

When, in my notes on Nov. 7, 1986, I diverted from p. 95 to return to a page of previous attitudes, specifically the Critical, as well as to the 3 Final Syllogisms and, of all things, J's Notes on the Dialectic, I was really talking in as disorganized a manner as Random Thoughts are generally, rather than following through with the 3rd Attitude as Hegel discusses it on p. 96, i.e. para. 62. There are, after that, paras 63 to 78 before that attitude is completed. The point is that, beginning with para. 63, the question of Faith and Intuition are too often "subjected to arbitrary use, under no better guidance than the conception and distinctions of psychology, without any investigation into their nature and motion which is the main question, after all." Hegel insists that if one is going to qualify intuition "as intellectual, we must really mean intuition which thinks..." His whole point, then, (and it continues on p. 98) is that he makes a very sharp distinction between the abstract expression of a "Supreme Being" and Christianity which proves itself and has an organizational expression in the Church.

Now whether you go into the <sup>details</sup> of 64 to 72 about the one-sidedness of the intuitional school or skip directly to para. 72, the point still is on the necessity of proof. Thus, continuing the rejection of abstractions like Supreme Being: "A second corollary which results from holding immediacy of consciousness to be the criterion of truth is that all superstition or idolatry is allowed to be truth, and that an apology is prepared for any contents of the will, however wrong and immoral. It is because he believes in them, and not from the reasoning and syllogism of what is termed mediate knowledge, that the Hindu finds God in the cow, the monkey, the Brahmin, or the Lama."

The essence of his sharp attack on Jacobi is that Descartes was right because it was the starting point for modern philosophy, but it is absolutely wrong "to return to this modern starting point or this metaphysic in the Cartesian philosophy". He then goes into the 3 points on which Jacobi and Descartes agree: 1) "Cogito, ~~ergo~~ ergo sum" at which point Hegel notes parenthetically "(Descartes, in fact, is careful to state that ~~by~~ by thought he means consciousness in general.) This inseparability is the absolutely first and most certain knowledge, not mediated or demonstrated."

" 2) The inseparability of existence from the conception of God: the former is necessarily implied in the latter, or the conception never can be without the attribute of existence which is thus necessary and eternal." At this point, Hegel footnotes all of Descartes' and also Spinoza.

" 3) The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things."

In a word, the whole attack is very, very deeply rooted against anything, whether Cartesian or Jacobi or Spinoza that roots its philosophy in "unproved postulates, which it assumes to be unprovable, proceeds to wider and wider details of knowledge and thus gave rise to sciences of modern times. The modern theory (of Jacobi), on the contrary, (para. 62) has come to what is intrinsically a most important conclusion, that cognition proceeding as it must by finite mediation can know only the finite ...."

As against this, Hegel concludes naturally "philosophy, of course tolerates no mere assertion or conceit, and checks the free play of argumentative seesaw." It is for this that Hegel called Jacobi a reactionary and ended the whole attack with this final sentence, before going to ~~Logic itself~~ Logic itself: "Strictly speaking, in the resolve that wills pure thought, this requirement is accomplished by freedom which, abstracting from everything, grasps its pure abstraction, the simplicity of thought."