

1/5/97

RANDOM THOUGHTS ON 2 RESPONSES TO MY LETTER ON THE IDEA OF COGNITION

BY DUPRE AND GA KELLY, though they both agree with me because they are non-Leninists (and religious) they are very different when it comes to what they agree with.

Thus, Dupre says that he has looked at the Hegel text as well as my interpretation and disagreement in relationship to Lenin being wrong. He nevertheless sees no conflict in Hegel between the Logic and Smaller Logic, since even in the Smaller (para. 235) Hegel makes it clear that though practical will overcomes the one-sidedness of theoretical, the Absolute Idea does a lot more than achieving will; ~~it leads to the Absolute Idea,~~ whereupon he quotes para. (236) that says that only the unity of subjective and objective "is the absolute and all truth". Whereupon he concludes "hence neither Logic supports Lenin's interpretation."


That is when he gets into ~~my~~ my interpretation of Absolute Spirit which "is a more complex issue. I do (not) think, though some interpreters do, that the Absolute Spirit can be so radically identified with the Absolute Idea as I thought you were willing to do." Nevertheless he agrees with me (which is more than GAK will do) that "the eternal idea is ceaseless motion, the movement itself," whereupon he begins disagreeing: "But I no longer follow you when you call the eternal idea 'revolution in permanence'. Your social interpretation is, in my opinion, not supported by Hegel's text. The entire concept of social revolution belongs to the practical order which itself is never absolute. I suspect that the real answer to your question lies in the Philosophy of Right."

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(Be very sure to re-read the last part of this paragraph, which claims that Marxism is a reduction of what Hegel places within the Absolute Spirit to a mere 'ideology' -- as Marx openly admitted. At that point, however, interpretation becomes transformation.)

* Not a rule
* Fairly
* comes to

At that point ~~my interpretation with~~ ^{he rejects} para. 577 as being any sort of "entrance to the new society". I would rather read it as an entrance into philosophy."



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In contrast, Kelly starts in great good humor and makes clear to begin with that not being a "Leninologist" and not having read his notes on Hegel for many years, he isn't really clear, but feels he agrees with me on my critique, since "practice and volition were of higher value to him than 'the Absolute' or indeed 'Das Denken', promising me he will write in greater detail after he has had a chance "to match the thoroughness..." that I supposedly achieved. Whereupon he makes it clear that disagreement with me on Lenin is not any sort of endorsement of my interpretation of Hegel: "who, for me, is ~~not~~ a revolutionary philosopher in the sense of comprehending the Absolute either as 'the new society' or as 'ceaseless motion ... that permanent revolution'. He is a revolutionist in his claim for knowing and the manner of those claims; ~~and they cannot be denied a presumed impact on society.~~" After which, he begs off because we would just be rehearsing "our old debate".

GAK then says that what he is really talking about is the question of the relationship of ~~the~~ objective and Absolute and that objective to Hegel is history, politics, social and "as such it seems a part of nature even preponderantly so, and lends itself to the Marxist ('reversion')". He gives credit to Marx in only one claim and that is "Hegel's true interest is not the Philosophy of Right but Logic ... Logic is not used to prove the nature of the state, but the state is used to prove the Logic." (Kelly is referring to O'Malley's translation of Marx's "Critique of Right," p. 18)

(This last para. shows him more religious than even Dupré and even than Hegel. Work it out.)

He also quotes in German from the Philosophy of Right the z. ~~1st~~ para. 13. I will leave Cieskowski be.