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ROSA LUXEMBURG, WOMEN'S LIBERATION, AND MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF REVOLUTION by Raya Dunajevskaya: Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982. Pp. xii, 234.

Everyone feels in his soul that we live in troubling days of capitalist contradiction. Profit-making presses prefer texts of Marxiology to other political works. Urban bookstores shun the classics of history, but provide large shelves for "Marxist studies," "women studies," "black studies," and "astrology, religion, and philosophy" (*sic*). Although mainly rebuffed by economics departments, Marxism has made a discreet entry (often in weird partnerships) to philosophy and literary criticism. A good deal of crude Marxist imagination and vocabulary has conquered the speech habits of "the brighter students." Yet the work of

Raya Dunayevskaya has been unjustly neglected. I can think of only one good reason why this should be so: academic smugness. Those who cultivate the grapes rarely share the table with those who sniff and drink the wine. Yet it is more profitable to engage with this writer in essential dialogue about the world's prospects than with countless others who are more popular or more prestigious. While fine-tuned Marxist commentaries keep being churned out, Dunayevskaya, who has been a revolutionary militant for fifty years, gives us The Acts of the Apostles.

She is not a "socialist of the chair"—one can scarcely imagine her sitting down. She is what might be called in archaic parlance an agitator or political journalist. Most of her activity has been in Detroit, where she has been involved, at close quarters or from afar, in decades of the tangled politics of the Extreme Left—from the heroic days of the CIO to those of the NBFO (National Black Feminist Organization). She is a compendium of who-is-who in liberation movements from Zanzibar to Tirana and from Teheran to Lima. She is an intellectual of the barricades. Yet she prefers to work in an atmosphere of argument, persuasion, and freedom. That much is demonstrated by her concern for scholarship, historical accuracy, and (by her lights) philosophical consistency. Those interested in her life and work and her many fascinating associations may consult the collection of papers she has deposited in the Labor Archives of the Wayne State University.

Since Dunayevskaya's years have been spent in the nitty-gritty struggles of the Marxist revolutionary movement to expand its strength and correct its tendencies, she has never catered to her own self-advancement. Aside from a great deal of fugitive journalism, she has published four books: *Marxism and Freedom; Philosophy and Revolution; Nationalism, Communism, Marxist-Humanism and the Afro-Asian Revolutions;* and the volume under review. In proper Marxist style, each of these works is a mixture of agitprop and philosophy. They are written to urge and obtain a commitment. But they are not wooly-headed books at all: they are an effort to transcribe for intellectuals what the straight and true path of Marxism is and to show how the society for which Marx fought and made philosophical provision is laboring to be born in all corners of the earth. Admittedly, Dunayevskaya does not express her views in cool, value-free sentences. She follows her master, who castigated academic writing in his own doctoral thesis on Democritus and Epicurus. If we do not meet "lackeys" or "running dogs," we will find "tail-enders" and "abysmal opportunism" and an "exploitative, racist, alienating system," etc. After hacking through this

special argot of insult (which is, after all, the mark of a life chosen and lived according to a certain protocol), one confronts a thinker of great interest.

We need to locate Dunayevskaya in the galaxy of Marxism. She is, by her own declaration, a "Marxist humanist." This means, first of all, that she is a fervent advocate of the human being as maker of himself, rejecting thought of any higher intelligence or higher creation (in Kolakowski's words, "the self-deification of mankind"). It means, secondly, that she places heavy stress on the developmental continuity of Marx's project and writings, and insists on the importance of the Paris manuscripts, where, according to the author, are to be found in embryonic philosophical clarity the claims by which Marxism is privileged to become the "science" for a variety of worldwide movements of liberation, however disparate they might seem to the naive observer. Third, it means a resounding rupture between the true Marx and the leaky legacy left to his followers by Friedrich Engels. Not only did Engels bequeath to the communist movement a mechanical and complacent tendency, but he misread and distorted Marx's interpretation of the man-woman relationship in his work on *The Origin of the Family*. According to the author, a careful reading of Marx's 1844 text in conjunction with the newly available *Ethnological Notebooks* sets the matter straight. Similarly, Marx, against the orthodoxy that prevailed in the Second International, was prepared to favor socialist revolution in underdeveloped countries without any bourgeois interlude. Thus, according to Dunayevskaya, Marx's thought provides for a more diverse panorama of liberation than many of his principal lieutenants had believed possible or desirable. Colonialized nations, racial minorities, females are all privileged to consult the corpus of uncontaminated Marxism for an identification of their role in the evolution of mankind from slavery to freedom. They must not, however, mistake or forsake his irrefutable insights (this was a problem for Rosa Luxemburg). "Our age," Dunayevskaya writes, "has the advantage in that we finally are in possession of nearly *all* of Marx's works" (p. 121).

Dunayevskaya respects dialectical philosophy as the truth of the world. She does not believe that Marx ever deviated from his early humanistic formulation: his philosophical anchorage can be identified from the early writings through the *Grundrisse* to *Capital* and the *Gotha Program*; and that is decisive for today's revolutionary movements. She attributes to Marx "one dialectical conceptual framework . . . masses in motion—a living, feeling, thinking, acting whole" (p. 119). "No doubt, ",

she adds, "a gap in the knowledge of Marxists resulted from the failure to know the *Grundrisse*" (p. 140). The world and its revolutionary acts are to be interpreted through what the author calls "Absolute Method." This is, first of all, an appropriation of the revelation that Lenin had in Zurich when he first read Hegel's *Logic* and annotated it; second it is an extension of the rapprochement of Hegel and Marx presented in Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution*. It is, especially, a follow-up to Marx's famous sentence on Hegel: "The greatness of Hegel's *Phenomenology* . . . is the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle. "To me," the author declares, "philosophy did not mean dialectics only 'in general,' but, very specifically, 'negation of the negation,' which Marx had called 'a new Humanism'." This might seem a dogmatic and slanted employment of Hegelian resources.

The focus of this book is announced to be Rosa Luxemburg and her revolutionary connection with the feminist consciousness. We are told that this connection can be taken further than is commonly supposed. The personality of Luxemburg, her position in international socialism, her courage, and her pathos are well expressed in the earlier chapters. A principal point that Dunayevskaya wishes to make is that (*pace* Nettl, Luxemburg's excellent biographer) Luxemburg was a totally liberated woman who did not go into a decline following the rupture of her liaison with Leo Jogiches, but went forward to ever more productive activity. This is demonstrated very convincingly. The book is not, however, really about Rosa Luxemburg: rather, it is about some of the lessons that she teaches as much through her errors as her indomitable will. Luxemburg was a first-class revolutionary who got her economics a bit wrong, could not reconcile philosophy with organization, and, in fact, suffered from "near tone-deafness in philosophy" (p. 120).

The teleological relentlessness of "Absolute Method" is very discerning in producing arch-villains, villains, mixed types, and heroes. The villains are legion: Engels, Bernstein, Kautsky, Plekhanov, numerous Mensheviks, the virtual whole of the SPD, Sartre, Althusser, and, it goes without saying, Stalin and all his progeny. There are ancillary, unwitting heroes like various Abolitionists, American black women, and radical feminists who never read much Marx. And there are persons who were equipped for greatness if they had not harbored various blindnesses: Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Herbert Marcuse. Marx, however, is sufficient unto the day if read correctly and with emphasis on the right texts. All strategies of struggle need to be submitted to his canonical authority.

What does a nonbeliever make of all this? In my judgment, this is an intelligent, though excessively polemical and optimistic, tract. After reading all of Raya Dunayevskaya's books that presume to gather all the wretched of the earth beneath the umbrella of "Absolute Method," referring all their individual and collective frustrations and desperations to works that Marx left unpublished and a discovery that Lenin made in the library, I cannot say that the messy world looks much clearer. Marxism (never mind other "liberations") is today so split into separate and warring chapels that it resembles Protestantism and liberalism, and probably also Catholicism. It is also "for rent" to forces beyond it. The great "-isms" are in trouble. The earth is not, I think, embarked on any privileged, though sanguinary, journey toward what Dunayevskaya considers fitting and humane. Moreover, like most contemporary progressivists, she cannot imagine or portray (except in the most abstract terms) what it would be like for all human beings to live together with equality, dignity, autonomy, and justice. She rejoins her antagonist Bernstein: the end is dim, the process is all. I suspect that in order to survive tomorrow, survivors of today will have to forsake most of their visions of what we might become. They will have to think in terms of what we must do in order to stay. But reading this book could profit them.

—George Armstrong Kelly
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sta agli inani tentativi di chi ritiene possibile determinare l'essere nella presunta fluidità di un dinamismo interiore o, quantomeno, coglierne il movimento fenomenologico. Si tratta, insomma, della non riducibilità di due livelli di conoscenza, l'una, nonostante gli evidenti limiti teoretici, saldamente radicata nel farsi quotidiano di un'azione raramente problematizzata, ovvero non svincolata dal dato della contingenza immediata, l'altra, proprio per il suo alto grado di problematicità, disancorata dall'effettualità dell'esistenza e proiettata in sfere che, alla fine, non sono in grado di comprendere il concreto del vivere. Ma se la servetta tracia ride dell'inanità dell'impegno del teoreta, il quale, all'atto pratico non mostra capacità nell'agire, il teoreta, tutt'al più, può sorridere del «sano intelletto» della servetta, incapace di penetrarne, malgrado l'apparente evidenza, il profondo delle motivazioni. Su un piano più direttamente psicologico, si tratta dello scontrarsi di due atteggiamenti nei confronti dell'esistenza connotati da un forte senso di «superiorità», cioè dalla reciproca percezione dell'altrui «inferiorità». Il riso della serva e il sorriso del filosofo sono i fenomeni esteriori di tale sentimento abbarbicato nell'intimo della coscienza singola. Il filosofo si stacca dell'immediatezza del sentire per spostarsi sul versante complesso dell'intelligere: la servetta ignora la possibilità medesima di quella complessità, legata com'è al centro dell'essere. Due forme, insomma, inconciliabili di «razionalità», il cui affermarsi è rispettivamente dovuto alla priorità che viene attribuita o al dato conoscitivo a cui la ricerca, svincolata da contingenze determinate di breve respiro, può condurre, o alla funzionalità di una strumentazione atta a muoversi «proficuamente» nell'ambito delimitato della solida utilità quotidiana. In fondo, la storia della ricezione della caduta del filosofo nel pozzo non può concludersi, poiché non può concludersi il divenire del pensiero umano.

Fabio Bazzani

R. DUNAYEVSKAYA, *Filosofia e rivoluzione*, trad. it. di M. Fugazza e A. Vigorelli, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1977, pp. 312; cfr. R. DUNAYEVSKAYA, *Rosa Luxemburg, women's liberation and Marx's philosophy of revolution*, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1982, pp. 234.

Pubblicato originariamente all'inizio degli anni Settanta, Filosofia e rivoluzione ha rappresentato e continua a rappresentare uno dei più significativi esempi di una recezione di Hegel operata al di fuori del marxismo accademico. L'autrice, già nota al lettore italiano per la pubblicazione della sua altra importante opera (trad. it. 1962) è nata in Russia, ma si «trasferì ancora bambina negli Stati Uniti. Agli anni 1937-38 risale la sua conoscenza di Trockij, che influenzò notevolmente parte della sua produzione intellettuale e di cui fu segretaria e collaboratrice durante l'esilio messicano. Tornata negli USA sviluppò, maturando un sempre più marcato distacco dalle posizioni trotskiste, una analisi della realtà sovietica sulla base di un minuzioso esame delle ideeguida dei primi tre piani quinquennali: in tale ricerca veniva messo in rilievo non soltanto il carattere burocratico e dispotico del regime staliniano, ma anche e soprattutto il suo definirsi come uno stadio del tutto nuovo del capitalismo mondiale. Tra il 1942 ed il 1943 pubblicò i risultati di questa sua indagine sul capitalismo di stato sovietico in una serie di articoli apparsi su riviste americane; l'impatto delle tesi della Dunayevskaya fu estremamente vasto sullo scenario della riflessione politico-economica della sinistra internazionale e se ne ritrova traccia anche in quegli autori che, proprio in quegli anni, cominciavano ad occuparsi delle nuove ed inquietanti forme assunte dal totalitarismo (ad es., A. Koestler).

Negli anni Quaranta e Cinquanta partecipò attivamente alle lotte del movimento operaio americano e iniziò quell'itinerario teorico che la porterà, nel 1958, alla sua prima rilettura in chiave umanistica del marxismo, significativamente accostata alle analisi compiute da H. Marcuse in Soviet Marxism, che fu pubblicato nello stesso anno (Marxism and Freedom... from 1776 to Today assieme a Philosophy and Revolution è stato recentemente ristampato negli Stati Uniti in occasione del centesimo anniversario della morte di Marx).

Nel 1955, dopo una lunga militanza nella sinistra americana, la Dunayevskaya costituì a Detroit l'organizzazione marxista-umanista «New & Letters», il cui omonimo organo di stampa esce tuttora; in essa è presente in modo esplicito il riconoscimento della funzione direttamente politica, «organizzativa» della filosofia. Nel rapporto sulla organizzazione del Plenum del New and Letter Committees, citato da M. Fugazza e A. Vigorelli nella introduzione alla versione italiana di Filosofia e rivoluzione, si legge infatti che ciò che distingue originalmente questo movimento è il connubio tra «una forma di organizzazione di comitato che comprende sia lavoratori che intellettuali, sia neri che bianchi, sia uomini che donne, [in cui] la filosofia non è un ingrediente aggiunto. E' il nucleo centrale» (cit., p. 9). Va ricordato tuttavia come il rapporto tra filosofia e pratica risalga nell'elaborazione teorica dell'autrice, al suo primo approfondimento dello studio del pensiero di Hegel che si era già concretizzato nel 1953 con la pubblicazione delle sue Lettere sull'idea assoluta di Hegel. E' significativo a questo punto rimarcare come, di lì a poco, il riconoscimento della necessità di una rilettura del rapporto Hegel-Marx ed in particolare del tema della dialettica e della contraddizione si affermasse in un orizzonte teorico segnato dalla crisi della vecchia ortodossia marxista-leninista (basti qui ricordare esemplificativamente il recupero della Fenomenologia dello spirito come strumento per una lettura della patologia borghese nella costituzione filosofica della critica dell'economia, o i pionieristici lavori di G. Lukàcs e di H. Marcuse).

«Perché Hegel, perché ora?»: ancora ponendo questa domnada la Dunayevskaya aprirà, nel 1973, il capitolo iniziale di Philosophy and Revolution. From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao, dove l'attualità di Hegel viene colta nella centralità dle concetto di assoluto e nella possibilità di utilizzare il momento della negazione della negazione come un formidabile strumento interpretativo dei processi rivoluzionari del presente: «Ciò che fa di Hegel un contemporaneo è lo stesso motivo che lo rendeva così attuale per Marx: l'efficacia della dialettica della negatività per un periodo di rivoluzione proletaria, proprio come per quell'epoca di "gestazione" in cui Hegel era vissuto. [...] Il suo metodo assoluto ha una forza di attrazione straordinaria perché il nostro bisogno di teoria deriva dalla globalità della crisi attuale [...] E' ormai tempo di affrontare Hegel sul suo stesso terreno, il metodo assoluto, che sappiamo in costante movimento ed insieme così "inflessibile" da non piegarsi ad alcuna sostanza assoluta. E ciò proprio perché è la dialettica del soggetto

to, il continuo processo del divenire, il metodo dell'"assoluta negatività", cioè dell'automovimento, autoattività ed autosuperamento (trad. it., cit., pp. 18, 19).

Questa lettura di Hegel — che ne mette in rilievo da un lato l'interpretazione umanistica datane da Marx e dall'altro lato la valutazione politico-rivoluzionaria leniniana — mira dunque a riaffermare come la filosofia non si ponga come semplice rispecchiamento esterno del reale, bensì sia già interna ad esso. Ciò che costituisce la novità teorica di questo libro è la messa in luce della essenzialità della interpretazione leniniana della filosofia di Hegel (nei Quaderni filosofici) ed in particolare della identificazione dell'idea assoluta con il movimento «dalla pratica alla teoria». Un altro punto che sembra importante richiamare è la considerazione della filosofia come fenomenologia delle «nuove forze e delle nuove passioni», vale a dire come fenomenologia dei nuovi soggetti che si prefigurano a partire dagli anni Sessanta. Commentando quel passo della Scienza della logica in cui Hegel definisce la negazione della negazione come «il semplice punto di riferimento negativo a sè, l'intima fonte di ogni attività, di ogni spontaneo movimento della vita e dello spirito, l'anima dialettica che ogni vero possiede in se stesso e per cui soltanto è un vero; perocché solo su questa soggettività riposa il togliere dell'opposizione tra concetto e realtà e quell'unità che è la verità» (trad. it. di A. Moni e C. Cesa, Bari 1974², Vol. II, p. 948), l'autrice rimarca non solo il ruolo che questa soggettività riveste in Hegel, ma sottolinea con forza anche come l'impatto hegeliano si riveli realmente dirompente quando, una volta raggiunto il vertice dell'assoluto, viene ad essere colpita addirittura la assoluta negatività.

L'Hegel tratteggiato dalla Dunayevskya e la stessa rilettura di Marx, Lenin, Trockij, Mao, Sartre, risentono fortemente della attenzione che l'autrice pone ad una formulazione originale sia del concetto di politico (e di rivoluzione come movimento reale e polo dialettico rispetto alla filosofia) sia del concetto di soggetto che emerge nei movimenti radicali della nostra epoca (negri, studenti, donne, giovani) così pure come nelle lotte di liberazione dei popoli africani e nelle rivolte dei paesi dell'Est: questi movimenti sono l'oggetto della terza ed ultima parte di questo libro spesso provocatorio, ma che recentemente offre interessanti elementi di riflessione su questioni non irrilevanti del pensiero filosofico-politico contemporaneo.

La ridefinizione dell'antagonismo sociale nelle forme dei mutamenti di fondo intervenuti a livello della soggettività moderna (su base socio-antropologica) sembra inoltre costituire l'elemento di raccordo tra le tesi della Dunayevskaya e le più recenti formulazioni della cosiddetta "teoria dei bisogni": in entrambi i casi viene infatti messa in discussione una concezione del marxismo come teoria oggettiva della transizione, come metodo lineare del processo rivoluzionario, a cui viene contrapposta la maturità già politica dei soggetti sociali antagonisti; ma la radicale dissoluzione del politico tradizionale che ne consegue non sembra confrontarsi con la dimensione progettuale, che aggetta fortemente verso problematiche proprie della sfera dell'etico, altrimenti ripresa in parte della riflessione della sinistra europea.

Nell'ultimo libro dedicato a Rosa Luxemburg, women's liberation and Marx's philosophy of revolution viene da un lato compiuta un'attenta ricognizione della "dimensione femminista" della figura e dell'opera di R. Luxemburg (finora trascurata sia dagli studiosi marxisti sia da quelli non-marxisti) e dall'altro lato viene messa in luce la importanza della analisi del ruolo della donna negli ultimi scritti di Marx. La Dunayevskaya sottolinea come R. Luxemburg abbia sollevato in maniera precorritrice un problema ancora ampiamente presente nei movimento di liberazione della donna degli ultimi decenni, vale a dire quello della "spontaneità" e della sua connessione con la forma-partito, ovvero quella che viene indicata come «la questione della autonomia». Dopo una accurata ricostruzione dei movimenti più significativi della biografia della Luxemburg compiuta nella prima parte dell'opera (dalla rivoluzione del 1905 alla rottura, nel 1910-111, con Kautsky, alla polemica con Lenin, alla teoria dell'accumulazione del capitale e della crisi), la Dunayevskaya si sofferma soprattutto nel capitolo VII del libro sulla connessione tra «questione femminile» e lotta contro il riformismo, nella cui prospettiva l'autrice riconsidera anche il rapporto tra R. Luxemburg e C. Zetkin: «la loro comunanza rivoluzionaria si mantenne su tutte le posizioni per due decenni: dalla lotta contro il riformismo alla lotta contro il militarismo, alla lotta contro la burocratizzazione dei sindacati alla opposizione alla guerra» (cit., p. 90).

Un altro motivo di interesse di questo libro è costituito da una rivalutazione della opera marxiana che contesta la validità di cesure tra il giovane Marx ed il Marx degli anni dell amaturità L'autrice inizia a compiere la sua ricostruzione riprendendo alcuni dei temi già presenti nelle sue opere precenti: la trasformazione della "rivoluzione filosofica" hegeliana nella filosofia della rivoluzione di Marx, i tratti più salienti del «nuovo umanesimo» marxista, per giungere, sulla base della recente trascrizione degli Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (a cura di L. Krader, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1972) a riconsiderare il ruolo che le questioni sollevate dall'antropologia e dall'etnologia della seconda metà dell'Ottocento ebbero nello sviluppo del pensiero di Marx: «Come il giovane Marx, nel suo primo rivolgersi all'economia, scoprì il proletariato come soggetto che sarebbe stato "becchino del capitalismo" e guida della rivoluzione proletaria, così alla fine Marx fece scoperte ancora più nuove allorché si indirizzò agli studi antropologici della Ancient Society di Morgan» (it., p. XI).

E' noto che le tesi di Morgan segnarono un decisivo momento nello sviluppo dell'etnologia come scienza autonoma e che da esse, e dalle ricerche di Bachofen su Mutterrecht, Engels trasse spunto ne L'origine della famiglia, della proprietà privata e dello Stato (1884) per dimostrare la consistenza delle tesi marxiane sulla transitorietà della organizzazione familiare borghese. Tuttavia l'autrice mette in rilievo, proprio attraverso un'attenta disamina degli Ethnological Notebookes, come il testo engelsiano sia tutt'altro che la «esecuzione del lascito» marxiano: in essi si evidenzia infatti come per Marx, a differenza di Engels, elementi della oppressione in generale, e di quella della donna in particolare, si creino anche ell'interno del comunismo primitivo e non siamo quindi correlati soltanto al superamento del matriarcato.

In opposizione ai tentativi degli ultimi anni di ritrovare nel testo marxiano la presenza di «più Marx», la Dunayevskaya ribadisce il carattere compatto, pur nella ricchezza delle articolazioni, dell'impresa marxiana; gli Ethnological Notebooks rappresentano per l'autrice non soltanto un importante momento della produzione matura, ma contribuiscono anche a «far luce sull'opera



marxiana come totalità. [...] Con l'analisi delle opere dedicate alle società primitive [...] Marx si immerse nello studio dello sviluppo umano in differenti periodi storici e nella fondamentale relazione uomo-donna. Egli tiene però fermi concetti già elaborati nei suoi Manoscritti Economico-filosofici del 1844» *(cit., p. 190).*

Valeria E. Russo

Fattori da Magenta a Montebello.
Catalogo della Mostra al Cisternino del Poccianti di Livorno, a cura di C. Bonagura, L. Dinelli e L. Bernardini, Roma, De Luca, 1983, pp. 395, L. 20.000.

«Storia e arte» più che «storia dell'arte» è il principio informatore del puntuale e ponderoso volume Fattori da Magenta a Montebello, *che accompagnava la recente omonima mostra organizzata dal Comune di Livorno presso il Cisternino del Poccianti. Per chiarire meglio il significato e l'impostazione del lavoro condotto da Cristina Bonagura, Laura Dinelli e Luciano Bernardini, occorre però fare piuttosto riferimento al più ampio progetto di ricerca posto sotto l'egida dell'*Archivio dei Macchiaioli, *il centro diretto da Dario Durbé che, oltre a curare il catalogo generale degli artisti del movimento, si esprime anche attraverso una collana editoriale in cui la publicazione livornese si inserisce come numero 8. L'*Archivio dei Macchiaioli *si pone infatti come esempio di metodo per la raccolta dei documenti — figurativi e non — e l'analisi dei fatti — sociali, culturali, politici — legati allo sviluppo delle tendenze artistiche, secondo un rigoroso intento storico-documentario.*
Emblematica di tale metodologia critica è, direi, la sezione dedicata, nel volume, al «Clima del '59». Il 1859, anno di gran peso nella storia del Risorgimento italiano, rappresenta in Toscana, ad un tempo, l'euforia per l'indipendenza raggiunta e il timore di un decadimento della coesione politica intorno all'ideale unitario. La rievocazione di tale temperie attraverso la documentazione relativa al concorso, bandito dal Governo provvisorio toscano guidato dal Ricasoli, per l'esecuzione di varie opere d'arte (dipinti, monumenti, medaglie) celebrative delle virtù culturali, patriottiche e militari italiane, illumina reciprocamente le vicende storiche e artistiche, dando quindi perfettamente conto — grazie anche ad un sapore quasi cronachistico — dell'urgenza e della penetrazione della politica nella cultura e nel quotidiano, in un reale, popolare e soprattutto non usurato senso di politica culturale.
Fattori, come è noto, partecipa e vince nella sezione del concorso riservata ad un dipinto relativo alla battaglia di Magenta. Ma prima di giungere ad analizzare le genesi e la realizzazione dell'opera fattoriana, gli autori ci inseriscono appunto in quel «clima» senza il quale l'interpretazione pittorica non avrebbe potuto essere che artisticamente legnosa e concettualmente «pompier».
Accanto alle preoccupazioni politiche in senso stretto troviamo così l'impegno a favorire il contributo di letterati e artisti al programma di governo, mosso anche dalla lucida consapevolezza che — come ebbe a scrivere in seguito il Poggi nelle sue Memorie del Governo della Toscana — *«i subitanei sconvolgimenti avevano prodotto gravi sconcerti e tolto agli uni e agli altri molte occasioni di lavoro».*
Un'affermazione questa di sconcertante e ammirevole realismo: non puntare solo sull'adesione delle forze culturalmente progressive, ma allargare la base del consenso ponendosi come nuovo pubblico dell'arte, e quindi come nuovo punto di riferimento per i suoi contenuti.
Se l'idea era teoricamente perfetta, nondimeno si scontrava con la realtà della preparazione e della sensibilità degli artisti che voleva sollecitare. Indirettamente, lo rileva con onestà uno di essi, Carlo Della Porta, commentando negativamente, in una lettera al Ricasoli, l'iniziativa di inserirlo nella commissione giudicatrice: «...Noi siamo artisti di piccole produzioni o ascetiche o romantiche o anacreontiche, o di genere, o siam semplici ritrattisti!». Sfogliando le pagine con le riproduzioni delle opere proposte dai concorrenti, si vede bene come anche a questi ultimi si attagliasse il giudizio espresso dal Della Porta su di sé e sui colleghi in giuria: la tendenza che prevale è quella di una interpretazione aneddotica o quanto meno insistitamente realistica del tema risorgimentale, anche nel caso in cui la classe di concorso prescelta non fosse quella riservata ai «quadri di costumi militari».
Al contrario Fattori, già tutelato da tale inflessione «lombarda» grazie alla frequentazione dell'avvertito ambiente fiorentino del Caffè Michelangelo e dalla personale esperienza di pittura di «macchia» dal vero condotta proprio — in quello stesso 1859 — su soggetti militari, ebbe un'ulteriore spinta verso un concreto realismo dalla contemporanea fortunata coincidenza dell'incontro con Giovanni Costa. Alla positiva influenza dell'artista romano, in generale sulla pittura toscana e specificamente su Fattori nel decisivo momento dell'elaborazione della Battaglia di Magenta, *lo stesso maestro livornese dedica più volte spazio nelle sue pagine autobiografiche: luoghi famosi, puntualmente citati dalla letteratura storico-artistica, fino nella manualistica corrente. Nondimento, rispetto agli esempi precedenti, gli estensori del catalogo livornese si distinguono per una maggiore organicità nell'esame del rapporto tra i due pittori, non limitandosi ad evidenziare isolatamente i dati già noti, ma istituendo stimolanti confronti diretti tra le rispettive opere eseguite intorno al 1860, anno del comune soggiorno a Livorno.*
Di particolare interesse, infine, la sezione del volume dedicata ai ritratti eseguiti da Fattori tra il 1860 ed il '62 non celebrati capolavori, ma anzi opere raramente frequentate dalla letteratura critica, la cui qualità risulta invece singolarmente illuminante dello stretto nesso tra committenza, soggetto e stile

Antonella Capitanio

ERIC L. JONES, *Agricoltura e rivoluzione industriale.* 1650-1850, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1982, pp. 250, L. 14.500.

I saggi del presente volume, quasi tutti già precedentemente editi nel corso degli ultimi quindici anni (ed alcuni già apparsi anche in italiano), rappresentano compiutamente l'attività di ricerca di uno degli storici più sensibili alle nuove esigenze che oggi si pongono per lo studio dei rapporti tra feudalesimo e capitalismo, forme di produzione e progressi tecnici, sfera della produzione e sfera della distribuzione in età preindustriale (o protoindustriale). Esigenze nuove rispetto a quelle che emersero, vari decenni or sono, dalle pagine di «Past and Present»; allora Dobb, Sweezy ed altri storici ed economisti concentrarono la loro attenzione su fenomeni generali (e spesso generici) con il rischio di ipostatizzare le

As Others See Us

Italian review of Dunayevskaya's work

Editor's Note—Below we print translated excerpts from a review of the Italian edition of Philosophy and Revolution and the American edition of Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution written by Valeria E. Russo which appeared in Dimensioni No. 30, 1984.

With its publication in the early 1970s, **Philosophy and Revolution** represents a most significant example of research on Hegel outside of academic Marxism...

"Why Hegel, Why Now?", is the question Dunayevskaya poses that will open in 1973 the initial chapter...where the actual relevance of Hegel for today is perceived in the centrality of his concept of the Absolute and in the possibility of utilizing the moment of the "negation of the negation" as a powerful instrument for the interrelation of the revolutionary processes of the present...

THIS READING OF HEGEL, which emphasizes on the one hand the humanistic interpretation given it by Marx, and on the other hand the political revolutionary interpretation given it by Lenin, tends to reaffirm that philosophy does not posit itself as a simple external reflection of reality but is already internal to the reality itself. What constitutes the theoretic novelty of this book is its emphasis on the essentiality of Lenin's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy (in **Philosophical Notebooks**) and particularly in the identification of the Absolute Idea with the movement "from practice to theory." Another point that seems important to remember is the consideration of philosophy as phenomenology of "new passions and new forces," that is, as phenomenology of new Subjects that begin to present themselves starting from the sixties...

The author...emphasizes as well that Hegel's impact is really shattering when once the vertex of Absolute is reached and what is heard is absolute negativity itself.

The Hegel represented by Dunayevskaya and the rereading itself of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Sartre, and Trotsky are heavily affected by the attention that the author poses for an original formulation both of the concept of political (and of revolution as a real movement and dialectic pole with respect to the philosophy), and on the concept of Subject which emerges from radical movements of our epoch (Black, Students, Women, Youth) as well as from the liberation struggles of African people and from the revolts of Eastern countries. These movements are the object of the third and last part of this book, which is often provocative yet offers interesting elements of reflection about important questions of contemporary political and philosophic thought...

IN HER LATEST BOOK, dedicated to **Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution,** she accomplishes on the one hand the precise recognition of the "feminist dimension" of Rosa Luxemburg's work (until now neglected by both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars) and on the other hand she has thrown light on the importance of the analysis of the role of women to Marx's late works. Dunayevskaya highlights in those decades a problem that is still present in the Women's Liberation Movement, that is, the problem of "spontaneity" and its connection with the party form or what is indicated in "the question of autonomy."...

Another interesting aspect of this book is the re-evaluation of Marxist work that contests the validity of the dichotomy between the young Marx and the mature Marx. The author starts her reconstruction considering some of the themes already present in her various works: the transformation of Hegel's revolution in philosophy into the philosophy of revolution of Marx, the most important aspect of the Marxist "new Humanism" reached on the basis of a recent transcription of Marx's **Ethnological Notebooks,** reconsiders the role that the question brought about by the anthropology and ethnology of the second half of the 19th century had on the development of Marx's thought...

In opposition to the attempt of these last years to find in the Marxist text the presence of several Marxes, Dunayevskaya restates the unified character, throughout Marx's works, though it is characterized by a richness of multi-dimensional articulation. The **Ethnological Notebooks** represent for the author not only an important moment of mature production but they contribute also to "cast light on Marx's works as a totality"...

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A Look at Books



Insightful Marxist Analysis: Dunayevskaya's Perspectives on Africa

Kevin Anderson

Raya Dunayevskaya, ROSA LUXEMBURG, WOMEN'S LIBERATION AND MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF REVOLUTION (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982), pp. xii, 234, $19.95 hardcover, $10.95 paperback.

Raya Dunayevskaya, PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982, orig. 1973), pp. xxvii, 372, $10.95 paperback.

Raya Dunayevskaya, MARXISM AND FREEDOM: From 1776 Until Today (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982, orig. 1958), pp. 381, $10.95 paperback.

THE RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA COLLECTION. Marxist-Humanism: Its Origins and Development in the U.S., 1941 to Today (Detroit: Wayne State University Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs, 1981), pp. 6561+, $60 microfilm.

The titles listed above constitute the bulk of a forty year contribution to political and social theory by the well-known Marxist humanist writer Raya Dunayevskaya, who in 1982 completed her third book on Marxist theory. This

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writer is already familiar to long-time Africa Today readers through her first-hand reports on The Gambia and Ghana (July and December, 1962). The new editions of her work by Humanities Press (1982) and the Wayne State University microfilm collection (1981) have finally made the whole of it easily accessible to interested scholars. Each work listed above offers theoretical and empirical insights for Africanists. This review will look briefly at each to get an overview.

Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution centers around analyses of women and non-Western society in relationship to overall theoretical issues in Marxism. In the section on Luxemburg, she unearths valuable and new material on the relationship of Africa to the disputes inside the West European left, particularly the German SPD. In 1911, when Luxemburg broke with the conservative SPD leadership three years ahead of Lenin, Dunayevskaya shows that it was Luxemburg's opposition to German colonialism in Africa that precipitated the split and the ensuing debate. In 1911 Luxemburg had criticized the party leaflet on Morocco thusly:

> "Let us add that in the whole of the leaflet there is not one word about the native inhabitants of the colonies, not a word about their rights, interests and sufferings because of international policy. The leaflet repeatedly speaks of 'England's splendid colonial policy' without mentioning the periodic famine and spread of typhoid in India, extermination of the Australian aborigines, and the hippopotamus-hide lash on the backs of the Egyptian fellah."(25)

She also traces Luxemburg's concern with the question of Namibia. Having shown that, Dunayevskaya goes on to present a critique of Luxemburg's position on national liberation, where Luxemburg opposed national independence movements as utopian and reactionary in the era of imperialism. She also gives an incisive critique of the philosophical and economic underpinnings of Luxemburg's great work on the theory of imperialism, **The Accumulation of Capital.**

In the section on women's liberation, Dunayevskaya discusses the relevance of early African women's revolts such as the 1929 Igbo Women's War against British imperialism to present-day struggles of women in the Third World. She analyzes women's participation in modern upheavals in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau as well as Portugal in the 1970s, and goes from there to a critique of the Chinese and more recent Third World revolutions from the vantage point of women's liberation. She views women as a crucial and newly emergent "revolutionary subject" in the 1980s.

The last section of this book deals with Marx. Much of it centers around his last writings on Russia and on non-European society such as his little-known **Ethnological Notebooks** and his 1881 letter to Vera Zasulitch on the possibility of a direct transition to socialism from the Russian pre-capitalist communal village. Dunayevskaya shows that all of Marx's major last writings, including the last edition of **Capital, Vol. I** (Paris: 1872-75) which he personally prepared for the printer, show the importance of this theme of alternate paths to human emancipation. Dunayevskaya quotes Lafargue's 1882 complaint to Engels that, after his trip to Algiers, "Marx has come back with his head full of Africa and the Arabs" (191). She concludes the book by arguing that with these last writings "Marx's legacy is no mere heirloom, but a live body of ideas and perspectives that is in need of concretization."(125) Nowhere are such late writings of Marx more relevant than to African studies, where Marxist class analysis is increas-

ingly being applied. Dunayevskaya's new reading of Marx shows an openness on his part seldom found in post-Marx Marxists. She shows that he intended much of the framework of Capital only for America and Western Europe and was working at his death on new approaches to non-European society.

Philosophy and Revolution was originally issued in 1973 and has been republished with a new introduction. The core of this book's discussion of Africa is in the major chapter "The African Revolutions and the World Economy." There, Dunayevskaya maintains that: "The African revolutions opened a new page in the dialectic of thought as well as in world history"(213). She then discusses African nationalist leaders and theorists such as Nkrumah, Senghor, and Fanon. It is Fanon whom she finds the closest to her own view when she writes that despite the great achievements of the independence struggles, "we must soberly face the present bleak reality"(217). She concludes:

> "The greatest of these tragedies, however, is not the external but the internal one, the separation between the leaders and the led in independent Africa. It is to this we must turn because without masses as reason as well as force, there is no way to escape being sucked into the world market dominated by advanced technologies, whether in production or in preparation for nuclear war."(218)

The rest of the chapter explores the neocolonial relationship of the world economy to Africa and offers a critique of dependency theories as well as conservative development theories.

But its Marxist analysis does not end there. Instead, Dunayevskaya continues it by returning to where she began: the living human subjects who have the power, in her view, to alter economic relationships, the African masses. She argues that despite the world economy "neocolonialism could not have been reborn so easily in Africa had the revolutionary situation continued to deepen."(236) At the core of her analysis is the inter-relationship of political and economic factors:

> "Precisely because the African masses did, at the start, feel that they were not only muscle but reason, holding destiny in their own hands, there emerged what Marx in his day called a new energizing principle. This resulted in the growth of production even in societies whose economy was restricted to a single crop."(237)

Despite the setbacks of neocolonialism, she concludes the chapter by arguing that the situation in Africa was still "fluid" in that: (1) new revolutions were ready to emerge in southern Africa, (2) the youth had shown resistance to neocolonialist regimes, (3) the neocolonial social structures in Africa were hardly as firmly implanted as, for example, those in Latin America.[1]

But Africa has importance in **Philosophy and Revolution** far beyond the single chapter on Africa. Dunayevskaya's central concept is that of an "open" or "unchained" dialectic where, she argues, Hegel (and Marx) "present the structures

1. I have employed this framework in my paper "The Tanzanian Model of Third World Development: After Twenty Years," presented to the Eastern Sociological Society, Baltimore, March 1983.

not as mere fact, not as hierarchy, not as pinnacle, but as movement" (39), and view human reality as "one long trek to freedom"(43). The African revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s were, to Dunayevskaya, a key example of the centrality of a dialectic of freedom to human history. For such a Marxist, African revolutions are not a place to "apply" a ready-made theory, but a unique human experience out of which Marxist theory can be reconstructed for the present. Philosophy and Revolution also contains valuable discussion of Lenin, Mao, Marx, and Sartre, theorists not without relevance to African revolutionaries.

Dunayevskaya's first book, Marxism and Freedom, originally published in 1958, at first glance seems to contain little on Africa. But there is much of importance to Africanists, such as the lengthy economic and political analysis of the outcomes of two major revolutions, the Russian and the Chinese. In analyzing post-revolutionary Russia and China, Dunayevskaya uses with great subtlety her concept of state-capitalism, first developed in economic writings in the 1940s. But in keeping with her present Marxist humanist stance, she stresses not only economic and political categories, but also philosophical and ideological ones, as well as the relationship of spontaneity to revolutionary upheaval. The analysis of China reads especially well in 1983, given the collapse of the Maoist dream during the last decade. This section had earlier seemed too sharply critical of Mao's experiment to many readers. The concepts of state-capitalism and of spontaneity and humanism developed in this book offer many vantage points for a Marxist analysis of the contemporary African scene. Her overall concept of socialist humanism, first articulated here, was developed parallel to that of socialist humanists in Africa such as Nyerere and Senghor, and especially Fanon, who wrote during the same period.

The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection includes virtually all of Raya Dunayevskaya's voluminous other writings, plus many by people with whom she has worked, from her earliest days as secretary to Trotsky in 1937-38 to today. Of special importance to Africanists are the following documents: (1)Her 1959 pamphlet Nationalism, Communism, Marxist-Humanism and the Afro-Asian Revolutions (2688-2723); (2) her writings on West Africa in 1961 and 1962 before and after her trip there(2906-3153 passim, 3184-3251); (3) a 1976 series of "Philosophic-Political Letters"(5182-5300) which include discussion of the Portuguese and African revolutions of 1974-76, the civil war in Zimbabwe and the Soweto uprising; (4) the 1978 pamphlet Frantz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought (5305-5363), written by two colleagues of Dunayevskaya, Lou Turner and John Alan, and introduced by her.

Taken as a whole, Dunayevskaya's three books and the Wayne State University collection contain an important contribution to African studies by a writer who has spent a lifetime as a political activist as well as a theorist. The passionate commitment to human liberation is never absent from Dunayevskaya's work, yet at the same time there is no lack of theoretical and analytical rigor.

Luxemburg, Feminism and Marx

A DISCUSSION OF THE WORKS OF RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA



FROM:

vol. xiv, number 8
August/September 1984
washington, d.c.

off our backs

Dear Friends,

We are reprinting the following review and commentary as an opening to a dialogue with other revolutionary feminists. We look forward to the much-needed discussion on the challenges facing the Women's Liberation Movement in the 1980s; please write us your thoughts. -- Women's Liberation, News & Letters Committees

Luxemburg, Feminism, and Marx

Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, by Raya Dunayevskaya, *Humanities Press, 1983*

The Marxist-Humanist philosopher Raya Dunayevskaya begins the chapter entitled "Luxemburg as feminist," in her latest book on Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, with a quote from Herman Melville: "... for original characters in fiction, a grateful reader will, on meeting with one, keep the anniversary of that day ... original ones, truly so, imply original instincts." Luxemburg, of course, is no fictional character; yet meeting her in the pages of this book is that type of experience that stays with the reader, both in one's thoughts and in one's daily sensuous encounter with the world -- this world, 1984, Ronald Reagan's America.

Listen to Luxemburg's definition of "being human," written in a letter to her friend Mathilde Wurm from a dreary German prison cell in 1916, where she had landed for her revolutionary opposition to World War I: "I'm telling you that as soon as I can stick my nose out again I will hunt and harry your society of frogs with trumpet blasts, whip crackings and bloodhounds -- like Penthesilea I wanted to say, but by God, you people are no Achilles. Have you had enough of a New Year's greeting now? Then see to it that you stay human.... Being human means joyfully throwing your whole life 'on the scales of destiny' when need be, but all the while rejoicing in every sunny day and every beautiful cloud. Ach, I know of no formula to write you for being human...."

Penthesilea was the Queen of the Amazons, and Luxemburg's identification with/ invocation of her in this letter is in the context of a blistering attack against both those socialists who had capitulated to the war, and also those who devised theories and excuses for the capitulators. Dunayevskaya uses this quotation as the frontispiece of the book, alerting the reader from the start that her discussion of Luxemburg will focus both on Luxemburg's revolutionary passion, revolutionary humanism, and on her feminist dimension, till now disregarded by Marxists and feminists alike.

not a feminist per se

Luxemburg herself stayed away from an identification as a "feminist." There is one letter from her in 1911, a year of intense anti-militarist activity in which the women of the German Marxist party, the Social Democracy (SPD), were the most militantly anti-war as well as opposing the opportunism of the party leadership; Luxembery writes to Luise Kautsky, "Are you coming for the women's conference? Just imagine, I have become a feminist!" But on the whole, starting from her entrance on the German scene

in 1898, as a young woman of 27, when the male leaders of the large and prestigious SPD wanted to shunt Luxemburg aside into the "Woman Question," Luxemburg, in refusing to be pigeon-holed, didn't raise Women's Liberation as an independent question, apart from the "class struggle."

Yet Dunayevskaya's careful tracing of Luxemburg's feminist dimension is no scholastic matter of isolated quotes; nor is it a psychological reconstruction of what Luxemburg "really" felt. Rather, it is that today's Women's Liberation Movement has given Dunayevskaya new eyes and ears to see both Luxemburg's greatness and her shortcomings; it is that for Dunayevskaya, the dialectics of revolution -- the centerpoint of Luxemburg's passion -- can never again be kept in a separate/compartment from Women's Liberation. At the same time, the fact that today's feminists have largely ignored Luxemburg's contributions to revolutionary theory and the relationship between theory and practice -- <u>because</u> she "wasn't a feminist" -- speaks volumes on the separation that has rigidified between feminist theory and theory of revolution.

masses in motion

Luxemburg is best remembered for her appreciation of the spontaneous creativity of masses of people in revolutionary action, and for her disputes with Lenin, critiquing him in 1904 for an overly-centralized concept of the Marxist party, and, while hailing the November 1917 Russian Revolution, warning of the imperative need for the practice of an open, socialist democracy after seizure of power. Both these questions have been given new meaning in our day by the contemporary Women's Liberation Movement, which has so forcefully raised the validity of revolutionary creativity outside "party" structures, the need for non-elitist forms of organization, the problematic of "What happens after the revolution? Are we to be confronted merely with a change in leadership and power, or will the revolution be deep and ongoing and practicing new human relationships?"

today and tomorrow

It's just such an expansive, human vision that informed Luxemburg throughout her life. "I am a lard of boundless possibilities," she wrote, and that sense of opening on to the world, discovering and creating the world, never left her. Dunayevskaya describes Luxemburg as "an original character... (who) instead of being simply 'one in a million,' combines yesterday, today and tomorrow in such a manner that the new age suddenly experiences a 'shock of recognition,' whether that relates to a new lifestyle or the great need for revolution here and now." (p.83)

It is that urgency for social revolution that animated Luxemburg's vision, action, thought, and speaks to us today, for surely social revolution <u>is needed</u> if we are ever to end this nightmare world. It was the dialectics of the 1905 revolution in her native Poland -- when the <u>masses in motion</u> were a "land of boundless possibilities" -- that drove Luxemburg to new heights, in everything from actual participation in the revolution to her pamphlet summing up those experiences, <u>The Mass Strike, the Party and the Trade Unions</u>. It is that pamphlet that earned her the reputation as a "theorist of spontaneity": "... in the mass strikes in Russia," she wrote, "the element of spontaneity plays such a predominant part, not because the Russian proletariat are 'uneducated,' but because revolutions do not allow anyone to play the schoolmaster with them." (quoted, p.18)

And it was the dialectics of revolution that informed her feminism, in everything from her urg-

ing the socialist women to maintain their autonomy from the International Socialist Bureau, to her personal life, her break-up with her lover Leo Jogiches. "I am only I once more, since I have become free of Leo," she said. Dunayevskaya writes: "... the revolution is an overwhelming force that brooks no 'interference' from anyone. Luxemburg needed to be free, to be independent, to be whole." (p.92)

failing to follow through

And yet... both on the "Woman Question" and on spontaneity, Luxemburg failed to follow through and develop her insights. Thus, by 1910, when she was mercilessly exposing the opportunism of the SPD leadership and they responded with vicious, personal, sexist attacks (in private, but doubtless known to her), Luxemburg studiously maintained what Dunayevskaya calls a "tone deafness" to male chauvinism. Moreover, she remained a member of the party she saw degenerating: "The worst working class party is better than none."

Luxemburg considered herself a loyal follower of Marx in not allowing anything to take precedence over the "class struggle" or the unity of the working class party. It is true, Dunayevskaya points out, that some of Marx's own writings on Women's Liberation were unknown to Luxemburg, from his 1844 Humanist Essays where he singles out the Man/Woman relationship as the most indicative of the need for a total Humanist revolution, to his 1881-82 Ethnological Notebooks, in which he discusses both the freedoms and limitations of women under "primitive communism." But even where Luxemburg did know Marx's position, as on the "National Question" -- Marx saw national struggles for liberation as a potential independent revolutionary ferment, whereas Luxemburg considered them reactionary -- even here she maintained that she was "really" practicing Marx's "true" position. Dunayevskaya argues that it is just such a narrowing of the openness and expansiveness of Marx's Marxism that has been the bane of the Marxist movement since Marx's death.

one from many?

This holds as well for the question of organization. With a limited conception of Marxism as "theory of class struggle," Luxemburg had no ground in her thought for transcending her contradictory position of hailing spontaneity and exposing the party leadership -- and yet organizing no new tendency around her views. In Part III of the book, on Marx, Dunayevskaya takes up Marx's 1875 Critique of the Gotha Program, in which Marx critiqued the unity program of the "Marxists" and the LaSalleans, arguing that unity, if based on some "lowest common denominator," can open no new road to freedom. His forewarnings were proven correct when, by 1914, the SPD had so gone off the rails of freedom -- for the purposes of creating a "mass party" -- as to capitulate to the German war effort. By 1919, it was the SPD leadership that crushed the German Revolution and aided the assassins of Rosa Luxemburg.

Luxemburg had critiqued that leadership as early as 1910, but her thinking, too, was mired in the fetish of the need for a unified party. One of the greatest achievements of the contemporary Women's Liberation Movement, Dunayevskaya argues, is the break with the 1960s Left which told women to wait till "after the revolution" to raise feminist demands. But has the revolutionary potential inherent in that break been fol-

lowed through? Dunayevskaya considers this problematic in "The Task that Remains to be Done: The Unique but Unfinished Contributions of Today's Women's Liberation Movement," by taking the reader on an exciting historic journey in which we see Women's Liberation yesterday and today, as both Individual and Universal, unseparated from the Black dimension in both Africa and America, and from revolution and revolutionary ideas, including those of Marx. These pages are alive with individual women, from Maria Stewart, Margaret Fuller and Sojourner Truth in the nineteenth century, to Ding Ling, Fannie Lou Hamer, and Maria Barreno in the twentieth. And in the category "Individualism and Masses in Motion," Dunayevskaya points out that "the individuality of each woman liberationist is a microcosm of the whole, and yet... the movement is not a sum of so many individuals but masses in motion." (p.83) Here she shows us everything from the March 1917 Russian Revolution initiated by women textile workers on International Women's Day, to the 1929 "Women's War" in what is now Nigeria, to Black women in the South of the 1960s and women in Iran, 1979.

practice to theory

What Dunayevskaya calls the "movement from practice to theory" in each historic period is shown in its highpoints and achievements; yet it is the "movement from theory" that has failed to develop those highpoints as ground for the future. Dunayevskaya critiques Women's Liberationists for too easily accepting the "male" version of a truncated Marxism that obscures not alone Marx's writings on Women's Liberation but the totality of his philosophic methodology, a "living dialectic" that demands to be recreated on the ground of the "new passions and new forces" of our age.

It is thus that Dunayevskaya turns to confront the full scope of Marx's work, "From Critic of Hegel to Author of Capital and Theorist of 'Revolution in Permanence'"; her treatment here is of a different order than any standard treatment of Marx. It is not alone her discussion of Marx's 1881-82 Ethnological Notebooks (only transcribed and published in the 1970s) that is new -- though that, certainly, is telling, as she puts to rest the notion that Engels' Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (supposedly based on these notes of Marx) represents the views of both men. Just as she contrasts Engels' unilineal view of historical progression to Marx's multilateral perspective, so she shows how Marx was ever conscious of new Subjects of revolution, whether the Black dimension in America, the peasantry, women, or what today we call the Third World.

challenging ground

"How total, continuous, global must the concept of revolution be now?" (p.187): this is the question that underlies the whole book, the setting of a revolutionary philosophic perspective without which the activism of the 1980s may end in yet one more soured or aborted revolution or revolutionary moment. "Without such a vision of new revolutions, a new individual, a new universal, a new society, new human relations, we would be forced to tail-end one or another form of reformism.... The myriad crises in our age have shown... that without a philosophy of revolution activism spends itself in mere anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, without ever revealing what it is for." (p.194)

This book spells out no "blueprints," but by integrating history and theory, individualism and masses in motion, revolution and Marx's philosophy of revolution, it lays challenging ground for addressing

the questions we confront in our activity, whether on form of organization, the relationship between Women's Liberation and other forces of revolution, or the relationship between social revolution in America and "solidarity work" with the Third World. The three parts of the book, on Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx, each have their own integrity, and yet are so tightly intertwined that when we reach the penultimate chapter, on Marx's concept of revolutionary organization -- we are confronted once again with Luxemburg's breakup with Jogiches following the 1905 revolution!

What is so exciting about Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution is precisely this unity of Individual and Universal, of past and present; "history" is always live history-in-the-making, with "revolution" not as a slogan or abstraction, but potential and possibility of a creative humanity, with women as revolutionary Subject adding new dimensions to the very meaning of "freedom" and "socialism."

"Being human means joyfully throwing your whole life 'on the scales of destiny'": this book challenges us to that, and not only as bravery, but as thinkers, as feminist "thought-divers" working out a philosophy of revolution to help us in our movement to realize social transformation, reach for freedom, in our lifetime.

by Michelle Landau

More on Raya D. (from a reader...

Dear Carol Anne Douglas,

I have been wanting to write you for some time. Your latest three reviews in the July 1984 oob have finally pushed me to do so. I have been a fan of yours for two reasons. First is that I admire that you have such an avid interest in feminist theory, that you can read what is often written in academese with ease and get right to the heart of the author's argument. The second reason is that you are "opinionated," that is, you don't pretend that you are objective in the bourgeois sense of that word, you have a point of view that you neither hide nor think is invalid. Your reviews often read to me as a dialogue with the authors of the books.. It is precisely that quality about your reviews that has made me want to write to you so often -- because I too have a point of view that has validity, and I often disagree with both you and those you are reviewing. (If you want to know about me, I am a signer of The Fourth World Manifesto, I appeared in the pages of oob in a write-up you printed on the Feminists Against Militarism Conference held outside Kalamazoo, Michigan, in September, 1981, and you can find my columns in the Marxist-Humanist paper, News and Letters.)

I too had many disagreements with Allison Jaggar's book, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, most of all her insistence on truncating Marx. It is that which leads to her mistake of thinking that the concept that "individuals are the best judges of their own interests" is liberal. While individual free-dom is certainly not a concept that Russia or China would embrace, it is Marx's concept. In 1844 he wrote, "We must above all avoid setting up 'the society' as an abstraction opposed to the individual. The individual is the social entity." And in volume three of Capital (hardly the young Marx) he said, "human power is its own end." Freedom can never be abstract; if the individual is not free, there is no freedom. For example, freedom, as you point out, is very concrete to East Europeans. You write in your review of Jaggar's book that "a number of East European Marxists have written since the 60's that alienation is possible under socialism (or some state controlled forms of it -- the existing ones)." You further state that "socialist feminists do not advocate that kind of socialism. But their theory does not account for its existence." You then go on to say that "some unorthodox Marxists- such as Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, have gone further towards a critique of existing authoritarian 'socialist' systems than socialist feminists have so far."

don't forget Raya

I wish you would have mentioned the one woman revolutionary philosopher whose theory not only takes into account the "experiences of hundreds of millions of people" in Eastern Europe, but whose theory does account for the existence of oppression in so-called socialist countries. In the 1940s Raya Dunayevskaya worked out the theory

of state-capitalism from a revolutionary perspective using the categories in Marx's Capital and Russia's own statistics. Why are we pretending in 1984 that that hasn't happened?

To begin to try and correct that, I would like to look closely at the latest article by Raya Dunayevskaya: Marx's "New Humanism" and the Dialectics of Women's Liberation in Primitive and Modern Societies published by Praxis International, Vol. 3, No. 4, January 1984; available from Women's Liberation -- News and Letters Committees, 59 East Van Buren, Room 707, Chicago, IL 60605 for 50¢ plus 30¢ postage. In the context of your remarks about the unfreedom of peoples in Eastern Europe, it is important to note that Praxis International is a Yugoslavian dissident journal that asked Ms. Dunayevskaya for this article. I make that point because you rightly point out in your Jaggar review that the existence of alienating "socialism" "severely limits the appeal of socialism as a political rallying point for Americans." Yes it does, even more so for East Europeans, but that does not mean we give up what can be a path for liberation.

some hard work

Towards the end of this short (thirteen page) highly condensed article, Raya Dunayevskaya introduces us to the concept of Marx's "hard intellectual labor" -- what she has elsewhere called "thought-diving"-- and in the same paragraph challenges her readers "to do the hard labor required in hearing Marx think." What becomes clear in working one's way through these pages is that Ms. Dunayevskaya too requires of us some hard intellectual labor right here and now.

What is clear is this labor is well worth it if one is reading because she wants to totally transform this alienating, sexist, racist, capitalist society, and if she is willing to entertain the thought that a revolutionary feminist philosopher, like Dunayevskaya, can reveal what in Marx's Marxism can help give a direction to the Women's Liberation Movement today.

who is Raya?

Before proceeding, it is important to introduce the reader to who Raya Dunayevskaya is. The Praxis International article says very little: "Raya Dunayevskaya has written extensively on Marxist-Humanism. Her latest book is Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution. A collection of her writings are on deposit at the Wayne State University Labor Archives." What is most important to this reviewer is the fact that Dunayevskaya is a revolutionary, the founder of an organization (News and Letters Committees in 1955), unseparated from the development of a philosophy of liberation she calls Marxist-Humanism. In fact, it is one or a combination of these four points -- woman, revolutionary, founder of an organization, and Marxist-Humanist -- that may have compelled not only bourgeois publications to purposely try to ignore her writings; but what are we to think of the feminist presses refusal to give her ideas a forum?

It is the very character of Marx's "New Humanism" and the Dialectics of Women's Liberation in Primitive and Modern Societies as a summation as well as development out of the body of Ms. Dunayevskaya's works, that gives this article both its richness and its requirement for "hard intellectual labor." But since its purpose is to help point a direction for the transformation of this society to one based on new human relations, which, as we know, is no easy task, we want to accept the challenge and

dive not only into Marx's thought, but to be able to hear this unique woman revolutionary thinking as well.

Marx & feminism?

What is key about the form of this article is that Dunayevskaya wants to look at "Marx's Marxism as a totality." Our age is the first to be able to do this, as works that have been previously unpublished or ignored are now being brought to light. It is the very compactness of the article that helps us to get a feel for Marx's absorption in women's struggles for freedom throughout his life. Dunayevskaya begins with the end, the Ethnological Notebooks written in the last year of Marx's life, as she wants to concentrate on his last decade to show Marx "rounding out forty years of his thought on human development and its struggles for freedom which he called 'history and its process, revolution in permanence.'" Dunayevskaya then goes back and begins again in the 1840s. There she shows us that when Marx spoke of "the direct, natural, necessary relationship of man to man is the relationship of man to woman," that became part of the ground for his philosophy: "Marx's concept of the Man/Woman relationship arose with the very birth of a new continent of thought and revolution the moment he broke from bourgeois society."

In the 1850s we see Marx's involvement not only with the working women and girls (some as young as nine) who broadened the 1853-54 strike in Preston, England, to include the question of education; but as well, Marx's defense of Lady Bulwer-Lytton who was thrown into a lunatic asylum because she "dared not only to differ with the views of her conservative, aristocratic-politician husband," but she dared to do so publically.

Dunayevskaya's reading of Marx's Capital gives new insights into what a feminist interpretation of Marx could mean for us today. Thus Marx's 80-page chapter in Capital on "The Working Day" is not seen by Dunayevskaya as simply description. Rather "Marx devoted that much space to women in the process of production and arrived at very new conclusions on new forms of revolt." (My emphasis.) In that same decade of the 1860s, Marx is trying to make sure that women are a part of the International Workingmen's Association both as rank-and-filers and as leadership -- Mme. Harriet Law was elected into the General Council. Marx as well points out that "great progress was evident in the last Congress of the American 'Labor Union'..." because "it treated working women with complete equality."

Yet this listing of facts does not do justice to either Marx or Dunayevskaya's work. What is key about both the form and title of this article is "Dialectics." Thus it is not only that the lengthening or greater intensity of the working day gives birth to "new forms of revolt." That methodology permeates the whole article as Dunayevskaya shows us Marx's revolutionary Dialectic, and thereby weaves one of her own. She is showing us Women's Liberation as a part of "history and its process." It takes "hard intellectual labor" indeed, to fully grasp this; and yet, it is precisely this -- Marx's revolutionary dialectic, his methodology -- that can help give a direction to the Women's Liberation Movement today. To Dunayevskaya the relationship of the philosopher to actual history shows Marx "transforming historic narrative into historic reason." She concludes, "That is the dialectic of Marx's seeing, not merely the statistics he had amassed, but the live men and women reshaping history. Nowhere is this more true than concerning the so-called 'Woman Question.'" (Dunayevskaya

always puts quotes around "Woman Question" both because that is what it was called in Marx's time as well as to show her considerable dissatisfaction with that as a title for all the great new ideas and developments women's fight for freedom has always raised.)

Engels ≠ Marx

The main concentration in this article, as well as in her work Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, is on Marx's recently published (1972) Ethnological Notebooks. Here the concern seems at least twofold. One is Dunayevskaya's emphatic assertion that Friedrich Engels is no Marx and that his unilinear work, Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (supposedly based on Marx's Ethnological Notebooks) was "damaging... to future generations of Marxists...." But it is not only "Marxists" she is concerned with: "we were all raised on this (i.e., Engels') concept of women's liberation as if it were, indeed, a work of Engels and Marx." Dunayevskaya aims "to disentangle Marx's views on women and dialectics from those of Engels." She does this by taking us on a short trip (to take the longer journey see Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution) through Marx's eyes to primitive societies. There we see what I think is her second emphasis, that unlike Engels' unilinear view of history (first matriarchy, then private property bringing with it women's oppression), "Marx traces dialectical development from one stage to another and related it to revolutionary upsurges so that economic crises are seen as 'epochs of social revolution.'"

Engels saw only the greatness of women's freedom in primitive societies and after the onset of private property he saw only women's oppression. Engels described the effect of private property on women as "the world-historic defeat of the female sex." Marx, on the other hand, saw both women's relatively greater freedom as well as the origins of women's oppression right within the primitive commune. After class society, where Engels saw only "defeat," Marx saw unceasing revolt. What Dunayevskaya is showing us is the dialectic at work where, even in the study of anthropology, Marx is able to see the duality in each situation, the oppression as well as the revolt, the possibility of new paths to freedom.

Dunayevskaya is not the only one to have taken up Marx's Ethnological Notebooks as part of the writings of his last decade. But what must be pointed out is that no one has looked at that last decade as has Dunayevskaya. An example is a new work edited by Teodor Shanin, Late Marx and the Russian Road -- Marx and 'the peripheries of capitalism', which contains writings by Shanin, Haruki Wada, Derek Sayer and Philip Corrigan.[2] Whereas they debate many of the questions Dunayevskaya develops, e.g., the extent of the continuity between the young and the older Marx -- women as revolutionary transformers of society are nowhere to be seen. To see the relationship of Marx to the dialectics of women's liberation, one would have to study Raya Dunayevskaya and read Marx for oneself. Certainly this article is a good beginning -- short, concise, difficult enough to make one ask questions, and so very clearly revealing a genuine passion for transforming society that it will make you want to take the plunge and do the "hard intellectual labor" needed to hear both Marx and Dunayevskaya thinking.

Terry Moon

Footnotes on next page

[1] Raya Dunayevskaya's body of work is extensive. Besides her latest, Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution (1982) what is instructive to see is the development of women as a revolutionary category since the emergence of Women's Liberation as a Movement in 1867. Her first work, Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 until Today (1958), while not making a category of women, singled them out in each freedom movement discussed, for example, the milkmaids who started the Paris Commune of 1871: "Although the men had not yet come into the streets on this early morning, and although the women were not armed, they held their own. As in every real people's revolution, new strata of the population were awakened. This time it was the women who were to act first." In her second work, Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao (1973), Women's Liberation is a category. Not only is the Women's Liberation Movement developed in chapter 9 as one of the "New Passions and New Forces" of our age, but "two drafts of the entire work were submitted for discussion and editing to special black/red, youth, rank-and-file labor as well as Women's Liberation conferences." Even though it is in the last chapter where women are taken up so directly, chapter one, "Why Hegel? Why Now? Absolute Negativity as New Beginning," gives some of the most profound insights into the relationship of a philosophy of human liberation to actual movements for freedom.

[2] See Michael Connolly's review, "Marx's Last Writings on Russia: New Paths to Revolution and Philosophic Continuity," News & Letters, Vol. 29, No. 5, June, 1984.

idealistic studies

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apprehend my "oneness with all" through the experience of love which is "the knowledge of unity." But the tension between the lower and deeper Self (Shiva) limits fulfillment. "The brilliance of Consciousness is proportionate to the degree of self-purification" (p. 39).

Religiously and culturally, the Tantric tradition does not take a negative attitude to the world and life, as Advaitins do. Natural desires are not to be shunned "but accepted as sparks of the divine Shakti" (p. 45). One develops religious attitudes toward all things and persons by sublimation not renunciation. Thus, the path of the householder may provide opportunities for integration and realizing the Self in its fullness. Enjoying the world does not produce bondage; attachment to it does. Sociocultural activity is to be fostered. Practically, the insight is that one may use "the so-called profane material in such a way as to make divinity out of it" (p. 60). Accordingly, even "sex is as religious and holy as anything" (p. 67).

With unexampled clarity and directness, Dr. Mishra expounds the practical aspects of this teaching (*Kaula-marga*), which for the most part has been caricatured in the West. Religious insight and metaphysical understanding may be achieved if one is properly sincere. (There are impostors.) "Love for the opposite sex is the beginning of the universal love" (p. 75). Sublimation and universal love become the essential means for liberation. And it is the author's claim that this is really not inharmonious with the true meaning even of Vedic teachings (pp. 82-88).

The concluding portion of this carefully indexed book contains astute clarifications of the (1) historical, (2) epistemological, and (3) yogic (Kundalini) aspects of Tantrism. Tantric epistemology is neatly distinguished from the Advaitic, Nyaya, and Sankhya positions, for knowledge is a state of effortless activity and is self-illumining. Consciousness is prior to all knowledge (p. 106) and the self is directly known. Metaphysics is "really experience acquired by higher induction" (p. 115).

Western thinkers, especially those with an idealistic orientation, will find much of genuine value and insight in this captivating and reasoned treatment.

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Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution

Raya Dunayevskaya

Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1982. $19.95.

This volume is divided into three parts. In the first, Ms. Dunayevskaya unfolds the story of Luxemburg's life as "theoretician, as activist and as internationalist." In the second part she briefly discusses the Women's Liberation Movement as a historical subject and thus as "revolutionary force and reason." In the third part she focuses on Marx as the theoretician of "revolution in permanence." Throughout the book, history, philosophy,

and critique are interwoven into a whole. Whether a coherent whole emerges from Dunayevskaya's careful work, or the book consists of three welcome but not well-related contributions to Marxist and feminist scholarship is not clear.

Dunayevskaya indicates in her introduction that she hopes that the Marxian dialectical principle "will show itself to be the unifying force for all three parts of the book" (p. xi). It does, insofar as each of the parts exposes the complexity of revolutionary praxis as a praxis that aims at both the overthrow of the old and the creation of the new and is a true beginning. If the principle fails to show itself, it is because the importance of the study of Luxemburg's and Marx's works to the Women's Liberation Movement is only hinted at and not articulated openly.

For Dunayevskaya such a study is compelling since she sees the relevance of both Luxemburg's and Marx's work to the present. The present is marked by the rise of the Women's Liberation Movement as a worldwide movement and its revolutionary potential is what is in the balance according to the author. But, what she observes is that the Movement "at one and the same time disregards Rosa Luxemburg, the feminist and revolutionary and above all helps those men who have tried to reduce Marx to a single discipline be that as economist, philosopher or political strategist" (p. 104).

The observation is not totally accurate. Luxemburg's works can be found in most feminist-run bookstores. Moreover, feminists have come to recognize Marx's genius and are attempting to grapple with his work. But, the current Women's Liberation Movement is young, internally divided, and very critical. Feminists would admire Luxemburg for her struggle against marginalization by the men who led the SDP, and would admit to Marx's attention to the relation between the sexes. Nevertheless, they would also point out their shortcomings.

Dunayevskaya notes some of Luxemburg's own shortcomings. While she praises her acute sense for opportunism among Marxists, she finds her lacking any sense for the dialectics the result of which is a mechanistic Marxism. Similarly, while she praises her internationalism, she finds her blind to the revolutionary potential of colonized people, the result of which is a contradiction in her idea of spontaneity.

Dunayevskaya apparently fears that the Women's Liberation Movement tends to share in Luxemburg's mistakes. This is at least implicit to her in her much too brief note on the Movement's racism or its disregard of what she refers to as the black dimension and its blindness to its international character. This is as implicit to her also in her short note on Engels's influence on the Movement—which she believes is detrimental. Finally, it is implicit to her repeated call to the Movement to attend seriously to Marx and thus do what Luxemburg could not do as well for she did not have access to the totality of Marx's work, in particular to the *Ethnographic Notebooks*.

The *Notebooks* verify, for Dunayevskaya, Marx's encyclopedic interests and their critical interrelations. What is more important is that they point out that Marx's Marxism developed steadily from the time he broke away from bourgeoise society as he came to understand Hegel's abstract and consequently dehumanizing construction of reality. Marx's understanding of Hegel did not lead him to a simple rejection of Hegelian philosophy but to its radical reconstruction. He turned his attention to the negation and its negation—to revolution.

The thesis Dunayevskaya argues for is, of course, well known and still frequently debated: there is no great divide between Marx's early works and later works. She also argues for the complementary thesis that Marx's Marxism is far from reductionistic or mechanistic. She constructs her argument in a special way, pointing out that the great divide was established when the Second International collapsed. The collapse was due to opportunism which Luxemburg was the first to spot and which she fought throughout her life. Lenin became aware of the opportunism within the Second International later. Yet, he was the only one of his generation to develop an insight into Marx's dialectics.

Lenin, who did not share his insight and "thus blunted creative new points of departure for new generations" (p. 176), complained about his generation's misconstruction of Marx. His complaint encompasses Luxemburg. But, it is to Luxemburg's credit that she put her trust in the creative force of the masses. In this, Dunayevskaya points out, she was Marx's heiress in the true sense. So is the Women's Liberation Movement insofar as it is "rooted in the movement from practice to theory" and "calls for a new relationship of theory to practice from which a new Man/Woman relationship is not excluded" (p. 191).

Today's socialist feminists can probably be described as the heiresses of Marx. Still, radical feminists have been challenging their theoretical work with the related questions: Is the work merely complementing Marxist analysis? and, Is this enough? Dunayevskaya does not offer an answer. While she seems to envisage a Marxism in which women are visible, I am led to suspect that she does not envisage as radical a reconstruction of Marx as the one Marx submitted Hegel to. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Dunayevskaya should be heeded. The study of Luxemburg and Marx is important to the Women's Liberation Movement and it is to such a study that she contributes greatly with this book.

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Mesmerism and the American Cure of Souls

Robert C. Fuller

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982. 227 pp. $20.

This book does not contain philosophical arguments, but is rich in material for philosophical reflection. In this small volume Professor Fuller traces the evolution of an idea deriving from the Viennese physician, Franz Anton Mesmer, through nineteenth-century American popular culture. What began with Mesmer as a thoroughly materialistic and antitheological theory of medical healing ended the century in America as a dualistic theory with the New Thought movement emphasizing the spiritual powers of the mind to control matter. How this came about gives us yet another illustration of the capacity of a culture to absorb a new idea, transform it, and use it in the interest of a dominant ideology.

Fuller gives us a lively account, but this is purchased at the expense of clarity. To give but one example, he says that in the final stages of the New Thought movement "mesmerism

eventually evaporated into a fairly uncritical cult of the power of positive thinking" (p. 146). Is "evaporated" an apt metaphor? What is meant by "uncritical?" If Fuller's general account is correct, the transformation of thought in a culture is principally determined by human needs, not intellectual criticism. Each stage in the evolution of an idea is a matter of adapting previous forms of thought in the attempt to satisfy new cultural and personal needs. In a perfectly straightforward sense, mesmerism was from its inception a "fairly uncritical cult."

Of course, Mesmer was onto something. While we no longer take seriously his ad hoc hypothesis about animal magnetism, the nature of hypnotic phenomena remains hotly contested and dimly understood by contemporary psychologists. In Fuller's concluding chapter he recognizes that the apparent successes of the mesmerists is not to be explained entirely by needs and cultural setting. According to Fuller, "The mesmerists, like the revivalists, made it possible for individuals to come into contact with the nonmaterialistic forces that govern their lives...to be inwardly connected with superhuman powers" (p. 174). Perhaps so, but this is a metaphysical claim that needs to be argued. It should not be asserted in the same tone as purely historical description.

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Thoughts and Thinkers

Anthony Quinton

New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982. vi + 365 pp. $24.50 paperback, $49.50 clothbound.

In this far-ranging series of essays on selected philosophers and a variety of social and philosophical issues, Quinton, the president of Trinity College, Oxford, shows that at least some college presidents can be intelligent, urbane, witty, and wise. Written between the late sixties and the mid-seventies, these perceptive essays reflect some of the preoccupations of that time, but also manage to embrace a wide spectrum of issues that are philosophical in the broad sense that Quinton espouses. Both in his "Preface" and throughout his essays, Quinton shows himself to have been immune to the enclosed, autonomous, and blatantly unhistorical style of philosophy in the two decades leading up to the mid-seventies when the social and political turmoil in Europe and the United States woke many from their analytical reverie.

Among many numerous themes in these polished and interesting essays, a few central ones can be extracted from the whole. G. E. Moore's common-sense philosophy is criticized throughout and his ignorance of the history of philosophy is shown to have undermined some of his accomplishments. C. I. Lewis's thought, especially as found in *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, is praised for its "systematic rationality" and its sagacious treatment of many difficult epistemic problems. In a series of interrelated

LOCAL 1930 Newsline

Affiliated with District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
125 Barclay St., New York, N.Y. 10007

Volume 3 – No.1 March, 1985

President's Report

Marion Porro

Here is a brief rundown of what has been happening recently.

Library Bargaining

Local 1930 and New York Public Library have met and exchanged contract demands. You recall a good portion of our demands are coalition demands. The Library has stated that there can be no settlement until the City not only comes to an agreement with the coalition, but that agreement must be in writing with all the "t's" crossed and "i's" dotted.

Clerical Broadbanding

The following reprint appeared in the January 1, 1985 issue of the Queens Borough Library Guild Local 1321 Newsletter.

CLERICAL BROADBANDING

As many of you already know, the broadbanding of clerks and senior clerks will not happen until the new salary contract is settled. To be sure, one has nothing to do with the other, but the City has taken the position that all July 1, 1984 salary adjustments will take place at the same time, whenever that may be. The new percentage increase, to be negotiated for all, will be on top of the broadband rate, so nothing will be lost by the delay except the inevitable tax loss which comes with getting retroactive pay after January 1 of the New Year. It looks almost certain that it will be that late from the City's position on salary negotiations.

The holding up of the broadband rates is unfair and unconscionable, but it is not illegal, since the agreement is in place and the effective date of payment fixed.

MELS-Education Benefits

As I reported in the November 1984 Newsline, a date for our signatures was set for the Trust Agreement, in July there was a breakdown in negotiations between the Library and District Council 37. The Trust Agreement will cover our members not only for Mels and Education benefits, but our Health & Security benefits (drug, dental, optical, etc.) as well.

I am getting a little tired of saying to you that there should be a signed agreement soon. Be sure to attend the next membership meeting for a complete report on the Trust Agreement and what it means to you.

Coalition Bargaining

At the time of this writing there is nothing new to report. It is just very sad that union members have to be pawns in the political chess game that Mayor Koch is playing. His tactic of non-negotiations was a surprise. How could a popular and allegedly reputable leader of the City of New York deny the collective bargaining process that was agreed to by his precessors more than 25 years ago. But it isn't checkmate just quite yet, Mayor.

Membership Meetings

At the November Membership Meeting the door prizes of $25 gift certificates were won by *Ann May, Rich Sawyer, Mary Ann Altman,* and *Jean Segure.* These members can reassure their co-workers that attending a Union Meeting is most rewarding.

At the January Meeting a District Council 37 Cook Book was won by *Jean Peterson* and T shirts were won by *Dawaine Clark* and *Mary Berman.*

Book Review by David Beasley

The Coal Miners' General Strike of 1949-50 and the Birth of Marxist-Humanism in the U.S. **(Chicago; News and Letters, 1984), 47 p. Raya Dunayevskaya, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (New Jersey; Humanities Press, 1981), 234 p.**

The Coal Miners' General Strike of 1949-50 was caused by the introduction of the continuous miner, a caterpiller mounted machine that ripped coal out of the coal face, swung it back and piled it high about the work crew. Since coal dust explosions could "twist steel rails like pretzels" at speeds over 50,000 miles an hour, the miners feared for their lives from the clouds of dust and heat created by this new machine. John L. Lewis, the great leader of the miners' union, refused to fight the introduction of automation, but he did call a work action when contract talks stalled. Exasperated by months of jockeying for position between union leaders and mine owners, the miners began a wildcat strike that quickly spread to mines around the country. When Lewis ordered the miners back to work, they refused to go.

The story of how the rank and file controlled the strike and arranged for their own food relief despite opposition from their union leaders is vividly told by Andy Phillips, who was a participant. The miners forced the coal operators to negotiate a better wage and Welfare Fund. But the continuous miner could not be stopped. It caused thousands of workers to be laid off, bringing about the Appalachian depression area as we know it today. Months later in 1951 the miners of West Virginia struck over this "man-killing" machine and forced Lewis and the owners to negotiate a seniority protection clause. "All subsequent contract talks were held in secrecy, and we first learned of new agreements when they were reported in the newspapers." Phillips comments wryly.

Active in the strike was Raya Dunayevskaya, philospher and Marxist with a perceptive and enquiring mind which in her writings since that period has carried Marxist philosophy over the impasse of Russian communism to an enlightened vision for the future. At the same time she has demonstrated a development of thought that hues more closely to Marx than that of other Marxist political groups.

The miners' strike taught her that spontaneous action created its own philosophy and led her to found Marxist-Humanism. Yet another left-wing party! you groan. But this one is directed by the workers, and I think, will become important.

Dunayevskaya explains her party thus:

> What became imperative for revolutionaries in the state-capitalist age (she includes Russia and America in this description) was to recognize the *class* nature of state-capitalism and not to limit the discussion of organization to "democracy" vs. "bureaucracy". What was needed was not just a political rejection of the "party to lead" but a whole philosophy of revolution as it related to organization.

Her book, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*, calls on Rosa and Marx (as distinct from Engels) to support her reasoning. She selects the Women's Movement as a salient example of spontaneous action becoming a form of philosophy. She shows us how Rosa, by championing mass action, overcomes the straight-jacket of organization thrust upon her. Marx, she writes, always recognized the importance of women for the success of revolution. Dunayevskaya is stimulating and profoundly insightful in guiding us past the thickets, the maze, and the bear traps of Marxist thought as it has been presented by some of his interpreters. She introduces us to the recently translated *Ethnological Notebooks* that Marx wrote in the last years of his life. The *Notebooks* confirm Marx's emphasis on the Man/Woman relationship as the most revealing of all relationships, initiate his concept of "revolution in permanence", and establish the possibility of revolution in the Third World in advance of the Western nations. Extending these ideas, Dunayevskaya connects Womens' Liberation with Third World liberation and emphasizes the Black dimension to the Woman's Movement by several pages of bibliography at the end of her book.

A description she writes of Marx deserves to be quoted because it demonstrates both her understanding of the man and Marx's appeal to his readers.

> Marx's historic originality in internalizing new data, whether in anthropology or in "pure" science, was a never-ending confrontation with what Marx called "history and its process." That was concrete. That was ever-changing. And that ever-changing concrete was inexorably bound to the universal, because, precisely because, the determining concrete was the ever-developing subject—self-developing men and women.

In the 1880s Henry Adams lamented that the ideas of the two most important thinkers of the time, Comte and Marx, were not taught in American universities. Comte has fallen by the wayside (though he may be found in university attics) whereas Marxist thought has invaded every intellectual discipline. I believe the above quotation gives the reason for Marx's durability and relevance.

And Dunayevskaya's extension of Marxist thought provides us with a promising path into the future which has the distinct advantage of encouraging us to develop it as we proceed. There could be no better antidote to Orwell's threatening vision of *1984*, already close upon us.

See P 205

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THE MARXIST REVIEW

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Comrade P Sundaraya

The Marxist Review deeply mourns the death of Comrade P Sundaraya, one of the oldest and most respected leaders of the pre-split CPI and the former general secretary of the CPI (M). He was a heroic and most dedicated fighter for the cause of socialism and world peace. His memory will continue to inspire the future generations of militants in India. We convey our deepest sympathy to Comrade Leela, other members of the family and all members of the CPI (M).

Comrade Barin Chatterji

We also mourn the death of Comrade Barin Chatterji, a veteran communist and an old colleague of the members of the MR editorial board. Since the split in the CPI, Comrade Barin worked with the CPI (M). He was also a warm friend of this journal. A most dedicated and unassuming comrade, his death is mourned by all who knew him.

APOLOGY

We very much regret that we failed to credit the review article published in the May issue

Raya Dunaevskaya : Rosa Luxemburg—Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution

to its author—Gabriele Dietrich.

We apologise for this omission.

We would also like to mention in this connection that the book reviewed may be had of

News and Letters Committee
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Personal

Friends may please note that my telephone number has been changed to [illegible].

Ajit Roy

Review Article

Raya Dunayevskaya : Rosa Luxemburg—Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution★

In her book on Rosa Luxemburg, women's liberation and Marx's theory of revolution, we have another attempt by Raya Dunayevskaya to work out Marxism as 'new Humanism". She had done this earlier in her books *Marxism and Revolution* (first published in 1958 and revised in 1964, 1971 and 1982) and *Philosophy and Revolution—from Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao* (published 1973, republished with a new introduction in 1982).

Yet, this book is different from her earlier ones in that it is written from a pronounced feminist perspective. It is different from most other feminist writings in that it tries to trace insights into the women's question in Marx's and Luxemburg's life and writings which went so far unnoticed while at the same time, Dunayevskaya tries to incorporate the perspectives of the women's movement in her overall theory of revolution. She had been prompted to write this book by the publication of *The Ethnological Notebooks* of Karl Marx, transcription of the last writings from his pen. which opened up a view of the women's question quite different from what Engels evolved in *Origin of the Family*. She theoretically links this vision up with the concept of permanent revolution and the whole question of transition to socialism from pre-capitalist society which Marx developed in the first draft letter to Vera

★ New Jersey : Humanities Press, Sussex : Harvester Press 1981.

Zasulich, and with one of the crucial questions raised by Luxemburg again and again : What is the relationship of spontaneity to both consciousness and "the Party"? In Dunayevskaya's words : "The total disregard of the feminist dimension of Rosa Luxemburg by Marxists and non-Marxists alike calls for the record to be straightened on that dimension in Luxemburg. Moreover, there is a need for today's Women's Liberation Movement to absorb Luxemburg's revolutionary dimension, not for history's sake but for the demands of the day, including that of autonomy". (p. IX) The women's movement cannot work without developing a comprehensive revolutionary theory.

In the first part of the book, Dunayevskaya depicts Luxemburg as Theoretician, as Activist, as Internationalist. Luxemburg entered the German arena in 1898 after underground party work in Poland. After only one year, she published *Reform or Revolution* (1899) which became the classic answer to revisionism and gave her a very strong position in the German party. It is characteristic to Luxemburg's approach that she did not allow herself to be pigeonholed and confined by the "woman question" or by anti-semitism for that matter or by any other single issue : "it was the totality of the revolutionary goal that characterised the totality that was Rosa Luxemburg". (p. 3)

In her personal life, she related deeply to her Polish comrade Leo Jogiches with whom she had shared party work in Poland but after entering the German scene she became much more independent of him also in questions of organisation in which she had relied on him earlier. Her final break with him came in 1907, but their political co-operation continued. He was murdered within six weeks of her violent death on January 15, 1918 through the hand of government troops. Jogiches paid for the attempt to uncover the true background of Luxemburg's and Liebknecht's murder, with his own life.

Dunayevskaya's book is difficult to read and more difficult to review since it is very densely written and presupposes a very detailed knowledge of Marx's and Luxemburg's writings.

Yet, what comes across even to the lay reader is the dialectics of Luxemburg being discriminated against as a woman in the party, supporting Clara Zetkin in her gigantic task of organising working class women and asserting herself as one of the leading theoreticians of the time.

Luxemburg sneaked back into Poland during the 1905 revolution despite being dissuaded by friends pointing out to her the dangers which she as a woman would face. The experiences there inspired her to write one of her most important pamphlets *Mass Strike, the Party and the Trade Unions* which became path breaking for the whole discussion on spontaneity. She wrote it in exile in Finland after a period in a Polish jail. The perspective expressed in this pamphlet was also forcefully brought out in her crucial contribution to he Congress of all the tendencies of the Russian Marxist movement held in April 1907 in London. The Congress in fact focussed on the nature of revolution. It deepened the great divide between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, but up to this day the minutes of this Congress have not been translated into English. Luxemburg, whose speech at the Congress is translated in the appendix, made a crucial impact in expressing the class character of the Russian revolution : "The Russian proletariat, in its actions, must show that between 1848 and 1907, in the more than half century of capitalist development, and from the point of this development taken as a whole, we are not at the beginning but at the end of this development. It must show that the Russian Revolution is not just the last act in a series of bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century, but rather the forerunner of a new series of future proletarian revolutions in which the conscious proletariat and its vanguard, the Social Democracy, are destined for the historic role of leader." (p. 9).

Comments Dunayevskaya ; "So sharply did Luxemburg express the class nature of the revolution, that what emerged was the relationship not only of the proletariat to the peasantry, but of the Russian Revolution to the international revolution. One could see, as well, the germ of future revolution within the present revolution. What had been clear

from the very start of Bloody Sunday when the Tsar's army fired on that first mass demonstration on 9 January 1905, was that Rosa Luxemburg was developing the question of continuous revolution." (p. 9f.)

It is interesting that Plekhanov in his polemics against Luxemburg caricatured her as "reclining on clouds···lost in day dreams .. like Raphael's Madona", avoiding the issue raised by her of who were the leading forces in the revolution—the proletariat and the peasantry or the bourgeoisie, by ridiculing her as a woman. He was cut to size for this by Lenin (p. 12).

In the same year 1907 Luxemburg, the only female member of the International Socialist Bureau, addressed the International Socialist Women's Conference in Stuttgart and urged the women to keep their center in Stuttgart. She also emphasised the importance of having a voice of their own in the journal *Gleichheit* (*Equality*).

Ever since 1905, Luxemburg focussed on mass organisation and general strike under Marxist leadership as a means of struggle expressing the unity of economics and politics.

This finally led to her break with Kautsky—1910/11—who stood for the highly bureaucratised style of functioning of the German party. Luxemburg started applying her lessons on the general strike drawn from the Russian Revolution to the German situation in 1910.

It was a time of mass strike and Luxemburg supported this wave not only by her writing but also by taking two months off from the Party School where she taught and going on an agitational tour. Ahead of anyone else, including Lenin, Luxemburg sensed the opportunism of the German Social-Democracy and finally broke with Kautsky.

Another important point of sharp controversy was Luxemburg's critique of the "Morocco incident", the sailing of the German gunboat 'Panther' into Morocco in July 1911. She

castigated the absence of consistent criticism of the incident by the party by publishing a "private" letter from party sources together with her own strong anti-imperialist critique. Again, the controversy which arose was full of male-chauvinist attacks against Luxemburg the tone of which she systematically ignored in the same way as she ignored anti-semitism in the party. Dunayevskaya quotes letters between Victor Adler and August Bebel in which Luxemburg is called a "poisonous bitch" while Bebel retorts: "With all the wretched female's squirts of poison I wouldn't have the party without her" (letter of August 1910, quoted p. 27). Dunayevskaya comments: "Violent male chauvinism permeated the whole party, including both August Bebel, the author of *Woman and Socialism*—who had created a myth about himself as a veritable feminist—and Karl Kautsky, the main theoretician of the whole International. Thus, after Luxemburg's break with Kautsky in 1911, when Zetkin also supported Luxemburg's position, and as they faced an approaching Party Congress in 1913 Kautsky warned Bebel: 'the two females and their followers are planning an attack on all central positions.' None of this changed the standing of that fundamental text of the socialist women's movement *Woman and Socialism*, which had gone through innumerable editions." (p 27) Luxemburg's consistent pushing for a mass line in the party and her uncompromisingly anti-imperialist stand brought her a certain amount of isolation which she used to write her most comprehensive theoretical work: *Accumulation of Capital (A Contribution to an Explanation of Imperialism)* which she started to develop in 1911 and published in 1913. She considered this work as a further development of what Marx had left unfinished in *Capital*, Vol. II, and therefore entitled the work: *Volume II of Accumulation of Capital or What the Epigones Have Made of It. An Anti-Critique*. What Luxemburg proposes in this book is a critique of Marx's theory of expanded reproduction in Vol. 2 of *Capital*. Marx's argument was largely directed against Adam Smith who had neglected the component of constant capital in the social production and was dealing only with variable capital and surplus value, assuming that the constant portion of capital

'finally" dissolved itself into wages. He also argued against the underconsumptionist understanding that contiaued capital accumulation was impossible because of the impossibility of 'realizing ' surplus value, i.e. of selling.

Marx divides social production into two departments : production of means of production and production of means of consumption. Surplus value is embodied in both. The underconsumptionist theory does not hold water because in capitalist society means of production forms the larger department. Summarised in Dunayevskaya's words : "Marx establishes that the total social product cannot be 'either' the means of production 'or' the means of consumption ; there is a preponderance of means of production *over* means of consumption (symbolically expressed as mp/mc). Not only is this so but *must* be so, .. It is not 'people' who realise the greater part of surplus value ; it is realised through the constant expansion of constant capital. The promise of simple reproduction—a society composed solely of workers and capitalists—remains the premise of expanded reproduction." (p. 36)

'Luxemburg's main line of argument went against Marx's assumption of a closed capitalist society meaning 1) a society composed solely of workers and capitalists and 2) 'the rule of capitalism in the entire world'. She held against this that expanded reproduction had never taken place in a closed society, but rather through distribution to, and expropriation of, 'non-capitalist strata and non-capitalist societies.'

Luxemburg maintains that these "non-capitalist surroundings" are essential for the realisation of capital. E. g., she states : "The most important thing is that value can be realized neither by workers nor by capitalists *but only* by social strata who themselves *do not produce capitalistically*". She neglects the class character expressed in Marx's department of means of production and department of means of consumption. She says : 'Accumulation is not only an inner relation between two branches of production. It is *first of all* a relation

between capitalist and non-capitalist surroundings". (both quotations on p. 38). Marx had emphasised how decisive it was to determine the use-value of commodities in order to understand the economic order. because iron is not consumed by people but by steel while sugar is not consumed by machines but by people. Luxemburg leaves this determination of the use-value out of consideration.

Dunayevskaya criticises Luxemburg by pointing out that she eliminates the fundamental Marxian distinction of means of production and means of consumption as being indicative of a class relationship and thus drifts from the production process to circulation, exchange and consumption.

This criticism of Dunayevskaya is somewhat questionable. Luxemburg's theory does not only pertain to the sphere of consumption, it is valid also for the sphere of production : Firstly, non-capitalist strata are essential in the process of original accumulation of capital through violence and plunder. Secondly, non-capitalist strata are also essential through their involvement in subsistence production which goes a long way in making capitalist exploitation possible. This is true for subsistence producers in the First World and also for women in the First World as well as in the Third World. Andre Gunder Frank has therefore used Luexmburg's argument to illuminate the relationship between centre and periphery and Claudia von Werlhop has used Luxemburg's argument to highlight the role of woman as subsistence producers. The argument goes that capitalism *reproduces* these strata which are essential for what has been called "ongoing original accumulation". I myself think it is more accurate to talk of "continuous formal subsumption" of non-capitalist labour under capital (i. é.. the "real" subsumption need not take place at all).

Dunayevskaya is right when she points out that capitalism was developing much more capitalistically (i. e. through expansion of machinofacture) and *between* capitalist countries (e. g. U. S. and Britain) than through "third groups" or between capitalist and non-capitalist countries. But she does

not explore the validity of Luxemburg's thesis for the explanation of the crippled form of capitalism prevailing in the countries of the periphery and also for the continued existence of women as a reserve army of capital.

There is also an incisive difference between Luxemburg and Marx in characterising the general contradiction of capitalism. Luxemburg sees it in the contradiction between production and consumption and between production and the market, while Marx sees the innermost source of crisis in the process of production itself. He characterises as the general contradiction of capitalism "(1) the degradation of the worker to an appendage of a machine, (2) the constant growth of the unemployed army, (3) capitalism's own downfall because of its inability to give greater employment to labour. Since labour power is the supreme commodity of capitalist production, the only source of its value and surplus value, capitalism's inability to reproduce it dooms capitalism itself." (p. 45) While Marx sees three major facts of capitalist production which lead to its collapse, namely: 1) decline in the rate of profit, 2) deepening crisis and 3) growing unemployed army, Luxemburg holds that accumulation is impossible without an extra capitalist force. However, she did not see this extra-capitalist force as a revolutionasy mass but postulated, in contradiction with her own theory that the proletariat alone would overthrow capitalism. While I agree with Dunayevskaya that Luexmburg's emphasis on an outside force is carried to an untenable extreme, the question all the same remains: What is the relationship between the proletariat as a revolutionary subject on the one hand and on the other hand, the marginalised masses in the countries of the periphery, women and other subsistence producers in the counteies of periphery and centre on the other. As far as the marginal mass is concerned, the problem is today even discussed in *Voprosy filosofi*. (*Problems of Philosophy*)

V. Khoros in his book *Population Its Past, Present and Future* (Progress Puhlishers Moscow 1984, p. 46,) refers to

to V V Krylov's article "Characteristic Features of Socio-Economic Processes in Developing Societies, *Voprosy filosofi*, No. 9, 1976, p. 105 while pointing out that "bourgeois development in the world's periphery (is) accompanied not by curtailment but by expansion of traditional sectors, that are becoming 'sediment reservoirs' of capitalism, for late capitalism can no longer function without recreating, supporting and conserving traditional structures that grow into gigantic hotbeds of backwardness and destitution." It seems that Luxemburg's thesis is up to a point vindicated by recent develópments.

One of the reasons why Luxemburg could not see the colonial masses as revolutionary subjects was her extreme stand on the nationality question. She deemed national self-determination to be "bourgeois". This stand was sharpened by her profound despair at the betrayal of the German Social Democratic Party at the outbreak of World War I. In her pamphlet *The Crisis of the Social Democracy* published under the pseudonym Junius, she argues: "So long as capitalist states exist, i. e., so long as imperialistic world policies determine and regulate the inner and the outer life of a nation, there can be no 'national self-determination' either in war or in peace." (quoted p. 55).

While Luxemburg found herself in sharp contradiction with Lenin on the nationality question, her position on spontaneity of the masses was in some ways closer to Lenin's position on party and mass organisation than it is often held to be. Luxemburg did acknowledge the need for centralism and conspiratorial work under an autocratic regime. What she decidedly rejected was the need for "factory discipline" which Lenin extolled as an educational remedy for the proletariat as well as for the intelligentsia. However, Dunayevskaya points out that Luxemburg's pamphlet on the 1905 revolution, *The Mass Strike, the Party, and the Trade Unions* was directed not against Lenin but against the German Social Democracy. Nevertheless, she did not agree with the vanguard theory. Her effort to spell out an entirely new concept of democracy has remained an unfinished task.

Dunayevskaya emphasises against both, Lenin and Luxemburg, the need to root spontaneity in a consistent philosophy of human liberation. She says: "Clearly, there was too much organisational Lasalleanism in Luxemburg as there was in Lenin. Neither her critique of Lenin's position, nor the development of her concept of spontaneity in *Mass Strike*, in 1906, had prepared her for the break with Karl Kautsky in 1910-11. What was missing in both at that time was a philosophy of revolution that was as one with their concept of organisation." (p. 61). Even when she broke with Kautsky she did not leave the party. She joined the USPD of the centrists when they broke with the SPD in 1917 since that was a "mass movement". Even when Spartakus, the former Gruppe Internationale, became a fully organised tendency, she broke with the USPD only at the actual outbreak of the German Revolution.

She emphasised that real life creates organisation as an outgrowth of ongoing struggle. What she did not anticipate despite sensing Kautsky's opportunism, was counter-revolution from within. Luxemburg was shattered when the war broke out and the Second International collapsed. Lenin reacted by issuing the slogan: "Turn the imperialist war into civil war"; and by re-examining his old philosophic ground by turning to Marx's origins in Hegel, Lenin criticised Luxemburg for her mechanistic anti-nationalism and called it "half way dialectic". Yet, the task of relating dialectics to the organisational question has remained unfinished as Dunayevskaya points out: "Ironically enough, although Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin were opposites in attitude to philosophy, they were *alike* in failing to relate organisation to philosophy. Whereas Luxemburg paid very little attention to philosophy in general, Lenin's profoud attention to philosophy, in 1914 became an attitude that would, when it affected politics and theory, last until his dying day. But it was never worked out by him in relationship to the party". Even though it were the women who had initiated the toppling of the tsarist regime by insisting on celebrating International Women's Day by a mass strike, this did not lead to a rethinking of the women's

question. Lenin, despite his conflict with the party in 1917, never rewrote *What Is To Be Done.*

The Second Interational collapsed with the vote of the German Social Democrats in the Reichstag (parliament) to support war credits to the Kaiser on 4th August 1914. A statement of opposition was signed by Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin. Rosa Luxemburg was legally prosecuted for her anti-war efforts since 1913, was again sentenced in February 1914 and arrested in February 1915 when she was about to leave with Zetkin for a planning meeting to organise the first international anti-war conference. The magazine of the women's wing, *Gleichelt*, had become the major publication of the radical Left and the most important anti-war journal. In August 1915, Zetkin, too was arrested. It was from prison that Luxemburg wrote her great anti-war pamphlet under the pen-name Junius. This was not only an ardent anti-war pamphlet but it opened up a new path to revolution. Though Luxemburg lost sight here of the national anti-imperialist wars, she drove home the point that the age of revolution had arrived.

During the whole process of the revolution, Luxemburg held on to her concept of democracy. She wrote in her pamphlet on the Russian Revolution: "Yes, dictatorship! But this dictatorship consists in the *manner of applying democracy*, not in its *elimination*" (quoted p. 72).

At the end of October 1918, the mutiny in the naval base of Kiel in the North of Germany on the coast of the Baltic Sea precipitated the collapse of the imperial regime. The Kaiser fled after repeated strike waves merged into a general strike. Rosa Luxemburg was freed by the revolutionary masses from the prison in Breslau. On 11th November, *Rote Fahne* (Red Flag), the publication of the Spartakus, issued a special supplement with a 14 point programme demanding immediate peace and all power to the councils of workers and soldiers.

Rote Fahne untiringly criticised the petty bourgeois illusion of the social democrats expressed in their call for a national assembly. Among the demands of the Spartakus spelled out in a later pamphlet was the elimination of parliament and election of workers councils, abolition of class discrimination and complete equality of sexes, expropriation of property, takeover of public transport and maximum 6-hour workday. Luxemburg was all the time involved in organisational activity, strikes, demonstrations, writing and publishing. There were only two and a half months left before she was murdered. The only alternatives she saw were either barbarism or socialism. In December 1918 the Founding Conference of the Communist Party of Germany was held which stressed especially the 1872 edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, "in which Marx had called attention to the fact that what the Paris Commune showed was that the 'working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes but must smash it !" (quoted p. 74).

The Spartakists with their workers' and soldiers' councils surrounded the Reich's chancellory and held the government captive until 5th January, but the counter revolution, armed to the teeth, finally prevailed. Luxembeurg's testament, on the day before her murder, rings out through history : 'Order reigns in Berlin !' You stupid lackeys ! Your 'order' is built on sand. Tomorrow the revolution will rear its head once again, and to your horror, will proclaim, with trumpets blazing : *I was, I am, I will be* !" (quoted p. 751).

In the second part of the book Dunayevskaya develops the perspective of "The Women's Liberation Movement as Revolutionary Force and Reason" and tries to see Luxemburg's life in the light of this perspective. She draws the lines out from the Women's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, N. Y. in 1848, via the contribution of revolutionary European women like Flora Tristan to the November Revolution of 1917. She sharply works out the Black dimension out of which the women's movement in the U. S. first emerged, the contribution of the freed slave women like Sojourner Truth

whose very name expressed her programme. She also draws out the line to the struggles of African women, the Igbo women who waged the "Women's War" in Nigeria against the British and their own collaborationist chiefs. Yes, these indeed were Luxemburg's sisters. Despite her systematic deafness to male chauvinism, she spontaneously expressed herself in very feminist terms in her personal correspondence. In a letter to Mathilde Wurm, commenting on the compromise with the war-effort, written from prison in 1916, she sees herself as the Amazon queen Penthesilea of the Greek myth who, in the drama version of Hienrich von Kleist, kills Achilles. Not only that, her whole vision of life is captured in those few lines : "I'm telling you that as soon as I can stick my nose out again I will hunt and harry your society of frogs with trumpet blasts, whip crackings, and blood hounds—like Penthesilea I wanted to say; but by God, you people are no Achilles. Have you had enough of a New Year's greeting now ? Then see to it that you stay *human*...Being human means joyfully throwing your whole life on the scales of destiny' when need be, but all the way rejoicing in every sunny day and every beautiful cloud. Ach, I know of no formula to write you of being human..." (quoted p. 83).

Though Luxemburg did not take up the women's question in her theoretical work, she collaborated in the autonomous socialist women's movement which Zetkin headed and frequently wrote for *Gleicheit* (Equality), the journal of the movement. Dunayevskya also convincingly shows how in Luxemburg's personal life, the break with Jogiches in 1907 led her towards great theoretical and organisational independence and depth of insight. One of the highlights of the women's movement was the first celebration of International Women's Day in March 1911 which Zethin had proposed to the Second International. The same year, the first International Women's Suffrage Conference took place and tens of thousands of women demonstrated throughout Germany.

Luxemburg wrote to Luise Kautsky : "Are you coming to the women's conference ? Just imagine, I have become a

feminist! I received a credential for this conference and must therefore go to Jena" (quoted p. 95). She saw the struggle for women's suffrage as an integral part of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. Women's activities in the Social Democratic Party was drastically curtailed when the war broke out and *Gleicheit* became the mouthpiece of anti-war resistance. Even after Luxemburg's and Zetkin's arrest in 1915 the opposition went on throughout until the November 1918-January 1919 Revolution which opened the gates of prison for Luxemburg.

The defeat of the revolution set an end to the women's movement as well. In the Soviet Union, the women's movement, which had among other things triggered off the February revolution, was suffocated by Stalinism.

Dunayevskaya shows clearly how the new women's movement in the mid-60s emerged from *within the left*, how the women within the Left started rebelling against male-chauvinism among Leftist men. "Where, therefore, racism and sexism had both been laid totally at the feet of the exploitative class regime, this time accusations of sexism were pointed at the Black males—indeed, at its most left wing, the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC), during its organising of southern Blacks." (p. 99). Further radical feminist voices came out of the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society). Without Dunayevskaya's going into it, we can recall that the women's movement in Europe likewise emerged from the left students' revolt in the sixties, where the women's movement erred was when it moved away from the vanguard organizations and from the Black Movement and class analysis. Dunayevskaya's main critique of the Women's Movement is the narrowing down of revolutionary perspective. In her own words: "To this writer, despite all the new depth and scope and global dimension of the new Women's Liberation Movement today, the most serious errors of not only bourgeois but of socialist feminists are that they, at one and the same time, have disregarded Rosa Luxemburg as a revolutionary and as a feminist, *and* above all, have helped

those men who have tried to reduce Marx to a single discipline, be that as economist, philosopher, anthropologist, or 'political strategist'. The truth is, however, that Marx, at all times—in theory as in practice, and in practice as in theory—was a revolutionary" (p. 104).

Dunayevskaya uses the third part of her book in order to work out the dialectical principle in Marx and the unity of thought on the women's question from the 1844 manuscripts up to his last writings' '*Ethnological Note-Books*'. She hereby tries to integrate subjectivity in objectivity, freedom in necessity and the revolutionary perspective of women's movement and other mass movements in revolutionary perspective of the class struggle.

The 1844 manuscripts were not published in Lenin's time and only came to light eight years after Luxemburg's death. Lenin had made his own discovery of Hegelian dialectics under the impact of the outbreak of the first world war and insisted that *Capital*, vol. I could not be understood without Hegel's *Science of Logic*. Dunayevskaya tries to show that, starting from Engels, all post-Marx Marxists had an insufficient grasp of dialectics, seeing it merely as a method of thought and not as a dialectic of liberation. Dunayevskaya insists on the profound integrative force of historical dialectics "There is but one dialectical conceptual framework, an indivisible whole which does not divide economics and politics from Subject: masses in motion—a living, feeling, thinking, acting whole. Therefore, in Marx's new continent of thought, history was not just 'economic periods' but masses *making* history. Because a single dialectical course determines the objective and subjective forces, the dialectic of Marx's philosophy of revolution allowed Marx's theory of history to transform historic narrative into historic Reason" (p. 119).

Dunayevskaya insists that while Marx's work has to be seen as one from the 1844 manuscripts to the *Ethnological Notebooks*, it is important to understand the profound differences in outlook between Marx and Engels. She drawn

the connection between the early writings and the last manuscripts as follows: "The first decade after his break with bourgeois society saw not only the concretization of Marx's Promethean vision in the *Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic* and the *Communist Manifesto* but the projection of 'the revolution in permanence'.

The last seven years of Marx's life saw not only most profound articulation of the organisation question in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and the French edition of *Capital*, which had foreseen our state capitalist age and deepened the significance of the fetishism of commodities, but the *Ethnological Notebooks*. Only recently transcribed, these *Notebooks* reveal, at one and the same time, the actual ground that led to the first projection of the possibility of revolution coming first in underdeveloped countries like Russia, a reconnection and deepening of what was projected in the *Grundrisse* on the Asiatic mode of production, a return to that most fundamental relationship of Man/Woman which had first been projected in the 1844 Essays." (p. 121)

As in her earlier writings, Dunayevskaya quotes Marx's famous statement on freedom from the 'Debates on Freedom of the Press' in *Rheinische Zeitung*, 12 May 1842: "Freedom is so much the essence of man that even its opponents realise it. No man fights freedom, he fights at most the freedom of others. Every kind of freedom has therefore always existed, only at one time as a special privilege, at another time as a universal right" (p. 124).

It was shortly after this debate that Marx had to leave *Rheinische Zeitung*, but not to join what he considered vulgar communism, nor to remain part of the Left Hegelians. He spelled out the direction in the *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*: "As philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy and once the lightening of thought has struck deeply into this naive soil of the people, the emancipation of Germans into men (sic) will be accomplished" (quoted p. 125)[8]. The decisive contribution in Marx's

analysis is that his analysis of alienated labour goes much further than the economic structure and class relations but comprises human relations as a whole. One of the crystallising events for Marx's thinking was the uprising of the Silesian weavers. Even if the *social* revolution were to occur only in one factory district, Marx recognised that "it represents man's protest against a dehumanised life, because it starts out from the *point of view of a separate real individual*, because the *community*, against the separation of which from himself the individual reacts, is man's *true* community, *human* nature" (quoted p. 128).

In his tenth Thesis on Feuerbach Marx made clear that "The standpoint of the old materialism is 'civil' society; the standpoint of the new is *human* society, or society, or socialised humanity" (quoted p. 129).

In the 1844 manuscript Marx had worked out that human alienation is first of all expressed in the man/woman relationship: "The infinite degradation in which human being exists for himself is expressed in this relation to the *woman* as the spoils and handmaiden of communal lust. For the secret relationship of human being to human being finds its *unambiguous*, definitive, *open* obvious expression in the *direct natural* relationship between the sexes. The direct, natural necessary relationship of human being to human being is the *relationship of man to woman*... From the character of this relation it follows to what degree *human being* as a species has become *human*."[9] Marx's ruthless critique of all that exists found its first comprehensive systematic expression in *Communist Manifesto* written for the Communist League in 1847. Soon after it was published the revolutionary ferment burst into action in 1848 all over Europe.

It is not possible to reproduce here Dunayevskaya's whole analysis of Marx's work. She works out a number of aspects of special relevance for the analysis of the problematic of the Third World and the modern mass movements like, e. g., the chapter on pre-capitalist formations in *Grundrisse*. Dunayevskaya sees in *Capital* the Great Divide from Hegel because

"the Subject—not subject matter, but Subject—was neither economics nor philosophy but the human being, the masses. Because dead labour (capital) dominates over living labour, and the *labourer* is the 'grave digger of capitalism', all human existence is involved" (p. 143).

It is obvious that we are still miles apart from what Marx really envisaged. No socialist society has as yet been able to really strive to overcome commodity production and thus a system which produces, as Marx expresses it in his chapter 'the Fetish Character of Commodities', "material relations between persons and social relation between things". The man/woman question in present day society expresses itself precisely in these terms. The struggle for women's liberation cannot be carried on in isolation from the anti-capitalist struggle".

The one throughgoing question in Dunayevskaya's book which is crucial for the integration of women's struggle and class struggle, but which arises first of all from the analysis of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, is the question of the relationship of party and mass spontaneity which it expressed in the overriding concept of permanent revolution. It would be reductionist to ascribe this pre-occupation with permanent revolution only to her Trotskyite background. Her contribution on the contrary consists of establishing permanent revolution as a general Marxist concept by developing it from the writings of Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg and making the specificity and limitation of Trotsky's contribution discernible. For Dunayevskaya the organisational question is inextricably intertwined with the philosophy of revolution. She shows convincingly the contradiction in Luxemburg herself: her emphasis on mass spontaneity but her inability to leave the party even at the point of total disagreement, her close work with Jogiches politically but the break-up of their intimacy under the impact of the mass upsurge of the 1905 revolution, in a situation in which Jogiches continued to represent principles of secrecy and avantguardism while Luxemburg started to understand masses in motion as historical Reason. She wrote to Emmanuel and Mathilde Wurm on 18 July 1906: "The revolution is magnificent. All else is bilge" (quoted p. 7), Dunayevskaya criticises sharply Lasalle's influence on the organisational question and the whole tendency in the Social Democratic Party to make the organisational question a fetish. She emphasises against this the importance of Marx's 1875 *Critique of the Gotha Program* as a critique of Lasalle's principles and also Marx's *The Civil War in France* as a crucial analysis of masses in motion during the Paris Commune. Both, the *Critique* and *Civil War in France* were of decisive influence for Lenin's *State and Revolution* in 1917. The problem is that all these analyses have never sufficed to really live down *What Is To Be Done*. The overriding question is how to incorporate within the ad hoc needs of organisation, the overriding goals of the classless society and to spell out the concrete steps of how to get there, how to overcome the enslaving subordination of the individual to division of labour and also the antithesis between mental and physical labour.

The crucial contribution of Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Program* is that it deals with the inseparable relationship of philosophy to organisation itself. Dunayevskaya traces the development of the concept of permanent revolution in Marx from 1843 onwards, developing further during the events of 1848/49 and being made fully explicit first in the Address to the Communist League, 1850. *The Critique of the Gotha Program* can be read in the light of the full philosophical implications of this concept. It was the historical events in between which helped to develop the concept of permanent revolution and the philosophy of total human liberation to the full. "The establishment of the First International, on the one hand, and the final structuring of *Capital* on the other hand, in the 1860s revealed, at one and the same time, not only the break with the concept of theory as a debate with theoreticians, and the development of the concept of theory as a history of class struggles, but a concept also of a new revolutionary force —Black.* The culmination of all these theories and activities was, of course, the historical appearance of the Paris

* Dunayevskaya here refers to the emancipation struggle of the black population in the US.

Commune of 1871, and there, too, we saw—along with the great discovery of a historic form for working out the economic emancipation of the proletariat—a new force of revolution, women" (p. 161).

In an afterword to the chapter on Marx's theory of permanent revolution, Dunayevskaya works out a critique of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, the shortcomings of which she sees in the fact that though Trotsky in 1905 had clearly anticipated that backward Rusia, involved in a bourgeois revolution, would reach for socialism in an "unbroken chain", he did nothing in those twelve years between 1905 and 1917 to develop this point. He saw the peasantry as conservative, the proletariat as backward and, as Lenin criticised, reduced his own "philosophy of history" to "the struggle for influence over the politically immature proletariat" (p.169). Trotsky failed to understand Lenin's position on the peasantry as introduced in his "Theses on the National and Colonial Question," presented at the Second Congress of the Communist International. In Dunayevskaya's words: Trotsky's reference to that thesis is limited to his fight with Stalin—internationalism vs. nationalism—and not *the* pivotal point of the revolutionary live force of the peasantry, of the national question, *and* of the perspective that, since world revolutions have not come by way of Berlin, 'then perhaps' it can come by way of Peking. That new point of departure was not grasped, much less developed by Trotsky" (p. 171).

In the final chapter, Dunayevskaya draws out the lines from Marx's late writings to the 1980s. She points out once again our historic advantage of having access to Marx's writings in entirety and thus of being able to grasp the totality of his revolutionary theory. She severely criticises the way Marx's posthumous works have been published. Among other problems, she perceives sharp differences between Engel's *The Origin of the Family* and Marx's notebooks "whether these relate to primitive communism, the Man/Woman relationship, or, for that matter, the attitude to

Darwin" (p, 179). Dunayevskaya sees a decisive methodological difference between Marx and Engels in the way how they deal with periods of transition in the historical process : Marx was showing that it is *during* the transition period that you see the duality emerging to reveal the beginnings of antagonisms, whereas Engels always seems to have antagonisms only at the end, as if class society came in very nearly full blown *after* the communal form was destroyed and private property was established. *Moreover for Marx the dialectical development from one stage to another is related to new revolutionary upsurges, whereas Engels sees it as a unilateral progression*" (p. 180).

Marx showed that the elements of oppression, including oppression of woman, arose from *within* primitive communism —with the establishment of ranks—relationship of chief to mass—and the economic interests which went with it. In Dunayevskaya's words : Marx demonstrated that long before the dissolution of the primitive commune, there emerged the question of ranks *within* the egalitarian commune. It was the beginning of a transformation into opposite— gens into caste. That is to say, within the egalitarian communal form arose the elements of its opposite—caste, aristocracy, and different material interests. Morever, these were not successive stages, but *co-existence* with the communal form" (p, 181). While it is unclear what Marx intended to do with his extensive anthropological notes, one thing is clear, namely that "the decline of the primitive commune was not due just to external factors nor due only to '*the world historic defeat of the female sex.*' That was Engels' phrase, not Marx's" (p. 183). In other words, Dunayevskaya abandons the monocausal approach of linking the women's question primarily to the property-concept and raises the question of how society even during primitive communism was *organised*. This way of approaching the problem needs to be developed further. It finds support also in what Marx wrote in the beginning of *German Ideology* on sexual division of labour and division of labour between head and hand. Recent anthropological data support the attempt for such a multi-causal analysis of the women's question and by analysing it that way, it links up with the overall organisa-

tional question and underlying philosophy of the working class movement in a much more creative way, because it does raise the question of division of labour and relationship between head and hand, vanguard and masses, styles of funtioning, direct democracy, flow of information, relationship of rationality and intuition, reason and spontaneity in an overall way.

The point, in other words, is not just to overcome monocausal explanations like "property" or "the world historic defeat of the female sex", "patriarchy" overthrowing "matriarchy" but to establish a dialectical method which does not take *counter*-revolution as its starting point but new stages of revolution emerging in ever new historical forms. The uncritical reception of Engels has often led to an idealisation, of the past ("matriarchy" under primitive communism) linked up with the promise of an idealised future ("equality" after the revolution) while at the same time the women's movement could be denounced as a bourgaois deviation abstracting people's minds from the priorities of the class struggle, "dividing the working class", etc. It is essential to understand that it is basically an absence of creative dialectics which prevent the Left today to perceive the revolutionary forces where they emerge. At the same time, there is lack of theory and creative dialectics in these mass movements as well. Dunayevskaya characterises the situation as follows: "Marx was not hurrying to make easy generalisations, such as Engels' characterization of the future being just a 'higher stage' of primitive communism. No. Marx envisioned a totally new man, a totally new woman, a totally new life form (and by no means only for marriage)—in a word, a totally new society. That is why it is so relevant to today's Women's Liberation Movement and why we still have so much to learn from Marx's concept of Man/Woman, not only in the abstract 1844 articulation, but in the empiric 1880 formulation when it was integrated with the need for total uprooting of capitalism and creation of a classless society" (p. 186).

Dunayevskaya illustrates Marx's unrelenting creativity by his draft letter to Vera Zasulich (1881) and his introduction to

the Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto* (1882) in both of which he anticipated that Russia could be the first to have a proletarian revolution ahead of the West. This links up with today's problem of Third World revolutions.

These are the threads we have to pick up if we want to face our own task, practically as well as theoretically. In Dunayevskaya's words: "The point is that—whether it was because Engels' name, after the death of Marx, had become sacrosanct, or because Engels' views reflected their own later views—not a single one of the post-Marx Marxists, beginning with Engels and continuing with Luxemburg, Zetkin, Lenin and Trotsky, all the way into our age with Mao, worked on the ground *Marx* had laid out, either on pre-capitalist societies or on the question of Women's Liberation. That is the ground that our age has dug out, especially since the mid-1970s. That isn't because we are 'smarter' than any of these great revolutionaries. It is because, we who have been struggling under the whip of the many *counter*-revolutions, do have one advantage—the maturity of our age" (p. 190).

Dunayevskaya quotes the myriads of crises in our age "from Russia to China, from Cuba to Iran, from Africa to Pot's Cambodia, that without a philosophy of revolution, activism spends itself in mere anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, without ever revealing what it is *for*" (p. 194).

Indeed, the tasks are outlined, the threads are there to be picked up. The difficulty consists in the fact that the philosophy of revolution and the New Humanism cannot be spelled out in the abstract, but have to be developed in correspondence to day-to-day actions, without our quest for Notion being bogged down and swallowed up by blind activism. In the Indian situation, there are three areas in which a lot of work needs to be done:

I. The organisational question (party-mass organisation, vanguardism-spontaneity, bureaucratism-mass action) has to be raised in the light of the quest for an underlying philosophy of revolution and with a critical analysis of the lack of dialectics in today's Left.

2. There is an urgent need to deepen the Marxist analysis of the Women's question in order to get away from mono-causal explanations and to incorporate the women's question organisationally and theoretically in the class movement and the class struggle in the women's movement. Such a deepening analysis will also help to integrate other mass movements (ecology, peace) in the working class movements and carry the necessary anti-capitalist perspective into these mass movements.

3. More debate and analysis is also needed on the question of the character of present day Third World revolutions. The question of socialist revolution gets easily defferred by pointing to the need for "completion" of bourgeois democratic revolution, in possibility to nationalise all industries etc. while the movement itself gets stuck in parliamentarism and unimaginative ad-hoc activism. The question what a socialist perspective means—apart from change of property relations—in terms of reorganisation of production processes, priorities of what is produced, direct democracy in decision making, etc, has to be worked out in the light of an overall analysis of the existing and the vision of a new, radically new society.

NOTES

1. See my summary of the argument in my article : 'The Unfinished Task of a Marxist Conceptualisation of the Women's Question', *The Marxist Review*, Vol, XVI, Nos 9 & 10, April 1983.

2. It has to be noted that the translation used here by Dunayevskaya is misleading . since Marx in the German original does not talk of the emancipation of Germans into "*men*" but into *humans* (Menschen).

3. Quoted by Dunayevskaya p-40f. in her own translation. I have altered her translation by using human being where Marx uses the word ' Mench" because this term is not adequately rendered by the term "man" since it very clearly and without discrimination comprises men and women and does not, as the English, state "man" as the norm and "woman" as the deviation.