevskaya has woven the writings not only of Marx and Hegel, but also of other revolutionary humanists of today such as Kosik and Fanon, into a totality which is no mere summation, but a new beginning for future revolutionary praxis, and that is inseparable from philosophy. What contemporary Marxist-Humanism stresses is that Marx's Humanism was a total view that not only did not divide theory from practice, but also pointed to many tasks for the serious philosopher or social theorist.

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DIALECTICS OF THE CONCRETE: ABSOLUTE NEGATIVITY AS
NEW BEGINNING FROM ITSELF

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1.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* is, in the history of philosophy, his very original pathway to the science of the Idea (Logic). As such, it is the Idea's foundation work, one which perishes or relinquishes itself to the Idea, i.e., to its self-determination. That the speculative form of the Idea, the science of logic, will itself relinquish or "release" itself into the real philosophy of the Idea in the spheres of nature and mind points to the truth of the *Phenomenology*, viz., that the science of the Absolute and reality is one of appearance.

This is so because Hegel's foundation is the ceaseless movement of *absolute negativity*. Thus, it is not only that Hegel grounded logic on contradiction, but that he has made philosophy phenomenological, as well. The quadripartite system of Hegel's philosophy appears as: (1) phenomenology, (2) speculative philosophy (logic), (3) real philosophy (Nature and Mind), and (4) absolute Mind (Art, Religion and Philosophy). In this system, Hegel moves from phenomenology through speculative philosophy, to real philosophy, finally to the subjection of the system itself to its own accumulated negativity, in order to arrive at the new standpoint of absolute Mind. In my view, the "seriousness, labor, patience and suffering of the negative" in the *Phenomenology* has turned into the Idea's "full fruition," work, generation and enjoyment of itself as absolute Mind. What, then, has been realized in Hegel's system of speculative and real philosophy is the truth of the *Phenomenology*.

Thought achieves its final result in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, becomes actual, experiences its Golgotha at the moment of "full fruition" and perishes. For Hegel, that perishing is a self-transcendence in which an advance is predicated on a return to and a return out of thought's original point of departure in sensuous reality; the living context in which thought first discovers and tests the certainty of itself. However, because sensuousness has only what is particular as its object, and thought has the universal for its object, it is as absolute knowledge that thought has gained true certainty and actuality of itself. Only then is cognition prepared to test itself by logically working through the universal forms of its determinations, from the most abstract to the most concrete totality in the Idea.

Hegel's *Phenomenology* can be said to be the process by which thought gains full certainty of itself as a universal determination, while the *Logic* constitutes the process by which it comprehends its actuality. It is a process of comprehension wherein cognition is no longer satisfied with the mere *recollection* of its forms as they have made their appearances in history, but is rather determined to discover the *method* of its own recreation. In comprehending itself as the "self-thinking Idea," cognition becomes actual in opposition to the reality of the objective world. Hegel's idealism is based on the notion that all things come into being and thus find their meaning from what is actual. Naturally, for him, that means the Idea; thus, the transition of Nature from the actuality that the Idea becomes in the *Logic*. The "self-thinking Idea" is then the active (actual) side of reality; the Idea reaching out of itself into the objective world (as its other) and returning all the more powerfully into a more concrete unity with itself. So, whether or not one agrees with Marx that Hegel has "de-humanized the Idea," he certainly comprehended its course and development on the basis of human reality.

In the *Logic*, however, cognition is but the *formal cause* of objective reality. It is only in being subjected to the *method* that its true actuality arises. In his lectures on Aristotle's

philosophy of mind, which served as a point of departure for his category of absolute mind, Hegel gives this succinct formulation for "self-thinking Idea:

"Thought, as being the unmoved which causes motion, has an object, which, however, becomes transformed into activity, because its content is itself something thought, i.e., a product of thought, and thus altogether identical with the activity of thinking" (Hegel 1974, v.II:14a).

This follows Hegel's interpretation of the Greek passage from Aristotle which ultimately closes the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*.

Nevertheless, it would be a total misinterpretation of Hegel to think that he only recapitulates Aristotle's Absolute Cause as his absolute Mind. In the *Logic* Hegel very explicitly sets forth his critique of causality when he states that "cause is the highest stage in which the concrete Notion, as a beginning in the sphere of necessity has an immediate existence; but it is not yet a subject that maintains itself as such even in its actual realization" (1976:830).

Hegel consummates a deeper, more concrete relationship of thought to reality than Aristotle, not only because philosophy has undergone 2500 years of development, but also because Hegel has made, what Marx called, "history and its process" the chemical reagent of cognition's self-development. While Aristotle, in the end, returns to the abstract universal of Plato's eternal forms, from which he had sought to extricate philosophy, Hegel takes his leave of Aristotle and brings thought down from its metaphysical heights in Greek philosophy to ground it in the immanent movement of history. The dialectic, as Hegel conceived it, was not an appropriation of metaphysics, but a critical transformation of metaphysics. His self-effacing homage to Aristotle in closing his *Philosophy of Mind* with a passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* testifies to Hegel's profound debt to the Greek philosopher.

Moreover, Hegel had not so "de-humanized" the Idea that his concept, "self-thinking Idea," ignored the obvious, namely, that it is human beings who think. Consider the following:

"... in Nature the Notion does not exist explicitly as thought in this freedom, but has flesh and blood and is oppressed by externalities; yet this flesh and blood has a soul, and this is the Notion... It is only in thought that there is a true harmony between objective and subjective; that constitutes me" (1974, v.II:150).

To grasp fully Hegel's "self-thinking Idea" as the great divide in the history of philosophy, because he grounds it in human reality, it is necessary to see how he appropriates the self-thinking Idea from Aristotle's philosophy of mind. For our purposes, Hegel's "translation" of the following passage from Aristotle is decisive:

"Before real activity nothing truly exists; or 'Understanding itself can enter thought, like the objects of thought in general. For in that which is without matter' (in mind), 'the thinker' (the subjective) 'and the thought' (the objective) 'are the same; theoretical knowledge and that which comes to be known are the same. In that which is material, thinking is only potentiality without matter, but the object of thought exists in it,' while Nature contains the Idea only implicitly." (1974, v.II:197).

First of all, Hegel makes us hold fast to the "self-thinking Idea," i.e., thought as object and as thinking subject—beginning as a movement from Nature (practice). That is because he preceded his "translation" of this passage with a brilliant critique of those who push to the extreme Aristotle's analogy about mind being a blank on which characters are traced by external forces. This critique leads Hegel to his own positive

exposition, which begins with the formulation that "Before real activity nothing truly exists," and ends with his own new vantage point that "Nature contains the Idea only implicitly." The exposition is then divided into two moments, which roughly correspond to the syllogism of Nature (Logic-Nature-Mind).

The first moment signifies the *Logic* as the dialectic determination of the abstract universal Being of Nature, in which the absolute Idea is the *method* of subjecting those determinations as objects of thought to absolute negativity. On the basis of the culmination of abstract Nature in the *Logic*, the dialectic makes its transition to concrete (finite) Nature. Thus, the ground for comprehending finite concrete Nature necessitates working out the categories of Nature's abstract universal Being as determinations of thought.

In my view, Hegel's "empiricism" is rooted in his dialectical idea of Nature. Mind, as "self-thinking Idea" in "flesh and blood," and as implicitly in Nature, becomes explicit through the process of thinking itself, i.e., through sundering itself and making itself its own object. Thus, Nature is Mind's external other and has itself as its internal other. Without the former (Nature) thought is only potentiality, though still the "object of thought exists in it." Thought, however, has no understanding to turn to, and has not become *comprehension*, the "action of cognition," when it subsists in Nature as a potentiality. It is only when thought takes its object from Nature (practice), *as from itself*, does there begin the "self-thinking Idea," and that as the "self-bringing forth of liberty" out of natural necessity. As Hegel notes, "the activity of apprehension brings that to pass which appears as something that is being apprehended" (1974, v.II:197). The very activity of thought brings its own determination into being out of its own nature.

I consider this, then, to be Hegel's *speculative naturalism*: mind emerges out of Nature (material reality) in the self-alienated form of the "self-thinking Idea." The self-elevation of cognition appears at first as a fantastic aberration of self-opposed mind. But, Marx's appropriation of Hegel's category of alienation as the principle of his "historical materialism" indicates the objective character of that fantastic form of appearance in which philosophic cognition arises in the modern world.

This, however, is only the Idea's first *appearance*, for its self-determination achieves a re-unification of subjective and objective, one in which it experiences the freedom of its own realm, and that as its very actuality. The second moment, then, is *further determined* by the *return* of mind out of its actuality—but having fully absorbed the freedom it experienced there—into Nature, which has now fully developed itself into a *social* nature that has yet to become a *fully human reality*.

2.

Because all of Hegel's beginnings in philosophy are so pregnant with their results and intimations of future development, absolute method is indispensable for their comprehension. Hegelian dialectics has so fully absorbed the Aristotelian, Cartesian, Kantian and empirical methods, as those rare moments in the history of philosophy when cognition grasps totality as a new way of knowing, that we truly become witness to a Promethean act of recreation in Hegel's *Logic*, right from the beginning.

The reciprocal transition of Being into Nothing disclosing the dialectic of Becoming, at the beginning of the *Logic*, is the self-winding circle of the concrete-Universal in its most abstract moment of appearance and comprehension. Hegel's beginning of the *Logic* is Eve Yesie's "turning in the widening gyre" in which "the center cannot hold." For flowing from it is the movement of the *Logic* and its presupposition in the *Phenomenology*. From the same source, the dialectic progresses by a kind of *fore-grounding*.

of itself into its beginning as it advances to the absolute Idea, which is its true, concrete beginning. From the same *source*, as ending, the dialectic of consciousness progresses by *back-grounding* itself into the sensuous and spiritual world. Absolute Knowledge, upon attaining concrete certainty of itself, *turns* to the realm of its absolute existence, as pure thought, in the *Logic*. The *Phenomenology* is the *Logic's* "creative presupposing" of itself as living cognition.

The *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* are the twin dialectics set in motion by the cataclysm in thought which Hegel begins the *Logic* with, i.e., the collision of the absolute indeterminacies of Being and Nothing. The collision of these absolute indeterminacies (Being and Nothing) gives birth to a universe of thought in "the absolute movement of becoming" (Hegel 1974, v.II:228). With Hegel's discernment of this ceaseless movement of the dialectic, he has gone further than Democritus and Aristotle, as well as all the ancient materialist philosophies, for he has created a whole philosophic universe out of the collision of the thought-determinations of their philosophies of Nature.

Just as Being and Nothing reciprocally interpenetrate one another, as manifestations of Aristotle's *energeia*, so the beginnings and endings of the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* mutually return out of each other. However, it is the *Logic* which mediates the *Phenomenology* and *Philosophy of Mind*. Logic divides itself in two—objective and subjective logic. Objective logic is the ground of essential being for phenomenological thought or understanding, and subjective logic is the notional ground for philosophic cognition. It is the objective world or rather the thought-determinations of the objective world which elevates understanding to the standpoint of the Notion. It is the subjective mind or the thought-determinations of the spiritual realm which further elevates cognition to objective, and finally to absolute mind.

In a certain sense, the *Phenomenology* is cognition's metaphysical *spiriting away* of Nature in order to gain absolute certainty of itself in its own realm; however, not by ending the dialectic development with absolute Knowledge, but rather through positing the point of departure wherein its labor must first begin. The full force and momentum of cognition is gathered for yet a deeper "thought-diving" into the Absolute.

The *Phenomenology* and the two logics (objective and subjective) of the *Science of Logic* are re-cast in encyclopedic form, this time transposed. Mind presupposes Logic through the mediation of Nature. Hegel formulates the process by which these three separate categories come together in the universal form of the *Encyclopedia*:

"... the unity of the Notion which is absolute existence, makes its appearance as necessity, and it presents itself first as the unity of self-consciousness and consciousness, as pure thought. The unity of existence as existence is objective unity, thought, as that which is thought. But unity as Notion, the implicitly universal negative unity, time as absolutely fulfilled time, and in its fulfillment as being unity, is pure self-consciousness. Hence, we see it come to pass, that pure self-consciousness makes itself reality, but, at the same time, it first of all does so with subjective significance as a self-consciousness that has taken up its position as such, and that separates itself from objective existence, and hence is first of all subject to a difference which it does not overcome" (Hegel 1974, v.II:228).

This self-conscious subjectivity, having absorbed the logical principle through the mediation of Nature, has once again to set forth on its journey to overcome and absorb objectivity, i.e., the course of subjective mind's phenomenological development through the social and political realm of objective mind to reach absolute mind. That Hegel closes the 1827 edition of the *Philosophy of Mind* with the primacy of the logical principle and the intimation of future "appearances" of mind turning to the objective world for new content, gave Hegel's closure the appearance of an *open-endedness* in

which dialectics reaches only halfway into reality and there settles for a ceaselessness that is "Not so much a reality as a never ending process of actualization" (Geraets 1984:37). Hegel's 1830 reworking of the closure as a syllogistic movement gives the ceaselessness of the dialectic of negativity a concrete existence by establishing the self-thinking foundation of the Idea, as the new beginning from itself. Thus, the absolute negativity of Hegel's doctrine of Being (Becoming) has been transformed into a doctrine of absolute beginning.

Hegel states that without the splitting brought about by Nature, Mind is an undifferentiated unity of subjective/objective. Moreover, understanding and phenomenological mind become objects of cognition just as the thought-determinations found in the *Logic*. The statement, "theoretical knowledge and that which comes to be known are the same," refers to Mind containing both understanding as theoretical or absolute knowledge and the objective development of its determinations of thought as logic (Hegel 1974, v.II:197).

Alienated from Nature and objective reality these two modes of cognition constitute the "self-thinking Idea" only implicitly. The second moment is that of Nature itself; a material or practical reality which is as self-contained as the alienated world of pure thought. As such, it implies its opposite, its other, as an indwelling potentiality, so that thinking and its thought-forms exist *within* it, but not yet as the moment of philosophic comprehension. The turning point is not reached until thinking, as a potentiality, reflects on itself, takes itself seriously as its own object and *nature*, i.e., has the certainty of itself by possessing itself as a *living idea*. It is then that the dialectic of thought comes into being, becomes actual, and begins its laborious task of raising mind out of its immersion in Nature and into its own realm of "self-knowing reason." Transition is the determination of Nature, and is, therefore, a transition from one immersion into another.

The Idea, then, is not only implicit in Nature, but the logical Idea as method is implicit in Mind, so long as the actuality of thought is arrested, i.e., so long as reason has not gained certainty of itself by demonstrating its own unfolding. In other words, so long as Mind is absorbed in Nature (is determined by practice alone), Logic is sunk in mind, as its potential and unelicited power. Method remains the indwelling power of the Idea's path to itself. Hegel's point, and it is why Marx refers to the *Phenomenology* as his greatest contribution, is that this Promethean self-lifting of the Idea out of its natural condition demands a *break-through*, as prelude, which both illuminates in a flash the outline of a new universal stage of cognition for a new epoch, and is the concrete manifestation of it.

The *Phenomenology* is Hegel's original emancipatory "unchaining of the dialectic" (Dunayevskaya 1982:XXIII-XXIV). It is very much more than an "introduction" to the system. Its necessary relationship to the structure and movement of Hegelian philosophy, i.e., necessary as an unchaining, becomes Hegel's first distinguishing of his Idea of Philosophy from all past and contemporary philosophy. Just as Hegel differentiated his dialectic of negativity from Plato's and Kant's dialectics in the absolute Idea of the *Science of Logic*, so he differentiated the final result of his *Philosophy of Mind* from that of Aristotle and Descartes. That is, Hegel distinguishes the concrete-Universal of his absolute Mind from the Concrete Universal of Aristotle's scientific (empirical) mind and from the rationality of Descartes. The latter distinction represents the closure of philosophy, as systems of logical and phenomenological sciences, while the former distinction signals Hegel's new "unchaining of the dialectic" as the final act of his philosophic labors.

3.

The "close" of philosophy is, for Hegel, equally a syllogism, i.e., a syllogistic resolution of the contradiction between two totalities, thought and reality. Indeed, closure and syllogism have the same German root, "schluss."

That Hegel met his death while in the middle of his tenth course of lectures on the Philosophy in 1831 is a fact not without significance for comprehending the final result of his philosophy. Hegel considers the science of cognition to begin with the history of philosophy. That he dispenses with his famous precaution at the beginning of the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* concerning introductions to science, and thus provides us with an open view of the whole course of philosophy as he came to conceive it in his lectures on the History of Philosophy, suggests that we need to reconsider the significance of Hegel's *historical* exposition of the science of philosophy. That becomes particularly decisive for questions concerning Hegel's final result in absolute Mind.

Why did Hegel re-work the end of his philosophy syllogistically the year before his death, after he had already discarded the syllogistic ending to the first (1817) edition in the second (1827) edition of the *Encyclopedia*? In 1827, it is the logical principle that has primacy as mind elevates itself to the Logic, whereas in the 1830 edition Mind is the element into which the (logical) Idea raises itself.

As we saw, there is only one sense in which it could be stated that the movement is one *from spirit to logic* by way of "elevation." That is when spirit (mind) is phenomenological and ends in a Golgotha, from which it elevates itself into the ether of pure thought, the Notion. This is the final result arrived at in the second edition (1827), where Hegel had not worked out a syllogistic ending which would be an open ending. What had not been worked out was the *nature* of the transcendence of the second syllogism.

What must be noted first is that this elevation (1827) has gone no further than the first moment of the second syllogism, or is only the second premise (i.e., the first premise of the second moment) of the whole movement. As such, it is the absolute negativity of the phenomenology of mind; a phenomenological totality whose transcendence is an "objective movement" resulting in a new beginning in the objective logic. In this completed state, however, it is a "half-way dialectic," in which inheres also the retrogression of the Third Attitude to Objectivity, as expressed in the intuitionism of Jacobi.

What is necessary to grasp is that Hegel's new comprehension of absolute mediation as the determination of the second syllogism (Nature-Mind-Logic) led him to a conception of the movement as one *from logic to mind*, as against the 1827 movement, from mind to logic. The ramifications of the new 1830 development is two-fold. First, the movement of the second syllogism is no longer an "elevation" or a transition, because, secondly, the second syllogism (para. 376) is the absolute mediation of the whole syllogistic movement, and, as such, contains the dual movement of mind's elevation to logic (the phenomenological moment of thought) and logic's free release into Mind and Nature (the philosophical moment of cognition). Through this movement the Idea attains a new result, a new concretization, one which breaks through the syllogistic form itself to establish a new foundation. It is a movement, as well, which Hegel had already singled out in the absolute Idea of the *Science of Logic* as "a mediation of a kind that does not belong to a comprehension by means of thinking," but rather is "the demand for the realization of the Notion" (Hegel 1976:828).

Thus, the so-called third syllogism is a totally new kind of comprehension of the Absolute. The 1817 and 1827 editions of the *Philosophy of Mind* represent a closure of the philosophical sciences. That this is not the case in 1830 can be seen in the transformation of the (logical) Idea into the Idea of Philosophy, which makes its *appearance* in the form of the sciences of the universal extremes, Nature and Mind.

Questions concerning Hegel's ending of the *Encyclopedia* go as far back as its first public appearance in 1817. Hermann Friedrich Kirrachs, the first of Hegel's disciples to teach his philosophy at a German university (Heidelberg), noted in a letter to Hegel in

1819 that "the opinion is current . . . that you purposely left the last paragraph of *Encyclopaedia* obscure, and that, as is being said, you conceived it ambiguously. It is in particular the term 'immediately' in the last line of the last paragraph which is giving much trouble. Some would like to replace it with 'mediated.' Although I am convinced the (logical) idea is knowledge remaining immediately by itself, very many people believe that, because in science spirit expresses itself as the truth of logic and nature, it is only in your philosophy that the Absolute has comprehended itself" (Hegel 1984:476-7).

In the surviving fragment of Hegel's letter to Hinrichs in the summer of 1819 not only did he respond to the question of immediacy/mediation in the final syllogism, but Hegel addresses the question of the philosopher/Philosophy relationship. He writes:

" . . . there was no choice but to read 'mediated' instead of 'immediately.' But mediation lies in the expression 'determinateness,' which indeed is nothing else. With regard to the other matter, namely that the conception arises that the Absolute has first comprehended itself only in my philosophy, there would be much to say. Briefly, however, in speaking of my philosophy. For every philosophy is the self-comprehension of the Absolute. Philosophy therefore is the comprehension of nothing alien. Comprehension of the Absolute is thus in fact the Absolute's comprehension of itself . . ." (Hegel 1984:478).

Though Hinrich's view was that the logical principle predominates as the definitive closure of the 1817 *Encyclopaedia*, and that conception persists through the 1827 *Encyclopaedia* even though Hegel dispenses with the syllogistic ending, nevertheless, what is new in the 1830 conception is that once the logical idea has become a principle of mind, through the mediation of Nature (practice), i.e., once subjectivity has absorbed the objectivity of the self-determination of the Idea, the Idea *appears* not only as the self-judging manifestation of Nature and Mind, but as the self-bringing forth of freedom grown into the permanent nature of absolute Mind.

That is to say, the actuality of freedom does not mean that the dialectic has come to a halt, rather absolute negativity is the guarantee of its ceaseless "movement and development." Moreover, the theoretical/practical context for the further development of the Idea has disclosed absolute negativity as having grown so much into the permanent character of subjectivity that the absolute moments of the Idea experience the immanent break down of this, their structural context, into *movements* from theory and from practice.

The Idea of Philosophy surely cannot be ideologically dissipated in the career of the philosopher, nor can the *life* of Philosophy be closed off as a world apart. If it is to become reality, philosophy's task must be to *project* itself, to make the sphere of its freedom actual.

Thus, the final result of the Hegelian dialectic is its determination *to be* as the realization and new beginning of "epochs of social revolution" (Marx 1973). In fact, the final syllogism is not a syllogism at all. Discerning *what* its determinacy actually is is made difficult by the fact that it is not a determination but a *reality*.

The final syllogism is the determination of determination, in the fullness of time, in the same manner that the absolute Idea is the comprehension of comprehension—absolute Method. As such, absolute determination is the sublation of determinacy, as absolute Mind "sets itself to work" engineering a *new human dimension, a new human reality*. This "new humanism" is the final result of the Hegelian dialectic, and has as its foundation the ceaseless movement of absolute negativity. It not only makes its appearance in "epochs of social revolution," but "has also a *subjective aspect*, which is merely another form of it. This is *the relationship of the philosophical system* which is

realized to its intellectual carriers, to the individual self-consciousness in which its progress appears" (Marx 1976, vol I:85). It appears in the form of the Party.

4.

It was Marx's preoccupation with this problematic in the context of the absolutism of German reality which underlaid his treatment of the principle of self-determination in Epicurean natural philosophy. Marx recognized that the foundation of the relationship of totality to actuality lay in Hegel's concept of absolute negativity. For Marx, the course along which the moments of this relationship develops is: from the process of growth, to the moment of determination, to the moment of negation which arises out of the negativity of determinateness, and is the "subjective point" of concentration of philosophy.

It was in Hegel's concept of totality that Marx saw that philosophic retrospection was not only for methodological purposes, but carried as well the historic necessity to become the philosophic perspective for totally liberating reality. Though he had not discovered the proletariat as the historic subject to realize this imperative, Marx, in his *Dissertation*, began to found his critique of Hegel's philosophic totality and the absolutism of German reality on the principal turning point of Hegel's absolute idea.

Two methodological categories arise in Marx's *Epicurean Notebooks* and *Dissertation* on Epicurean natural philosophy which are decisive in Marx's original comprehension of Hegel's absolute negativity. The first category Marx identifies as the moment of philosophy turning to and ultimately against existing reality. The second was Marx's contention that "from the specific manner of this turn we can reason back towards the immanent determination and the universal historic character of a philosophy" (1976, vol I:85). The subjectivity upon which these concentric revolutions in philosophy is grounded, i.e., the process through which philosophic retrospection becomes philosophic perspective, Marx describes as:

"... the theoretical mind, once liberated in itself, turns into practical energy, and, leaving the shadowy empire of Amethes as will, turns itself against the reality of the world existing without it . . . But the practice of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the critique that measures the individual existence by the essence, the particular reality by the Idea" (1976:85).

Marx's emphasis on the turning of philosophy, its revolution, to reality in the *Dissertation* concentrates on the splitting of philosophy into the subjective tendencies of two parties. The diremption of philosophic totality occurs as a consequence of its "urge to realize itself." Driven by the determinate character of its totality having become concrete in-itself, philosophy's inner self-contentment and completeness (is) broken. What was inner light has become consuming flame turning outwards. The result is that as the world becomes philosophical, philosophy also becomes worldly . . ." (1976, v.I:85-7).

In the section of his *Notebooks* which corresponds to this moment in his *Dissertation*, Marx's stress, however, is more on the moment of second negativity, i.e., the moment of positing the new. Moreover, it is here that Marx singles out, most concretely, philosophic retrospection as inseparable from positing the new:

"... philosophy casts its regard behind it . . . when its heart is set on creating a world; but as Prometheus, having stolen fire from heaven, begins to build houses and to settle upon the earth, so philosophy, expanded to be the whole world, turns against the world of appearance. The same now with the philosophy of Hegel" (1976, v.I:491).

What is also arrived at in this "turn-about of philosophy," this revolution in philosophy, is the self-development of the individual.

"The world embracing a philosophy need in itself a revolution a world new apart. The philosophy's activity therefore also appears torn apart and contradictory; its objective universality is turned back into the subjective form of individual consciousness in which it has life."

Marx then declares that "He who does not acknowledge the historical necessity must be consistent and deny that man can live at all without a world philosophy . . ." (1976, v.I:491).

As the conclusion of his argument against those "Hegelians who understood our master wrongly," Marx posed the methodological perspective needed to comprehend the "immanent determination and world-historical character" of the Hegelian dialectic. We catch, here, in embryo, the basic outline of the "new continent of thought and revolution" that Marx's *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844 would signal when he broke from bourgeois society and saw the subjectivity of the proletariat rather than that of the philosopher, as "(philosophy's) transubstantiation into flesh and blood." The process of "Reasoning back from the determinate character of this turn-about" of philosophy, as retrospective continuity at the moment of discontinuity, of being "torn apart," allowed Marx, methodologically, to re-articulate Hegel's Idea of Philosophy "from the specific manner of this turn-down to its subjective point." In other words, "What formerly appeared as growth is now determination, what was negativity existing in itself has now become negation . . . philosophy in its most concentrated expression, epitomized in its subjective point . . ." (1976, v.I:493).

5.

That this "subjective point" to which philosophy is concentrated is but the concrete manifestation of absolute negativity was proven further by Lenin's encounter with Hegel's *Science of Logic*, 70 years after Marx's study led him to found a "new humanism." When Lenin noted that no sooner had Hegel begun to develop the Practical Idea than subject became synonymous with the Notion, Lenin, standing on the threshold of the Russian Revolution and confronting Hegel's absolute Idea, experienced a "shock of recognition" (Dunayevskaya 1982:95-120). It signalled a break in Lenin's thought, one which he marked with the aphorism: "Man's cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it." Nevertheless, he was so taken with having found that the idealist Hegel had, at this point, underscored the primacy of *practice* over the theoretical Idea, that what Lenin goes on to develop is:

"The notion (= man), as subjective, again presupposes an otherness which is in nature independent of man. This notion (= man) is the *impulse* to realize itself, to give itself objectivity in the objective world through itself, and to realize (fulfill) itself.

"In the theoretical idea (in the sphere of theory) the subjective notion (cognition?), as the universal and in and for itself indeterminate, stands opposed to the objective world, from which it obtains determinate content and fulfillment.

"In the practical idea (in the sphere of practice) this notion as the actual (acting?) stands opposed to the actual.

"The self-certainty which the subject (here suddenly instead of 'Notion') has in its being in and for itself, as a determinate subject, is a certainty of its own actuality and of the *non-actuality* of the world. (i.e., that the world does not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity.)" (Lenin 1976, V.38:212-3)

The suddenness which Lenin felt Hegel had begun to use subject interchangeably with Notion was due to the fact that there occurs a spontaneous break in the Idea at the

point when it achieves a new comprehensiveness and new self-determination. In the transition to the absolute Idea, Hegel concludes, at this stage, that "the actuality found as given is at the same time determined as the rational absolute end, but whereas in preceding cognition the actuality appeared merely as an objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, here it appears as an objective world whose inner ground and actual substance is the Notion" (Hegel 1976:82).

The error that Hegel's transition is sudden, once we have entered onto the ground of the practical Idea, is due to our having forgotten that as each stage of the Idea's unfolding reaches a turning point the dialectic leaps ahead, not as to something alien and outside itself, and thus having only the appearance of a newness, but rather as what is unobscurely present in the actual.

Therefore, when we are fully conscious that the turning point is reached within the absolute Idea, Hegel informs us that this moment "is the simple point of the negative relation to self, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublation of the opposition between Notion and reality, and the unity that is truth." This moment of second negativity, furthermore, is "the innermost, most objective moment of life and spirit, through which a subject, a free being, exists" (Hegel 1976:835-6).

6.

The articulation of Raya Dunayevskaya's discernment of absolute negativity at this turning point of the twenty-seven paragraphs of the absolute Idea in the *Science of Logic* profoundly anticipates the syllogistic result of Hegel's absolute Mind in the 1830 edition of the *Encyclopaedia*. The development of the Idea has not exhausted itself in its course, but on the contrary has gathered itself through the course of its self-development into the unity of the absolute Idea. Concentrating there the indwelling power to sunder itself anew, the absolute Idea appears as a two-fold movement from theory and from practice. The category of the absolute Idea, thus, is split asunder, according to Dunayevskaya (Dunayevskaya 1986). For, not only does "the highest opposition" exist between the theoretical and the practical Idea, but their mediation constitutes the method and process of their re-unification. Dunayevskaya discovers the "first principles" of that unification within the Hegelian dialectic itself, and she argues that the "new humanism" of Marx is the fullest articulation of it for the modern capitalist epoch.

Though Marx's "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" breaks off at para. 384 of the *Philosophy of Mind*, before he presents "why Hegel separates thinking from the subject," nevertheless, Dunayevskaya holds that "what Marx is . . . saying is that the total dichotomy between the philosophic world, where alienations are 'transcended,' and the actual world, where they are as big as life, is proof enough that the philosophic world is bereft of practice, that existence does not enter the world of essence" (1982:58).

It is the concreteness of individual cognition, "purified of everything that interferes with its universalism, i.e., with freedom itself," which gives thought its power of "self-judging of the Idea." The new philosophic foundation Marx discovered through his dual confrontation with the crisis in German reality and the Hegelian dialectic led to the following anomaly, according to Dunayevskaya:

" . . . the very idea of taking up the birth of 'positive Humanism' as the result of the second negation, after communism, in defense of Hegel against Feuerbach . . . is truly phenomenal. Here is Marx, who had already broken with the Young Hegelians, and is sharply antagonistic to Hegel's abstractions which cover up the loopholes in his theory of alienation. Marx holds that Hegel reduces

transcendence to accommodation with the irrational world he calls Hegel's key concept of *Otherness*, of observing objectivity, nothing short of the "use of his principles." Here Marx finally stands Hegel "right side up" after having parted ways with him in the analysis of the actual world. And yet it is at this fork in the road of philosophy "as such," that he turns to praise Hegel for his "insight expressed within alienation . . . into the actual appropriation of his objective essence through its transcendence in its alienated existence." (1982:38-9).

In her rigorous exposition of the 27 paragraphs of the absolute Idea, presented before the Hegel Society of America in 1974, Dunayevskaya argues that a "new stage of cognition" is the energizing principle in the three syllogistic subdivisions of the absolute Idea, which appear as the following moments: (1) absolute Method, (2) second negativity, and (3) the Absolute as self-liberation.

The attainment of the self-transcendence of Hegel's logical system as the final result of the syllogistic movement of the absolute Idea, Dunayevskaya deduces in the "final syllogism" of absolute Mind. What is new, in her conception, is the deduction of Hegel's transcendence of the logical system in absolute Mind from the completed totality of the *Logic* itself, i.e., from "absolute negativity as the transcending mediation." In other words, the objectivity of the final result of absolute Idea, when worked out syllogistically, illuminates Hegel's re-working of the ending of absolute Mind in 1830. It is also an illumination which reveals Hegel's transcendence of his own system.

If Dunayevskaya has discerned the self-transcendence of the Hegelian system from the vantage point of her conception of *absolute Idea as new beginning*, then it represents the system's *absolute proof*: absolute because it discloses cognition's "determination to mediate itself with itself, and thereby—by the mediation being at the same time the abrogation of mediation—it is immediacy" (Hegel 1974, V.III: 229-30).

This not only provides the necessary ground for Dunayevskaya's projection of absolute negativity as new beginning, but, in turn, grounds the *necessity* for making a new beginning in thought and in reality, on the basis of a "new stage of cognition." That necessity is derived from what Hegel called the "inner ground and actual subsistence of the Notion" which reaches for the future, a "successor in its conclusion" (1976:842). The dialectical proof flowing from the logical sequence is equally the historical consequence. Because the imperative of grasping each stage of transcendence from a new vantage point actually comes from within, and follows from "the *objectivity* of the drive (and) *summation* in which the advance is immanent in the present," thought "breaks through the barriers of the given, reaches out, if not to infinity, surely beyond the historic moment" (Dunayevskaya 1977:12).

This self-determination of the Idea is, I believe, what the late Black revolutionary thinker, Frantz Fanon, meant when he referred to the self-determination of the Third World as "an original idea propounded as an absolute" (1968:12; Turner and Alan 1986). That "original idea" he held to be a "new humanism." It is in this light that I hope the present essay is interpreted as a way to expand the discussion of the Hegelian dialectic, in an age which displays more of a tendency for sociology than for Philosophy.

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**THE FETISH OF HIGH TECH:
Marx's *Mathematical Manuscripts* vs. "Computer Consciousness"**

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Introduction

The fetish of high tech is especially strong in the San Francisco Bay Area. The region's aura drew an inordinate amount of attention in the 1984 election from each of the candidates on the presidential tickets. The candidates were hoping some of the magic of Silicon Valley would rub off on them as they tied the hope for the future to high tech. These illusions were fed anew by the Reagan "recovery" even though the economists had to coin a new phrase for this "recovery." That phrase, "growth recession," means economic growth with recession level unemployment. In this "recovery" Reagan's massive buildup of state intervention in the economy in the form of militarization was coupled with talk of winning a nuclear war. The close connection between militarization and technological innovation is not new. Indeed, the first computer was built during World War II to drastically reduce the time it took to compute ballistics. Even the first so-called high-level language for business, COBOL, was a Department of Defense project (Spence 1982). However, the total threat posed by the present buildup makes the fetish of high tech everyone's concern.

Reagan chose the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland to repeat his election year quip, "high tech, not high taxes." Concretely that has meant Reagan's persistent promotion of his Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"). SDI gives computers a bigger role in the decision making process that can push us over the nuclear precipice. A new group of computer professionals claims that SDI means yet another scenario for bringing about the nuclear holocaust. They are worried about the inevitable "bug" in SDI computer programs (Radell and Nelson 1985).

Reagan is pushing to the limit a policy where "economics and military policies constitute a single spirit" (Rothschild 1984). As opposed to Japan with its 10 year program which will be civilian, the focus of so-called "artificial intelligence" in the U.S. is military and is redirecting the computer science resources at universities throughout the country. The Department of Defense is struggling with the Department of Commerce to put an iron curtain around Silicon Valley's exports because the civilian advances in high tech have outstripped the military. There is dislike for the military in the personal computer industry which has its roots in an organization founded by anti-draft organizers (Siegel 1984). But when giant IBM, which predominates in the computer capital goods market, decided to penetrate this last niche of entrepreneurship, the shakeout had already started. It extended to even threaten those original makers of the personal computer at Apple. The recession has made the military's attempt to control all aspects of high tech easier. Now they are tapping into the huge pool of newly unemployed talent in Silicon Valley (Markoff 1985).

Another aspect of high tech's total threat comes from new initiatives outside of the military. These initiatives will result in even more massive unemployment on the other side of this "recovery." GM is the big new name in the world of computer programmers. That is true not only because they acquired Electronic Data Systems Inc. of Dallas but because they plan to use their clout in the capital goods market to reorganize the whole field. GM is the country's largest user of computers outside of the Federal government. The new concept they are pushing, MAP (machine automation protocol), is touted as a "universal organizing principle." MAP's goal is to eliminate up to 120,000 workers in the next two years by making all the programmable devices on the shop floor communicate with each other. (Stix 1984).

The fetish of high tech and the illusion that technological innovation can be neutral in a capitalist society is unfortunately part of the thinking of many of those opposed to this society. Marx left us a lifetime of revolutionary praxis which included a critique of science as the factory. Viewed from that perspective Marx's 1880 *Mathematical Manuscripts*, a critique of that specific branch of science, speaks sharply to today's reality. That reality has engendered many studies of high tech's connection with militarization and structural unemployment. The view taken in this paper is that in order to get beyond the fetish of high tech it is not enough to expose these connections. The focus here is to search for a solution through the structure of concrete activity.

The Fetish of High Tech and Capitalism's Division of Labor Today

Computer programming demands great mental energy, tortuously tracked into narrow channels. You become painfully aware of your thought being tied to the capacities of the machine. The machine is limited to those dimensions of thought that can be mechanized, i.e., reduced to a formal logic. Formal logic is what can be parodied in the millions of on/off switches that make up the micro chips of the computer. Right now computers are limited to a highly restrictive syntax which bridges the gap between it and everyday language. Knowledge of the syntax is the expert's basis. Each computer program, even if badly written, creates its own specialized syntax, and hence that programmer becomes an instant expert. It is an expertise that is narrowly confined to that particular application. Because of this a huge amount of time is spent documenting a program, i.e., explaining to another programmer what it does.

Programming is the alienation of the very activity of thinking. There is a new aspect to what Marx called the fragmentation of human capacities. Capitalism has discovered new ways to use a certain dimension of thought as a tool. But your own thinking plays no role in directing the process where your thought is used as formal logic. That reduction goes hand in hand with production relations where the purpose for the use of the tool remains as separate as ever from the person using it. Programming perfects thought as mere means; it has no necessary relationship to thinking which determines the goal of an activity. It is easy to confuse the activities of computers with thought when the critical dimension of thought isn't viewed as that which gives human action a direction. That is not the starting point if one accepts that human activity is to be organized around the production of commodities.

The programmer still controls the machine within these narrow limits as opposed to those left in production. In production it is the goal of the program to replace people and to personify the machine to control as completely as possible the people left. Who can forget that during 1983 national AT&T strike it was the operators who were the most militant and raised the most fundamental issues which the settlement didn't address: not only how their numbers had been drastically reduced, but working conditions made worse when the work flow is controlled by computers.

Today's programmers are like the craftsmen of the manufacturing period who built the first large scale machines. The overall tendency was their complete demise as large scale machinery was built to recreate itself. In the early period of a revolution in production, however, the capitalists aggressively seized upon these craftsmen in a process which converts the worker into a crippled monstrosity by furthering his particular skill as in a forcing house, though the suppression of a whole world of productive drives and inclinations" (Marx 1976:481).

The way in which the totally dedicated data processing professional becomes monstrously crippled (nerds) is well known as a personality distortion. It is often the price paid for such intense singling out of abstract formal logic as everyday human activity. As the supposed truth of thought abstracted from life, Hegel called formal logic the "height

of self-estrangement." It was dismissed, wrote Hegel, as "mere pedantry, of no further use either in practical life or in science," soon after its discovery because the "study of Logic is no more necessary to teach us to draw correct conclusions than a previous study of anatomy and physiology is required in order to digest or breath" (1966:para. 183).

But formal logic was resurrected in its most general form, abstracted from all meaning in fusion with mathematics, by Russell and Whitehead in their *Principia Mathematica*. Their work set the ground for the materialization of logic in computers using on/off states to parody a base two number system. Materialized formal logic is self-estrangement intensified because it distorts, way out of proportion, that aspect of thought by tremendously amplifying its capacity. A file is accessed 10,000 times in a few minutes and 100 different actions are taken on the information in there depending on 100 different criteria. Once the program is working on the machine it becomes part of its capability. You are responsible for keeping track of all its ramifications when set in motion.

Capital pays for itself by working and a computer which is down due to software brings heat from many directions. A common nightmare is having many unfamiliar processes turned over to you and being held responsible for getting things going after a crash. Relying on computer processes which often fail, brought out the sharpest opposition from PATCO workers who were accountable for the lives of thousands of people in the air. Many people may depend on software working. The only ones who can get it working after the inevitable crash are programmers.

Programmers in a data processing (DP) shop relate to each other by personifying these blocks of materialized formal logic. Systems have a name and a "personality" that does things on the basis on what it "encounters." The inversion of making "thought" mechanical as something objective with external validity is the alienation of human beings from each other. Intellect is directly linked to the capacities of the machine and the machine is what links people to each other. Marx's view of how contradiction totally infects the capitalist world in an address to British workers in 1856 is a more precise depiction of today's reality: "All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life and in stultifying human life into a material force" (Marx and Engels 1980, vol. 14:656).

The task of directly "endowing material forces with intellectual life" runs up against the limits of formal logic as a way of categorizing the world. Information about things keeps growing and, whatever the machine's capacities, it is exhausted. There are always new aspects of things or people needed as part of the complete picture. The real world is ever demanding even greater precision from the computer record of particular length and made up of discrete units of information. Because it is an external way of connecting something to a more general category through particular aspects, Hegel said totality would always elude formal logic because a thing is infinite in qualities.

It is not those infinite qualities, however, which drive capitalism's obsession with replacing people with machines. Rather, it is a completely phantom "quality" of things issuing out of commodity production, the amount of labor time "in" them, which looms larger than life in today's reality and in the data DP is concerned with. That includes computer programs themselves where the goal of "artificial intelligence," aside from the military, is to accelerate software productivity.

Of course one of the most diverse aspects of the real world is the infinite variety and nuances of meaning in everyday language. The incompleteness of the present revolution is reflected in the constant proliferation of new computer languages. Each language has its own arbitrary syntax to learn, spinning off new cadres of "experts," and new jokes

about the latest buzzwords. New languages arise with big claims to have bridged the gap between syntax and real world meanings. Just to "translate" they use a lot of the machine's capacity, a capacity which changes constantly as new technological innovation stores information even more microscopically. But what they reveal is both a language reduced to the machine's capacity as well as that capacity itself stripped of the mystifying syntax. The automating of programming itself has gone far enough so that already it is very difficult to get an entry level programming position.

Marx described this process where capitalism constantly revolutionizes production, creating new extremes to the fragmentation of the human being while keeping in reserve great masses of people in misery to be thrown from one industry to another, as an "absolute contradiction." Because these constant revolutions in production produce ever new forms of the old ossified division of labor, Marx added that the only positive aspect to this "absolute contradiction" is the emergence of the "totally developed individual" (1976:618). We will gain an appreciation of Marx's concept of the totally developed individual from Marx's own multidimensionality. Not separate from his focus on overcoming capitalist reality, Marx returned to criticize science in the particular form of mathematics in the 1880's.

Marx's *Mathematical Manuscripts* and the "Veil of Obscurity" Over Today's Mathematics


In his own day Marx continually demonstrated that all science was incorporated into the machine as a weapon against the laborer. This process of science arising out of the need to discipline labor in production hadn't differentiated to the point where mathematics was directly the form of science's role as it is in the second industrial revolution of today. Marx's own digging into mathematics as a separate science in the 1880's, however, casts illumination of problems of today. What Marx was subjecting to critical scrutiny was differential calculus, tracing the root of over 200 years of confusion in Newton's and Leibniz's original creation of calculus. Newton was the supreme materialist proclaiming *Hypotheses non fingo* (I assume no hypotheses). He considered thought speculation to be separate from the external truths of the physical world which he viewed as one big machine. Indeed, the very title of Newton's epochal work, *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, shows how intertwined were his views of mathematics and natural philosophy.

He created calculus to find the common ground for the phenomena of gravity pulling things back to the earth and the motion of the planets. That ground was for Newton the rate of change of velocity. But what Marx criticized was his mathematics. Marx had long before called science "a priori a lie" when it has a basis separate from life. What he felt compelled to return to criticize near the end of his life was the development of a field most directly based on the force of thought itself. Newton's very eagerness to get to the result was at the cost of rigor in mathematics from which that field hadn't fully recovered as Marx was investigating it in the 1880's (1983).

The use of the result of differentiation, a new way of viewing the original equation from which it was derived, has never been questioned in its ability to reveal something new. It is the process which has been mystified over the centuries. Marx characterizes the process of its derivation as negation of the negation which was hidden in the mystifying methods of mathematics because they could not conceive how something could come out of nothing. Marx insists the process of differentiation came out of "ordinary algebra" (1983:113). In particular, it originated in Newton's own binomial theorem (1983:112). Newton was not concerned with any continuity in the development of the idea from algebra to calculus. Marx writes that with both founders of calculus (Newton and Leibniz) "all of their intelligence was concentrated on" the value of derived expressions as "operational formulae" (1983:78).

Thought, reduced to mere "operational formulae" by Newton, produced startling results while the process was thoroughly mystified. Marx credits Lagrange, a century later, with establishing the binomial theorem as the "primary basis for differential calculus" (1983:109). Lagrange's calculus developed independently out of the inadequacies of the attempts of Taylor and MacLaurin to establish an algebraic calculus. Marx praises Lagrange for providing a "foundation in pure algebraic analysis" free of Newton's metaphysical transcendence." However, he criticizes Lagrange for "needing one or another of these 'metaphysical' representations himself in the application of his theories . . ." (1983:115). Marx's repeated stress on the need for "pure analysis" is to free math from any notion of theoretic activity as an external tool. Marx's pathway to get to thought's own inner movement was through Hegel's dialectic of negative self-relation. Let us trace this briefly in a concrete example.

Take the equation $y = x^2$ which Marx uses to contrast his method with Newton's (1983:93). On a graph it looks like this:



This equation gives you the value of y for a given value of x . The graph represents each individual value as a point. Taking the derivative proceeds by first viewing a given point dynamically, i.e., in terms of what it isn't, or what it could become, within the whole of this equation. That idea is symbolized by a new value, a change in x , a change completely unspecified with respect to its magnitude, we'll call Δx so that $x + \Delta x$ is a value of x in this equation giving a new value of y to which we have to add an unspecified Δy , or:

$$y + \Delta y = (x + \Delta x)^2$$

Now the original equation has become a relationship between two binomials, $y + \Delta y$ and $x + \Delta x$. What makes these binomials special is that they came out of a negative self-relation in our original expression, $y = x^2$. If we substitute the original value of y , which is x^2 , we get:

$$x^2 + \Delta y = (x + \Delta x)^2$$

Multiply out $(x + \Delta x)^2$ by the rules of ordinary algebra:

$$x^2 + \Delta y = x^2 + 2x \Delta x + \Delta x^2$$

$$\Delta y = 2x \Delta x + \Delta x^2$$

Divide both sides by Δx :

$$\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} = 2x + \Delta x$$

If we undergo a second negation and view our original point x by negating its change, or referring it back to itself and not what it isn't (mathematically making Δx equal to zero), we get:

$$\frac{0}{0} = 2x$$

Now $\frac{\Delta x}{\Delta y} = \frac{0}{0} = 2x$ is the instantaneous rate of change of y per unit x in the original equation. It is a dynamic way to view any given point in the above graph. (For example, when $x = 1$, y is increasing twice as fast as x ; when $x = 50$, y is increasing 100 times as fast as x .) $2x$ is the derived equation which has been given the symbolic name $\frac{dy}{dx}$ and only emerges when Δx is set exactly to nothing.

Marx stresses that what is important is the process and $\frac{dy}{dx}$ is introduced to symbolize that because by itself is meaningless or, as Marx put it: "First making the differentiation and then removing it therefore leads literally to nothing. The whole difficulty in understanding the differential operation (as in negation of the negation generally) lies precisely in seeing how it differs from such a simple procedure and therefore leads to real results" (1983:3). Marx attacks as a "chimera" "the closely-held belief of some rationalizing mathematicians that dy and dx are quantitatively actually only infinitely small, only approaching $\frac{0}{0}$. . ." (1983:5).

It is as if a positive something "out there" had to be invented instead of the self-development of the idea which dx and dy are introduced to represent. In a method that is still taught today Newton got to the equation in the box but in a form which mystified the process. Anticipating the operational formula, which is the end result ($\frac{dy}{dx} = 2x$), Newton decided Δx and Δy are really dx and dy in the form of "infinitely small quantities":

$$dy = 2(dx)x + (dx)^2$$

Contrary to all mathematical rigor, Newton spirited $(dx)^2$ away in a spurious pragmatic maneuver. He claimed that as dx becomes a very small but discrete quantity $(dx)^2$ is even smaller and inconsequential. Then both sides are divided by dx and dx and dy being "infinitely small quantities" resulting in:

$$\frac{dy}{dx} = 2x$$

The point here is not a lesson in mathematics but rather the form of Marx's critique of this most abstract of sciences. Marx's critique stripped "away the veil of obscurity" (1983:109) over mathematics by tracing the self-development of the idea of calculus over 200 years. In particular, Marx was showing how second negativity is no abstraction but the concrete form of development even in the idea of an algebraic equation. Let's look again at the dual rhythm of self-development through negative self-relation. Algebraic calculus is a development in the relationship of individual points or values to the whole algebraic expression. Within a particular expression, i.e., $y = x^2$, neither neighborhoods nor isolated points exist outside of that relationship. The result emerges from the process of negative self-relation when the individual value is viewed strictly in relation to the whole algebraic expression. The negation of "self" begins with making x what it isn't by adding some positive or negative, but unspecified, Δx . The negation (Δx and hence Δy) is in turn negated in a particular form, i.e., the ratio $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}$. The individual value of x is brought back to itself in a new way, $\frac{0}{0} = 2x$. This is a particular $\frac{0}{0}$ which, as we saw in the new equation $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} = 2x$, tells you something new about each individual value in the original equation. Again, in the entire movement there is no need

for neighborhoods (Δx as "infinitely small"). Mathematicians encountered $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} = \frac{0}{0} = 2x$ as a contradiction. Rather than developing a new path for mathematics through this contradiction, they merely tried to circumvent it. Marx concluded that even though you mathematicians have simplified things after 200 years you are not home free because the foundation, the method, was wrong.

Marx's method was a concrete demonstration that negative self-relation is the source of movement and a critical transition in mathematical thought. After his death an opposite foundation for modern math was laid by the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead. They introduced direct reigns on the free development of thought—banishing self reference altogether as a source of contradiction. When self reference is separated from the live human subject as a property of abstract thought, it creates the celebrated paradoxes of mathematics. The simplest is: "This statement is false." Though materialization of formal logic required that information be encoded in discrete, i.e., noncontradictory, on/off states, it was the mathematicians' method of viewing thought as perfectly separated from reality which created the illusion that contradiction could be purged. A "little universe"—elementary number theory—was to be created which was totally consistent. It could definitely be said of any proposition in this universe: it is either true or false. Because content is viewed as totally purged in this kind of logic, form, or proof, is everything.

In 1931 a mathematician, Kurt Godel, proved within the limits of the rules of number theory, or any formal system consistent with ordinary arithmetic, that undecidable propositions exist. He showed that it could never be proved that such a formal system is free of internal contradictions. Leading scientists like John von Neuman, who were pushing computers as the mechanization of thought, saw this as a catastrophe. The real shocker is that this had no effect on the direction of their work, least of all a turn to reevaluate their method in order to work out a human logic. Rather it generated a new round of speculation and debate about the capacities of machines.

The tizzy mathematics is in today is reflected in the ludicrous extreme of this speculation in a popular 1980 work *Godel, Escher, Bach* (Hofstadter 1980). These 742 pages, the author himself writes, "wallow in" (26) the possibility of "artificial intelligence." In this aim it is no further along at the end than at the beginning. From the start Hofstadter accepts the self-limiting limitations of formal logic systems and Godel's proof that the nature of their totality could never be determined from within such systems. A work which purports to be about machines is an ongoing speculation on form and content, the centrality of self reference and contradiction in art, music, and mathematics. This speculation, however, is tied to a central concept the very name of which is mystifying: "strange loops" (Turtle 1984). This work proceeds as though totality can somehow emerge through discrete blocks of externally interrelated formal logic. The mystification of "strange loops" is never any clearer or comes closer to its goal of mixing up what can be materialized through formal logic and thought itself. Thus the end turns to "consciousness" not, however, its own self-movement including the bubble Godel burst of those who put forth such pretension for formal logic. No! Hofstadter turns to "consciousness" which "has been proposed for eons, by various holistically or 'soulistically' inclined scientists and humanists . . . [as] a phenomenon that escapes explanation in terms of brain-components." This "consciousness," he writes, is a "candidate" for something outside of definitely decidable propositions. Definitely decidable propositions, in turn, are relegated to the "hardware" of neural activity with which consciousness has some kind of undeciphered coded "strange loop" (1980:709).

We could laugh heartily at this if we didn't have to return to face today's reality: specifically contradiction not as abstract thought tied to the capacities of machines but

the live human being facing unemployment, alienating work relations and the nuclear precipice. Summarizing the development of post-Newtonian mathematics, Marx reminds us in the *Mathematical Manuscripts* of Hegel's incomplete break with Kant—based on the development of the post-Kantian philosophy which never "investigated the general foundation of Kant, of idealism in general" (1983:113). The development of mathematics from its foundation to today impels a return to the roots of this new industrial revolution in the post World War II world with a view toward Marx's own general foundation which centered negation of the negation on labor. In 1844 Marx insisted that only when you begin with human activity is contradiction in a form "driving toward resolution," a resolution which could transform labor into self-activity and unite the ideal and the real (1980, vol. 3:294).

The Future in the Present: The Post World War II World and Today

World War II came out of the world capitalist collapse of the 1930's. Like today's "growth" through militarization that slaughter was the impulse for the introduction of new technologies. It gave birth to not only the bomb, but the first computer and "cybernetics" in the form of self-aiming anti-aircraft guns.

Not all were uncritical of this technological revolution which emerged out of World War II. There were two fundamentally different ways of dealing with the horrors of this new technological stage. One, which I'll return to, came from the workers actually facing this technology, another from scientists like Norbert Wiener. Wiener invented the term cybernetics and was one of the prime movers of this revolution. He projected in 1950 in *The Human Use of Human Beings* the most dire consequences, raising the question of what is specifically human. Yet he had no vision of what is human development outside of his model for self-development in machines. That model was based on the formal logic of his former teacher, Bertrand Russell.

The closest analogy he achieved in his suggestion that learning might be reduced to the ability to alter taping—i.e., the way a person or machine automatically responds to a given stimulus from the outside—was Pavlovian psychology. As was mentioned above, from a critical perspective, it was Hegel who first projected the kindred relationship between formal logic and autonomic body functions like digestion.

The shock is that today Wiener is still held up as a model for the technological innovation taking responsibility for the consequences of his actions (Heims 1980). A whole generation of intellectuals was drawn to Wiener's work as a vision of the positive possibilities of the new technology. But it is the future horror it projected which became the reality of today—from the "apocalyptic spiral" (1950:175) of the arms race to ". . . an unemployment situation, in comparison with which the present recession and even the depression of the thirties will seem a pleasant joke." (1950:220)

Warning and foreseeing does not mean being able to influence events. Technology out of control is not an abstract question but the concrete experience of work relations under capitalism where the machine dominates you. Historically, the introduction of machines was no mere transition requiring a new moral imperative but was, as Marx shows again and again, the very weapon used against worker revolt. It is centuries of division between mental and manual labor which makes even the most humane scientists see the self-development of the machine as parallel to what is human. Facing the 1984 reality we can no longer afford the luxury of Wiener's view of Cybernetics and Society (his subtitle) as parallel entities. That view of history sees the future from the present as external reality with a life of its own: ". . . For the individual scientist, even the partial appraisal of this liaison between the man and the [historical] process requires an imaginative forward glance at history which is difficult, exacting and only limitedly

achievable . . . We must always exert the full strength of our imagination" (cited in Heims 1980:337).

In spite of this view that the scientist may intervene in the historic process by imagining the impact of his invention far into the future, by now we can see how little impact that imagining has had. But more important is breaking with the method that views development as process which is external. The fetish of high tech reflects the fetishism of commodities where human thought united with action doesn't recreate social reality, but, rather, investigates social reality as something based on the laws of commodity production which are given the status of objective validity. That fetish was not only Karl Marx's own specific critique of the whole of bourgeois thought but also pointed to freely associated labor as the only way to transcend that barrier. The pathway to gaining control over the consequences of the idea began, for Marx, in the immediate structure of human activity.

The future as self-development of the machine is the present for workers. Although programming is alienating activity, programmers still have some control over the pace of work and the way they use their tools. The full anti-human results of computer programming under capitalist production are experienced by others directly. Automation brought programming into manufacture in a big way. The human being in an automated industry is a mere appendage to the machine. The pace and conditions of work are now determined by the self-directed action of the machine. Before even the word "automation" was coined, workers grasped its implications and opposed it in their own spontaneous actions. The U.S. coal miners in 1949-50 staged a general strike which included opposition to the introduction of a machine, the continuous miner, which was the first recorded use of the new automation. Their strike was not only over the impending unemployment. Rather they questioned what has become of the labor process now that the human being was so totally an appendage to this new mechanical monster, ripping through the coal face. Or, as one miner put it: "What kind of labor should man do? Why should there be a division between mental and manual labor?" (Phillips and Dunayevskaya 1984:5). The miners carved out a completely independent path departing from their own leader, John L. Lewis. They took on the company and the state with its new state-capitalist weapon, the Taft-Hartley injunction.

By now the wildcat strikes against automation have swept every industry, showing repeatedly the objectivity of this drive to unite mental and manual labor, as workers' opposition from the beginning was not only against the unemployment caused by the new technology but the new conditions of labor. Yet there has been no bridge from post-Marx Marxists or those who seem to be raising a kindred question like the "human use of human beings" to this form of self-development. In 1949 Wiener did reach out to labor by writing to Walter Reuther, then the head of the UAW. Reuther, as a labor bureaucrat, could only praise the new technology as "progress" he would never oppose. A few short years later, when automation was introduced in auto, the wildcat strikes which swept the industry marked the great divide between the rank-and-file and the labor bureaucrats (Denby 1978).

Look at the Bay Area today, where Freemen workers demonstrated on a baseball field against leaders in their own International Union (UAW). The UAW locked them out of their own union hall in order to clear the way for the new extremely robotized production in the new GM/Toyota plant. Every worker there knew of working conditions in Japanese auto plants described in Satoshi Kamata's book originally called *Toyota: Factory of Despair* which was quoted at length in the local press. One of the workers I met at that demonstration has been permanently displaced (the new robotized plant needs only 3000 workers where 8000 worked before). He is now in a retraining program in electronics which he says isn't for any real job. He added that the

worst part is the "extreme anti-unionism and claims that all the high tech firms don't have unions because they 'take care of their workers,' as though a \$6 an hour job in Silicon Valley is a rosy future. High tech has affected our way of thinking."

Apart from a totally new way of thinking there is no way to escape still greater degenerations produced by a method which views thought as mechanical. Thus the latest idiocy, called "Human Sciences" at Westinghouse, is to use electrodes to track the brain wave p300 to make sure workers are paying attention. This is being touted as an answer to the air traffic controller's strike and the continuing deterioration of work conditions in that field after the destruction of PATCO. It is also put forth as "a key productivity measure for the information age" (Schrage 1984).

At the end of his life, in his *Mathematical Manuscripts*, Marx not only anticipated today's crisis in production but also a new direction to the fetish with his critique of science's attitude toward thought itself. He showed how the science of mathematics itself was thwarted. Nor did we have to wait for a challenge to the methodological foundation of Newton's view of the universe which reigned supreme for over two centuries. That view was finally overthrown by Albert Einstein whose breakthrough was also methodological. He criticized "Newton's fundamental rule '*Hypotheses non fingo*'" and not only made the observer but the thinker a dimension of the truth of the physical world: "We know that science cannot grow out of empiricism alone, that is the construction of science we need to use free invention . . . This fact could elude earlier generations, to whom theoretical creation seemed to grow inductively out of empiricism without the creative influence of a free construction of concepts" (Paris 1982:14). However, it wasn't the new theoretic departure in itself that unleashed the human energy to put $E = mc^2$ into practice. After several decades the first form of its realization was the bomb.

That event raised more sharply than any theoretical discussion the problem of having "one basis for science and another for life." A few weeks before the first A-bomb exploded over Hiroshima, Einstein affirmed in an interview that politically he was a socialist. He added, however, that for his scientific work he felt more affinity with the dialectic of Hegel than that of Marx (Morgan 1985). In opposition to the prevailing view within science, Einstein certainly had an endearing view of philosophy's speculative idea (Dukas and Hoffman 1979:91-92). However, the stark separation within Einstein between his political goals and his theoretical work, demands another look at Marx's relationship to Hegel.

Marx broke with both Feuerbach, the materialist, and Hegel, the idealist. He insisted on beginning not with the thinker in general but with the thinking and doing. As Marx turned in 1844 to focus on labor, he felt Feuerbach missed the importance of "negation of the negation" in Hegel as the "movement of history" (Marx and Engels 1980, vol. 3:329). In his Theses on Feuerbach, Marx further elaborated his preservation of the Hegelian idea in an original way: "Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity as objective activity" (Marx and Engels 1980, vol. 5:3).

What separates the workers striking against automation from intellectuals like Wiener is Marx's own starting point of the idea as it informs activity. The new stage of capitalist production revealed more profoundly capitalism's negative character. In the face of the new automation workers questioned the very nature of human activity under capitalism. Just as the new technology makes physical activity as mechanical and devoid of thought as possible so, too, thought has become as mechanistic as possible, a mere tool, instead of that which gives activity a direction. Marx's *Mathematical Manuscripts* show in a different discipline his opposition to theory based on a duality

between objects of sense and objects of thought as he turned to critique mathematics as a human activity. In so doing he made "negation of the negation" concrete in a new way. The *Mathematical Manuscripts* reveal again Marx's preservation of the Hegelian dialectic.

Today's labor process, where the method of modern math has been so thoroughly infused in capitalist production, speaks to the relevance of the *Mathematical Manuscripts*. What the founders of modern mathematics took from Newton's attitude toward mathematical thought was the reduction of thought to a mere external tool. They also took the assumption that what is rational in thought is free of contradiction and hence free of self reference. Hofstadter reintroduced contradiction and self reference but in a mystifying form. In that way he could continue the focus on the machine's development. He merely amplified illusions about making "conscious" computers. Before the inner development of mechanical principles came into their own, it was common to confuse mechanics with human characteristics. The first locomotive was designed with two feet (Marx 1976:505). Real robots look nothing like the mechanical human shapes that populate science fiction. Rather their form reflects the potentialities of mechanical logic. The fetishism of the "thinking" machine is quite different for the live consciousness which is a dimension of capitalism's concrete human activity. Today's programming as an alienating activity under capitalism is the perfection of thought as a mere tool. On the other hand, the idea as it gives activity a direction was Marx's starting point for critiquing both capitalist production and theoretical mathematics.

It is time to unite thinking with activity, science with life, in a new unity of theory and practice beginning with the objectivity of the drive to become total individuals that emerges out of today's total crisis. As far back as 1843, in his essay "On the Jewish Question," Marx had posed the incompleteness of "political emancipation" and saw the need for "declaring the revolution to be permanent" to reach the "individual human being . . . in his everyday life, in his particular work, and his particular situation" and thereby accomplish "human emancipation." In the section on "Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret" in *Capital*, Marx makes the particular barrier to emancipation explicit. There Marx isolates the concrete form of human activity that mystifies human relation to nature and to each other. "Whence, then, arises," wrote Marx, "the enigmatic character of the product of labor, as soon as it assumes the form of a commodity? Clearly, it arises from this form itself." (Marx 1976:164). People are related to the social whole and to each other through this particular thing, reproducing a false attitude to objectivity in bourgeois thought. In seeing through the fetish Marx's philosophy of revolution in permanence is concrete. The self-development of the idea and revolution are inextricably bound together. The full development of science will come only with the full emancipation of the human being.

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ELEANOR MARX IN CHICAGO, 1886:
REVOLUTIONARY FEMINISM AND THE HAYMARKET CENTENARY

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Nineteen eighty-six marks not only the hundredth anniversary of the Haymarket events in Chicago, Illinois, but the visit of Eleanor Marx, Karl Marx's daughter, to that city as the most important stop on her tour of the U.S. That these two events—Haymarket and Eleanor Marx's visit—had an impact on each other is a fact that is unfortunately missing from the celebrations marking the 100 years since Haymarket. It is certainly time—a century after the event—to begin a discussion of her trip, not because Eleanor Marx makes an interesting footnote to Haymarket, but because we have much to learn from her as a revolutionary feminist who greatly illuminates the inseparability of women from revolution. Eleanor Marx, whose attempts to carry out Karl Marx's direction to go "lower and deeper" into the masses, as well as her own original contribution to what was then called "the woman question," speaks to today's movement in a way that demands a closer look at her life and work.

There is no better place to start, on this hundredth anniversary year, than with the American tour she made in 1886. For what Eleanor Marx brought to America was a demand for genuine internationalism that would have nothing to do with the chauvinism of all too many of the German socialists who viewed U.S. workers as backward. She brought with her a deepening of the fight for the eight-hour day, her unique concept of revolutionary feminism and her practice of genuine Marxism.

What was inspiring everyone at that moment in history was the movement in the U.S. of rank-and-file workers, women and men, fighting for the eight-hour day—a struggle which took off after the end of the Civil War with what Karl Marx called "the seven-league boots of the locomotive." Even the anarchists, who disagreed with the movement for the eight-hour day, were swept along because, as Albert Parsons, one of the Haymarket martyrs, explained: "We did not choose to stand aloof and be misunderstood by our fellow workers" (cited in Foner 1977:102).

Because of this powerful agitation from below, the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions (later to become the AF of L) made two motions at their international convention in 1884. The first established Labor Day. The second became May Day: "Resolved, . . . that eight hours shall constitute a legal day's labor from and after May 1, 1886 . . ." (cited in Foner 1977:98). The method? If peaceful negotiations for an eight-hour day were fruitless—a strike! By mid-April, 1886, just in anticipation of May Day, 30,000 workers were granted the eight- or nine-hour day. By May 1, 350,000 U.S. workers struck. The first May Day in Chicago was almost a general strike, with meatpacking, the stockyards, and the railroads shut down.

It was this tremendous movement that the capitalists were trying to destroy when, on May 4, a bomb was thrown by an agent provocateur into the crowd at Haymarket Square. There, working men, women and children had come to protest the gunning down of four McCormick Harvester workers who had been picketing on May 3 to keep 300 scabs from taking their jobs. Now eight Chicago anarchists were in jail, seven condemned to death. The police declared war on the workers, breaking into homes and printing offices, smashing meetings, beating and arresting workers as well as innocent bystanders by the hundreds. It was to this Chicago that Eleanor Marx came in September, 1886.

Eleanor Marx was tremendously moved by the events at Haymarket and outraged by the so-called trial which blatantly condemned men to death, not for the bombing, but for

their anarchist ideas. Although both Karl and Eleanor Marx had battled with anarchists all their lives, every speech Eleanor gave in the U.S. began with a passionate defense of the Haymarket prisoners. But Eleanor Marx wanted her American trip to be much more than an expression of international solidarity for the condemned anarchists. She was to continue on American soil the battle of ideas Karl Marx had fought in Europe.

The American socialists—who were primarily German in origin, refugees from the 1848 revolutions in Europe—had originally invited Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel to come to the U.S. to take advantage of the great new stage of Labor struggles in order to build the American movement. But neither Liebknecht nor Bebel could speak fluent English. What was needed, Eleanor discovered, was someone to “speak English” to these German-American chapters in more ways than one—for their concept of revolution was so narrowed that many of them had made it a principle *not* to speak English, thus showing their contempt for the indigenous U.S. proletariat.

In contrast, what Eleanor Marx saw was how American workers were struggling for socialism as a part of their fight for the eight-hour day. She stressed again and again the importance of joining with the U.S.-born workers, letting them take the lead, so that their innate socialism could develop.

Eleanor's Chicago speech revealed her determination to talk about socialism in a way that any worker would understand and to which they could feel an affinity. To do this, the body of her talk took a great deal from the form of Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, explaining just what socialism is as opposed to what the bourgeoisie says it is.

What best proves that Eleanor's insistence on the revolutionary character of the native U.S. worker was correct, is the response her Chicago speech received. This is how Yvonne Kapp describes it in her biography of Eleanor Marx:

“Large numbers had to be turned away from the doors of Aurora Turner Hall. Even then too many had been admitted; the gallery sagged and threatened to collapse under the weight of ‘people standing on the forms, between the forms and almost upon each other,’ while in the body of the hall the crowd was unable to applaud in unison because, as they said: ‘We were packed so closely that some of us could not move our arms unless those standing by put theirs down to give us a turn’ ” (Kapp 1976:159).

At the same time, her whole attitude to what was then called “the woman question” brings out the todayness of women as Reason and as liberationists. Even in her speeches on what most would consider “other topics” she always brought in women. She talked of “men and women” and rarely used the word “man” alone because she *meant* both. In her Chicago speech, again following what Marx had developed in the *Manifesto*, she showed how capitalism had dehumanized women and transformed love into prostitution and exploitation. She also brought in a vision of what women are: “To the socialist a woman is a human being, and can no more be ‘held’ in common than a socialistic society could recognize slavery” (cited in Kapp 1976:164).

Shortly before her American tour, Eleanor had written on *The Women Question* in a pamphlet co-authored with Edward Aveling. To get a better understanding of her feminist contribution, we need to look more closely at this pamphlet. It was supposedly a review of August Bebel's book, *Woman—Past, Present and Future*, although she tells us in the pamphlet that “we have wandered so far from Bebel along our own lines of . . . thought” (1976:15). Indeed, while those who write of Eleanor Marx as a feminist continually try to trace her feminism to the influence of Bebel, Engels and Ibsen, this article shows her as very different, certainly distinguishing her as a unique socialist feminist who was *not* following Bebel, Ibsen, whose play, *A Doll's House*, she both

translated and acted in, nor Engels, whose *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* was published in 1884.

In *The Woman Question* Eleanor states that, "Women will find allies in the better sort of men, as the labourers are finding allies among the philosophers, artists and poets. But the one has nothing to hope from man as a whole, and the other has nothing to hope from the middle class as a whole" (1976:8). Eleanor had much of what is thought of as "socialist criticism" of bourgeois feminists—particularly that they didn't understand that "The position of women rests, as everything in our complex modern society rests, on an economic basis" (1976:6). But her more original criticisms were that, with the bourgeois feminism of her day, "The actual position of women in respect to men would not be very virtually touched," and that none of the bourgeois feminist demands "touches (women) in their sex relations" (1976:7).

She writes with passion of the unmarried woman, asking why it is that one can always pick her, but not the unmarried man, out of a crowd of family gathering? She describes what forced celibacy does to a developing human nature and attacks the practice that only men are permitted to "proffer affection," showing, by quoting Shakespeare, how that is not a natural state of life and pointing out how marriage is a purely economic arrangement. She takes up the age that people married, showing it to be a class question and opposed to human nature. She gives her views on how children should be told of sex and ends with her vision of human relations which (although she characterized it as monogamy) is an expression of genuine reciprocity between men and women.

What those who tie Eleanor Marx as feminist to Bebel, Engels and Ibsen all ignore is her relationship to the ideas of Karl Marx. It is not only that, as his daughter, she had a unique experience, growing up in a household where her own sisters' intellectual curiosity and their interest in the revolutionary movements of their day were strongly nurtured. It is that there is no doubt whatsoever that it is from his writings that she got her inspiration to grapple with "the woman question."

It was his ideas she was seeking to make real in all her writings and all her activities, whether that be with women, with the unskilled and unorganized workers, or in her internationalism. Indeed, those she had to fight hardest were the elitist leaders of the Social-Democratic Party, who, in trying to play down the revolutionary road of Marx's Marxism, kept gossiping in letters to each other that Eleanor was trying to make a god of her father—as if Karl Marx was not the founder of the revolutionary socialism they all supposedly followed.

What becomes clear in reading *The Working-Class Movement in America*, written after the U.S. tour, is how much *Capital* had influenced Eleanor. Following the way Marx had documented the conditions of the English workers in *Capital*, the conditions of the working-class in the U.S. are here likewise documented by the capitalists' own statistics—the "latest annual reports of the Bureau of Labour for the various States" (Marx and Aveling 1891:23). The horrible working conditions that led to the upheavals of the 1880s and 1890s are revealed in the despair of the labor commissioners themselves as they report on women and child labor, the eighteen-hour days, the company stores, the fines, the "black lists."

A special awareness of the Black dimension is seen in the way Blacks are quoted to show "that the immense coloured population . . . is beginning to understand the wage-slavery question. Their purpose' (i.e. of the 'idle classes') 'is to keep us poor, so that we will be compelled to toil for their benefit . . . The coloured people are getting awake on this matter. The time is past when they can be deceived'" (Marx and Aveling 1891:32-3).

Significantly, the longest chapter in the book is on "Woman and Child Labor," and the meetings with U.S. feminists are discussed in the chapter on "Some Working-Class

Leaders." These are not working-class women but suffragists and although Eleanor criticizes them for their similarity to the English bourgeois feminists, she also points out how "American women suffragists differ from the English in one very important particular. They are ready and willing to listen to the ideas of other schools of thought . . . ready to engage in the more far-reaching struggle for the emancipation of the workers as well as in that for the emancipation of their own sex" (1891:194-5).

Beyond that, she singles out the suffragists as being "much more outspoken" than their English sisters: "They call things honestly by their names, and are not like the English, afraid of being thought 'improper.'" Neither was Eleanor Marx. She led a most extraordinary life and her contribution to today's Women's Liberation Movement and the U.S. and British labor movements is only now beginning to be fully explored.

What speaks to us today is not only that her insistence on the primacy of American workers as creative leaders has been proved historically in that every working-class advance made in the U.S. has been the result of a uniquely American proletariat, unseparated from the added dimensions of Blacks and women. While it was in the U.S. in 1886 that Eleanor Marx first immersed herself in the movement for the eight-hour day, the passion workers revealed in Chicago to control their working day was something she was to experience again in the 1890s in England.

There is no question that Eleanor Marx *practiced* Marx's philosophy. A translator of his works, they became part of her—especially *Capital*. She was the one who took so seriously Marx's decision that one must go "lower and deeper" into the proletariat that she did her most magnificent work with Jewish immigrant women in the slums of London's East End—a group of workers the rest of the movement disdained. Her own test of her practice was to see who really represented the workers; in writing to Engels describing the infighting, sniping, name-calling and lying of the different socialist factions, letter after letter would conclude: But the workers are with us. She transcended the infighting of the Leftist groups because she was grounded both in her experience in Chicago and in Karl Marx's *Capital* where he contrasts the "pompous catalogue of the 'inalienable rights of man'" to the true "Magna Carta of a legally limited working-day" and the real struggles for the eight-hour day.

Because our interest in Eleanor Marx is for today we can't look at her life as if it is just a collection of facts. Yvonne Kapp's two-volume book *Eleanor Marx*, for example, while invaluable as a reference, offers no point of view, and so buries Eleanor Marx in the facts of her life—both trivial and significant—that the meaning of life for us today is obscured. Yet Eleanor Marx has much to tell us. Eleanor Marx did not put women's liberation and socialism in separate compartments. If women's liberation wasn't on the official agenda, it was on hers, and it wasn't only lip service or just a tool to involve women in the "real" struggle as it was to so many of her contemporaries—and ours. Her Chicago trip shows her sensitivity to the indigenous population and her ability to combat elitism by stressing the innate socialism of the English-speaking U.S. workers. Her speeches and activities reveal how she grounded herself on Karl Marx's writings and was able to make his ideas to diverse groups of workers.

Eleanor Marx is important to us—not only in what she *did* accomplish, but what she failed to do as well, for it is here that we need to transcend her. Whereas Eleanor Marx *practiced* Marx's Marxism, what she did not accomplish was to make *explicit* that her practice was the practice of Marx's *philosophy*. Why she did not do that remains to be worked out but we can not afford the same mistake. Our age of failed revolutions has made quite clear the necessity of the inseparability of philosophy from the movements for freedom. Our look at Eleanor Marx is not for history only as past, but as in the making today with the living forces of labor, youth, Black and women, and because it is

determined by the needs of our age, Eleanor Marx's life is a contribution to the freedom movements today.

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COMBATING PLANT CLOSINGS: THE ROLE OF LABOR

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From July 21 to October 28, 1985, 8,200 workers from the nine mills of the Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corporation were on strike—the first major steel strike in over 25 years. The company filed for bankruptcy and on that basis attempted to nullify the union contract and foist concessions on the workers. The outcome included the forced resignation of the chairman of the board of Wheeling-Pittsburg and a negotiated settlement. While the settlement did include concessions, the company was not able to destroy the workers' organization because the expected worker backdown under the threat of closing did not happen. In about fifty cement plants across the country in 1985, workers rejected concession contracts in an industry that claims to be declining. Rather than striking, they disrupted production through various forms of non-cooperation. Gaining a suitable contract was their immediate objective, but in the meantime they used the fact that they had no contract to their advantage. In Chicago in 1984, when the Playskool Company announced that it was closing down its Chicago plant, a call from a small coalition of community and labor groups to boycott Playskool products met with such a huge response that the company was forced to maintain some production in the plant for a year and mount a massive public relations campaign to restore a tarnished corporate image.

While none of these happenings represents a solution to the growing problem of plant closings, they do indicate that working people are exploring some new directions in a search for solutions. Bluestone and Harrison (1983), and others have provided an important insight in arguing that many of the plant closings we see today are due to the policies of multi-national corporations. They have documented what is essentially a new stage of capitalist development, comparable to the formation of mass production industry in the 1930's, and the advent of an age of automation in the 1950's.

The present period beginning in the early 1970's is new in several respects. Corporations, faced with a steep and long term decline in profit rates, more frequent and deeper economic downturns followed not by boom but stagnation, and unstable world political situations have developed new technologies. These technologies have made capital itself more mobile than ever before in history. There are new developments in telecommunications and transportation technology as well as robotics and micro processor based production. These have eliminated the need for particular labor skills, and management can now move their operations from one region to another or to another country with relative ease. They can actually move capital from the production of one product to another as well.

Thus many factory closings occur not because of a lack of demand for a product, but because management has found a potentially higher rate of return on the investment dollar in another location or another product. In the City of Chicago two of the remaining three steel mills are owned by corporations for whom steel making is a sideline. Their management is dominated by accountants, bankers and lawyers who are concerned not so much with developments in the steel industry, but with the bottom line of their financial statements. There is no longer any necessary relationship between steel making and money making. The closing of Playskool in Chicago involved ending one profitable operation in Chicago for a possible more profitable one elsewhere. The closing of Wisconsin Steel in Chicago was the end result of a long period of disinvestment that began when the profitable and state-of-the-art mill did not meet the corporate parent, International Harvester's, hurdle profit rate.

I want to make an argument that the process of combatting plant closings, as opposed to adjusting to them, originates with the workers doing the combat; it does not originate with public policies, union leaders or other external agents. I will develop this argument first by summarizing the philosophic ground of Marxist-Humanism and then showing how that philosophy is concretized at one other major turning point in American labor history—the period between 1949 and 1951. We will then return to today to discuss the implications.

Philosophy and Economics

Although Bluestone and Harrison (1983) document the fact that there has been a long term trend of a falling rate of profit, they do not go on and trace its origins. Nor do they spell out its implications for today. It was Marx's analysis of western capitalism that demonstrated that the decline in the rate of profit is tied to the necessity under capitalism to continuously replace the sole source of value, living labor, with the machine. While today's capitalists certainly don't subscribe to this view, the decline in profit rates cannot be disputed. Nor can it be argued that the return on investment is high enough to sustain a growing economy. Despite the talk of the Reagan ideologues of recovery through "growth recession," the fact is that today's plant closings occur in a context of long-term decline. Since World War II gave western capitalism a temporary reprieve from the depression of the 1930's, there have been no less than seven major recessions. And each has exposed the depth of the problem with more clarity. Since the 1975 recession forced bewildered economists to coin the phrase "stagflation," we have seen recession upon recession followed by "recoveries" that were not recoveries at all. Today's situation is simply a deepening of what was present then: a low rate of economic growth, deep and persistent unemployment, and the decline of much of our basic industry. Long-term economic decline and the new capital mobility are the objective conditions with which efforts to combat plant closings must contend.

At similar historical junctures there have been plans and political galore. But none of them pointed to the needed social transformation. Only the actual struggles of workers against the conditions under which they are forced to work and live could do that. While the struggles depicted at the beginning of this paper are neither solutions nor a fully worked out direction forward, they do provide a starting point for combatting plant closings. But to review human activity in this manner requires a philosophical vantage point that challenges the pragmatism embedded in the notion of state Plan as solution. What I am posing here is a philosophical perspective called, "Marxist-Humanism," by its founder, Raya Dunayevskaya. Essentially, Marxist-Humanism is the concretization of Marx's own philosophy for today.

Marx demonstrated that individual capitalists are compelled to replace the human workers with machines and reduce those left working to an appendage of the machines. Marx also argued that history was a history of people fighting anything that limited their ability to be whole human beings ("the quest for universality") and that the most monstrous such limitation of the capitalist age is the division between mental and manual labor which the machine ruthlessly tears apart. The historical "quest for universality" initially causes resistance to the most limiting aspects of the system. Ultimately there is wide spread revolt. In the course of the resistance and revolt, people begin to work out what the struggle is for—what the new social system will be. This latter development was seen by Marx as critical to the process of social transformation and he called it the negation of the negation. Thus while capitalist production was at the center of his critique of capital, he did not see the abolition of private property as the end or goal. Rather he saw that revolution was continuous and required totally new human relations that were determined by human beings as Subjects of their own liberation.

Marx's philosophy was thus never separated from his economics or political activity. The human being as Subject of his or her own liberation was in fact presented in his first draft of *Capital* as "an absolute movement of becoming." But he left us no blueprint, no Plan—rather "a trail from the 1880's to the 1980's" (Dunayevskaya 1982).

As Raya Dunayevskaya put it:

"Only live human beings can recreate the revolutionary dialectic forever anew. And these live human beings must do so in theory as well as in practice . . .

What is needed is a new unifying principle, on Marx's ground of humanism; that truly alters both human thought and human experience . . . Marx's legacy is no mere heirloom, but a live body of ideas and perspectives that is in need of concretization. Every moment of Marx's development as well as the totality of his works, spells out the need for "revolution in permanence." This is the absolute challenge for our age" (Dunayevskaya 1982:195)

Worker as Subject in an Age of Automation

In concretizing this philosophy for today we will first look to the year 1949 because it represents the beginnings of efforts of rank and file labor to deal with the advent of automation. Seeing how labor responded to the automation of the coal mines can establish the ground for understanding the search for new directions today.

In the late 1940's capitalism was on the verge of a new stage of development. While the automation of the oil industry had occurred earlier than coal and had also met with resistance from workers, the coal miners' strikes of 1949-50 and again in 1951 opened a new stage of cognition that went far beyond the mines themselves. First, it is necessary to see that at the end of World War II, the coal industry was beginning a decline both in its relative share of the energy market and in absolute terms as well. Between 1948 and 1953 coal production was nearly cut in half. The mine owners responded to the decline in a classic manner. On the one hand they introduced new technology—the continuous miner machine—designed to increase worker productivity. Second, they developed a new approach to labor relations that emphasized efforts to insure continuous production as opposed to the more confrontational tactics used previously. To accomplish the latter task, a new organization was formed in July of 1950—the Bituminous Coal Operations' Organization (BCOA). BCOA was headed by George Love, organizer of the largest coal mining operation in the world, The Pittsburgh Consolidated Coal Company (CONSOL) and by the U.S. Steel President Harry Moses (Dubofsky and Van Tine 1977:496). The BCOA was an alliance of coal companies which together mined about half of all the coal in the U.S. Love controlled 52 of the association's 110 votes and Moses controlled about another 19. Love and Moses used this power to convince the coal operators to avoid strikes, government involvement in unions and attempt to work together with labor to solve mutual problems in a "businesslike" way (Dubofsky and Van Tine 1977:487).

In the coal industry the labor union was controlled by John L. Lewis, a founder of the CIO and one considered to be an uncompromising militant. His response to the declining conditions in coal production was eventually to capitulate to the owners both in supporting the new mining technology and the new form of labor relations proposed. Although the 1949 strike actually came before the formation of the BCOA and Lewis' subsequent capitulation, the activity around the strike itself showed what was to come.

Rank and file coal miners also saw the new stage of capitalist development in the particular form of the continuous miner machine. Shortly before the 1949 strike, the *Fairmont Times*, the largest daily newspaper in West Virginia, carried a front page report about the continuous miner complete with pictures. Later U.S. Steel's Harry

Moses glowingly described the technological marvel as "the only assembly line mass production industry carried on under ground." (Dubofsky and Van Tine 1977:494) But the miners had another name for it—"the mankiller." Not only did the continuous miner cut the size of the mining crew from 19 to 4, but it created absolutely terrifying working conditions. Here is how a former coal miner described it. Noting that the pace of the machine now controlled the pace of the miners tending it, he goes on to describe the deadly dangers.

"With the head ripping into the face, the powerful whirling bits pulverizing the coal conveyed back and dumped into the waiting buggy, fine coal dust quickly saturated the air, making it impossible to see more than a few feet. . . . Here you have the continuous miner, ripping coal out and spewing it back over the conveyor boom as it swung back and forth until the coal was piled from rib to rib and to the top, virtually entombing the work crew in a confined area where the dust and heat were multiplied many times over. With all the motors running and in an atmosphere superladen with fine coal dust, a single spark from anything—the grinding bits hitting a hard sulfur ball, a spark from any motor, a short in any electrical wire—could turn that face into a raging inferno of death-dealing destruction. And that's precisely what has happened since the continuous miner's introduction—many times over" (Phillips and Dunayevskaya 1984:12-13).

The miners' contract was due to run out on June 30, 1949. Beginning in May, Lewis ordered workers to strike for several brief periods to deplete coal stockpiles. When the contract expired, however, despite a firm union tradition of "no contract, no work," Lewis stunned everyone by proclaiming that miners would work a three day week. The miners were disappointed but went along with their leader. Since the mining companies were no longer contributing to the union health and welfare fund, Lewis announced in late September the suspension of all payments from the fund. This sparked strikes in Northern West Virginia and Southern Pennsylvania which later spread all over Appalachia—West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama and Ohio and later to the west. On September 30, Lewis ordered the hard coal miners in Mississippi and the soft coal miners in the west back to work. On November 10 he ordered the rest of the miners to resume a 3 day week. In January CONSOL brought court action against the three day week which prompted Lewis to call out miners in six CONSOL mines in West Virginia. Spontaneously most of the other miners in the area joined the strike. Lewis "suggested" they return to work, but now something new happened. Union officers called a meeting and voted to reject Lewis' suggestion. When union officials attempted to gain reconsideration, rank and file refused. Not only did they stay out, but the strike began to spread. The union called a meeting for local union officers only but at that meeting on January 19, 1950, 1800 rank and file miners showed up and confronted their union leaders with such fury that it became clear that the strike was now firmly in the control of the rank and file. From the January mass meeting until the mine operators gave in on March 3, 1950, rank and file miners ran the strike using the mass meeting as a new type of labor organization and creating their own relief fund which developed solidarity with working people in many different industries and in many different parts of the country (Phillips and Dunayevskaya 1984).

In the following year, the miners in West Virginia went out on yet another strike. It is virtually unreported in labor history books. It was another wildcat defiance of Lewis. But Dubofsky and Van Tine, Lewis' biographers, didn't even refer to it. Instead they focus on Lewis' continued capitulation to operators. Yet the strike was significant because it involved two new elements. Miners were demanding seniority rights which they had never done before, and secondly the strike was settled for the first time even while the miners were still out. The importance of seniority rights had to do with extensive layoffs connected with the continuous miner—but also the workers view that this

machine was a mankiller as they termed it and many of the younger workers wanted the right to get off of it. As one close supporter of the strike put it:

"We didn't know at the time that Appalachia would be formed into a depression area from this. But people wanted the seniority system to have the right to get off this machine, not to get on it, because they were young people and it was a man-killer. And so the new strike broke out." (Phillips and Dunayevskaya 1984:31)

At the time of these strikes Dunayevskaya was not only working directly supporting the miners but she was also studying Hegel, translating Lenin's philosophical notebooks on Hegel, and writing a book on Marxism. The philosophical vantage point that emerged through this combination of activities enabled her to see the activity of the miners in a very different light from other observers at the time and from the few labor historians who have discussed the strike.

Rather than seeing this strike as an end point (in coal's critical and dominant role in the economy or in John L. Lewis' career) as Dubofsky and Van Tine did, Dunayevskaya saw the strike and its aftermath as a new beginning not only for miners but for working people generally. For one thing she argued that the strike was a part of a whole "dialectical circle of circles" and thus marked the beginning of a new epoch. It wasn't simply a matter of the continuing decline of capitalism that had begun to usher in a new age of automation. Rather it was the world wide revolt against these conditions and the new questions being raised in the process that distinguished this epoch. In short, this epoch was marked by the maturity of the thought and activity of human subjects seeking revolts in Eastern Europe after the death of Stalin, and by the beginning of the civil rights movement in the U.S. with the Montgomery bus boycott in 1956. The sum total of these dialectical developments showed that not only had we entered a new stage of capitalist production with automation, but also a new stage of cognition in which "the movement from practice is itself a form of theory" (Dunayevskaya 1982).

That does not mean that the miners themselves had put all of this together. Rather their activities in creating new forms of labor solidarity and organization had laid the ground for a new way of thinking. What Dunayevskaya was able to see in all this activity was that the Reason of the miners was raising a fundamental question about this new epoch—"what kind of labor should a human being do?" And she thus made a philosophical category of that question and the workers' subjectivity for this age—"the movement from practice is itself a form of theory." Seeing the profound question in the workers' thoughts and action, and then making of a category that defined a new relationship of theory to practice was itself an act of meeting the movement from practice with a movement from theory that is grounded in Marx's philosophy. It was the beginning of a working out of that philosophy for this age which she called Marxist-Humanism.

The significance of the subjectivity of the miners during the 1949-51 period and of the philosophical development that could catch that subjectivity as a world-wide phenomenon, a universal for this age, is further highlighted by what happened later. The next major development in automation occurred in the auto industry when the term "automation" was actually invented by a Ford Motor Co. executive in 1954. The reaction of United Auto Workers president, Walter Reuther to this development was similar to that of Lewis. He told his members, "you must not fight progress." The division between leadership and rank and file erupted during the 1960's and early 70's in practically every industry in the country. The forms of revolt and organization pioneered by the miners in 1950—the wildcat strike, the mass meeting and new forms of labor solidarity—evolved by the 1960's into what were called shop caucuses, often Black

shop caucuses. In the 1950's there were waves of wildcat strikes in auto, steel and coal. They reached a climax in 1939 after United Steel Workers president, David McDonald had "won" the strike. The settlement failed to change the conditions of work—the kind of labor workers were being forced to do in an age of automation. So the workers wildcatted against automation. In the 1960's the shop caucuses took a different form. Black auto worker Charles Denby describes their development and the difference between the 1960's and 1950's as follows.

"The greatest difference between the new caucuses emerging then and those that appeared before was that most of us who were in Black opposition groups up to that time thought that the most important thing to do was to throw out the leadership, or change the union structure, or something of that nature. The young people then weren't thinking that way. They were thinking in terms of complete change—a revolution" (Denby 1978:266).

This development was not because of low pay. It was a response to racism and to the dehumanizing conditions imposed upon workers in the automated factory. Denby expressed it this way.

"Automation is the machine. We know that. But it is also making the man a machine too . . . A man's body had to be trained to work like the machine. The machine tells the body how to work . . . What alienates a production worker is that he is driven to do work that is separated from his thinking. This along with the terrific pace we have to work, makes a worker doubly tired at the end of a day" (1978:196).

The divide between workers and their union leaders remains to this day. These leaders welcome the new technologies as progress and counsel concessions as the age of automation and now mobile capital technologies reduce the number of jobs and close plants displacing entire workforces. In this respect the worker is forced to be even more an appendage to the machine. That is true both of those who are left in the plants and those whose very ability to work is being determined by the bankers and accountants and the new transportation and telecommunications technologies. The view of many workers today about these conditions was expressed recently by a Black Chicago steel worker as he traveled to a rally in Pittsburgh, PA to support the striking workers at Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel.

"In my opinion, its going to take a lot more than this rally. What is needed is a total reconstruction in the union movement. We have to go back and regain control of production. Because when the union gave that up to gain wage increases, we started on the road that has brought us to this point."

In order to draw out the implications of this statement and the implications of the philosophical vantage point we have developed, we wish to examine this view of workers' subjectivity as it relates to plant closings today.

Combatting Plant Closings Today

In bringing the lessons of the early 1950's to today's efforts to combat plant closings, it is crucial to see that the miners' strike posed the question "what kind of labor should a human being do," and signified that the masses of workers were seeking a totally new way of living that included not only control of production, but new human relations that included new relations between women and men, Black and white.

The lessons for today can not be reduced to strategy and tactics any more than they could in the 1950's. The most important lesson of the miner's strike is that from the philosophical vantage point we have posed, it is possible to see how the workers

themselves, acting as the Subjects of their own freedom, in a "quest for universality," pointed a direction forward. It is essential to see both the role of human self development in pointing the direction forward and how philosophy is integral to our ability to see it.

Our discussion of the miners' strike shows that philosophy is not a tool of analysis but a task to do. It is always to be worked out in relation to what masses of people are thinking and doing. The ground of Marx's Humanism is what enabled Dunayevskaya to catch what the rank and file were thinking and doing and to assist directly their struggle by demonstrating the Universals that the workers were bringing out, thus founding Marxist-Humanism.

Any approach to combatting plant closings will be of little use if we are not able to link an analysis of objective condition to the Reason of the forces whose ideas can point to the needed direction forward. To find that link requires a very thorough philosophical reorganization that not only rejects narrow pragmatism but works out a philosophical ground which is able to see that:

"The days are long since past when these voices from below could be treated, at best, as mere sources of theory. The movement from practice that is itself a form of theory demands a totally new relationship of theory of practice . . .

The transformation of reality has a dialectic all its own. It demands a unity of the struggles for freedom with a philosophy of liberation. Only then does the elemental revolt release new sensibilities, new passions, and new forces—a whole new human dimension . . .

Ours is the age that can meet the challenge of the times when we work out so new a relationship of theory to practice that the proof of the unity is in the Subject's own self-development. Philosophy and revolution will first then liberate the innate talents of men and women who will become whole" (Dunayevskaya 1982b:289-292).

The statement of the Black Chicago steel worker who was quoted earlier as saying that what was needed was a "total reconstruction in the union movement" that would enable workers to "regain control of production," is certainly an expression not only of revolt against the closing of the steel mills, but it points a direction forward. His and other voices being raised in the course of combatting plant closings are far more than mere "sources of theory," but a challenge to develop a new relationship of theory to practice.

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THE CIO, THEN AND NOW: A VIEW FROM AN
ORGANIZER'S EXPERIENCE

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Today, when you look at the condition of the AFL-CIO—whether it is the concessions they force their members into, or what is worse, how these labor bureaucrats do not support militant workers out on strike, as with the Hormel workers in Austin, Minnesota—you may wonder: why pay any attention to the CIO? But if we take a deeper look at the period when the CIO was born and what it did achieve, you may see in that past important signposts for today.

The truth is that the Congress of Industrial Organizations changed the industrial face of the United States by creating industrial unionism, instead of remaining stuck in the craft unionism of the American Federation of Labor. It wasn't, of course, the present bureaucracy that did the creating. Even those who were then militant leaders—John L. Lewis, Walter Reuther and others—did not do it. Those *from below*, the rank and file, the spontaneity of masses in motion, did the creating. They created a new form of struggle by sitting down right at their machines and not leaving the factory.

It is within that context that you will see that, though I am telling you of my own experiences, they represent the experiences of American youth of the 1930s who refused to follow the world they did not make. They would not accept the Depression as any sort of life to bow down to. We were out to reshape the world.

Before proceeding further, it is a good idea to say a few words about the city in which the events I will describe took place. My hometown, Lynn, Massachusetts, aside from its two huge electrical plants, was called, "The Shoe City." The shoe and leather industry was the moving force in the life of the city for many years before the electrical industry gained its present dominance. The tanning of leather calls for the use of a certain chemical composition in the water used in the tanning process. It can be found in this area, but not in most other areas of the country. This kept the leather industry largely a captive of the area. The shoe industry, dependent on leather for its supplies, remained close at hand.

The workers of the area were a mixture of every imaginable nationality, with Poles, Irish, French-Canadian, Italian and Eastern Mediterranean (Greece, Turkey, Armenia) workers dominating the scene. At the same time a substantial section of the working class of the area steeped in American traditions, hardened in the Abolition movement before the Civil War. Lynn had sheltered Frederick Douglass when he was pursued elsewhere. The workers of Lynn gained for themselves a reputation of being the "Red Center" of the country in 1918. The strikes in the shoe and leather industry were the most militant and decisive struggles in that period. The women were noted for their part in the struggle for the right to vote. Orators with new ideas found a ready hearing.

The CIO did not suddenly spring into being. It was a long time becoming. The basic idea that the industrial form of organization was far superior to the craft form goes back to the Socialist Labor Party of Daniel DeLeon in the first years of the twentieth century. The CIO died as an organization because it could not move beyond this idea of labor organization. During and after World War I, the Industrial Workers of the World—the Wobblies—succeeded in organizing industrial union in the Western mines, in lumber, and made an impact in New England, but wherever they found success the capitalists brought in the police and militia, threw the leaders in jail and broke up the ranks.

Within the mainstream labor movement the idea of industrial unionism was always rejected by those leaders whose jurisdiction might be undermined. Craft unionism was

the order of the day until 1935, when the CIO was born. When industrial unionism did come, it was in the context of the "depression decade," the world which I entered when I left high school.

By the time I graduated from high school I was quite used to working for a living. My father was a worker with five children to support on his wages. We had the necessities of life, a decent home, but there was no cash around for frills or amusement. Even by the time I was ready to enter high school it was necessary for me to work to buy my clothes and to support my schooling.

I began working at 16 in a woodworking factory that manufactured novelty furniture. Later I worked as an usher in theaters from 2 p.m. after school until 9 p.m. and longer on Saturdays and Sundays. These hours of work left little time for the normal social activity that most young people of that age enjoy.

I had not yet had the personal experience of belonging to a union but had heard my father talk about them. My father had worked at the same job in the same shop for the General Electric Co for 36 years. Before him my grandfather was employed there as worker, as foreman. I later worked in the same plant as an engineer, the third generation of the same family to devote their lives to the Company. I recall that many times my father was offered a better job, as foreman, refusing to become part of management. His excuse to them was "that he was temperamentally unsuited for the post."

"Shop Reports" of what took place in the factory were served up at every meal in my home all the time I lived there. The relations of the bosses to the workers, the details of their daily lives, their joys and sorrows were as much a part of my existence as if I had been in the shop. I knew each and every one of them intimately, bosses and workers alike.

In 1918 my father had joined the International Assn. of Machinists, A.F. of L. He went through a long strike which was lost. I personally cannot remember it, but I do remember what we suffered during that period and I recall that he kept the Union Card in his drawer for years afterward as a matter of pride. He often said what he thought about that strike, its strength and its weaknesses. He remarked about the shortcomings of the craft form or organization, said it was no good. What we need, he said, is one big union with all the workers in it. And he was no radical, but a conservative Catholic.

The year I graduated from high school, 1930, was the height of the Depression. I not only could not find a job, I was dissatisfied with all I saw, and wanted to change it. The Socialist Party seemed to have a great tradition, from its labor struggles and the anti-war work of Eugene V. Debs. I joined the Socialist Party, then led by Norman Thomas.

After the depression of 1930 hit with full force, it was impossible for a young man to get a job anywhere. There were hundreds of men available for every position offered. After the election of Roosevelt and the institution of his work projects, a few jobs became available to those with political connections. My father, being a good Democrat, was able to have me placed on an E.R.A. Project as a pick-and-shovel laborer. My job came through a call from the Mayor's office. I went to see the Mayor at 9 p.m. and was told by him to report to the Fine Hill Cemetery on the following day for work. Thousands of men, from every walk of life were engaged in cutting away forest land and preparing it to be a cemetery. I worked there for a year, blasting out hard pan rock with dynamite, preparing the final resting place for our and future generations. When I left the project to become a W.P.A. teacher I was one of the three engineers assigned to the project.

As a W.P.A. teacher I was expected to form my own classes, find the pupils, not interfere with the regular teaching program and generally to make myself as inconspicuous

as possible. We reported to the Supt. of Schools weekly and received about \$20 a week for our efforts. It did not take too long to determine that classes called "Current Events" were acceptable, and that the "Workers Educational Center," in reality the office of the Socialist Party was able to maintain two functionaries paid by the Teachers Project of the W.P.A. The Communist Party locally did even better; they had not less than five functionaries paid on the same basis.

In the "Workers Educational Center" unemployed shoe workers and a group of about 20 Italian workers gathered from time to time. They provided the base of Socialist Party activity of that period, much of which centered around the shoe and leather industry.

The shoe and leather industry in the city was not one or two large factories but literally hundreds of small shops employing from ten to several hundred workers each. All the shoe manufacturing machinery was owned by the United Shoe Machinery Corporation. The manufacturer rented space in a building, bought himself some leather, hired his machines on a royalty basis and he was in business. The exploitation under such conditions led to sweat shop practices, strikes, militant struggles and a general tradition of radicalism among the workers of the industry. The Communist Party was able to build considerable support for itself due to the rotten practices of the A.F. of L. craft unions in the industry. Each trade, Lasters, Operators, Cutters and the rest were represented by separate unions. A strike involving 25 people might have four or five unions representing them in negotiations. One craft union might settle their grievances behind the backs of the other unions involved and then go back to work, leaving the rest out on strike. The situation led to the complete distrust of all the old line craft unions. The workers were ready for any industrial type of organization that would permit them to bargain on at least shop wide basis.

The leather industry in Lynn was based mainly on the tanning of goat skins that were brought over from Greece, Turkey, Armenia and the Near East. Many of the workers in the industry were those who left the old country and had followed the shiploads of skins and settled at the point of their processing. These people formed the backbone of the labor force together with a large percentage of Poles.

The work in the leather industry was the most miserable imaginable. A goat at his best is pretty smelly but when his hide has spent weeks in the hold of a ship its smell is beyond description. These hides were sorted by hand and put into lime pits to soak for a certain period to remove the flesh and hair. When the hides were ready they were pulled out by hand and scraped to begin the tanning process. Only rugged men with cast iron stomachs could withstand this type of work.

If the hides were left in the lime soak too long, the lime would consume the skin. This factor was responsible for setting the strike conditions within the industry. An employer with a batch of skins worth \$150,000 soaking had a limited period in which to negotiate a settlement with his workers. He fought back with the same venom that the workers employed. The resulting strikes were some of the most bitter and the most militant that I have seen anywhere.

The employers hired strike-breakers and ran them into the plants in cars and trucks. The city provided plenty of police protection for the scabs to pass through the picket lines.

The picket lines were always mass picket lines, the ranks filled by strong men armed with knives, clubs and rocks. The women there in force, too. The women who were in the industry as finishers or ironers were not weaklings and the strikers' wives were strong women, used to a days work. They came and gathered rocks in their house aprons

depositing them in piles along the picket line for their men to use. They set up soup kitchens in the Union Hall to feed the men. The strike was as critical to them as it was to the men.

Cars or trucks approaching the plant were waylaid on side roads leading to the plant, stoned, and their occupants beaten up. Cars and trucks were tipped over by the sheer mass of the men and then set afire. When loads of leather would leave the plant they, too, would be set afire.

On one occasion the plant was getting back to normal operation and the strikers feared that the strike was lost. The plant itself was quite isolated on the edge of a river drawing its power from a dam across the river and transmitting it through the plant by a system of belts. A union meeting was held to discuss the next move but little emerged from the leadership. One of the strikers, without discussing his plans with anyone, in the dead of night walked across the dam and entered the plant, cut a two foot section out of the transmission belt, threw it in the river and walked back across the dam. The plant was closed down for another two weeks and the union was able to negotiate a settlement. The worker who had risen to the task at the moment of need returned to the ranks as quietly as he had emerged.

The Tannery Workers Union in those days was an independent union organized along industrial lines. Its outstanding leader Joe Massida, was a short, heavy-set Italian who looked very much like former New York Mayor LaGuardia. He was a member of our local Socialist Party organization. We were therefore kept well-informed about pending strike actions and union problems. The man was a tremendous agitator with powers of persuasion equaled by few in the field. I have seen him get up on a soap box and start speaking to the wall of the factory. The windows would open and the workers hang out to hear him. Within the hour he had persuaded them to walk out on strike.

For years he was able to withstand pressure from inside the union by the Stalinists who sought to take over the union. Yet, he was a man who would tell the workers what to do, who would lay down the line and who would brook no interference with his plans.

Ben Gold, of the Furriers Union and Zimmerman of the Trade Union Unity League took the initiative in forming the United Fur and Leather Workers Union, utilizing these unaffiliated or independent locals as a base. Massida, the man of purpose, took the Tannery Workers into the amalgamation with the idea that he could "use" these Stalinists for his own ends. They in actuality used him to get a grip on the union and then disposed of him.

In these days of the sharp differences between the garment unions and the radicals of all stripes, we are apt to overlook the period when the unions were closely allied with the Socialist Party. In the early '30's the garment unions under Dubinsky and Sidney Hillman would frequently make donations of as much as \$5,000 to the political campaigns of the Socialist party and maintained very friendly relations with the party. The existence of this relationship made it quite easy for Socialist Party members to be appointed as organizers in the clothing industry.

In 1935, when the International Ladies Garment Workers Union projected a big drive to organize the shops in and around Boston, our local Socialist Party organization got in on the ground floor. I was appointed an organizer in that campaign and the local went all out to assist in the campaign. The union told us what shops they wanted organized, provided money for expenses and the Socialist Party provided a hall in which to meet.

We stood outside the factory gates and talked to the workers as they were leaving, asking them to sign membership cards, give us names of more people in the shop, and to

make appointments to see them in their homes after work. There were three shops involved with a force of about 250 workers, largely young women. In two months we had a majority of workers in all three shops signed up in the union.

Dave Halpern, the head of the out-of-town department of the I.L.G.W.U. was in charge of the drive. He occupied a lavish suite at the Hotel Kenmore in Boston and directed the drive from there. When he thought that everything was set he called out every garment shop within a radius of 150 miles of Boston to prevent the work from being contracted out. Periodically he would sally forth, get into a fight with a cop on the picket line and have himself arrested, making sure there were plenty of newspaper reporters around. His staff of lawyers would have him free within the hour and comfortably back at his hotel.

In the Lynn shops when the strike call came we walked in, pulled the main electrical switch and called for the girls to follow us out. They all came and the three shops were shut down tight. Under the Socialist Party headquarters there was a restaurant and I arranged to have the strikers fed there. The entire crew was given two meals daily for the four weeks that the strike lasted. The solidarity of the strikers was wonderful. The employers made no attempt to operate the shops, there was no violence and the entire period went like clockwork. The women reported every day for picket duty, stayed around the headquarters, sang songs, read books, danced and made themselves at home. Their spirit was such that they would have stayed out six months if necessary.

The strike terminated with Halpern signing an agreement with the major garment shops in Boston proper and embracing some of the major contractors. He issued instructions to us to tell the workers to go back to work. We protested. What is to be done about an agreement for these people who have been on strike? We were told that it would not be possible to have a salaried business agent assigned to the city since the total membership was so small and the dues payments of the members did not make it "profitable" for the union to maintain a local there. We were furious but absolutely helpless to do anything. If a union will not take in members or sign an agreement then there is little that can be done to force them to act. The only alternative was to tell the workers to return to work. They did so as a defeated group although by all rights they had done everything necessary to win the struggle.

There is no possible way to explain a betrayal of that kind to the workers who have been betrayed. That their predicament was none of our doing had little effect on their attitude toward those who they held responsible. Leaders in such a position are finished.

We were finished in that locality as trade unionists, but we were also finished with the Socialist Party. Any organization that would tolerate cooperation with individuals responsible for such activities deserves no support.

By the mid-1930's, the coal miners under John L. Lewis were in the forefront of the industrial union movement. They were themselves an industrial union, and their history was one of a series of conflicts with the companies and the government. All the way since World War I, the miners union had its ups and downs as the government and the coal operators tried every trick in the book to break the union.

But it was in the automobile industry that the situation came to a head. It was impossible to organize the auto industry on a craft basis. There were too many trades involved at every stage of production. The auto corporations were among the most powerful in the world, and were not about to give in to unionization without a struggle. At Henry Ford's Rouge plant, an ex-FBI thug named Bennett ruled, and kept the union out by such bloody encounters as the "Battle of the Overpass."

This brutal conflict resulted in new union tactics. They came in the form of the sit-down strike, virtually unprecedented in labor history. What preceded the auto

sit-downs of 1936-37 were the great upheavals of 1934, including the Toledo Autolite strike. There, we witnessed how early radicals like A.J. Muste had organized the unemployed. In the Autolite strike the unemployed said that they not only would not scab and take union jobs, but would join the picket lines by the thousands. This they did, and after days of street battles, the Autolite strike was won.

In the Flint sit-down strike of 1936-37, victory over General Motors, the auto giant, changed everything. In that struggle, women played a new and vital role. Under the leadership of Genora Johnson, women, especially wives of the strikers, organized the Women's Emergency Brigade to feed and defend the strikers in the plant. Day after day they fed the strikers, despite police and scab attacks on them. To this day the Women's Emergency Brigade and Genora Johnson have not received the recognition that was due them for their role in the struggle for a contract at GM. The UAW leadership has always ignored her role.

Fifty years after the Flint sit-down strike, the UAW held an anniversary meeting in Flint. And yet Genora was not among the many invited speakers. No woman from the sit-down was. But Genora and many of the surviving members of the Women's Emergency Brigade were in the audience, demanding the right to speak. At an arranged moment, News and Letters Committees—the Marxist-Humanist organization to which I now belong—along with the Flint chapter of the National Organization for Women (N.O.W.)—stood up in the balcony and yelled "Let the women speak!" Our banner said: "The Struggle Continues; 1937-1977." We succeeded in forcing the bureaucracy to give the floor to Genora. You can see this demonstration in the movie, "With Babies and Banners."

The sit-down strikes were important because of the threat that they posed for the capitalists. Here were workers occupying the factories, denying access to the "owners." When offices were invaded, the secrets of the auto bosses were exposed. It was the sit-down tactic that brought the bosses to their knees.

Direct action took the place of discussion. When the police or National Guard threatened to break up a picket line, the flying squadrons went into action. Car loads of strikers would be dispatched to the trouble spots and the picket lines were restored.

Among the tannery workers in Lynn, Massachusetts other tactics were employed. We called it the "educational committee." The committee's job was to call on the scabs in their homes and try to convince them of the error of their ways. It was usually successful, but where necessary a little banging about was enough to convince them to stay away from the plant.

Where the cops and thugs tried to break up the picket lines, we went out and bought 3/4" baseball bats to which we affixed our picket signs. The usually got the attention they deserved and were more effective than the cops' billy clubs.

What were the radical parties doing in the midst of all these labor upheavals? After the Toledo Autolite strike of 1934, A.J. Muste's Conference for Progressive Labor Action merged with the Trotskyists to form the American Workers Party on Dec. 1, 1934.

Internationally, Leon Trotsky had initiated what became known as the "French turn." Recognizing the growing number of militant left-wing socialists within the Socialist parties around the world, Trotsky urged his supporters to enter the Socialist parties, in order to win their best elements to Trotskyism. This is how I met the Trotskyist movement in Massachusetts.

In Minneapolis the Trotskyists were active in a coal yard where some of them worked shoveling coal all day. They organized a union through the Teamsters and held a 100

percent successful short strike. This action, followed by the organization of the Truck Drivers in Minneapolis, led to the first General Strike in the history of the city and became the high point in the history of the Trotskyist movement.

The strikers set up food kitchens, a hospital with a doctor and nurses, and several garages where cars were dispatched to cover trouble spots. A daily paper, *The Organizer*, was published to answer the lies of the capitalist press. All were paid for by contributions from workers, who put their money in cans set up in workers' gathering places. At the same time, the AFL—to which the Teamsters belonged—was collaborating with the governor of Minnesota, who sent in troops against the strikers. The strikers won nevertheless.

But nationally, it was not the AFL—where Trotskyists led a single local in Minneapolis—but CIO which grew massively in membership. When the Trotskyists joined the Socialist Party, I was immediately attracted to them because of their stand in support of the Spanish Revolution. By the fall of 1937, Norman Thomas was expelling the left-wing from the Socialist Party because they refused to stop publishing their paper, *Socialist Appeal*. I was one of those expelled. On Jan. 1, 1938, we formed a new party of U.S. Trotskyism, the Socialist Workers Party.

During World War II, I was drafted into the Navy. When I came out I began to have disagreements with the Trotskyist position that Stalin's Russia was still supposedly a workers' state, though they admitted its "degeneracy." I developed a position that Russia was a state capitalist society.

I also disagreed with them on what they called "the Negro Question." Trotskyism's leader, James P. Cannon, barely mentions Blacks in his *History of American Trotskyism*. In truth, the party did little to recruit them. This was more startling when you consider that Black labor struggles and the struggles for voting rights had been pivotal reasons for the success of the CIO. While Blacks couldn't join the AFL (except in rare instances), the CIO opened its doors to them, and in strike after strike Black workers made it possible for the CIO to win. Frankly, the Trotskyists in that period were very hard to convince on the question of self-determination for Blacks in America.

I cannot go into this whole question here, but I can only point to what is central to my views as a Marxist-Humanist today—the relation of theory to practice in the struggle to establish new human relations. The whole point is that if one really aims for totally new human relations you have to understand and practice them in your own paper and in your own organization. This is true whether we are speaking of class, of race, of relations between men and women, or of relations between practice and theory.

Thus, a retrospective such as this on one's life, is really at the same time a perspective of what kind of future one is fighting for. As someone who experienced the CIO, the Socialist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and all the varieties of radicalism, my hunger for totally new relations was that much deeper by still being unfulfilled.

The unions today have little in common with their origins in the CIO. The CIO was born in class struggle, fought uncompromisingly for basic worker rights and won. The initiative for the struggle came basically from the ranks of the unions. "Leadership" as epitomized by John L. Lewis did not mean that the initiative, such as in the sit-down strikes came from above. On the contrary, it came from below, and only when it proved successful, was it endorsed by the leadership. The workers fought with their bare hands where necessary, always without money, against giant corporations, police power, imported thugs, strike breakers and governments of all descriptions. Yet they won.

Today, the union bureaucrats seek to obtain their goals by purchasing the best congressman they can find, and seek, by legislation, to obtain goals that yesterday would

have been settled on the picketline. Expensive TV commercials have replaced basic organizing techniques. Membership in unions is constantly dropping, to the point today where less than 19% of the U.S. workforce is unionized. The new jobs that Reagan talks about consist of minimum wage employment in fast food industries, or other service sectors, all largely non-union. In the garment industry sweat shops are as prevalent today as they were when I was organizing that industry in the 1930s.

And now, in 1986 we see the crowning achievement of the UAW leadership—long considered the most progressive of the major unions. They have just signed a contract for the GM Saturn project, covering a plant yet to be built, for a workforce yet to be hired, committing those workers to a wage scale set at 20% less than the prevailing wage in the auto industry. This is the wave of the future as GM-UAW would have it. This pact sounds the death knell for the much-vaunted democracy of the UAW, as contracts are secured before workers are even hired. Unfortunately, for both the auto companies and the UAW leaders, many rank-and-file workers have a different vision of the future, and they are determined to see it come true.

The basic idea of industrial union is still valid. The degeneration of industrial unions in this age of state-capitalism is a great obstacle to emancipation of all humanity. Only the workers can overthrow the present bureaucracy and return it to the principles on which it was founded and on which it must rely if the labor movement is to survive.

For my part in this, I have assembled my archives, the writing and documentation of 50 years of class struggle in the United States. In 1985 I donated the "John F. Dwyer Collection" to the Wayne State University Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, where they are now open for research. Included among my papers are the archives of Martin Abern, a Trotskyist leader now deceased. I hope my archives will prove useful to a new generation of labor activists as they tackle the problems they will face in the future.