Jean Marchand's business is business




THE LAST POST

Vol. 2, No. 6

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The May revolt in Quebec





THE LAST POST Vol. 2, No. 6

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## CUTCOM EUT

#### Not the climate for an election

First it was supposed to happen in April. Then it was going to be some time in May. Then June was going to be the date - some had even pinpointed it to June 27. Then it was July 3, or July 10. And finally it was an absolute certainty that it would be July 17.

Ottawa's amateur and professional election-watchers jumped at every particle of bait they were offered, and they kept wondering why they had got hooked. Opposition parties - not to mention newspaper reporters and columnists - repeatedly had the election called and the machinery geared up, only to slow it down again, and again, and again.

It began in earnest just after the visit to Ottawa of U.S. President Nixon, an event that, in the atmosphere pervading both Ottawa and Washington this spring, was bound to be interpreted in electoral terms. Since it could have little effect on the American election, a presidential visit to Ottawa being about as exciting to most Americans as a visit to the California White House, it had to have something to do with the Canadian election.

The theory was that the strains in U.S.-Canadian relations, the talk about Canadian independence, the fights with . then U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally, the breakdown of trade negotiations were not popular with Canadian voters, large numbers of whom were dependent on Americanowned companies or trade with the United States for their jobs. The Canadian voter wanted to believe that the United States was his friend, Warm words between Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau along with a Great Lakes pollution treaty that had been held in readiness in anticipation of a moment

patching up the image.

Nixon came, and nice things were said about Canadian distinctiveness and how it didn't have to imply that our two countries weren't still chummychummy. But the visit had a formal, correct air to it, and often the Canadians thought the Americans were being somewhat less than correct, as when they shortened the visit to a day and a half, turned down Canadian suggestions about a presidential side-trip to Toronto and a press conference in Ottawa, and proposed an agenda for the Nixon-Trudeau talks consisting of Nixon's visit to China, Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, and the non-medical use of drugs.

The next week Secretary Connally refused to come to an international bankers' meeting because it was being held in Montreal and U.S.-Canadian relations were back to normal.

It wasn't the sort of climate in which to launch a campaign.

The election was again called by everyone, except the prime minister, when the government made known that it was finally going to release the longawaited Herb Gray report on foreign ownership.

This was something the government could not go into an election without. It had repeatedly promised some sort of policy statement on foreign ownership, and pressure on it to fulfil that promise had been building up, especially since the publication of a pirated version of the Gray report in the monthly Canadian Forum in November

But the report, when it was released May 2, turned out to be too pallid to be of much electoral use. It was a sub-

such as this would go a long way toward stantial retreat from even the mild preliminary document the Forum had published. The Forum version had said, "If the screening process is to be able to secure greater benefits from foreign direct investment, it must have real bargaining power. The law must give it the authority to refuse a potential entry or takeover ...." In the government version this became, "If the review agency is to be able to secure greater benefits from foreign direct investment, it must have substantial bargaining power. Consideration would therefore have to be given to



Trudeau: keeping 'em quessing

empowering the agency to block any proposed foreign investment which it could review."

The only people happy with the document were the business community and its journalistic voices: "Foreign investment unhampered," gloated the Montreal Gazette.

It was a further demonstration of a major difficulty the government was facing: in an election year the Liberal party has to please the voters, but it also has to please its corporate backers. Sometimes these two things cannot be done at one and the same time, and the Liberals must choose.

In its January cabinet shuffle, the government had chosen to please its corporate backers. In the Gray report, it chose to do so again.

Then Finance Minister John Turner announced he would be presenting a budget May 8, and several new factors were thrown into the equation. On the one hand it meant that a June election was ruled out — with the constitutional necessity for an eight-day budget debate and a 57-day campaign there wouldn't be time. On the other hand, budgets often contain goodies that a government seeking re-election can put to work for it.

One diehard June election advocate asked Turner what he would do if Trudeau dissolved Parliament before May 8. Turner replied he would leave the country, and speculation then centred around whether Trudeau would prefer to have Turner, often pictured as his rival waiting in the wings for a chance to challenge him for the leadership, in the country or out of it.

Trudeau chose to keep Turner in the country, and as it turned out it was just as well. His performance budget night had some observers fondly remembering Ben Benson. The budget contained little somethings for old age pensioners, veterans, students - and businessmen. Its major innovation was a better tax deal for the manufacturing industry, which Turner tried to present as an employment measure. When a reporter asked him how he knew the tax benefits would be spread around in increased employment instead of being absorbed in higher profits, Turner had to admit that he didn't

It was a bit difficult to find much electoral content in the budget, which didn't contain the usual pre-election general tax cuts, but there was no lack of trying. Then it was noted that the government was trying to get the old age pension increases passed quickly so that the higher amounts could be sent out in the June cheques. The heat was on again.

The polls showed the Liberals down to 39 per cent, the Conservatives up to 35.

It was all supposed to happen Friday, May 19. And it did. But instead of making the expected announcement of a July 17 election, Trudeau announced that there would be no election at least until the autumn

Toronto Globe and Mail columnist George Bain, who knows about these things, said the decision had not been made until the cabinet meeting the day before.

But one New Democratic Party candidate thought otherwise.

"Trudeau's playing with us," he said.
"By focussing attention on the election

date he's making sure that he, and he alone, remains in the limelight. And we're falling into his trap.

"(Former Ontario premier John)
Robarts did the same thing in 1967.
Everyone thought there would be a spring election and by the time the election
finally was called in the fall everyone
was exhausted and the atmosphere had
changed. And so did Bill Davis last
year; I don't know how many times
Stephen Lewis called the election in the
spring. If Davis had called the election
when we wanted it instead of when he
wanted it we probably would have done
a lot better.

"That's what Trudeau's doing and it might work."

#### Criminology:

#### **Academic counterinsurgency**

Criminology is a relative new-comer as a field of academic study, but Canada has been in there almost from the beginning. The Department of Criminology of the University of Montreal — founded at the same time as its American counterpart, the School of Criminology of the University of California at Berkeley — is a pioneer of this science.

In those eleven years, criminology has flourished. Other universities have set up schools or departments, and various associations and centres have sprung up. One such centre is the CICC (Centre international de criminologie comparée, or International Centre of Compared Criminology), founded in 1969.

The CICC was born of the initiative of Prof. Denis Szabo, who remains director, and established through an agreement between the International Criminology Society in Paris and the University of Montreal, where it is housed. In principle, this centre is independent of the university's own school of criminology, but some of the personnel commute freely between the two.

The relations of the CICC with certain Third World countries went relatively unnoticed until Prof. Szabo gave an interview to journalist Pierre Turgeon. In an article which appeared on March 11 in Perspectives, Turgeon stated that the CICC had sent advisors to the Ivory Coast, Iran and Brazil "who train the police forces there to use the most modern methods to repress demonstrations and causes of criminality."

He quoted Szabo as saying that to countries like Brazil, the CICC exports "a formula which relies upon brains rather than muscles and machine-guns for maintaining order". Economic development, Szabo continued, "cannot be carried out without maintaining social order", and these countries "cannot afford the luxury of a democratic system".

Faced with embarrassing questions from students and faculty, Szabo published a retraction. The CICC, he said, could not help train police forces in Brazil, Iran or Ivory Coast, because the people it sent could not be considered police experts. The assistance provided he insisted, is above all scientific, and the ties the CICC maintains are with university authorities and individual criminologists.

The retraction came soon after the publication of the offending article. But it was too late. Suspicious minds were at work.

The departments of anthropology, sociology and political science of the University of Montreal, as well as the university faculty association, asked the University Assembly to enquire into the activities and objectives of the Centre. (This request has gone unanswered).

Students organized a mass meeting and passed a petition demanding the expulsion of the CICC from the University. Police were called in after a brief occupation of the CICC's offices.

The Fourth International Criminology Symposium was held this year at the end of April at the Laurentian

resort of Mont Gabriel, 45 miles north of Montreal, under the theme of "Police and Modern Society". The final meeting of this conference, attended by Solicitor-General Jean-Pierre Gover, was interrupted by a group of about 40 students, many of them foreign, who had a few words to say.

Accusations and counter-accusations have flown. Denis Szabo and his defenders assert that the work of the CICC could have a humanizing effect on the administration of justice in some countries by leading to advances in the study of criminology which, in turn, might lead to the police and the judiciary taking a closer look at the causes of friction between the criminal and society.

Jean-Marc Von der Weid, one of the political prisoners released by Brazil in exchange for the kidnapped Swiss diplomat Enrico Bucher, disagrees. He says he is worried by Szabo's philosophy of the necessity of changing the form of repression. He asserts that the CICC has provided information to people who have been called upon by Brazilian military authorities. A confidential CICC document indicates that Prof. José Rico, sent by the Centre to Brazil, had meetings with "high officials of the police and the department of justice".

One of the Centre's contacts in Iran is a Dr. Said Edmat, an opposition member of the National Assembly. The only opposition tolerated in Iran is that which is in fundamental agreement with the policies of the régime.

In the Ivory Coast, professors connected with the CICC are teaching at the Abidjan Criminology Institute, set up by the CICC, but the Centre's ties do not end there. Denis Szabo and Yves Brillon, also of the CICC, have had meetings with Camille Alliali, minister of justice (and world traveller - he was at the Mont Gabriel symposium), Mr. Chenal, general secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, and Bakary Coulibaly, director of the National Police.

The University of Montreal has provided the CICC with \$50,000, but needless to say the Centre has more important and interesting sources of funds. Among these is the Ford Foundation, which has committed \$350,000.

The Ford Foundation has in the past funded projects aimed at providing the CIA with information on subversive movements in Southeast Asia and Latin America, and has engaged in other questionable ventures. The solicitor-general of Canada has come up with \$150,000 for research on the police

grant comes from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). CIDA has provided \$250,000 for the creation of the Abidjan Criminology Institute. This would seem to be in keeping with the policy which the Department of External Affairs, of which CIDA is a branch, has set for itself, as outlined in a series of colourful booklets entitled "Foreign Policy for Canadians" published in 1970 under the authorization of Mitchell Sharp.

The booklet dealing with Latin

America spells out the following policy: "There is also the less clear-cut sort of problem which could be posed by any revolutionary situations which might develop in Latin America. Canada's basic role in this regard would appear to be to do what it can to assist those who are striving to remove the potential causes of violent revolution in the hemisphere.

There is little reason to suspect that revolution is considered any less undesirable in Africa or Asia.

#### **Nova Scotia teachers:**

#### **Unsure militancy**

lawyer who is now Nova Scotia's premier, has a bad reputation among working people when it comes to handling labour and wage disputes. The UFAWU fishermen know that. The construction workers on Michelin plant sites know that. And now the teachers of Nova Scotia have also suffered - they lost a battle with the government over their wages for the next two years.

The group is the Regan government's latest target in an apparent campaign to bring "respectability" to Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotia Teachers' Union, representing the province's 10,000 teachers, tried for four-and-a-half months to obtain a decent increase from the government.

They suggested an increase of 13 per cent this year, with an additional nine

Gerry Regan, the onetime labour per cent next year, while the government clamped a five per cent ceiling on wage increases for provincial teachers and civil servants on February 7. That was only three days after Education and Finance Minister Peter Nicholson was informed 85.6 per cent of the teachers had rejected the government's offer of five per cent over each of two years.

The government's intransigence raised the teachers' wrath to the point where they became somewhat militant for the first time in their history, and one of the first times among teachers' groups in Canada. 400 Halifax-Dartmouth area teachers demonstrated outside Province House the day the legislature opened. Shortly after that, there were isolated walk-outs and slowdowns across the provinces.

Following the annual NSTU Council photo: Neil Harrison



Another hefty Canadian government Halifax teachers demonstrate outside the Legislature

meeting in late March, work-to-rule campaigns and withdrawal of services from extra-curricular activities began on a province-wide rotating basis. Even normally passive students held mass boycots of classes, mostly in support of their teachers. A strike vote was held in mid-April.

But that's all over now, as the government and NSTU executive reached an agreement May 5 giving the teachers a five per cent increase retroactive to January 1, 1972, and another five per cent on January 1, 1973, which lasts until July 31, 1973. Only membership ratification is necessary.

The month of April was relatively quiet throughout the province as the long delay in coming to an agreement took its toll on a group still unsure in its militancy.

The teachers' militancy grew out of a frustration of dealing with Nicholson and his cohorts. While the government expected the teachers and civil servants to accept the wage ceiling, they gave increases of 20 per cent to employees of Nova Scotia Liquor and Light Commissions and a reported 43 per cent increase to highways workers (enough to make some of them forget the government is not allowing them to vote on the union of their choice).

At the same time, the teachers realized a five per cent increase would not really be an increase at all. With new deductions implemented in January, a teacher taking home \$433.26 in December neetted \$416.67 in January or \$16.59 less a month. The five per cent will cut that loss to \$1.06, certainly not enough to cover the rising cost of living and provide a decent increase.

Other statistics cited by the NSTU in newspaper ads in provincial papers during the fight indicate Nova Scotia teachers are among the poorest paid in Canada, outdone only by those in Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan. In actual terms, this means 65 per cent of the teachers, including those with masters' degrees, earn under \$8000 a year.

Part of the problem is that teachers negotiate directly with local school boards while the government is the real boss. It sets out the amount to be spent on education through the Foundation Grant Program which details minimum standards of education, salaries, etc.

If the new legislation goes through, Nova Scotia teachers will be the first outside Quebec legally able to negotiate directly with their provincial government. They would have the same rights as a union, although they would not come under the Trade Union Act.

This new legislation should help the teachers in future, for the only way agreement was reached this year was through direct talks between the NSTU executive and the provincial government. It may be the lever the teachers will need in coming years to raise themselves above the controversy of professionalism and responsibility to students. This year professionalism was played down as teachers seemed more concerned about fighting the government for a decent increase. The responsibility story just didn't work when students across the province walked out to support their teachers.

#### Vietnam:

#### New offensive of the satellite press

In the last week of April, a Washington-datelined United Press dispatch told of President Nixon disregarding his chief advisors and ordering the bombing of North Vietnam. The dispatch was based upon an interview with an American government official who refused to be either named or directly quoted. The most interesting aspect of the disclosures of the shy official was that Nixon's decision to bomb the North was made, not during or in response to the current offensive, but over three months ago.

That brings us back to February. In the early weeks of this year North Vietnam was bombed. At that time, according to Pentagon releases, up to 350 planes took part in raids which stopped just short of Hanoi and Haiphong. One analyst, Fred Branfman of Project Air War, declared that those raids were as heavy as any launched against the north, and added that they indicated the "most serious escalation since the Gulf of Tonkin in May 1964." (See Last Post Vol. 2. No. 4)

On Feb. 13, Neil Sheehan described

the renewed air war as an attempt to "stave off a major military set-back in Indo-China, particularly during a sensitive election year." Sheehan went on to describe the fiascoes of earlier raids into Cambodia and Laos.

Vietnamization had failed, Sheehan said in February—the Vietnamese had been saying it all along but who the hell listens to them?—and Nixon's only option lay in intensifying the air war. Branfman made the same point, but

added that the administration in Washington was engaging in "unprecedented" steps "to prepare the public for massive air strikes against the north, including prepared plans to attempt to bomb the dykes around Hanoi and to mine the harbour of Haiphong."

As winter turned to spring — on April Fool's Day to be exact — the public was deemed ready. A massive invasion from North Vietnam was announced.

"If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we have given assistance to its life, we have helped shape its future."

Senator John F. Kennedy, June 1, 1956.

"We will not be defeated and we will never surrender our friends to Communist aggression."

-President Richard Nixon, April 26, 1972

"Vitenam is just a blood pump that never wears

—A South Vietnamese soldier quoted in the New York Times, May 21, 1972 When the invasion was announced four days after it happened — the satellite press of Canada went right back to square one, or lie one, of the Vietnamese war — that is, it was aggression from the north. Gone was any concern over the old "credibility gap" of the Johnson era; the media in Canada bought the U.S. story hook, line and pellet bomb.

Leaving aside the old experts on colonial liberation like the Gleaner down in New Brunswick, the liberal-lefty Toronto Star, after declaring the war over every time Nixon did himself, decided that the president was doing everything humanly possible to end the war—at about the same time Nixon said so himself. The Star got so carried away that for one edition it headlined the North Vietnamese or National Liberation Army as the "enemy."

When the Pentagon announced victory over the invaders (somewhat prematurely), the Star published a little background boiler-plate about Major General Jim Hollingsworth—the American "senior advisor in the Saigon area" and the premature hero of the siege of An Loc. Hollingsworth, who loves firing his guns even on his days off, regularly commandeers helicopters so he can go out "zapping Charlie Kong".

As the offensive ground on, the Globe and Mail reprinted an article from the New York Times which described the fall of Binh Dinh province with little resistance. "Years of work on pacification programs have been dashed and Vietnamization has failed one of its most crucial tests," says the article.

All this is probably true, but Binh Dinh province is in central South Vietnam, and the bulk of the fighting was taking place along the coast. If we presume an invasion from the north, how in fact, did the North Vietnamese not only out-flank the Americans and the Saigon army but do it without them even knowing it? Details.

One of the problems of reportage of the war in Vietnam in Canada is that it is based only upon descriptions and assumptions from a section of American opinion. The essential assumption of the current period is that the current fighting emanates from the north. The army of the NLF simply does not exist.

This notion not only makes for ridiculous explanations of the actual fighting, but more importantly distorts the whole nature of the war. Over the years the Canadian media have been filled with American battle and political estimates — the war is winding down, winding up, it was being Viet-

#### DEPARTMENT OF APOCALYPTIC VOMIT

NEW YORK — In the decade of the 1960s the vigorously growing United States economy thrust the Dow Jones industrial average to 995 points, the equivalent of a bursting young earth heaving up the Himalayas.

—by John Cunniff, Associated Press business analyst, in the Ottawa Citizen

namized, pacifized, homogenized — any cliche that was current.

Thus when the invasion from the north was announced by the Pentagon, it was completely accepted, and when Nixon retaliated by bombing the north it was also accepted, even though Nixon retaliated at least three months before the attack.

But the new stage in the war is not the bombing of the north — although that has reached unprecedented levels — but the overwhelming air-power now ranging over the entire area of Cambodia, Laos and North and South Vietnam. The New York Times, as early as April 9, saw this stage in the war for what it was.

While the *Toronto Star* was telling us editorially that Nixon was doing everything possible to end the war, the *Times* described his policy as rescalation.

"The so-called 'protective reaction' strikes against the North have", said the Times, given way to direct action, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff threathens to 'go after all enemy targets that are supporting the enemy offensive in South Vietnam.' After blasting missles and other anti-aircraft sites just above the DMZ, 'we will walk up north,' he warns."

Even before the mining of the harbours of North Vietnam, the Times and the Democratic Caucus in the House and Senate were on to the crucial new development in the war, which the Canadian media were quite oblivious to. There was the constitutional issue — Nixon had no legal authority to escalate — and there was the military-international-political aspect.

The assembling of the largest air and sea armada in the history of the war was not a defensive gesture in response to an invasion — not one military observer has suggested that the increased bombing or the mining of the harbours would make any immediate difference to the battle situation in the South — but rather an offensive action predicated on a military victory.

The mining of Haiphong harbour and the increased bombing of the North, including the new laser-guided bombs, were another step in the escalation.

Several thousand battle ready U.S. Marines are on ships hovering about the coast of North Vietnam. An invasion of the North, around the panhandle above the DMZ, is currently being touted in Washington. Remember Admiral Moorer: "... we will walk up north."

In this context, the reportage of the war in Vietnam by the Canadian media—the insistence that it is simply an invasion from the North and not fought in the South by Southerners—that the United States and President Nixon are merely looking for an "honourable" way out instead of a victory—the acceptance of every Pentagon cliche and estimate—is an dishonest as it is irritating in its mindlessness.

#### PAGAN'S LAWYER CHARGES INTERFERENCE

Defence lawyer Clayton Ruby alleged United States government interference in the deportation case of Humberto Pagan (Last Post, Vol. 2, No. 5) May 29 and tried to call John Smith, who had acted as attorney for the Canadian justice department in the case, to the stand in Pagan's extradition hearing to prove it.

But Judge A. E. Honeywell, presiding over the hearing of the 21-year-old Puerto Rican independence leader, refused to allow Smith to testify on the grounds that what had happened in the deportation hearing was not relevant to the extradition case.

Ruby told the court that by calling Smith to the stand he intended to prove that the U.S. government, acting through an Ottawa legal firm, had asked Smith to call witnesses in the deportation case after Smith had stated his intention not to call witnesses

He said Smith had a letter with him which could prove this.

Pagan is accused of killing a police officer in a March 11, 1971 demonstration on the campus of the University of Puerto Rico in San Juan. He fled to Canada in August after several attempts were made on his life in Puerto Rico, and was arrested in Ottawa in September by the RCMP.

The extradition hearing was still in progress at press time.

# PSSU



# PSSO

#### by Claude Balloune

#### Summer and OFY:

Project co-ordinators and successful applicants in the federal government's Opportunities for Youth program were impressed by a new clause in the 1972 OFY contract that says there is to be no employer-employee relationship in any project, taking it as a sign of the program's commitment to the spirit of community and co-operation. The reason for the clause, it turns out, is to ensure that people who earn OFY salaries this summer are ineligible for unemployment insurance afterwards . . . The federal government is thinking of ditching its troubled information agency, Information Canada. Last straw apparently was InfoCan's proposed computerized clipping service, which the government, with some reason, regards as an absurd waste of money . . .

The editor of the recent University of Toronto Press volume of selected Trudeau speeches, chief speechwriter Ivan Head, chose a disproportionate number of speeches he had written himself. Some of the other speechwriters in the Prime Minister's Office were not pleased.

#### Notes from down East:

When Alex Hickman, Newfoundland's new Conservative justice minister (and old Liberal justice minister). received an advance list of successful applications for OFY grants, he decided that the document could be put to good political use. He contacted all the successful applicants in his Burin Peninsula constituency, and let it be known that the grants were due to pressure he had put on the federal government. For those that had been turned down, he laid the blame on Don Jamieson, federal MP for the area and Newfoundland's representative in the Trudeau cabinet. Not to be outdone, Dave McNaughton, Jamieson's research assistant, immediately sent out telegrams of congratulation to the successful applicants. However, the list both Hickman and McNaughton had used was a preliminary one, and two of the projects on it had to be cut to stay within the budget. On the basis of of all the hearty congratulations, one of these groups had already negotiated a bank loan and spent several hundreds of dollars ...

Long time Toronto TV face Bill Walker — who is to host Under Attack this fall — got into a poker game in a Halifax hotel room recently, along with Nova Scotia Highways Minister Garnet Brown, Mayor Walter Fitzgerald, Police Inspector Ron Bedgood and several other bigwigs. According to the 4th Estate, the fighting Halifax tabloid, Walker became abusive on the subject of Maritimers and their intelligence. Garnet Brown went after him and had to be restrained. Later, after Walker again became nasty, one of the gentlemen present gave him a punch in the head and threw him out of the room.

He couldn't get back in so he stood outside whimpering for an hour. Finally, the hotel manager summoned a delegation of policemen. The police tried to enter the room, eventually overcoming the resistance of one of the poker players. They were of course taken aback to see Inspector Bedgood and no charges were laid.

#### The joys of B&B:

In Quebec, there's some grumbling about Molson Brewery's new premium, 10-percent alcohol beer, Brador. In English, the label on the back states: Brador is the finest achievement of the brewmaster's art. The French translation reads: Degustez lentement votre Brador (Drink your Brador slowly) ... The Bank of Montreal's advertising campaign to push loans carries a similar message. In English, the posters ask: "What's on your mind," with images of a would-be borrower dreaming of sailboats, vacations and other essentials. In French, the campaign asks: "C'est quoi votre problème?" On the other hand, the very good Italian film about Sacco and Vanzetti carries a slightly different message, depending on whether you see it in Vancouver or Montreal. In the last scene, as Vanzetti is being led to the electric chair, he raises his fist and says in English: "I'm innocent." In French, he says "Vive l'Anarchie!"

Over in Ottawa, that anarchistic mob known as the Canadian Labour Congress dined on 75-cent ham sandwiches during their convention at the Ottawa Civic Centre. Their caterer, Jack Edilson Ltd., managed to keep the prices so low because he uses non-union workers....

During the recent labour crisis in Quebec, a penitentiary visit program was cancelled for at least one institution. Reason? Prison authorities were advised that if a riot broke out, they couldn't be assured help from police or the army because they were on standby for other duties . . .

CIL missed out on a highly profitable deal in Libya recently. One of its subsidiaries, the West African Explosives and Chemical Co. Inc., had negotiated a sweetheart deal with the government to build an ammunition factory. Seems the government asked CIL for a deal so that the people (read, bureaucrats) could acquire stock. CIL agreed, but on the rather startling condition that it be given a tax break which would allow it to deduct dividends as an expense! The whole deal was scotched by a coup d'état.

There is no truth to the rumour that Mayor Drapeau of Montreal intends to hire Metropolitan Opera soprano Colette Boky to sing all the national anthems at the Olympic Games.



## THE MAY REVOLT

uebec's political and economic system has survived the most serious crisis of the past few years of upheaval. But, as no one tires of saying, things will never be the same again. The 'Crise Sociale' that gripped the province for several weeks in April and May will continue to have a deep and significant impact. For during this time, organized labour mounted its most serious challenge to the existing order.

The political comportment of 'le monde ordinaire' — the ordinary people — is changing. The social struggle and the fight against private enterprise are taking primacy over nationalism as the main force making for real change in Quebec.

The Common Front of labour was organized to press demands for the very real needs of 210,000 public and parapublic employees. In doing this, labour clashed head-on with the very real interests of business. And so, what might have been an ordinary collective bargaining struggle was transformed into a political confrontation with a government pledged to safeguard a system based on profit.

The trade union movement mounted its confrontation entirely within our democratic and legal structures. It was done within the traditional limits of collective bargaining procedures. But it was done outside the mental and political framework of contemporary North American trade unionism.

The public service strike was brought to an end only through the use of repressive legislation aimed at the fundamental rights of unionism — rights won through decades of struggle. This legislation was added to the standard use of injunctions, which resulted in the jailing of numerous ordinary people, along with the three leaders of the Common Front — Marcel Pepin of the Confederation of National Trade Unions, Louis Laberge of the Quebec Federation of Labour, and Yvon Charbonneau of the Teachers' corporation

Labour's answer to this repression was an unprecedented revolt. Thousands of Québécois workers staged massive walkouts, demonstrations and occupations.



by Nick Auf der Maur



# SHAKES QUEBEC

They showed their solidarity as they seized control of towns and radio stations, struck against both private and public enterprise. They expressed their anger at intimidation and the denial of democratic rights, and gave vent to their feelings of hostility towards big business and government.

The crisis revealed the deep currents of politicization of certain sections of the working class, and speeded up a similar trend in other areas. It showed the hollowness of traditional liberalism, and increased a polarization of class sentiment. In so doing, the workers of Quebec may have laid the foundations of an opposition dedicated to furthering workers' interests.

The government beat back the recent revolt, and may well try to stifle the movement permanently through more repressive legislation. Through the Liberal party and its supporters, attempts are being made to erode and divide the union movement.

But the movement has shown it has a solid base. "The government of Monsieur Bourassa is only a step away from

pushing unionized workers into resistance and clandestinity," declared Louis Laberge. "He has only to declare the union movement illegal. But he shouldn't rub his hands so quickly. We haven't decided to let ourselves be beaten."

The drive towards a new society in Quebec has started in earnest. Most of the labour movement is committed to it. There is a new enthusiasm that becomes apparent in discussions with union officials and the rank-and-file militants.

There is a desire to do away with a bureaucratic unionism that fits neatly into its place in the system, and to return to the roots of trade unionism. There is a desire to get away from seeking a little more an hour for the labour elite, and to fight for the interests of all workers, unionized and non-unionized.

"Not since the days of the Industrial Workers of the World, since the days of Joe Hill and the battle for the eight-hourday," says Marcel Pepin, "has a North American union movement been so dedicated to the tradition of revolutionary syndicalism."

o understand what is happening in Quebec, it is necessary to go back a little into the recent history of the labour movement. Since the end of the Second World War, the trade union movement has had a continuing influence on the development of Quebec. It has often been in the forefront of the battle for reform, and has acted as a catalyst.

The 1949 Asbestos strike — fought against abominable working conditions, poor wages and an American-owned company, supported by a reactionary Duplessis government that never hesitated to use police state methods — helped to shape the men leading both the Canadian state and the Quebec labour movement today.

The bitter, lost struggle at the Murdochville copper mines in 1957 helped the demise of the Duplessis era by emphasizing the desperate need for reform and change.

With the advent of the Lesage Liberals and the Quiet Revolution in 1960, the union movement, especially the CNTU, underwent a period of major growth. In less than a decade, the CNTU doubled its membership, mostly in the public and para-public sectors such as the civil service and the hospitals. During this time, the CNTU, originally founded as a Catholic alternative to 'dangerous social tendencies' of American-supported unions, maintained its intense rivalry towards the Quebec Federation of Labour. The QFL in turn always suspected the Liberals of favouritism towards the CNTU.



Construction workers' paper: an example of politicized papers being read today

By the late 60s, amid all the national and social ferment in the province, a common interest was developing within the ranks of the CNTU, the QFL and the Teachers' corporation, brought on by common experiences. Individually, the unions fought numerous public service strikes. There were hospital and hydro workers, Liquor Board employees who walked out, teachers who struck, marched and resigned, and who, when they finally got a contract out of the Union Nationale government, found it was time to negotiate the next contract.

By the time the last contract talks were completed, the 900-odd bargaining units had decided that perhaps it would be more efficient to make common cause. They broached the idea to the Union Nationale government, which indicated it would be favourably disposed to negotiate with a common front.

The Common Front was beginning.

The unions, instead of engaging in fratricidal combat, got used to co-operating. They helped to found Québec-Presse, the fighting weekly tabloid; started co-ops; declared Common Fronts for medicare; for French as the working language; against the War Measures Act. Then came the La Presse affair, a major labour confrontation in a shop that contained both CNTU and QFL unions, and the Common Front proved it could work in contract negotiations. But, on the other side, the common front of government and private enterprise again proved itself, and the La Presse conflict took on political proportions.

By this time, the Common Front for negotiations with the government already had been settled and the manoeuvring was well underway. It represented 210,000 of the 250,000 people who were either directly or indirectly on the government payroll.

The contract reasons for banding together were simple. "The Quebec state," explained one union pamphlet, "under the pretense of public interest, exploits its employees like any other capitalist. It does not hesitate to use the judicial or legislative apparatus to repress the workers struggle. It uses all means possible to divide the workers, for example negotiating with the weakest sector first, and then imposing those conditions on other sectors. The affiliation of workers in three separate labour federations only helps the State's game."

The opening of Common Front government negotiations more than a year ago came at a time when the political consciousness of the unions was developing rapidly.

In the fall, the CNTU issued an analysis of the workers' situation in Quebec entitled "There is no future for us in the present economic system." They followed it up with a manifesto called "Let Us Rely on Our Own Means (Ne comptons que sur nos propres movens)".

"American imperialist capitalism has a direct influence on the life of all Québécois," it states at the beginning. "To rid ourselves of this influence we must first learn how the capitalist system which leads to imperialism works. Having understood it, the question will not then be to replace American capitalism by Quebec capitalism, but to seek something else which can answer the real needs of the population."

It was no coincidence that the increased political awareness came at a time when the Quebec economy was suffering severe problems. Unemployment was running at an average of 10 per cent, the welfare rolls were up by a staggering proportion, plant layoffs and shutdowns were an almost everyday occurrence, and the sell-out of Quebec natural resources to predominantly American interests continued un-



Laberge, Lemieux, Chartrand and others at meeting at the Montreal Forum in support of building a Common Front

abated. And while labour suffered the consequences, government reaction was limited to increased handouts and tax concessions to industry. Profits remained high, and in many cases soared. New technologies and automation, coupled with threats to move to cheaper labour markets, imperilled job security for thousands of workers.

In the autumn, Louis Laberge told the QFL's annual convention: "We (have) one common enemy and the unification of all the agents of oppression dictated on our part the fusion of our efforts in a single common front.

"The oppressed represent the immense majority. The sharpened consciousness provoked by the open aggression of the economic and political system for a number of years has thrown everyone together on the same side."

When the Common Front got together to negotiate for civil servants, teachers, hospital workers, maintenance men, engineers, jail guards and the rest of the public sector, it decided to press demands that would have some social consequence, that would in the long run benefit the rest of the populace. This was to be done, with some modifications, entirely within normal, legal bargaining procedures.

The principal innovation was to be the demand for one central bargaining table. The Front wanted first to negotiate the total amount of money available for salaries, and then decide how to divide it up. Following that, working conditions and job security would be negotiated at separate tables.

The government refused, saying it was tantamount to allowing the unions to negotiate government policy. It insisted on straight sectoral bargaining. This would break up the Front into some 16 or more separate units.

The government's refusal, in addition to weakening the Front's bargaining strength, would limit its ability to press demands containing social consequences. These included equal pay for equal work, regardless of region, sector or sex; an eight per cent raise to keep up with the cost of living; job security and a say in working conditions to bring the government bureaucracy and public services closer to the people; and finally, a \$100 minimum wage for all workers.

Job security and working conditions were especially important to the teachers since 5,000 of the 70,000 members were slated to be laid off next September.

The \$100 minimum was necessary because some 40,000 of the 210,000 people involved were taking home \$70 or less a week. More than half got less than \$100. This was the most important demand, since the unions felt it would set a precedent, and help make it the minimum wage in the private sector. The rate was based on the fact that both the Senate Committee on Poverty and the Castonguay Com-

mission on social welfare in Quebec set it as the poverty level for a family with two children.

Public Service Minister Jean Paul l'Allier argued that many of those making less than \$100 were women, and that the government should only have to pay "the average rate for a similar job in private industry."

Marcel Pepin explained that collective bargaining was an instrument of change, and this time around they wanted to change the social order a bit.

"The \$100 minimum is a new method of remuneration which the capitalist system cannot accommodate and the government rejects it. The basis for this remuneration should be based not on the needs of the market, but on the human needs of the least favoured workers.

"We want to start from a vital, decent minimum and we want to diminish the gap between the best and the least paid. But the present capitalist system tends to widen this gap."

The government felt that demands that wages be paid according to social needs rather than according to the economic value of labour went far beyond the scope of collective bargaining, and were an attempt to force it to accept union social and economic policies.

But rather than say this in the open, the government simply refused the demand for a central bargaining table. A single table was essential so that weak sectors, such as hospital workers, would share the strength of the group.

For almost a year, until last March, negotiations bogged down on this single, elementary point.

The government devoted this time to trying to split the Front, saying that one couldn't possibly find any common ground between teachers and manual labourers.

At one point, the teachers actually pulled out, but then returned.

Teachers president Yvon Charbonneau explained: "The negotiations could bring up the whole question of the capitalist system and unmask it. It would be the tip of the lance, the first blow against the system."

Private enterprise, the unions constantly told their members, was putting enormous pressure on the Bourassa government to resist the \$100 minimum.

The government claimed it lacked the financial resources. The fact that so many of its employees would be better off on welfare, along with thousands of others, didn't seem to bother it.

Instead, the Quebec authorities launched a massive propaganda campaign extolling the generosity of tits offers. The campaign was led by a well-paid force of recently hired journalists pumping out the government side of the issue to the public. They spent a fortune on a glossy, multicoloured 32-page brochure entitled 'l'Important' which was inserted in almost every paper in the province. They took out countless newspaper ads aimed at specific groups of workers, always implying they would be better off on their

The Common Front's own campaign — and this perhaps was one of its worst mistakes — was more internal, specifically aimed at maintaining solidarity. It revolved around its slogan — NOUS, le monde ordinaire (WE, the ordinary people). Perhaps because of financial limitations, they didn't fully carry their side of the issue to the public, the recipient of so much government publicity.

ith negotiations at an impasse, the Front held a strike vote. On March 9 some 75 per cent voted to reject the government offer of a 4.3 per cent raise, and gave its approval for a general strike. (Actually, considering inflation, the offer amounted to a net reduction for some workers. Under the guise of "reclassification," the government also wanted to increase working hours for some with no appreciable increase in pay.)

One week later, l'Allier agreed to the Front's demand for a central negotiating table. But the two chief government negotiators, deputy minister Roch Bolduc, and Reynalde Langois, a specially hired lawyer, refused to budge. No ministers attended the negotiations.

The Front called a one day strike for March 24, but a severe snow storm caused them to postpone it for four days.

When they went out on March 28, the government was waiting with injunctions against Hydro-Quebec workers, psychiatric and chronic care hospital workers (most were non-medical staff; cleaners, cooks, laundry, etc.).

After the one-day strike, Front leaders demanded that l'Allier himself, or somebody who was in a position to bargain genuinely, be present at the talks in Quebec City's Holiday Inn. Nothing happened except a 0.4 per cent upward revision of the wage offer.

The Front, in turn, made a major concession and dropped its demand for an immediate \$100 minimum, asking for it only in raises spread over the life of a three year contract. It was rejected.

The Common Front decided to go for an all-out, unlimited general strike on March 11.

It agreed to provide essential services. In hospitals, it was left to individual unions to negotiate with local administrations what constituted essential services.

The government immediately slapped injunctions on 61 hospital unions.

The battle for public opinion was shaping up, and the government chose to focus attention on the hospitals, where it could most easily turn public opinion against the strike.

"Everything indicates," said a CNTU statement, "that the government felt it could easily count on about 60 hospital administrators (many of whom owed their jobs to patronage) to render essential service negotiations impossible in their institutions and thus prepare the way for injunctions."

Workers at 20 institutions chose to ignore the injunctions, on the grounds they were unjustified and deprived them of their right to strike as provided in the labour code. They also felt they were intended to divide the Front.

As the strike, the largest in Canadian history, dragged on for several days, the media went about their task of whipping up anti-union hysteria.

The English media, particularly the Montreal Star and Gazette, were especially prone to this tactic. From the first day, before the strike could possibly have had any effect, the Gazette carried wild, front-page emotional stories about patients being forced to sleep in urine or beside cadavers.

"They could write stories like that about general hospital conditions without a strike," commented one picketer.

In fact, the media campaign became so shrill that on about the fifth day of the strike, l'Allier himself told a press conference that while it was a difficult situation, there was no emergency. He in particular asked the Star and the Gazette to keep things in perspective. However, there was no doubt that the effects of the strike were massive. Over 200,000 people were out as government machinery ground to a halt.

Throughout the first several days of the strike, Premier Robert Bourassa dodged the issue and refused to make any statements. At a press conference, l'Allier — who still had not attended any negotiations — said that government would respect the workers' right to strike and not resort to strike-breaking legislation. However, Liberal backbenchers and right wing cabinet members, led by Finance Minister Raymond Garneau, demanded legislation.

Morale on the picket lines was high. Everywhere in the province, le monde ordinaire marched, picketed and pressed their demands. 'Man on the picket line interviews' invariably showed that the strikers were conscious of the political aspect. "The government doesn't represent us," said one court clerk, "It represents Bay Street, St. James Street, Wall Street, but not us. Our union is the only thing that represents us."

The so-called 'liberal' element of the government — l'Allier, Social Affairs Minister Castonguay and Labour Minister Cournoyer — seemed intent on waiting the strike out, waiting for public opinion to force the unions to accept the latest offer, and waiting for the financial burden of the strike to crush the poorly paid. But the right wing element clamoured for an iron fist.

On April 19, the ninth day of the strike, the Quebec judiciary struck the first blow.

On that day, the government had come up with a new offer. Louis Laberge had said "the offers are not yet close to meeting our objectives. They do not satisfy us but they are the basis for study and we will take a close look at them." At almost the same time he was saying that, 13 workers from the Charles Lemoyne hospital on Montreal's South Shore appeared before Superior Court Judge Georges Pelletier for sentencing for violating injunctions.

The sentences shocked and angered the union movement. Thirteen union officials, none of them salaried, and most of them amongst the lowest paid workers in the Common Front, were sentenced to six months in jail plus personal fines of \$5,000 each. In addition, their unions were fined \$70,600.

Before the judiciary was to be through, in the following days, a total of 103 workers were fined a half-million dollars and sentenced to a cumulative 24 years in prison.

"When the law is ignored and the authority of the courts is openly defied, there is reason to fear a situation which could degenerate into anarchy," said the judgment.

Judge Pelletier added that if the law permitted him, he would have decertified the unions involved.

Union leaders and rank and filers were enraged.

### FRONT 210,000 EMPLOYES SYNDIQUÉS DU SECTEUR PUBLIC ET PARA-PUBLIC employés du gouvernement employés d'hônitaux employés de soutien des cegeps employés de la Société des Alcools du Québec et des commissions scolaires POUT RE MONDE Et quand le gouvernement ne veut pas négocier quand les négociations trainent depuis un an, il ne nous reste qu'une chose à faire, comme tout le monde: s'écraser ou bien faire la grève.

Marcel Pepin noted that Judge Pelletier had been a political appointee, saying "he became independent when he became a judge I suppose. He used to be a Liberal Party organizer. Is his judgment, because the Liberals are in power, tainted by his past?

"Doctors and police have made illegal strikes, but nobody gets charged. But simple hospital workers making a legal strike are condemned like criminals."

Yvon Charbonneau, the teachers' leader, was furious: "The union movement may have to go into the resistance in the historic sense of the word. The day may come when we will have to drop our pencils and chalk. This government won't compromise except in the face of arms ... maybe there's a lesson to be learned."

"Has there ever been a single damned company, a company which poisons our water, destroys our environment, that has ever been fined \$50,000?" asked Louis Laberge, "But this Liberal judge didn't hesitate for a second to fine a union of 700-800 members \$50,000. There has never been a goddam giant company fined as much in Quebec."

But the Liberals were preparing more to come. They were quietly drafting Bill 19.

On Wednesday, the same day the Judge went into action, the Common Front met at the Chateau Frontenac for the first time with a committee of cabinet ministers to discuss the latest offer.

Aside from l'Allier and Castonguay, there were Finance Minister Garneau and Education Minister Francois Cloutier, who slept through most of the so-called emergency meeting. Hanging over the Front's head was the threat of back-to-work legislation. The Common Front attempted, at the very least, to salvage the \$100 minimum. They offered to reduce substantially demands for the highest paid workers. Not a chance. Finally Marcel Pepin asked the Finance Minister point blank if he was ready to accept the \$100 minimum if the Common Front arranged other salaries so that the government wouldn't have to increase its total payments by much.

Advised by one of his counsellors, Le Devoir reported, not to answer the question, Mr. Garneau finally admitted that the fundamental reason for the refusal of the minimum wage was that the government couldn't upset the industrial structure, the state of the labour market — supply and demand — and private enterprise.

There was nothing left to do, except for the government to unveil Bill 19. Premier Bourassa said the time had come to tell the Common Front "enough is enough," as het introduced the Bill to the National Assembly.

Labour leaders had been expecting legislation for some kind of moratorium. Instead, they got a harsh, repressive

piece of legislation which, in effect, destroyed the unions. Bill 19, while allowing a month for more negotiations, permitted the government to impose a settlement by simple dedree. In addition, the unions would be deprived of all their fundamental rights for a two-year period. It went way beyond normal back-to-work legislation.

It also provided for fines of from \$5,000 to \$50,000 per day against unions and union officials who went against the law. The 210,000 employees could be fined \$250 a day each if they didn't immediately return to work. Conceivably, it could work out to \$200,000,000 a day or more.

The National Assembly debated the bill for 24 hours, nonstop, before finally passing it on Friday afternoon, April 21, the 11th day of the strike.

The severity of the Bill shocked Front leaders. Initially, they announced they would recommend civil disobedience.

Louis Laberge was extraordinarily upset. He compared the law to the laws of Hitler and Mussolini, saying it was only one step away from declaring unions illegal. Almost one-half of the CNTU membership had lost their union rights as defined by law, a total of 210,000 workers were all but decertified.

"I know," said Laberge, "that there are many citizens who are happy that this special law has been adopted because our strike causes inconvenience and perhaps social malaise. But the citizens of Quebec should not rejoice. If the Bourassa government can do this to 210,000 who are exercising a recognized right, imagine what they can do to individuals.

"In the short term, citizens may feel comfortable, but that's exactly what happened in Germany and Italy when Hitler and Mussolini deprived citizens of their rights." Even Labour Minister Jean Cournoyer was shaken by the legislation. It was apparent that the hardliners, not the so-called progressive faction of the cabinet had drafted the legislation. "They're crazy," said Cournoyer in a private conversation, "a thing like this could provoke serious disorders." After the passage of the law, the Common Front went into a huddle to decide on a course of action.

hile the Common Front leaders spent Friday night debating a course of action, the right wing of the CNTU moved to scuttle resistance. The three right wing members

of the central's five-man executive — vice president Paul-Emile Dalpé, treasurer Jacques Dion and director of services Amedee Daigle (known as 'les trois D') — called a snap meeting and voted to recommend respect for the law and a return to work.

This severely compromised the position of the two remaining members of the executive — president Marcel Pepin and general secretary Raymond Parent (known as 'les deux P'). The CNTU accounted for more than half the 210,000 strikers.

Voting results trickled into the Common Front's Quebec City headquarters at the Holiday Inn. About 65 per cent of the QFL and CNTU, and 53 per cent of the teachers voted to stay out. However, barely half the workers were able to participate in the hastily called vote. Once again,

#### The judges who did the sentencing

The savage sentences handed out by Justices Georges Pelletier and Pierre Cote to Common Front leaders and union officials have caused many to take a close look at the political background of these judges.

QFL president Louis Laberge declares "I always said there was no justice in Quebec. This is just one more proof. While big corporations are fined \$75 for breaking the law, we must go to jail for exercising our right — the right to strike."

And CNTU leader Marcel Pepin says "It's no secret that Judge Pelletier is a former Liberal party organizer. Have his judgments been tainted by his former activities? I'll let the public judge that for itself."

Pelletier was actively involved in Liberal party politics in Quebec before Liberal prime minister Lester Pearson appointed him to the Superior Court in 1963. Although he denies he was an organizer, he agrees he was a frequent and much sought-after speechmaker for the party. He ran, unsuccessfully, as a Liberal candidate for the constituency of L'Islet in the 1950s, and is a former vice-president of the Quebec Liberal Federation, where he served on a policy commission.

When Pelletier's close friend Jean Lesage led the Liberals to power in 1960, Pelletier was made chief prosecutor for the Salvas Inquiry that was set up to probe scandals during the preceding Union Nationale regime. While working for the Quebec government in 1962, his salary was \$100 a day, or five times as much as the minimum being asked by public service workers in the current dispute.

Justice Cote also has links with the Liberal party, although he has not been as directly involved as Pelletier. His background was explored by the Quebec weekly Quebec-Presse, which found he came from a traditionally Liberal family. Before being appointed to the Superior Court by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1969 he worked with the legal firm of Pratte, Cote and Tremblay. This firm earned \$156,035.61 in legal fees from the Quebec government in 1964-66 while the Liberals were in power under Lesage. At roughly the same time that Cote made it to the Superior Court, another member of the firm, Yves Pratte, was appointed president of Air Canada. Cote's first cousin is the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, Hugues Lapointe, a former federal Liberal cabinet minister.

It's been an accepted and traditional thing for lawyers and judges in Quebec to align themselves with a political party, and to stick to it throughout their lives.

Judge Pelletier seems to have had a certain premonition that his sentences would not be generally accepted as fair and just: at the height of the crisis he and his wife checked into the Chateau Frontenac Hotel, which has a private security force, reportedly "nervous" about staying at home.

the most militant group were the poorly paid hospital workers.

Late Friday night the Common Front made up its mind. It recommended a return to work.

Union militants were shocked.

The three leaders needed most of the night to rally many of the militants to the decision, and were visibly pained by the strain of the situation — Le Devoir reported Marcel Pepin "had not yet recovered from the blow struck by his executive", Louis Laberge had traces of tears on his cheeks, and Yvon Charbonneau's white face was pinched with rage.

"One of the three must have worked for ITT," snapped one minor official on hearing the back-to-work order. There was some isolated sentiment among rank-and-filers to ignore the leaders' recommendation (in fact, some teachers and hospital maintenance workers stayed out for a few more days).

The reasons for their decision, the three leaders explained, were the inconclusive results of the strike vote (the feeble turn-out may have been caused by resignation and apathy), and the fear that if resistance was mainly centred in the hospital sector, the workers could be severely bludgeoned on the picket lines.

Further, the statement by 'the three Ds' seriously weakened the solidarity needed to defy Bill 19. Marcel Pepin, exhausted and torn by the CNTU executive split and without sleep for 60 hours, said it was against his will that he had made the back-to-work recommendation.

"I have changed a lot in two years," he told a reporter on the drive back to Montreal. "Now I believe it's better to accept the risk of violence than to capitulate on our demands for a new social order."

But that was not to be. The strikers were already moving back to work. The Quebec labour movement had apparently suffered a resounding defeat.

Quebec's conservative French and English papers were jubilant.

"The young government of Robert Bourassa was better prepared and more astute than the labour leadership," cheered the Montreal Gazette. "It was ironic to see the two more influential members of the labour leadership — Marcel Pepin and Louis Laberge — negotiating with ministers 20 years their junior, and losing every round in the 10-day long battle of wits."

In Montreal, the two regional labour outfits — the QFL's Montreal Labour Council and the CNTU's Central Council — held meetings over the weekend of April 22-23.

The QFL's Montreal group, previously a fairly conservative body which represented skilled workers — carpenters, plumbers, printers and the like — was holding a long-planned orientation congress. The mood of the delegates was apparent from discussions Saturday morning in the workshop on the economy. For instance, a vote was taken on a resolution advocating collective ownership of the means of production and workers' self-management. The ballot was 98 in favour and four against. Although few of the delegates represented workers from the public sector, Bill 19 was a main topic of angry discussion.

Over at the CNTU, Marcel Pepin attended the emergency meeting of the Central Council where he faced a deluge of bitterness over the decision to return to work. The Council accused the Front leaders of having missed the chance of a lifetime. Urged on by president Michel Chartrand, the Council called for a May 1 general strike by all organized labour. It also demanded the resignation of 'the three Ds'.

Local union leaders from all Common Front affiliates

agreed to consult their memberships, but some were doubtful such a massive action could be polled and organized on short notice.

Chartrand, who for years has been trying to get May 1 recognized as workers' day instead of the official September Labour Day, was adamant as he feverishly tried to get the general strike going.

But by Thursday it appeared to all concerned — except Chartrand — that the move was impossible.

By that day, April 27, QFL general secretary Fernand Daoust and Marcel Pepin — both initially sympathetic to the idea — declared it was "technically impossible to organize the strike", but that they were exploring other means of protest. Pepin's position within the CNTU was strengthened when the 24-man Confederal Bureau expressed unanimous approval of his leadership, and in effect censured 'the three Ds' for publicly denouncing Pepin's words and conduct.

Union militants were organizing information meetings across the province. Inside union ranks, there was unanimous denunciation of Bill 19. The Bourassa government was condemned for giving in to the "fascist corporations and business community."

"St. James Street," declared one St. Jérome worker, "wants to keep Quebec as a source of cheap labour. They won't let Bou-Bou give us a decent wage."

Although feeling was running high, the movement couldn't pull together on a single means of expressing its anger.

On Thursday, the Quebec justice department moved, unwittingly, to give labour its chance. During the week, the Big Three — Pepin, Laberge and Charbonneau — had said local hospital workers shouldn't bear the sole responsibility of going to jail, since they had all urged them to disobey injunctions.

The three were summoned to appear in court on Thursday, May 4.

The right wing media were pleased, saying jail sentences for the leaders would teach them to think twice before violating the law.

"We'll go to the court," Laberge said, "and I'll plead guilty with pride."

Throughout this time, the government was still expressing confidence that a negotiated settlement could be worked out

But despite the government's public avowals of good will towards the unions and denials that it was out to crush the Front, many observers, including at least one cabinet minister, privately questioned the haste with which the Big Three were brought to court by the Justice department.

"If the government really wants a peaceful settlement," said one civil servant, "I don't see why (justice minister) Choquette is pushing the Front. It seems like a provocation. After all, they can wait to press charges when the climate improves somewhat. They never did a damn thing to the Montreal and Provincial police when they went on illegal strikes. At least the Common Front was engaged in a legal operation."

He noted that when medical specialists had defied the government and stayed out on an illegal strike two years ago, demanding an increase over the official offer of \$52,000 a year, no charges had been laid; but hospital workers on strike for a minimum \$100 a week wage were getting six months in jail and \$5,000 fines for a legal strike.

The Common Front leaders appeared briefly before the parliamentary committee on the public service and deposited their voluminous studies and demands. Pepin repeated his charge that the government wouldn't accede to the \$100 minimum wage because they were unwilling to upset the capitalist labour market. Finance Minister Garneau, sitting off to his side, avoided Pepin's accusing eyes.

May 1 came and there was no strike.

In Montreal, several thousand people showed up at the Paul Sauvé arena to celebrate the founding of the Montreal regional front, composed of the Montreal Labour Council, the Central Council and the various teachers' groups. In a series of short speeches, the representatives pledged to work with all progressive groups, welfare recipients, unemployed and students, and to promote the local Comités d'Action Politique (CAPs) and generally lead the fight against capitalism, reaction and Bill 19.

Afterwards there was a beer and cider party, and dancing to the new revolutionary music popular in Quebec.

Labour was in a militant mood, but was still groping for a way to deal with the situation.

Three days later, the Quebec City judiciary bumbled into

In the morning, Superior Court Judge Pierre Coté sentenced 15 more union men to jail for violating injunctions. The leaders were due to be tried at 2 p.m.

The three men came up from Montreal and arrived shortly before the appointed hour, accompanied by a large contingent of supporters. Others were crammed into every nook and cranny of the small, oak-panelled court room. Actually, there wasn't much room for supporters. The court was filled with security guards and plainclothesmen, including a couple of Bourassa's personal bodyguards.

When the three marched into the court house, they couldn't get through the mob and into the court room. Somebody said there was a bigger court room down the hall, and everybody, led by Laberge, Pepin and Charbonneau, trooped in security men, plainclothes detectives, supporters.

They sat and waited for the judge.

Before he arrived the riot squad, bedecked in leather and black visors and carrying long, black truncheons, muscled their way into the already crowded court room. Marcel Pepin noted the buildup of hardware and began to get angry. Still, there was no judge. Pepin consulted his watch, noted the time (2:30), looked at his two co-accused, and saw they understood what was happening.

"Let's go," he said, and the three leaders of Quebec's unions got up and walked out of the court room. Through the marble halls of the court house they strode, followed by a frantic crowd of reporters and heralded by an advance guard of television cameramen grinding away.

"I'm not going to sit in there with the riot squad behind me," said Pepin.

"You saw them, the ton-ton matraques," Laberge said.
"With their big sticks. It's like a banana republic.

"If they want to arrest us, they know where to find us.

We're not in hiding."

The judge showed up 15 minutes later, called a brief recess, and then proceeded with the trial. He listened to government

and then proceeded with the trial. He listened to government tapes of the union leaders and announced he would issue his verdict later.

Justice Minister Jerome Choquette admitted that the presence of the riot squad in the court house had been "a mistake" but that the three men should not have walked out. Many unionists regarded the presence of the riot squad as another example of justice department provocation.

The verdict was announced Monday, May 8.

Marcel Pepin, Louis Laberge and Yvon Charbonneau, the heads of Quebec's three top labour organizations, were sentenced to one wear in jail each.

In a lengthy, 28-page judgment (printed in full in most French papers), the Judge quoted from U.S. Supreme Court decisions, John F. Kennedy, British Columbia court rulings against the United Fishermen and Allied Workers, and several other sources to justify the maximum possible sentences

"This sentence should take effect immediately," wrote the Judge. "Any lesser sentence would leave the Judge feeling that, without reason, he failed the duty dictated by his conscience."

(Last Post learned that the decision was actually a 'collegial' one, made in consultation with other Superior Court justices.)

The severity of the one-year term stunned union members.
"That's justice, that's the democracy of the Liberal hacks,"
said one bitter teacher.

"That's the justice of the system," said Louis Laberge, "while big corporations are fined \$75 or \$500 for polluting our rivers, killing people or breaking the law, we — the criminals — must go to jail for exercising a right — the right to strike."

It was late Monday afternoon, but the groundswell of anger was already apparent.

At union meetings that night — a continuous custom in Quebec in the past few months — the members denounced the judiciary, government and business for collusion.

On Tuesday morning, the leaders and hundreds of sympathizers gathered outside the CNTU headquarters on St. Denis street for the trip to Quebec City where they were to turn themselves in.

ven as the motorcade made its way along the South Shorehighway to Quebec City, the walkouts and protests began. There had been no order given; from the first it appeared spontaneous. Around 11 a.m. longs oremen — never active in Common Front activities — walked off the job in Montreal, Trois Rivières and Quebec City (only three weeks before, the 3,500 ILA members had signed a new contract).


By noon, 5,000 teachers in Joliette, the Gaspé, Chicoutimi, l'Estrie, Sorel, Mont Laurier and the Mille Iles had joined the protest.

Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) maintenance workers set up picket lines in several CEGEPs and a few hospitals. Groups of nurses and CNTU hospital workers joined them.

At 2 o'clock, the families of the three leaders joined three or four thousand workers at St. Louis Gate at the Quebec City Wall. The longshoremen showed up and volunteered to act as marshals. The throng started to march with Laberge, Pepin and Charbonneau to the court house.

The sun was shining as a grimy longshoreman approached to shake Marcel Pepin's hand. Pepin's 12-year-old daughter Marie was crying. Michel Pepin, eight, marched alongside his father. The longshoreman took Marcel Pepin's hand and said: "Don't worry Marcel, we'll take care of your family while you're in jail."

The workers delivered the three to justice department officials, shouting solidarity and vowing they'd make the



Hospital workers show their opinion of Bourassa (Bou-Bou) and Bill 19

Quebec government know how they felt. The three were taken off to Orsainville prison on the outskirts of the city to begin their terms.

As the news was announced on the radio stations of the province, right wing commentators expressed satisfaction and declared that law and order had triumphed. They noted that there had been some protest, as expected, but nothing on a large scale.

That evening, in the remote North Shore town of Sept-Iles, several hundred miles down river from Quebec City, a few hundred workers gathered for a protest outside the local court house. Police tried to break it up, and a battle ensued. It was the spark that started the revolt.

The workers of Quebec were about to rise up by the thousands in one of the greatest displays of solidarity this country has seen since the Winnipeg general strike in 1919. The workers were to show hostility to a government dedicated to the interests of business. But above all, they were to show that the new militancy of the Quebec trade union movement comes from the base, and is not dictated from the top. The revolt was the first, tentative step by the workers of Quebec to shrug off their old fears, and to defend their class interests.

Late Tuesday and early Wednesday, the Sept-Iles workers had organized several meetings and voted massively to strike. Within a matter of hours, thousands of unionized workers brought the rich iron ore port to a standstill. The strike committee proceded to take control of the town, and seized the radio station.

In St. Jérome, a light industrial area with heavy unemployment 40 miles north of Montreal, the 400 employees of Regent Knitting Mills walked out. They were joined by the bus drivers, Secor metal plant workers, teachers and

white collar workers. At the invitation of unionized workers at CKJL radio station, the strike committee took over and started to broadcast revolutionary music and union statements.

The movement mushroomed across the province.

By Thursday 80,000 construction workers were off the job, along with workers at the Manicouagan 3 dam. Miners joined the protest in Thetford Mines, Asbestos and Black Lake. Workers shut down factories all across the province, including 23 at the St. Jérome Industrial Park alone.

Mass meetings were held throughout the province.

In Sept-Iles one 52-year-old steelworker had tears in his eyes as he told a reporter: "They put Louis in jail. They can't do this. If we let them, they can put us all in jail, anyone of us."

By Friday, radio announcers were left breathless as they read off lists of plants closed, walkouts, towns occupied, radio and television stations seized. For much of the Conservative and Liberal media, the situation seemed to be bordering on revolution. The shutdowns were blamed on a "small minority" of revolutionary agitators and goon squads.

Yet the majority of walkouts took place after mass meetings and votes. It took a lot of conviction to walk out since all the strikes (with the exception of Montreal's 8,000 blue collar workers) were illegal and violated hard-won contracts. A typical case involved the Sir George Williams University library workers, where a majority walked out shortly after having won a long strike battle for union recognition from a management which had previously resisted all organizing attempts.

In many cases, work stoppages were the result of other strikers visiting work sites and asking — sometimes demanding — that their fellows join them in a demonstration of worker solidarity. On occasion, in the heat of the situation, there were incidents of heavy-handed 'requests' brought on by inflamed passion.


But certainly, the massive, wide-spread response couldn't be attributed to "thugs and goon squads" as Robert Bourassa repeatedly claimed. Countless small plants, some with fewer than 25 employees, shut down and stayed shut for a day or a week.

In the Thetford Mines area, 8,000 workers downed tools within the space of two to three hours. All it took was one group to initiate the action. The rest moved spontaneously as word got around.

In Chibougamau the general shutdown was provoked by an angry group of women, some of them teachers and hospital workers. They marched to one of the mines and pulled their husbands off the job. It was only a matter of time before the effect was total.

A few groups, like the militant elementary school teachers who blocked bridges by dumping kegs of nails on the roadways, went slightly beyond peaceful protest. But on the whole, considering the scope of what was happening, there was remarkably little violence. One reason was that the actions were so widespread that police adopted a policy of non-intervention. Their power was too thinly spread. If they provoked a confrontation in one area, they wouldn't be able to contain the snowballing effect. For once, the police were too weak to provoke violence.

"The government thinks it can scare the workers by throwing their chiefs in jail," explained Michel Chartrand. "They think it's going to shut the workers up ... well, they set a forest fire which is going to spread everywhere, mobilizing thousands of workers in the private sector as well as the public sector."



A few of the 'ton-ton matraques' await a call from the bosses in Montreal's Phillips Square

Jean Labelle, a 28 year-old factory worker in St. Jérome offered a New York Times reporter a simple explanation: "What's our complaint? I guess the answer is that we're tired of being pushed around, and now, finally, we're pushing back. If we can show them we're capable of anything."

Right-wing media commentators blamed the three Common Front leaders for the situation, saying that they should appeal their sentences and get out on bail. Yet the same commentators took NDP leader David Lewis to task for suggesting the sentences were due to the judge's "reckless ignorance," and answered that the sentences were fully justified. In almost the same breath, they were damning the leaders for going to jail and then supporting the harsh sentences.

The union position was that they'd rather serve their sentences right away than wait six months.

"It's no use to appeal," said Laberge, "because the system is rotten. And it's entirely rotten; it's not just rotten on one level."

A QFL statement said: "As far as we are concerned, we believe the police machine should push its logic to the extreme and lock everyone up who thinks like Laberge, Pepin and Charbonneau."

As the situation escalated, even some members of the business community wondered aloud if Bourassa had handled the conflict properly. "From an absolutely pragmatic point of view," declared Charles Perrault, head of Le Conseil du Patronat, an employers group, "history shows us that imprisoning union leaders rarely serves the cause of the state. It's a political conflict, and as much as this imprisonment is unfavourable to the state, it's a good tactic for the leaders."

The protests continued.

At QFL headquarters in Montreal, one top official said that many of the permanent staff "had underestimated the base, the rank and file." The union militancy was surprising not only the government and the employers, but the leadership. "Louis Laberge called from jail saying he was expecting protests but nothing on this scale."

During the week, the office building at the corner of St.

Denis and Ste. Catherine St. East where the QFL and several affililated unions are located, was the scene of continuous activity. Union officials and members were tramping up and down the stairs (the elevator operators were off on strike) singing the Marseillaise. Down the road at the CNTU the preference seemed to be for the Internationale, but the feeling was the same, as union bulletins and news flowed in from across the province.

The work stoppages took on interesting and imaginative forms

At the General Motors plant in Ste. Thérèse, which has had a troubled history of management problems, autoworkers asked a few dozen workers from St. Jérome to set up picket lines at the plant during lunch hour. Normally, the autoworkers eat inside the plant at the cafeterias. This time, however, they went out to eat, and when they returned they refused to cross the St. Jérome pickets and never went back to work. The 2,000 Autoworkers were out, and at the same time managed to avoid legal responsibility.

Late Thursday night, Montreal newspaper workers at La Presse and Le Devoir decided to walk out. They were joined by supporters at the two other French-speaking papers, Journal de Montréal and Montréal-Matin. Together, they went over to the two English-language papers, the Gazette and the Star to request they stop publishing for a day. They proved unwilling, despite what Star editor Frank Walker described as the visitors' "polite" attitude. However, after considering the situation, the two English papers decided not to publish "in order to protect the safety of our employees." (Common Front members regarded their coverage of the general strike as "hysterical and violently antiunion.") Even employees of the union-backed weekly Québec-Presse walked out for a day.

Employees at the Albert Prevost Institute, a mental hospital in north-end Montreal, locked out management personnel and ran the place by themselves, proclaiming "North America's first liberated hospital."

By the end of the week, strikes and workers' control extended to Sept-Iles, Baie Comeau, Port Cartier and Haute Rive on the North Shore, Chibougamau in the North West, Murdochville in the Gaspé and Thetford Mines.

In addition to these towns, workers seized control of radio stations — and in a few cases, TV outlets — in at least a dozen other localities, including Amos, New Carlisle, Rouyn-Noranda, Joliette, Sherbrooke and a few in the Montreal area for varying amounts of time.

In the controlled towns, local Common Front committees decided which merchants would be allowed to remain open. Invariably, large food stores, like A&P, Steinberg's and Dominion, representing big money, were ordered closed in favour of co-ops or small, family-owned stores. The latter were ordered not to take advantage of the situation and a strict price-freeze was enforced.

By far the most spectacular aspect of the labour revolt was the vehemence and swiftness with which it spread through outwardly placid provincial areas. The reasons for

this are as varied as the regions affected.

The two hardest hit areas, the St. Jérome-Laurentian region and the North Shore, differ drastically, yet both demonstrated the same frustration, impotence and rage. St. Jérome suffers from high unemployment (it was up to 35 per cent 18 months ago) and, with the exception of a few big, new plants, pays low wages, often \$2 an hour or less. It has all the urban facilities a town its size could provide, with easy access to metropolitan Montreal, a half-hour drive south on the Autoroute.

Sept-Iles, on the other hand, on the isolated North Shore, ranks in the top ten communities in Canada for average earnings. While Sept-Iles easily rates as a boom town, the Laurentian area is experiencing an industrial decline. Yet both regions exploded.

"It's probably the outlying areas that are going to provoke the real changes in Quebec," explained Pierre Mercille of

the CNTU's Laurentian Central Council.

"For years, the ideas came from Montreal, but the most radical actions came from outside the metropolis: Cabano, Mont Laurier, and now the massive walkouts of Sept-Iles, St. Jérome, Sorel. In Montreal, it's so big and anonymous, it's difficult to have co-ordinated action. But in the little towns, the workers understand fast, they know themselves and they act."

y the weekend, the protests hadn't faded and the Bourassa government was becoming frantic. It was clearly surprised by the extent of the protests. It had counted on the three leaders to appeal their jail terms. On Saturday, the premier dispatched Liberal lawyer Roger Thibadeau to Orsainville prison to plead with Marcel Pepin to appeal and get out of jail. The lawyer was an old friend of Pepin's and had brought him a gift — a book entitled l'Humanité en Marche. It was inscribed 'de notre amitié, Roger Thibadeau'. Pepin smiled and said: "Thanks for the souvenir."

Up until this time, the government had confined itself to declaring it still hoped for a negotiated settlement — along with declarations from Justice Minister Choquette to the effect that police had everything under control.

From their prison, the Big Three issued a defiant statement: "Within the current union conflict, there is an overriding social struggle. The Liberal establishment ... has

chosen the clubbing of the workers as its trademark. This government has no social policy, and we know it.

"This government, as an employer, cowers before its real boss,' the private sector, and we know it. This government chooses to imprison those who disturb the cosmetics masking the colonized, and we know it.

"The ordinary people understand quickly that this government won't, and cannot truly negotiate, because the men who belong to it are themselves held at the throat by the financiers or the men in Ottawa; and it is to them that they owe their power, not to the ordinary people.

"Repression turns a simple panic into a battle; a participant into a combattant; a diverse group of individuals into a force of solidarity ... and finally, it obliges everyone to choose sides.

"Let us leave this government to its folly, to its judges and its useless, repressive laws, to its grey solitude in the image of a Brinks truck. The union and social cause for which we are fighting is just. We will win it by our resistence and our determination."

Meanwhile, a crowd of about 3,000 people gathered outside the prison for what was billed as "le Woodstock syndical." The park beside the prison assumed a festival atmosphere as a tent city was set up, complete with stands selling foods, homemade jams, T-shirts decorated with the Big Three in prison garb and crafts.

In between the music, people like Michel Chartrand, Marcel Perreault, Chartrand's counterpart at the QFL's Montreal Labour Council, and Robert Chagnon, of the Montreal Alliance des Professeurs, harangued the crowd. All three had been symbolically kidnapped the day before in Montreal, and delivered to the festival by militant teachers.

Chartrand took the opportunity to denounce René Levesque and the attitude of the Parti Québécois. "These are the guys," he told the participants, "who want an institutionalized union movement, integrated into the capitalist system. We don't need bums like that to tell us what to do."

He had less kind things to say about Robert Bourassa who, at about that time, was hovering overhead in a helicopter, accompanied by Roads Minister Bernard Pinard widely known as Mr. Patronage and one of the biggest dispensers of Liberal favours. After satisfying themselves that the Bolshevik mob wasn't about to run riot, the two ministers returned to the premier's new concrete bunker office-residence near the National Assembly.

Aside from the proletarian upheaval, Bourassa had to contend with an incipient palace revolt. The cabinet was severely shaken when it was learned that two of Bourassa's few able Ministers — Social Affairs Minister Claude Castonguay and Public Service and Communications Minister Jean-Paul l'Allier — had tendered their resignations.

Although l'Allier, as public service minister, had been nominally responsible for negotiations with the Common Front and Castonguay's ministry was the biggest single employer, both men denied their dispute with the government had anything to do with the labour conflict.

They were angered by federal Finance Minister John Turner's spring budget. It had increased certain social services like old age pensions without consulting the province. For years, Quebec governments have had a running dispute with the federal government that centred on the demand to repatriate control of all social services, such as family allowances. Castonguay has been trying to create a coherent social security policy for the province, bringing all these monies and measures under provincial jurisdiction.

Both ministers felt the new budget violated federalprovincial understandings, and that the premier had been feeble in presenting Quebec's case. The crisis of confidence in Bourassa was so strong on this matter that Labour Minister Jean Cournoyer, himself indirectly involved in the labour crisis, had denounced his own government in a Parliamentary Commission two days before.

Visibly angry and pounding his fist on the table, he told Parti Québécois House Leader Camille Laurin: "You've made your choice, but I haven't made it as yet. But between you and me, I've had it up to here, my fists are ready ... If the government is capable of standing up to the union movements, they'd better stand up to the federal govern-

ment."

Agriculture Minister Normand Toupin agreed with him. Somehow, Premier Bourassa managed to cool the dissidents. Both Castonguay and l'Allier said they would withdraw their resignations, at least until the Liberals had weathered the labour storm.

Two days later, in another bid to get negotiations going with the Common Front, Bourassa took the public service portfolio away from l'Allier and gave it to Cournoyer. L'Al-

lier retained the communications portfolio.

Quebec labour leaders have never been hostile to Cournoyer; in fact, many even like him. The same can be said, to a lesser degree, about l'Allier. But it can't be said for the rest of the cabinet which decides policy, so it's difficult to understand what Bourassa hoped to accomplish with this supposed conciliatory move.

The union protest and revolt was now in its eighth day. Aside from this minor portfolio switch, the government had done little except wait it out and hope public opinion, whipped up by the media, would force the Front into capitu-

lation.

The Liberals, in fact, decided the media, already bordering on hysteria, weren't enough. And so the party embarked on one of the more bizarre escapades of the conflict in an attempt to break the unions.

Early in the week, a staffer of the Teachers' corporation intercepted a secret telex message to the Liberal Party's 108 riding presidents. The message, sent by party president Lise Bacon, ordered local Liberal associations to set up, in effect, vigilante committees.

They were told to "gather information on local disturbances, arouse public opinion against the strikers and find ways of ensuring order themselves." One of the ways suggested was to pressure local authorities to swear in party stalwarts and toughs as "special constables." In two towns at least, Baie Comeau and Haute Rive, a total of over 200 civilians were sworn in.

Meanwhile, Justice Minister Choquette, the government's most persistent hardliner, assured the populace that the police had "complete control over the situation" and that there was "no reason, for the moment," to take additional measures. He said police power was concentrated in 14 strategic points in the province and ready to move in if necessary.

On Tuesday, May 16, 34 local union officials decided to renounce their bail and join the Big Three at Orsainville

prison.

Another huge crowd turned out in Quebec City for the latest surrender of prisoners, representing "le monde ordinaire". The scene was even more emotional and bitter than the surrender ceremonies the week previous.

"One thing I can never forget," said 51-year-old Mme Louise Leblanc, a hospital worker from Notre Dame de Lourdes in Montreal, "is that I have been condemned for having defended the cause of the workers." She was accompanied by her daughter who, like herself, was sentenced to 6 months in prison and a personal fine of \$5,000, but who had elected to stay out and care for the family.

The group marched from the Cross of Sacrifice monument to the Court House, carrying the Front's latest poster bearing a photo of hospital worker Doris MacDonald. It stated simply: "I was a peaceful woman, but today I have anger in my heart."

"Tell Mr. Richard, the personnel director at St. Jean de Dieu Hospital, that his prisoners have a message for him," muttered another worker. "Tell him we're not giving up, we're going to spend our time in jail reading about the labour movement and politics and we're going to come out stronger than ever."


While some strikers were returning to work, they were being replaced by others, such as the Liquor Board employees, 1,500 shop workers at the Canadair plant and 650 National Harbours Board office workers. Another 135 schools were reported closed in the Eastern Townships, the Trois Rivières region and Quebec City suburbs, while some 700 Hydro-Quebec workers joined the protest.

But the Liberal Party's offensive against the unions was gathering steam. An anti-strike meeting of construction workers was organized at the Jean Beliveau arena on Montreal's South Shore. Although it purported to be a union meeting, it was later revealed that rental costs for the arena were picked up by the Montreal Association of General Contractors. The contractors had given non-union personnel and unionized workers who had refused to strike the day off, to attend the meeting and later disrupt an official union



#### CHAPT CHOT CA COMMENCE!









Courtesy of the Gazette and the artist

meeting. At the second meeting, the two groups clashed outside the Paul Sauvé arena. Police separated the two camps and then provided the anti-strike faction with megaphones and loud speakers to harangue the strikers.

The leading speakers were small time contractors, many of whom depend on the good graces of the party in power to stay in business. At least two of the anti-strike meeting leaders were identified as Liberal organizers.

The same day that the 34 new prisoners turned themselves in, the new public service minister, Jean Cournoyer, got in touch with the jailed Front leaders and said he was now prepared to negotiate a "true settlement." The three were inclined to accept Cournoyer's good faith. He was regarded as an honest labour minister and seemed genuinely interested in negotiating a collective agreement outside the framework of Bill 19.

Wednesday afternoon, QFL general secretary Fernand Daoust, speaking for the Front, announced a truce and called for an end to all work stoppages. The government, he said, was prepared to talk. It was understood that the Big Three would be released on probation, as provided by law.

By Thursday, Quebec's labour revolt had ground to a halt

and the workers streamed back to their jobs. The Front had reason to believe that Cournoyer was empowered to enact a conciliatory agreement. Cournoyer also believed this

However, the cabinet was divided and Justice Minister Choquette moved to undermine Cournoyer's position and stamp out all efforts at conciliation. Choquette, who has moved to consolidate his power over Quebec's police forces and increase his influence in the Liberal Party apparatus since the October FLQ Crisis, had decided that an immediate release of the union men would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

Despite the fact the union had lived up to its part of the bargain and despite Cournoyer's attempts to obtain their release — abetted, it is believed, by both Castonguay and l'Allier — the three remained in jail.

As the government tried to outmanoeuvre the Front, the Liberal Party engaged in promoting the destruction of union solidarity. Their tools were to be the ambitious 'three'Ds', Dalpé, Dion and Daigle, the right wingers in the CNTU executive.

he 'three Ds' accused Pepin of "odiously misrepresenting" the membership, saying, in the words of Dalpé, he "preferred, to the detriment of negotiations, the easy oasis of prison . . . and, as everyone knows, at the expense of the taxpayers." The three then went about the task of attempting to wreck union solidarity better than any employer or government.

They organized an ad hoc meeting of about 1000 dissident union officials in Quebec City to decide whether to "clean out the CNTU of leftists and revolutionaries," or else to break up the CNTU and start their own "non-political" union central. They opted for the latter.

Their actions shocked CNTU loyalists, normally a thickskinned, rough-hewn breed.

Actually, the "mutinous treachery," as the left-wingers called it, was the culmination of the long battle within the union central over politicization. The battle was building up for a show-down at the annual convention scheduled for June 11. It became increasingly apparent to the right-wingers, mostly relics of the old Catholic Confederation days, that they were in for a resounding defeat over the adoption of the "Ne comptons que sur nos propres moyens" manifesto.

Raymond Parent, the secretary-general loyal to Marcel Pepin, is convinced that the mini-revolt was organized by the Liberals. Within the CNTU, a number of union officials still adhere to the Liberal party, some of them working as party organizers. One of the men lurking in the background behind the 'three Ds' is Jacques Olivier, a former treasurer of the CNTU's Federation Nationale des Services and a hospital union official. He now works for the Prime Minister's Office in Ottawa.

At any rate, the 'three Ds' were unable to muster enough support, as the vast majority of union leaders and members rallied to uphold their imprisoned president and preserve the CNTU's integrity and direction.

Three of the CNTU's eleven Federations, which group members according to sector — Wood and Construction, Clothing, and Textiles — voted to support the 'three Ds.' But within these Federations — for example construction workers in Sept-Iles, St. Jerome and other regions — large groups have decided to pull out and stay in ranks.

Only about three of the CNTU's 22 Central Councils — which group members according to region — have voiced support for the breakaways. Nevertheless, the educated guess is that they can take away upwards of 20,000 of the CNTU's total membership, and the harm caused is considerable.

Naturally, the internal conflict, brought full blown into the public view, caused nothing but glee within Liberal ranks, especially as it came while the Front was still seeking the release of the Big Three.

Cabinet Minister Cournoyer was trying desperately, as he had promised, to obtain their release on day parole. How-

#### Liberating the media

#### by Last Post staff

"This is CJSO, the voice of the workers." The voice came suddenly over the airwaves, startling the residents of Sorel, Quebec. "The next song coming up is dedicated to all the workers who for the past two days have said goodby to their bosses and the unjust policies of the government. It is called 'Adieu'."

A little later, a man sitting on his verandah in Montreal's working class suburb of Laval twisted his dial to CFGL and heard: "This is Common Front number five." The message was followed by revolutionary and nationalist music and news broadcasts, sympathetic, for once, to Quebec's striking workers.

It wasn't the first time, and it was not to be the last during that frantic period of protest against strikebusting legislation and the jailing of union leadership, that workers and students were to gain control of areas of the media.

A total of 23 radio stations fell for periods varying from 20 minutes to a couple of days. And in what turned out to be an unbelievably easy gesture, all Montreal's papers were persuaded, one way or another, to cease publication for 24 hours.

The history of taking over the media goes back, in a way, to the October crisis, when Quebecers and the provincial government were taught a lesson by the Front de Liberation du Quebec about the power of left-wing messages in mass circulation.

Convinced the FLQ manifesto was full of sound and fury, and little else, the government, to stall for time, agreed to allow it to be broadcast over the French network of the CBC in prime time. Officials later conceded it was

one of their biggest mistakes. The manifesto won wide support; the majority may have rejected the FLQ, but they remembered the manifesto's message.

Perhaps during the Common Front walkout it was a case of the media being so bad that the workers felt compelled to take it over to give Quebecers a more accurate picture of what was going on.

Interpretations of the action by the commercial press went to the extreme of implying 150 thugs with baseball bats were closing down the whole province. But more usual was endless criticism of the work force for creating 'anarchy' in face of the anti-strike legislation.

First to act were the workers in the distant, North Shore town of Sept-Iles.

Suddenly, the morning muzak of the top forty, mushed with the usual babble of the local radio, was interrupted. "This station is now in the hands of the workers. From now on we'll be broadcasting union bulletins from across Quebec and be playing the music of the resistance," said a voice coming over the waves.

"There were about 40 of them," said an announcer in an interview later. "They gave me a paper with a message on it and said: Put it on the air."

One thing the occupiers were adamant about was commercials. There were to be none. Instead there were union messages. One was to workers at the airport of the occupied town calling on them to walk out briefly.

By Friday, the station was still broadcasting, but the takeover petered out as police re-gained control of the town.

In the meantime, other towns around the province were

ever, the hardliners, led by Justice Minister Choquette, sabotaged all attempts. The latter claimed it was simply an administrative decision, left to judicial authorities without political interference. In fact, the decision not to release the three was decided finally at a Liberal party caucus meeting.

Urged on by Cournoyer, who promised he would obtain a negotiated settlement of the public service conflict and make amendments to Bill 19 (and prompted by the 'Three Ds' mutiny), Pepin, Laberge and Charbonneau finally opted to appeal their sentences. Along with the other imprisoned unions, they were released on Tuesday, May 23.

Once out, Pepin called a meeting of the CNTU's ruling Confederal Council which voted by a 117 to 7 margin to expel the 'three Ds.' (The three had refused to resign although they were openly working against the union. They were to be up for re-election at the convention and the betting, four months ago, was that they'd all lose their jobs.)

While conducting Common Front negotiations with the government — hindered by a divided cabinet — Marcel Pepin also has the task of ensuring that the CNTU convention remains orderly. It is to be held in Quebec City, where the 'three Ds' are headquartered. It is believed that the dissidents, after having refused to defend their ideas democratically at the convention, might attempt to use physical force to discredit the convention (it is recognized by even hostile observers that the CNTU has possibly the most

democratic structures of any union outfit in North America.)

However, despite the irritation caused by the rightwingers, morale within the CNTU is very high, especially amongst the people who feel the conservatives slowed the movement's evolution in the past.

"When I got out of jail," said Pepin, "I sensed an impression of incredible vitality in the ranks ... one inning of the game is over, the dynamic forces of syndicalism have grouped together ... Our action necessarily causes upheavals as we really try to ensure that political and economic decisions are no longer made by a powerful minority."

The culminative effects of the April-May events has resulted in an even greater radicalization and politicization of Quebec workers than was believed possible. The Common Front was solidified by joint action at the local and regional level in countless cases.

Louis Laberge said when he got out of jail: "Yes, I've changed since October 29 (date of the violent *La Presse* demonstration). If you want, they talk of my radicalization, that's OK with me. I'm no longer the same guy that I was. Because I used to believe in the damn system. I don't believe in it any more. If we continue to accept St. James Street, we'll never get out of the hole."

What happened to Louis Laberge has now happened to thousands upon thousands of Quebec workers.

benefitting from a temporary lull in the usual diet of bad music and worse commercials as workers took over station after station: Sorel, Thetford Mines, Hautrive Gaspe, Matane, Carleton sur Mer, St. Georges de Beauce, New Carlisle, Amos, Val d'Or, Lasarre, Rouyn and Chibougamau.

Sometimes, the local television station was also beseiged. Workers were occasionally able to negotiate with management for union broadcasts at regular intervals until the end of the strike.

In St. Jérome, a Laurentian town about 40 miles north of Montreal, listeners were treated to live coverage of the police breaking down the doors of the studio while occupants chanted "solidarity, solidarity."

The police were acting on the orders of station owner Jean Lalonde who, none too pleased, avowed he was "going to get those bastards out of there." Lalonde, after the eviction 5 p.m. Wednesday afternoon, tried to keep the station going by himself, playing records all night long. The next morning he locked the doors and went home to bed.

Newspapers were also liberated.

Conrad Black, a young millionaire who owns several Quebec papers, was awakened one morning with an hysterical phone call from the man who publishes L'Avenir, Black's paper in Sept-Iles.

"They're taking over the paper, they're seizing control," screamed the publisher. Black was in somewhat of a daze. The night before he had been carousing at a black-tie affair at the exclusive St. James Club, with business magnates who had been congratulating themselves on how smoothly the government had put down the unions with Bill 19. Suddenly a new voice came on the line, informing him the paper, notoriously anti-union, was about to be dismantled.

Black was speechless. "Comrade," he shouted into the phone, "be reasonable." He began desperate negotiations,

while in the background his publisher shouted: "Don't give in — we still hold half the building." Finally the workers' committee agreed not to dismantle the plant.

In rural areas, taking over the local paper or radio meant taking over the communications network and the propaganda value was inestimable.

Montreal's militants also managed to make their presence felt by closing down all of the city's daily newspapers simultaneously for 24 hours. But in a city with numerous radio stations and a ready and waiting police force, they had to content themselves with a sort of guerrilla warfare.

At CKVL in suburban Verdun youthful workers and students managed only 20 minutes of broadcasting before their program was blacked out and police arrived. But they were greeted by wellwishers with stacks of records at the door in response to a call they had made for revolutionary music to replace the muzak in the studio.

Some people were getting the message.

There were moments of high humour: during a threehour takeover of the peace-love station CHOM, occupants dutifully played the commercials — and then beseeched their radio audience to boycott the products in question.

And there were disappointments: A carefully-planned occupation of a French-language CBC studio in Montreal was foiled by police who were waiting for militants at the door.

In the long term, the takeovers stand as a heady turning-point in mass media history. Quebee's population experienced an unprecedented bath of information regarding the profound changes taking place. The lies, distortions and omissions of the commercial press went rudely flying in their teeth.

"This time we only closed the papers for a day. We only seized the radio stations for, in some cases, a few minutes." said a Common Front spokesman.

He added: "For now."

# Sept-lies revolts

#### From a special correspondent

SEPT-ILES-They don't read much Trotsky in Sept-Iles. But the workers of this iron port way out east on the St. Lawrence put themselves at the head of the May revolt in Quebec with something that looked like what Trotsky called "dual power." They didn't consider it dual, they thought it was simply power. They thought they controlled the town, and for a day - Wednesday, May 10 - they did.

Then the Provincial Police came in, and you started to get a strange feel in the wide, sandy streets of Sept-Iles, the feel of two forces circling each other. Two animals wary of each other, rule by dual power: something had to give. In the Russia that Trotsky described, it was the bourgeoisie;

in Sept-Iles, after five days, it was the workers.

Sparked by the imprisonment of the three union chiefs, and by two Bourassa Bills, 19 (breaking the public service strike) and 15 (back-to-work-or-be-fined for two construction union groups which had been fighting over jurisdictions on a Sept-Iles site), the 60 or 70 per cent of Sept-Iles men who are in the union took over the town. They sealed off the roads into it, prevented people from coming in from the airport, and closed down the stores except for ones chosen by themselves. They pulled 2,000 Steelworkers and 1,500 Machinists out of Iron Ore of Canada and Wabush Iron, the mostly-American operations that ship Quebec's ore from here to the States, and the docks were still.

At one demonstration, May 10, a man described by the townspeople as a bankrupt Liberal contractor drove wildly into the crowd and injured 35 people, one of whom died. The incident brought an easing of tension between demonstrators and the Sept-Iles police. But the Quebec Provincial Police, who had been tear-gassing from a helicopter, took advantage of this to enter the town, unblock the roads, and begin a round of checks on cars, on citizens, some arrests. There were two or three hundred of them in town, housed at fancy motels and letting it be known that they were in charge.

All was calm in Sept-Iles said the mayor, all was under control in Sept-Iles, said the provincial justice minister, and the strike went on. And also the closing of stores, the one extra gesture that permitted the unions to claim they were

in control of the town.

On the evening of May 11, the workers' local common front prevailed upon the mayor and city council to send a telegram to Premier Bourassa backing all the workers' demands. They also convinced the mayor to order the police to evacuate the radio station (which they had re-captured the day before) "in order that the workers may continue to use it to inform the population."

They also prevailed upon the Mayor to read an order closing down stores and listing which types of services would be allowed to remain open.

The police did not sponsor store reopenings, at least not

at first. They didn't try to end the strike with scabs either. something difficult to do in a big, highly technological layout like Iron Ore.

And so the unions were still half in control of the town that had been opened by Iron Ore of Canada in 1954, the town of 27,000 where they have the highest average income in Quebec. Sept-Iles is a frontier town, young, latetwentieth-century-suburb in its architecture, separatist, well-paid, a union town. Sept-Iles is a town which knows it is exploited, and is mad, but doesn't want to go too far.

The gates of Logistec, one of the stevedoring firms that handle the incoming cargo for the town, the stuff Iron Ore needs to ship out the ore. "There are ships in the harbor waiting to unload," a boss says. "Iron."

"Iron?"

"Iron, sheet iron," The iron ore capital of the north has to import sheet iron.

Guys are around picking up paycheques. One, in a car, with his overalls and cap, shows his cheque: \$411 in two weeks: \$140 tax off. "Don't judge by that, I work on the big cranes, my pay is bigger than average."

What's going on when guys who make \$411 in two weeks close down a town? "Well, it's a revolution. The guys here are fed up. It touches the whole union movement, this Bill

19 and the three chiefs in prison."

Other workers are around, and one has his little girl with him; they put in their bits, all the same basically. Our leaders are in jail; the Common Front got nailed; the construction workers, once at each other's throats, came around Tuesday morning, a few teachers too, asking us to be solidaire; we're not going to fink on that, our own union could be hit, it's too much. We're losing money but we'll be out till it's settled, we're in negotiations now for our contract, and they'll have to produce something good, because despite the high salaries in Sept-Iles, the high prices take back what you gain.

The evening before was spent with Clément Godbout of the Metallos, those United Steelworkers of America with the CIO guts and the Québécois minds. He had said many things. "The future?" he had said. "I see it as all right, because the workers have decided to stop fighting just for more money and have decided to fight for a new society .... What kind of new society? Well, I talk the way I do

for a reason - I'm a socialist.'

His kind of socialism would include the nationalization of resource industries like iron ore, but would also fit in with René Lévesque: when Lévesque came on television that night and said the government should avoid provoking, but the union men should be prudent too, it seemed to go down all right with him.

Then a remarkable meeting with a young machinist out-



The symbol of the Sept-Iles workers

side a church on Sunday, the second-last day of the strike. He chatted before the Provincial Police arrived to check his papers and his trunk for the seventh time; he chatted just as coolly after.

When asked what there was beyond the two Bills and the chiefs, his response was quick: "There's automation. Iron Ore is putting in \$30 million investment next year in new machinery, and in my section, it'll mean guys laid off." He's on the negotiating committee, and later, over beer and coke in the kitchen-living room of his neat-as-a-pin apartment, he and his wife — he's 26, she's 23 — tell more.

"The companies, they have no heart, eh? Acquired rights—they'll try to take them away from you. All that counts for them is the buck. Look, here's the book we negotiate from: present contract—union demand—company offer—result. Here we're still fighting to hang on to things we already had—little things, French as the language which rules in contract interpreting—we haven't even gotten into our demands for new things."

What does he want? To take over the plants, to do away with the boss? "I don't think we want that." What does he want? "Changement. Changement." He says the French word in English, and it is a beautiful word, beautiful but vast. By what agent? "Well, I think the Parti Québécois can do a lot."

Sept-Iles is PQ. That's a background fact to what's happening here, not a key. No René Lévesque portraits, no Patriote flags or tuques. What you hear is more against Coiteux, the Liberal wood merchant who beat separatist Sept-Iles twice, in 1966 and 1970, with votes from the still-alienated Gilles Vigneault fishermen further down the coast, than for the PQ. A few OUI badges from the 1970 PQ campaign are worn, but it is NOUS stickers from the Common Front, and a fist-projecting-from-a-peace-sign symbol of Sept-Ilien design, which prevail.

Valmore Tremblay, who lost to Coiteux in 1970, is still a big man, a curly-headed, plain-talking giant, in workers' councils. But he's thought of less as a PQ man than as a union man, a founder of the Federation des Travailleurs Unis, Sept-Iles' permanent common front of men and women of all the unions and even the non-unionized. Dr. Bainville, the PQ doctor, and Maitre Desrosiers, the PQ lawyer, are

around, advising, getting the arrested unionists bail, yes indeed. But the feel is union. The war is class.

The young machinist tried to answer the question of why the strikers hit the small fry of capitalism hardest. "Well, we've closed down Iron Ore too; what more can we do to them?" he asked. "The stores? We closed Steinberg's because it's anti-union; we left Lamontagne open because it's French-Canadian." But Steinberg's is unionized here.

All this made food scarce on the shelves, and prices high. But prices are always high in Sept-Iles, and it has been known to slip out from the Hudson's Bay Company that Sept-Ilers owe it \$600,000, maybe a million. With husband-and-wife salaries, this couple aren't in debt. But they're in this cramped apartment amid the bungalows, at \$130 a month. Nearer the waterfront Household Finance flashes, and they're building some elegant low-rental blocks. There are slums here; modern slums.

The phone rings. The machinist is up. Something about what to close. "No, that's an essential service. I'd call that an essential service." The mayor has denied the municipal arena to the workers; they have to decide whether to answer the company call back to work for the Monday shifts, and they can't get a hall. In fact, meetings have been few in this strike, manifestoes have been missing, notions of workers controlling without closing-down nobody seems to have.

There will have to be some knitting-together next time; the phone isn't enough, the union offices are too cramped. "No," the Machinist is saying, "I'm not giving the okay. You'll have to get a decision from the committee."

And what about the women? Often they yielded to the men in conversations, but Sept-Iles women are not Quebec mater dolorosas. "My mother is anti-union and she doesn't know why," said the machinist. "She lives in Shawinigan and she thinks it was the unions that ran down Shawinigan, made all that unemployment."

Not so his wife. She's an elementary school teacher, a Common Front militant; she was one of the 72 per cent of Sept-Iles teachers and civil servants who voted to defy the back-to-work law. Teachers are articulate on the modern methods they're supposed to use in too-large classes, on the union principle that's stabbed by Bill 19; often they're like the visitor in the machinist's kitchen who said: "Make sure your reportage is leftist."

Earl Farnham, top man of Iron Ore in Sept-Iles, refuses an interview in the midst of the strain and says: "We're not ashamed of what we're doing here; in fact we're rather proud of it." When all this was over he'd be glad to show a reporter through the plant. Perhaps, as did Quebec-Cartier Mining, the U.S. Steel subsidiary at neighbouring Port-Cartier, he'd give a little plastic package to the visitor: "Iron Ore concentrate/66%"

Now they're back to turning out the 66-percent concentrate here; power is no longer dual. The machinist had another statistic. How many of the men in his plant knew that the owners of this operation were making big, big money? "I'd say 99 per cent."

On May 17, local 5569 of the United Steelworkers of America voted to go back to work in Sept-Iles. But, they said in a resolution adopted at the meeting, "in returning to work, the slaves of the government have lost a battle but not the war. Don't forget, messieurs les ministres, that the roses will re-flower in the new spring."

#### IL N'Y A PLUS D'AVENIR POUR LE QUÉBEC DANS LE SYSTÈME ÉCONOMIQUE ACTUEL



La CSN
propose
un changement
radical

by Ralph Surette

The year of the manifestos

"J' pense qu'on s'en va dans la mauvaise direction" (I think we're going in the wrong direction) this young French Canadian lawyer was saying. His wife had said the same thing in the morning. His mother-in-law in the afternoon. It's a common expression in Quebec these days in certain quarters.

They were commenting on the "direction" the labour movement has taken.

The entire family, however, are avid Parti Québécois supporters. They attended a PQ rally at the Montreal Forum May 6 that drew a crowd which would be formidable even in an electoral year — 22,000 people. They contributed heavily, too, to the amount René Lévesque announced that night had been raised by the PQ in public subscriptions in a fund drive in March — a whopping \$600,000, or twice the stated objective.

The PQ, in short, is a powerful force in Quebec. Its power is not diminishing. It is probably rising.

So is its conservatism.

For only a few days later, slick PQ lawyers were quaking in their pants along with Liberals and stock exchange presidents as the labour unions in turn demonstrated their power with the Common Front strike.

The unions and the PQ represent the two basic directions in which Quebec, constantly in motion, is moving. The only other force that has gained anything in Quebec recently is the far right. A scientific poll taken everywhere in Quebec except Montreal island for Radio-Canada recently showed the Créditistes, despite a leadership split, neck and neck with the Liberals at 30 per cent popularity. The Union Nationale was disintegrating and the PQ had risen slightly since the election.

In the PQ's first flush late in the 1960s, when René Lévesque was still prone to being called "Quebec's Castro" by the business community, it was assumed that the PQ was running on the same track as the more progressive elements of the unions. In fact, if there was any division to be conjured it was that the lethargic workers, satisfied with their union salaries, weren't interested in sacrificing their "standard of living" by firting with separatism. Louis Laberge was happy being part of the AFL-CIO-CLC international union structure, Marcel Pépin was still a moderate union technocrat, the two labour centrals were bickering with each other, and the business community was spared its illusions.

After the 1970 provincial election, when all of the PQ's seven seats came from dispossessed areas, René Lévesque, feeling both thankful and guilty, announced that the PQ would move to the left "to represent the people who voted for us."

It did not.

The first crunch came during the La Presse strike of last October when Lévesque denounced the labour leaders, who had led the October 29 demonstration and personally assaulted police barricades, as a bunch of fanatics. Lévesque got bouquets even from the English-language media for that. Robert Burns, the former CNTU man who sits as a PQ member of the national assembly for Maisonneuve, dared ask what the hell the PQ was good for if it was going to act like just another pack of Liberals. Lévesque told him to get right out of the party if he didn't like it. Burns has been rather silent ever since.

That the PQ and the Common Front are not only moving in different directions, but are on a collision course, has become abundantly evident since the *La Presse* strike in the economic manifestos which both the PQ and the CNTU have published. The QFL also published a manifesto, but

its message is roughly the same as that of the more controversial CNTU one "Ne comptons que sur nos propres moyens" (Let us rely only on our own means — translated into English by Black Rose Books in collaboration with the CNTU) which deals more directly and comprehensively with social issues (its dedication reads: "To the working people of Quebec who will be among the first to establish a libertarian socialist society of workers' self-management").

The PQ economic manifesto, which is to be discussed and voted upon at the party's autumn convention, outlines a program whereby economic independence is supposed to be achieved through strict ownership regulations rather than through nationalization and socialism. It states that independence is a prior condition for this. The burden of repatriating the economy will rest squarely on the plethora of half-state, half-private enterprise institutions that were set up during the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s — Hydro-Quebec, SIDBEC (steel), SOQUEM (mines), SOQUIF (oil), REXFOR (forestry), and particularly the Société Générale de Financement which is the repository for Quebec Pension Plan funds — and which are being progressively dismantled by the present-day Liberals as hindrances to unfettered private enterprise.

The document of the CNTU — which, like the other unions, has never pronounced itself for the independence the PQ wants — does not even mention the nominal borders the PQ wants to set up. It goes to the heart of the matter: it says that Quebec is simply the most exploited area, economically and socially, in the North American corporate plan. And no amount of national borders and tinkering with ownership rules will stop the corporations. Only a transfer of their ownership to the working class will solve the problem.

The CNTU manifesto is based on various economic studies and it lucidly simplifies the economic realities to make them clear to the membership. It makes short work of the PQ's dreams for reviving the Quiet Revolution. It points out that the strong civil service "statist" technocracy that grew up with the Quiet Revolution was simply a would-be French-Canadian capitalist class that was frustrated by the manipulations of Quebec society by American and Anglo-Canadian corporations. These civil servants, along with doctors and lawyers, form the backbone of the PQ.

To demonstrate the different positions of the PQ and CNTU, here are some exerpts from both their manifestoes.

CNTU: (under a heading titled "Self-delusion of the lamb in the face of the wolf") "The economic liberation of Quebec will be accomplished by a system other than capitalism, because a Quebec form of capitalism, whether it is private or state, could do no other than submit to the dictates of the American collosus . . . The great illusion held by those who maintain the thesis that what is needed is an independent capitalist Quebec consists of suggesting that it is possible to civilize foreign capital by imposing limits on its actions . . . But what's in this competition game for the workers? Whether it be private or state capitalism, the fate of the Quebec workers will remain no less tied to the capitalist

labour."

PQ: "At the moment of independence all companies ...

must become incorporated in Quebec ... Each of the stages
to be crossed must be clearly understood by the agents of
economic life ... Corporations have a remarkable faculty

system which will perpetuate the exploitation of their

for adaptation. But they must know to what they will have to adapt."

CNTU: "What would we do in place of the owning class? If workers were to decide the allocation of Quebec's resources, production would have to answer to two objectives:

1) to furnish goods and services in sufficient quantity and quality for all Québécois.

2) to develop production structure in a way that constantly improves the standard of living and to put an end to exploitation of the population's labour by a minority ....

The field in which the working class would neutralize the American giant is that of socialism."

PQ: "It is necessary to establish several categories of foreign capital investment in the Quebec economy According to the nature and activity of the business, it can be permitted or forbidden to be controlled from outside, and in certain cases even exclude all outside interests.

Exclusively Quebec sectors: The first category deals with sectors where foreign interests would be outlawed in just about all its forms ... Examples: the mass media, the distribution of printed matter, books, primary steel works.

Majority Quebec sectors: ... where a certain portion, even an important one, could be foreign controlled, as long as this participation is below 49 per cent. Examples: Banks, trust and insurance companies, railroads and certain manufacturing industries.

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CNTU: "Appropriation of profits and wastage can only be done by nationalizing all the dominant industrial sectors of the economy. Nationalization is the only way which makes it possible to reorient production according to the population's needs: economic decisions cannot be taken in relation to the minority's profit because that systematically ignores the real needs of the population.

Capitalist investment (taking even the profits or, what is worse, even the savings of workers) leads to a production structure with no connection to needs; workers must appropriate the connection of the connect

riate profit for investment according to their priorities.

Similarly, nationalization remains the only effective means of improving working conditions of the workers. History shows that, even at the price of unceasing battles, working conditions remain of little concern to capitalists."

PQ: "Of all companies considered as centres of economic decision-making, the most strategic group is that of financial institutions ... We cannot allow a small group of companies to have a monopoly over government borrowing ... Whatever rearrangement of the financial system is brought about, it must fulfil certain primordial conditions:

-That sums required by government and large companies

be easily acquired ...

-That the individual be able to exercise normal choice between different types of investment . . . .

#### Ottawa: strange games

#### by Robert Chodos

OTTAWA — "I'm surprised the Tories haven't hit Trudeau on this," one political observer was saying. "If what happened in 1970 was an apprehended insurrection, then what's this? You'd think they'd be up there demanding that he step in."

The reticence of the Conservative opposition, which has rarely hesitated in the past to cater to latent anti-Quebec sentiment in English Canada was indeed remarkable. Even John Diefenbaker contented himself with an attack on NDP leader David Lewis for his criticism of the judicial system that had sent the three leaders of Quebec's Common Front to jail for a year.

But the game that Prime Minister Trudeau and his government were playing was even stranger.

"The cause of the present disorders," Trudeau told a Toronto Star interviewer May 17, "are labour difficulties, whereas the cause of the disorders in October, 1970 were not things you could solve by increasing the minimum wage or by signing a contract. The disorders of October, 1970 were caused by people who said, 'We want the state to capitulate and hand over authority to us.' Which is not what the union workers are saying in Quebec, although some leaders may be saying it."

The attempt to separate workers from leaders is predictable. The cocksure, almost contemptuous downplaying of what the strikes of April and May involved is not.

And more surprising still was a statement by Regional Economic Expansion Minister Jean Marchand, Trudeau's Quebec lieutenant and the man who warned of a *felquiste* under every bed in October 1970.

Speaking in Joliette, Quebec, about 40 miles north of Montreal, Marchand told reporters that he understood why the Quebec government, given the situation with which it was faced, would have resorted to special legislation to end

the civil service strike. Understood, but did not approve. He noted that the federal government, in similar situations, used the instrument of compulsory arbitration instead.

Marchand and members of his staff later denied that he had intended any criticism of the Bourassa government and Bill 19. One official said that the minister had only set out the possible methods by which Bourassa could have dealt with the strike.

If it wasn't criticism, it was too close to it for the Bourassa government to take much comfort. Nor could it take comfort from another statement of Trudeau's in the *Toronto Star* interview

Asked what he thought the effects would be if he called a federal election with Quebec in "semi-turmoil", Trudeau replied, "It's hard to say but my guess would be that it would rather serve the cause of federalism, and hopefully of our government, to have that kind of election, because I think that the people of Quebec want to be reassured that there is at least one strong government somewhere. And if we are campaigning in Quebec and saying: 'Look, you may be having troubles locally but don't worry; the country is in good strong hands; please vote for us,' I think it wouldn't be disadvantageous to us."

There is little consistency to the various federal government statements. Marchand obliquely says that Bourassa acted too strongly, Trudeau (who like Marchand later denied he had meant to criticize the premier's handling of the crisis) obliquely says he didn't act strongly enough. But one point of consistency is a complete absence of enthusiastic support for the Quebec government's position. In the midst of it all came a federal budget that was widely interpreted in Quebec as an intrusion into provincial areas of jurisdiction, that helped trigger the threatened and almost consummated resignations of two key Quebec cabinet ministers, and that

-That a certain level of competition be maintained between financial institutions."

CNTU: "How to nationalize: Nationalization of the means of production should take account of two principles: our real ability to manage the economy and the political situation at every moment of the building of socialism . . . .

First of all, we must nationalize according to our ability to assume the management of of nationalized industries; frequently, too hasty nationalization created more problems than were solved because of the losses caused by inability to manage the industries.

But the political situation can impose hasty nationalizations; for example, the bourgeoisie might oppose the building of socialism and try to sabotage the workers' efforts by exporting their industries' profits or by refusing to collaborate with nationalized industries. Thus it would be necessary to nationalize these enterprises, and the losses due to "bad management" would thus become the "Apprenticeship cost" to free itself from capitalism . . . .

The sectors controlled by American imperialists should be nationalized rapidly .... Priority sectors of the economy to be nationalized are those in which American and Anglo-

Canadian monopolies reign as kings."

PQ: "Among all the economic agents which participate in the plan (the PQ plan), two are of exceptional importance: the state, because the equivalent of one third of the GNP is in its hands, and businesses, because they control the major part of investments."

weakened further the struggling Liberal government in Quebec City.

Another consistent point is a prudent staying away from the demagogic, what-kind-of-people-are-we-dealing-with language that marked the interventions of the federal government, and Trudeau in particular, into the October 1970 crisis. The government was decidedly reluctant to unleash the kind of hysteria that sent its popularity soaring at that time — perhaps because it knew it couldn't.

In fact, the one organized voice in English Canada on the current situation in Quebec was a voice of support.

It came from the Canadian Labour Congress, whose biennial convention in Ottawa happened to coincide with the strikes in Quebec. On its first day, the convention unanimously passed a resolution condemning Bill 19 and the jailing of trade unionists, expressing support for "the legi-

timate collective bargaining objectives" of the Quebec workers, and calling for "immediate action . . . . to enlist support for those who have been victimized."

There was no one in the convention who was not willing to express at least verbal support; there were many who thought that the resolution did not go far enough. The main question was how to interpret the call for immediate action. Some delegates talked of pulling the whole convention out of the Ottawa Civic Centre and march down to Parliament Hill or across the Ottawa river to Hull, but no real groundswell for such a march developed.

"There was some confusion," said George Gilks, a delegate from United Steelworkers local 1005 in Hamilton and one of the few supporters of the NDP's Waffle group at the convention, "whether that phrase about immediate action meant right now or on the local level after the convention. I talked to a large number of delegates, both from Quebec and from English Canada, and found them divided. The Quebec people had some strategy of their own and weren't sure they wanted a march by us now, and the English-speaking delegates probably would have followed the lead of the Quebec delegates but weren't prepared to act on their own."

If there was to be any action, the impetus would have had to come from the leadership of the Congress, and that impetus was not forthcoming. Homer Stevens, president of the non-CLC-affiliated United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union and an observer at the convention, attributed this to "the total absence of any real leadership in this Congress." The resolution had satisfied the demand for a stand by the CLC, and for president Donald MacDonald and his colleagues, that was enough.

After the resolution carried, most of the Quebec delegates went home, and the rest of the convention passed with only sporadic interest expressed in the Quebec struggle. David Lewis, who had strongly condemned the jailings in his speech to the Steelworkers' policy conference less than a week before, spoke to the CLC May 18 and failed even to mention Quebec.

There seemed to be little likelihood that much would be done after the convention either. Because repressive labour legislation and jail sentences for defying injunctions were things that had occurred in British Columbia and Nova Scotia and elsewhere as well as Quebec, English-Canadian workers could be stirred to a show of support.

But they could not be stirred much beyond that. Like most other English Canadians, English Canadian workers were playing it cool.



#### Stephen Lewis's war with the Waffle

#### Double, double, toil and trouble

f the NDP leadership gets its way this June, the spectre of the Waffle will be haunting somebody else this summer, and by next year it will be a colorful footnote in the pastel pink history of Canadian social democracy. If, that is, things go according to plan.

Ontario leader Stephen Lewis launched the purge campaign last March with a speech that took the Waffle by surprise with its vehemence and effectiveness. Backed by the Ontario caucus, labour heavies like Steel's Larry Sefton and Auto's Dennis MacDermott and their men, and doubtlessly the blessing of David Lewis, Stephen fired the opening volley in what former deputy leader Walter Pitman calls "a civil war" in the NDP.

Since the fall of 1969, the Waffle has been a painful thorn to the party leadership. The so-called harmless and naive academics proved they could organize. They demonstrated that the party at least in the East was in a state approaching political rigor mortis. The Waffle generally breathed a little new life into the flagging body.

The Waffle presented a competent and erudite leadership in Mel Watkins and Jim Laxer, and demonstrated that it could play political marbles as well as the big boys. Laxer, in coming second for the NDP leadership, proved the Waffle was becoming a rallying point for anti-leadership forces, and a credible alternative to the present leadership.

The media, grasping at anything to embarrass the NDP, gave the Waffle quite a build-up. It's hard to determine to what degree the Waffle is partially a creature of the media; let's just say it had good breaks and knew how to take advantage of them.

The Waffle grew in maturity when it showed it derived its support not only from the younger crowd but from another constituency — the old-time party activist — the person who hustles the raffle tickets, pushes the leaflets and does the canvassing. As one prominent Waffle ill-wisher said: "The section of the party that is most vulnerable to the Waffle are the old CCFers who have stuck with the party through the lean years. They are attracted by the eager activity of the Waffle, its militant rhetoric and simplistic answers and formulas."

All this was disconcerting enough to the party leadership, but then the Waffle farted in church.

At the last convention of the Ontario Federation of Labour, the Waffle labour caucus made its appearance. It was shot down in flames then, and did no better at the May CLC convention, but it demonstrated that it was serious about organizing within the Canadian labour movement. The leaders of the large internationals like Steel and Auto, who have been sitting for years on rank and file discontent that's been waiting to be articulated, blew the whistle. Perhaps they see something we don't, because the Waffle's inroads into labour have been, to be generous, rather modest. But let the labour brass be the best judge of its own insecurity.

So it came to pass that Stephen Lewis packed the provincial council meeting in March and declared with furrowed brow: "This is undoubtedly the most difficult speech I've had to make in the party in my short tenure as leader. I have

worried about it and wrestled with its contents for some weeks, and I suppose that it wasn't until putting pen to paper last night that everything finally took shape. Even so, I approach this report to council with a necessary mixture of resolve and trepidation."

He blasted the Waffile on four points: human relationships, structure, labour and ideology.

On the first point, "human relationships," Lewis attacked the Waffle for fostering anger, bitterness, intolerance, and generally destroying the friendly attitude that is supposed to surround the NDP. He quoted an article he once read that argues democratic socialism should "create a society ... of people who treat each other with the same respect and trust as we would today treat those individuals whom we choose for our friends. I like that", he said.

On the second point, "structure", Lewis argued that the Waffle has an elaborate machinery of steering committees and mailing lists and conferences and that it's a "highly organized internal group whose structures and activities are often competitive with those of the party ..." Lewis is particularly rankled by statements, pamphlets and press conferences by the Waffle which he charges create confusion in the public's mind about who is the NDP and who isn't, and what it does and doesn't stand for. On this point, probably, some substantial compromise could be arrived at.

The longest and most vehement part of Lewis' speech attacked the Waffle for its "sneering, contemptuous attitude towards official trade unionism and the labour leadership."

He went on: "The vocabulary used is mocking and scornful, replete with all the rhetoric about old-time, right-wing, reactionary, establishment, bureaucratic, power hungry pork-choppers — or brass, the terms are interchangeable. Every article and every pronouncement has to include this ritual and gratuitous abuse."

The last point, "ideology", Lewis admits is the least of the problems, He attacks the Waffle, predictably, for dogmatism, rigidity, etc. He observed that "I think it's time for a re-definition of democratic socialism in Canada and Ontario for the 1970's and beyond. I would love to see the process launched. I personally haven't found time to set down better precepts ...."

The centrality of the labour issue to this battle is confusing. The Waffle isn't within a mile of threatening the CLC establishment. Either the labour leadership is plagued with paranoia, and is extremely thin-skinned, or there is more to it. Although they would no doubt love to have the Waffle expunged, it's by no means certain that the Ontario union leadership initiated the purge against the Waffle. Some centre-left people in the party assert that Lewis initiated it all single-handedly and made sure that he lined up a labour cheering section to make it look like he was just acting on behalf of the labour brass.

As Michael Cross pointed out in Canadian Forum: "Anyone familiar with the chaos that is the Waffle can appreciate the hilarity of Lewis' portrayal of its tight and brilliant organization. And he rose to comic heights when he con-

#### If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well it were done quickly. -Macbeth

trasted this with the poor, oppressed trade union leadership."

In fact, the considerations might have had little to do with labour. Ever since Laxer finished a respectable second to David Lewis in the leadership race, it was obvious he or Watkins might well gain the eventual succession to Lewis. If a decision was made to get rid of the Waffle someday, perhaps this March just came up as a question of timing. Besides, if Watkins or Laxer were going to win their seats in the next federal election, the results inside the NDP may have been too ghastly for the leadership to contemplate. Also, in October the Ontario party is having its convention. Last time, the Waffle rounded up around one third of the delegate votes. The time to knock out the Waffle might well have to be before this next convention, where it might show itself too strong to knock out.

Time is clearly not on the side of the party and trade

union leaderships.

The Waffle has responded to the charges that it is an organized group within the party by justifying its existence as the only effective means by which policy disagreements can be effectively pursued. "Without a structure the Waffle could not exist," they say. Since the Waffle has announced that it intends to continue, that would seem to be that.

At the provincial council meeting at the end of June, the Waffle could be ordered to dismember its structure. If it refused, as its leaders claim it would, then perhaps some of the Waffle leaders would be expelled from the party and that would take care of the Waffle.

That, at least, seems to be the approaching collision of steam engines in store for the NDP.

But there is a substantial third area that may tip the scales

A scheme has been proposed by Desmond Morton, and backed by former provincial secretary John Harney and Walter Pitman and much of the "centre-left". It suggests "affiliated organization" status to the Waffle, which would permit it independence of action, and also not tar the NDP with its brush when it made statements. Trade unions have an affiliation mechanism with the NDP. So far this suggestion has been cold-shouldered by the Stephen Lewis forces, though the Waffle would probably go along with it.

The battle is doing serious damage to the party. Some candidates have said they might withdraw from the federal election race if the Waffle is forced out. Some party resignations would be expected. In the meantime, out in Saskatchewan, pressure has been exerted on Premier Blakeney to tell Stephen Lewis to cool it. While such an appeal will probably never materialize, support for the Ontario executive and Stephen Lewis has, except for the CLC brass, been extremely muted. The provincial caucus is going along, but there are several members of the federal caucus who are visibly and vocally upset.

As Walter Pitman wrote in the Toronto Star:

...the party is in a state of agony! Many members are not Waffle, but are heartsick over the idea that anyone, especially those so committed to the socialist cause, should



be drummed out on the basis of their expression of that commitment."

This points to that third area of the party which has no love for the Waffle, but also has an axe out for Lewis. In a toe to toe battle at the end of June at the provincial council, so heavily weighted with votes from the labour establishment, it seems the Waffle would lose. But biding their time, this third section of the party may make a move if the split gets out of control. A number of people seem to be helping Stephen Lewis get out on the limb, and maybe one will have a saw. The game now going on in the NDP is one any number can play.

Most leading Wafflers refuse to discuss their plans after the showdown is forced in June. "We are fighting to win a majority to defeat the executive's recommendations" they say, oozing determination and confidence something like a punctured tire oozes air.


The problem is that the Waffle is by no means a homogeneous group. Laxer, in his reply to a party commission report, claims that "the Waffle formed a clear break with the various strains of American New Leftism that had dominated the Canadian scene since the early sixties." Maybe that is true, but the evidence is not overwhelming, because the Waffle does represent an alliance with a lot of new left types. There is always pressure on Laxer and Watkins personally to prove they aren't "sellouts to Social Democracy", and there is always pressure of a more serious nature within the Waffle to charge off to greet the Red Dawn alone.

Regardless of the pressures within the Waffle, the group is, as Laxer says, "a product of the social and intellectual currents of the 1960's." These currents are reflected now in the Waffle and in the NDP. There is no way that this can be obliterated by commissions or purges.

In Ontario, this time, Stephen Lewis may well win the battle with the Waffle, but will probably go on from there, as is his wont, to lose the war for the NDP.

This article was written by the Toronto staff of the Last Post.

Why Ottawa hands out money, and where it goes



Bobert Chodos

# The business of Jean Marchand is business.

# No one believes in Santa Claus ...any more

Early this year, a frustrated applicant for a federal grant was startled to see a familiar figure — short, sandy-gray-haired, mustached — in front of him on a Montreal street. He blocked Jean Marchand's path and told him "I'm having a lot of trouble with your department."

"So am I," said the Minister of Regional Economic Expansion, brushing the applicant aside and stepping into a wait-

ing car

Marchand's direct encounters with the public tend to be that way — the clever throwaway line, deceptively candid, sometimes offensive, but more often disarming. His two best-known punch lines are the straight-faced accusation during the October crisis that Montreal's municipal opposition party FRAP was a front for the FLQ, and his remark that what he liked best about Ottawa was the train to Montreal.

The public face of the department over which Marchand

presides is different.

A red-black-and-white billboard, in any number of towns in Quebec or the Atlantic provinces, announces that the school, road or sewer system under construction is another project of the Government of Canada, department of regional economic expansion. A press release, faithfully reproduced in the local paper, says that thanks to \$37,400 of the department's money, some enterprising company is going to build a factory in Three Rivers, or Sherbrooke, or Truro, and create jobs for 24 people.

The basic message is JOBS.

Marchand's public image has always been mixed because of his unusual style. As a Quebec labour leader, as a minister in the Pearson Cabinet, as one of the most prominent men in the Trudeau government, he has been highly successful in making enemies as well as friends.

But there was no such mixed image of the department of regional economic expansion (known as DREE) when it was set up in 1969. Its creation fulfilled one of the few pledges Pierre Elliott Trudeau had bothered to make in his "no promises" election campaign the previous year. After his election sweep, Trudeau asked his long-time friend and principal lieutenant Marchand what portfolio he wanted. Marchand asked for DREE and got it.

The new department was seen everywhere as a sign of hope — especially in Atlantic Canada, where regional underdevelopment is most deeply rooted. There had been despair over the failure of earlier attempts by the federal

government to help lagging regions. DREE was to be different. Instead of small, jerry-built programs there was to be an all-out attack on one of the major weaknesses of Canadian confederation. Ottawa promised regional equality and, not surprisingly, there was little public criticism of the new department for two years, while people waited for the promises to be fulfilled.

Then, in late 1971, the honeymoon came to an end. Where there had been eager waiting, suddenly there was a series

of broadsides against the department.

The most widely publicized criticism came from the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC) — an organization sponsored by the four provincial governments and by private individuals. It devoted its fifth annual review of the Atlantic economy, released last October, entirely to the work of DREE.

APEC does not quarrel with everything. It accepts the idea of a federal department for regional development, and asks for a ten-year guarantee that DREE will get enough money to continue. Further, it accepts the main instrument the department uses in trying to carry out its aims — grants to private corporations.

But, APEC complains, the department's programs are badly planned, subject to political pressure, administered by a bureaucracy that is too centralized and too unresponsive.

It feels that it's "next to impossible" to find out how large a grant has to be to convince a firm to locate in a particular area. It says the advantages that DREE supposedly gives the Atlantic provinces —by allowing maximum grants there to be higher than in other areas — are more apparent than real, since the department rarely gives the maximum grant anyway. It notes that these advantages, such as they were, were further eroded by the decision to make the highly-developed Montreal region eligible for DREE grants, as of January 1, 1971. APEC also attacks the government's concentration on infrastructure — developers' jargon for public works — which it says does not directly contribute to regional economies. It suggests these projects are chosen because they are highly visible and show men and machines at work.

Further, it says Marchand's wide powers leave his department open to political pressure, maintains that planning for the Atlantic provinces cannot be done effectively from far-away Ottawa, and asks for a regional office to carry out all DREE activities for the area.

Finally, APEC points out the contradiction of a federal government, at one and the same time, cooling down the national economy to fight inflation while it is trying to build

up the economies of underdeveloped regions.

Marchand himself, in his backhanded way, lent support to this criticism on December 13 when he told the House of Commons that "a distinction should after all be made between the general policy of the government in the economic field and the activity of the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, which, of course, can be affected by the general policy, but which has so far been very effective."

Heavy criticism from one of the main areas of the country supposedly being helped by the DREE programs was bad enough, but more was to come. A few weeks after the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council report, a similar document was made public by the Quebec Federation of Labour, whose new political consciousness was just beginning to surface.

Marchand and Trudeau have been particularly sensitive to criticisms of the department that come from Quebec, which is widely regarded as DREE's favoured child. When Premier Robert Bourassa told Trudeau last November that Ottawa's campaign against regional inequality had accomplished little, the prime minister, according to Arthur Blakely of the *Montreal Gazette*, "reacted with shocked dis-

belief."

The Quebec Federation of Labour report does more than just echo APEC's criticisms. It goes further and attacks the whole concept of the giveaway policy. It says DREE has not changed the structure of the Quebec economy (just as APEC said about the Atlantic economy). It says DREE has perpetuated outside control of Quebec's economy, that it has neglected the poorest parts of the province in favour of those that are economically stronger, and that the new employment it creates is often offset by layoffs or shutdowns elsewhere, sometimes in the same companies that get the grants. Government grants, it says, have eliminated the

risk factor from private enterprise — the usual justification for private profit.

The QFL's onslaught against DREE concludes that small and medium-sized companies cannot meet the challenge of regional development, and that for large enterprises, the government grants are gifts, pure and simple.

Attacks on DREE continued to pop up at an increasing rate. Ottawa's own Science Council said that regional incentives were only making inefficient industries even more inefficient. "There is a place for small-scale manufacturing in the less-developed provinces," it said in its report on Canadian manufacturing, "as the success of many companies attests. Manufacturing industry is not, however, the ultimate solution to the development of these areas, since it fails to make use of their inherent advantages."

The next major blow-up came over the Atlantic Develop-

#### The message was clear

There is a general impression in Ottawa that Maritimers and Newfoundlanders are not only poor, but are incapable of understanding the reasons for their poverty, and that all wisdom about the Atlantic provinces comes from outside the region.

But in fact, Ottawa has been a good ten years behind the Atlantic area in coming up with ideas for economic development. While the federal government was setting up a series of unrelated, ineffective agencies in the early and middle sixties, Atlantic economists had long been urging a co-ordinated approach that emphasized secondary manufacturing. Some of their ideas finally became federal policy in 1969 when DREE was set up. Many have still not been adopted.

The most consistent voice on regional development has been the respected Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, founded in Fredericton in 1954. In report after report, it has hammered home its message for more than a decade.

As Larry Hudson, mayor of Marystown, Newfoundland, and the province's vice-president of the Council, said recently: "APEC is basically responsible for the recognition by Ottawa of regional disparity. It was through its efforts that the Atlantic Development Board was founded and eventually the department of regional economic expansion."

The core of the APEC message is that if anything is to be done about low incomes, chronic unemployment, out-migration and the other signs of economic sickness, a new source of jobs has to be found. And that new source has to go beyond the region's established, resource-based activities.

In a 1962 pamphlet, Incentives for Manufacturing Industries, the Council noted that more than 25,000 jobs had disappeared in resource-based industries between 1951 and 1957. It said: "This general tendency for the demand for labour in the primary industries to diminish can be expected to continue." The answer lay in manufacturing, despite poor performance in the 1951-57 period.

APEC had to face the problem that, all other things being equal, a manufacturer would rather set up in southern Ontario or parts of Quebec or British Columbia. It suggested incentives to get over this hurdle: industrial estates, loans and grants for equipment, tax concessions, vocational and technical training programs, transportation assistance.

It recommended that particular emphasis be placed on developing "key" or "cornerstone" industries, which would help to attract other industries. It also advised concentrating industries in selected areas, so they could use common services. In a later (1965) pamphlet, it suggested these areas might be Halifax-Truro, Sydney-Glace Bay, Saint John, Moncton, Bathurst-Belldune, Charlottetown, St. John's and Corner Brook.

Another recurring refrain: "A development program for Canada's four eastern provices must be bold, massive and well co-ordinated. Government must take the initiative and it is imperative that the federal government be active in formulating, financing and administering a regional development program."

Other economists were saying the same thing. At APEC's urging, two eminent British economists, A. K. Cairncross and Thomas Wilson, did separate studies and came up with similar recommendations.

The provincial governments had their own schemes, and these were having mixed success. Newfoundland made the first attempt in the early fifties, but Premier Joey Smallwood's early industries had mostly sunk without a trace, taking with them the surplus the province had had when it joined Canada in 1949. Nova Scotia's Industrial Estates Limited and the New Brunswick Deelopment Corporation, both children of the late fifties, had not been so disastrous and had attracted some lasting industry. But both had a habit of being taken to the cleaners by sharpies from Ontario or the U.S. looking for a fast buck. The notorious heavy water plant at Glace Bay was only one of several large projects that went sour. None of these schemes was the "bold, massive, and well co-ordinated" program APEC was calling for.

In the meantime, what was Ottawa doing?

One early comment came from the 1957 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, chaired by Walter Gordon. It recommended federal spending on infrastructure in the Atlantic provinces, and hoped investment would increase to meet employment needs. But if develop-

ment Council's ten-year strategy for the Atlantic region.

The ADC is an advisory group, made up of people in the Atlantic provinces, and responsible to DREE. It had submitted its strategy to Marchand in January 1971. This recommended that the main objectives for the next ten years should be "to achieve adequate employment opportunities for the region's population", to reduce the rate at which people were moving away from the area, and to "bring about structural changes in the economy which will ensure for the future a high and self-sustaining level of activity."

How should this be done? The Atlantic Development Council said the need was to develop manufacturing, and particularly secondary manufacturing; complexes of related industries should be emphasized. Although it said that resource-based industries should also be "systematically explored and promoted", the ADC declared these would not

provide enough jobs by themselves. In fact, as these were rationalized, there would be a loss in jobs that would have to be made up elsewhere.

The targets set by the ADC were 170,000 jobs by 1981, with 50,000 of them in the manufacturing sector, and \$25 billion in capital investment. It emphasized the importance of these targets as "a guide to public policy", as a "challenge" to "each individual and business organization", and as "a yardstick against which public and private actions can be measured."

The ADC strategy was based on what Atlantic economists had been saying for years. And since the ADC was responsible to DREE, it was regarded with some hope in the region.

Marchand made no comment for almost a year. Then, on January 14 of this year, he told the ADC that he was accepting the plan.

# but Ottawa wouldn't listen



The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council has consistently been ten years ahead of Ottawa when it comes to ideas for the economic development of the region.

ment did not pick up, it suggested helping people to move away. This was greeted with an angry outcry, and Ottawa quickly dropped the idea.

Ottawa's first concrete step was the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (ARDA), a creation of John Diefenbaker's remarkable agriculture minister, Alvin Hamilton. The goal of ARDA, and its spin-off, the Fund for Rural Economic Development (FRED), was to redevelop depressed rural areas, to improve use of rural land and retrain rural people.

In 1962 the Diefenbaker government, in its dying days, established the Atlantic Development Board (ADB) to advise on the region. After Lester Pearson's election in 1963, the ADB was given a fund of \$100 million — later increased to \$150 million — to spend. The Pearson government also introduced the concept of handouts to new industries in designated areas in 1963, when it brought in the Area Development Act (ADA).

These remained the instruments of Ottawa's develop-

ment effort in the Atlantic provinces until 1969. Not even their defenders would claim they were an adequate

The agencies were totally unco-ordinated with one another, let alone with other federal policies. ARDA came under the agriculture department, and later the forestry and rural development department; ADA reported to the industry department; the ADB to the minister of transport.

The Area Development Act was meant to reduce unemployment, not to promote regional development, so the designated regions left out the most promising growth areas. All Nova Scotia was named — except for Halifax-Dartmouth. In New Brunswick, Saint John was off the list. Because of this and other weaknesses, only about a third of the new jobs were in the Atlantic provinces, even though 45 per cent of the people living in designated areas were in that region. The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council said flatly in 1968 that "the designated area program falls short of being a development program at all."

Meanwhile, the Atlantic Development Board spent most of its money on public works — largely power and highway projects — although it did give assistance to fish plants at Georgetown, P.E.I. and Canso, N.S.

But the ADB's most conspicuous failure involved a 1964 amendment to the act under which it had been set up. This made it responsible for preparing an overall plan for the economic growth of the Atlantic region, in co-operation with the Economic Council of Canada.

The plan never appeared. The ADB never even set the goals a plan might aim for. Its staff of economists came from all over the country and from abroad, including many former Regina civil servants drawn to Ottawa after the 1964 defeat of the CCF in Saskatchewan — but there were few Maritimers. The economists continued to ignore advice from the region. Expensive studies from consulting firms continued to pile up on the shelf.

Five years of these federal agencies left little to show. At the accession of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968, hardly a dent had been made in regional inequality, or in Atlantic resentment of federal policies. The piecemeal approach

had been tried - and found wanting.

"We wholeheartedly agree," he said "with the essence of this strategy. Much of what my Department has done in its relatively short life has been consistent with it." But he refused to accept the targets set by the Council. Too many unknowns, he said ... depends on performance of national and international economies ... more effective decision-making needed. At a subsequent press conference, he tossed off a disparaging remark about promising jobs, noting Premier Bourassa's ill-fated promise to create 100,000 jobs in Quebec by the end of 1971.

The chairman of the ADC, William Smith, sat next to Marchand, visibly disappointed. He gently chided the minister for not accepting some targets, so that there would be some way of knowing if the department's policies had succeeded or failed. The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council

followed with another broadside in its monthly newsletter, saying that Marchand's refusal to accept the targets was "as inexplicable as it is disappointing.

"It calls into question once again the federal government's dedication to the long-term development of the Atlantic Provinces on a planned and orderly basis and reinforces the suspicion that DREE is nothing more than a well-financed give-away program to be extended or contracted according to the economic and political exigencies of the moment."

Marchand continued to take credit for accepting the ADC strategy; his critics continued to attack his department for not accepting the core of the that strategy, the targets.

It was back to square one.

# **Battle of the Ottawa whiz kids**



Tom Kent: he and Jean Marchand formed one of the highest-powered political teams in Ottawa.

The structure and programs of the department of regional economic expansion bear the personal stamp of their creator — Tom Kent

Like Jean Marchand, Kent came to DREE from the department of manpower and immigration, which they had set up together in 1966. Until the combo was broken up by Kent's departure to Sydney under cloudy circumstances in the fall of 1971, to become president of the Cape Breton Development Corporation (one report is that Trudeau ordered his removal because of his persistent internal criticism of the government's unemployment policies), Marchand and Kent formed one of the highest-powered political teams in Ottawa.

Kent did not come into the bureaucracy through the usual route, and has never been far away from the political side of things. He ran unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate in British Columbia in 1963, then was top adviser to Prime Minister Pearson before his stint at manpower. In 1968, he was part of a group of left-of-centre Liberals who would have preferred to see Marchand, rather than Trudeau, succeed Pearson as Liberal leader. Recent reports have Kent still harbouring political ambitions of his own.

Marchand declined to run for the leadership in '68, citing poor health, and supported Trudeau instead. With Trudeau's victory, he emerged with greatly increased power. Now he is Liberal campaign chairman for Quebec, overseeing all the money that comes into party coffers in the province — and all the federal money that goes out.

The structure of DREE is horizontal: each major division of the department reports directly to the deputy minister. And when the deputy minister was Tom Kent, there was little communication among those divisions.

That is the way Kent liked it. Kent is a man who wants to feel close to the programs he oversees. If there was going to be a thumb on the activities, that thumb had to be his. So if a major effort involved more than one division, Kent was always the lynch-pin. Much the way a trans-ocean television signal has to bounce up to a satellite and be beamed back to earth, communication in DREE had to move up to Kent and back down to the proper place.

The programs show the same evidence of Kent. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of people in regional develop-

ment planning. First, there are the ones who like to labour long and hard to produce a development plan for an area, a plan that covers all the major bases; then, and only then, the spending starts. The other kind are the ones who are impatient with the delays of long planning; they want to spend fast and get something — anything — moving.

Kent clearly falls into the latter camp and he is often scornful of the former. When Trudeau took over the Liberal Party in 1968, this conflict was one of the first he had to

deal with as he went into his first election.

It might have been simply a minor skirmish in the ongoing bureaucratic warfare that is Ottawa. But it was not. The whole argument was thrown into sharp relief by the fact that the first group also had a powerful advocate, Len Poetschke.

Kent and Poetschke come through as classic antagonists. In many ways, they are similar. Both are tall, lean, darkhaired; the most striking thing about them is that they are so much alike. Without dispute, both are clever — even brilliant—policymakers and theoreticians. Each, in his own way, has charisma of a sort. They inspired some deep loyalties in their followers.

Their opening bout came a few days after Trudeau had called the 1968 election; the new prime minister obviously wanted to make some firm statement on regional development to follow up the flowery rhetoric of his leadership cam-

paign.

On May 7, 1968, Poetschke's group of planners from the old department of forestry and rural development submitted a memo to Cabinet. It argued that government structures were inadequate to deal with the new problems which the economy was throwing at them. Departments were organized narrowly on different sectors; but the problems to be solved spanned several sectors.

They argued for more integration of economic development programs, more flexibility in the programs and a policy that would involve the government in an attempt to

influence broad trends in the economy.

Specifically, they wanted a Developmental Planning Board made up of Cabinet ministers from the main economic portfolios. Working with the board would be a Planning and Program Development Group of top civil servants. The Board would make the policies and the group would coordinate the work of departments and help them come up with programs to carry out the policies.

In each department, there would be a small planning group which would "bring the departments fully into the process of program formulation and implementation on an integrated basis." The central group would act as the point

of contact with the provinces.



Received three grants totalling \$7.1 million while George McClure was with DREE. On August 1, 1970, McClure left the department to accept an executive position with McCain's.

# IBM.

"Needs a grant from the Canadian taxpayer like I don't know who needs what."

This would ensure "close and continuing communication" and "the Cabinet, rather than being at the pinnacle of a vast administrative hierarchy, assumes a position at the

centre of the decision-making process."

The memo contains an understandable amount of salesmanship of the soft-sell variety. The proposals, it said, "can produce, with a minimum of disruption, the changes in the organization needed to anticipate and solve multidimensional problems before they reach crisis proportions; to identify potential development situations; and to ensure that such situations are exploited quickly and in a manner which is in accord with the national interest."

Poetschke's group knew they were asking a lot. In fact, they almost conceded defeat before they began by pointing out to the cabinet the ramifications of their proposal.

"The implications of this approach are far reaching. Governments must be prepared to concern themselves, first, with the substance of problems and, only at a later stage, with the division of jurisdictional and financial responsibility.

"The main concerns are to ensure that no important program and policy areas are overlooked because of jurisdictional limitations; that all alternatives are explored in the development of programs . . and that the necessary integration is achieved for effective implementation."

In simpler terms, the planners were saying "think before you spend", "don't make piecemeal decisions", "figure out where you're going before you start arguing with the prov-

inces".

Kent, more politically sensitive than Poetschke, was on the other side of the argument. And that side was saying "Time's a-wastin'". The Liberals had an election to fight and you don't fight elections on a platform of Developmental Planning Boards and Planning and Programming Development Groups.

Three days after the Poetschke memo went to Cabinet, Trudeau announced that regional development programs would be pulled together in a single department after the election. He specifically singled out the Atlantic provinces as the chief raison d'etre for the new department. "The net result of this," he said, "would be to ensure an accelerated economic growth in the region affected and a much more effective use of resources."

Perhaps it was Trudeau's newness to government that led him to think that yet another shuffling of civil servants into yet another bureaucratic configuration would "ensure"

faster economic growth.

In any case, the upshot of all this was DREE and after the election the team of Marchand and Kent was sent in to do the job.

# The great Canadian DREE machine

Marchand and Kent had a lot of rhetoric to live up to. Promises to end regional disparities had been around for a long time. Trudeau had voiced them again, in a comment that convinced even some cynics that this time the Liberals meant what they said:

"If the underdevelopment of the Atlantic provinces is not corrected — not by charity or subsidies but by helping them become areas of economic growth — then the unity of the country is almost as surely destroyed as it would be by the French-English confrontation."

That one statement has been quoted again and again in the Atlantic provinces, at first by everyone who had high hopes of a government deeply committed to helping the area. Later, it was cited by Liberals as they defended DREE against its critics, and by those critics as they tried to demonstrate the gap between what Trudeau said and what his government did.

The promise of a strong commitment was not just a oneshot affair. In March 1969, Trudeau wrote in the Atlantic Advocate: "I have begun by trying to make clear the central place that regional development occupies in our whole thinking about the future of Canada, about our national life and identity, about our fundamental purposes and the political institutions we need for them."

It was up to Marchand and Kent to make good on those promises.

The philosophy behind the programs they produced was far less subtle than the Poetschke approach. At all costs, the government at least had to appear to be doing something. And that meant that Ottawa had to spend money in very visible ways. It had to be able to make grand announcements and put up billboards at projects it was funding. It still does.

In some circles, this is known as the manure theory of development: spread enough money around and something is bound to grow. But of course no government can announce a program stated that crudely.

So it took Marchand-Kent a year to launch their first major initiative — the Regional Development Incentives

DREE's assistant deputy minister for co-ordination is 31-year-old Rod Bryden, who came to Ottawa after helping Otto Lang get elected in Saskatoon-Humboldt in 1968. Lang had him appointed a \$100-a-day - later \$150-a-day — consultant to the grains group he set up to study the problems of the grains industry. He moved over to DREE to do a major study of the Halifax-Dartmouth area, taking time out to run his brother John's almost-successful campaign for the leadership of the New Brunswick Liberal Party in the fall of 1971. Then he became national director of the Local Initiatives Program, established under Lang as manpower minister; now he takes a slight cut in salary as he moves back to DREE. One of his first acts in his new job has been to hire Tom Kent's old adversary, Len Poetschke.

Act (RDIA), which replaced the old Area Development Agency program. Kent's major beef with ADA was that it ran on a rigid formula locked into law; if a company's proposal met those statutory requirements, it got a grant, no matter what the civil servants or politicians thought.

Kent wanted something more flexible; he wanted more say in who got money, where it was going, what kind of projects it was funding. The solution? A few limitations and leave the rest to ministerial discretion.

Under RDIA a wide swath of the country was made a designated region. It covered all the Atlantic provinces except Labrador, most of Quebec outside Montreal, northern Ontario, the southern Prairies and southeastern British Columbia. And there was the Otto Lang jag too, a dogleg off the westward line that nicely takes in a large chunk of the justice minister's riding.

The rules were simple. For a new plant or an expansion into a new product line, you could get up to 25 per cent of your capital costs plus up to \$5,000 for every job created. If you were just expanding your plant or modernizing it, you could get up to 20 per cent of the capital costs.

It was the civil servants — the minister in contentious cases — who would decide just how much of that largesse each company would get. Theoretically, a company would get more money if it was going into an area of very high unemployment or if its project would have a particularly significant impact on the economy of the area.

The government's other major thrust was wrapped up in the Special Areas program. Its job was to put money into infrastructure (which, as Harry Flemming of the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council said, "used to be known in some political circles as 'porkbarelling'"). The theory is that industry won't locate in an area because there aren't enough roads, sewers, water, homes for their workers, schools and hospitals. Put in the infrastructure, so the theory goes, and the depressed region will have a fighting chance to get new industry.

The two key divisions of DREE set up to handle these programs were the appropriately-named incentives division and the inappropriately-named planning division.

From the title of the planning section under Jack Francis, it looked as if the government might be committed to some kind of long-range strategy. That belief might even have been buttressed by another comment of Trudeau's in the Atlantic Advocate:

"We would invite waste and disillusionment if we rushed into (substantial programs) without careful planning, based on a broad strategy for achieving the greatest possible advance for the region as a whole. The planning and coordinating responsibilities of the new department are therefore essential to its success, and particularly so in the early years."

That statement was made early in 1969. Three years later, DREE's new deputy minister, Doug Love, finally added a new assistant deputy minister to the department to handle co-ordination. Lack of co-ordination had been a notable feature of the early years and Love's move was an admission that Kent had muffed it.



Not even Marchand ever said the problems facing Montreal in late 1970 were regional development problems.

# The manure theory rides triumphant

What about the "broad strategy" and the "careful planning"? The Atlantic Development Council's strategy was received unenthusiastically by the department. And the planning division has done little real planning. It has spent its time negotiating with the provinces, a process that turned into a tug-of-war for the boodle Ottawa was offering. The joint federal-provincial planning committees were little more than meeting grounds where the two sides could try to push through their pet ideas.

At one point, the Nova Scotia government released its plan to the press out of exasperation at Ottawa's intransigence. The tactic didn't work. Ottawa sniffed at the display poor form, you know, — and approved what it wanted to approve in the first place. Underlying the government's steps was the attitude that the provinces did lousy planning.

The result was that the focus of decision-making shifted to Ottawa. What Ottawa said, went. He who pays the piper and all that. There was some justification in DREE's attitude

to provincial plans; even more than Ottawa, the provinces think in short-run terms.

One reason for this is that the provinces are understandably skeptical of Ottawa's long-term commitment to regional development. As APEC said in its report on DREE, "It is little wonder that the provinces, the Atlantic Provinces in particular, regard DREE as a temporary cornucopia to be plucked as quickly as possible before Ottawa snatches it away."

Ottawa's approach is tailor-made for what Tom Kent now calls "the politicians of stagnation, whose entrepreneurship is so sharply concentrated on the arts of extracting money from Ottawa."

There is another element here too. The provinces cannot afford the high-priced talent to put together complex economic plans. One reason is that Ottawa hires a good portion of the small pool of Canadian regional development economists. Provinces have asked Ottawa for money to spend on beefing up their own planning groups. Ottawa has never liked this idea; it would, after all, cut into its own control of how the money was being spent.

Back in the mid-sixties, an experiment in planning was undertaken in Nova Scotia. It was called Voluntary Economic Planning, and it was a whole structure of planning committees responsible to the provincial government. At the top of the pyramid was a Voluntary Planning Board, and it received advice from a number of sector committees — one for tourism, one for fisheries, one for construction and so forth. Each sector committee had segment committees working under it: in fisheries, for example, the segment committees dealt with fresh and frozen fish; salt and pickled fish; lobsters; fish by-products; while one represented vessel owners and operators. Most of the committee members were businessmen, predictably enough, with trade unions, professional people, and civil servants represented in smaller

proportions.

Voluntary Planning's first plan, presented to the government in 1966, evolved from the bottom up; the Board estimated that about two thousand people were involved in some way in its preparation. The plan recommended much the same things on a provincial level as the APEC economists had been pushing for on a regional level: more secondary manufacturing, incentive grants, co-ordinated economic policies aimed at development. The planners had the ear of Finance and Economics Minister (and later Premier) Ike Smith, and many of their ideas were incorporated into government policy.

In 1969 the planning structure was revised and upgraded, largely with the aim of improving the government's ability to work with the newly-formed federal department of regional economic expansion. A cabinet secretariat on planning and programs was established, and Len Poetschke was brought in from Ottawa to head it.

But Tom Kent, who had made sure the Poetschke approach to planning was not implemented in Ottawa, had no interest in seeing it implemented in Nova Scotia. "Sources who have been close to him," Dulcie Conrad wrote in the Halifax weekly 4th Estate early in 1971, "have said Mr. Kent doesn't hold out any hope for bringing the Maritimes out of its economic disparity and if federal handouts .... will keep the people happy, so be it."

Besides, Poetschke had the audacity to criticize federal policies publicly.

Soon after the Liberal government was elected in Nova Scotia in October 1970, new Premier Gerald Regan, with encouragement from Kent, axed Poetschke and abolished the secretariat


Now the federal planners have a new toy. The Economic Council has developed a complex econometric model of the Canadian economy; DREE wants to regionalize the model and test out its plans in the computer before putting them

DREE's people talk in terms of the next two or three years for results to start emerging from this esoteric exercise. A more realistic time-span is fifteen years.

The incentives division under Assistant Deputy Minister Wally Lavigne has a more clear-cut mandate - spend money. More accurately, it is supposed to make commitments to spend money. When DREE decides to hand out an incentive, it makes an offer. Armed with that offer, the company is supposed to raise the actual cash itself to pay the bills to build a factory and buy equipment. The offer, of course, means the bank loans come easier. When the plant goes into production, DREE pays the firm 80 per cent of the grant and the company can pay off the loan. The other 20 per cent is paid later.

Incentive grants are based on the infant industry argument. Give a firm enough seed money to get going and it will be able to get over the hurdle of the first couple of years. Once it's on its feet, it can keep going on its own. Even in terms of pure economics, the economists will probably never decide on the merits of that argument. But they can agree on one thing. If you are going to hand out incentives you should give them to projects that are located in the selected growth centres - the Special Areas. The two policies should work together.

In DREE's case, that doesn't happen most of the time. Grants go to people who apply for them; it doesn't matter where they are going. So infrastructure money is used to build up Halifax and incentive grants go to firms locating in Amherst. The reason is mainly that the incentives division doesn't really give a damn about strategies or plans or goals for an area.



A wide swath of the country was made a designated region. Note the Otto Lang jag in Saskatchewan.

It is interested in one target, the money it is supposed to commit in each fiscal year. So the job is simple — shovel out the money and don't worry about what it does. The manure theory rides triumphant.

DREE's standard defence of its lack of visible success to date is a valid one. Unless there is rapid growth in the national economy, you cannot run a proper regional development program. If you want to spread around the benefits of new growth, you need new growth to spread around. And in the last few years, there has been little enough of that.

All this is true on the surface. But remember Trudeau's comment about "the central place that regional development occupies in our whole thinking"? If he meant it, then Trudeau embarked on his fruitless anti-inflation policy in the full knowledge that the lagging regions would be the first to get screwed and would be the hardest hit.

The failure of the government to take account of the regional effects of its national policies has been one of the most frequent points of attack on its regional development program. Nor is the critics' insight a new one: Professor

Thomas Wilson, in his report to the Atlantic provincial governments in 1964, said that "a necessary condition for reducing underemployment in the less prosperous areas is the successful adoption of policies for high employment in the country as a whole, even if such policies do not provide any benefits peculiar to these areas themselves."

The implication of the government's statements about a planned and co-ordinated approach to regional development was that it would tailor all its policies to regional needs. Fiscal and monetary policy, tariff policy, transportation policy all have considerable effects on regional economies. Conservative regional development critic Jim McGrath has pointed out that the government has introduced what are effectively regional trade policies designed to benefit southern Ontario — for example, the auto pact. Why not comparable arrangements for the Atlantic provinces?

In pursuing the devil inflation, Trudeau knew he was exacerbating a problem which he had said could destroy the unity of the country. It is easy to forget that he won the 1968 election as the national unity candidate.

# Did DREE give up on the East?

A major turning point in the history of DREE occurred on January 1, 1971 when amendments to the map of designated areas went into effect. Added were all previously undesignated parts of Quebec, along with the eastern tip of Ontario. To cushion the effect this would have on the Atlantic provinces, maximum grants for capital costs in the Atlantic region were raised to 35 from 25 per cent (a gain that was largely illusory, since almost all DREE grants are below the maximum).

Before the changes, 38.3 per cent of the money given in grants had gone to firms establishing in the province of Quebec, and 34.1 per cent had gone to the Atlantic provinces. After the changes, Quebec got 54.4 per cent, the Atlantic provinces 17.3.

\$34,752,000 in RDIA grants had gone to Quebec up until December 1970; from January 1971 to March 1972, it got \$82,637,000. The Atlantic provinces got \$30,913,000 up to December 1970, and \$26,357,000 from January 1971 to March 1972.

Quebec's share has increased steadily: it got 39.3 per cent in the first six months of 1971, 53.6 per cent in the last six months of that year, and fully 74.8 per cent in the first three months of 1972. Even when one very large grant (\$13,770,000 to International Telephone and Telegraph for a paper mill on the North Shore of the St. Lawrence) is discounted Quebec still got 61.9 per cent in those three months.

These proportions do not in themselves prove discrimination against the Atlantic provinces. But they do raise serious questions about the nature of the incentives program.

Of all the provinces, Quebec comes closest to reproducing in miniature the structure of the Canadian economy as a whole. Parts of it — the Gaspe and Lower St. Lawrence regions — are economically similar to the neighbouring Atlantic provinces. Along with the Atlantic region, eastern Quebec forms the severest challenge for any regional development policy in Canada.

On the other hand the Montreal area — the bulk of the new area designated in January 1971 — is as heavily industrialized as southern Ontario, although incomes in Montreal are lower. People from the outlying regions of Quebec pour into Montreal in search of jobs, just as Maritimers pour into Toronto and people from the prairies into Vancouver.

Not even Jean Marchand ever said that the problems facing Montreal in late 1970 were regional development problems. Rather, he has maintained it was a short-term unemployment problem caused by a lag in investment in the Montreal area. "If you study the economic evolution of Montreal in relation to Toronto, for example," he told Jim McGrath in the Commons Committee on Regional Development on April 27, 1972, "you see that for many years they were progressing at the same rate and now Montreal is going this way in relation to Toronto. So that is what we have tried to balance out now, and we have been successful."

Even granting Marchand his estimation of his success, and granting him his interpretation of the problem in Mont-

The figures in this article are based on department releases, and contain some inaccuracies. Deputy Minister Doug Love admitted to the Commons Standing Committee on Regional Development May 10 that the size of a grant was often revised after its initial announcement, and these revisions were not publicly reported — although he promised they would be in future. He said there had been 90 such cases, involving a total upward revision of \$7 million. The two specific cases he mentioned were a grant to McCain Foods in New Brunswick that had been increased from \$2.9 million to \$6.1 million, and one to Gaspe Copper Mines in Murdochville, Quebec, that had been increased from \$1.2 million to \$3.6 million.

real (others have suggested that the designation of Montreal and the Quebec crisis of October 1970 were not unrelated), it is still possible to ask whether DREE was the proper instrument to deal with that problem.

Marchand and departmental officials have always said DREE is not an anti-unemployment measure. They have emphasized the importance of looking at the long term. The use of development grants to deal with short-term problems in Montreal is in direct conflict with that, and the impact of the incentives program in the areas for which it was intended could not help but suffer.

The low proportion of grants going to the Atlantic provinces is matched by a low proportion of applications coming from there. From January 1971 to March 1972 there were 407 applications for RDIA grants to set up plants in the Atlantic provinces, or 15.7 per cent of the total across the country. Quebec had 2074 applications — 63.3 per cent of the total; of those, 1300 were for the newly-named region around Montreal.

One of the difficulties with a policy of grants to private corporations is that it forces the minister to be a "passive onlooker". He can only react to applications; he cannot

initiate projects. The success or failure of his policy ultimately depends on whether it fits in with what private corporations want to do, or, as economist Kari Levitt put it at a regional planning conference in Winnipeg last autumn, "the only serious planning that is done in Canada is done by large corporations."

And so if corporations want to get their grants in Montreal instead of in Moncton or Corner Brook there is little the department can do.

The facts are consistent with themselves. Since the designation of Montreal, 21.9 per cent of unemployed people living in designated areas are in the Atlantic provinces. The region has received 18.3 per cent of the grants by number, and 17.3 per cent by value. 15.7 per cent of the applications have come from there. The department has 14 officers specifically assigned to handling applications from the Atlantic region, as compared to 42 for Quebec. The only office for processing applications that the department maintains outside Ottawa is in Montreal.

The question is: what ever happened to the original intention of the program to attract industry to the Atlantic region? Has DREE given up on the Atlantic provinces?

# Patronage? Conflict of interest?

Other questions are being asked about the incentives program too

On March 1, John Burton (NDP—Regina East) demanded an emergency debate in the House of Commons on possible conflict of interest in DREE. The charge was based on the membership of the minister's advisory board, which includes several businessmen representing corporations that have received DREE grants.

One member of the board, Kendall Cork, is vice-president and treasurer of Noranda Mines Ltd., which has received a DREE grant of \$3,522,000, and whose subsidiary Gaspe Copper Mines Ltd. has received a grant of \$3,627,000. Another board member is Jack Estey, executive vice-president of National Sea Products Ltd., which has received three DREE grants totalling \$2,229,701. M. W. MacKenzie, retired chairman of the board of Chemcell Ltd., which has received grants totalling \$406,923, is also on the advisory board.

In the Regional Development Committe on April 27, Burton pressed the same line of attack. This time he brought up the case of George McClure, who joined DREE on February 24, 1969 and left the department on August 1, 1970 to accept an executive position with McCain Foods Ltd. In the time McClure was with DREE, three grants totalling \$7.1 million were made to McCain Foods.

The department replies that the advisory board is an advisory body only and makes no final decisions. Furthermore, its meetings are confidential so that we cannot know whether it discussed the grants in question, although Deputy Minister Doug Love told the Committee the board had never discussed the Gaspe Copper grant. As for McClure, Love said he was not in the incentives division but in operations east, which does not handle incentives, and an investigation had "failed to reveal any evidence that would

give rise to legitimate concern about conflict of interest.'

Wally Lavigne, assistant deputy minister for incentives, dismisses the suggestion that RDIA grants are used for patronage purposes of any kind with a contemptuous "horseshift"

But patronage and conflict of interest are matters of definition. Canadian Johns-Manville, Falconbridge Nickel, IBM, Union Carbide, Westinghouse, and the Steel Company of Canada were among the corporations represented at a major Liberal Party \$50-a-plate fundraising dinner in Toronto March 1. All have received DREE grants, ranging from \$126,000 for Stelco to \$6 million for IBM. Is that patronage? Or merely a perfectly normal coincidence?

Of course, corporations identified with the Conservative party have also received DREE grants, including Stanfield's Ltd., the opposition leader's family's underwear business in Truro. And the proposition that DREE has gone out of its way to favour specifically Liberal corporations would be impossible to prove.



Johns-Manville

Westinghouse


Were among the corporations represented at a major Liberal party fundraising dinner in Toronto March 1. Both have received DREE grants.

Perhaps the real point is not that there is conflict of interest between working for DREE and then going to work for McCain's, but rather that there is no conflict of interest - the interests are the same.

Another charge that has been levelled against the department is that it often doesn't create jobs, but at best moves them from one place to another. The Quebec Federation of Labour, in its report on DREE, cites several cases of recipients of DREE grants that had laid off workers - for example Bruck Mills Ltd., which received \$843,105 to create 140 jobs at its textile mills in Sherbrooke and Cowansville, Quebec, and laid off 95 workers at the Sherbrooke mill, or Swecan Saw, which received \$129,486 to create 48 jobs at its plant in Lanorie d'Autray and laid off 19 workers at the same plant.

The \$13-million-plus grant to ITT for a pulp-and-paper complex on the North Shore, coming at a time when Canadian International Paper was closing a paper mill at Temiscaming in northwestern Quebec throwing several hundred workers out of their jobs, was widely criticized. And so were grants to firms that closed down their southern Ontario operations to move into designated areas. Union Carbide received \$1.3 million to move from Welland, Ont. to Beauharnois, Quebec, while Aerovox Canada received \$235,000 to move from Hamilton to Amherst, N.S.

For these, too, the department has its reasons. The ITT complex and the CIP mill have nothing to do with each other, say departmental officials; besides, the pulpand-paper industry has to be rationalized and the closing of the obsolete, inefficient Temiscaming mill accompanied



Infrastructure: "used to be known in some political as 'porkbarreling' ".

by the construction of the modern, efficient ITT complex is an important step in that direction.

The companies that were subsidized to move from Ontario elsewhere often would have closed their Ontario operations anyway, according to the department. It was a question of getting them to establish somewhere in Canada or having them leave the country. Competition for foreign investment is keen, and other countries offer much more generous concessions than Canada. If we want to get our slice of the pie, we have to know how to play the game.

Or else we should be questioning whether we want to be in the game at all.

> 'The situation has really not changed'

"IBM needs a grant from the Canadian taxpayer," Kari Levitt told the Winnipeg planning conference, "like I don't know who needs what. The situation has certainly become quite, quite absurd."

The rationale for giving grants to small entrepreneurs, who are often blocked from starting new enterprises by a shortage of capital, is clear enough. But as the QFL pointed out, the challenge of regional development cannot be met by small enterprises.

What is the justification for giving grants to corporations like IBM, Michelin Tire, ITT, Westinghouse, and Procter & Gamble, which are not short of capital by any stretch of the imagination?

Let Jean Marchand explain:

"It's not a present that I'm giving. Because an enterprise, for example IBM, would prefer to be in Metropolitan Toronto or elsewhere, so I tell it: if you come establish yourself in Granby, I will compensate you for the economic disadvantages that that implies for the company; I won't give you a present; I will simply compensate you for the economic disadvantages."

Marchand has been consistent in citing this rationale for incentive grants. However, the grants are calculated not on the basis of economic disadvantage but on the basis of capital costs and jobs created. Economist Roy George of the University of Toronto has shown that in strict dollarsand-cents terms, there is no economic disadvantage to establishing a manufacturing plant in Nova Scotia rather than in Ontario: the higher cost of transportation is made up by lower labour costs. George attributes the absence of industry in Nova Scotia to lack of entrepreneurship; according

# TTT

Got \$13-million-plus for a pulp-and-paper complex on Quebec's North Shore, at a time when Canadian International Paper was closing a paper mill at Temiscaming, throwing several hundred workers out of iobs.

to Kari Levitt, there are many factors at work — for example, any manufacturer making a product that requires servicing will want to be close to where the product has to be serviced.

Wally Lavigne has said, "the grants are incentives: they are to incite firms to establish in a designated area," and this is perhaps closer to what they are all about. The government says in effect, 'If you don't want to go into a designated area, there's nothing we can do. If you do, we'll sweeten things a little by giving you some money.' The corporation says, 'Okay, if you give us two million we'll go. Now let's work that out in terms of numbers of jobs created and percentage of capital costs.'

One suggestion often made is that the government should buy equity in the companies it finances, instead of just giving them money; that it should keep some ownership and control. The NDP has repeatedly advanced the suggestion; Tory critic Jim McGrath sees some merit in it; privately, even some DREE officials agree.

"Under the Incentives Act, if the act is well implemented," Marchand told Arnold Peters (NDP — Timiskaming) in the Regional Development Committee, "I do not think we are justified in asking for that. If you want to invest in northern Ontario, you need a grant because you will be at a disadvantage in relation to your competitors, so you say, 'If you want me to go there, I need a grant of \$1 million; otherwise I will not be on an equal footing and I will not be able to compete.'

"If we think it is in the public interest to have your plant there, all we do is compensate you for a disadvantage that we impose on you in the name of the public interest. Why should we ask for shares? What would be the moral justification? You would say, 'All right. Keep your \$1 million and I will go elsewhere and be in a position to compete without your \$1 million.'"

"Except," replied Peters, "that the people should be protected in being able to say, 'You damn well do not operate with our resource unless you do this', and putting money in it should give us some equity in it."

One might well ask Marchand what the moral justification is in giving \$6 million to IBM.

In fact, the department is beginning to experiment with buying equity through its Newfoundland Development Corporation, just getting underway. In another experiment, its New Brunswick Multiplex Corporation is trying to attract a group of related industries to Saint John. Neither of these programs has been in existence long enough to evaluate them, but they appear to be signs that the department is having a few healthy doubts of its own about the crude giveaway approach to regional development.

Another often-heard suggestion is that the government should set up its own enterprises, that it should plan seriously, identify opportunities for industrial development, and go into them itself. Public ownership should be a major government instrument for economic growth instead of the last-resort measure to save doomed enterprises that it has tended to be in this country.

"That is something different," Marchand told Peters.
"There I would agree much more with you. Should we do more of this — to have a public corporation of our own instead of granting this \$1 million? There I would feel much more in agreement with you."

There is no sign that the minister's noble sentiments are about to become departmental policy.

Marchand says again and again that the gap between unemployment in the Atlantic provinces and unemployment in the country as a whole is closing, but the evidence is at best uncertain. In January 1969, just before DREE came into being, the difference was 4.2 per cent; in January 1970 it was 3.9 per cent; in January 1971 it had been reduced to 2.2 per cent (mostly as a result of an increase in unemployment in the rest of the country); and in January 1972 it was back up to 5.2 per cent. There were 493,000 more Canadians employed in January 1972 than there were in January 1969, but only 12,000 of those new jobs were in the Atlantic provinces.

"The situation has really not changed," Kari Levitt said in Winnipeg. "It has only become more absurd because there is a proliferation of both federal and provincial incentives. In this complete zero sum game, the only people who really benefit are the few scamps who operate in this administrative jungle and a number of large firms, or the shareholders of same, who locate in certain areas."

One effect of DREE may be to dispel a long-standing Canadian myth.

There has been a pronounced tendency among social-democrats and left-liberals in Canada to equate greater centralization with progress. Provincial governments are regarded as inherently backward and reactionary; the only hope for change lies in Ottawa. The Regina Manifesto is as centralist a document as has ever been produced in this country, and CCFers and New Democrats have remained faithful to that aspect of their original statement of principles, if not to others. It is only recently that some radicals, particularly in Quebec, have fought to take powers away from Ottawa rather than give more powers to it.

But in this army of centralizers one prominent Canadian political theorist always stood out as a dissenter.

"The first task of the socialist," wrote Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1961, "is to educate all of the people to demand maximum service from all of their governments . . . Most of the reforms that could come about through greater centralization could also follow from patient and painstaking co-operation between federal and provincial governments. And the remaining balance of economic advantage that might arise from forcefully transferring more power to the central government is easily offset by the political disadvantages of living under a paternalistic or bullying government."

Robert Chodos is a member of the Last Post editorial board. The Last Post thanks several people in professional positions where they cannot use their names.



# BEVIEW

# Buffalo jump

by CAROLE ORR

In March 1971, the Globe Theatre in Regina presented Carol Bolt's Next Year Country, a semi-review based on the story of the On-To-Ottawa trek of 1935. (I defy you to find this treated in any history text; Unequal Union awaits a sequel.) Now Toronto's Theatre Passe Muraille, persisting, has revived Next Year Country under the new title of Buffalo Jump.

When asked why she chose this particular subject, why she thought it important, Carol Bolt replied "It's a beautiful

story"

In that one remark resides most of the elements of the brilliant success of Buffalo Jump, as theatre, as tale, and

as a social and political document.

Too often, drama that takes a political line degenerates into litany, or worse, into an immodest diatribe that only antagonizes the audience. In the words of Paul Thompson, director of Buffalo Jump, "a play takes ideas as far as they

are theatrically viable".

George Ryga's Captives of the Faceless Drummer for instance, produced in both Vancouver and Toronto, suffered from simplistic treatment, bombast, and generally turgid arguments borrowed from the New Left and liberal sociology. This drama of the FLQ and surrounding phenomena had all the political clarity of the Toronto Star and the finesse of an Anacin commercial. George Ryga is capable of far better writing. He would do well to look to Carol Bolt for guidance in the political arena.

Instead of sermonizing, Buffalo Jump tells "a beautiful story" of the 1930s, of the men who left the 20-cents-a-day government relief camps in B.C. to stage protests in Vancouver, of Red Walsh and Arthur "Slim" Evans, who led them in their fight for work and wages, of the people who helped them, of the Mounties who fought them and framed them in the "Regina Riot" of 1935, and of R. B. Bennett himself. There are no inflammatory heroes, flags, or other handy cathertics. What symbolism there is is of the broad, extending Varroy, incorporated largely in John Boyle's remarkable sets for this particular production.

Thou, both Walsh and Evans were outstanding figures in the ebacle, Ms. Bolt ooses to show them as essential elements of a more complex heroic: the collective. It was

this approach that another Canadian playwright, Rick Salutin, was using in Fan Shen, the drama of one village during the Chinese Revolution, recently produced at Toronto Workshops. In Buffalo Jump, Walsh and Evans become Red Evans, who succeeds in being a believable character but at the same time not a predominant personality. Peter Boretski, who plays Evans, alternates in other roles (as do all the actors and actresses) notably that of Garth McRae, one of the men he leads. The men are portrayed with equal feeling, depth and wit. That is, all characters hover between two dimensions and three, moving easily from intense drama to farcical operetta to pantomime and back again. This review-style allows a remarkably seductive combination of humour and politics. We are, in the favourite old tradition of the theatre, entertained.

But if Buffalo Jump is not a lecture, neither is it a diversion. The conclusions are inescapable. R. B. Bennett opens with an election harangue promising a Better Day with Bennett in the 1920's. Next, in pantomime and chorus, the bare facts of the 1931 miner's strike in Estevan, which culminated in the shooting of Nick Nadwan, one of the miners, by the RCMP. We meet the Western farmers, the men who set off for Ottawa, the Mayor of Golden, Wilf Carter and the RCMP. None of the experience of such a thoroughgoing piece of theatre can be transposed here. (Would we stage

The Gutenberg Galaxy??)

This is essential. Many lamentable offerings of the theatre should have been short stories. Others should have been on the Op Ed page. Carol Bolt and Buffalo Jump affirm the unique potentialities of the theatre. Paul Thompson's production justifies the argument that Canadian theatres must offer an alternative not only to imported rubbish but to indigenous rubbish promoted by such radical conservatives as Gerard Pelletier, Pierre Berton, the CIC in general and governments in particular.

Buffalo Jump is an attack on these flabbies by its very existence. It is even more clearly a reasoned attack on their ancestors: Bennett, King and the entire tradition of rational schizophrenia upheld even to this day on The Hill. Theatres across the country should produce it.

# Sex and violence

father present some remarkable similarities. Both films are directed by fairly young film makers. Both are localized period pieces, immaculately detailed in their particular time and place. Both present phantasy worlds and then try to pass those worlds off as real saying "it might not have happened exactly like this, but it could have". Both films are to a large extent well made.

And both are huge financial successes. The Last Picture Show was one of 1972's biggest sellers and The Godfather is expected to be the biggest grossing film in history. Variety says that both films are instrumental in the current optimism that surrounds the film industry. Apparently the industry feels that film is going to regain its tarnished status as North America's number one entertainment - a title it presumably lost to bowling somewhere in the early sixties.

This latter point is interesting. The

The Last Picture Show and The God- Last Picture Show deals essentially with sexuality and The Godfather with violence. Until very recently, explicit sex and explicit violence were never considered subjects suitable for the purposes of entertainment. Certainly, they weren't considered suitable in the prebowling days.

Granted, such films as I Am Curious (Yellow) and Bonnie and Clyde drew large audiences. However, those audiences were specific. They were composed of the new American film intellectual who started to flourish in the mid-sixties, and those who enjoyed participating in the sensationalism of the controversy which censors and other like-minded souls were providing.

Up until the past year, sex and violence were considered either theses to be discussed or controversies to be exploited. Such is not the case with the sex of The Last Picture Show or the violence of The Godfather. These two films are considered entertainment. Their appeal is to all levels of North American society. They are "hits" in the old

fashioned sense of the word. People go to these films not because they are controversial or intellectually stimulating - although to a certain extent they are both of these - but because they are considered enjoyable, pleasant films to watch.

The Last Picture Show presents a montage of life in the small Texas town of Anarene circa 1952, as seen through the eyes of Sonny, a young man reaching what is conventionally called maturity. Director Bogdanovich delineates impeccably the preoccupation with hamburgers, the Korean war, football, cars, the ambition to make it, etc. However, the central metaphor which makes all these aspects sensible is sexuality. Sexuality is the symbol of the desperation and the void of rural America in The Last Picture Show.

The sexual experiences of Sonny and his fellow Anareneans are portraved in the most asensual of terms. Women close their eyes and wait passively to be subjected to the mechanics of "screwing". Men perform their footballconditioned rituals clinically.

Jacy, the hippest lady in town, manages to do numbers with Sonny, Sonny's best friend Duane, her mother's lover, and presumably Bobby Sheehan whose claim to "cocksmanship" is his swimming parties at which guests trench and initiates trench on the diving board. What? All of this she does with as much petulance as she can muster. But there is no passion. In all the sexual rites of The Last Picture Show there is not so much as a moan. The only passion associated with sex is the passion of a mother deranged by poverty and ignorance who wants the death of the preacher's son for having taken her five year old daughter for a drive. He made her take her pants off.

In fact, all the scenes that relate to sexuality are scenes not of happiness but of suffering. The only time we see Ruth Potter, the coach's wife, in bed with Sonny she is crying. Jacy's premeditated night of hymen sacrifice ends in Duane's impotence and her scorn. The saddest example of sex is the sacrifice of the simple minded Billy by his friends, drunk for desperation for a piece of ass, to the obese two dollar whore who bloodies his nose.

Trapped between the specious puritanism of conventional morality - "it's a sin" says Jacy to her 'itchy' mother - and the small town sadness which uses that morality to protect itself, people make love out of a sense of desperation. Love therefore is relegated to the illicit, the promiscuous, the utterly

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impersonal.

The essential thematic concern of *The Godfather* is violence; more specifically, and more significantly, the violence perpetrated by the corporate structure.

Director Coppola creates within the context of the ethnic group in order to make the point that violent action is inculcated by individuals who can be genuinely sympathetic. Violence is portrayed not as a result of a conspiracy of stereotyped evil men but as an inevitable fact of the corporation, the family, in its pursuit of power in a capitalistic society. The Corleone family is a quasipolitical structure composed of people who enjoy eating, drinking, partying etc. Violence is something that belongs exclusively to the pursuit of power. As Tessio, one of the godfather's chief assistants, says when he is being led to his execution for having conspired to assassinate Michael, "Tell Michael it was nothing personal, I always liked him, it was only business".

The Godfather, Brando, is much more the father than the butcher. His early epistles of terror are inspired by personal commitments which he takes upon himself on his daughter's wedding day. And these are fairly tame. He grants vengeance to the undertaker whose daughter has been assaulted. But he refuses to murder the assailants. He traumatizes the corrupt movie mogul without injuring him seriously, (presumably a man so callous as the film producer will get over finding himself in bed with a horse's head readily enough), in order that his godson be promoted to stardom.

Violence becomes brutal as it is defined in terms of the corporate structure. It is the means by which money is made and protected. On his return from Sicily, Michael explains to his future wife, Kay, that his father's family is soon to become a legitimate corporation. He correctly parallels the Corleone family with the conventional power structure.

The Last Picture Show and The Godfather then are concerned primarily with sex and violence. And both films are explicit. There is certainly enough pubic hair, breast, and blood to satisfy even the greatest pervert or sadist of say 1945 or 1952. How is it then that these two films are such financial successes? How is it that those same individuals raised in the forties and fifties, and who kept a stern eye on genitals and arteries in the sixties are waiting hours in line to enjoy that same thing which they once decried?

For one thing, film today invites a more liberal response. The recent recognition by younger people that film can be an art form just like the French say it is, has filtered through various social strata, and now even lawyers and their wives speak cogently enough of the great styles of Penn and Nichols at cocktail parties and bridge games, etc.

More importantly, the rash of sexploitation, and serious attempts at presenting some sort of honest look at the sexual experience on film have had their effect in dissolving the public's fleecied moral fibre. The same argument applies to violence.

However, the most important factor that allows the sex of The Last Picture Show and the violence of The Godfather their entertainment value exists within the two films themselves. The outstanding quality of nostalgia is innocence. Nostalgia, like pleasant memory, cannot be subjected to the changes and vicissitudes that are present in our dayto-day realities. The nostalgic past is a safe place, an innocent place, a release, an escape from the humdrum of contemporary life. The Last Picture Show and The Godfather are as nostalgic as the Sears Roebuck catalogue. Sex and violence are made safe, entertaining subjects by submerging them in the innocence that is inherent in that nostalgia.

One of the main concerns of The Last Picture Show is the coming of age of Sonny. As we see him progress from football season to football season he witnessess and suffers himself a series of experiences which should make him a man. As such, the film should show the poignancy of innocence lost. I say should because it never does. The film remains innocent throughout. "Nothing's really been the same since Sam the Lion died" says Sonny. But what isn't the same except the fact of Sam's death and the other facts of dayto-day life in Anarene? Sonny makes no moral change. There is no indication that at the film's end he has evaluated his experience. The film, innocent at the beginning, is innocent at the end. And there is nothing more pleasant to watch than happy endings, or to be fair in this case, not unhappy endings. Just like they used to make them in the good old days.

The Godfather too is made palatable by nostalgia. The sheer immensity of the film recalls an era when Hollywood was producing its happy climaxed entertainment. The film has all the things that made a movie successful in those good old days: a big budget — six mill-

ion dollars — and a huge star, Marlon Brando. The hype concerning Brando in fact correctly draws back upon old memories: critics say it's his greatest role since Streetcar Named Desire.

The film even has an old time production set-up. If you noticed, the list of credits runs a full ten minutes. This is because director Coppola was not allowed to handle personally what every other director considers his undeniable right. There are individual casting agents, individual set designers, separate people for choosing locations, etc. Just like the good old days the director is forced to take a back seat to the producer and the studio in determining how the film is to be made.

So The Last Picture Show and The Godfather appeal to mass audiences, a large chunk of which long for them good old days. Ironically, them good old days were days in which sex and violence were discreetly confined to marriage and war. The Last Picture Show and The Godfather are huge financial successes because they evoke an atmosphere which recalls an era in which the very subjects with which these films concern themselves were not present.

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# Dear Last Post:

My heartiest congratulations on super-gossip Claude Balloune's new co' umn, LAST PSSST. He seems to be hurling the dung in all directions with equal intensity and, one hopes (I suppose) accuracy. Your magazine is one of the only left-wing journals with the imagination to vary its diet occasionally ... and Balloune is the best innovation to date. I particularly appreciate his expose of our ever-so-precious media and its bagatelle of pundits (re: Peter C. Newman, Montreal Star, etc.) Balloune may be the only one with integrity left - and I'll be interested to see if the rest can take it as feebly as they dish it out. Now that the Balloune's Gone Up, let's hope the Last Post keeps it there

David Humphrey Montreal

# Dear Last Post:

The review of Vallières' switch to the Parti Québécois in your May issue is dishonest. Nowhere does Nick Auf der Maur indicate his own position — does he think Vallières has sold out, does he believe in supporting the PQ at this time? Surely it is wrong to be a serious reporter but a political dilettante. Auf der Maur must have a position. Analysing the article, I think it probable that Auf der Maur's position is closer to Gagnon's than Vallières', but this is based only on subtleties.

Elsewhere in the issue your reviewer quotes Marx: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." Believing that, one would have to take a stand publicly on important issues in one's own country. Neither Nick Auf der Maur, nor Last Post, seems to have decided.

Last Post, in least in Toronto, appears even in suburban variety stores,

indicating a readership far beyond that of Canadian Dimension, Ramparts, or other comparable journals. This increases the responsibility for Last Post to cease waffling.

Vallières has never had a proworking class philosophy, neither when he supported indiscriminate terrorism, nor when he wrote his racist books, nor when he switched to supporting a bourgeois party. The PQ is not even antiimperialist in a bourgeois sense since it wants to attract more U.S. investors. Supporting the PQ is counterrevolutionary ... Agree or disagree?

Kevin Henley Toronto

# **Dear Last Post:**

I was looking forward to a good, insightful story on the CBC strike in your recent issue. Instead I found a full page ad on the back cover placed by the management of CBC. What the hell?

Simone Barsinister Balfour, B.C.

### **Dear Last Post:**

Donald Livingstone, at the beginning of his review of two books about work, said, "We all work; we get up in the morning and shave and ..." But what about the more than 30 per cent of the labour force that do not shave before going to work? The rest of the review provides more of the same: "It's a man's work ...", "A man who has less is less of a man in a class society where a 'man' is defined ...", "Decisions which affect the very centre of our lives and the meaning of our manhood ..." I am shocked to find such rampant male chauvinism in the Last Post. I showed the review to one of my sisters without telling her what magazine it was in: her comment was, "Not bad for a reactionary magazine." But the Last Post should be a lot better than a "reactionary magazine". I started reading the review in hopes of finding some useful information and ideas for the Working Women's Committee of Saskatoon Women's Liberation, and instead I found a disgusting display of male chauvinism.

Women form one third of the labour force — there were 2,032,000 working women in 1967. Work is just as oppressive to a woman as to a man, if not more so because of the heavy burden of discrimination on the basis of sex. True workers' control can never be achieved without the full participation of women. Women sparked the Russian Revolution in March, 1917. (The women at the Pudilov factory in Petrograd walked out when the Tsarist regime tried to prevent them from celebrating

International Women's Day — and incited a general strike which became the revolution.) And we women plan to be in the forefront when Canadian labour achieves workers' control — in spite of male chauvinists such as Donald Livingstone.

I am renewing my subscription to the Last Post in the belief that this will never be allowed to happen again. Should it happen again—well, I'm sure you remember what was done to the Ladies Home Journal.

Halina Zaleski

# **Dear Last Post:**

I have just received Vol. 2, No. 5 of Last Post and find Nick Auf der Maur's article on Vallières, "The long road to Mont Laurier" distressing on several counts.

Firstly, why was it written? That's the most general question so I'll start there. The article says nothing. The fact that Vallières exists and has done what he has done does not merit five pages of regurgitated, out-line form history of the Québécois movement (a task already excellently done in Vol. 1 No. 1). We are not told anything about Valliéres himself and the reasons for his shift into electoral politics still remain mystified. The article might have dealt with many of his personal and political considerations for doing what he did. The second last paragraph contains the only new insight in micro-politics (the personal) with Vallières stating his coming to grips to male chauvinism. How did he do it? Is this something new in the consciousness of women and men in Quebec?

These considerations are glossed over in a journalese which maintains itself in glib fashion throughout the article. This leads to my second question or criticism. Why was the form in which the article written glib and condescending? Lines like "often confused, sometimes aberrant, and occasionally rational history of the recent growth of the radical left in Quebec in the past decade" are pointless and serve only to further anglophonic racism with the image of crazy bomb-throwing bearded Québécois. In fact the whole piece reminded me of (not quite but close) a liberal article in MacLean's.

In short, the article struck me as being politically beside the point. It is distinctly out of tune with the quality of writing and information usually contained in Last Post. I hope that such incidences of flip, non-analytic journalism disappear from the pages of Last Post altogether. We don't have time for it.

Yours in continuing solidarity,
Dick Betts
Vancouver

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