

ARNOLD MILLER
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17 November '86

Dear Rayo.

Greetings. I am enclosing a copy of my rendering of the last 4 paragraphs of the Encyclopedia which I made after noticing that Wallace had misread 'sic' for 'sick' in § 575. As it is my only copy and my typewriter is temporarily out of action would you be so kind as to let me have it back, or send me another.

When I was asked to translate the Phil. of Spirit Zusätze, it was left to Findlay to make any necessary corrections, but I did notice two places which I thought could be better translated.

§ 441. Instead of "it has a mode in its knowledge", a better rendering would be: "its knowing contains a determinateness." And at the end of the para: "and is the eternal movement of sublat[ing] this immediacy and being a rational knowing."

§ 445 4th para. Instead of: "But cognition is genuine,

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just as far as it realizes itself, or makes the concept
its own", I prefer: "But cognition is genuine just as
far as intelligence actualizes it, that is, explicates
the concept of cognition."

I enjoyed the Atlanta Conference and renewing
acquaintance with H.S.A. members. I had the pleasure
of meeting two of your students there. Is Matthew
Bagot one of your students? I met a number of
H.S.A. members and it is possible I may have got
their names confused, but I think it was Bagot who
mentioned you.

I look forward to hearing from you.

With best wishes

Arnold Miller

19 Dec. 86.

Dear Raya,

My letter has been returned as I sent it
to your old address. I should have checked
it in the spring number of the Owl.

Best wishes for 1987.

Arnold

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Typed copy of handwritten

November 17, 1986

Arnold Miller
Cranhams Lodge
Cranhams Lane
Cirencester
Glos. GL7 1UE

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AVM

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Hegel's Encyclopaedia

§ 574

This Notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the self-knowing Truth (§236); it is the logical Idea with the signification that it is the universality which has been authenticated in the concrete content which is its actuality. ~~The~~ Science has ^{§24} in this way returned into its beginning and the logical Idea is its result as the principle of spirit: in the disjunction [of the Idea] into presupposed extremes, the Notion was only implicit and the beginning was an immediate; but the logical Idea has raised itself out of this process and thus has risen above the phenomenal character belonging to it in that process into its pure principle which is also its proper element.

§ 575

It is this process of manifestation which in the first instance establishes the further development. The first manifestation is constituted by the sylogism which is based on the logical Idea as its starting-point and has Nature for its middle term which unites spirit with it. The Idea becomes Nature and Nature becomes spirit. Nature, which stands between spirit and its essence, does not, it is true, sunder them into extremes of finite abstraction, nor does it stand aloof from them as a self-subsistent Other which, as such, would only be a link between Others; for the syllogism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially determined as only a transition-point and negative moment and as implicitly the Idea; but the mediation of the Notion has the external form of transition and Science the form of a necessitated development, so that the freedom of the Notion as its union with itself is posited only in the one extreme.

§ 576

This manifestation is superseded in the second syllogism in so far as this is already the standpoint of spirit itself which is the mediator of the process, presupposing Nature and uniting it with the logical Idea. It is the syllogism, in the Idea, of Reflection at the level of spirit: Science appears as a subjective cognitive activity of which freedom is the aim and which is itself the way to its production.

§ 577

The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy which has self-knowing Reason, the absolute universal, for its middle term. This sunders itself into spirit and Nature, making the former its presupposition as the process of the subjective activity of the Idea, and the latter its universal extreme as the process of the unexplicated, objectively-existent, Idea. The self-disjunction of the Idea into the two manifestations (§§575-6) determines both as its (self-knowing Reason's) manifestations. In the Idea of philosophy these two are unified: that which moves forward and explicates itself is the nature of the whole process, the Notion, and yet this movement is no less the activity of the cognizing subject. The eternal Idea, its essence fully actualized, is eternally self-active as the eternal begetting and enjoyment of itself as absolute spirit.

*Note. In the fourth sentence of § 575 Wallace has misread 'sie' for 'sich' and has translated 'Nature . . . sunders itself' instead of 'Nature , . . sunders them'.

Dec. 12, 1986

Dear A.V. Miller,

I am sorry I didn't get to the HSA Conference this year; I would have loved to have met you, especially at this time when I am digging hard into a new interpretation of Hegel's Third Attitude to Objectivity. The Wallace translation is too "free" for the precise point at issue in P 76 on which I would like your comment. (I am enclosing the first six lines of the Wallace translation you used and the first six lines in the original German, Meiner publication.)

Could you tell me why the 1892 Wallace ^{translation} ~~edition~~ was used by you in 1975? Was it because of Findlay's preference? This is a question both of content and form, as well as the actual naming of Jacobi where Hegel did not single him out, but wrote against ~~the~~ ^{the original} "Recent German philosophy." (History of Philosophy) The important point is that Jacobi, who at one time seem to almost have been forgotten, had evidently gained a new type of fame, Hegel in the Preface writes: "The treatment of the attitudes of thought which I have distinguished in it was to meet an interest of the day."

It seems to me that when history enters--and history of course is dominant in the History of Philosophy--it is very clear that Hegel's distinction between Descartes and Jacobi lies both in the different historic periods, one, empiricism and intuitionism opening the doors wide to science as well as pronouncing the famous Cogito Ergo Sum; the other, Jacobi, coming after the Critical School, yet returning to faith pure, simple and whole. In actuality, Hegel is separating himself from all preceding philosophers, as was clear from the revolution in philosophy he wrought with Phenomenology of Mind. When it comes to the Third Attitude to Objectivity Hegel considers any move other than the Dialectic "reactionary"--and isn't Hegel's word regressive? (zuruckgekehrt)

I would greatly appreciate your comments.

Sincerely,

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Excerpts from
From Dialectics of Liberation / Summary of Smaller Logic
written by Raya Duvayevskaya 2/15/96

*Key are P 16 (revisions)
M. Phil. folder no
"introduced" GPP
on one side
sent*

Chapter Five--Third Attitude of Thought Towards the Objective World

To me, this chapter on what Hegel calls "Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge" and which is nearly entirely devoted to Jacobi, is the most important and essentially totally new as distinguished from the manner in which Hegel deals with the other schools of thought in his larger Logic. The newness comes not from the fact that he does not criticize Jacobi (and Fichte and Schelling), as devastatingly in the larger Logic, but in the sense that he has made a category out of it by devoting a chapter and by making that chapter occur when, to the ordinary mind, it would have appeared that from Kant he should have gone to his own dialectical philosophy. Hegel is telling us that one doesn't necessarily go directly to a higher stage, but may suddenly face a throw-back to a former stage of philosophy, which thereby is utterly "reactionary." (That's his word, reactionary.)

The first critique of Jacobi's philosophy is the analysis that even faith must be proved; otherwise there would be no way to distinguish in anyone's say-so whether it is something as grandiose as Christianity, or as backward as the worshiping of an ox. No words can substitute for Hegel's:

The term Faith brings with it the special advantage of reminding us of the faith of the Christian religion; it seems to include Christian faith, or perhaps even to coincide with it; and thus the Philosophy of Faith has a thoroughly pious and Christian look, on the strength of which it takes the liberty of uttering its arbitrary dicta with greater pretensions to authority. But we must not let ourselves be deceived by the semblance surreptitiously secured by means of a merely verbal similarity. The two things are radically distinct. Firstly, Christian faith comprises in it a certain authority of the church; but the faith of Jacobi's philosophy has no other authority than that of the philosopher who revealed it. And, secondly, Christian faith is objective, with a great deal of substance in the shape of a system of knowledge and doctrine; while the contents of the philosophic faith are so utterly indefinite, that, while its arms are open to receive the faith of the Christian, it equally includes a belief in the divinity of the Dalai Lama, the ox, or the monkey, thus, so far as it goes, narrowing Deity down to its simplest terms, to a Supreme Being. Faith itself, taken in the sense postulated by this system, is nothing but the sapless abstraction of immediate knowledge... (par. 63)

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(Continued)

You may recall (those of you who were with us when we split from Johnson) that we used this attitude as the thorough embodiment of Johnsonism, and in particular the series of letters he issued on the fact that we must "break with the old" and stick only to the "new" without ever specifying what is old and what is new, either in a class context or even in an immediate historic frame. This is what Hegel calls "exclusion of mediation" and he rises to his highest height in his critique of Jacobi when he states: "Its distinctive doctrine is that immediate knowledge alone, to the total exclusion of mediation, can possess a content which is true." (par. 65) He further expands this thought (par. 71):

The one-sidedness of the intuitional school has certain characteristics attending upon it, which we shall proceed to point out in their main features, ~~now~~ that we have discussed the fundamental principle. The first of these corollaries is as follows. Since the criterion of truth is found, not in the character of the content, but in the fact of consciousness, all alleged truth has no other basis than subjective knowledge and the assertion that we discover a certain fact in our consciousness. What we discover in our own consciousness is thus exaggerated into a fact of the consciousness of all, and even passed off for the very nature of the mind.

A few paragraphs later ^(par. 76) is where Hegel uses the term "reactionary" -- "reactionary nature of the school of Jacobi. His doctrine is a return to the modern starting point of the metaphysic in the Cartesian Philosophy." You must remember that Hegel praises Descartes as the starting point of philosophy, and even shows a justification for any metaphysical points in it just because it had broken new ground. But what he cannot forgive is that in his own period, after we had already reached Kantian philosophy, one should turn backward:

The modern doctrine on the one hand makes no change in the Cartesian method of the usual scientific knowledge, and conducts on the same plan the experimental and finite sciences that have sprung from it. But, on the other hand, when it comes to the science which has infinity for its scope, it throws aside the method, and thus, as it knows no other, it rejects all methods. It abandons itself to the control of a wild, capricious and fantastic dogmatism, to a moral prig- gishness and pride of feeling, or to an excessive opining and reasoning which is loudest against philosophy and philo- sophic themes. Philosophy of course tolerates no mere asser- tions, or conceits, or arbitrary fluctuations of inference to and fro. (par. 77)

* * *

Hegel's Logic from Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences Wallace translation

Paragraph 76 (p. 109)

If we view the maxims of immediate knowledge in connection with the uncritical metaphysic of the past from which we started, we shall learn from the comparison the reactionary nature of the school of Jacobi. His doctrine is a return to the modern starting point of this metaphysic in the Cartesian philosophy. Both Jacobi and Descartes maintain the following three points:...

Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830) Felix Meiner
1959

Paragraph 76 (p. 99)

In Beziehung auf den Ausgangspunkt, die oben sogenannte unbefangene Metaphysik, das Prinzip des unmittelbaren Wissens betrachtet, so ergibt sich aus der Vergleichung, daß dasselbe zu jenem Anfang, den diese Metaphysik in der neuern Zeit als Cartesische Philosophie genommen hat, zurückgekehrt ist. In beiden ist behauptet:...

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