THE LAST POST

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

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With the new Clark government in office at a time of growing difficulties for Canada — whether it be the Quebec independence question, tensions between Ontario and Alberta, declining social services, Tory policy on 'restraint', the growing pressures to increase our dependence on the United States, or a host of other problems — we think there is greater need than ever for a magazine like the Post. You can help us do our job better.

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AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTION

Clark: prisoner of the right?

by RAE MURPHY

The word from the remarkably unchastized Liberal opposition is that it intends to give the new Tory government enough rope to hang itself. Given the adroitness so far shown by Joe Clark it seems a good bet that, given enough rope, Clark will find a way to stab himself.

All the Joe Clark jokes notwithstanding, we can all understand the story of the 97 pound weakling who, being tired of all the bullies kicking sand in his face, decided to get even. Instead of signing up with Charles Atlas, Joe Clark decided to join the Progressive Conservative Party and get even. A not unreasonable option for a young Albertan.

We can empathize with, or at least forgive Joe Clark his many problems. Many of us feel uncomfortable with horses — except when they are going with the proper odds; and not only have many people been intimidated by wine waiters in Hull, some of us have come across beer slingers in that town who have scared us half to death. Indeed, Clark may literally have stumbled on the great political force of the 1980s — Klutz power.

But there is one element about Prime Minister Clark that it is quite impossible to overlook — and that is the party he leads. In the Progressive Conservative Party circa 1979 there are 50 Eldon Woolliams and Sterling Lyons for every David MacDonald and David Crombie, or even Joe Clark.

The long years spent in opposition have influenced the composition as well as the political ideology — or, more properly, ideologies — of the Conservatives. This makes for the liveliest of political conventions, but one imagines it will also, for the same reason, make for one of the more untidy governments. Underneath the veneer of slickness, manifested during the election with the care and feeding of Joe Clark, the soul of the party is an amalgam of frustrations generalized as the "screwed middle class."

At its core, the Tories are the party of the simple answer — get down to brass tacks... hang the bastards... get back to basics... how come those bureaucrats with indexed pensions can bury me in paperwork while my hardware store is being squeezed out of business....

* * *

Bingeman Park in Kitchener-Waterloo, scant days after Joe Clark was almost blown off the television by Pierre Trudeau in the great debate. It's also the night of the first game of the NHL Playoffs final series. Yet the place is packed. Ontario Premier Bill Davis is introducing Joe Clark:

Tory campaign worker: Listen to that guy go on....

Last Post: Do you think anybody will ever knock off that government?

Tory campaign worker: He's going, and so he should. He just runs a lousy Liberal government — and a lefty one at that. He's lost all his good men.

Last Post: I think Clark is very much in the Davis image.

Tory campaign worker: We'll fix that.... You know that turkey just squeezed in.

Except for a bit of fuss as one NDP'er with a loud bass voice is escorted out, all conversation stops. Cheers for Clark shake the crowded auditorium.

* * *

The attitude of that campaign worker is more typical of the Conservative Party than is apparent, especially than is apparent during the post-election euphoria. It reflects the direction from which will come the internal party pressure upon the Clark government.

If in the election Liberal policy — to the extent any policy could be perceived — was quite alien to the mainstream of the electorate, it should not be overlooked that Tory policies are by tradition alien to this mainstream.

As the *Toronto Star* noted in its editorial renouncing its traditional support for the Liberals, "... one of the considerations that prompts us to endorse the NDP is that the Conservatives and the Liberals are both moving to the right...." The Tories are a right-wing party, a fact that could be obscured while they were in opposition. Clark is looked upon with suspicion and distrust by a very vocal, and now powerful section of the party.

These pressures will come in the context of the economic and social problems that are on the national agenda, together with a scarcely submerged public perception of the Tories which could be described as the "R.B. Bennett

photo: David Lloyd

Prime Minister Clark and External Affairs Minister MacDonald: from coffee-klatch politics in Toronto to a Middle East crisis

syndrome." Things could come unstuck rather rapidly.

The potential for coming unstuck is evident in just about every area.

Consider what would have been thought the most unlikely area — foreign affairs. Good old Canada, which hasn't had a foreign affair since Pierre Sevigny met Gerda Munsinger, has allowed the coffee-klatch politics of one Toronto constituency to embroil it in the Middle East.

While Joe Clark and Flora MacDonald fervently wish the whole issue would go away, Robert Stanfield may just not be able to move slow enough to do that. Presumably there will still be Arabs and Israelis around when Stanfield returns. Indeed, the American presidential election campaign will just be heating up and poor old Jimmy Carter has a promise about Jerusalem somewhere in his past.

If foreign affairs was an unlikely area for a Conservative government to become unstuck — consider the likely, predictable areas:

The almost off-handed comments that Canada must rapidly raise its gasoline prices to "world level" without any apparent consideration of how those extra royalties or "windfall" profits will be used to cushion the blow will pit the government of Ontario directly against both the feds and Alberta. It will also create problems inside the Tory caucus. The Tories are the government because they picked up enough seats in Southern Ontario. They won't stay if they lose them.

In the same manner, John Crosbie's glib assertion about his preference for American domination and Continental Free Trade appears to be a rather thoughtless and again highly divisive attitude for a new Finance Minister. Since over 80 per cent of our trade with the U.S. falls under the category of "free", the only thing we are talking about now is really energy and resources. In the context of current trade relations with the U.S., free trade simply means the export of gas and oil from Alberta to the United States, at the expense of Ontario and Quebec.

The impending U.S. recession, which is receiving the type of advance promotion usually reserved for a Hollywood blockbuster, also provides an unlimited area for government screw-ups. In the Clark government we appear to have at least four Finance Ministers, all marching to the beats of different drummers.

John Crosbie figures to continue in the tradition of Jean Chretien with his policy of restraint, even at the cost of reneging on election promises — a small price to pay if one has a majority government, but a potentially dangerous course if one is in a vulnerable minority situation. Sinclair Stevens wants to slash government operations and "save money" by liquidating Petro-Can and other "unnecessary" government institutions. Robert de Cotret apparently wants a "stimulative deficit," and good old Jim Gillies is merely the guy who gets to talk to Clark every morning.

Of all our current Finance Ministers, Sinclair Stevens is closest to the pulse of the party and the caucus. When the road gets a little rocky, Sinc Stevens, with neck as red as the flag of Albania, will be there with the answers that will revive all the memories of R.B. Bennett.

It doesn't really matter if few or any of us can recall life in the Depression; the experience has been handed down to us in much the same way that mothers in parts of Europe still frighten their children into obedience with threats that the Turks will return.

From the safety of years one can even imagine

that it wasn't quite so much the total helplessness in the face of the suffering that seared the mind, but the attitude of the government to the people.

The miserable social workers who looked into the cooking pots of the welfare recipients, the cruel bastards who issued the dole, the mounted police who charged the crowds of demonstrating unemployed, the brutal bosses who slashed the wages of those still working — all became represented in the rotund, stiff-collared ogre we know as R.B. Bennett.

There is a spectre haunting the Clark government. It is the spectre of R.B. Bennett. It is this that is a good part of the nervous comments one hears: "How do you think he will do?"

This is not to suggest that Clark is another R.B. Bennett. It is to suggest, however, that Clark does not have much stature or appeal beyond the confines of his party, and as a result is a prisoner of the slogans and ideals of a party whose right-wing is in the ascendancy.

The ascendancy of the right within the Tory party can be seen in Ontario, where the government has evolved from a rather efficient small "l" liberal regime into one waging holy war on social services. It can be seen in Manitoba, where the cave-men in the Cabinet are dismantling everything, and in Alberta where a provincial government is heading us directly towards an energy common market with the United States.

The Tory wipeout in Quebec eliminates, it would appear, the logical option for a new government — that is, introduce a nice budget; trick, trap or torment a disorganized opposition; and get a quick election to produce a working majority. In other words, do a Diefenbaker. But that doesn't seem to be in the cards.

The Clark government's constituency is the party itself. And they are tough hombres. Many people in English Canada saw the election as a plebiscite on Pierre Trudeau. Many Tories see the election as a mandate to put flesh and blood on hoary old Conservative code words.

The Joe Clark government is clearly a government of English Canada. The problem of "National Unity" did not weigh heavily on the minds of most voters. The voters did not think it necessary to vote Liberal for the sake of Quebec — nor, incidentally, did Quebec feel obliged to vote Tory to assuage the Anglos. All of which could make any future discussions somewhat simpler. At least it should be easier to strip away the fiction that Quebec exists as just one province along with nine others.

Regardless of the fate of the Quebec referendum, or of the Levesque government, nobody seriously considers that relationships in Canada will return to where they were, or, rather, where most English Canadians thought they were, before the victory of the Parti Quebecois. Perhaps the election of the Conservative government, with its lop-sided English make-up, will inadvertently accelerate the process of placing the crisis of the Canadian Confederation into a realistic context. Defining the problem is usually a step in the quest for a solution.

State relationships in Canada, however they are to be negotiated or re-negotiated, must have some economic rationale. If the historic trend is towards "larger trading blocs" — or whatever polite euphemism is used to express the idea of a North American common market — this must be at the centre of our concerns and negotiations. With Quebec virtually eliminated from the federal government, the problem is presented more starkly. If Confederation was seen as a bulwark against American expansion, then the prevailing attitude towards a fortress America should provide a context in which a new internal relationship is established.

In other words, it may be opportune to move away from criticizing the louts who scream that French is being shoved down their throats with bilingual cereal boxes, and ask the louts who somehow determined that "National Unity" had something to do with cereal that snapped, crackled and popped, to get serious.

Even this early in the election post mortems the Liberals — at least the section of them who will become more vocal as the inevitable "Thinkers Conferences" get organized — are making noises about the party having lacked its small "l" liberalism of late. There will be calls for policy redefinitions from such people as Jean-Luc Pepin and Lloyd Axworthy as they stake out territory for a possible leadership contest. These calls may, by the way, be echoed by the new Leader of the Opposition who, from all reports, liked being Prime Minister and might want another shot at it if he can succeed in getting himself redesigned.

At this stage of the Liberal hiatus the elusive "vibrant liberalism" cranked out daily on the editorial page of the *Toronto Star* should provide something more than cold comfort. After all, when Liberal policies become too much for even the *Toronto Star* to swallow, then some of the heavy thinkers should get the point. With all this hippy Proposition-13 jazz that has been going down of late, we should keep in mind that the only people who thought they had a chance to vote on their own layoffs were voters in Ottawa and most of them rejected a golden opportunity to become examples of fiscal restraint.

If things are going to get tough all over, it is perhaps useful for the Liberals to remember one of the basic confusions of Canadian politics: Do depressions bring the Tories, or do the Tories bring depressions?

Mackenzie King's great success was based not only on the elections he won; but also on the big one he was lucky enough to lose.

Karl Marx once wrote about history repeating itself, first as tragedy and then as farce. So we should all draw a little comfort as we watch Joe Clark sharpening that rope.

Quebec: the big split

by ROBERT CHODOS

"Parle fort Québec" — "Speak loud Quebec" was the Liberal slogan in the province, and speak loud Quebec did.

The only problem was that English Canada also spoke loud, and it said something very different. As Paul Longpré, Ottawa correspondent for *La Presse,* wrote the day after the election, "never has Canadian duality been so dramatically expressed."

A Liberal landslide in Quebec was more or less expected, and substantial Tory gains would have surprised most observers. But the magnitude of the Liberal victory and the Conservative defeat were enough to give even the most dedicated Tory pause.

By taking 67 of the 75 seats and an astonishing 62 per cent of the popular vote, the Liberals won their most sweeping victory in Quebec since 1945. There were seven ridings in which Liberal margins of victory exceeded 30,000 votes, while the outgoing Health and Welfare Minister, Monique Bégin, won by more than 40,000.

Among the 75 Tory candidates, by contrast, only two were elected while five others managed to save their deposits. The party took only 13 per cent of the popular vote, losing more than a third of its 1974 support and running behind Social Credit. In several especially perverse Montreal ridings, Tory candidates managed to come fourth, trailing the Rhinoceros Party in both Outremont and Laurier.

Inevitably, comparisons are being made with the election of 1957, in which Quebec resisted a Tory tide that swept a minority government under John Diefenbaker into office. The comparison has its self-serving aspects, from a Tory point of view, since the 1957 vote was a prelude to another election a year later in which Quebec contributed 50 seats to a Diefenbaker majority.

This experience has become the basis for what is known in Tory circles as the Churchill Strategy (after former Tory cabinet minister Gordon Churchill), which envisions the Conservatives winning a minority without Quebec, followed by a majority that includes Quebec, which votes Tory so as to have a voice in the government. The election of May 22 can be seen in this light as stage one in the Churchill Strategy.



Premier Levesque: a split he can interpret to his advantage

There are, however, several important differences between 1957 and 1979.

First of all, the Tories are much weaker in Quebec now, in absolute terms, than they were after the 1957 election. They won nine Quebec seats in 1957, and more than thirty per cent of the popular vote. If the Tories had done as well in Quebec on May 22 as they did in 1957, they would be celebrating a breakthrough in the province.

Second, the Tories underwent significant losses in Quebec in this election, while they made significant gains in 1957. Their nine seats in that election was up from four in 1953, while the Liberals' 63 was down from 66. In this election it was the Liberals who gained seven seats and six per cent of the popular vote.

Third, the Tory victory of 1957 came as a surprise to most people, while the 1979 victory was widely regarded as a possible outcome of the election. The Liberal sweep of Quebec thus takes on more of the character of a deliberate decision by that province to refrain from participating in a swing to the Tories.

And finally, the 50 Quebec seats the Tories took in the 1958 election were not won by John Diefenbaker but were delivered to him by the Premier of the province, Maurice Duplessis. The current Premier of Quebec, René Lévesque, is not likely to put his weight behind the Tory cause, and it is equally unlikely that he could deliver a significant number of seats if he did.

If there is a relevant comparison, it is not with 1957 but with 1917.

That election, the most divisive in Canadian history, was held in the heat of World War I and fought on the issue of conscription. The Union government of Sir Robert Borden, a Tory team bolstered by the defection of large numbers of English-speaking Liberals, was re-elected with massive support from English Canada while Quebec remained loyal to the Liberal rump under Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

The Union government in 1917 ran an explicitly anti-Quebec campaign, on the slogan "Quebec shall not dominate the rest of Canada." While the immediate result of the campaign was a government victory, its long-term effect was to perpetuate the historic Conservative weakness in Quebec that 62 years later makes the voters of Outremont and Laurier consider the Tories not quite so palatable an option as the Rhinoceros Party.

The Tories did not run the same kind of anti-Quebec campaign in 1979, although Joe Clark did come out against Quebec's right to determine its own future, a position that caused many of his own supporters in the province to disavow him and probably led to more votes lost for the Tories in Quebec than votes gained in the rest of the country.

But such instances of direct catering to the know-nothing vote were few. It was much more characteristic of the Clark campaign to avoid saying anything at all about issues concerning Quebec's constitutional future and French-English relations. It could not be said that in rejecting Clark Quebec voters were rejecting any clear option for the province.

The election did, however, reveal a split in the country, a split every bit as deep as the one that showed up in 1917. It is important to understand just what the nature of this split is and what it portends.

It is not, in the strict sense, a French-English split, nor one between Quebec and the rest of Canada. It is a split that heralds the end of the Trudeau concept of federalism, even though Quebec seems to have declared its support for that concept. And it is a split that both René

photo: David Lloyd

Opposition leader Trudeau: his concept of federalism rejected

Lévesque and Claude Ryan can interpret to their advantage.

In the Quebec National Assembly the day after the election, Ryan interpreted the results in the province as a vote for federalism, while Lévesque said they indicated a "family vote" — Quebecers voting for one of their own.

If it was a family vote, one of its most interesting aspects is who is included in the family. For even outside Quebec, the major concentration of Liberal strength is in largely French-speaking seats in northeastern New Brunswick, northern and eastern Ontario, and St. Boniface in Manitoba.

But it is not a purely francophone family either, since English-speaking Quebecers voted Liberal in proportions as great as their French-speaking neighbours, and some of them were sobered the next day to find out that they had more in common politically with French Quebec than with the rest of English Canada.

Perhaps the best definition of the family would be those Canadians who had a direct stake in national unity as an issue. This includes not only the minorities on both sides, who have the most to lose from a division of the country, but also most French-speaking Quebecers, who before they are either federalists or separatists are people who want to have their interests defended at both levels of government. Those Quebecers — and there are many — who voted for Lévesque in 1976, for Trudeau in 1979, and will vote

for Lévesque again in the next provincial election are not being inconsistent, only realistic and self-interested.

This does not mean, however, that Quebecers will therefore swing to the federal Tories as soon as they get the chance. For this election has brought about changes that make that unlikely, and that may make federal politics increasingly irrelevant in Quebec.

The problem with interpreting the vote in Quebec as a vote for federalism is that federalism, like sovereignty-association, takes more than one player to make it work. And while English Canadians cannot be said to have voted against federalism, they did vote not to be particularly interested in it or its problems. In an election where legitimate reasons for tossing out the government were not hard to find, there is no reason to interpret the election of the Conservatives as an anti-Quebec vote. It is nevertheless striking that the urgency of getting rid of the Liberals was so much more apparent to the voters of Scarborough and Burnaby than to those of St. Maurice and Anjou.

The effect of all this is to shift the constitutional debate in Quebec almost entirely to the provincial level. Claude Ryan is now the *chef incontesté*, the unchallenged leader of the federalist forces in Quebec. This means that both the kind of federalism that will be defended and the context in which that defence will take place have changed drastically from what they were before May 22.

The constitutional differences between Lévesque and Ryan are much narrower than those between Lévesque and Trudeau. The elimination of Trudeau means that Ryan will no longer have to contend with proposals such as unilateral repatriation of the constitution to which he is just as firmly opposed as Lévesque is. The debate is now between one form of special status for Quebec proposed by Ryan, and another form, called sovereignty-association, proposed by Lévesque.

This debate will be carried out by Quebecers, at the Quebec level. There will also be a quite separate process of negotiation with English Canada, represented by the other provincial governments — and by the federal government of Joe Clark. Whether in the short run the result of the federal election is good for Lévesque or Ryan, and whatever its effect on the referendum, in the long run it helps consolidate the division of Canada into two separate societies.

Quoted in the *New York Times* the Sunday before the election, Professor Léon Dion of Laval University said that "Quebec as a society must agree in front of the rest of Canada." With the narrowing of the debate to Lévesque versus Ryan, that process may have been hastened considerably.

What is much more in question is whether English Canada as a society can agree in front of Quebec, and this is one of the key questions facing Joe Clark, in charge of an English Canadian government, based in roughly equal measure in Ontario and the west. The question of whether Clark can adequately represent Quebec has been settled: he cannot. Whether he can adequately represent both Ontario and Alberta, with their historic differences, remains to be seen.

Manitoba: no time for the right

by DOUG SMITH

Those who latch on to the antics of people like Sterling Lyon as proof that the West is inhabited by right-wing yahoos should give some thought to the results of the federal election. As well, those pundits who feel the country is taking a rightward tack should examine the Manitoba results in particular, before they claim that Joe Clark's victory proves their point.

For in Sterling Lyon's fiefdom — the home of Canadian reaction — the people gave a fairly clear indication of how little patience they have with right-wing governments. The Tories went into the election confident they would decimate the Liberals in Manitoba and capture every seat except for that held by Stanley Knowles. Instead the NDP won five seats, came close in a sixth and two left-leaning Liberals beat Tories who were odds-on favourites.

After two years of Sterling Lyon, Manitoba voters got their first chance to pass judgement on "acute protracted restraint" and they said it stinks.

The NDP went into the election with a good organization but with a fair amount of apprehension that Knowles might end up being the only New Democrat elected. But as the campaign progressed it became apparent that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with Sterling Lyon. In the end, the popular vote of every NDP candidate went up, including one who put out no

literature, had no office, and virtually no campaign.

The battle for Winnipeg-Fort Garry, containing most of James Richardson's riding, was one of the most surprising and telling of the election. Sidney Spivak — who had been Duff Roblin's Minister of Industry and Commerce — was expected to dump Liberal Lloyd Axworthy. Spivak had been the provincial Conservative leader until Sterling Lyon wrested the leadership away from him after the 1973 NDP victory. The leadership race was dirty, hard fought, and created a great deal of antagonism in the party towards Lyon.

When the Tories came to power Spivak was given the highly unpopular job of Tory hatchetman in their decimation of the provincial civil service. The Tory nomination was seen as Sidney's pay-off for doing the dirty work. He had been promised the federal trade and commerce portfolio. But it seems that the Lyon backlash was too strong for Spivak to overcome. As one person said, "Sterling Lyon has stabbed Spivak in the back one more time."

And the man who beat out Spivak could be an outside contender to replace Trudeau. Axworthy will come to Ottawa as the perfect bright young man to beat Joe Clark. As an MLA in Manitoba, Axworthy has been a good small "l" liberal espousing such issues as urban development, rent control, freedom of information and extension of human rights legislation.

Prior to being elected to the provincial legislature, Axworthy worked in Ottawa for John Turner. In fact one major kafuffle of the campaign came when Axworthy distributed a pamphlet with a prominent endorsation from Old Blue Eyes.

The pamphlet never referred to Trudeau by name, an omission which apparently raised considerable amounts of Trudeau's ire. All the same, Axworthy did come to his chief's side last fall when other Manitoba Liberal candidates were calling for a new leader in the wake of the disastrous by-elections. Lloyd had both of their official endorsations lifted. Axworthy was also a strong defender of bilingualism — a dicey move for someone running for Jim Richardson's seat.

Jack Hare, clearly one of the most hare-brained persons ever elected to the House of Commons also went down to defeat. Elected in last fall's by-election in St. Boniface, Hare at that time exhibited his sensitivity on the issue of French rights when he explained to a *Globe and Mail* reporter that he was not canvassing in a number of French-speaking polls since "the priest in the pulpit says vote Liberal, and what can you do."

As an MP, Hare wrote a letter to NDP health critic Larry Desjardins asking him to see what he could do about the cutbacks in health care at the St. Boniface hospital. Desjardins read the letter in the legislature, causing the Conservatives no small amount of embarrassment. Hare's explanation was that the letter was never meant to go out, but rather was a "hypothetical letter".

Premier Lyon: Manitoba's voters showed what they thought of 'acute protracted restraint'

Desjardins caused some concern himself when he endorsed Axworthy over the NDP candidate. Desjardins had been a Liberal up until 1969 when he crossed the floor to give Ed Schreyer a majority and himself a cabinet seat. There are now rumblings that he will be kicked out of the provincial caucus.

The Conservatives were clearly dazed by the magnitude of their provincial defeat. Lyon termed it an aberration and said he had no intention of modifying his restraint policies. It is felt that Lyon himself is too doctrinaire to attempt any modifications. But this could lead to yet another Tory purge. One clear sign that the Tories are nervous is their decision to postpone the by-elections to fill Schreyer's, Axworthy's and Spivak's seats. The government had originally intended to hold the by-elections in late June.

So while May 22 was not the final conflict it was a stinging slap in the face to Sterling Lyon and one that many Manitobans savoured deeply.

The NDP: declaring victory

by ANGUS RICKER

Pauline Jewett was once the political Pollyanna of the Liberal Party.

She was bright, determined and an academic high flyer at Carleton University's School of Canadian Studies. She won the Northumberland constituency in eastern Ontario in 1963, before losing to George Hees in 1965.

When Pierre Trudeau came to power in 1968, Ms. Jewett continued to do her bit for the Liberals. PET's participatory bandwagon resulted in the Liberal policy conference in Ottawa in 1970 and Ms. Jewett was a star performer.

The conference was going well until Mr. Trudeau suddenly announced he would not be bound by the resolutions or the results. Exit Pauline Jewett.

Switch now to the floor of the House of Commons where Pierre Trudeau plods on as Opposition Leader with a largely absentee Québec caucus and scarcely a Western MP in sight. Sitting in the NDP group of 17 MPs from the West is the Honourable Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam.

Pierre Trudeau meet Pauline Jewett.

* * *

For the NDP, May 22 brought its assets and its liabilities. The assets included Ms. Jewett, Vancouver lawyer Ian Waddell and Father Bob Ogle but they must replace three of the party's brightest lights, T.C. Douglas, Andrew Brewin and Stu Leggatt, who had all stepped down.

Also:

- The party did well in the West but poorly in southern Ontario.
- NDP popular vote jumped dramatically in the Atlantic provinces but the seats stayed at two.
- Organized labour finally gave major backing to the party but the campaign laid an egg all over the NDP and CLC president Dennis McDermott.
- The party had enough money for a major campaign effort in terms of a leader's tour and television ads but used the opportunity to sell Ed Broadbent as the other parties sold Joe Clark and Pierre Trudeau. The voter was supposed to distinguish between NDP *Duz*, Tory *Wisk* and Liberal *Ivory Snow*.
- Despite a discredited Liberal leader and a weak Tory one, the NDP failed to make its long-heralded breakthrough or even reach Ed Broadbent's personal goal of 30 seats.

photo: The Commonwealth



Ed Broadbent: sold the way other parties sold Clark and Trudeau

- Compared to the 1974 election, the NDP did show a marked improvement but few New Democrats have forgotten that 1974 was disaster incarnate.

In the face of these supremely mixed results, the party line firmed up quickly and the public and party members will be hearing it a good deal in the coming months.

Essentially, the party insiders are looking at the results and declaring victory. They point to the most votes (more than 2 million) and the highest percentage (18.0) the NDP has ever attracted. Only a churl would point out that the NDP hit 17.9 as long ago as 1965.

The party upped its vote to 19.3 per cent in the Atlantic provinces and in the West was over 30 per cent in three provinces with the Liberals a poor third.

The Toronto and southern Ontario disaster is being blamed on the Liberals. Since the Liberal vote collapsed, the NDP line runs that the party could not count on enough three-way splits to win the five more seats they were hoping to get. It is tempting to believe the NDP was squeezed between the Liberal ethnics and the Tory

mortgage holders but this overlooks the fact that the provincial NDP holds 14 of 29 Toronto seats.

It is tougher for any New Democrat to blame anyone publicly for the failure of the CLC campaign so the party is waiting for a "full evaluation" of the labour effort. The campaign is credited with winning isolated company town ridings such as in Newfoundland and Skeena in B.C. but not much else. The CLC high profile led to high expectations that weren't fulfilled and may have scared off NDP votes.

Actually, the party will not have to wait for an evaluation to know that the CLC effort is unlikely to be repeated, regardless of the brave statements by Mr. McDermott. The campaign had a reverse effect on the membership and the many organizers and reps will be first to recognize that one big election effort is no substitute for continuing union education programs.

"Many working class people just don't see themselves as a union vote," said an Ottawa NDP strategist. For proof he cited the similar unionized Nova Scotia constituencies of Cape Breton-East Richmond and Cape Breton-The Sydneys. In the first, Father Andy Hogan won handily for the NDP by 4,500 votes, in the second New Democrat Ed Murphy ran third, 2,500 votes behind Liberal winner Russell MacLellan.

There is nothing new, of course, in stating that Canadian workers don't see themselves as working class. CCF leader M.J. Coldwell said it in the 1940s; someone on the strategy team ought to have looked it up.

However the pluses and minuses of the election add up, the NDP will be looking at another campaign within a year or 18 months. Joe Clark has told some journalists that he will present his most popular legislation during the first session and go for an election next spring, provided, of course, that the Tories stop making the kinds of mistakes that will see all Canadian automobiles powered by Israeli orange juice.

NDP MP Lorne Nystrom predicts that if the Tories' Gallup standing reaches 50 per cent Mr. Clark will be tempted into an election. The Tories will only have to win a few seats that they missed last time, plus a few in Québec, to get an effective working majority. Some of the obvious targets include the Maritimes, Ontario and Manitoba seats where poor organization and (in Manitoba) the record of Premier Sterling Lyon cost the Tories several MPs.

Certainly no opposition party will be trying to defeat the minority government in the House. The Liberals, with a humbled leader and a Québec caucus that will be at home fighting the referendum, will be joined in the crucial abstentions by Social Credit which is broke and saddled with the failure of the Parti Québecois to deliver votes.

The NDP is also perfectly happy not to be wielding the balance of power because it would revive memories of the 1972-74 Parliament and its sudden, unhappy ending. The NDP will defend vigorously its own issues such as Medicare and Petrocan and may have plenty of economic issues.

Despite expected oil price increases and the high rate of inflation, the Tories are committed to expansionary economic policies while many business economists are calling for deflation.

Also, an announcement of the results of the current round of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations is due this summer and even with a generous five-year phase-in, some of Canada's marginal industries may be phased out. Textiles and clothing are two weak, heavily-protected Canadian industries but they are also major employers in Québec. In machinery and heavy equipment, the U.S. has been pushing hard for better access to Canadian markets. A significant tariff reduction could mean the loss of many jobs.

Labour is also not happy with the reductions in Unemployment Insurance Commission benefits, nor will it lightly accept the growing erosion of living standards.

The NDP caucus will have many opportunities if it is organized and capable. Leader Ed Broadbent, who has done the hard work necessary to establish himself in the House of Commons, had the chance to show his leadership to the new caucus members in a special two-day meeting held at a Québec resort in mid-June.

In the House, the NDP is hoping that Liberal critics will be so tied up with departmental criticism that the NDP will be the party of issues and ideas. This supposes a good deal from a caucus that is still fairly small and has several older members.

If all the older MPs were like Stanley Knowles, Ed Broadbent would have few problems. He is the one other New Democrat who has a national presence and a broad constituency on such matters as pensions and House of Commons procedure.

Mr. Knowles, at age 71, kept up the tradition of J.S. Woodsworth in Winnipeg North Centre by winning the seat for the 12th time since 1942. He won by using the techniques that Woodsworth showed him, including "shop gating", which meant getting up at 5 a.m. for six weeks running so he could meet workers going on and off shift at the major plants.

It still works because he polled 59 per cent of the vote, his best ever showing. The NDP also won five seats in Manitoba for the first time since 1945 which Mr. Knowles attributes to the excellence of the candidates and the callous record of Sterling Lyon which, in his preacher's turn of phrase, "was more of a cross than Joe Clark could bear."

In Ottawa, Mr. Knowles sits in his sixth floor office in the Commons Centre Block which is furnished in what might be called "late 1950s UIC." He is surrounded by a dozen of his

photo: Public Archives of Canada

Founding the 'New Party': Stanley Knowles at the head of the table

famous filing cabinets which have a record of almost everything and he produces four cabinets worth for the Public Archives every year.

Knowles has one eye firmly fixed on history and the other on strategies for the next Parliamentary session. This time he knows the NDP will have little leverage with the government like they did in 1972-74 when he and Allan MacEachen met every day.

He also doubts whether 1980 could turn into another 1958 when John Diefenbaker turned a minority Conservative government into a majority government with 208 seats. The CCF went from 25 seats to eight and Stanley Knowles lost Winnipeg North Centre for the first and only time.

"But Dief was a Messiah, there was no stopping his ride to the largest majority. He raised the Old Age Pension by nine dollars and got thousands of votes.

"Would Joe Clark be prepared to do that? I'd be surprised."

For proof, Knowles turned his gentle wrath on Jean Piggott, the self-styled "doughnut lady" who Joe Clark appointed as his "social policy advisor."

"Dief gave a bit of an impression of being a poor man's Tory. Golly, when Mrs. Piggott was interviewed she spoke of advising Joe Clark in terms of appointments going to the right people, that the PM gets the ear of caucus and that he gets the ear of special interest groups.

"She didn't once say women, veterans or pensioners. I don't think there's a poor man's rib in this Tory Party."

As for tiny, perfect David Crombie, he got the back of the hand with "I don't think he's aggressive, he may be progressive." Overall, Knowles noted the progressives aren't in the money portfolios, which from an opposition viewpoint, is just dandy.

If his 12th Parliament is a short one, Knowles will be back for a 13th, tying the record of his old rival, Dief. After 33 years as an MP, he admits he is hooked on the job: "You live it all the time, I don't do anything else."

In his 44 years of campaigning for the CCF-NDP, Mr. Knowles has seen the party establish itself to where it is now self-sustaining. He had much to do with the conversion of the CCF through the New Party to the NDP in the early 1960s.

His book, *The New Party*, predicted success for the NDP if it squeezed out one of the two major parties in the 1960s. He is now prepared to revise that to the 1980s.

Some evidence supports such a rosy view, at least in the West where there are many signs that the Liberal vote is collapsing federally just as it has provincially. In no fewer than 22 Western constituencies in the past election, the second place NDP vote plus the third place Liberal vote exceeds the winning Tory margin.

For the NDP to take advantage of this oppor-

tunity there would have to be an election fairly soon while Pierre Trudeau is still Liberal leader and Joe Clark would have to fulfil his "Joe Wimp" image so that a Tory would be stopped.

Already, tactically astute NDP MPs such as Lorne Nystrom are planning to run the next campaign as a straight NDP-Tory fight. Nystrom knows the Liberals are down but he also knows that John Turner could pick them up again fairly quickly.

To put the New Democrats in the position of being the Western party, Nystrom will characterize the Tories as the party of Bay Street with its financial ministers all from the east, particularly Treasury Board Minister Sinclair Stevens, who is not forgotten for his part in the failed Bank of Western Canada.

The acid test for the Tories in the West will be on expensive issues such as the Hall Commission report on grain handling and transportation. If there is not large amounts of public money forthcoming for upgrading Western railway lines and shipping ports, the Tories could lose the legacy of Alvin Hamilton and John Diefenbaker.

But beyond the opportunities in the West, the NDP has serious difficulties elsewhere. The Maritimes and Newfoundland vote must be organized and translated into seats and the seats lost in Ontario must be regained. Further, the party must finally come to terms with Québec after eight years of ducking the issue.

The NDP policy on Québec, as the Québec newspaper editorial writers are at pains to point out, is no policy at all. The NDP message that a Québecer with a job will not be a separatist may be plausible at a party convention in Winnipeg, but it means nothing in Québec.

To pacify the West and labour unions that live in fear of fragmented bargaining units in Québec, the NDP has substantially backed away from the "two nations" policy of 1968. Two nations was certainly a loser as long as Pierre Trudeau was there to kick it around, but Québec has changed despite him. The NDP has changed, too, as the Québecois delegates who fought for "autodetermination" resolutions at every NDP convention since 1971 have faded away, leaving behind a few Trotskyists, Montreal Anglos and professional trade unionists.

The party effort in Québec, never strong since the brave days of Charles Taylor in the 1960s, has become the most token of campaigns. This year the election for the NDP in Québec was over the day consumer activist Phil Edmonston said illness prevented him from contesting a seat.

The party is now considering what it can do about Québec but it has no working ideas beyond waiting until after the referendum. The number of PQ cabinet ministers and MNAs with past CCF-NDP associations is tantalizingly large but there will be no fraternization until sovereignty-association becomes yesterday's slogan.

On Québec policy, John Harney has consistently fought within the party (and lost) for a "two nations" policy and has been vainly seeking to sell the NDP on the idea of a people's constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution.

On federal-provincial negotiations, it has been Saskatchewan's Premier Allan Blakeney who has been actively seeking the compromises between the federal government and the bigger provinces.

The federal party has not had much of a role in Québec-Canada relations and there must be some doubt whether it ever will. The party is perceived as an outsider's party and to have been on the wrong side on conscription in the Second World War and, surprisingly, on the War Measures Act. (The NDP opposed the first two WMA readings but not the third.)

These incidents have not been forgotten or forgiven and neither has the party's more recent flip-flop on the air controllers' controversy. Given these historical burdens, there is now some vague speculation that there could be a socialist federalist party formed in Québec which would form a working alliance with the NDP. That sounds like "two nations" all over again but it is probably as ephemeral as other NDP dreams about Québec.

After the party history has been reviewed, the policy weighed and the campaigns evaluated, there remains the certainty of another election, probably sooner than later. Much time and energy will be spent with campaign planning, the leader's tour and advertising.

In part, the campaign attracts much attention simply because it's there. It is eight weeks long, costs so many million dollars, gets so much in subsidies, requires so much effort and so many workers. It is an eminently measurable event and it will be watched and pinched by pollsters, flacks, journalists, budgeters and party people.

But does the campaign appreciably affect the number of votes cast? Some New Democrats point out that the shift in Gallup Poll percentages from the beginning to the end of the 1979 campaign was not great. Also, a recent book on the 1974 election campaign, *Political Choice in Canada*, showed that 55 per cent of the electorate had made up its mind by the day the election was called. Only 26 per cent decided in the final month when the advertising and television pitches were at their peak.

These New Democrats argue that Joe Clark and the Conservatives won the election in the two-and-a-half years prior to the campaign. They add further that the success of a government does not depend on any Clark-Trudeau-Broadbent leadership cult but rather on the effectiveness of the committees each of the three will set up.

That's why Ed Broadbent has to get his party moving now, before the entire party apparatus goes back into a post-electoral snooze.

The PQ begins to stumble

by IRWIN BLOCK

The day is fast approaching when the people of Quebec will be asked in a referendum to give their government a mandate to negotiate sovereign statehood, in association with the rest of Canada.

This is a climactic moment, and yet the Lévesque government, in its third year in power, finds itself in internal crisis, unsure of where it's heading, losing electoral support, and lacking momentum on the central question — Quebec's future relationship with its neighbours.

A good part of the problem lies at the helm, with René Lévesque. As Premier and Parti Québécois leader, he has blundered his way from one thing to the next, starting with the diplomatic faux pas of the state visit by French Premier Raymond Barre last winter and culminating in his endorsement of Social Credit candidates in the federal election.

The fact that Pierre Trudeau and the federal Liberals were thumped out of office — a result Lévesque and the PQ hoped for — did not erase the failure of the Créditistes under Fabien Roy to win more than a disappointing six seats, even with PQ backing.

The defeat of Trudeau, with all its implications of debunking the "French Power" myth in Ottawa and voter polarization along linguistic lines, failed to overshadow the steady stream of political setbacks that are plaguing the PQ administration.

Most significant was the sudden announcement by Cabinet minister Robert Burns that he is quitting politics even before the referendum is held, ostensibly on the grounds of his poor health. His departure dramatized the current malaise in the PQ.

Burns incarnated the moral conscience of the party. As a one time adviser to the Confederation of National Trade Unions, he personified the social democratic



Levesque: some recent blunders

priorities in the party program.

The "social bureaucracy" that has become a trademark of the Lévesque government is but one of the disappointments for the social democrats who helped build the party and put it in power.

Burns denounced the "power hungry egomaniacs" in the Cabinet, without specifying whom he was referring to. "Just not my gang," he lamented.

A socialist and confirmed advocate of Quebec independence, Burns has never been on the best of terms with Lévesque. His affirmation that both the referendum and the next provincial election are lost causes is an indirect rebuke of the Premier's leadership.

Burns was in a good position to know where the PQ stood among voters. He ran the campaign of PQ candidate, Dr. Charles Roy, in Argenteuil against Liberal leader Claude Ryan. He witnessed first hand the slide in PQ support that also occurred in the Jean-Talon and Notre-Dame-de-Grâce votes.

Why is the PQ, after a decade of steady growth in popular support and exemplary development of a grass roots approach to policy formation, suddenly on the defensive, losing ground?

Lack of leadership on the central issue of Quebec independence is certainly at the core of much of the malaise. Instead of clear policy, obfuscation has until now been the route chosen to accomplish the twin goal of staying in power, without losing the referendum.

To believers, the PQ has been saying that its proposed "association of sovereign states" is really independence.

To the majority of Quebecers who fear the economic consequences of the separatist adventure, the PQ is saying that what it wants is a "true confederation."

Here's how ex-journalist Jean-Pierre Charbonneau (PQ MNA for Verchères), for example, interpreted the federal election results in a speech to the National Assembly May 23:

"If you want to interpret yesterday's vote as an anti-separatist vote, I am in agreement.... The Québécois are not separatists."

He, like many other Quebecers, is a victim of a process, described by former PQ ministerial aide Robert Barberis, as "technocratisation" of the pre-referendum debate. There have been so many versions and nuances and conflicting statements and technical reports on just what it is that Quebecers will be asked to approve that everyone's confused. Including Charbonneau.

The biennial convention of the PQ at the beginning of June gave its rubber stamp of approval to the sovereignty association blueprint drafted by the PQ executive over the Winter. It calls for Quebecers to

approve in a referendum the twin concepts of sovereignty — the exclusive right to legislate on all public and private matters and the exclusive right to levy all taxes for public purposes — linked to elaborate forms of economic association that appear to contradict the first goal.

The PQ also laid the groundwork for winning its referendum by promising to hold a second consultation before proceeding with any unilateral declaration of independence.

New referendum promise

The promise to go to the people if talks with Canada fail is designed to sway Quebecers in much the same way the first referendum promise was used by the PQ to get support from undecided voters in the 1976 election.

The easy passage of a softened approach to the referendum was a victory for those in the party, especially Premier Lévesque, who now appear to be looking more for a better deal than the absolutist dream of independence that is at the basis of the PQ.

That's of no concern to the technocratic elite that cherishes grand visions of Quebec's future. Claude Morin, the province's Intergovernmental Affairs Minister, is looking for bargaining power to compel the rest of Canada to negotiate a new deal for Quebec.

He maintains, and he's probably right, that "the provincial Premiers don't want us to win our referendum because they know that, if we do win it, this is going to give leverage to Quebec that has never been given to any Quebec government so far."

In order to get that leverage, the party machine, tightly controlled by Lévesque, and the government have attempted to please the traditional middle class with such policies as support of private schools. At the same time it has neglected the interests of its constituency — the urban working class and the new middle class of teachers, professionals and public servants.

A new laissez-faire approach to labour relations, under Pierre-Marc Johnson (son of the late Union Nationale Premier Daniel Johnson and possible successor to Lévesque), has allowed a public transit strike in Quebec City to drag on for more than four months, with no display of leadership. The fact that the people who depend most on the system are the powerless déclassé of the Lower Town has a lot to do with government indifference.

The hands-off approach also allowed a strike by the United Steelworkers of America to continue since the autumn and throughout the winter at the Noranda-owned Gaspé Copper Mines in Murdochville in a virtual political vacuum, as far as the PQ was concerned. And this despite the open support of the government by the Steelworkers boss in Quebec, Jean Gérin-Lajoie.

Move to the right

And yet, notes political sociologist Pierre Drouilly of Université du Québec à Montréal, this "veritable shift to the right by the leaders of the Parti Québécois... yields nothing on the electoral level."

"The Liberal bloc of voters doesn't move. They are satisfied with the government (How can they not be with a government that is so 'liberal'?), but they nevertheless vote for the Liberal Party.

"... The obstinate refusal of the Péquiste leaders to recognize their political debts toward the social groups which gave them massive support November 15, 1976 (workers, civil servants, intellectuals, students, low wage earners, unemployed, welfare recipients, young workers, etc.) is inducing today a demobilization, and a deep disenchantment among these groups."

This is the backbone of the PQ, that is threatened, the men and women who will be needed to wage the referendum battle.

All this in *Le Devoir* from the PQ's favorite electoral analyst.

Again, a muted attack against René Lévesque, written in invisible ink between the lines.

Activists like Drouilly and Burns are concerned that the disaffection of the PQ's electorate, coinciding with the new vigour in the Quebec Liberal Party, under Claude Ryan, threaten the PQ's project.

The arrival of Ryan at centre stage on the political scene, now that he sits in the Assembly and daily challenges the Premier as Opposition Leader, nose-to-nose, is another factor with which Lévesque has yet to come to terms.

Liberals biding time

The Liberals have not defined their formula for renewed federalism, but they're under less pressure to do so. Various committees of the party are drafting a manifesto for constitutional change that is expected to be put before a policy convention in the autumn.

Ryan is biding his time, digging into the main dossiers and mastering Parliamentary rules in his usual rigorous fashion, exuding the confidence of a winner. Lévesque is nervous, knowing full well that one of these days Ryan will take the offensive and maintain the pressure.

The defeat of Trudeau boosts Ryan's stature. It adds weight to the unity of federalist forces under the provincial leader. This does not bode well for the PQ.

The PQ has few allies. It is opposed by the federal government, all federal parties, all provincial governments, big business, a good part of the labour movement now that negotiations are underway with the public service unions, and the multinationals.

In its pet project of expropriating Asbestos Corp., second largest producer in the province of asbestos fibre, the PQ has also adopted the low profile approach. It is here tackling General Dynamics Inc. of St. Louis, Mo.,controlling shareholder of Asbestos Corp. and a pillar of the U.S. military-industrial complex, a new member of the enemy list.

The PQ has no shortage of opponents. But the dilution of party commitments in an attempt to make the whole thing saleable is alienating PQ members and supporters. This process may well be the worst enemy of them all.

Polarization hurts the PQ

by ELIOT HOLMES

Readers of the Montreal newspaper *La Presse* were greeted last May 9 with a big front-page photo of a radiant Claude Ryan gesturing enthusiastically, apparently toward the enormous crucifix that hangs over the Speaker's chair in the Quebec National Assembly.

Actually, he was gesturing toward supporters who had come to the public galleries to greet him on his swearing-in day, but that didn't matter. Nor did it matter that the Quebec Liberal leader never actually said outright that he was guided by the hand of God. What mattered is that he appeared to have said it.

Ryan's piety has provided a great boost to political humour in Quebec. In the federal campaign, for instance, the fun-loving Rhinoceros party proclaimed "the Ayatollah Ryani" as their spiritual leader and urged people to "vote Rhinoceros before the hand of God twists your arm."

But religion has not been an important factor in Quebec politics in recent decades; another explanation will have to be found for Ryan's 9,000-plus margin in the Argenteuil by-election — the biggest vote margin ever recorded in that riding — and the surprisingly strong win — by nearly 6,000 votes — of lacklustre Liberal Jean-Claude Rivest in Jean Talon. In fact, despite the popularity of the Parti Québécois government, the April 30 by-elections point to an inexorable PQ defeat in the coming general election, probably next year.

Why is the PQ going down the tube? It has enacted popular reformist legislation protecting consumers, agricultural land, unions and car crash victims. Many PQ ministers, notably Premier René Lévesque, are well-liked and respected. In day-to-day administration, the government is clearly less sleazy and underhanded than its Union Nationale or Bourassa Liberal predecessors. A recent poll shows a slim majority of the population could even be persuaded to give the government a mandate to pursue sovereignty-association.



Robert Burns: unhappy about the party's direction

Why then do things look so gloomy for the PQ? Why are they worried the Liberals could take the coming by-elections in Prévost, the seat left vacant by the death of PQ member Jean-Guy Cardinal, and in Beauce-Sud, held by independent nationalist Fabien Roy until he became the federal Social Credit leader?

A big part of the reason is Rodrigue Biron, the Union Nationale leader aptly described by Ryan as "a big, insignificant fellow who understands almost nothing." Biron used to be very good at talking out of both sides of his mouth, especially in the 1976 campaign with his contradictory language policies which varied according to the language of his audience.

He has at various times said his

party might support the "yes" side or the "no" side in the independence referendum. But his continual tergiversations have cast the party into a state of terminal confusion — to the point where its staunchest supporters can no longer figure out where it stands, except as a staunch defender of capitalism.

Biron siphoned off a lot of anti-Bourassa votes in the 1976 election, enough to raise UN standings in the assembly from one to 11, and enough to tilt the balance to the PQ in as many as 28 other ridings. Argenteuil in 1976 was very nearly one of those ridings. That year, the third-place UN won 24.6 per cent of the vote, cutting the Liberal margin of victory over the PQ to only 1,275 votes. But on April 30, 1979 the UN no longer had Robert Bourassa behind it. Despite the key UN organizers sent full-time into the riding, the party came up with only six per cent of the vote. The rest went to the Liberals. So did the 10.3 per cent won in 1976 by the now defunct provincial Créditistes. The reactionary Freedom of Choice party barely made a ripple. The name of the game is polarization. Everyone who finds the PQ too nationalist or even too socialist is coalescing around Claude Ryan's Liberals. They're all ganging up against the PQ, just as the British Columbia Liberals and Tories fled in droves to the Social Credit in 1975 to oust Dave Barrett's New Democrats. Even improving on the 41 per cent of the vote it won in 1976 will not save the PQ. They are toying with long overdue electoral reform, with some form of proportional representation in the National Assembly. But this can only soften the inevitable crunch, not prevent it.

Ryan's campaign

Ryan, to his credit, ran a thorough local campaign in Argenteuil, a rural riding taking in parts of the Ottawa Valley and the western Laurentians. He took the wheel of his dark maroon Chevrolet himself as he whizzed along the back roads, visiting every little hamlet and taking time to listen to people's problems. Despite his absence of roots in the riding, something his opponents exploited to the full, he apparently came across well.

The PQ candidate in Argenteuil was a local dentist named Charles Roy, who had run and lost twice before. He was well regarded in the riding, but one thing that any dentist should consider before going into politics is that people whose minds aren't absolutely made up may hesitate as they step into the polling booth and suddenly remember how much it hurt when the dentist's drill struck that nerve.

Burns' big loss

A bigger loser than Roy was Robert Burns, the minister of parliamentary reform and a key PQ organizer. Burns owns a cottage on Lac Simon in the northwestern part of the riding, and as soon as the by-elections were called, he was up there working as an almost full-time organizer. Still recovering from a mild heart attack, he threw everything in it, including at least $500 in bets. Toward the close of the campaign, he was going around saying how much it felt like that fateful November day in 1976 when the PQ swept into power. But all the evidence showed he was headed for a decisive loss.

Did he really think the PQ would win the seat, one of his senior aides was asked.

"Do you promise this is off the record?" she replied. "I mean, really off the record?"

A solemn assurance was given.

"Yes," she blurted out, "he really believed it." In the event, Charles Roy lost his deposit.

Now Robert Burns has joined him on the scrapheap of politics. Burns went out with a bang in late May, letting it be known as he resigned that he was unhappy over PQ backing of the Créditiste party in the federal election and predicting that the party would lose both the referendum on sovereignty-association and the next election.

Another big loser was Claude Morin, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, who appeared to be running things for the PQ in Jean Talon riding. Jean Talon is a cosy, upper middle-class Quebec City riding. The average age of voters there is 53. The most striking thing about the riding is its 32 convents, which house 2,000 nuns. In short, it should be a safe Liberal seat. But even the popular Raymond Garneau, the defeated Liberal leadership candidate who held the seat before, had lost a great hunk of votes in 1976. And loyal Garneau supporters were not exactly aching to give a show of confidence to Ryan, who had snubbed their man.

Liberal candidate Rivest was known as a sleazy Bourassa backroom boy. PQ candidate Louise Beaudoin, in contrast, was considered bright and popular, and polls showed her with a slight edge. Why, then, did she lose by nearly 6,000 votes, sliding badly from her 1976 showing?

Part of the reason was Claude Morin, author of the PQ's step-by-step approach to Quebec independence. Don't blow the trumpet of independence, he counselled both Roy and Beaudoin. Tell people they're voting just to elect members to the National Assembly and they'll have a chance to vote on sovereignty-association later, in the referendum. This worked for us in 1976, and damn it, it will work again.

PQ sounded evasive

Well, it didn't. Without repeating Bourassa's obnoxious anti-separatist campaign of 1976, the Liberal candidates nonetheless raised the issue of independence, and they made their PQ opponents look almost as evasive and unsure of themselves as Joe Clark trying to explain a stimulative deficit.

The PQ approach in the Prévost and Beauce-Sud by-elections will not be the same. René Lévesque has said so. Lévesque tried to explain away his April 30 by-election defeats by saying the Liberals had merely held on to two Liberal seats. He will have to be more convincing than that if he wants to have a respectable showing in the referendum, the only hope open to a mere mortal who seeks to stave off the demise of his party.

Bill Bennet's close shave

by FRED ADLER

It was quite a switch for just re-elected Social Credit Premier Bill Bennet.

Here he was on the night of May 10th, holding out the olive branch of reconciliation towards his defeated rivals, Dave Barrett and the New Democratic Party.

"We may disagree," he said about Socreds and NDP'ers to supporters in his home riding of Okanagan-South. "But we both have the best interests of B.C. at heart."

Work with my government, Bennet urged the new NDP Members of the Legislative Assembly, "not in a mood of confrontation but in a legislature in which all of us can have and hold above all the better good for our province and the welfare of our people."

Bennet's message amazed NDP'ers around the province. For who else practised confrontation except the Social Credit party? During the campaign that had just ended, the Premier continually jeered at Dave Barrett's NDP government of 1972-1975.

He called it at times "a wrecking crew" and the "free-est spending government in Canadian history." At one point, the premier viciously slurred the B.C. NDP and its Jewish leader as "national socialists." Nazis, in short, though Bennet never used that term.

Yet now, as the re-elected leader of a very polarized province, Bennet had to change his tune, move towards the centre and woo some very anti-Socred voters.

Yes, his government was back in power with 48 per cent of the vote, down one per cent from the election of 1975. But the NDP had just scythed down seven of his MLA's including three Cabinet ministers. The NDP vote had soared dramatically from 39 per cent to nearly 46.

Meanwhile, in Vancouver, Opposition Leader Dave Barrett was picking solace out of yet another NDP defeat.

"It augurs well for the party," he told NDP supporters about the election results. "A party whose economic policies benefit not just a special few but all the people."

The NDP, Barrett pointed out, had forced all the other parties into the Socred camp. And "we have raised our vote to 46 per cent."

True, but in politics victory is all, and the NDP had lost.

Still, Barrett had a point. How does a party win 46 per cent of the vote and still lose?

Consider, Allan Blakeney's NDP won a sweeping victory in Sas-

photo: John Bentley

Dave Barrett: finding solace in defeat

katchewan in 1978. Their vote? 47 per cent. Ed Schreyer and the Manitoba NDP won two elections and never garnered more than 43.

When Barrett and the NDP won in 1972 they only took two votes in five. So what happened now? Well, unlike 1972 the Liberal and Conservative parties collapsed completely. The combined vote of the two old-line parties came to less than six per cent.

Under Jev Tothill, its fourth leader in ten years, the Liberal vote plummetted from seven per cent in 1975 to less than one. Not surprising since the Liberals ran only five candidates province-wide. The Tories ran 40 candidates under the leadership of Vic Stephens and on a platform of tax cutting.

The Tories' vote rose only marginally and Stephens lost his Oak Bay seat outside Victoria to a Socred, finishing third behind an NDP'er.

"I will have to climb back into the legislature somehow," Stephens said on the night of May 10th. "The way politics are going now in this province it won't be hard."

Perhaps, but for now the Tories were wiped out. Party standings in the new legislature? Socreds 31, NDP 26, Liberals and Tories zero.

Bill Bennet's hard-line government had driven many Liberals and some Socreds into the NDP camp. Too many for the liking of the Premier. So he told the people of B.C., in a message clearly directed to those who had voted against him. "I care about you, and I care about this province."

Freed from the ghost of his dead father, former Premier W.A.C. Bennet, he had trounced the NDP once more while using his father's tactics of scare and bribery. But it was a very close shave.

Things looked different on April 3rd, when the Premier dissolved the house and called an election after three years and four months in office.

Bennet hoped to catch the NDP flat-footed fighting on two fronts in both federal and provincial elections. But on prime time 6 o'clock TV Bennet took over 20 minutes to announce that the election would be

photo: John Bentley



Bill Bennett: four more years

"a clear choice in philosophies. The people must raise their voices on how they want their resources developed."

The Premier was talking about the B.C. Resources Investment Corporation, formed by the Social Credit government by throwing into the corporation's pot all the shares acquired by the previous NDP administration in resource industries. Then the Premier cynically offered five free shares in BCRIC to every man, woman and child.

The NDP at first opposed the share giveaway pointing out that the people of B.C. already owned the companies in the BCRIC pot. It also said that the Socreds were selling out money making companies and the province would pay for it in the long run.

Then the NDP switched tactics and Dave Barrett said "it was too late to stop the share giveaway."

The day before the election was called, B.C.'s Minister of Finance, Evan Wolfe, had brought down what he called "a sunshine budget." The $4.57 billion package slashed sales taxes, from five to four per cent, increased homeowner grants $100 each to $380, cut personal income taxes and promised a system of "universal" denticare.

One Vancouver community health group quickly pointed out that the "universal" plan would only cover half the province's children, the richer half who wouldn't need it anyway.

Only the sales tax reduction took effect immediately. The B.C. government also promised to end car insurance rates in the publicly-owned ICBC, rates that discriminated against drivers on the basis of age or sex.

The rest of the budget would have to wait until the Social Credit government was re-elected. The Premier was saying in effect to B.C.'s voters: "Vote for us and you'll get your goodies."

Would it work? Maybe, but the BCRIC shares and the budget totalled very small beans. Five shares apiece in BCRIC would sell for less than $60 in August when they would be distributed. And the $100 homeowners' grant looked very small to home buyers or owners.

As one B.C. Hydro bus driver snorted, "The taxes on my house come to $1,000 a year alone. What's $100?"

"Neither the budget nor the five shares had any great impact on the election," says Yvonne Cocke, the NDP's campaign director.

So what were the issues? Some observers said there were none, but three stood out. Would many BC'ers forget the savage treatment

meted out to their pocketbooks and egos in the past three years and four months of Social Credit government? Would BC'ers opt for Bill Bennet's brand of individualism over the NDP's more caring collectivism? And in the midst of 8.3 per cent unemployment and 11 per cent inflation, would B.C. voters believe Bill Bennet's boast that his government had got "B.C. moving again."

For the Socreds had plenty to answer for. In the past three years and four months the government had outraged parts of the labour movement, welfare recipients, injured workers who wanted compensation, transit users in Vancouver and Victoria who now paid double the fares they did in 1976, environmentalists, minorities, the women's liberation movement and car users by hiking ICBC rates, in 1976 sometimes tripling them.

The list of groups outraged by Socred sins could go on for pages. The question was; Would the B.C. voters forget them and vote for the Socreds again; or would they wreak revenge on a heartless government?

Dave Barrett hoped they would. As leader of the Opposition that was natural. But the 48 year-old former social worker tried to capitalize on the Socreds' arrogance in low-key fashion during the election of 1979.

He toured the province dressed in dark conservative businessman's suits. He never took off his jacket or rolled up his shirt sleeves as in the past. There were no more jokes about "little fat Dave" that had made him seem more of a stand-up comic than a Premier during the 1975 campaign.

Barrett humbly admitted past mistakes "I am older now, wiser and with scars on my you-know-where," he told one audience after another. "We went too fast as government. We made mistakes."

He made only two big promises during the campaign. Clearly the image of a free spender pinned on him by the Socreds stuck and hurt.

First Barrett promised to use the government owned B.C. Railway to link up Alaska to Washington. The link, Barrett claimed, would create 4,000 permanent jobs and 5,000 construction jobs a year. Barrett also promised to boost gas export prices to the U.S. by 40 per cent.

The leader of the Opposition was endorsed by Ralph Loffmark, former Minister of Health under W.A.C. Bennet who was in Alaska with Barrett the day Bennet called the election. The now UBC professor of economics hailed Barrett's railway plan as "visionary".

Barrett had also established ties with Captain Harry Terry, a Surrey businessman who said he had little time for Bill Bennet. Barrett was obviously trying to construct a new coalition while holding traditional groups like labour to match what he called the Socred coalition of "car-dealer millionaires."

photo: Kini Mcdonald

Grace McCarthy: busy dispensing gifts and grants

BRITISH COLUMBIA

It must have worried Bill Bennet, who ran scared in the campaign's last two weeks. The press that had been ignored in the campaign's first opening now received first-class treatment. The Premier stepped up his pace, jetting to three or four places a day, scattering grants and loans like a drunken sailor scatters coins.

Grace McCarthy, the new Minister of Human Resources, matched Bennet's gift-giving pace stride-for-stride. In one week she dispensed over $4 million in gifts and grants. She shared the platform with federal Industry Trade and Commerce Minister Jack Horner when the former Tory came calling to Vancouver on May 3rd, promising a gift of $10 million for a Vancouver trade centre.

Yet times had changed since W.A.C. Bennet's day. "People," observed *Vancouver Express* reporter Harvey Oberfeld about the gift-giving of people's money back to them, "are much more cynical about politicians now." The gifts smacked of bribery.

Bennet refuses debate

Bennet refused to debate face to face with Barrett unless B.C. Fed president Jim Kinnaird and former NDP Natural Resources Minister Bob Williams appeared with Barrett. These men, said Bennet, were the true rulers of the party. Williams had never been forgiven bythe mining industry for his mining legislation of 1974. He had dropped out of sight for the past three years, but was still seen by some incorrectly as a dangerous radical force in the NDP.

Yet Bennet's request now struck some as cowardly. And the Premier's plan to catch the NDP fighting as one organizer put it, "two battles on two fronts with one hand tied behind our back in both," backfired too.

Two NDP campaigns merged into one. And the NDP put the federal one on the backburner until May 11th. Ed Broadbent visited B.C. three times backing up the provincial NDP. And all NDP contributions were tax deductible. Not so for the Socreds since they were strictly a provincial party. Businessmen, said some, did not give the Premier the money he wanted.

Bennet spoke poorly before partisan audiences. He also spoke for too long and lectured his audiences instead of inspiring them.

Fear issue raised

What was left? Fear, specifically fear of socialism and the NDP's supposedly free-spending ways. During the campaign Bennet ran against the NDP calling it "socialist". A series of radio ads put out by the Social Credit party, claimed the NDP stood against individual ownership. That pitch didn't carry the punch of the past but it must have swayed some.

Anti-socialist ads flooded the pages of the *Vancouver Express* on May 9th. The thrice-weekly *Express* was filling in for the struck *Vancouver Sun* and *Province* and was far more sympathetic to the NDP.

"Socialism Breeds Poverty" screamed an ad paid for by a group called "British Columbians for a Secure Future." "Free Enterprise Creates Wealth that Can be Shared By All." Other ads warned against bringing back an NDP government that had supposedly hurt the mining industry and thrown miners' jobs out of the province. None were sponsored by the Social Credit party which contented itself with urging B.C.'ers in its main ad to "Stay with Good Government."

Unlike past campaigns, most of the directors of the big mining and forest companies stayed on the sidelines.

Meanwhile, Socreds pressured some Tories to stay out of the provincial scene. A candidate in Duncan on Vancouver Island claimed Socreds had threatened to "break his legs" with a baseball bat. Vic Stephens, as Tory leader, failed to get Joe Clark's endorsement when Clark showed up in the province.

The Liberals ran such a weak campaign with only five candidates that one NDP'er observed, "Ottawa wants Barrett to win. Because if the Socreds win by a mile that will mean plenty of Tory seats in B.C. on May 22nd."

That theory was backed up when Federal Health and Welfare Minister Monique Begin accused Human Resources Minister Grace McCarthy during the campaign of not passing along a $20 a month federal increase to old-age pensioners.

Yet on May 10th B.C. once more plumped for free enterprise. The NDP swept eight out of Vancouver Island's ten seats. It split Vancouver and the suburbs with the Socreds, with the Social Credit party winning the more affluent northern and southern suburbs while the NDP gathered up the eastern side, Bill Van Der Zalm held on to Surrey but the man he beat last time around, former NDP Provincial Secretary Ernie Hall, shared the now two-seat Surrey riding with Van Der Zalm.

NDP victories

NDP'ers Bill King, Norm Levi and Rosemary Brown, who had lost their seats due to a Socred "redistribution" bill, all won. Levi won one of the NDP's sweetest victories by beating George Kerster in Maillardville-Coquitlam. Kerster had squeaked past Dave Barrett in suburban Coquitlam in 1975.

Yet the Socreds shut the NDP out of the eastern end of the Fraser Valley. In the north the NDP upset former NDP'er but now Socred Frank Calder in Atlin and former M.P. Frank Howard beat Socred Agricultural Minister Cyril Shelford in Skeena. Still, save for three other seats, most of the north and the interior stayed with the Socreds.

It was enough for victory and it was an old story. Since 1933 the CCF-NDP has been the government for only three years. The party has now been in opposition for 43 of 46 years.

"We will surely be the government again in this province," a smiling but sad Dave Barrett said after conceding defeat.

Perhaps, but for B.C. voters that was a familiar tune. For now the Socreds were in again, under another Bennet.

Big win for Lochinvar

by ROSS HARVEY

There is no other way to describe it. Peter Lougheed's Tories romped to a staggering election victory Wednesday, March 14.

Although the Conservatives' percentage share of the popular vote dropped from about 61 to 57 per cent, that vote still was distributed evenly enough to allow Tory victories in 74 of Alberta's 79 provincial constituencies.

And the three opposition parties came out of the race with no more nor less than that with which they entered it: four seats for the Social Credit Party, one seat for the NDP and no seats for the province's beleaguered Liberals.

In all five cases of opposition victory, they merely held the seats they had before dissolution.

Both the Socreds and the New Democrats were looking for at least a few new seats in the election. They were counting on the Tories' having alienated — if not downright abused — enough of the electorate during the eight years since they were first swept to power in 1971 to have created a significant — if small — opposition vote.



Peter Lougheed: a staggering election victory

The Socreds were relying on a vague and directionless feeling among their potential supporters that the "government has become too big, too powerful," in the oft-repeated words of their leader, Bob Clark.

It was a classic petit-bourgeois pitch, aimed at dissaffected members of the supposedly upwardly mobile urban middle classes on the one hand, and at conservative farming and small business elements in rural Alberta on the other.

Constant attacks on the growth of the civil service — currently the most popular bogeyman in Canadian politics — and the supposedly "socialist" stance of the Lougheed government (exemplified by the purchase of Pacific Western Airlines and the establishment of the Alberta Energy Company), coupled with a touchingly nostalgic call for a "return to free enterprise and open competition in a free market place", were spiced with a series of election promises based on the wealth of the Heritage Savings Trust Fund, the total dollar value of which was exceeded qualitatively at least only by the obvious lack of planning and forethought that went into them.

Organizationally, the Socreds stuck to running leader Bob Clark back and forth across rural Alberta in a series of rented Winnebagos, stopping wherever a group of senior citizens, rural rate payers, aging supporters or moderately interested chamber of commerce partisans could be found. Only once did Clark's barely organized entourage attempt a major urban rally when they drew 800 people in Calgary in the last week of the campaign.

The New Democrats concentrated much more heavily on a fast-paced and tightly organized media-oriented leader's tour. NDP

ALBERTA

chief Grant Notley took to the air for most of the campaign's 28 days, speaking to a series of afternoon luncheon meetings and evening rallies. The NDP campaign reached its climax in Edmonton three days before the election when the party organization there managed to pull 1,400 people to a rally. It was the largest rally of the election.

Classic NDP campaign

The New Democrats' leader's tour was coupled at the constituency level with the classic canvass-and-pull-the-vote campaign that has become the NDP's hallmark.

The NDP was looking for support in two major camps. First were the relatively poor small farmers in the province's north. Banging away at the theme that the Lougheed government had consistently ignored the plight of small farmers throughout its term — they maintained three farm families had left the land every day since the Tories first gained power — the NDP tried to drive home the message that the only way to make the government sit up and take notice was to vote in an NDP member.

In the cities, especially in Edmonton, the New Democrats were counting on the trade union movement to galvanize its members behind the party for the first time. A series of government moves against organized labour during the last four years had solidified the leadership of the unions behind the NDP more than at any time before. The major question was whether or not that leadership could deliver its members' support at the ballot box.

This they tried very hard to do. Major advertisements in the province's daily newspapers, radio spots, and a stream of letters from the central Alberta Federation of Labour were combined with running some of their own prominent members as NDP candidates.

The NDP made its pitch for working class votes on bread and butter issues. The cost of housing and basic consumer goods, the cutbacks in health, social service and education spending, and the general "arrogance" and careless attitude of the government toward the urban working classes were highlighted again and again.

But when all else was said and done, it was the major unspoken issue of the campaign that guaranteed the Tories their landslide victory.

Only obliquely alluded to in their very polished TV ads, and only hinted at in Lougheed's major speeches, the Eastern menace was the Conservatives' ace in the hole.

In the final four days of the campaign, when it looked as if the oppositions' combined assaults were at least going to have the effect of encouraging some of the "soft" Tory vote to stay home, Lougheed and his troops did a thorough PR. blitz, the message of which was crystal clear: "they" want our money and our oil, and the only way to keep "their" greedy paws off it is to close ranks behind Lochinvar and let "them" know there's no way.

The call to arms having been sounded (one of Edmonton's two daily newspapers headlined its day-before-election editorial "Vote Lougheed"), most Albertans dutifully voted to continue pumping the lion's share of the province's wealth to Houston and New York, rather than to Toronto and Ottawa.

But there was another, and perhaps even more important, unspoken aspect to the election campaign. In a nutshell, Albertans are nervous. With very few exceptions, Canada continues to trudge along in the throes of a major and prolonged recession. The fragile and in fact deteriorating nature of Canada's staples export-oriented economy has for several years operated as a grim reminder to almost all Albertans that, "There, but for the grace of God, go I."

To realize the power of the Tories' hold on Alberta's political imagination, one need only substitute the name Peter Lougheed for that of the deity in the above quotation.

Surrounded by an increasingly confusing and sometimes apparently hostile world, Albertans want nothing so desperately as to maintain their own possibly transient good fortune. And despite the province's obvious mineral wealth and consequently booming economy, the nagging feeling that all this is but a mirage, that the slightest alteration in the current economic and political makeup of Alberta will send it hurtling back to the days of economic marginality and national obscurity, is present almost everywhere.

It was upon this shared perception — that Lougheed (the significance of the Conservative party itself pales beside Mr. Lougheed's personal aura) is the only man capable of defending Fortress Alberta and thus of continuing the frantic if fragile pace of the province's one-sided economic development — that the massive Tory consensus emerged once again on election night in Alberta.

The NDP had told the people of Alberta to "Send them a message." They did. The message was, "Keep up the good work, Peter. We're counting on you."

* * *

ADDENDUM: On the Monday following the election, two indicative announcements were made almost simultaneously. The first was that yet another large new find of natural gas and heavy oil has been made in the province. The second was that the Tory Hospitals Minister in the previous administration had "forgiven" the debt of an Edmonton doctor who is said to have bilked the province's health care insurance (medicare) plan of around $140,000.00. Plus ça change . . .

RELAX, THE COUNTRY IS SAVED

Cookbook author Jehane Benoit, singer Roger Doucet, and performer/broadcaster Emile Genest are among the big name federalists appointed to the Pro-Canada Foundation this week.

— Gillian Cosgrove, The Montreal Star, May 25, 1979

the Last Pssst

by Claude Balloune

The Faculty Club: The new Tory government has quickly displayed a penchant for appointing commissions to exhaustively study everything under the sun. When **Pierre Trudeau's** regime began in 1968 its strong academic orientation was quickly noticed, but did not surprise anyone — however, it has come as a real surprise that **Clark's** clique is showing signs of out-Trudeauing the Trudeau gang.

The Tory Civil Service? Loyalties in the senior levels of the civil service, including the high **mandarinate** have begun to switch as Ottawa's fat cats find it easier than they expected to live with the **Clark government.** Senior officials are going around saying how approachable and friendly and willing to listen the new ministers are, in contrast to the Liberal batch who had developed a high sense of "arrogance" and were "difficult to approach," being walled off by troops of hot shot political assistants. In other words, the bandwagon is being climbed on — for now.



Clark: pleasing the mandarins

Camille Laurin: under a watchful eye

Off to Paris and an Eagle Eye: Rene Levesque's buddy **Yves Michaud** is going to be on his way to Paris as Quebec's Delegate-General, i.e. Ambassador, there. Michaud is distinguished for having been host of the Montreal dinner party following which Levesque ran down **Edgar Trottier** while driving downtown in the wee hours of the morning, and for having been one of those who ran the separatist newspaper *Le Jour* into the ground. Another alumni of the paper, which went belly-up in spite of the financial wizardry of **Jacques Parizeau**, is **Evelyn Dumas.** She's now in the Premier's office as inter-cultural affairs aide. She's supposed to be looking after the rights of the minorities, such as the English, but her real job is to keep an eagle eye on what Cultural Affairs Minister **Camille Laurin** is up to.

Chiseling: According to Quebec's Bill 101 its illegal to have signs in one language unless that language is French. On a building on Notre Dame Street in Montreal there is a Latin-only sign chiseled permanently into the stone. It reads: "Frustra Legis Auxilium Quaerit Qui In Legem Committit" — which means, "it's useless to invoke the law when you have placed yourself beyond it." The building is owned and operated by the Quebec Dept. of Cultural Affairs which is presided over by **Camille Laurin,** the author of Bill 101.

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Mike Cassidy: the party's upset

Hoping for Jerusalem: Quebec's governing **Parti Quebecois** is quietly hoping that **Joe Clark's** government goes ahead with its promise to move the embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The PQ figures it's well-known that it's not hostile to the Arabs, and would not only be exempt from any boycott but would pick up investments that otherwise would have gone elsewhere in Canada.

Election jottings: Marcel Prud'homme, chairman of the Quebec Liberal caucus, faced a little problem in the federal election in his St. Denis riding when a photo got around showing him with **Yassar Arafat** applauding the PLO. Liberal candidate **David Berger** was hurriedly pulled in from Laurier riding to attest to Prud'homme's friendship for Israel.... **Gaston Isabelle,** Liberal MP for Hull, spent the first three weeks of the campaign holidaying in Maine.... **Gilles Caouette,** campaigning in Temiscamingue for his father's old Creditiste seat, made a big thing of the menace of Black immigration. He lost....

Off to London? I'm told that after former Liberal biggie **Paul Martin** comes home soon from his plush posting as Canadian High Commissioner in London his replacement will be **Robert Stanfield,** Joe Clark's predecessor as Tory leader.

Shredded: It's said that some of the **paper shredding** that went on in Ottawa following the Liberal election loss involved plans for a Liberal version of the NDP's fair prices review board as well as something for a Canadian industrial strategy. The Liberals had expected they would win enough seats to be able to govern with the support of the NDP and were ready with goodies for **Ed Broadbent.**

Unholy alliance: What does the **NDP** and the **oil companies** have in common? **Petrocan,** now that the oil barons have come out in opposition to the Tories' idea of jettisoning the crown corporation.

Michael Who? The NDP's Ontario organization has become increasingly distraught over the low profile and unpopularity of leader **Michael Cassidy**.... The Ontario Tories are no less upset. They're afraid that if the NDP vote collapses in the next provincial election the result could be a big breakthrough for the provincial Liberals under leader **Stuart Smith.**

Jacques Who? When **Jacques Lavoie** made it into the House of Commons in a 1975 by-election he made waves because he was a Conservative from Quebec, and there was breathless talk of a Tory breakthrough. But things didn't work out and Jacques crossed the floor to the Liberals. Things didn't work out there either and in the recent election Lavoie didn't get a Liberal nomination, so he ran as an Independent in **Hochelaga-Maisonneuve** where the Liberal was popular **Serge Joyal.** Things went from bad to worse. Lavoie used the Liberal logo on his campaign posters — and then had to paint out part of it because Joyal took him to court. By the end of the campaign he was so low on funds he was selling chocolate bars to raise money. He got 1,852 votes, fewer than the Tory and the NDP'er; Joyal got 21,124. Poor Jacques.

Next year in Salisbury? Now that the Tories have jettisoned Liberal foreign policy to the extent of promising to move our embassy in Israel to the disputed city of Jerusalem, External Affairs Ministry types are fearful there'll be a change on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia — abandonment of sanctions and diplomatic recognition, followed by a tilt towards the ruling White minority in South Africa.

Wedding bells: After Premier **Rene Levesque** married his appointments secretary **Corinne Cote,** following a courtship since the mid-'60s, Ms. Cote resigned her job. She has yet to be replaced... By the way, Levesque has an office staff of about 60; not one is an Anglophone.

The Final Blow: If anyone has any doubts that Montreal is a declining financial centre they can now lay those doubts aside. *The Wall Street Journal* has spoken by voting with its feet. The prestigious financial paper recently moved its big desk to Toronto, leaving only two lonely staffers in Montreal.

Bless you: When speaking in the Quebec National Assembly, Liberal leader **Claude Ryan** has a habit of raising both arms as if he were delivering a sermon or a benediction, adding to a spat of Ryan jokes. Ryan has been a sitting duck for jokes ever since he was reported to have mused about being guided by the 'hand of God'.

"The Bay" and other specials at the corporate bazaar

by David Cubberley and John Keyes

The average shopper, smitten with a desire to own some commodity, heads down to Eaton's, Simpson's or The Bay and buys it on time. By contrast corporate shoppers, suffering from similar desires but at a mega-level, take themselves down to the stock exchange and buy the company outright. Thus it was that the Thomson family of London, England did some March shopping at the international corporate boutique and decided to acquire the $3 billion annual sales market of Canada's premier merchandiser, The Bay.

The Bay had been placed on special display at the boutique several months earlier, where it was subjected to discreet advertising of its virtues: tight management team, interesting assets mix, undervalued stock with no defined block of controlling shareholders. Promotion was quietly undertaken by a Toronto firm specializing in mergers and acquisitions, thus allowing the product to be shown round a select class of corporate shopper.

The Thomson family lunged at the plum with a share offer sufficient to establish a 51 per cent controlling interest, valued at about $365 million in hard cash. Asked where the bucks were coming from, Ken Thomson, scion of the entrepreneur-financier who had built the family firm, responded blandly: "Simply, my family has a lot of reserves." He didn't elaborate and the corporate press covering the deal was unable to dress a bottom line for the family wealth.

'Big' was really all it could manage, mouth agape: through Thomson Newspapers Ltd., control over 98 dailies and 21 weeklies in Canada and the U.S., comprising assets of $245 million (1977) and profits of $50 million (est. 1978); substantial holdings in insurance and trucking in North America; and vast British assets centred in newspapers and publishing, tours and an airline, and North Sea oil. Total scope unknown, due to the fact that major portions are hidden behind family-owned, non-public com-

panies, thus obviating the need to report holdings and earnings systematically. Reported the *Financial Post*, "Thomson's assets are spread from Timmins to Thailand and back in private and public companies... but only the main ones are publicly identified." 'Big', and itching to grow.

Thus the Thomsons, a family of expatriate Canucks who had used the rewards of their Canadian investments to help boost themselves up the international corporate ladder, wanted to return to the 'home fold' and spread around a little largesse. But how are we to understand it: just an instance of a Canadian firm reinvesting its profits in a new sector of the same economy? Or, rather, a multinational firm biting off a profitable chunk of our economy with profits made elsewhere? In Thomson's case, it all depends upon which pocket of the corporate vest the money appears to be coming from.

The formal bid for The Bay came from two of Thomson's family companies, Thomson Equitable Corp. and Woodbridge Co. However, financing of the spring shopping spree was facilitated through control of another company, International Thomson Organization (ITO), an Ontario firm, said the *Financial Post*, "created last year to remove Thomson's British assets from the constraints of British foreign exchange control;" or, according to other reportage in the same paper, "to escape the constraints imposed by monopolies legislation and the size of the relevant markets in Britain;" or, then again, to permit the "swapping (of) the staggering British tax burden for the lighter Canadian one."

We can choose among the explanations offered, but they all lead to the same conclusion, stated in the *Financial Post*, "changing the nationality of the assets from British to Canadian meant the... wealth could flow freely out of Britain *for more lucrative investment elsewhere*— most obviously in North America."

ITO is thus a receptacle for dollars gleaned elsewhere and a vehicle for reinvestment of that mobile wealth in new markets. Its investment kit was swelled by 1978 estimated pre-tax profits of $250 million (on an asset base of $180 million), due to the successful siphoning of funds realised through the British wing's activities in North Sea oil development. The family had astutely financed its oil venture with $350 million in borrowed bucks, a debt soon to be cleared by abundant profits, and is now positioned to enjoy a cash flow estimated at as much as $500 million over the next five years alone.

But why jump at The Bay or, more precisely, why prefer an existing asset to the option of investing in some of that new productive capacity that would end the current world slump? The answer derives from economic conditions created by the slump itself, based on the simultaneity of inflation and recession. Investment in new capacity looks risky. Old investments, due to the lassitude of the stock market and the distortions introduced by inflation, are looking better and better. A growing minority of economists say that stocks are 'systematically undervalued.' And established capital obviously agrees, preferring to centralize control over existing wealth in a flurry of takeovers and takeouts.

The Thomson family has no historic expertise in merchandising nor, despite its purchase, any interest in developing some. From the outset it made it clear that The Bay was "an investment" and that the existing management group would be left to run the shop as before. This was, as they say in the trade, a case of "assets at a discount," just an old-fashioned 'good buy.' "A pension plan" for a large pool of mobile capital looking for hedges against inflation. "A big, mature investment with steady earnings potential," as the *Financial Post* put it, not to mention prime real estate holdings, excellent market position and an estimated $123 million cash return from the sale of some Dome Petroleum shares, held by The Bay through its minority interest in Hudson's Bay Oil and Gas.

An apparently irresistible transaction with a solid Canadian pedigree was thus in the shaping. No problem with the issue of nationalism, thus no basis for FIRA to involve itself in the sale; no additional concentration in the merchandising field given Thomson's asset portfolio, thus no real concern on the part of the Combines Investigation Branch. All in all a salutary business deal, the more so because, as the Thomsons affirmed, "by paying for The Bay with money earned abroad.... (the family is) adding to the equity stock in Canada."

Even as the Thomson family was launching its move into the Canadian merchandising field, the Bay Street financial community was abuzz with rumours of other bidders for the Hudson's Bay Co. waiting in the wings. For very obvious reasons The Bay's plumlike qualities had been widely recognized in the corporate market place, presenting a pool of assets clearly underestimated in the book-value of its shares, and the 'scuttle-butt' was that a challenge for the prey might come from Canadian Pacific Ltd., Power Corporation, Argus Corporation or — not surprisingly in light of the battle for control waged between these two — either the Bronfman group or Brascan.

Nonetheless, when, on March 28, the challenger emerged in the person of W. Galen Weston, chairman and president of George Weston Ltd., the analysts were taken by surprise. Not the least startled were the executives of The Bay, themselves, who had greeted the Thomson offer only a couple of weeks earlier with praise and admiration for their good taste.

The Thomson take-over had the distinct advantage, from the perspective of the incumbent executive of The Bay, of promising very little interference in the administration of the Hudson's Bay Co. holdings. Taking what has been called a "hands-off" approach to his investments, Kenneth Thomson is known to concern himself with little but the profits to be gained. The Weston group, however, presents a radically different approach to its corporate acquisitions; a more meddling, "hands-on"

Takeover happiness: Ken Thomson (left) celebrates his takeover of The Bay with Bay Governor George T. Richardson and Bay President Donald McGiverin

involvement would have awaited The Bay upon its integration into this already diversified conglomerate.

The global offer made by Westons, of some $471 million for 51 per cent of the ordinary shares in The Bay, surpassed that of the Thomson family by over $100 million and had the immediate effect of stimulating the bidding. Under pressure from the challenge the Thomson offer rose from an original $31 per share bid on 51 per cent of the stock to an eventual $37 for 75 per cent, at which price the board of governors recommended acceptance to the 31,000 shareholders.

No doubt the anticipated profit on shares purchased at around $20 by some members of the board a mere matter of weeks before the Thomson offer was made public, made the decision to accept somewhat easier. Indeed, as in the case of governor George Richardson, who between February 6 and 23 picked up some one million shares at $22, and stood to make a quick profit of $16 million on their re-sale to Thomson, their personal interests were particularly well served by the transaction.

The Weston offer which sparked this bidding clearly envisaged an integration of The Bay into its already impressive Canadian retail network. In the property development sector, the combination Weston-Bay would have dominated the growth of commercial shopping centres across Canada, internally through The Bay's subsidiary Markborough Properties, and externally in obliging any promoter wishing to include a Bay store in his project to also sign a lease with Loblaws.

In an explanatory letter to Weston shareholders, dated April 3, Galen Weston had expressed, as his objective in making this energetic lunge for control of the Hudson's Bay Co., the desire to "create a strong, nationwide merchandising organization widely owned by Canadians. This acquisition will be the most significant in Weston's history. It will provide an entirely new dimension to the group, diversifying its holdings in merchandising into a prominent position in non-food retailing while at the same time expanding the Company's thrust in the natural resource area . . ." In a history which began with a modest Toronto biscuit factory in the 1880's, this initiative certainly stands out as one of "the most significant," if not wholly unexpected in the

light of the Weston saga of growth through wholesale acquisition.

The desire to acquire the well established operations, assets and reputation of The Bay is consistent with Weston's program of corporate expansion which began in the 1920's, the result of which reads like a shopping list of companies covering four continents. The taste for what has been described as "headlong expansion" has gained for the company a powerful economic presence in England, South Africa, Rhodesia and Australia as well as Canada and the United States.

W. Galen Weston's wish to buy into, as he described it, "a prominent position in non-food retailing" is equally reflective of the manner in which this Canadian bakery extended itself beyond its initial industrial activity into other sectors. Responding to the pangs of a voracious appetite, Westons undertook a series of predatory forays, beginning in the early 1940's, taking them into the wholesale food sector, chocolate and dairy production, packaging services, the fisheries industry on both coasts, pulp and paper production and food retailing.

Given the importance of The Bay's 'premiere' position in the field of non-food retailing, only recently reinforced with the acquisition of Simpsons and Zellers, to say that Weston was shopping for a "prominent" foothold in merchandising borders, one is tempted to suggest, on understatement. A successful take-over would have confronted the Canadian public with a conglomerate controlling fully 28 percent of the food and department store market with sales close to $10 billion annually.

The predatory approach to expansion, while by far the method most favoured by the Weston management group, has not always governed their investment habits. A recent attempt at developmental expansion in this very field, with the Sayvette chain of department stores in Ontario, failed dismally to cut into the market of the established retailers. Their second try at the same target, with the Bay offer, represented a return to the tried-and-true method of "if you can't beat them — buy them out!"

Despite the surprise which greeted the Weston bid on The Bay, there is every reason to believe that the move is one which had been on the mind of Galen Weston for some time.

In fact, after the public offer was made for an outright take-over at the end of March, it was discovered that the initiative had actually first been launched, in another fashion, last summer. One of the many holding companies through which the Weston interests are controlled, Wittington Investments Ltd. (84 per cent owned by the Weston family) had started picking up shares in the Hudson's Bay Co. as they came on the market to a value of "several million dollars", when The Bay's purchase of Simpsons gave them cold feet and the buying was halted.

There is no reason to believe that the idea had been discarded, however, since those shares were still held by Wittington at the time of the March offer. Presumably, had not the Thomson offer come along to hurry matters to a conclusion, Wittington would have gone back to the market and conceivably repeated the 'coup' which over a period of six years, 1947 to 1953, gained for George Weston Ltd. control of Lobaws Groceterias Company, to date still the most important acquisition.

A comparison of the Thomson and Weston offers reveals similarities other than their common acquisitiveness in a corporate market recognized as one of the most promising in the world. Interestingly, both, while benefiting from Canadian corporate seals, have long outgrown any narrow "nationalist" identity.

Like Roy Thomson, Willard Garfield Weston, the father of Galen, went to England to establish himself on English soil and by 1948 had succeeded in becoming the largest baker and biscuit manufacturer in the United Kingdom. From the outset candid about the motives moving him to invest — concerning his African interests, for instance, he loudly proclaimed that "sanctions or no sanctions, I am investing in Rhodesia now" — Weston recognized, as does the class in which his son moves today, allegiance to no 'nation-state' when dollars, pounds or South African rands were in the balance.

This class of capitalist in Canada seems to have come out of the woodwork for the Hudson's Bay Co. transaction. At least one of the other parties rumoured to have been in the background was in the market with a considerable bank-roll extracted from its foreign operations. Having recently sold its electricity interests in Brazil, Brascan was seriously casting about for a haven for the estimated $380 million in cash reserves which were burning a hole in its corporate pocket. After the acceptance of the Thomson offer by The Bay, Brascan, with the financial aid of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, started stalking another merchandising group rich in assets, the F.W. Woolworth Co. ($6.1 billion in sales internationally per year).

Rounding out a class of shopper to which most Canadians can never hope to aspire, both the Bronfman group and Power Corporation were browsing at the time The Bay came onto the market. The case of Power shows clearly that there is very little that can interfere with the profitable exploitation of the Canadian economy, whether or not the majority of Canadians must pay for it through an inflation rate of close to 10 per cent and a level of unemployment not far behind.

Having only last year suffered a long strike in his newspaper holdings, most prominently *La Presse*, and another even more costly in his bus operation at Voyageur, Power president Paul Desmarais is openly seeking an opportunity to invest some $100 million in reserves.

In the meantime, while Brascan was out to pick up Woolworth, the Bronfmans, through their family trust Edper Investments Ltd., had paid out $150 million in their effort to wrest control from the man-

Garfield Weston: founder of the business empire that competed with Thomson to take over The Bay — a similar moveable capital story

agement group that was guiding the former. The Bay transaction was obviously not an isolated incident in the apparently heated up battle for the division of power in the Canadian economy, but represents a drive towards concentration which is taking on wider dimensions.

Interestingly, the spectacle of two huge corporate suitors rivalling for the affections of The Bay, unfolding before the public during a federal election, caused nary a ripple on the political surface. Plainly, neither Joe Clark nor Pierre Trudeau felt that this was the moment to play David Lewis. The political silence was attributed to the straightforward business character of the deal, itself guaranteed by the 'citizenship' of the capital involved. "All the interested groups are Canadian," noted *Le Devoir*, thus "the question of 'foreign investors' plays no role at all in this affair."

But 'foreign investment' was not at issue in Power Corporation's bid to wrest control of Argus Corporation, and yet Pierre Trudeau felt the need to have a Royal Commission investigate the problem of corporate concentration and identify how it could be aligned with the public interest. Thus the Bryce Commission came and went, leaving a trail of boring reports and timid recommendations. Oh yes, and leaving the Combines Investigations Branch, the agency that has traditionally handled monopolistic concentration, with the same toothless mandate.

Does nationality of a particular capital imply some connection with what is in the public interest? And can capital of this magnitude really be said to possess 'citizenship' in a national community?

The notion of corporate citizenship is a dubious one, especially when dealing with operators like the Thomsons, Westons, Bronfmans or Brascan. The Weston clan jumped from Canada to England and back whenever it suited its corporate convenience; the Thomsons are doing the same thing today. Canadian-made capital skipped to England in both cases, bleached itself of its marks of national origin and exploited the profitable opportunities of the imperial centre. From there it whisked off to other corners of the globe, tying up lumps of national

Weston's Loblaws: a successful takeover of The Bay would have meant 28 per cent of the food and department stores market

economies wherever the 'rate of return' looked good.

What we are in fact confronting are multinational corporations operating on a global scale; their apparent 'Canadian-ness' is little more than an accident of birth. The nationality of such capital pools is pure corporate — they will take up residence wherever the best profits are to be made. If that happens at one moment to be North Sea oil exploration, then perhaps the capital looks British, tried and true; but should the conditions governing investment in that quarter appear too stiff, then capital quickly divests its nationality and flows off to the next opportunity. This time perhaps it's an investment in merchandising, in Canada, an environment where the company is an old hand — and for the locals, it looks like the repatriation of a chunk of capital, a gratuitous return for having hosted the company for years.

Since capital's nationality is decidedly fluid, its apparent citizenship does not establish a direct connection with the public interest. But what does then? For economic liberals, the identity of interests between corporate growth and community needs is immediate; the bond is only broken when an individual pool of capital exploits its control over social resources without respect for the basic principles of 'free enterprise'.

It was from this point of view that the president of Mutual Life Assurance Co., J.H. Panabaker, warned his annual general meeting that Canada was being engulfed by a "takeover fever" that would "concentrate business decision-making among fewer groups." What concerns Panabaker is not the process of accumulating and centralizing power per se — he sees that as the goal of all business activity — but the fact that the system may be penetrated by hucksters and investment sharpies seeking to amass personal empires, themselves incapable of creating real wealth.

Thus there is an incorrect and a correct route towards concentration of power. For him the goal is growth based on "creators of industrial wealth" who see their factories "continuing as living entities, not merely as commodities to be sold to the first bidder."

Panabaker, an idealist and nationalist, refuses to face up to capital's tendency to fly the coop in search of better feeding. For him, money with no direct allegiance to efficient production is bad money; but he's stuck, because money's sole allegiance is to its own expansion. So, reasoning against the grain of present events, he concludes that mergers and takeovers that "maintain competition and contribute to increased efficiency in the use of Canadian resources should be facilitated. The others should be stopped, lest Canada's growth be stunted by corporate cannibalism."

So once again it's up to government or, more accurately, the Combines Investigations Branch, to determine whether a proposed centralization of corporate power is in the public interest. And what is defined as a 'threat' to the public interest is limited pretty much to criminal infringements of competition, i.e. the conscious fabrication of monopoly aiming to undermine the ability of other firms to compete in the market.

But what a vague concept with which to arm the so-called public protector: every accumulation of capital, whether through growth on an existing asset base or through acquisition of someone else's assets, aims to bring a larger portion of a market under its direct control. That is *the* objective of business. Hence the line between 'good' and 'bad' does not exist and the watch-dog is left fishing about (when its leash is pulled) for some artificial definition of how much power is too much power, or what type of acquisition is illegitimate acquisition.

Galen Weston's motivation in wanting The Bay was hardly criminal in nature: just the product of an astute business sense which, had it succeeded, would have brought together the world's largest integrated retail empire, with untold opportunities for further growth. It's certainly true that the market power he would have manipulated would have produced awesome advantages for his firm in the competitive battle, but there is no form of business growth that would not have exactly the same intention. And business is growth, period.

The liberal approach to the concentration of power, internally contradictory as a theory, leads to cynical, do-nothing behaviour in practice. The New Democratic Party is working the same side of the street, but it promises to get tough and to bring in a stricter law to 'regulate' competition.

In this vein Ed Broadbent complains about corporations with the freedom to make "excess profits," though he himself might legitimately be taxed as 'excessive' in his reference to the problem and 'insufficient' in his explanation as to what would constitute a 'just profit'. Excess profits apparently come from firms that have bagged too much market power. Ed doesn't elaborate much beyond that, but he knows of one firm that clearly exceeds the bounds of what is acceptable: George Weston Ltd.

Ed's solution would be to strike a commission of inquiry (a novel approach!) into the question of concentration in the food industry, with the express purpose of dismantling "the Weston giant." Queried as to the precise point at which 'bigness' turned into 'badness', Broadbent asserted that it was a "technical problem" that should be left to the experts to define. In other words, he himself had no idea. Thus Ed believes that "large companies are good" for the economy, but that 'too large' is 'too much', and promises that 'too much' will be defined if we will just send him to Ottawa.

Weston's Ltd., which is clearly too much by any standard, will be dissolved. Thus the NDP proposes to take up the work of America's trustbusters and dismember the Canadian equivalent of the Standard Oil Co. octopus. But would the break up of the Weston food capital eliminate the fact of concentration, or would it simply push Weston to manifest its presence in other fields? Would the sale of Loblaw's Groceterias Ltd. to another capital pool — perhaps a Ken Thomson — invigorate competition in the supermarket business? And would the capital pool in question permit Ed Broadbent to officiate over a fragmenting of its handiwork — or would it not in fact use its mobility to move elsewhere, or rally the members of its class to do battle with the state power?

The NDP view is that corporate power can be nudged and legislated into conformity with the public interest. This is naive. What is significant about corporate power is not its locus — in the hands of a Weston or a Thomson or a panel of faceless managers — but its moving principle: that of a continually expanding concentration of control over society's productive apparatus. Today it is world-class capitalism operating in a global marketplace. Its growth process follows its own logic, which allows it to control and manipulate what is commonly taken as the public interest.

To look for a link between the public interest and accumulating corporate power at the level of 'nationality' is erroneous. Looking upon the state power as capable of 'regulating' the limits of that accumulation involves a complete underestimation of the control already exerted by corporations over our lives.

Business power and wealth may appear to be fixed in the form of factories and stores, thus bound tightly to our communities, but just interfere with that power to the point where its ability to accumulate is disadvantaged relative to other countries and you will see how quickly it becomes mobile and moves on. Thomson's oil money is a case in point.

To look upon corporate concentration as the accumulation of raw power over national communities is to see the beast for what it is. Instead of dismembering a 'pernicious' concentration of power and distributing it round the class who already control it, or regulating the conditions under which that power is exercised, the alternative lies in its appropriation by those whose interests should dominate national economic life — the public.

Strike and profit

by Kerry Segrave

Placer Development is a low profile Vancouver based outfit. The company is a holding, financing and exploration organization. Through subsidiaries and associated companies it has varied interests across Canada and abroad, including mining operations in Canada, the U.S. and the Philippines, participation in oil and gas operations in Western Canada, and plywood and industrial operations and cattle ranching in Australia.

Mineral exploration is carried out on a world-wide scale with attention to the southwest Pacific, Fiji, and New Guinea. Two of its largest mines in B.C. are Gibraltar Mines, an open-pit copper mine and Endako, an open-pit molybdenum mine, both in the central area of the province. Most of the company's molybdenite concentrate is sold under long term sales contracts with European and Japanese buyers. Users include steel and chemical companies.

The major shareholder is Noranda Mines, holding about 32 per cent, and the company notes that molybdenum is the most significant contributor to its earnings. The company's profits exceeded $20 million in both 1977 and 1978. Placer is the tenth largest mining company in Canada.

The Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers (CAIMAW) represents Placer workers at both the Gibraltar and Endako mines. CAIMAW is a Canadian union which got its start in Winnipeg in 1964 and moved into B.C. in 1966. In both of these cases it bumped out international unions which the workers felt weren't giving them adequate service.

In 1974 the union moved into Endako, at the invitation of some of the employees and the next year took the Gibraltar mine away from the United Steelworkers. While CAIMAW was organizing at Endako, Placer made a last ditch effort to block them from taking over. They re-opened negotiations with the Steelworkers at Endako in the middle of the contract. The company explained the re-opening was due to the fact the contract was not up to par with those at other mines. CAIMAW argued it was a ploy to block them since they would be barred from raiding for six months after a contract was signed.

Relations between the two got off to a bad start and have been going downhill ever since. They have engaged in five sets of negotiations, three at Endako and two at Gibraltar, with all five ending in a strike or lockout.

The most recent strike at Gilbraltar lasted eight-and-a-half months and ended in February of this year. Just a week later, on Feb. 14 the 500 miners at Endako went out on strike. The Endako mine is located near the community of Fraser Lake, in central B.C. Fraser Lake, population 1,500, is 160 km. west of Prince George.

Possibly Placer felt the strikes were hitting too close to home (Gibraltar workers had picketed the head office in Vancouver for a few days during their strike) or perhaps they felt they were getting a bad name from all these strikes. In any event Placer decided to explain to their head office staff just what this strike was all about, and so, on April 3, 1979 a meeting was held.

All the staff were invited to attend the hour long meeting, from the top executives down to the lowest level clerks. There were actually three meetings, one for each of the three floors Placer occupies in a downtown office tower, and each lasted for an hour.

The meeting was broken down into five sections; an overview, negotiations and impasse, options, illegal activities, and rights and responsibilities, with the company using five people to present its side.

Placer began by characterizing unions as inherently destructive, citing the 1976 wildcat strike at Alcan as an example, and terming CAIMAW a violent and destructive union.

They claimed the Endako local was controlled by ten individuals and the union encouraged employees to quit Endako. This, the company claimed, made it easier for CAIMAW to control the smaller number of remaining employees. The company didn't bother to explain how the union prevented Placer from hiring more men to bring the work force back up to strength.

As an example of CAIMAW's militancy Placer pointed out a CAIMAW-led strike in Winnipeg which had been going for five months. It also cited two other B.C. companies, both of which had been with CAIMAW, and one of which had broken away. The remaining CAIMAW company was now on strike and the company stated the men at the other plant saw the strike and were very happy to be out of that union.

The company had several xerox copies of a letter that had appeared in Burns Lake *District News* (the area's weekly paper) which it circulated around the room. The letter was anonymous and purported to be from a group of Endako employees unhappy with CAIMAW. The letter writer wondered why there couldn't be happy relations between the company and the workers.

One person at the meeting suggested that perhaps, just perhaps, the odd individual might feel the letter was written by the company. Placer said it had been

at Placer mines

The Endako mine, near the community of Fraser Lake in central B.C.

accused of that. Placer's influence in the area extends beyond the mine. Through a wholly owned subsidiary it owns a shopping center, hotel, a 16 unit apartment building, nine houses, and 13 townhouse complexes consisting of four to five units each, all in Fraser Lake.

The company next explained how the relations between management and the union had been very good up until the present set of negotiations, with only 15 grievances in a year. Regarding the union's wage demands the company called them outrageous and claimed the union refused to discuss costs (the company's). The first negotiation meeting had lasted only four minutes and the company called the union's behavior 'an animal show.'

For the audience Placer outlined three options for the future; (1) give in to the union demands, (2) somehow get back to the bargaining table, (3) keep their sales up to break down the union. Placer dismissed the



PLACER DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

MEMO TO: All Vancouver Office Staff April 2 1979

FROM: R. G. Duthie

RE: Labour Disputes with CAIMAW

Three open meetings have been scheduled for Tuesday, April 3, 1979 in the 7th Floor Board Room. All staff are invited to attend, and the meetings have been arranged as follows:

1:00 p.m. -- 7th Floor, Mail room personnel
2:00 p.m. -- 8th Floor, Lab, all exploration staff
3:00 p.m. -- 9th Floor, Purchasing, Computer staff

These meetings will describe our current disputes with CAIMAW, and will cover the following subjects:

1. CAIMAW -- an overview; L. C. Fairfield
2. Endako relationships, company position, union position, and negotiations - the impasse; P. E. Womersley
3. What options are open to the Company; A. J. Petrina
4. Illegal Union activities -- films, photographs, etc. J. P. Taylor
5. Company rights and responsibilities, Union rights and responsibilities; Michael Hunter, Russell & DuMoulin
6. Questions and answers; Panel.

Regular short meetings will be held after this initial review, to keep Vancouver Office staff apprised of developments.

R. G. Duthie

RGD:jpt

Placer 'invites' its employees

first option as not collective bargaining, made no comment on the second, and declared the third was the only real option.

The highlight of the meeting was the illegal activities section. The audience was told they would see violence and mass picketing. What they saw was a film of about six minutes in length which displayed nothing of the sort.

The first two minutes consisted of a shot of a Toyota pick-up driving down a road. A few times the driver got out and talked to a handful of 'pickets' and then drove on. The truck was unmarked and the 'pickets' had no signs or banners of any kind. What this sequence had to do with the Endako strike is anybody's guess.

Action picks up in the next 3 minutes. This time we see a large flat-bed truck with the word ENDAKO on the side. It too is driving down a road, isolated. Two parts of the film show it stopped, once on a deserted road, and once at what appears to be a gas station. In each of these sequences one 'picket' is slowly and casually spraying the word HOT on the canisters of molybdenum on the truck. He sprays it on several cans in both sequences. It is not possible to tell if it is the same person or not.

Before the film the audience was told that spraying HOT is a union tactic to mark goods so they can be identified by other union members who may then choose not to handle them.

In this three minute sequence it must be remembered there is not another person in sight, just the truck and one 'picket'. The 'picket' is again unmarked. If there were other pickets on either side, why didn't the cameraman pan to include them in the shot? If there was no one else there, why was the truck conveniently stopped to allow this dastardly union activity to transpire? Anyway why was the 'picket', knowing he was being filmed, going about his task so slowly and casually?

The last minute of the film showed a truck, parked again and driverless. It had a smashed right front window. Broken by rock throwing strikers, so said the company. Placer then showed two still photos. One was of the truck, this time with both front windows smashed. The other was a shot of the driver with a small cut on his forehead and a slight trickle of blood.

The curious thing about this film (probably Super 8, shooter unidentified) was that not a single solitary picket carried a sign of any kind and most of it was shot in isolated country, not near any buildings. There was no violence, no rock throwing shown, and no mass picketing, never more than a half a dozen of those mysterious unidentified people. The film may be legitimate, but it does conjure up strong images of the agent provocateur.

The company had said the union was using violent tactics, and when they were asked to elaborate on this all they could come up with was rock throwing and letter writing. A curious definition of violence. CAIMAW had apparently written letters to some of Placer's customers in Japan stating their case.

Placer told its employees at the meeting it was selling molybdenum to its customers at very high prices, much higher than before the strike. Someone asked if the company didn't have a moral responsibility to sell at ethical prices. The company's only reply was to say it had contacted its customers and the customers would rather pay high prices than receive no product at all.

Toward the end of the presentation the company complained that, unlike the unions, the law was not on its side and the B.C. Labour Relations Board was always on its back.

Contract negotiations had begun last September and the strike came after a mediator made a number of unsuccessful attempts to settle the dispute and then withdrew claiming the two sides were too far apart.

The current wage scale at the mine ranges from $6.92 up to $9.10 an hour. At the time of the strike Placer was offering a 26 per cent wage and fringe benefit package over 3 years, while the union was asking for 44 per cent over 26 months. CAIMAW was trying to match the Gilbraltar settlement.

A second major issue was the contracting out of work, with the company saying it only contracts out what its workers can't handle, while CAIMAW claims some of the work being contracted out had previously been done by the mine workers.

The situation remained relatively calm until early April when Placer began running truck convoys loaded with molybdenum out of the strike-bound mine. The company also hired security guards to escort the trucks from the mine and guard the property. All during the strike the mine has remained in partial operation, manned by supervisory personnel.

A four truck convoy left the plant, carrying 11,000 lbs. of ore each during the first week of April. Strikers followed the convoy to its destination in Calgary. In the Alberta city the Calgary police set up road blocks to hinder the strikers as they followed the trucks and told the men they would be arrested if they picketed in Alberta.

Early the next week, A.H. Petrina, vice-president of Placer charged the union with sabotage, threats and destruction of property. The RCMP stated they were investigating several incidents, including telephone threats, a damaged water pump and a damaged transformer. CAIMAW countered that the company was now employing goon squads (the security guards), said they didn't know of, or condone any violence, but the violence had only occurred after the company had hired the 'goons'.

On April 11 the company escalated activities which they hoped would provoke the union men into rash action. They ran an 11 truck convoy out of the mine. Not only did they have their own security goons but they also had about 20 RCMP officers on hand.

The strikers watched the convoy move out amidst bitter remarks and took down licence numbers of the vehicles and took pictures. The company guards took pictures of the picture takers. The RCMP kept their eyes on everything.

Between the mine and the highway is a wooden bridge which had been recently repaired after it caught fire. A fire the RCMP termed as arson. A policeman and a dog checked out the bridge before the convoy passed but found nothing. The only incident involved a police car picking up three flat tires due to nails on the road. A company sweeper cleaned the road before the convoy passed, escorted out of town by its own guards and the RCMP.

By now business in the town of Fraser Lake was suffering and many of the townspeople and merchants sympathized with the strikers and considered the company action to be strikebreaking.

One merchant felt the company, instead of hiring guards, should use the money to find a solution to the dispute. He also felt the heavy concentration of police would only increase the bitterness. The police claimed that they weren't taking sides.

The B.C. Labour Code prohibits a company from hiring professional strikebreakers, although strike replacements can be hired. CAIMAW brought an application to the LRB to have the ore convoys stopped, claiming the security guards, from Securiguard Services Ltd, were professional strikebreakers.

On April 12th the LRB ruled that Placer could ship the ore from behind the picket lines. The Board said CAIMAW's application to prevent this contained insufficient grounds to declare the shipments as strike breaking. The company had said the guards they hired did not work in the mine itself.

On the evening of April 18th, Placer ran another convoy through the lines, this time 24 trucks, carrying $11 million of ore, and were more successful in provoking violence. Heading east the convoy passed through the communities of Fraser Lake and then Fort

Fraser. At both towns the convoy was pelted with rocks and other objects and a number of windows were broken.

The most serious incident took place in between the two communities when several shots were fired at the convoy, disabling two trucks. The RCMP immediately threw up roadblocks and began searching vehicles for firearms. A tire repair truck was with the convoy and when the trucks were repaired the convoy continued east with an RCMP escort. The strikers gave up following them at Prince George.

The trucks in the convoy had been stripped of all identification marks and had 'PLACER' signs affixed to them. The company claimed it had now shipped out about $17 million worth of ore since the strike began. The union states the mine is operating at 10 to 15 per cent capacity and that Placer has not shipped out that much ore. CAIMAW feels some of the trucks have contained equipment going out for repairs, that the company is trying to gain a psychological advantage with its large convoys, and to provoke the union.

CAIMAW's amnesty request

CAIMAW indicated a willingness to bargain and asked the mediator to bring back a written proposal from the company. By now another stumbling block had been added in the form of a new issue in the dispute. The union wants amnesty for its members participating in the strike, but the company has stated it is not prepared to negotiate amnesty for union members who they claim have committed acts of violence against Placer during the strike.

The company has been taking the ore to Calgary to await further shipment to its customers because machinists at Vancouver International Airport have refused to handle the ore bound for Japan.

One trucking line involved in the dispute is Pathfinder Lines of Fort St. John, B.C. At a recent LRB hearing the company co-owner, Richard Cronin, admitted the trucking company violated its licence by transporting 36 loads of diesel fuel into Placer's Gibralter mine during that strike, as well as taking machinery out of the mine. Pathfinder received $1.60 per mile for transporting fuel into Gilbraltar during the strike and earned a reported $50,000.

During the Endako dispute, Cronin said Pathfinder was leasing four vehicles to Placer instead of contracting to carry the ore out to avoid violating its trucking licence again. Pathfinder is receiving $1.00 a mile from Placer for leasing the trucks.

Toward the end of April, a solidarity rally was held for the strikers at Prince George and was attended by several hundred workers from area unions, as well as some area politicians.

One of the speakers was the Mayor of Fraser Lake, Angus Davis. He said that while the village council had urged the provincial labour minister to intervene for the good of the village, the council had decided not to get involved. Mr. Davis is also the Endako mine's personnel manager and one of the supervisory people now working there.

The first bargaining between the parties in over two months took place on May 1st. Just three hours before this meeting Placer showed its contempt for the union by running yet another convoy of seven trucks through the picket lines.

A crowd of about 16 people gathered in Fraser Lake on the highway to attempt to halt the convoy. The group consisted partly of wives of miners and was watched by RCMP who had brought in six extra men and a dog.

The wife of one striking miner was bitten by the police dog twice, on the ankle and on the leg. The leg wound required three stitches to close. The RCMP claimed the woman tripped, causing the dog to react and to bite. The woman said she fell, but only after the dog bit her. She claimed further that the police left her in the ditch and didn't check to see how she was. RCMP Const. Carl Maloney said, "If the people weren't there, there wouldn't have been a problem."

Placer spokesman Bill Thompson said the company wasn't trying to spoil the meeting by taking ore out the same morning and said the company was the one who made the meeting possible. He claimed it was just coincidence. The union termed it deliberate provocation.

That same day the company made a new offer to the strikers. It consisted of a 22.1 per cent package over two years. The union negotiating committee rejected it that day and the membership turned it down two days later.

On the night of May 6, three power poles on the mine property were cut down causing a temporary blackout in Fraser Lake. An emergency power plant restored power to the community within half an hour, but the mine was still not operating a week later since B.C. Hydro crews refused to cross the picket lines to repair the damage.

Placer's profit increases

When the company made its offer in May, Bill Thompson said it was the company's last offer. "There's only so much we can offer" he declared. CAIMAW staff representative Bob Green said the published profits of Placer at Endako work out to $40,000 per worker. The company is now selling molybdenum for about $20 a pound, three times what it charged before the strike started. The union claims Endako is the most profitable mine in B.C.

The company held its annual meeting early in May and President Ross Duthie accused the CAIMAW leaders of being irresponsible. "A small minority of labour leaders appear to have motives other than the welfare of their membership as a goal."

At the meeting he announced the company's first quarter profits. This was a period during which Placer was struck by Gilbraltar and/or Endako for the entire period, except for one week. For the first three months of 1979 Placer showed a profit of $11.4 million, more than double the $5 million they made for the same period in 1978.

Rear View

TV and the political process:

The cheering section

by MARK STAROWICZ

The Powers That Be, by David Halberstam. Alfred Knopf/New York. 772 pp. $19.20 cloth.

As It Happened: A Memoir, by William S. Paley, Founder and Chairman, CBS. Doubleday/New York. 418 pp. $18.95 cloth.

"Television acts as a cheering section for the side that has already won."
— Robert MacNeil, *The People Machine*

It is David Halberstam's very convincing thesis in *The Powers That Be* that television and radio have:

- Destroyed the American party system;
- Raised a new political elite;
- Almost destroyed the power of the Senate and the House of Representatives;
- Swelled the power of the Executive Branch to the level that culminated in Richard Nixon's Imperial Presidency.

Though the book is so flawed that the weeds almost choke the garden, Halberstam has nevertheless written the most important study of the American media since A.J. Liebling's *The Press*. This book will be widely discussed, it will have a great impact on the younger emerging journalists and it will become one of the basic texts studied in journalism schools.

It may also prove to be a useful tool in the attack that is surely coming from the U.S. Congress on media power, as the courts begin to circumscribe the definitions of the First Amendment, and as you hear the words "trust-busting" applied to the media in America for the first time in decades.

Journalism is ranked 16th now in the list of 20 professions held in respect by public opinion. This is a healthy sign that the public's mistrust of government has also extended to the media, and that the public has not totally bought the Watergate PR that saw the press as the purifying force in a democracy. (It is even more encouraging that lawyers are ranked even lower than journalists in that list of public esteem, considering that 11 of the 15 Watergate conspirators were lawyers).

Halberstam's achievement is to document the impact of the mass electronic media on the political process. Our criticisms of television and radio have suffered to date from an excess of conspiracy theories, or "villain" theories. Halberstam shows instead that the mass concentration of millions of viewers on three newscasts is what created the powder keg, and that once power is so concentrated, it is easily manipulated — in fact, the imperatives take over, and you don't even need villainous publishers or network executives. In other words, Halberstam describes the problem as a *process*, not as bad men.

Quite simply, he demonstrates that the President, the White House, had complete access to television — that it is the nature of television to focus on one man, in crisis. Television has failed in the U.S. to reflect the Senate or the House of Representatives. It can't put make-up on hundreds of legislators, and train them to talk in 40 second clips.

Halberstam's thread is to follow the White House from Roosevelt to Nixon, and to show how the White House succeeded or failed to make television subordinate to the Executive Branch. And while Kennedy was effective in his use of television, and Johnson, weak, he demonstrates that this was only a matter of degree. The loser was the Legislative Branch. And in thus failing to cover the processes of the Legislative Branch, television replaced the party, the party apparatus, the Congressman, the



William Paley with Edward R. Murrow: Paley and CBS slowly destroyed Murrow's news department

party worker, as the means of communication between the White House and the people — the party is no longer the broker of political power.

This may on the surface appear progressive if one thinks of parties as Tammany Hall ward-healers. But the parties are also the caucuses in which the real interests of real groups and regions are brokered. Halberstam argues that the brokerage functions of the American legislative process have been short-circuited by the White House access to direct communication with a minimum of 40 million people a night.

Halberstam portrays with some poignancy the decline in power of Sam Rayburn, and the political school he represented as Speaker of the House of Representatives, faced with Senators and Congressmen who didn't give a damn for many of the intricate balances of the committee systems and the hard work, but instead realised that a compact of Revlon in the attache case for television make-up and befriending a correspondent was a shorter route to power than the committee system.

He traces the roots of the Imperial, or Electronic Presidency to Roosevelt's brilliant use of radio, the Fireside Chat, the personal, intimate appeal to the listener — the roots of the idea that the President is your Friend: "Roosevelt was more often than not going directly to the media rather than to the Congress with information; and he put more energy into his press relations than into his congressional ones."

In doing so, Roosevelt also began the decline of the supremacy of the newspaperman. Why deal with a broker, when the radio network could deliver the reader directly?

As he treats the beginnings of television, Halberstam makes a brilliant point — the concentration of audience has been a corrupting force on the definition of news. Television executives became part of the political process.

"For television represented very simply a quantum jump in journalistic and political power. The audience was so much bigger and the emotions the medium generated were so much greater that in

many ways the traditional laws of journalism were no longer applicable. And very subtly and unconsciously there was a compensating narrowing in scope, in adventurousness on the part of the network, in terms of what could and would be said.

"There is an unwritten law of American journalism that states that the greater and more powerful the platform, the more carefully it must be used and the more closely it must adhere to the norms of American society, particularly the norms of American government."

Walter Cronkite for example, has a distinguished record of intelligent, critical commentary on the CBS radio network. On television, he is not the same man — he will not make the observations, the criticisms he made in his daily radio commentaries. Lyndon Johnson, an avid radio listener, observed: "If Walter Cronkite would say on television what he says on radio, he would be the most powerful man in America."

This is the quandary of television that is so misunderstood.

How do you reconcile that kind of power?

You reconcile it by ignoring the central crises in a society — CBS only recognized McCarthyism after it was in decline.

You reconcile it by coming out on the side of the powers that be — television as the cheering section for the side that has already won.

Television news and current affairs is bad in North America not because the managers are spineless; not because all the money is to be made in entertainment alone. Television information is bad because no one has learned to reconcile the astonishing power it has.

It is the atom bomb, compared to the conventional warfare of print.

Some sympathy has to be shown for the problem. The prospect of the television networks acting like fighting little advocacy-journalism magazines or papers raises frightening possibilities — who's got the right to go crusading on the national news?

Since nobody elected television anchormen or front line correspondents, Halberstam argues that they are perpetually searching for legitimacy to justify the power thay have. Like steel smelters who always have ad campaigns showing how much grass they've planted, television is always demonstrating that it is not monolithic by looking for "man on the street", feedback devices, and always praising the fundamental simple values of its society. Most of all, television is afraid to use its own atom bomb, and develops a consensus style of journalism.

This is not necessarily bad — one should genuinely ask what right one man or a team of newsmen have to such astonishing access to the public psyche.

But Halberstam points out that to avoid facing this crisis — how to be a responsible television journalist — is to abdicate the power to those who will use it: in the case of the last 20 years, the Executive Branch of the American government.

Halberstam's litany of presidential phone calls to CBS executives is astonishing. Almost invariably they buckled under to whatever the White House wanted, in terms of access to air time.

CBS — in fact all the networks — were so frightened of dealing with Watergate, that the CBS reports on Watergate were at the beginning *entirely* summaries of what the *Washington Post* was reporting — and totally attributed to the *Washington Post*. CBS was simply not chasing Watergate — it wasn't even reporting it. It would wait until the pressure of facts published by the papers was so great, that it could summarize only what the papers had said. It would have no original journalism of its own. In fact, CBS's two part report on the Watergate scandal, its first major one, which was nothing but a summary of what the *Washington Post* had already proved, was almost yanked off the air because of White House protests. This was weeks after all these facts had been established beyond any doubt.

It is one thing to have something proved in court. One thing to have it appear in print, even in the *New York Times*. It is something else to have television apply its benediction to the established facts by even recognizing them.

There are two kinds of news in North America: The facts. And the facts that television has put on the air. Television is the *consensus* medium. It ultimately is pressured to report not the facts — but the news that all contending parties have agreed are the facts.

Again, the critic of this should be asked for his alternatives. If the power must be exercised with restraint, and responsibility, one should not assault caution.

It is unfortunate, given the power of television, that it has often attracted the weakest and most shallow journalists. The ladder from well-groomed local anchorman to top flight correspondent is well travelled. There are few traditions in television journalism that match the depth, the requirement for background, expertise, and first hand knowledge that institutions like the *New York Times*, the *Sunday Times*, or *Le Monde* have succeeded in achieving.

The answer to the responsible exercise of power implicit in television journalism is to temper it with knowledge. Here is where we need the journalists with the excellent economic backgrounds — in fact, economic journalists backed up with researchers. Journalists that go to the Middle East who have read more than one book. Labour reporters who have spent ten years covering labour. Legislative reporters with a demonstrated knowledge of political history. Courts reporters with extensive legal background.

The crisis faced by having great power in journalism has been confronted before — by institutions like the *New York Times* and *Le Monde*. The answers are not in formats.

The *Agence France Presse* correspondent in Moscow retired in the late sixties. After *28* years in that posting. That's a little unrealistic as a posting

perhaps. But we have elevated the *two year* posting to the level of a virtue. And when the reporter who is covering the civil war in Beirut was last seen covering fires in Chicago, then we have a right to be skeptical.

It should be very difficult to become a television reporter, or news executive. It should be the height of the journalistic profession — achieved by those of experience, studied in their field.

Instead, the television reporter is still considered by the journalistic fraternity, correctly in too many cases, the pretty boy on the story.

CBS, Halberstam shows, had the opportunity to resolve this crisis. It had assembled the greatest foreign correspondent and domestic correspondent corps in American electronic journalism in the shape of Edward R. Murrow's news department.

CBS's gradual destruction of its news department by Paley's and the management's fear of using television as a *journalistic* as well as an *entertainment* medium is also one of the high points of Halberstam's book. It was just too difficult, too demanding and intricate to come to terms with this power in news. It was easier for CBS, and of course more profitable, to argue that television was an entertainment vehicle.

Since then, the myth that television is a bad information vehicle, suited largely for entertainment rather than information, has been enshrined in our mythology — with no more ardent supporters of that myth than the television networks themselves.

Returning to Halberstam's main thesis, the most difficult job for television is to accurately and fairly reflect the political process.

It is hard to cover the House and the Senate. It is easier to be a vehicle for the presidency.

Charles Ferris worked in the office of the Senate Majority leader at the time of the Agnew resignation. He became one of the chief critics of television's perversion of the real political processes in America.

His specific job was to get Democrats, as members of the Opposition, on television.

He observed that television, in its reluctance to use Senators and Congressmen on the air, tried to balance out affairs by trying to play the proxy opposition itself. CBS simply thought Dan Rather could put things neater than a Democratic Congressman. Halberstam reports Ferris' rather interesting observations:

"They were so reluctant to give time to the opposition, to put on specials at night that might ventilate complicated issues and give the Congress a chance to respond to presidential television, that they had built up too much political pressure, like forcing too much gas into too small a bottle. Simply in order to save their precious air time, they had inadvertently assumed the role of proxy opposition. This was not doing the real opposition very much good; nor, as the mounting resentment of the networks showed, was it doing the networks any good. The role of proxy opposition, he thought, was extremely dangerous and playing it had politicized the networks more than was healthy. It would be more natural to let political figures speak for themselves. When Ferris made this point to the networks he was shocked by what he viewed as their arrogance; yes, they would say, his points had some merit, but few congressmen were good — as professional — on television as their own people . . . congressmen often digressed, went off on tangents, wasted time. Thus, their own people did it better. Which was probably true, Ferris conceded, but it was beside the point; in a democracy it was not the job of an anchorman or a White House correspondent to dissect a partisan speech of a president. There were people *elected* to do precisely that job."

Halberstam's conclusion: "In this new electronic forum — the only one with much immediate meaning to most Americans — true political opposition as conceived by the Founding Fathers was nonexistent."

Ferris, incidentally, had his revenge.

After Spiro Agnew resigned because of his involvement in the Maryland kickbacks, he asked the networks for prime time to make a final statement. Something he had done many times in the past. Once again he got what he wanted. A man caught with his hand in the till *was being given prime time to clear his own name.*

Ferris picked up the phone to Bill Small of the CBS bureau in Washington and offered a number of available Democratic senators to respond to Agnew.

"Of course Bill, we've got a problem," he said. "None of them is a convicted felon."

Canadian television has shown itself equally inept — I would suggest unwillingly — to reflect the complexities of the political process.

Apart from the two major network evening newscasts, there are no significant vehicles of current political coverage on Canadian television (the only exceptions to that being *Newsmagazine*, *Question Period* and *The Watson Report*).

Isn't it interesting that the major electronic treatment of political affairs occurs on CBC Radio, not on the television networks? Radio is somewhat off the beaten path — the consequences of controversy are not as great. Thus, when Halberstam suggests that huge audiences spell great power, and having great power inclines one to avoid the political marketplace, his observation might have its Canadian applications.

Television is quite prepared to debate whether or not nuclear power is dangerous; it is quite prepared to examine whether or not too many mastectomies or hysterectomies are being performed by the medical profession; it is quite prepared to give us lingering shots of the dying family farm. Is it prepared to debate whether or not the Solicitor General is breaking the law?

It is the essence of our democracy that too much power should not be concentrated in too few hands, and this must apply to television, as well. A television network cannot be *Ramparts*. This is a new

Walter Cronkite (left) with CBS boss William Paley: Cronkite wouldn't say on TV what he said on radio

dilemma in journalism, where it is not sufficient to speak of "having guts" and there would be no more dangerous idea than "publish and be damned".

How do you responsibly communicate to millions of people one minute, where a single word can take on enormous emotional or prejudicial connotations? Dismantling this power would be pointless — modern Ludditism. The networks are here to stay.

The answer lies not in avoiding the political process, but in presenting it to the audience in its every intricacy. As Halberstam's book suggests, the problem with television news and public affairs in the United States is that it does not reflect the intricacies of the political process. By doing so — in fact by avoiding the issue entirely — it became the arm of the White House.

The answer, therefore, must lie in the opposite: television, more than any other medium, must not be the medium of consensus, but the medium of debate. It not only should reflect the political marketplace, it *is* the political marketplace.

That screen, to do its honest brokerage role in the process, must explode in Scoop Jacksons, Peter Lougheeds, Joshua Nkomos, Claude Morins, Bill Bennets and Jerry Browns.

Network executives are the first to point proudly to the fact that most citizens get their information

from television (the same executives will, however, tell you that television is really an entertainment, not an information medium; someone should trip them up on that one someday). Television *is* the prime source of information in our democracies.

If you own the marketplace, you behave differently than if you own one stall in the market.

If television is the medium of primary information in the democracy, then it is critical to the choices a citizen makes. If it is the main network of dissemination of choices, then the art of television is the art of presenting the complexities, the ramifications, the contending forces.

If television is going to do that, then it will have to take itself seriously as *the information medium*.

The television networks of North America are parliaments in themselves. The lesson of Halberstam's book is not that the CBS reporters should have been investigative reporters trying to blast the Nixon White House, but that television should have broadcast all the contending forces in the political crisis of the early 1970's. Then the balance of political forces would have taken care of themselves.

In the end that happened. Television covered the Ervin hearings. It learned that the Watergate hearings were more popular than the soaps they were replacing. But who had ever seen or heard of Senator Sam Ervin before the hearings? How many Congressional hearings were ignored by the networks during the Vietnam War, the invasion of the Dominican Republic, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the bombing of Cambodia?

The political process was there. The marketplace, television, had simply decided to exclude it.

* * *

I would not like to leave the impression that Halberstam's book is an orderly treatment of these dilemmas. In fact, the book is tragically mis-edited, and the excitement in reading it is not a rising excitement of seeing an emerging idea, but the excitement instead of falling into a giant pile of undigested, unrelated information.

The Powers That Be is actually a history of four institutions — *CBS, Time, The Los Angeles Times,* and *The Washington Post*. It is clearly a rewrite of existing company histories, combined with many personal interviews Halberstam conducted. Thus, it suffers from that "Boys on the Bus" style of anecdotal reporting which lives on the border between gossip and fact.

It is not so much a clearly thought out book as a vein to be mined by later scholars.

Halberstam also demonstrates the worst of all journalistic traits — the pack instinct. It is an honourable tradition in journalism to dump on the publisher, but woe to the journalist who criticizes his own colleagues.

Thus, the entire Washington press corps escapes any criticism in this book, and Halberstam goes out of his way to say nice things about anyone from the level of managing editor down. It is almost sycophantic in dealing with the White House press corps. But to be fair, the club of journalists make Freemasonry look tame, and Halberstam has gone as far in criticizing the journalistic myths as anyone can and still expect to get a job after publication.

For all its terrible flaws, this is one of the more important books of the decade.

* * *

William Paley's *As It Happened* is a corporate apologia. It reads like a book written by a team of lawyers. (Paley had a great deal of trouble keeping ghost writers working on his memoir, and in the end it probably was written by lawyers.)

It is only interesting reading in conjunction with *The Powers That Be*, which offers a much more incisive history of CBS, and how it buckled to political pressure, how it disbanded its own news and public affairs tradition under Edward R. Murrow.

One turns to *As It Happened* to hear Paley's version of events, and one is disappointed to see Paley avoid the issues entirely, and tell us instead how wonderful Jack Benny was, and the reader is left staring at pictures of Paley standing in front of his Picassos, or his Bahamas mansion. It is about as relevant a contribution to the history of broadcasting as Lady Eaton's memoirs (which have a chapter on how to eat a peach) are to the history of Canadian business.

Paley's memoirs do, however, contain one of the most precious passages of double-talk that one will ever read. It deals with CBS's attitude towards employee loyalty oaths during the McCarthy scare:

"... Nor did we want to require a 'loyalty oath' from our employees, for in those times demanding an oath of allegiance would signify a doubting or an impugning of the characters of the thousands of men and women who worked for CBS.

"After much thought, studies, and consultations, we decided upon an in-house questionnaire, issued to all CBS staff employees, including some performers. The employee was asked if he or she was then or ever had been a member of any organization listed as subversive by the Attorney General of the United States, and the list of organizations, including the Communist Party, U.S.A., was printed on the reverse side of the questionnaire. The system was used to relieve us and our employees of any threatened blackmail, accusations, or pressures by outside crusaders. Only three or four of our employees refused to comply, and one person resigned 'as a matter of principle'. About fifteen or twenty had stated in their replies that they had joined one or more of the listed organizations in the past. They were interviewed and when the circumstances of their past activities seemed absolutely harmless, they were kept on. Four or five employees either had inimical associations or were so ambiguous in explaining their affiliations that employment was terminated."

Mr. Paley, who is capable of distinguishing between loyalty oaths and "questionnaires," or using the quaint phrase "ambiguous in explaining their affiliations," then goes on to describe CBS' courageous role against McCarthyism.

The 1979 Cannes Film Festival:

"CANNES-DO"

by PATRICK MacFADDEN and CAROLE ORR JEROME

P: The 32nd Cannes Film Festival is like the elephant: easy enough to describe but hard to say what it is.

* * *

C: First, you need to be in the picture so to speak. Louder than a thousand words.

So you're on the French Riviera. It is Mediterranean sea. It is sun. It is waving palms. Tropic breezes and magical moonlight. And seashells and starfish. And stars. Fishing. For starfishes.

All up and down one brilliant stretch of sand they're there on the beach as bait. Trying to catch the Big One, Old Mogul. Little movie stars and big movie stars and starlets and what's a male starlet? At the Cannes Film Festival everybody can walk right in where ordinary face meets door in Los Angeles or New York or London or Rome. Doors are probably the single greatest impediment to the natural full flowering of international commerce, offset only slightly by the telephone.

There are no doors on the beach.

* * *

P: The original site, where the Croisette now glitzes past the *Palais des Festivals*, where the films in competition are shown, and now "graced" by the eclectically baroque Carlton Hotel housing the $1,000-a-day suites of the movie moguls, was a swamp. Thereby hangs a tale.

Lord Brougham — he of the carriage — and his party — were on the Grand Tour, a nineteenth century English affectation. The Grand Tour included the lowlands, Germany and Italy, but not, of course, France, a country no English gentleman would wish to patronize. While in Italy, an epidemic of cholera, or perhaps typhus, seized the land; his lordship's retinue was forced to flee across the Vars River, then a boundary line of sorts between France and the then Kingdom of Sardinia. At Cannes, their path was blocked by Frenchmen who objected to their continuing further on the reasonable grounds that (a) they were English and (b) they were probably disease-ridden. They

A Vampire AWOL: Klaus Kinski in 'Woyceck'

forced Brougham to spend the night in a tent in the swamp. Next morning, he liked the look of the place. Returning to London, he invented the Côte d'Azur single-handedly and it has remained British ever since.

Years later, another famous party, the Duke of Windsor and Mrs. Simpson, fleeing the wrath of Royalish British mobs, repaired to the Carlton Hotel where they made rendezvous with Winston Churchill and took tea on the terrace.

I realize this has nothing to do with films but I thought *Last Post* readers might like to know about it.

It was also from Cannes that Napoleon, the small Corsican, began his long march back to Paris. Something else to bear in mind: the Mediterranean has no tides, an unfortunate oversight, and the sand is artificial and had to be trucked in.

* * *

C: So at Cannes, even the beaches compete. There is not simply "The Beach." One doesn't say "See you at the Beach." One must specify which beach, as "The" beach has been parcelled out to entrepreneurs more fortunate than you or I, in 30 yard stretches divided by low fences and featuring pricey little café restaurants and young waiters who double as ushers to guide you to your 12 Franc mattress in the sun. There's the Lido Beach and the Royale and the Maschou and like that. La Sardine. Cancer Ward. Très chic.

Movies are born and careers die on Mashou. Evenings they can be seen, the unlucky ones, like stranded whales, hoping to at least get a bit part in a bouillabaise.

Cannes is a market as much as a festival. The competition for the Palme d'Or is as nothing compared to the commerce, the wheeling and dealing that goes on. It is really the world convention of the movie business, about the only place where anybody can see everybody even if he's a nobody. All the Somebodies are here. And they mean business.

"I'm not your agent dear. I'm only your friend." (A passerby.)

"I've always said Cannes is a zoo, but we all love animals." (Roman Polanski.)

* * *

P: I am aware that the artificiality and illusion-making at Cannes are troublesome to persons of taste and discrimination. "Plastic" is a favourite word in the lexicon of the tasteful ones.

Nevertheless, the determination and energy given over to depicting objects, to the replication of images, elicit a grudging admiration from the sporting-minded such as myself.

Some years ago here, I stood outside the *Palais* while the starlet of the evening's official film wended — that's the word — her stately way along from the Carlton to the *Palais*, languorously swooning on the arm of whomever was being swooned upon.

Decolletage a-jiggling, she was preceded by about 400 paparazzi (in evening dress) walking backward and popping off flashbulbs 13 to the dozen until the evening sky was lit up with the kind of brilliance and sparkle which, according to religious literature, always attends an apparition, a miracle or the descent of a deity.

"Wow!" — or a word to that effect — I breathed to my companion, Mr. Geoffrey Minish, Agence France Presse man in Paris and a grizzled veteran of film festivals.

"Quite," agreed Geoffrey, "and, you know, some of those cameras may even have film in them."

* * *

Photo: Bruce Pittman

A Cannes beach lunch: at right, author MacFadden



Terrence Malick, director of 'Days of Heaven' — Americans make the best films

C: In the fifties and sixties Cannes was what it used to be. Sophia Loren and Princess Grace stopped traffic as they walked arm in arm down the Croisette. A mere figure of speech really. The traffic on the Croisette is permanently snarled. A mere nothing, a nobody even, suffices to stop it. No one is sure who is anybody and everyone is afraid of missing Somebody.

I was looking glamourous in an old towel when accosted. "Excuse me, but are you Somebody?"

Not for you.

As I was saying, Brigitte Bardot startled the world here with her first public declarations on her private life: "I'm buying an apartment you know, so I can take sunbaths." (Breathless simper.)

Ah, the good old days. We still have the glamour and the sharp wit, but it is not the same.

Mariel Hemingway, mobbed by photographers and fans and journalists, upon being asked how she had managed to play so sensitively in *Manhattan*, replied enthusiastically "Gee, I dunno."

* * *

P: One afternoon last week, on the Carlton Hotel beach, one very minor mogul, really a mere mogulette, of my acquaintance complained to me that his bill for water, just water, over one hour came to $30. I commiserated as best I could.

* * *

C: The real stars now are the directors. Asked why he chose Marlon Brando to play Colonel Kurtz in *Apocalypse Now*, Coppola replied "He was the only star I could get."

But some people will go to *Apocalypse Now* not to see Brando, which is not worth it, but to see what Coppola has done, which is. The real big events now at Cannes are the directors' press conferences. Thirteen hundred journalists and innocent bystanders came to hear Coppola after the world premiere screening of *Apocalypse Now*.

It used to be that only movie buffs knew who the director was. This was partly due to the politics of the studios. The actors and actresses can be kept pretty well in line but a director is potential trouble. He is at the artistic control panels once he's on the set, and if the directors become stars in their own right, the studios will have trouble getting the levers back. They already are — when Coppola met closed doors (there are those doors again) from the moneymen for his proposed film on Vietnam five years ago, he was big enough, from *The Godfather*, to get it on without them. Vietnam is trouble and Coppola is trouble. If it makes money, though, the studios will soon be renting jungle on a monthly basis. That's the beauty of the market.

* * *

P: Moment to cherish: A Canadian film producer — charity dictates anonymity — gave me an invitation to view his latest film. But only, he added darkly, on the understanding that I wouldn't write about it.

Over the years I have received invitations to screenings on precisely the opposite grounds. Some scribes would be vexed by this producer's antic behaviour — attempts to muzzle the free exchange of opinion, blahbetty-blah. But not I. I see it as another Canadian first.

* * *

C: Seen on a poster of Margaret Trudeau's film, *L'Ange Guardien*, in a publicity office:

"To my Gerard, my favourite and best international lover.

"My Dearest Gerard.

"Love & passion. Maggie."

Pity the Perrier King.

* * *

C: At a champagne party for the screening of *Running*, a Canadian-American production that features a lot of shots of Michael Douglas as an American Olympic

runner and the Montreal Olympic Stadium as Canadian content, someone came up to *Running* producer Robert Cooper wearing a T-shirt that proclaimed that Ann Margret and Bruce Dun are middle-aged.

"I *LOVE* your T-shirt," exclaimed Cooper.

T-shirts are very big at Cannes. Buttons too. Sarah has a button that says 'I love parrots'. "What's 'Parrots'? When is it being screened?" The trained eye sees all. It's from Harrods pet shop she replies.

Cooper doubles as CBC's Ombudsman. He says he liked the *Running* script and decided to co-produce the film because it's a lot like Ombudsman. The chance for the underdog and all that. It's really Canadian.

Though Canada is trying to get out from under the dog this year and, according to the Canada Film Development Corporation people, and *Cinema Canada*, "Canada has arrived commercially." So has

Coppola's 'Apocalypse Now'

by CAROLE ORR JEROME

It's hard to say anything about *Apocalypse Now* without feeling like an idiot and sounding like a film critic. The reaction to it at Cannes ranged from gushing inanities to half-witted put-downs to catatonia, none of which is quite *a propos*.

People who were expecting a movie were puzzled and disappointed because *Apocalypse Now* starts off as a movie with all the right dialogue and battle scenes, but then it gradually changes into something else. It *looks* like a movie, it walks like a movie, it talks like a movie, but it isn't a movie.

Coppola himself says it is "a film" as opposed to a movie, meaning something that verges on the artistic as opposed to the commercial. But *Apocalypse Now* is not the sort of earnest and tortured work of art of one man's vision destined for the sparsely populated little art cinemas on the wrong side of the universities. It is a film for everybody. People, especially old Vietnam hands, who go to see it expecting a film about Vietnam, are going to be dissatisfied too. Vietnam was one hell of a lot worse.

"My film isn't about Vietnam, it *is* Vietnam" says Coppola. He was speaking at a packed press conference after the screening at Cannes. "It was crazy."

Apocalypse Now is *about* Vietnam in the same way that Vietnam *wasn't* about Vietnam after a certain point. It was about insanity and moral judgement and the lack of it. It went beyond even war.

So Coppola has taken the American experience in Vietnam and put it into the terms of Joseph Conrad's classic novel *Heart of Darkness*. It is a voyage upriver into the interior of the jungle and the mind and the darkness at the heart of humanity.

So *Apocalypse Now* can't be attacked on the basis of whether or not it's as good a movie as *The Deerhunter*, or whether or not it's an accurate portrait of Vietnam. It is not trying to be either of these. Nor is it, strictly speaking, an adaptation of a book, so it can't be taken on that basis either.

It is all of these things and is above all a very subjective experience for anyone sitting in a dark theatre going upriver with those soldiers into the jungle. Martine Sheen plays the part of a young captain who is assigned to go into Cambodia via the river to kill a green beret colonel, Colonel Kurtz, played by Marlon Brando, who was gone berserk in the heat of the jungle and the war.

"Oh great. That's just fucking typical. That's fucking great." The reaction of one of Sheen's men when he finds out what the mission is.

"I think we're going up there to blow up a fucking bridge or something and we're gonna go and blow out one of our own guys? That's fucking great. Shit."

It's all there, isn't it? When Coppola first started trying to raise the money for the film five years ago the studios weren't interested. Nobody wants to make a film on Vietnam they said. Do something nice. So he put all the money he had earned from *The Godfather* into it and raised the rest himself, putting everything he owned against it. Now, he says, he's being attacked for having spent so much on a film about Vietnam. $30 million.

"So howcum we can spend that and more on a fairytale like the Wiz, or on some stupid jerk who flies in the sky and I'm not supposed to spend it on a film on one of the great moral crises of our history?"

"You know I really don't like violence. But for instance when I made *The Godfather* I got more letters about that damn horse's head than anything else. (The racehorse's head was severed and put in the bed of its owner as a warning from Mafia bosses.) Well, the dog food companies killed that horse to feed your little poodles. There were 30 people killed in that movie. People get more upset about animals being killed than people."

Coppola says he made *Apocalypse Now* as if it was going to be the only film made on Vietnam, because at the time he started it it looked like that would be the case.

When they split the best film award at the Cannes Festival between *Apocalypse Now* and the German film *The Tin Drum*, the jury did, in fact, what the Americans did in Vietnam — found themselves unable to make a decision and so tried to play it both ways.

They weren't quite sure what *Apocalypse Now* was.

The film of the book of the dwarf — 'The Tin Drum'

Australia. For years they've fought the same battles. The Aussies have a word for it: "Cultural Cringe."

"Canada Can and Does Cannes 79" says the T-shirt.

What does it?

* * *

C: The finest piece of theatre, however, was neither at the beach nor on the silver screens at Cannes. It was at Roman Polanski's press conference. Coppola's press conference a close second.

Polanski met the press for the first time in three years, to announce his intention of going back to the States to face sentencing for having sexual relations with a minor of 13 years old. And to talk about his new film *Tess*, based on Hardy's novel *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, starring his current love Nastassia Kinshi, who also came for the event.

Three hundred journalists, photographers and television crews clawing and climbing over one another for the privilege of giving Polanski the best free publicity ever devised for an up and coming movie. Polanski was magnificent: "I won't avoid any of your questions." And didn't, but gave some of it back to a slick, grinning American who asked 'impertinent' things about the parallel between his crime and the young girl Tess. "Well, you look very happy so you must have a nice love life but I don't suppose anyone here wants to hear about it," said Polanski. The American grin stayed glued on. They were both having it both ways.

Polanski said he was going back for his own conscience and peace of mind. Did he mean he wanted to be punished?

"No," he replied, "though I realize there are a number of deviates who enjoy that sort of thing."

That sort of thing. Polanski knows what makes good copy and what sells movies.

Did he regret what he had done?

"Yes, of course."

But precisely why was unclear. Repent might have nailed it down but the question wasn't asked.

Regret, however, yes.

There is no denying that Polanski had been through quite an ordeal and was about to face more, and a possible three years in prison.

And now here he was at Cannes turning it all into a soapbox for *Tess*.

Oh, give us the old soft soap . . . .

The market will market anything.

* * *

P: Second moment to cherish: A British chap gives me an invitation to *The Bitch*, starring the slightly-soiled Joan Collins who has just been voted British sex symbol of the year. Her previous success was called *The Stud*. The invitation calls for black tie.

As readers know, I am a person of elastic principles. But of all the reasons to don my dickie-bow, watching Miss Collins feign heat is not among them.

* * *

C: Are there movies?

"There is no American film industry." — Francis Ford Coppola at press conference following world premiere of *Apocalypse Now*, Cannes, May 19, 1979.

"There is no European film industry." — François Truffaut.

Better start learning Japanese.

None of this is true. What Coppola means is that there are no Americans making films the way the Europeans do and Truffaut means the Europeans don't know how to make films the way the Americans do. "Like me," he says, "I make bittersweet love stories. I would probably make the first James Bond to bomb at the box office." It's the old Art versus Entertainment thing. Coppola's film is, he says, a work of art, not a movie, but a film. Is it entertainment? Is *The Lady Vanishes* art? Where would you put your four dollars?

* * *

P: The European cinema is permanently mired in crisis. In 30 years, the number of filmgoers in the United Kingdom has fallen from 460 million to 167 million. In the Federal German Republic, the figure dropped from 860 million in 1965 to 124 million in 1977. France had 440 million spectators in 1957 as compared to 168 million in 1977. Italy went from 820 million in 1955 to 373 million in 1977.

The reasons most often cited are the power of the American film industry and competition from television. Yet there are far more cinemas in Europe than in the U.S., twice as many, actually; and the annual sale of tickets in Europe is 50 per cent higher than in the U.S.

It's in the distribution sphere that American hegemony must be examined in order to understand the apparent discrepancies in the figures I've quoted. European systems are fragmented while the Americans have a single body responsible for production, financing and distribution. Cushioned by a large domestic market, U.S. distributors are free to roam the international market at will, bringing messages of all kinds to the peoples of the earth.

A further complication for the European cinema is that it is seen as a cultural medium but run on a commercial basis, a mixture, as Jean-Luc Godard remarked, "of Renault and the Louvre."

No such complications are allowed to hamper the U.S. industry. According to the *Giornale dello Spettacolo*, the Italian trade bible, "the American cinema industry's takings . . . for the first four months of 1978 were estimated at $190 million a month, 21.5 per cent higher than for the corresponding period in 1971. This was an all-time record in the history of the American film industry."

* * *

C: The Americans still make better movies. They even make better 'films'.

Manhattan and *Apocalypse Now* have all the artistic merit and psychological speculation of the best of the European cinema without killing one's interest in both. They are, in a word, *entertaining*. They are, therefore, to the cultured European mind, somewhat suspect, like new cheese. The Europeans cling grimly to art as understood by St. Augustine and other bon vivants. Werner Herzog's *Woyceck* moves at a slow forced march through the tortured psyche of a nineteenth century German soldier, played by Klaus Kinski, who clearly was having trouble getting out of his previous role as Dracula in Herzog's equally boring *Nosferatu*, in which he breathed heavily a lot and made his upper lip tremble. *Woyceck* came out as a kind of AWOL vampire. This should have been entertaining but oddly was not.

Can a film ever be as good as the book? Take "the film of the book of the dwarf" as it was called in one movie magazine. Not promising. I hear you squirm. Not *my* four dollars by gum. The book is *The Tin Drum* by Gunter Grass, one of the most brilliant novels of modern Germany. This is, in the eyes of a number of movie fans and critics, something of a drawback; "especially a book," writes Richard Pohler in *Screen International*, "that, although containing brilliant and very satirical passages, is very tough to read."

The Europeans have had a lot more practice with long words and ennui and angst and the like, though, so they read such books and then make films just like them. The Americans make movies. And never the twain shall meet.

I myself personally am fond of the French and their sensitivities, but the French film of *The Bronte Sisters* will merely confirm the belief of all Englishmen that France is a disease, mercifully non-contagious.

Let us be fair. A number of the European entries are wonderful films — Risi's *Caro Papa* (but that is Italian which is protected from European moroseness by the Alps and spaghetti) and Kontchalouski's *Siberiade* (Soviet moroseness is at least epic).

But they just do not come anywhere near *Manhattan* or *Apocalypse Now*, or *The China Syndrome* or even *Hair*. All American entries at Cannes.

American know-how exists.

What does it *know?*

James Ivory's *The Europeans* is based on Henry James' novel of a European baroness who goes to live with her relations in America in the mid-nineteenth century. She is cultured and they are raw by comparison. But Americans are living and Europeans are curiously past by comparison.

Europe no longer has dreams. It is living and dying in an effort to understand why life was and has a long and splendid tradition to draw upon for sustenance.

It is not in a hurry.

Europe is time and depth and fine old cheese. Can we have all that and Coppola too?

* * *

P: Last day. The Feast of the Ascension. The producers who didn't make a sale are leaving their hotels, stealthily by way of the fire escape. The playbills and press kits whirl in the *mistral* that scuds along the deserted Croisette. All over Cannes, the slap of rejected credit cards; the news of the Canadian election results hums everywhere among our contingent, the more sober of whom are listening for the plop of a fallen sparrow. It may indeed be time to move on.

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