

HEGEL-STUDIEN

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Charakters des Gegenstandes' thematisiert und dem Inhalt des Wissens als Maßstab gegenübergestellt werden kann.⁸

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Recent Writings of R. Dunayevskaya

The question "Why Hegel? Why Now?" has been posed in a quite controversial way by RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA, the Russian-born Marxist and former secretary to LEON TROTSKY. Her study of LENIN'S *Philosophical Notebooks* and MARX'S *1844 Manuscripts* in the 1940's, both of which she was the first to translate into English, as well as her own analysis at that time of STALIN'S Russia as "totalitarian state capitalism" became the jumping off point for her serious grappling with Hegel in the 1950's.¹ Her experiences since then in the U. S. labor, Black, antiwar and women's liberation movements, and her direct contact with Third World revolutions in Africa and Asia have formed the political humus for her very original "Marxist humanist" synthesis of Hegel, MARX and LENIN on dialectic. This humanist and Hegelian Marxism becomes in turn a vantage point from which to assess critically the new social movements since the 1950's and 1960's.

⁸ Natürlich stellt sich für den heutigen Leser die Frage, wie Hegel sich die Struktur kognitiver Beziehungen genauer vorgestellt hat. Eine Reihe von interessanten Überlegungen finden sich bei K. Cramer: *Bemerkungen zu Hegels Begriff vom Bewußtsein in der Einleitung zur Phänomenologie des Geistes*. In: Seminar: *Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels* (oben, Anm. 1) 360 ff. Sicher bedarf der Sachverhalt weiterer Klärung. — Bei verschiedenen Autoren findet sich die Tendenz, Hegelsche Unterscheidungen (oder Unterscheidungsversuche) mittels analoger Vorstellungen bei Husserl (namentlich in den *Ideen I* und in den *Logischen Untersuchungen II, 1*) zu erläutern. — In Ermangelung besserer Erläuterungen wäre es wohl zu hart, von einer Erklärung nach dem Prinzip 'obscurum per obscurius' zu sprechen. Indes läßt sich nicht übersehen, daß bestimmte Probleme bei Husserl selbst offenbleiben. (Wenn Theunissen (334) den Begriff des vollen Noema unter Rekurs auf die *Logischen Untersuchungen II, 1*, (400) nicht bloß als „Gegenstand, welcher intendiert ist“, sondern „so wie er intendiert ist“ in Erinnerung bringt, so wäre es gleichermaßen wichtig, daran zu erinnern, daß Husserl in den *Logischen Untersuchungen* den Transzendenten Gegenstand und den Intentionalen Gegenstand identifiziert (425), diese Auffassung in den *Ideen I* § 89 jedoch revidierte: der transzendente Baum kann abbrennen, das Noema hingegen nicht. — Der Rekurs auf Husserls Horizont-Begriff scheint hingegen glücklich. Hier wäre auch eine Analogie zur modernen Unterscheidung zwischen Fakten-Kennntnis und Hintergrundwissen gegeben. Insbesondere scheint die Annahme eines Erklärungswertes der Husserlschen Unterscheidungen für die Hegel-Interpretation aber auch einen Entscheid bezüglich der Noema-Kontroverse bei D. Fallesdal, G. Küng und R. Sokolowski voraussetzen zu müssen. — Für eine Diskussion weiterer Aspekte dieser Fragestellung darf ich auf meinen *Kommentar zur 'Einleitung' der Phänomenologie des Geistes* verweisen, der 1987 bei Reclam erscheinen wird.

¹ For the full background see her collected papers: *The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection* (microfilm). Detroit 1986.

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To be sure, she sees Hegel's central contribution to be his dialectic of "freedom" or of "negativity". But where other Marxists such as her friend and colleague MARCUSE, or LUKACS, held that Hegel gives up freedom and negativity at the stage of his "absolutes", and thus grounded their "Hegelian" Marxism on earlier stages of his dialectic, DUNAYEVSKAYA plunges directly into Hegel's absolutes — whether in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Science of Logic* or the *Philosophy of Spirit* — as the source of her own "revolutionary dialectics". She grounds her Marxist humanism in what she terms "absolute negativity as new beginning". In her 1974 paper presented to the Hegel Society of America, she begins by quoting Hegel's *Science of Logic* on the absolute idea containing "the highest opposition in itself".²

As early as 1958, she had elaborated this view in relationship to political ferment in Eastern Europe, when she wrote: "Until the development of the totalitarian state the philosophic foundation of Marxism was not fully understood" because "we live in an age of absolutes — on the threshold of absolute freedom out of the struggle against absolute tyranny."³

But the full development of her concept of "Hegel's absolutes as new beginnings" came in her writings in the 1970's. After discussing "absolute negativity as new beginning" in both the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*, her *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973) then turns to the conclusion of the *Encyclopedia*, on absolute spirit, paragraph 577: "Finally, we are at 'the ultimate', the final syllogism. 'Suddenly' the sequence is broken . . . not only does Logic not become the mediating agent; Logic is replaced by the self-thinking Idea . . . the self-movement is ceaseless." (41-42)⁴ She writes further that: "The revolt that erupted in East Germany in 1953 and came to a climax in the Hungarian Revolution was articulated also in new points of departure in theory . . . It was as if the 'Absolute Universal', instead of being a beyond, an abstraction, was concrete and everywhere." (45) It is this part of Hegel that she finds the most "actual": "In Hegel's Absolutes there is embedded, though in abstract form, the fully developed 'social individual', to use MARX's phrase, and what Hegel called individuality 'purified of all that interfered with its universalism, i. e., freedom itself.' Freedom, to Hegel, was not only his point of departure; it was also his point of return. This was the bridge not only to MARX and LENIN but to the freedom struggles of our day." (43)

DUNAYEVSKAYA is well aware that even MARX "did not think" that it was "possible for another age to make a new beginning upon Hegel's Absolutes". (45). But MARX did not, she argues, live in an age of totalitarianism emerging out of post-revolutionary societies, specifically Stalinist Russia. That is our problematic today how-

² See R. Dunayevskaya: *Hegel's Absolute Idea as New Beginning*. In: *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*. Ed by W. Steinkraus and K. Schmitz. New Jersey and Sussex 1980. 163-175.

³ R. Dunayevskaya: *Marxism and Freedom. From 1776 Until Today*. New Jersey and Sussex 1982 (1958). 21, 23. The preface to this work was written by H. Marcuse.

⁴ R. Dunayevskaya: *Philosophy and Revolution. From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao*. New Jersey and Sussex 1982 (1973). See also the German translation: *Algebra der Revolution*. Wien 1981. Pagiration in parentheses is to the 1982 English edition.

ever, which necessitates a new look at Hegel: "What Hegel had shown were the dangers inherent in the French revolution, which did not end in the millenium. The dialectic disclosed that the counter-revolution is *within* the revolution. It is the greatest challenge that man has ever had to face." (287) Her most recent books, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (1982) and *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* (1985) have further concretized the concept of "absolute negativity as new beginning" for areas of contemporary concern in Marxist and feminist theory.

How is all of this to be assessed? Several U. S. Hegel scholars such as Louis DUFFÉ and GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY have argued that DUNAYEVSKAYA is very nearly "subverting" Hegel by substituting for Hegel's dialectic "an unchained dialectic" (KELLY). KELLY's comments and her spirited rejoinder on both Hegel and contemporary politics are excerpted in DUNAYEVSKAYA'S 1982 introduction to the second English edition of *Philosophy and Revolution*.

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